

TERRORISM: DYNAMICS OF THE NEW WAVE

Dr. Noman Omar Sattar

Introduction

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, and has existed since ancient times. It came into the limelight after the terrorist attacks of September 11, and the ensuing War on Terrorism (WoT). Most of the current discourse of/about terrorism is based on these related developments—September 11 attacks and WoT. Terrorism has been viewed in different dimensions, and given different meanings, depending on the perspective. It is a cliché to say that there is no universal definition of terrorism, but definitions abound. A better understanding of the phenomenon calls for clarity of the perspective, whether it is addressed as a new form of conflict, or a religious war, or a freedom struggle. This article contends that while ‘terrorism’ has been associated with freedom struggle in the recent past, and could be related to religious war in the distant past, today it can be viewed as a non-traditional form of conflict--a conflict between a state and a non-state actor. It is not meant to unravel the causes of terrorism, or to explain its types but to understand and explain its contemporary manifestation/s, in order to understand its role in world politics and impact on the security discourse. As a new form of non-traditional conflict, terrorism baffles policymakers and academics alike. Today, terrorism can be viewed in a pre- and post-9/11 perspective. In this article, it is viewed in the post-9/11 perspective, as a new wave sweeping across the world, having complex dynamics. It is hoped that the lessons learnt by understanding these dynamics can help in addressing the problem in both the local and global context.

Defining Terrorism

Post-9/11 era has seen hectic efforts on the part of the academic and political communities to understand and define terrorism. As part of these efforts, research under the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) has led to studies offering new insights; while databases,

such as Global Terrorism Database (GTD), have compiled information on around 70,000 domestic and international terrorist events. These studies have broadened the scope of terrorism discourse, linking it with aspects such as political ethics, libertarian beliefs, religious extremism, as well as deterrence.

It has been aptly said that terrorism is better understood as seen than as it is defined. Thus it is pertinent to explain the phenomenon before it is defined. Terrorism can be viewed as

- A non-traditional form of conflict.
- A mode of violent protest.
- A political message through a violent act.
- A violent act symbolizing a struggle.

From the above, the following characteristics can be inferred:

- Terrorism is a politically inspired act.
- It involves violence or threat of violence.
- It has symbolic significance.
- It is a fight and struggle against a stronger opponent, or enemy.

GTD is based on a definition of terrorism that is used by many open source databases, that defines terrorism as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation;¹ this seems to be a compact definition.

Andrew Sinclair gives the following 10 principles of terrorism:²

- Warfare by extreme means.
- Lifeblood of tyranny.
- Weapon of outlaw against oppressor.
- Murder on the cheap.
- Lash on the back of the refugee.
- Victory by stealth for the few.

- Defeat by cowardice for the crowd.
- We become terrible to those who make us fear.
- Measured by scale of victims, not merit of cause.
- Tolerance of terror is no virtue.

The above gives an idea of the varying perspectives, and how these differ. It is pertinent to ask whether terrorism is a political strategy or a war strategy? Is it a war of attrition or a violent protest? Or it is all of the above? Often it is a confrontation between a state and a non-state actor, at least in its current manifestation; today it is a political and a war strategy, as well as violent protest. It could be viewed in two related dimensions: in a personal dimension, it reflects personal disillusionment and moral outrage; in its public dimension, it is a potent political message (also caused by disillusionment). What is common to both is the template of a violent act. While the latter is exemplified by terrorist acts against the US, the former can be explained by the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by Mohammad Bouyeri in 2004 to express outrage at the filmmaker's anti-Islam movie, *Submission*. There are many other such cases of "self-recruited leaderless jihad" from Europe.³

So how to address (and understand) terrorism? Can it be viewed as "a collective rationality?"⁴ Is it clash or contrast between modernity and primitivism, or simply a post-modern phenomenon?⁵ Freedman views it as new type of war, also viewing it as a combination "of modern and primitive forms of warfare."⁶ Terrorism, post-9/11, has been termed New Terrorism, also, 'modern Islamic Terrorism,'⁷ representing a paradigm shift within the discourse of terrorism. Could it be better understood exclusively in a theological context, symbolizing a religious-or civilizational-war? (many do see terrorism in this perspective, taking US-led WoT as 'war against Islam.') Samuel Huntington had highlighted this particular aspect when he wrote about and referred to a "clash of civilizations" in his celebrated article that stirred so much controversy.⁸ One can only speculate if he could foresee a civilizational clash in the early 90s. In the wake of 9/11 attacks, President Bush picked up this theme soon after the 9/11 attacks,

when in an address to Congress, he said, “This is the world’s fight. This is the civilization’s fight.”⁹

