ISSN 1999-2297

Margalla Papers

2009

Margalla Papers 2009



National Defence University
Sector E-9 Islamabad
Pakistan
www.ndu.edu.pk

Margalla Papers

Institute for Strategic Studies; Research & Analysis
National Defence University, Islamabad

Editorial Board

Lieutenant General Muhammad Yousaf	Chairman
Major General Azhar Ali Shah	Member
Rear Admiral Khan Hasham Bin Saddique	Member
Major General Syed Tariq Nadeem Gilani	Member
Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema	Member
Lieutenant Colonel Dr Saif Ur Rehman	Member

Editor	Lieutenant Colonel Dr Saif Ur Rehman
Assistant Editor	Mr. Abdul Rauf Iqbal

Advisory Board

Lt Gen T.W. Ghazi (Retd)	Former Secretary Defence Pakistan
Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema	Dean FCS, NDU Islamabad
Ambassador N. A. Shaikh	Former Foreign Secretary Pakistan
Dr. Weinbaum	Scholar in Residence, Middle East
Mr. Bluent Karadeniz	Director of Department Center for Strategic Research MOFA Turkey

Margalla Papers is sponsored and edited by the Institute of Strategic Studies; Research & Analysis, National Defence University, E-9, Islamabad, Pakistan.

Statements of fact or opinion appearing in Margalla Papers are solely those of the authors and do not imply endorsement by the editors or publishers.

Manuscripts and editorial communications should be directed to editor at the address above. More information for contributors is available at the NDU website.

Website: http://www.ndu.edu.pk
Email: disp@ndu.edu.pk
Margalla Papers

CONTENTS

	Page
• Foreword	i
• Israel Factor in US Veto Behavior *Professor Dr. Mansoor Akbar Kundi*	1
• Terrorism: Dynamics of the New Wave *Dr. Noman Omar Sattar*	22
• Non-Traditional Security Threats to South Asia *Dr. Raja Muhammad Khan*	40
• War and Strategic Environment: Actors for Change and Future Wars *Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal*	67
• Dynamics of Peace and Stability in the Middle East Arena: Identifying the Contemporary Challenges and Options for Response *Ambassador Arif Kamal*	94
• US-India Nuclear Deal: Analysis and Implications for Pakistan *Brigadier Sardar Muhammad, SI (M)*	106
• Russian Foreign Policy in Post 9/11 Period: From Diplomatic Retreat to Resurgence *Air Commodore Ghulam Mujaddid*	121
• Afghan National Army – An Assessment of Promises & Dangers *Lieutenant Colonel Raza Ali Khan*	140

FOREWORD

Margalla Papers is an annual publication of National Defence University, country's apex institution of national security and strategic studies. Based on contributions by prominent scholars and eminent writers, it provides a forum for discussion and debate on current issues impacting the national security. The "Institute for Strategic Studies; Research and Analysis" (ISSRA) of the University engages itself in bringing the insights of scholars to bear upon the advanced research on key issues faced by the country. The articles of this journal deal with global, regional, internal and military subjects with sound background knowledge and substantial research work by the specialists in the relevant fields.

In the first article, Professor Dr Mansoor Akbar Kundi has analysed and discussed the role of Veto Power of five permanent UN members with special reference to US tilt towards Israel. The author has unfolded US-UN apathy towards miseries of Palestinians, contrary to the basic UN principles. The scholar has also provided chronology of resolutions US voted in favour of Israel.

Pakistan is currently encountered with the menace of terrorism. Dr Noman Omar Sattar has deeply evaluated the dynamics of terrorism in the Post 9/11 perspective. The scholar has deduced that by comprehending these dynamics, the phenomena of terrorism can be addressed more prudently in both the local and global context.

Dr Raja Muhammad Khan undertakes an indepth study of "Non-Traditional Security Threats to South Asia". The author highlights that power potential of South Asia is being marginalized due to multifaceted security threats. The scholar has given an insight to the non-traditional security threats and their implications on the region in the long run.

Dr Zafar Nawaz Jaspal's article "War and Strategic Environment: Actors for Change and Future Wars" carries thought provoking findings pertaining to war, state and strategic environment. The scholar has highlighted the prominent actors and

drivers responsible to bring about change with special emphasis on various regional and extra regional players.

"Dynamics of Peace and Stability in the Middle East Arena: Identifying the Contemporary Challenges and Options for Response" is a delicate subject which has been scholarly elaborated by Ambassador Arif Kamal. The author has given an overview of contemporary political landscape coupled with the other elements impinging regional security. The scholar has also suggested a roadmap for long lasting peace in the region.

Brigadier Sardar Muhammad's article on "US-India Nuclear Deal: Analysis and Implications for Pakistan" has carried out thorough appraisal of Indo-US Nuclear Collaboration and its impact on the region in general and Pakistan in particular. The author has vividly projected aims and objectives of both India and US in pursuits of nuclear deal and also suggested policy options for Pakistan.

Air Commodore Ghulam Mujaddid in his article "Russian Foreign Policy in Post 9/11 Period: from Diplomatic Retreat to Resurgence" has comprehensively examined Russian Foreign Policy in the context of post 9/11 era. The article projects the ambitious of various stakeholders including Middle East, China, India and South Asia. The author has suggested a way forward for Pakistan in the arena of present geo-political environment.

In the wake of current complexed regional geo-strategic environment, Afghanistan is striving hard to establish her military institutions and develop National Army. In this connection Lieutenant Colonel Raza Ali Khan has carried out a pioneer work projecting achievements and difficulties in the way of formative phase of Afghan National Army.

Major General Azhar Ali Shah
Director General
Institute for Strategic Studies; Research & Analysis
National Defence University, Islamabad.

ISRAEL FACTOR IN US VETO BEHAVIOR

Professor Dr Mansoor Akbar Kundi

Introduction

US and Israel have special relationship but they actually developed after 1967. Now since 1970 there have been very close relationship.

Jimmy Carter

Our relationship would never vary from its allegiance to the shared values, the shared religious heritage, the shared democratic politics which have made the relationship between the United States and Israel a special—even on occasion a wonderful—relationship."

Bill Clinton

Foreign policy of a country is the patterns of relationship it establishes with the outside world for the promotion of its national interests, an eternal phenomenon in international politics. The outside world includes state or nation-state and non-state actors. The nation-state actor as Huntington claims "will remain the most important actors in world affairs"[1]. The non-state actors have importance in international system which has grown since 1945. The non-state actions include International Government Organizations (IGOs), Non- IGOs or NGOs, Multinational Corporations (MNCs), Movements and media. It is "the actions of a state toward the external environment and conditions under which (foreign) actions are formulated. Foreign Policy is also a syntheses of the ends (national interests) and means (power and capabilities) of nation states. The interaction between national goals and the resources for attaining them is the perennial subject of statecraft.[2] The interaction can be either bilateral or multilateral but is ultimately for the promotion of national interests. Karl W. Deutsch is right when he says that the "foreign policy of every country deals with the preservation of its independence and security, and second with the pursuit and protection of its economic interests."[3]

The interests however can be other than routine interests countries have in common. They include special status for a country and "enemy of my enemy is my friend" considerations. So is the case of Israel in American foreign policy behavior. In the American policy making the Israel factor has played an important role in the restructuring of American relationship with the outside world, particularly the Muslim world majority of whom have not recognized Israel. For the US foreign policy making the survival of the Israel as a regional power is of core importance. The US foreign policy which was historically based on the principles of Monroe Doctrine, recognizing the rights of the existence of free nation on the principles of mutual co-existence and non-interference in European affairs, made a rapid shift in the post-World War II.

The emergence of Israel on the political map of Middle East was the achievement of the Zionist designs actually received its support in the Belfour Declaration long before the Second World War. Israel soon became the leading aid as well as nuclear technology recipient country from the US. It is the largest US aid receiving country in the world since 1960. In Noam Chomsky's words, Israel is the only country to which American citizens can give tax free contributions, thus imposing on others a subsidy to Israel, in addition to the direct official aid and loans.[4]

The major political and morale support for its nuclear device in 1966 came from the US when it emerged as the sixth nation in the world and the first in the Middle East to develop and acquire nuclear weapons. The main expression of support for Israel has been foreign, military, and UN diplomatic support as its strategic liability. The fact as supported in the recent book by Wesley Clark Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism and American Empire that America had totally turned a blind eye to the development of either nuclear capabilities or arsenals by Israel.[5] The US supported the Israeli cause in the UN Security Council on important issues where the rights of Palestinians was injured in large. Warren Christopher, Secretary of State in said that in relation to US and Israel "special relationship for special reasons".[6] He is absolutely right. They don't fall even under traditional models of bilateralism or national interests driven model about which once John F. Dulles, the US

Secretary of State under D. D. Eisenhower (1953-59) and architect of SEATO and CENTO had said that there are several de facto regimes in the world that we do not recognize. We act, in this respect, as our national interests dictate. The US supports Israel no matter it is against their national interests; international law principles or democratic values. American support for Israel since 1948 in international affairs is largely accountable for a drift in the American foreign policy. So is the case of the US United Nations (UN) veto behavior since 1972. It has been reflective of the unilateral support for Israeli aggression in the Gaza and Palestinian area.

This paper is an attempt to highlight the Israel factor in the US UN veto behavior since 1972 in defiance of the principles of UN Charter, international law and comity. The article will focus upon the dichotomy of the theory and practice of the UN veto behavior by a superpower in its special relationship. The hypothesis of the paper is that soon after US started using veto in the Security Council, its use has aberrantly been exercised against the UN Charter, international peace, security and morality to defend Israel aggression and hegemonic policies. The method of research is largely qualitative and analytic under theoretical and historical contexts.

Veto Power of Permanent 5

The veto power of the Permanent Five (P-5) constitutes the very essence of the United Nations mechanism which in large has reflected on the impartial and democratic nature of the institution. There is no equality of rights of the member states. The five countries which reaped the fruits of victory in World War II were accorded special privileges.[7] There has been no mention of the Veto in the UN Charter. The use of veto is the ultimate result of have and have-nots power division of the use of affirmative and concurring vote of the UNSC on procedural and non-procedural matters. Article 27 of the UN Charter says:

> Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters

> shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting."[8]

The use of power is a privilege and responsibility of P-5. Its use was discussed in detail and approved in the UN Conferences in San Francisco, Dumbarton Oaks, and Yalta during 1944-45. The use of veto power was allowed in the hands of major powers which founded the United Nations largely for the promotion of international peace and security. It was designed to prevent any move or resolution which could threaten the very principle of the United Nations. Nevertheless, its use has been negated in spirit due to uneven division of the use of powers on procedural and non procedural matters. One can cite number of examples when the use of veto being in negation of the UN Charter and international law was exercised to support power politics and regional interference for national interests. For example, when two resolutions were tabled in Security Council reproving the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and taking American diplomats as hostages by Iranians in 1980 the USSR immediately vetoed them one after another. As David Schweigman discusses in his book The Authority of the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the voting in the Security Council on procedural and non-procedural patterns has marked the uneven division of powers between the permanent and non-permanent members.[9]

Matters included in the procedural list or discussed are very limited without being significance. For example, the putting on any country's request for UN membership by Security Council is procedural matter and does need concurring vote, but the approval of 9 members including concurring of P-5 is non-procedural (absentia is allowed). Thus in August 1972 Security Council

succeeded in tabling the resolution for membership of Bangladesh as it was procedural but China vetoed it on 25 August 1972 as non procedural matter. To Schweigman,

> the internal procedure of the Council such as the inclusion of the items on the agenda; adjournment and suspension of meetings; and matters designed as procedural by the Charter. non procedural matters include i. matters relating to the Council's discharge of its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under Chapter VI and VII ii. Matters relating to the admissions and expulsions of members, and the expulsion of members and suspension of their admission rights, iii. Matters relating to the execution of judgments by the International Court of Justice and the request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice iv. Recommendations for the appointment of Secretary Generals.[10]

Also, in case of any dispute whether the item is procedural or non-procedural the matter is treated as non procedural where affirmative vote of the P-5 is applicable.

