DETERRENCE IN TRANSITION: FROM NUCLEAR SHADOWS TO TECHNO-DETERRENCE ACROSS LAND AND SEA

Abstract

This paper examines the evolving dynamics of cross-domain deterrence between Pakistan and India, focusing on how nuclear, conventional, and maritime capabilities intersect to shape South Asia’s security environment. Between 2014 and 2025, both countries have sought to project strength not only through nuclear signalling but also through conventional force modernisation and an increased emphasis on naval power in the Indian Ocean. These overlapping domains of deterrence influence how each side perceives threats, makes decisions, and responds during moments of tension. The Pahalgam episode, marked by sharpened rhetoric and heightened alert statuses, serves as a revealing case of how crises in South Asia can quickly spill across multiple domains, creating uncertainty and heightening the risk of miscalculation. The growing prominence of naval power, in particular, highlights how sea-based deterrence and maritime competition are adding new layers to the traditional nuclear equation between Pakistan and India. By drawing attention to the human and political dimensions of deterrence, the paper argues that South Asian stability cannot be understood solely in terms of nuclear balances. Instead, it requires recognising how military postures, leadership choices, and perceptions across different domains collectively shape crisis outcomes and long-term defence policies.