In simple words, terrorism can be seen as use of indiscriminate violence for political ends. The simple definition could be elaborated as an act of violence targeting non-combatants for political aims. A more refined definition reads as follows: a willful act of extreme violence targeting civilians but aimed at an avowed enemy. The definition is conditioned by the perspective—US, UN, western, Muslim. Whatever the “perspective,” the “objectives” remain the same, death and destruction, political chaos and violence. These are the short-term objectives; the long-term objectives include political change, an ideal world or system, for instance, desire for an Islamic Caliphate. (The current wave of deadly terrorist attacks in Pakistan underscores this point.)

In the words of Freedman, ‘terrorism is normally considered to be a coercive mechanism, part of a guerrilla strategy, in that actions create threats of worse to come if political demands are not met ...’¹⁰ Hoffman focuses on violence alone, “terrorism is as much about the threat of violence as the violent act itself.”¹¹

Richardson explains the phenomenon in a more elaborate fashion:

Terrorists are substate actors who violently target noncombatants to communicate a political message to a third party. Terrorists are neither crazy nor amoral. They come from all parts of the world. They come from all walks of life. They fight for a range of different causes... They come from all religious traditions and from none. One thing they do have in common: they are weaker than those who they oppose.¹²

Each definition focuses on and highlights specific aspects, and ignores others, depending on the perspective. An important and controversial aspect of terrorism is “state terrorism,” that in itself is controversial. In recent years, it has been overshadowed by the rise in religion-inspired militancy (that is not being discussed in this article).

What is Terrorism?

An understanding of terrorism also calls for taking into consideration the historical context. All accounts and discussions of terrorism refer to its past manifestations. In *An Anatomy of Terror*, Andrew Sinclair traces the phenomenon through history in its varied manifestations.¹³ Among the well-known are: Sicarii or Zealots, who fought against Roman rule in Palestine; the Assassins, who represented a fanatic Islamic sect in the Middle East, who earned reputation as a gang of organized killers (Assassins); Thugs, gangs of highway robbers/killers, active in India till the 19th century; Ku Klux Klan, gangs of white racists who targeted the blacks in post-civil war America. In the modern times, politically motivated gangs and groups have proliferated cutting across national and geographic boundaries--IRA in UK, PLO, Hamas and Irgun in Palestine, PKK in Turkey, LTTE in Sri Lanka, Abu Sayyaf Group in Philippines, FARC in Colombia, FALN in Venezuela, MIRC in Chile, Shining Path in Peru, and ERP in Argentina, all earned reputation for fighting the state or targeting their opponents and enemies for extortion, and carrying out extermination with a political message.¹⁴ Other outfits in the western countries, Red Brigade in Italy, Red Army in Germany, and Red Army in Japan also make the list of radical/revolutionary movements with a political agenda. While most of the above have been local in terms of their operation, the current wave is global in terms of operations, and has a manifest anti-US, anti-west bias.

Thus terror and terrorist are not new in history or society; they present and represent a wide array and cross-section in their evolution. Jacobin terror in France, Final Solution of Hitler, purges of Stalin, killing fields of Cambodia, My Lai massacre in Vietnam, and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans reflect the myriad forms of terrorism in individual and collective capacity in the past; these cases are generally not referred to in current terrorism discourse.

Bruce Hoffman traces modern terrorism to the late 1960s, to the hijacking of an El Al flight from Rome to Tel Aviv in 1968, by three Palestinians belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). This had a clear political message: to swap the

passengers for Palestinian prisoners;¹⁵ this was followed by a wave of hijackings. Historically, “political message” has included struggle for independence, as in America, India and South Africa, giving birth to the trite phrase: one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. Many dispute that a terrorist can pass as a freedom fighter. The distinction between a freedom fighter and terrorist is tricky and acrimonious. PLO leader and President of Palestine Yasser Arafat thus tried to make the distinction:

The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonists cannot possibly be called terrorist...As to those who fight against the just causes, those who wage war to occupy, colonize and oppress other people, those are the terrorists.¹⁶