The role of non-permanent members is rather limited in procedural matters, because they don't have the right of concurring vote. Had they had been assigned the right of concurring vote in non-procedural matters, the Security Council might not have been heavily dominated by the permanent members as it is today. The use of veto has given an edge to the P-5 as a dominant role in the world politics.. Giulio Terzi, the Italy's UN Ambassador has rightly remarked that no matter the use or threat of the use of veto, the 'hidden veto' has prevented substantial discussions of questions that are crucial to international peace and security. The right of the veto is embedded in the article 27, paragraph 3 of the UN Charter, is

addressed by virtually all reforms proposals about SC (8). It is the dominant feature of the UN Charter. Richard Falk says that Veto gives unilaterally to prevent a decision from being taken" and establishes a hierarchy among the members of the organization by wrongfully giving the five states the trustee of the international community.[11] It was designed as the special right of maintaining the international security and peace, but unfortunately it failed in large.[12]

A total of 261 vetoes (1946-2009) have been used in the Security Council with the following frequency: USSR/Russia 123, US 82, UK 32, France 18, China 6 (including one by Republic of China or Taiwan against the application for admission of Mongolia in UN). The use of veto against the admissions of new states in the UN was very frequent in 1950s and 1960s. The absolute majority of them were exercised by the USSR which blocked the admission until next. Many countries with excellent democratic record such as Finland, Italy, and Japan were blocked by USSR. The Great Britain and France never used veto to block an admission to the UN. Since 1976 there has been no use of veto against the application of admission for UN membership. America did not use its veto power as the foreign policy options or state behavior until 1970. There had been occasions when it should have used the veto for the enhancement of world peace and security. In many strategists' analysis US could use its right of veto on a number of sensitive and strategic issues such as Arab-Israel dispute in 1956, Jordan River dispute and Arab-Israel War 1967 either in support of Israel against Arabs or uphold the UN charter. Since then it has dominantly exercised it in favor of Israeli role in the Middle East in violation of UN Charter as its strategic liability with unyielding support. In 1970 the US exercised its first veto on November 1970 on the situation in South Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). On Sept. 10 1972 US exercised its second but first veto on Israel. It was the Republican era with Henry Kissinger in the heyday of his diplomatic career, served as the Secretary of State under Nixon.

Henry Kissinger, a German born Jew, was the supporter of "Rejectionist Position" in favour of "Greater Israel". It was the realization of the policy that Israel should not accommodate any

settlement or facilitation to Palestinians and maintain its firm control over the occupied areas as "Strategic Asset" for US. It was during Nixon that "Special Relationship" between Israel and US began which culminated in its height after Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Kissinger is on record for saying that Israel since 1948 has played a valuable role in the Middle East and US is fortunate in having an ally in the Middle East. These events will be taken into account in all future developments.[13]

During Nixon Administration huge arms supply was made to Israel which included F-4s and A-4s, a part of the overall $ 500 millions package, as well as M-60 tanks, 105mm gun tanks, M-109 self propelled 155m howitzers, M-107 self propelled 175 mm guns, M-113 armored personnel carriers, Ch-53 Sikorsky helicopters and Hawk surface to air missiles. It was the beginning of realization by the US that Israel, besides material and military, needs more diplomatic support inside and outside UN. The fact has been revealed by George H. W. Bush (Sr) who served as the US Ambassador to UN (1971-73) when the first veto on Israel was used. The resolution was tabled at the request of Syria to debate the Israeli air strike of September 8 on Arab guerrilla bases in Syria and Lebanon. It mobilized an "embittered debate" with a veto end which darted off diplomatic efforts.[14]

American Use of UN Veto since 1970

Out of the total 82 UN vetoes America exercised, 41 are on the Middle East question with Palestinian question at flashpoint. They primarily revolved around the issues of situation in the occupied territories with Israeli atrocities committed against Palestinians; complaint of Lebanon or Syria against Lebanon; violation of UN Charter and international law; and expansion of Jewish settlement in Gaza and East Jerusalem. As Donald Neff and Robin Alden discusses the resolutions were to attract world opinion and international organizations to secure necessary justice against the atrocities Israel committed. In response, US cynically used veto to shield Israel from international criticism, censure and sanctions.[15]

The draft resolution was tabled to condemn Israel's air attacks against Lebanon and Syria on Sept. 6, the day after 11 Israeli athletes were killed at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. They were killed by five Arab terrorists belonging to PLO wearing track suits who climbed the six and 1/2 foot fence surrounding the Olympic Village in Munich, Germany. The death toll of the attacks ranged between 200 and 500 Lebanese, Syrians and Palestinians, mostly innocent civilians. Ambassador Bush justified the action as a new policy to combat terrorism in Middle East: we are implementing a new policy that is much broader than that of the question of Israel and the Jews. What is involved is the problem of terrorism, a matter that goes right to the heart of our civilized life.[16] It is important to note that the attack on Israeli athletes and the relevant events by the PLO militants which included the hijacking of three airplanes with hundreds of passengers to Jordan, and killing of three American diplomats in Khartoum was widely condemned by Islamic countries and was regarded as terrorist act. The OIC had asked for international tribunals to conduct the inquiry. The Israeli bombardment supported by American diplomatic support, nevertheless, inflicted much heavier damage by killing hundreds of human lives and flagrant violation of international law and international conventions: i.e. the Hague Convention 1907 respecting the laws and customs of war; and 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention protecting civilian population in time of war.

On July 26, 1973 U.S. vetoed a resolution which had nothing to do with terrorism but oriented international law question by affirming the rights of the Palestinians and established provisions for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories as embodied in the previous General Assembly resolutions. It was few months after the October Arab-Israel War 1973 where Egypt by crossing the canal and deeper penetration into Israeli area had tarnished the military image of Israel. America used UN diplomacy as an anti-Israel behavior by Egypt and asked for immediate ceasefire on which all P-5 agreed. The US's support for Israel was a writing on the wall. President Nixon requested the Congress for immediate $ 2,200 million military aid to Israel to "offset Soviet supplies to the Arab States".[17]

Similarly, the US exercised four vetoes during 1975-76 on Israel to silence the resolutions on Situation in the Middle East (Israel/Lebanon). The Middle East Situation in large were concerned about the Palestinian question, Jerusalem status, and question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of their inalienable rights. It was the period during which Palestinian question had entered the international agenda and debates in General Assembly and Security Council reflected the US-Israeli hegemony against the prospects of Palestinian state. The US UN behavior during the period individually and collectively (particularly or generally) strangled the wording of the "UN Resolution 242 from 1967 which stood for peace and settlement. In Noam Chomsky's words:

> From then to the present the US has blocked the possibility of a diplomatic settlement in the terms acceptable to by virtually the entire world: a two-state settlement on the international border, with "minor and mutual adjustments; that was the principle of official, through not actual, US policy until the Clinton Administration formally abandoned the framework of international diplomacy, declaring UN resolutions "obsolete and anachronistic.[18]

The vetoing of the resolutions thwarted initiatives from "UN, Europe, the Arab states, the USSR, and the Security Council and General Assembly.

The resolution on Palestinian rights question in April 1980 was supported by all except US while the one on Israel/Lebanon issue had only one abstaining. The resolution was tabled to condemn the violation of Palestinians human, socio-cultural and religious rights at the hands of Israeli government. It followed the frustration grown after the Israeli Knesset passed a law declaring East and West Jerusalem combined as the "eternal capital of Israel". It led to the growing annexation of occupied territory under Israel control with

day to day settlement of Jews. The ruling of Knesset was the violation of democratic spirit designed to promote trust building amongst citizens. An important clause of the bill actually proposed by Geula Cohen that ""the integrity and unity of Greater Jerusalem (Yerushalayim rabati) in its boundaries after the Six Day War shall not be violated" was dropped and omitted the word annexation and Sovereignty.[19] The year 1982 witnessed the highest number of US vetoes in the Security Council with six UNSC resolutions being tabled off from discussion. Noam Chomsky in his book Fateful Triangle shows despair on each of the resolution which if had been allowed for discussion would have opened new discourses on the world peace and security. Describing the one on 26 June he says, the US in flagrant violation of UN Charter simply rejected it because in American policy makers' analysis, a transparent attempt to preserve the PLO as the viable political force, evidently an intolerable prospect for the US government (due to Israel).[20] A total of 18 vetoes were used under the Reagan Administration (highest than any Administration). They all shielded Israel from the Security Council criticism one way or another. Half of the resolutions vetoed were tabled by the non-permanent members of the UN Security Council about Lebanon and its aftermath situation.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 left Middle East not only politically uncertain and instable but in security hazards of blood and miseries by leaving around 20,000 to 20,500 dead. The Israel invasion of Lebanon followed an ongoing peace process which Yasser Arafat was going to achieve by imposing discipline on the many PLO factions to maintain the cease-fire made under U.S. auspices. It was a failed assassination attempt by the PLO rival group by Abu Nidal (June 3) on Israeli Ambassador Shlomo Argov in London. Consequently, the Israel went to war. Had Israel, under the Prime Ministership of Manachem Begin, not gone to war, the things in many political scientists' analysis, such as Edward W. Said, the costs would have been much lesser. Begin was told by even own advisers not to go to war as Arafat was in no control of Abu Nidal, but the information could not stop the invasion To Minachem Begin, all Palestinians were PLO and were to be punished.