Arafat’s distinction is understandable, and makes sense. This distinction helped him overcome the stigma of “terrorism” after a long diplomatic struggle, till he became the president of Palestine. But the distinction bin Laden makes is problematic, drawing a murky line between good and bad terrorism:

Terrorism can be commendable and terrorism can be reprehensible. Terrifying an innocent person and terrorizing them is objectionable and unjust, also unjustly terrorizing people is not right...The terrorism we practice is of the commendable kind for it is directed at the tyrants and the aggressors and the enemies of Allah, the tyrants, the traitors who commit acts of treason against their own countries and their own faith and their own prophet and their own nation. *Terrorizing those and punishing them are necessary measures to straighten things and to make them right.*¹⁷ (emphasis added)

The above statement by bin Laden professes his worldview as well as the agenda and goals of al-Qaeda. Ostensibly, the agenda is global and transnational, thus many view bin Laden as not being conservative or orthodox. Others could point to his culpability in the

9/11 attacks referring to his two *fatwas* against the US, in 1996 and 1998, and in light of the above statement.

It is worth noting that today's terrorist—the “new terrorist”—is mostly not fighting for freedom. Many national leaders have advocated the use of force to further their personal or state's narrowly defined goals. As Richardson puts it: “So a terrorist is neither a freedom fighter nor a guerrilla. A terrorist is a terrorist, no matter whether or not you like the goal s/he is trying to achieve, no matter whether or not you like the government s/he is trying to change.”¹⁸

The above discussion leads to the following postulates:

- The terrorist/s has/have serious grievance (carried from the past) that they share with the community; they not only want to share it, but want to impose it on all members of the community.
- Today's globalized world has made the job of recruitment and training much easier.
- Easy access to technology has solved the problem of communication as well as causing physical harm and destruction.
- Today's terrorism thrives on media coverage and attention.
- Terrorism emphasizes the role of non-state actors, who have a global reach, and a global agenda; thus terrorism has become truly transnational and globalized.
- It is the means not the ends that determine a terrorist act.
- Terrorism works, especially for the weak

It is said that the terrorists have truly reaped the benefits of globalization, in terms of openness of communities and communications, and access to such channels. This has facilitated them in pushing their agenda through networking, communication and deft use of technology. Gunaratna has aptly observed.

In the post-Cold War era, the transnational character of these terrorist groups has necessarily brought forth certain advantages, viz., global networking with potential allies, arms suppliers, and other terrorist groups, as also the generation of transnational support. Instead of resisting globalization, consequently, contemporary terrorist groups are actively harnessing contemporary forces of change.¹⁹

It is interesting to note that terrorism is practiced by the Right and the Left, with varying objectives and justifications. Two sets of variables are important to consider, the means and ends, and the nature of goals and how these are justified. These could be couched in political rhetoric or religious edicts.

In the recent past, terrorist was mostly a single person, a hijacker, or a kidnapper, an extortionist, or executioner. 9/11 brought a shift in this image, as the pictures of 19 hijackers flashed in the media in the days and months to come. They were all young men, and hailed from different parts of the Middle East; they represented a new generation of terrorists, as they did, a brand of terror. In Sageman's classification, these terrorists constituted the 'third wave' of radicals to be stirred by the ideology of global jihad.²⁰ The first wave comprised the Afghan Arabs who came to Pakistan and Afghanistan to fight the Soviets in the 1980s, and popularized the idea of *jihad*. The second wave comprised elite expatriates from the Middle East who went to the west to study at universities; these young men joined al-Qaeda's training camps in Afghanistan in the 1990s. The third wave consists

...mostly of would-be terrorists, who, angered by the invasion of Iraq, aspire to join the movement and the men they hail as heroes. But it is nearly impossible for them to link up with al Qaeda central which was forced underground after 9/11. Instead, they form fluid, informal networks that are self-financed and self-trained. They have no physical headquarters or sanctuary, but the tolerant, virtual environment of the Internet offers them a semblance of unity and purpose. Theirs is a scattered, decentralized social structure—a leaderless jihad.²¹

Those who fit in this category include Mohammad Bouyeri, the murderer of Dutch filmmaker, Omar Sheikh, kidnapper and murderer of American journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan, and other wannabees, on both sides of the Atlantic, keen to play a role, and make a contribution in a global jihad against the West—not just the US. It is from this generation that recruitment is taking place in Europe, and that poses a threat in the future. These people belong to normal, often affluent families, are active members of the community they belong to, and are ticking time bombs.