The UN resolutions being all designed to halt Israeli aggression against civilians and innocents, were blocked by the US because they were meant to condemn Israeli aggression.[21] The UN Vetoes strengthened Israel Strategic Asset concept which actually began after the invasion of Lebanon. US and Israel relations had never been so close and cordial as they were after the invasion. The aftermath of invasion witnessed more hegemonic role of Israel at the hands of US. It was after that Israel's National Water Company took control of the whole (scarce and disputed water resources) in the region. Ibrahim Matar in his research says that by virtue of the usurpation of the water resources the Israeli administration of the occupied territories, largely in the hands of military commanders, facilitated newly settled Jews by displacement, impoverishment, (and) fragmentation of Palestinian communities, and limitation of economic growth of the indigenous Palestinians.[22] Quoting extensive sources on the Israeli water problem and usurpation management i.e. Judea and Samaria and others published in leading American newspapers, Noam Chomsky in his book Fateful Triangle writes that Israel was heavily dependent for water resources in West Bank which for Israel was a more significant commodity than oil in the Middle East. It fulfilled 1/3 of its water sources with more exploration. [23]

In 1988 were witnessed the highest number of US vetoes on Israel. Out of the total five, four resolutions were vetoed within four months. The nature of the resolutions tabled was Israeli aggression in Lebanon, Syria and occupied territories. Lebanon and Syria in the individual resolutions had complained about the Israeli aggression in their territories. Had the resolutions not been voted, there would have been a debate on the atrocities of Israel, but US did not want it and believed in veto by silencing the voice of the aggrieved. With the exception of one absentia on the first resolution which was the complaint of Lebanon against Israel, the other four were supported by all other members of the Security Council. The question of occupied territories and violation of human rights of innocent dominated the UNSC debates, then and onwards, as the systematic perpetration of racist crimes, including war crimes, genocide, and ethnic cleansing by being contrary the spirit of the International

Convention on the Elimination of All Form of Racial Discrimination 1969. [24]

Five resolutions between 1989-1995 were tabled to attract the attention of World Body on the precarious state of affairs in the occupied territories but they were out of arena due to the US veto. The miserable state of affairs of the occupied areas has been on UN Security Council and General Assembly agenda with clear statements that its occupants are bereaved of their human, political and socio-cultural rights. This was the ultimate result of 1967 Arab-Israel War which made Israel as the dominant power with US supporting it as its strategic asset. Sherbok describes in her valuable work on the Palestine-Israel Conflict:

> The outcome of the war was that Israel became the dominant military power in the region. Israel's troops were stationed on the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and the River Jordan and held a lien on Syria only thirty miles from Damascus. They controlled the whole of Palestine, including the West Bank of the Jordan and Jerusalem, along with on million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza strip, and they occupied the Sinai Peninsula and a thousand sq. miles of Syrian territory on the Golan Heights. Furthermore, one million Arab were displaced. Some 350,000 Palestinians fled from the West Bank to the East Bank of the Jordan. [25]

Exclusive and alien rule of Israel is a source of perpetual violation of human rights and international law in occupied territories. As Emma Playfair describes "international law in general and particular regards belligerent occupation as an inherently temporary state, contained rules designed not only to enable the occupier to ensure the safety of the occupying forces, but to preserve the essential and distinct nature of the occupied territories. [26]

But as mentioned above, this rule neither applies to Israel which claims as the democratic country nor US Administrations which adhere to the principles established by its founding fathers: George Washington, John Adam, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson etc. They adhered to the principles all providing a guideline for principles of democracy at home and abroad of which American role in today's world has totally total negation of. America is a country which grew out of popular armed resistance against colonial masters on the grounds of liberty, fraternity and independence. America was built on the teachings of John Locke (1632-1683) and Montesquieu 1689-1755) that people have a right to resist in arms (revolution from below) against an unrepresentative and repressive rule). .

Under the Clinton Administration two UNSC resolutions were rejected in March 1997. They were calling upon Israel to refrain from East Jerusalem settlement activities and Demanding Israel's immediate cessation of construction at Jabal Abu Ghneim in East Jerusalem. The situation in East Jerusalem was deteriorated after "Prime Minister Nathanyahu opened the controversial Hashmonean Tunnel under the temple Mount in Jerusalem.[27] It led to violent clashes and closure of safe passages for Palestinians.

Under the Bush first term of Presidency in March and December 2001 two resolutions were vetoed. The first one was a demand for establishing a UN observer force to protect Palestinian civilians. The second resolution was the result of UNSC meeting on the presence of Israel forces in Palestinian controlled area. It demanded the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestinian-controlled territory and condemning acts of terror against civilians. The situation worsened after Ariel Sharon in September went to Haram al Sharif, the Temple Mount with huge contingency of troops. He had been warned by Yasser Arafat not to go there in the greater interest of peace. The protests and demonstrations the next day of the visit culminated into bloody scenes with Israeli troops ready to shoot with gunship helicopters in action from above.

The resolution of December 2002 was relevant in nature. It condemned the killing by Israeli forces of several United Nations employees and the destruction of the World Food Program (WFP)

warehouse which was meant to provide food and other necessities to internally displaced Palestinians. The use of US veto is said to have dimmed the possibility of "Saudi Plan" proposed in 2002 and accepted by Arab League, a plan with sizeable American population approval. The Plan was perceived as a positive peaceful situation as it offered full recognition and integration of Israel into the region in exchange for withdrawal to the 1967 borders. It was an outstanding international consensus the US blocked inside and outside the UN.[28]

In September 2003 on the issue of Security Wall another resolution was vetoed by US. The wall which was the ultimate result of the Israel Security Plan was not built on Israel's border but rather well within occupied Palestinian territory, thereby de facto annexing Palestinian land and ensuring that Israel's colonies remain. It is estimated that approximately 43% of the Occupied West Bank (containing approximately 94% of the illegal Israeli settlers) will be de facto annexed by Israel.[29] About the vetoing of the 16 September 2003 Resolution Tony Judt writes thus.

> On September 16, 2003, the US vetoed a UN Security Council resolution asking Israel to desist from its threat to deport Yasser Arafat. Even American officials themselves recognize, off the record, that the resolution was reasonable and prudent, and that the increasingly wild pronouncements of Israel's present leadership, by restoring Arafat's standing in the Arab world, are a major impediment to peace. But the US blocked the resolution all the same, further undermining our credibility as an honest broker in the region. America's friends and allies around the world are no longer surprised at such actions, but they are saddened and disappointed all the same. [30]

Similarly in 2004 two UNSC resolutions were vetoed in favor of Israel. The first one in March 2004 was the condemnation of the killing of Ahmed Yassin, the leader of the Islamic Resistance

Movement Hamas, while the second in October 2004 was to demand Israel to halt all military operations in northern Gaza and withdraw from the area. The veto of the resolution condemning the murder of 66 year old Palestinian spiritual and political leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin by the Israeli forces can be better understood under the context of its veto power behavior on the Arab-Palestinian rights and self-determination against Israel. It was due to the violation of human rights and international law that the International Court of Justice in October 2004 gave a bold and symbolic decision condemning Israel's anti-terrorism partition fence is a violation of international law. The ruling though was unilateral and not binding upon Israel, but it served as a mirror in which the harsh action is seen and judged. It strengthened the pivotal concept of the law of nations that the promotion of international comity depends on the principle that that the integrity and sovereignty of nation-states and nationalities be respected and protected. Similarly, the Court's ruling will support the Naturalist school of international law, one of the three schools, that the international law is a true law and needs to be effective and regularized for international peace and security. The Court ruled out that the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) commander should reduce the infringement upon the local inhabitants, even if it cannot be totally avoided, by altering the path of the fence in most areas complained of in the petition.[31] The judgment meant that modifications would have to be made to a 25-mile stretch of the barrier to the north and west of Jerusalem. The court asked for the turning down of the fence by immediate compensation by Israel to Arab residents for the damage inflected. The Israel's West Bank separation barrier was declared illegal thus.

The erection of fence was originally designed to follow the Green Line 1948 Border which was the border of Israel established by 1949 Armistice Agreement. The spirit of the line dramatically changed after 1967 War where Israel occupied West Bank and Gaza. The Green Line was the soft or loose border which facilitated Palestinians in day to day life to cross illegally into Israel to make bread and butter. After the election of Ariel Sharon, the decision was taken to erect the path with a total direction.

The last two vetoes US used in support of Israel were in July and October 2006. The first one was on the ongoing Israeli military operations in Gaza and in return the Palestinian rocket fires into Israel. The resolution called for immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and a cessation of violence from both parties in the conflict. The second resolution was a demand for the unconditional release of an Israeli soldier captured earlier as well as Israel's immediate withdrawal from Gaza and the release of the dozens of Palestinian officials detained by Israel. Since November 2006 there has been no veto, no matter whatever diplomatic support for the Israel outside UN is afforded by the US which in Chalmers Johnson's analysis is behaving like an Empire and not a nation-state. To him US has 926 internal (in US) and 725 non US military bases ranging from al-Udeid air base in the desert of Qatar, southeastern in Kosovo and Kandahar. It can well be described as the globe's "lone superpower," then as a "reluctant sheriff," next as the "indispensable nation," and now, in the wake of 9/11, as a "New Rome." [32]

Conclusion

The US UN behavior on Israel since 1973 is reflective of the special relationship and unconditional support the US shows for Israel. The Veto behavior shows that the use of concurring vote by P-5 has not been used in large to support the UN Charter which primary aim was to maintain international peace and security, to safeguard human rights, to provide a mechanism for international law, and to promote social and economic progress, improve living standards, and fight diseases. The US UN veto behavior has been negation of the very principles the UN was founded for. It symbolizes the special relationship between US and Israel which are expressed diplomatically, material and ideological. Majority of the resolutions tabled on UNSC floor were in conformity of the Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 which emphasized in black and white "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of the territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security".

Author

Dr. Mansoor Akbar Kundi is currently the Vice Chancellor of Gomal University. Being a Pakistani-American educated, he joined University of Balochistan as Lecturer in 1979. He studied in University of Arizona from 1984-88. He is an author of ten books and forty research articles. He had been a scholar on Pakistan Chair at Istanbul University from 1998 to 2001. He was three times Dean of different faculties in the University of Balochistan.

Notes

[1] Samuel P. Huntington, **The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order** London: Touchstone Books, 1997, p. 36.
[2] Theodore A. Couloumbis. James H. Wolf, **Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice**, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1994, p 115.
[3]Karl W. Deutsch, **The Analysis of International Relations**, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1978, p. 100
[4]. Chomsky, Noam **Middle East Illusions: Peace, security and Terror**, first published by Rowman and Littlefield, 2003, reprinted in India, New Delhi: Chaman Offset Press, 2003, p 266
[5] General Wesley Clark **Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism and American Empire**, 2003, p 112
[6] The term special relationship was used by Jimmy Carter in 1977, Yitzhak Rabin in 1992, and Warren Christopher in 1993; all are quoted in Bernard Reich, "The United States and Israel: The Nature of a Special Relationship," in David W. Lesch, *The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Assessment* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996), pp. 233, 248.
[7] http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1999/437/op3.htm
[8] **See introduction in Bruno Simma and Hermann Mosler, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. p 3**
[9] *David Schweigman,* **The Authority of the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter**, New York: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001, p 46.
[10] Ibid, p 47
[11] Richard Falks, **"United Nations and the Rule of Law" in the Preferred Future for the United Nations** p. 8
[12] Ibid p. 301.
[13] Yitzhak Rabin, **The Rabin Memoirs** Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979, p. 189
[14] . **Kesing's Contemporary Archives**: Weekly Diary of World Events, Published by Keesing's Publications Limited, Bristol, London, 1971/72, p. 25501
[15] file://localhost/H:/Vetoes%20until%202008.htm
[16] Robert Alden, **New York Times**, Sept. 12, 1972

[17] **Kesing's Contemporary Archives** 1973, p. 26177
[18] Noam Chomsky, **Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for global dominance** Allen & Unwin (South Asian Ed), 2007, p. 168
[19] Ian S. Lustick , "Has Israel Annexed East Jerusalem?" in **Journal** by Middle East Policy Council, 5:1, 1997
[20] Noam Chomsky, The **Fateful Triangle**, Boston, MA: South End Press, 1983, p. 19
[21] Op. cit. **Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for global dominance** p 167
[22] Emma Playfair, ed. **International Law and the Administration of Occupied Territories** 1992, p 20.
[23]. Noam Chomsky, **The Fateful Triangle**, Boston, MA: South End Press Classic, 1983 (reprinted in 1999), p 47 and endnote 12 p 81.
[24] . John T. Rourke, **International Politics on the World Stage 11th ed.** New York: McGraw-Hill 2007, p 466
[25] Dan Cohn Sherbok and Dawoud el Alami, **The Palestine-Israel Conflict: A Beginner;s Guide** Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2001, pp. 145-46
[26]. Emma Playfair, ed. **International Law and the Administration of Occupied Territories** Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 1
[27]. Yehudit Kirstein Keshet , **Checkpoint Watch: Testimonies from Occupied Palestine**, MacMillon, 2006, p. 28
[28] Ibid p. 169 (quoting Mark Sappenfield in **Christian Science Monitor**, 15 April 2002
[29]. http://www.bobmay.info/wall.htm
[30] **Tony Judt, "Israel: The Alternative" in The New York Review of Books 50:16, October 23, 2003,** http://www.nybooks.com/articles/16671
[31] "Mansoor Akbar Kundi "A Bold and Symbolic Ruling" **The Nation** Lahore: Pakistan, July 12, 2004
[32] . Book reviews on the Chalmers Johnson. **Sorrows of the Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic, Standford: Standford University Press, 2004 http://www.amazon.com/Sorrows-Empire-Militarism-Republic-American/dp/0805070044**

List of Resolutions US vetoed in favor of Israel

Date	Yes, No/Veto Abstain	UNSC Official Record	Draft Text No	Subject
10 Sept 1972	13-1-1	S/PV. 1662 para 74	S/10784	Situation in the Middle East (Ceasefire 1967 Violation)
26 July 1973	13-1-0	S/PV. 1735 para 97	S/10974	Situation in the Middle East (Palestinian Question
8 Dec 1975	13-1-1	S/PV. 1862 para 118	S/11898	Situation in the Middle East (Israel/Lebanon)

25 Jan 1976	9-1-3 China & Libya did not participate	S/PV. 1879 para 67	S/11940	Middle East Question including the Palestinian Question
25 Mar 1976	14-1-0	S/PV. 1899 para 106	S/12022	Jerusalem Status
29 Jun 1976	10-1-4	S/PV. 1938	S/12119	Question of the Exercise by the Palestinian People of their inalienable Right
30 Apr 1980	10-1-4	S/PV. 2220 para 151	S/13911	Situation in the Middle East (Palestinian Rights)
20 Jan 1982	9-1-5	S/PV. 2329 para	S/14832 /Rev.1	Situation in the Middle East (Golan Heights)
2 Apr 1982	13-1-1	S/PV. 2348 para 9	S/14943	Situation in the Middle East (Mayors of Nablus and Ramallah Dismissal)
20 Apr 1982	14-1-0	S/PV. 2357 para 101	S/14985	Situation in the Middle East (Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem Attack)
8 Jun 1982	14-1-0	S/PV. 2377 para 23	S/15185	Situation in the Middle East (Lebanon)
26 Jun 1982	14-1-0	S/PV. 2381 para 12	S/15255 /Rev.2	Situation in the Middle East (Lebanon)
6 Aug 1982	11-1-3	S/PV. 2391 para 38	S/15347 /Rev.1	Situation in the Middle East (Lebanon)
2 Aug 1983	13-1-1	S/PV. 2461 para 238	S/15895	Situation in the Middle East (Occupied Arab Territories
6 Sept 1984	14-1-0	S/PV. 2556 para 49	S/16732	Situation in the Middle East (Lebanon)
12 Mar 1985	11-1-3	S/PV. 2573 para 208	S/17000	Situation in the Middle East (Lebanon)
13 Sept 1985	10-1-4	S/PV. 2605 para 170	S/17459	Situation in the Middle East (Occupied Territories)
17 Jan 1986	11-1-3	S/PV. 2650 p. 31	S/17769 /Rev.1	Violation of Haram Al-Sharif (Jerusalem)
30 Jan 1986	13-1-1	S/PV. 2642 p. 38	S/17730 /Rev.2	Complaint by Lebanon against Israeli Aggression
1 Feb 1986	10-1-4	S/PV. 2655 p. 114	S/17796 /Rev.1	Syrian Complaint against Israeli Interception of Libyan Civilian Aircraft

18 Jan 1988	11-1-1	S/PV. 2784 pp. 39-50	S/19434	Complaint of Lebanon against Israel
1 Feb 1988	14-1-0	S/PV. 2790 p. 42	S/19466	Situation in the Occupied Arab Territories
15 April 1988	14-1-0	S/PV. 2806 p. 53	S/19780	Situation in the Occupied Arab Territories
10 May 1988	14-1-0	S/PV. 2814 p. 58	S/19868	Complaint of Lebanon against Israel
14 Dec 1988	14-1-0	S/PV. 2832 p. 28	S/20322	Complaint of Lebanon against Israel
17 Feb 1989	14-1-0	S/PV. 2850 p. 34	S/20463	Situation in the Occupied Arab Territories
9 June 1989	14-1-0	S/PV. 2867 p. 31	S/20677	Situation in the Occupied Arab Territories
7 Nov 1989	14-1-0	S/PV. 2889 p.32	S/20945 /Rev.1	Situation in the Occupied Arab Territories
31 May 1990	14-1-0	S/PV.2926 p.36	S/21326	on the Occupied Arab Territories
17 May 1995	14-1-0	S/PV.2926 p.36	S/21326	on the Occupied Arab Territories
7 Mar 1997	14-1-0	S/PV.3747 p.4	S/1997/ 199	Calling upon Israel to refrain from East Jerusalem settlement activities
21 Mar 1997	13-1-1	S/PV.3756 p.6	S/1997/ 241	Demanding Israel's immediate cessation of construction at Jabal Abu Ghneim in East Jerusalem
27 Mar 2001	9-1-4	S/PV.4305 p.5	S/2001/ 270	on establishing a UN observer force to protect Palestinian civilians (report of Council meeting SC/7040)
14 Dec 2001	12-1-2	S/PV.4438 p.30	S/2001/ 1199	on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestinian-controlled territory and condemning acts of terror against civilians

20 Dec 2002	12-1-2	S/PV.4681	S/2002/ 1385	on the killing by Israeli forces of several United Nations employees and the destruction of the World Food Programme (WFP) warehouse
16 Sep 2003	13-1-3	S/PV.4842	S/2003/ 980	on the security wall built by Israel in the West Bank.
14 Oct 2003	10-1-4	S/PV.4828	S/2003/ 891	on the Israeli decision to "remove" Palestinian Authority leader Yasser Arafat.
25 Mar 2004	11-1-3	S/PV.4934	S/2004/ 240	on the condemnation of the killing of Ahmed Yassin, the leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement *Hamas*
5 Oct 2004	11-1-3	S/PV.5051	S/2004/ 783	on the demand to Israel to halt all military operations in northern Gaza and withdraw from the area.
13 July 2006	10-1-4	S/PV.5565	S/2006/ 878	on the Israeli military operations in Gaza, the Palestinian rocket fire into Israel, the call for immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and a cessation of violence from both parties in the conflict.
11 Nov 2006	10-1-4	S/PV.5488	S/2006/ 508	on the demand for the unconditional release of an Israeli soldier captured earlier as well as Israel's immediate withdrawal from Gaza and the release of dozens of Palestinian officials detained by Israel.

TERRORISM: DYNAMICS OF THE NEW WAVE

Dr. Noman Omar Sattar

Introduction

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, and has existed since ancient times. It came into the limelight after the terrorist attacks of September 11, and the ensuing War on Terrorism (WoT). Most of the current discourse of/about terrorism is based on these related developments—September 11 attacks and WoT. Terrorism has been viewed in different dimensions, and given different meanings, depending on the perspective. It is a cliché to say that there is no universal definition of terrorism, but definitions abound. A better understanding of the phenomenon calls for clarity of the perspective, whether it is addressed as a new form of conflict, or a religious war, or a freedom struggle. This article contends that while 'terrorism' has been associated with freedom struggle in the recent past, and could be related to religious war in the distant past, today it can be viewed as a non-traditional form of conflict--a conflict between a state and a non-state actor. It is not meant to unravel the causes of terrorism, or to explain its types but to understand and explain its contemporary manifestation/s, in order to understand its role in world politics and impact on the security discourse. As a new form of non-traditional conflict, terrorism baffles policymakers and academics alike. Today, terrorism can be viewed in a pre- and post-9/11 perspective. In this article, it is viewed in the post-9/11 perspective, as a new wave sweeping across the world, having complex dynamics. It is hoped that the lessons learnt by understanding these dynamics can help in addressing the problem in both the local and global context.

Defining Terrorism

Post-9/11 era has seen hectic efforts on the part of the academic and political communities to understand and define terrorism. As part of these efforts, research under the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) has led to studies offering new insights; while databases,

such as Global Terrorism Database (GTD), have compiled information on around 70,000 domestic and international terrorist events. These studies have broadened the scope of terrorism discourse, linking it with aspects such as political ethics, libertarian beliefs, religious extremism, as well as deterrence.

It has been aptly said that terrorism is better understood as seen than as it is defined. Thus it is pertinent to explain the phenomenon before it is defined. Terrorism can be viewed as

- A non-traditional form of conflict.
- A mode of violent protest.
- A political message through a violent act.
- A violent act symbolizing a struggle.

From the above, the following characteristics can be inferred:

- Terrorism is a politically inspired act.
- It involves violence or threat of violence.
- It has symbolic significance.
- It is a fight and struggle against a stronger opponent, or enemy.

GTD is based on a definition of terrorism that is used by many open source databases, that defines terrorism as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation;[1] this seems to be a compact definition.

Andrew Sinclair gives the following 10 principles of terrorism:[2]

- Warfare by extreme means.
- Lifeblood of tyranny.
- Weapon of outlaw against oppressor.
- Murder on the cheap.
- Lash on the back of the refugee.
- Victory by stealth for the few.

- Defeat by cowardice for the crowd.
- We become terrible to those who make us fear.
- Measured by scale of victims, not merit of cause.
- Tolerance of terror is no virtue.

The above gives an idea of the varying perspectives, and how these differ. It is pertinent to ask whether terrorism is a political strategy or a war strategy? Is it a war of attrition or a violent protest? Or it is all of the above? Often it is a confrontation between a state and a non-state actor, at least in its current manifestation; today it is a political and a war strategy, as well as violent protest. It could be viewed in two related dimensions: in a personal dimension, it reflects personal disillusionment and moral outrage; in its public dimension, it is a potent political message (also caused by disillusionment). What is common to both is the template of a violent act. While the latter is exemplified by terrorist acts against the US, the former can be explained by the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by Mohammad Bouyeri in 2004 to express outrage at the filmmaker's anti-Islam movie, Submission. There are many other such cases of "self-recruited leaderless jihad" from Europe.[3]

So how to address (and understand) terrorism? Can it be viewed as "a collective rationality?"[4] Is it clash or contrast between modernity and primitivism, or simply a post-modern phenomenon?[5] Freedman views it as new type of war, also viewing it as a combination "of modern and primitive forms of warfare.'[6] Terrorism, post-9/11, has been termed New Terrorism, also, 'modern Islamic Terrorism,"[7] representing a paradigm shift within the discourse of terrorism. Could it be better understood exclusively in a theological context, symbolizing a religious-or civilizational-war? (many do see terrorism in this perspective, taking US-led WoT as 'war against Islam.") Samuel Huntington had highlighted this particular aspect when he wrote about and referred to a "clash of civilizations" in his celebrated article that stirred so much controversy.[8] One can only speculate if he could foresee a civilizational clash in the early 90s. In the wake of 9/11 attacks, President Bush picked up this theme soon after the 9/11 attacks,

when in an address to Congress, he said, "This is the world's fight. This is the civilization's fight."[9]

In simple words, terrorism can be seen as use of indiscriminate violence for political ends. The simple definition could be elaborated as an act of violence targeting non-combatants for political aims. A more refined definition reads as follows: a willful act of extreme violence targeting civilians but aimed at an avowed enemy. The definition is conditioned by the perspective—US, UN, western, Muslim. Whatever the "perspective," the "objectives" remain the same, death and destruction, political chaos and violence. These are the short-term objectives; the long-term objectives include political change, an ideal world or system, for instance, desire for an Islamic Caliphate. (The current wave of deadly terrorist attacks in Pakistan underscores this point.)