Two peculiarities (and contradictions) of modern terrorism are worth noting. First, while a terrorist act does not bring the terrorists closer to their goal, they remain defiant, irrespective of success or failure; they rather deflect the blame on the other-- the enemy. Ramzi Yousaf during his trial in the US stated: “I support terrorism as long as it is used against the United States and Israel...You are more than terrorists. You are butchers, liars and hypocrites.”²² Second, the change they plan to effect through a terrorist act usually pushes their goal further away. Attacks in New York and Washington led to a war on terrorism, with the al-Qaeda on the run, as Bush promised. The same is the case with the extremists’ goals in Pakistan. Military offensive in Swat reclaimed the area from their control; the ongoing operation in south Waziristan has the same goal, prompting violent terrorist acts wherever they can in pursuance of their cause.

Religious Dimension

The term ‘religious terrorism’ is an oxymoron; religion and terrorism do not mix. Yet, religion gives an extraordinary dimension to terrorism; this became more pronounced after 9/11. While many scholars picked this theme and explained terrorism in its religious context/dimension, Mark Juergensmeyer gave it classic expression after the end of the cold war—before the religious dimension became popular in the wake of 9/11 attacks. In *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*, he writes:

Even ordinary religion contains strands of violence. Some of the world’s most significant religious symbols are stained with

blood. The savage martyrdom of Husain in Shi'ite Islam, the crucifixion of Christ in Christianity, the sacrifices of Guru Tegh Bahadur in Sikhism, the bloody conquests detailed in the Hebrew Bible, the terrible battles celebrated in the Hindu epics, and the religious wars described in the Sinhalese Buddhist Pali chronicles—all these events indicate that in virtually every religious tradition images of violence occupy a central place.²³

It is apt to say that more than providing reason, religion provides a justification for terrorism. In countries and areas where the political system was atrophied and the political process derailed, this phenomenon was linked with radicalization of politics, as in Lebanon and Afghanistan, and Palestine. End of the cold war, globalization and American hegemony coalesced to push the phenomenon across borders, in an anti-US strain.

Relationship between terrorism and religion is difficult to define, more so to sustain. It is easier to understand this phenomenon in the context of power or lack of it. In the words of Juergensmeyer, "...terrorism can give religion power as well. Although sporadic acts of terrorism do not lead to the establishment of new religious states, they make the political potency of religious ideology impossible to ignore."²⁴ Thus religious justifications provide a noble, almost unquestionable motive to a violent, inhuman act. In its recent invocation, Islamic edicts have been callously invoked to justify terrorist acts. After the terrorist acts of 9/11, a frequent question was not just "why would anyone want to do such a thing?" it was also, "why would anyone want to do such a thing in the name of God?"²⁵ Terrorist attacks in the mosques in Pakistan, targeting the worshippers, underscore this point.

This empowerment achieved through religious violence is important for those who have been denied power, or have been marginalized, and have never tasted power. Taliban provide a good example in the case of Afghanistan. They became prominent during the days of the civil war among the *mujahedin* groups and warlords following the Soviet withdrawal. As they captured more territory, dispensed justice, and brought a semblance of order to the war-torn country, they tasted power, and enforced their version of Islamic

Sharia. They formed the Afghan government, for whatever it was worth, carried its external relations, howsoever limited, including meetings with US officials and representatives of oil companies, UNOCAL and Bidas to discuss oil concessions.²⁶ This taste of power and religion-inspired self-righteousness led them to defy the world community (over the issue of destroying Buddha's statues at Bamiyan), rebuff the US over its call to hand over bin Laden after 9/11 attacks, and ignore its patron, Pakistan—that was empowerment. Role of Hamas in Palestine politics also illustrates the same point. Hamas' evolution is also a story of violent acts leading to empowerment.

Radical religious movements believing in and practicing violence have the following in common:²⁷

- They reject the compromises with liberal values and secular institutions that most mainstream religion has made....
- They refuse to observe the boundaries that secular society has set around religion.
- They try to create a new form of religiosity that rejects what they regard as weak, modern substitutes for the more vibrant and demanding forms of religion....