In the words of Freedman, 'terrorism is normally considered to be a coercive mechanism, part of a guerrilla strategy, in that actions create threats of worse to come if political demands are not met ….'[10] Hoffman focuses on violence alone, "terrorism is as much about the threat of violence as the violent act itself."[11]

Richardson explains the phenomenon in a more elaborate fashion:

Terrorists are substate actors who violently target noncombatants to communicate a political message to a third party. Terrorists are neither crazy nor amoral. They come from all parts of the world. They come from all walks of life. They fight for a range of different causes… They come from all religious traditions and from none. One thing they do have in common: they are weaker than those who they oppose.[12]

Each definition focuses on and highlights specific aspects, and ignores others, depending on the perspective. An important and controversial aspect of terrorism is "state terrorism," that in itself is controversial. In recent years, it has been overshadowed by the rise in religion-inspired militancy (that is not being discussed in this article).

What is Terrorism?

An understanding of terrorism also calls for taking into consideration the historical context. All accounts and discussions of terrorism refer to its past manifestations. In *An Anatomy of Terror*, Andrew Sinclair traces the phenomenon through history in its varied manifestations.[13] Among the well-known are: Sicarii or Zealots, who fought against Roman rule in Palestine; the Assassins, who represented a fanatic Islamic sect in the Middle East, who earned reputation as a gang of organized killers (Assassins); Thugs, gangs of highway robbers/killers, active in India till the 19th century; Ku Klux Klan, gangs of white racists who targeted the blacks in post-civil war America. In the modern times, politically motivated gangs and groups have proliferated cutting across national and geographic boundaries--IRA in UK, PLO, Hamas and Irgun in Palestine, PKK in Turkey, LTTE in Sri Lanka, Abu Sayyaf Group in Philippines, FARC in Colombia, FALN in Venezuela, MIRC in Chile, Shining Path in Peru, and ERP in Argentina, all earned reputation for fighting the state or targeting their opponents and enemies for extortion, and carrying out extermination with a political message.[14] Other outfits in the western countries, Red Brigade in Italy, Red Army in Germany, and Red Army in Japan also make the list of radical/revolutionary movements with a political agenda. While most of the above have been local in terms of their operation, the current wave is global in terms of operations, and has a manifest anti-US, anti-west bias.

Thus terror and terrorist are not new in history or society; they present and represent a wide array and cross-section in their evolution. Jacobin terror in France, Final Solution of Hitler, purges of Stalin, killing fields of Cambodia, My Lai massacre in Vietnam, and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans reflect the myriad forms of terrorism in individual and collective capacity in the past; these cases are generally not referred to in current terrorism discourse.

Bruce Hoffman traces modern terrorism to the late 1960s, to the hijacking of an El Al flight from Rome to Tel Aviv in 1968, by three Palestinians belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). This had a clear political message: to swap the

passengers for Palestinian prisoners;[15] this was followed by a wave of hijackings. Historically, "political message" has included struggle for independence, as in America, India and South Africa, giving birth to the trite phrase: one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. Many dispute that a terrorist can pass as a freedom fighter. The distinction between a freedom fighter and terrorist is tricky and acrimonious. PLO leader and President of Palestine Yasser Arafat thus tried to make the distinction:

> The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonists cannot possibly be called terrorist…As to those who fight against the just causes, those who wage war to occupy, colonize and oppress other people, those are the terrorists.[16]

Arafat's distinction is understandable, and makes sense. This distinction helped him overcome the stigma of "terrorism" after a long diplomatic struggle, till he became the president of Palestine. But the distinction bin Laden makes is problematic, drawing a murky line between good and bad terrorism:

> Terrorism can be commendable and terrorism can be reprehensible. Terrifying an innocent person and terrorizing them is objectionable and unjust, also unjustly terrorizing people is not right…The terrorism we practice is of the commendable kind for it is directed at the tyrants and the aggressors and the enemies of Allah, the tyrants, the traitors who commit acts of treason against their own countries and their own faith and their own prophet and their own nation. *Terrorizing those and punishing them are necessary measures to straighten things and to make them right.*[17] (emphasis added)

The above statement by bin Laden professes his worldview as well as the agenda and goals of al-Qaeda. Ostensibly, the agenda is global and transnational, thus many view bin Laden as not being conservative or orthodox. Others could point to his culpability in the

9/11 attacks referring to his two *fatwas* against the US, in 1996 and 1998, and in light of the above statement.

It is worth noting that today's terrorist—the "new terrorist"—is mostly not fighting for freedom. Many national leaders have advocated the use of force to further their personal or state's narrowly defined goals. As Richardson puts it: "So a terrorist is neither a freedom fighter nor a guerrilla. A terrorist is a terrorist, no matter whether or not you like the goal s/he is trying to achieve, no matter whether or not you like the government s/he is trying to change."[18]

The above discussion leads to the following postulates:

- The terrorist/s has/have serious grievance (carried from the past) that they share with the community; they not only want to share it, but want to impose it on all members of the community.
- Today's globalized world has made the job of recruitment and training much easier.
- Easy access to technology has solved the problem of communication as well as causing physical harm and destruction.
- Today's terrorism thrives on media coverage and attention.
- Terrorism emphasizes the role of non-state actors, who have a global reach, and a global agenda; thus terrorism has become truly transnational and globalized.
- It is the means not the ends that determine a terrorist act.
- Terrorism works, especially for the weak

It is said that the terrorists have truly reaped the benefits of globalization, in terms of openness of communities and communications, and access to such channels. This has facilitated them in pushing their agenda through networking, communication and deft use of technology. Gunaratna has aptly observed.

In the post-Cold War era, the transnational character of these terrorist groups has necessarily brought forth certain advantages, viz., global networking with potential allies, arms suppliers, and other terrorist groups, as also the generation of transnational support. Instead of resisting globalization, consequently, contemporary terrorist groups are actively harnessing contemporary forces of change.[19]

It is interesting to note that terrorism is practiced by the Right and the Left, with varying objectives and justifications. Two sets of variables are important to consider, the means and ends, and the nature of goals and how these are justified. These could be couched in political rhetoric or religious edicts.

In the recent past, terrorist was mostly a single person, a hijacker, or a kidnapper, an extortionist, or executioner. 9/11 brought a shift in this image, as the pictures of 19 hijackers flashed in the media in the days and months to come. They were all young men, and hailed from different parts of the Middle East; they represented a new generation of terrorists, as they did, a brand of terror. In Sageman's classification, these terrorists constituted the 'third wave' of radicals to be strirred by the ideology of global jihad.[20] The first wave comprised the Afghan Arabs who came to Pakistan and Afghanistan to fight the Soviets in the 1980s, and popularized the idea of *jihad*. The second wave comprised elite expatriates from the Middle East who went to the west to study at universities; these young men joined al-Qaeda's training camps in Afghanistan in the 1990s. The third wave consists

> …mostly of would-be terrorists, who, angered by the invasion of Iraq, aspire to join the movement and the men they hail as heroes. But it is nearly impossible for them to link up with al Qaeda central which was forced underground after 9/11. Instead, they form fluid, informal networks that are self-financed and self-trained. They have no physical headquarters or sanctuary, but the tolerant, virtual environment of the Internet offers them a semblance of unity and purpose. Theirs is a scattered, decentralized social structure—a leaderless jihad.[21]

Those who fit in this category include Mohammad Bouyeri, the murderer of Dutch filmmaker, Omar Sheikh, kidnapper and murderer of American journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan, and other wannabees, on both sides of the Atlantic, keen to play a role, and make a contribution in a global jihad against the West—not just the US. It is from this generation that recruitment is taking place in Europe, and that poses a threat in the future. These people belong to normal, often affluent families, are active members of the community they belong to, and are ticking time bombs.

Two peculiarities (and contradictions) of modern terrorism are worth noting. First, while a terrorist act does not bring the terrorists closer to their goal, they remain defiant, irrespective of success or failure; they rather deflect the blame on the other-- the enemy. Ramzi Yousaf during his trial in the US stated: "I support terrorism as long as it is used against the United States and Israel…You are more than terrorists. You are butchers, liars and hypocrites."[22] Second, the change they plan to effect through a terrorist act usually pushes their goal further away. Attacks in New York and Washington led to a war on terrorism, with the al-Qaeda on the run, as Bush promised. The same is the case with the extremists' goals in Pakistan. Military offensive in Swat reclaimed the area from their control; the ongoing operation in south Waziristan has the same goal, prompting violent terrorist acts wherever they can in pursuance of their cause.

Religious Dimension

The term 'religious terrorism' is an oxymoron; religion and terrorism do not mix. Yet, religion gives an extraordinary dimension to terrorism; this became more pronounced after 9/11. While many scholars picked this theme and explained terrorism in its religious context/dimension, Mark Juergensmeyer gave it classic expression after the end of the cold war—before the religious dimension became popular in the wake of 9/11 attacks. In *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State,* he writes:

Even ordinary religion contains strands of violence. Some of the world's most significant religious symbols are stained with

blood. The savage martyrdom of Husain in Shi'ite Islam, the crucifixion of Christ in Christianity, the sacrifices of Guru Tegh Bahadur in Sikhism, the bloody conquests detailed in the Hebrew Bible, the terrible battles celebrated in the Hindu epics, and the religious wars described in the Sinhalese Buddhist Pali chronicles—all these events indicate that in virtually every religious tradition images of violence occupy a central place.[23]

It is apt to say that more than providing reason, religion provides a justification for terrorism. In countries and areas where the political system was atrophied and the political process derailed, this phenomenon was linked with radicalization of politics, as in Lebanon and Afghanistan, and Palestine. End of the cold war, globalization and American hegemony coalesced to push the phenomenon across borders, in an anti-US strain.

Relationship between terrorism and religion is difficult to define, more so to sustain. It is easier to understand this phenomenon in the context of power or lack of it. In the words of Juergensmeyer, "…terrorism can give religion power as well. Although sporadic acts of terrorism do not lead to the establishment of new religious states, they make the political potency of religious ideology impossible to ignore."[24] Thus religious justifications provide a noble, almost unquestionable motive to a violent, inhuman act. In its recent invocation, Islamic edicts have been callously invoked to justify terrorist acts. After the terrorist acts of 9/11, a frequent question was not just "why would anyone want to do such a thing?" it was also, "why would anyone want to do such a thing in the name of God?"[25] Terrorist attacks in the mosques in Pakistan, targeting the worshippers, underscore this point.