Thus for the radical religious movements, the term secular is a profanity, and they target secular modernism. Anything not religious is secular, and anything secular is profane and un-Islamic. (While India remains predominantly religious and Hindu, most Pakistanis question India's secular credentials, and view secularism as irreligious.) That is the problem being faced by the new generation of Islamists in Europe, how to mix religion (practice in public) with their secular environment? Their lifestyle is a dangerous mix of modernity and religiosity, the extremist versions posing a threat to society.

Such Islamic radicals profess democratic leanings, but believe in authoritarianism, and do not allow dissidence (or

dialogue); they have been termed “Islamofascists.” It has been noted that the

Islamofascists are the most prominent of these groups and, perhaps, the most ruthless and unpleasant—not because of any features specific to Islam as a religion, but because of the particular conditions to be found within the so-called world of Islam; in particular the failure of any state or society with a majority of Islamic population to offer a convincing, non-fundamentalist model of modernity.²⁸

The religious aspect of terrorism became more pronounced as terrorist acts continued in response to WoT, echoing anti-US sentiments. This became an almost universal protest movement, marking protest against US wars, and presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, and its pro-Israel policy in the Middle East. Jessica Stern aptly observes, “The religious terrorists we face are fighting us on every level –militarily, economically, psychologically, and spiritually. Their military weapons are powerful, but spiritual dread is the most dangerous weapon in their arsenal. Perhaps the most truly evil aspect of religious terrorism is that it aims at destroying moral distinctions themselves.”²⁹

Post-9/11 Context: War against Terrorism

The terrorist attacks of September 11, targeting the Twin Towers in New York, and Pentagon in Washington, DC, gave a new meaning to terrorism and a new face to the terrorist. Apart from the fact that all 19 of the 9/11 terrorists were Muslims, Muslims were either involved or implicated in subsequent terrorist acts in different parts of the world, from Bali to Barcelona (while many were preempted). The terrorist was no more faceless, his face covered by a hood or a scarf, someone looking and behaving sinister, as members of Red Brigade, Baader Meinhof, or Al-Fatah. The new generation of ‘terrorists’ was represented by regular people, young, educated and urbanized; they were, to borrow pop culture terms, “young and restless,” and “rebels with a cause.’

9/11 has mostly been described in cliches as an event that changed the world, changed the way the world looked at security. Interestingly, in this case, hindsight is more disturbing than benefiting: seven months before the 9/11 attacks, *Newsweek* ran a cover story titled “Terror goes Global.” Under the story, “Danger: Terror Ahead,” the correspondents explained bin Laden’s global network, spanning different continents.³⁰ Under another story, “A Spreading Islamic Fire,” the correspondents wrote, “But bin Laden operates more like a venture capitalist than a conquering general. Think of it as Jihad Inc., together with its subsidiary, Jihad.com. How powerful has this multinational force become?”³¹ This was to be known to the world in just seven months, in the most violent manifestation of terrorism the world had ever seen.

Richardson poignantly observes if we want to understand what changed on 9/11, we must first understand what happened before. Terrorism is not new, and it is not a modern phenomenon; examples go back at least as far as the first century after Christ. Terrorism is not now, and never has been, the sole preserve of Islam; the examples that follow are drawn from four religions and none, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Christianity, and atheism.³²

In 2004, US State Department prepared a list of seventy-four terrorist groups; thirty-seven of these were Islamist groups, more active than the rest.³³

In the September 11 attacks, the US had been the primary target and suffered grievous loss in terms of human and material cost; thus it led the world in response that had the following elements:

- Punishing (the Taliban in) Afghanistan, for harboring bin Laden and al Qaeda.
- Removing the Taliban government.
- Military presence in Afghanistan to fight and exterminate the al-Qaeda.
- Engaging Pakistan to help fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Thus started the War on Terrorism, later incorporated into the 2002 National Security Strategy of the Bush Administration. The war in Afghanistan in October 2001 was just a beginning, and became a war that was not going to end soon. The end of the Taliban government was the beginning of problems for the US as it became the main target of the al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The Taliban resurfaced in Afghanistan, and developed its Pakistan counterpart, *Tehrik Taliban Pakistan* that unleashed a reign of terror on the Pakistanis for Islamabad's support for the US WoT. (Many in Pakistan make a distinction between the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, or the good and bad Taliban). After a spate of deadly attacks in Peshawar, *TIME* commented:

For seemingly forever, Pakistan has been a state failing in myriad ways. Yet even by its treacherous standards, what has occurred over a very bloody recent week is depressing. Bombs in bazaars, assaults on the army—whether you are protected (soldiers) or not (shoppers), the militants are declaring, We can get at you. It's as if the country is becoming the hell Iraq was at its worst.³⁴

As the new US administration under President Barack Obama mulls its Afghanistan policy, and as he continues his support for Pakistan in WoT, the problem of terrorism is far from being resolved. Terrorist threat to the US might have receded but its ally Pakistan is at the receiving end. In the month of October, more than 300 lives were lost in a surge of terrorist attacks in its capital Islamabad and Peshawar and its environs, as its armed forces set about fighting the extremists in South Waziristan, the turbulent bastion of Pakistan based Taliban; as the year ended, the military operation continued.

President Bush declared WoT to respond to the 9/11 attacks, and vowed to hunt down and eliminate al-Qaeda. US-backed coalition was able to remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, but it got bogged down in Afghanistan's treacherous mountains in its hunt for the Taliban and al-Qaeda leadership. Eight years on, there is no sight of bin Laden, and no sight of the end of this war. Surely the US policymakers have a better understanding of terrorism and the terrorist threat, but their war strategy has yet to

work in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The enemy remains faceless and elusive as the US struggles to grapple with the challenges of terrorism, in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and wherever its interests lie across the globe.

Conclusion

When the history of the immediate post-9/11 years comes to be written, it will be seen as a period marked by two major mistakes and two major missed opportunities. The mistakes were a declaration of war against terrorism and the conflation of the threat from al-Qaeda with the threat from Saddam Hussain. The missed opportunities were the opportunities to educate the American public to the realities of terrorism and to the costs of our sole superpower status and the opportunity to mobilize the international community behind us in a transnational campaign against transnational terrorists.³⁵

One might disagree with the above comment by Richardson—Americans were educated to the realities of terrorism, perhaps for the first time after 9/11, and Washington successfully mobilized an international coalition for attacking Afghanistan, and in fighting the War on Terrorism. Nevertheless, Richardson's views point to many stark realities: that 9/11 has been marked by mistakes and missed opportunities; that the new face of terrorism has an indelible 9/11 link; and the predominant American role in fighting terrorism. The US charts the course and calls the shots in the War on Terrorism, and is the only country to have the political will and the resources to pursue this war. As the major victim of terrorism, it reserved the moral right and judgment over the issue. Most of the issues related to New—post-9/11-- strain of terrorism can be related to the above factors.

It is a cliché to say that terrorism is not a new phenomenon; while that is true, 9/11 changed the face of terrorism. In its post-9/11 manifestation, terrorism is different from the phenomenon the world witnessed in the 1960s and 1970s--the nationalist strain, and as struggle for independence. Now it is a violent political message, in a strident anti-west strain.

Terrorism today is a new form of non-traditional conflict, pitching a non-state actor or actors against major power/s. The new terrorist has the will to take on a superpower, and has the resources to access the latest technology. The terrorist still believes in guerrilla tactics, but these are more lethal and are aimed at causing greater damage, human and material. Following 9/11, the targets also have a symbolic value.

Post -9/11, terrorism has a marked Muslim connection. Despite what President George Bush and PM Tony Blair told their Muslim audiences, despite how the terrorists justify their goals and defend their actions, most acts of terrorism since 9/11 have been carried out by the Muslims—in Bali, London, Barcelona, besides other abortive attempts. It is debatable whether and how the US is responsible for all that is afflicting the Muslims in different parts of the world, and whether US policies in the Middle East call for targeting holidaymakers in a Bali club, and commuters in London underground, or on a Barcelona train. In a characteristic statement, bin Laden observed: “The truth is the whole Muslim world is the victim of international terrorism, engineered by America and the United Nations.”³⁶

While US presence in Afghanistan and Iraq is questionable, attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993, USS Cole in Aden and on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were carried out *before* the US attacked Afghanistan and Iraq. Continued US presence in Afghanistan and Iraq are important push factors in continuing terrorist attacks against the US. Pakistan is paying the price for its role and contribution in the War on Terrorism, besides some domestic factors.

While the tide of terrorism may not be ebbing soon, it remains as much linked to US policies as to the objective conditions in the Muslim world, denial of justice, poor human rights situation, and authoritarian rule. Addressing the “root causes” of terrorism need to be done in the Muslim societies, to start with, while the west need to reevaluate its relations with authoritarian Muslim regimes.