This empowerment achieved through religious violence is important for those who have been denied power, or have been marginalized, and have never tasted power. Taliban provide a good example in the case of Afghanistan. They became prominent during the days of the civil war among the *mujahedin* groups and warlords following the Soviet withdrawal. As they captured more territory, dispensed justice, and brought a semblance of order to the war-torn country, they tasted power, and enforced their version of Islamic

Sharia. They formed the Afghan government, for whatever it was worth, carried its external relations, howsoever limited, including meetings with US officials and representatives of oil companies, UNOCAL and Bridas to discuss oil concessions.[26] This taste of power and religion-inspired self-righteousness led them to defy the world community (over the issue of destroying Buddha's statues at Bamiyan), rebuff the US over its call to hand over bin Laden after 9/11 attacks, and ignore its patron, Pakistan—that was empowerment. Role of Hamas in Palestine politics also illustrates the same point. Hamas' evolution is also a story of violent acts leading to empowerment.

Radical religious movements believing in and practicing violence have the following in common:[27]

- They reject the compromises with liberal values and secular institutions that most mainstream religion has made….
- They refuse to observe the boundaries that secular society has set around religion.
- They try to create a new form of religiosity that rejects what they regard as weak, modern substitutes for the more vibrant and demanding forms of religion….

Thus for the radical religious movements, the term secular is a profanity, and they target secular modernism. Anything not religious is secular, and anything secular is profane and un-Islamic. (While India remains predominantly religious and Hindu, most Pakistanis question India's secular credentials, and view secularism as irreligious.) That is the problem being faced by the new generation of Islamists in Europe, how to mix religion (practice in public) with their secular environment? Their lifestyle is a dangerous mix of modernity and religiosity, the extremist versions posing a threat to society.

Such Islamic radicals profess democratic leanings, but believe in authoritarianism, and do not allow dissidence (or

dialogue); they have been termed "Islamo-fascists." It has been noted that the

> Islamo-fascists are the most prominent of these groups and, perhaps, the most ruthless and unpleasant—not because of any features specific to Islam as a religion, but because of the particular conditions to be found within the so-called world of Islam; in particular the failure of any state or society with a majority of Islamic population to offer a convincing, non-fundamentalist model of modernity.[28]

The religious aspect of terrorism became more pronounced as terrorist acts continued in response to WoT, echoing anti-US sentiments. This became an almost universal protest movement, marking protest against US wars, and presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, and its pro-Israel policy in the Middle East. Jessica Stern aptly observes, "The religious terrorists we face are fighting us on every level –militarily, economically, psychologically, and spiritually. Their military weapons are powerful, but spiritual dread is the most dangerous weapon in their arsenal. Perhaps the most truly evil aspect of religious terrorism is that it aims at destroying moral distinctions themselves."[29]

Post-9/11 Context: War against Terrorism

The terrorist attacks of September 11, targeting the Twin Towers in New York, and Pentagon in Washington, DC, gave a new meaning to terrorism and a new face to the terrorist. Apart from the fact the all 19 of the 9/11 terrorists were Muslims, Muslims were either involved or implicated in subsequent terrorist acts in different parts of the world, from Bali to Barcelona (while many were preempted). The terrorist was no more faceless, his face covered by a hood or a scarf, someone looking and behaving sinister, as members of Red Brigade, Baader Meinhof, or Al-Fatah. The new generation of 'terrorists" was represented by regular people, young, educated and urbanized; they were, to borrow pop culture terms, "young and restless," and "rebels with a cause.'

9/11 has mostly been described in cliches as an event that changed the world, changed the way the world looked at security. Interestingly, in this case, hindsight is more disturbing than benefiting: seven months before the 9/11 attacks, *Newsweek* ran a cover story titled "Terror goes Global." Under the story, "Danger: Terror Ahead," the correspondents explained bin Laden's global network, spanning different continents.[30] Under another story, "A Spreading Islamic Fire," the correspondents wrote, "But bin Laden operates more like a venture capitalist than a conquering general. Think of it as Jihad Inc., together with its subsidiary, Jihad.com. How powerful has this multinational force become?"[31] This was to be known to the world in just seven months, in the most violent manifestation of terrorism the world had ever seen.

Richardson poignantly observes if we want to understand what changed on 9/11, we must first understand what happened before. Terrorism is not new, and it is not a modern phenomenon; examples go back at least as far as the first century after Christ. Terrorism is not now, and never has been, the sole preserve of Islam; the examples that follow are drawn from four religions and none, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Christianity, and atheism.[32]

In 2004, US State Department prepared a list of seventy-four terrorist groups; thirty-seven of these were Islamist groups, more active than the rest.[33]

In the September 11 attacks, the US had been the primary target and suffered grievous loss in terms of human and material cost; thus it led the world in response that had the following elements:

- Punishing (the Taliban in) Afghanistan, for harboring bin Laden and al Qaeda.
- Removing the Taliban government.
- Military presence in Afghanistan to fight and exterminate the al-Qaeda.
- Engaging Pakistan to help fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Thus started the War on Terrorism, later incorporated into the 2002 National Security Strategy of the Bush Administration. The war in Afghanistan in October 2001 was just a beginning, and became a war that was not going to end soon. The end of the Taliban government was the beginning of problems for the US as it became the main target of the al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The Taliban resurfaced in Afghanistan, and developed its Pakistan counterpart, *Tehrik Taliban Pakistan* that unleashed a reign of terror on the Pakistanis for Islamabad's support for the US WoT. (Many in Pakistan make a distinction between the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, or the good and bad Taliban). After a spate of deadly attacks in Peshawar, *TIME* commented:

For seemingly forever, Pakistan has been a state failing in myriad ways. Yet even by its treacherous standards, what has occurred over a very bloody recent week is depressing. Bombs in bazaars, assaults on the army—whether you are protected (soldiers) or not (shoppers), the militants are declaring, We can get at you. It's as if the country is becoming the hell Iraq was at its worst.[34]

As the new US administration under President Barack Obama mulls its Afghanistan policy, and as he continues his support for Pakistan in WoT, the problem of terrorism is far from being resolved. Terrorist threat to the US might have receded but its ally Pakistan is at the receiving end. In the month of October, more than 300 lives were lost in a surge of terrorist attacks in its capital Islamabad and Peshawar and its environs, as its armed forces set about fighting the extremists in South Waziristan, the turbulent bastion of Pakistan based Taliban; as the year ended, the military operation continued.

President Bush declared WoT to respond to the 9/11 attacks, and vowed to hunt down and eliminate al-Qaeda. US-backed coalition was able to remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, but it got bogged down in Afghanistan's treacherous mountains in its hunt for the Taliban and al-Qaeda leadership. Eight years on, there is no sight of bin Laden, and no sight of the end of this war. Surely the US policymakers have a better understanding of terrorism and the terrorist threat, but their war strategy has yet to

work in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The enemy remains faceless and elusive as the US struggles to grapple with the challenges of terrorism, in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and wherever its interests lie across the globe.

Conclusion

When the history of the immediate post-9/11 years comes to be written, it will be seen as a period marked by two major mistakes and two major missed opportunities. The mistakes were a declaration of war against terrorism and the conflation of the threat from al-Qaeda with the threat from Saddam Hussain. The missed opportunities were the opportunities to educate the American public to the realities of terrorism and to the costs of our sole superpower status and the opportunity to mobilize the international community behind us in a transnational campaign against transnational terrorists.[35]

One might disagree with the above comment by Richardson—Americans were educated to the realities of terrorism, perhaps for the first time after 9/11, and Washington successfully mobilized an international coalition for attacking Afghanistan, and in fighting the War on Terrorism. Nevertheless, Richardson's views point to many stark realities: that 9/11 has been marked by mistakes and missed opportunities; that the new face of terrorism has an indelible 9/11 link; and the predominant American role in fighting terrorism. The US charts the course and calls the shots in the War on Terrorism, and is the only country to have the political will and the resources to pursue this war. As the major victim of terrorism, it reserved the moral right and judgment over the issue. Most of the issues related to New—post-9/11-- strain of terrorism can be related to the above factors.

It is a cliché to say that terrorism is not a new phenomenon; while that is true, 9/11 changed the face of terrorism. In its post-9/11 manifestation, terrorism is different from the phenomenon the world witnessed in the 1960s and 1970s--the nationalist strain, and as struggle for independence. Now it is a violent political message, in a strident anti-west strain.

Terrorism today is a new form of non-traditional conflict, pitching a non-state actor or actors against major power/s. The new terrorist has the will to take on a superpower, and has the resources to access the latest technology. The terrorist still believes in guerrilla tactics, but these are more lethal and are aimed at causing greater damage, human and material. Following 9/11, the targets also have a symbolic value.

Post -9/11, terrorism has a marked Muslim connection. Despite what President George Bush and PM Tony Blair told their Muslim audiences, despite how the terrorists justify their goals and defend their actions, most acts of terrorism since 9/11 have been carried out by the Muslims—in Bali, London, Barcelona, besides other abortive attempts. It is debatable whether and how the US is responsible for all that is afflicting the Muslims in different parts of the world, and whether US policies in the Middle East call for targeting holidaymakers in a Bali club, and commuters in London underground, or on a Barcelona train. In a characteristic statement, bin Laden observed: "The truth is the whole Muslim world is the victim of international terrorism, engineered by America and the United Nations."[36]

While US presence in Afghanistan and Iraq is questionable, attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993, USS Cole in Aden and on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were carried out *before* the US attacked Afghanistan and Iraq. Continued US presence in Afghanistan and Iraq are important push factors in continuing terrorist attacks against the US. Pakistan is paying the price for its role and contribution in the War on Terrorism, besides some domestic factors.

While the tide of terrorism may not be ebbing soon, it remains as much linked to US policies as to the objective conditions in the Muslim world, denial of justice, poor human rights situation, and authoritarian rule. Addressing the "root causes" of terrorism need to be done in the Muslim societies, to start with, while the west need to revaluate its relations with authoritarian Muslim regimes.

The new face or brand of terrorism forms a new wave since 9/11; it calls into question many traditional postulates, like terrorism being caused by poverty, and carried out by the illiterate. Two aspects make the new wave of terrorism a significant and dangerous enterprise: its justification in the name of religion, and access to and deft use of technology. The War on Terrorism will go nowhere till the terrorists enjoy this luxury, and till the domestic and transnational sources of support are unplugged. This cannot take place so long as terrorism is seen as just an American obsession and the War on Terrorism as an American war.

Author

Dr. Noman Omar Sattar is Associate Professor and HoD of the recently established department of Strategic & Nuclear Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad. He has been a Fulbright fellow at University of Notre Dame, Indiana, and Salzburg Seminar alumni. He has given talks at National Defence University and Command and Staff College, Quetta, besides being a guest lecturer at different universities. He has contributed research articles to journals and chapters in books and occasionally contributes to papers.

Notes

[1] Quoted in Gary Lafree, Laura Dugan, Susan Fahey, "Global Terrorism and Failed States," in J Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2008* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2008), p.40.

[2] Andrew Sinclair, *An Anatomy of Terror. A History of Terrorism* (London: Macmillan, 2003), p.xvi.

[3] Marc Sageman, "The New Generation of Terror," *Foreign Policy*, March-April 2008, *p.39.*

[4] According to Martha Crenshaw, a radical political organization is seen as the central actor in the terrorist drama. The group possesses collective preferences or values and selects terrorism as a course of action from a range of perceived alternatives. "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice," in Walter Reich,ed., *Origins of Terrorism. Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), p.8.