The new face or brand of terrorism forms a new wave since 9/11; it calls into question many traditional postulates, like terrorism being caused by poverty, and carried out by the illiterate. Two aspects make the new wave of terrorism a significant and dangerous enterprise: its justification in the name of religion, and access to and deft use of technology. The War on Terrorism will go nowhere till the terrorists enjoy this luxury, and till the domestic and transnational sources of support are unplugged. This cannot take place so long as terrorism is seen as just an American obsession and the War on Terrorism as an American war.

Author

Dr. Noman Omar Sattar is Associate Professor and HoD of the recently established department of Strategic & Nuclear Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad. He has been a Fulbright fellow at University of Notre Dame, Indiana, and Salzburg Seminar alumni. He has given talks at National Defence University and Command and Staff College, Quetta, besides being a guest lecturer at different universities. He has contributed research articles to journals and chapters in books and occasionally contributes to papers.

Notes

¹ Quoted in Gary Lafree, Laura Dugan, Susan Fahey, "Global Terrorism and Failed States," in J Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2008* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2008), p.40.

² Andrew Sinclair, *An Anatomy of Terror. A History of Terrorism* (London: Macmillan, 2003), p.xvi.

³ Marc Sageman, "The New Generation of Terror," *Foreign Policy*, March-April 2008, p.39.

⁴ According to Martha Crenshaw, a radical political organization is seen as the central actor in the terrorist drama. The group possesses collective preferences or values and selects terrorism as a course of action from a range of perceived alternatives. "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice," in Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism. Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), p.8.

⁵ Chris Brown, "Narratives of Religion, Civilization and Modernity," in Ken Booth, Timothy Dunne, *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of World Order* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), p. 297.

-
- ⁶ Lawrence Freedman, "A New Type of War," in Booth-Dunne, *Worlds in Collision*, p.37.
- ⁷ Sinclair, *An Anatomy of Terror*, p.28.
- ⁸ "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*, vol.72 (1993).
- ⁹ President Bush's address to joint houses of Congress, quoted by Chris Brown, "Narratives of Religion, Civilization and Modernity," in Booth-Dunne, *Worlds in Collision*, p.295.
- ¹⁰ Freedman, "A New Type of War," in Booth-Dunne, *Worlds in Collision*, p.37.
- ¹¹ Bruce Hoffman, "Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Terrorism in the United States," Santa Monica: Rand, 1998, p.38.
- ¹² Louise Richardson, *What Terrorists Want* (New York: Random House, 2006), p.20.
- ¹³ Sinclair, *Anatomy of Terror*.
- ¹⁴ Besides Sinclair and Richardson, many others in the post-9/11 era made effort to explain different types of terrorism, and referred to the above manifestations. For example, Michael Ignatieff, *The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terrorism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
- ¹⁵ Hoffman, "Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Terrorism..."
- ¹⁶ As Quoted in Richardson, *What Terrorists Want*, p.1.
- ¹⁷ Quoted *ibid.*, p.7.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.10.
- ¹⁹ Rohan Gunaratna, "Transnational Terrorism. Support Networks and Trends."
- ²⁰ Marc Sageman, "The Next Generation of Terror," *Foreign Policy*, March/April 2008, p.38.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, pp.38-39.
- ²² As quoted in Sinclair, *An Anatomy of Terror*, p.343.
- ²³ Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp.153-54.
- ²⁴ "Terror in the Name of God," *Current History*, November 2001, p.358.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, p.357.
- ²⁶ Discussed in detail by Ahmad Rashid, *Taliban. Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000)
- ²⁷ Juergensmeyer, "Terror in the Name of God," p.358.
- ²⁸ Chris Brown, "Narratives of Religion, Civilization and Modernity," in Booth-Dunne, *Worlds in Collision: Terrorism and the Future World order* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), p.300.
- ²⁹ Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God. Why Religious Militants Kill* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003), p.296.
- ³⁰ *Newsweek*, February 19, 2001, pp.14-17.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, p.18.
- ³² Richardson, *What Terrorists Want* (New York: Random House, 2006), p.23.
- ³³ *Ibid.*, p.61.
- ³⁴ *TIME*, October 26, 2009, p.7.
- ³⁵ Richardson, p.170.
- ³⁶ Quoted *Ibid.*, p.45.