[5] Chris Brown, "Narratives of Religion, Civilization and Modernity," in Ken Booth, Timothy Dunne, *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of World Order* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), p. 297.

[6] Lawrence Freedman, "A New Type of War," in Booth-Dunne, *Worlds in Collision*, p.37.
[7] Sinclair, *An Anatomy of Terror,* p.28.
[8] "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs,*vol.72 *(*1993).
[9] President Bush's address to joint houses of Congress, quoted by Chris Brown, "Narratives of Religion, Civilization and Modernity," in Booth-Dunne, *Worlds in Collision*, p.295.
[10] Freedman, "A New Type of War," in Booth-Dunne, *Worlds in Collision,* p.37.
[11] Bruce Hoffman, "Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Terrorism in the United States," Santa Monica: Rand, 1998, p.38.
[12] Louise Richardson, *What Terrorists Want* (New York: Random House, 2006), p.20.
[13] Sinclair, *Anatomy of Terror.*
[14] Besides Sinclair and Richardson, many others in the post-9/11 era made effort to explain different types of terrorism, and referred to the above manifestations. For example, Michael Ignatieff, *The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terrorism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
[15] Hoffman, "Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Terrorism…"
[16] As Quoted in Richardson, *What Terrorists Want,*p.1.
[17] Quoted ibid., p.7.
[18] Ibid., p.10.
[19] Rohan Gunaratna, "Transnational Terrorism. Support Networks and Trends.'
[20] Marc Sageman, "The Next Generation of Terror," *Foreign Policy,* March/April 2008, p.38.
[21] Ibid, pp.38-39.
[22] As quoted in Sinclair, *An Anatomy ofTerror,*p.343.
[23] Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp.153-54.
[24] "Terror in the Name of God," *Current History,* November 2001, p.358.
[25] Ibid., p.357.
[26] Discussed in detail by Ahmad Rashid, *Taliban. Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000)
[27] Juergenymeyer, "Terror in the Name of God," p.358.
[28] Chris Brown, "Narratives of Religion, Civilization and Modernity," in Booth-Dunne, *Worlds in Collision: Terrorism and the Future World order* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), p.300.
[29] Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God. Why Religious Militants Kill* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003), p.296.
[30] *Newsweek,* February 19, 2001, pp.14-17.
[31] Ibid., p.18.
[32] Richardson, *What Terrorists Want* (New York: Random House, 2006),p.23.
[33] Ibid., p.61.
[34] *TIME,* October 26, 2009, p.7.
[35] Richardson, p.170.
[36] Quoted Ibid., p.45.

NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO SOUTH ASIA

Dr. Raja Muhammad Khan

General

South Asia, the home to one fifth of humanity is endowed with abundant natural resources. However, like other developing world, it has so far failed to realize its full potential. In recent years, a significant economic growth has been witnessed in the region especially in India. Nevertheless, even this economic development remained unable to alleviate poverty, diseases, environmental hazards, and unemployment, mainly due to existence of both traditional as well as and non-traditional security threats, which consume major chunk of the limited regional resources. While the political stakes are very high in case of traditional security issues, non-traditional security problems can be resolved through cooperative efforts without encumbering the political and historical baggage.

The region needs paradigm shift to solve its multifaceted problems. Focus on non-traditional security challenges would be one way of preventing the region from further chaos and instability. In today's age of globalization, because of the ubiquitous traditional and non-traditional challenges, South Asia is considered as one of the most vulnerable region on the globe. Since the bulk of region's GDP is spent on defence budgets and other non-developmental expenditures, therefore, only a minuscule attention could be paid to meet the challenges of the non-traditional security threats to the region. There is an urgent need for the regional countries to evolve a cooperative framework wherein joint strategies could be worked out to resolve the non-traditional security threats.

In defining the non-traditional security, Chinese General Xiong laid down criterions, which says; these transcend national boundaries, hence transnational in character, go beyond the military sphere, have a sudden and unexpected appearance and more "frequently interwoven with traditional security threats".[1] The non-

traditional security threats include; environmental degradation, irregular migrations, infectious diseases, drug trafficking, terrorism and insurgencies, transnational crimes, water and power shortages and natural disasters. Together with many others implicit ones, these threats are dangerously threatening the human security in South Asia. As a corollary to these threats, over 35 percent[2] South Asian population suffers from abject poverty.

Inaction and lack of political will to address non-traditional security challenges indirectly exacerbates the traditional security threat to the region. Adding to it, the lack of trust between the two traditional rivals; India and Pakistan further creates an element of improbability in the regional stabilization. While the significance of the confidence building and maintenance of the prevalent level of deterrence to traditional security threats cannot be overemphasized, all South Asian states would have to shift their focus to address the non-traditional security threats to their viscous securities through a collective vow.

Main Argument

This paper aims to bring into sharp focus various types of non-traditional security threats, which are afflicting the South Asian region. An attempt has been made to examine why the regional security is inextricably linked to the real threats and is given a superficial treatment. However, the instability to regional security calculus will exacerbate if the South Asian states do not collectively address the issues related to human security caused by aforementioned non-traditional security threats. The central question of the paper is; how South Asian countries could be integrated to fight their common enemies, posing threat to its over 1.6 billion populace. With the hope that all countries of the region will recognize this common threat and embark upon joint efforts to address it to the benefit of all, an endeavour is being made to explore the common grounds for the cooperation and integration at the regional level while dealing with these non-traditional threats.

Conceptual Understanding

Re-conceptualisation of security has become necessary because of gradual but fundamental and long-term changes in the international system. Some of the prime factors that have necessitated a new thinking on the concept and scope of security studies are the demise of cold war that has led to global interdependent world; states are now more than ever dependent on international society and institutions.

Human security and development are the main non-traditional security challenges to South Asia. Except Sri Lanka and Maldives, the conflict prone region falls at the bottom quartile of the human development index. With respect to the human poverty index, South Asian countries are on the breadline once compared with rest of the world. This is the only region in the world, which spends less than 30 US dollars per capita on healthcare per year, which is even 2/3rd of what Sub-Saharan Africa.[3] Based on purchasing power parity of 1 US dollar a day, over 35 percent people[4] of South Asia survive below the poverty line. This percentage would be doubled, if the universal criterion of US $2 a day is made as the basis for drawing the poverty line in South Asia. In that case, 80 percent Indians and 73.6 percent Pakistanis would fall in the category of poor.[5]

Against the backdrop of all these factors, the late 20th century has seen a rise of non-traditional security issues (in particular human security). The genealogy of the idea can be related to if not traced back to the growing dissatisfaction with prevailing notions of development and security in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Economics undoubtedly led the way with its critiques of the dominant models of economic development beginning in the 1960s. Beginning in the 1970s, the Club of Rome group produced a series of volumes on the "world problematique" which were premised on the idea that there is a complex of problems troubling men of all nations: the poverty. Degradation of the environment: alienation of youth: rejection of traditional values and inflations and other monetary and economic disruptions.[6] In the 1980's two other independent commissions contributed to the changing thinking on

development and security: the first was the Independent Commission on International Development Issues chaired by Willy Brandt, which, in 1980, issued the so-called "North –South report". This report not only raised traditional security issues like peace and war, but also issues like how to overcome world hunger, mass misery, and alarming disparities between the living conditions of rich and poor.[7]

The second commission of the 1980s the Independent Commission on Disarmament and security issues (chaired by Olof Palme) authored the famous "common security" report, which also drew attention to alternative ways of thinking about peace & security. It acknowledged that common security requires that people live in dignity and peace, that they have enough to eat and are able to find work and live in a world without poverty and destitution. [8] In 1991 Stockholm initiative on *Global Security and Governance* issued a call for "common responsibility in the 1990s which referred to" challenges to security other than political rivalry and armaments" and to a wider concept of security, which deals also with threats that stem from failures in development, environmental degradation, excessive population growth and movement, lack of progress towards democracy.

The renowned economist and the former Pakistani finance minister, Dr. Mahbub ul Haq (late), had ranked human security at a higher pedestal than the territorial, national, or regional security. Being one of its pioneers, Dr. Haq presented the concept of human security in UN Development Programme in 1994. He was of the view that; though the migration of the poor may be blocked cogently, but the tragic consequences of their poverty would travel without a passport.[9]

The Canadians also gave a people centric view of security in 1996 when their foreign minister Lloyd Anworthy in an address to the 51st UN General Assembly first broached the idea of human security on behalf of his government. By focusing on people and highlighting non-traditional security, the UNDP has certainly made an important contribution to post Cold War thinking.

Richard H Shultz describes NTS as complex, involving a myriad of threats (internal, regional and transnational), wherein a large number of actors are involved (governmental & non-governmental), where violence is generated not only by conventional physical force, but also by economic, environmental and social forces.[10]

Roberts Mac Namara argues," It is increasingly being realized that it is poverty, not the lack of military hardware that is responsible for insecurity across the southern half of the planet".[11] To prove this statement one can see in countries like Rwanda, Liberia, and Somalia & Zaire, wherein environmental threats and poverty were the major cause of civil war and infightings hampering the traditional security parameters. According to Barry Buzan, a security analyst, there are three-pronged debates/ approaches to security studies in the post cold war era. First school of thought is the Traditionalist who retains the military focus of security. Second school of thought is the widener, who extends the range of security issues to include threats other than military ones. Third school of thought is the Critical security studies who have a questioning attitude to the whole framework in which security is conceptualized[12].

Dynamics of Non-traditional Threats

Apart from its benefits, the globalisation has created a fright whereby, "a threat to one is a threat to all",[13] an argument echoed by a high-level panel at the UN that studied the nature of hazards to global security.[14] Indeed the concept of security has transcended the traditional geographical borders of state(s) and the military force can no more be considered the only measure to ward off threat to the securities of nations.[15] This transition in the concept of security is a product of globalization. The non-traditional security threats are non-military in nature and transnational in scope[16].These are indeed neither domestic nor purely interstate, rather appear at a very short notice, cause colossal losses and transmitted rapidly due to globalization and communication revolution.[17]

The non-traditional security threats like natural calamities and the non-state human actions, cannot be restrained within the geopolitical boundaries and hence affect governments, people, societies and institutions alike within or across the geographical boundaries of a state. As globally agreed, these threats are three-dimensional in nature: first; purely related to the natural disasters like hurricanes, floods and droughts, earthquakes, tidal waves, volcano eruptions and avalanches. Likewise, it also includes; outbursts of communicable diseases like; HIV/ AIDS, tuberculosis, SARS, swine flu, etc. The second dimension includes the semi natural threats that affect the essential resources and economic conditions of the nation states like water shortages, scarcity of energy resources, poverty and unemployment, etc. The third category however is purely manmade and appears in the forms of; terrorism, deforestation, transnational crimes, insurgencies, trafficking in illegal drugs, weapons and migrants, etc. Natural disasters and manmade security crises can potentially lead to mass migrations and displacements.

Indeed, the non-traditional security threats have inextricably linked the fates of even those states that are not geographically contiguous to each other. These threats can affect their sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as the safety of their respective societies.[18] Non-traditional threats range from a portion of a state to the region and ultimately engulf the global security. Since no state alone can handle the multiple non-traditional threats by itself, therefore, in the contemporary world, every nation state requires regional and global cooperation to make itself secure. These threats are eventually causing dangers to the human security and development in the region.[19]

The sub-Himalayan South Asian region, one of the most densely populated geographical region of the world that is marred by both traditional and non-traditional security threats.[20] Otherwise, the regional politics is careworn by the frequent divergences and political instabilities, mainly caused by the nuclear rivals; the India and Pakistan. Three major wars between India and Pakistan and natural disasters have resulted in to big loss of life and have increased impoverishment. War and conflict have marginalised the

potential of SAARC since its inception in 1985 and there perished over 130,000 people due to natural disasters since the beginning of the new millennium and less than 30,000 people in all major wars and minor clashes between India and Pakistan.

Human Development Profile of South Asia.

A brief data of human development in South Asia is given below. [21]

Countries	**HDI Ranking**	**Life Expectancy at Birth (years)**	**Adult literacy rate (% age 15 and above)**	**GDP per Capita (PPP US$)**	**Human Development Index (HDI) Value**
Maldives	100	66.5	97.2	5,261	0.741
Sri Lanka	99	71.9	91.1	4,595	0.743
Afghanistan	-	46.0	28.1	250	-
India	128	63.4	64.8	3,452	0.691
Pakistan	136	62.9	48.7	2,370	0.551
Nepal	142	61.5	48.6	1,550	0.534
Bhutan	133	62.8	47	1,969	0.579
Bangladesh	140	62.6	41.1	2,053	0.547

These estimates have been taken from the Statesman's Year Book-2009 that contains figures of year-2008. However, there is a further slide in the Human Development Indexes (HDI) of almost all South Asian countries during 2009. As per new HDI, ranking India is at 134, Pakistan-141 and Bangladesh at 146.[22] Norway is number one at the global HDI chart and U.S at number 13. Indeed, the HDI endows with a combined measure of three dimensions of human development: the life expectancy (healthy living); adult literacy rate (educational standard) and purchasing power parity measured by the income level[23].

Non-Traditional Threats Tearing the Inner Fabric of the Region

As per the global seismic record, South Asia is positioned among the world's most vulnerable seismic prone regions with regard to the natural as well as manmade disasters[24]. In its recent history, the region has sustained 15 out of the 40 major disasters in the world between 1970 and 2000.[25] The region has undergone extensive geological and tectonic process in history. Over fifty-four percent area of India alone is vulnerable to the earthquakes. Tracing the previous history of the earthquakes in South Asia; in 1905, Kangra, a city of Indian state of Himachal Pradesh was shattered by the worst earthquake of 7.9 magnitudes at Richter scale, killing 20,000 people. In 1935, an earthquake of 7.6 magnitudes with the resultant death of 35000 people jolted Quetta.[26] A similar earthquake hit Indian city of Gujrat in 2001, killing 11500 people. In 1945, 2000 people died once an earthquake of 7.9 magnitudes hit the areas of Makran coast in Pakistan.[27]

On December 26, 2004, the Indian Ocean Tsunami caused over 40,000 deaths in India, Sri Lanka, and Maldives alone. Overall, the tsunami caused over 230,000 deaths in eleven countries, major being the Indonesia,[28] and inundating vast coastal areas. In October 2005, a devastating earthquake with the magnitude was of 8.6 on the Richter scale killed over 73000 people and injured cum disabled approximately 100,000 people in northern Pakistan. Besides, it left over 2.8 million people homeless. Over $3 billion were expended on the rehabilitation of the Tsunami victims in Sri Lanka, India, and Maldives. However, the rehabilitation of the 2005 earthquake victims is still in progress. As an estimate, over $7 billion would be required for completion of this gigantic task. As per estimates in the last 25 years natural disasters have killed nearly half a million people in South Asia besides inflicting colossal financial damages worth US$ 59,000 million.[29]

Prior to 2005, there existed no worthwhile mechanism in almost all South Asian countries to deal with the post-disastrous phenomenon like rescue and relief. Following the December- 2004 Tsunami and October 2005 Earthquake, South Asian countries started implementing the strategies for disaster mitigation and risk

reduction. India and Pakistan established their respective National Disaster Management Authorities (NDMA). Indeed, the very first step towards concerted and coordinated regional action on disaster risk reduction ought to be a clear understanding of the depth and extent of hazards, vulnerabilities and likely losses due to disasters. The system will strive for key improvements in disaster preparedness and response with regard to the three R's concept: Rescue, Relief and Rehabilitation.[30] However, still there is a need for an all round paradigm shift to proactive measures in the approach to disaster mitigation.[31] There is a pressing need for a disaster preparedness and management system at the level of South Asia, which would promote regional cooperation to ensure security from natural disasters.

Major Human Security Challenges to the Region

Migrations and Displacements. As a common phenomenon, migration and displacements of the people have always taken place in the history of humankind. Following the Europe, Asia stood second with 49.7 million migrants in 20th century.[32] Within Asia, South Asia alone has a record of 35 - 40 million[33] permanent migrations, mostly taken place as result of partition of subcontinent in 1947. Bulk of the migration was motivated by ethno-religious or the ideological factors. Within South Asia, the mass migrations took place between India and Pakistan, including Bangladesh; as the former part of Pakistan. Nepal and Sri Lanka had also undergone migration in those initial days of independence.

In its subsequent history, over ten million people have migrated from one country to another within South Asia. As per world migration record, out of the top ten countries of mass migration, three are located in the contemporary South Asia. These include; Afghanistan 4.1 million migrants, Bangladesh 4.1 million migrants and Sri Lanka with 1.5 million migrants.[34] Migrations from Afghanistan have taken place mainly because of the Russian invasion from 1979 to 1989 and internal instability thereafter till-date. Whereas, the migrations from Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have

been caused by economic factors or compelled by environmental degradation and natural disasters.

In the same region, Pakistan and India are hosting a huge population of the migrants, ranked as the tenth, and sixth respectively in the world ranking of migrant hosting countries.[35] Pakistan is mainly affording the Afghan refugees where 2.5 millions are still holding on in the country from the initial 3.5 million took refuge in 1980s.[36] Besides, Pakistan is also accommodating over 1.5 million Kashmiri refugees, migrated from Indian Occupied Kashmir during the period from 1948 to 1990s. The country is paying a heavy price in terms of economic cost and internal demographic problems created because of the migrants over the years.

In the near past, the country has tackled with the issues of internally displaced people (IDPs). Over two million people from Swat, Malakand, South Waziristan and surrounding areas were displaced either because of the brutalities of militants or else as a safeguard measures, prior to the military operations against the militants. Their relief, temporary settlement at new locations, and finally resettlement to their native towns was a gigantic task, undertaken by the Government of Pakistan successfully. This process caused heavy economic losses, endangered physical security of the people and numerous damages to the houses, properties and other belongings of the IDPs.

Migration in India has mainly taken place on the economic basis.[37] There is reciprocity of economic interests in India; the migrants contribute in terms of their labour and expertise in the Indian economy and in turn, benefitted too. In practical terms, India is gaining from these migrants. They had neither created any domestic instability for India nor made demographic changes in the Indian population. On the contrary, migrants in Pakistan have been a great threat for the internal stability and have caused demographic changes and economic losses; the country is likely to suffer even in the days to come. Sri Lanka is facing a similar scenario. Another series of invisible threats is the; human trafficking, sexual exploitation, organized crime, violent abuse and economic

exploitation. "Human trafficking not only adversely affects individuals but can also undermine respect for whole groups".[38]

Environmental Threats. "Environmental threats do not respect national boundaries, and no single state or group of states can successfully cope with the environmental threats"[39]. Indeed, there always have been ruthless threats to the human survival from the environmental dilapidations. In the historical perspective, it was the environmentally created declining birth rate originated from the use of lead in water pipes, which ultimately led to the fall of the great Roman Empire[40]. In the medieval Europe, the dearth of sanitation gave way to the rapid spread of diseases like Cholera. In the contemporary world, Swine Flu, has sensationally spread worldwide and has so far caused death of 6300 people. Avian influenza and SARS have spread borderless to engulf the humanity from all over.[41]

At the global level, so far only six countries (New Zealand and five North European countries) could achieve over 85% results in meeting the environmental goals like; availability of clean air and water, environmental health, biodiversity and sustainable energy[42]. The South Asian giant India; having the third highest growth rate in Asia, after China and Japan, is ranked at 118th in meeting the environmental goals as determined through an index developed by Yale University's Centre for Environmental Law and Policy[43]. Other South Asians are placed even at lower pedestal than India.

The rapid increase in the South Asian population is yet another threat to the region. Three South Asian countries namely; India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh constitute the world fastest growing populations. Otherwise, world population has increased from one billion in 1804 to six billion in 1999 and likely to touch the figure of nine billion in 2050. South Asia alone houses 1.6 billion populations,[44] which is highest in the world once compared with the other regions of the same size.

This population expansion in the South Asia has seriously threatened to overwhelm the economic development and diminution in the standard of living. Over population is causing depletion in the

available resources, which in turn increase the poverty in the region. Linked with the population is the rapid urbanization in the South Asian region. India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh are extremely pretentious over this rapidly changing social trend, which has quickly expanded the size of cities. Flooding of the rural population towards cities has created urban nightmares, overtaxing of existing facilities and dense concentration of poverty.[45]

The swelling population warrants proportionate increase in the food requirements, which demand for intensive farming. The process in turn causes soil erosion, salinity, deforestation, and desertification. According to World Food and Agricultural Organization, 53000 square miles of tropical forests were damaged in the decade of 1980s and from 2000 to 2005, an area equal to that of Sierra Leone has been deforested annually at the global level.[46] The worst deforestation in South Asia took place by creating sandbars in the Bay of Bengal by silt runoff from the Himalayas. The local Bengali population, dwelling over these islands is more frequently troubled during annual cyclones.[47] Pakistan is also rapidly losing its forests through illegitimate cuttings and burning of forests. Deforestation also results into the loss of the biodiversity.

Like other developing countries of the world, "slash and burn technique",[48] is being used to create additional farmland by clearing forests in the South Asia. The process emits carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide into the atmosphere. Emission of these gases heavily contributes towards greenhouse effects. Just for the clarity, the greenhouse effect is indeed the "rise in temperature that the earth experiences because certain gases in the atmosphere trap energy from the sun".[49] Apart from this, the nitrous oxide also contributes in the destruction of the ozone layer, which protects all living beings from the dangerous ultraviolet rays of the sun.

Submergence Hazards in South Asia. Apart from the land-based countries of the region, the global warming and climate change is seriously affecting the island countries. In South Asia, Maldives is one such example, whose land area is only about 300 square kilometres, as compared to 100,000 square kilometres vast sea area.[50] Over 80 percent of the country's land area is just less

than one meter (3.3 feet) above the mean sea level. As forecasted by environmental experts, owing to the global warming, there is a gradual increase in the sea level and by the end of the century, this increase would reach to 18 centimetres[51] that may submerge Maldives' 193 inhabited islands along with its 999 untenanted coral islands scattered off the southern tip of India. Under these trepidations, the Maldivian President has already launched a global campaign for the purchase of new homeland for his people and as a mark of protest organized an underwater cabinet meeting in the open sea in October 2009.

UN Climate Conference held from December 1-12, 2008 at Poznan,[52] expressed its concern over the future of Maldives.[53] Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and some islands of India are also facing similar environmental threats in the longer run. Unfortunately, no meaningful consensus could be achieved on the issues of environmental threats even during the recently concluded, UN Climate Change Conference held at Copenhagen from 7-18 December -2009. With major industrial powers remaining as obstacles, a "10 billion-dollars-a-year, three-year programme", has been launched for the financial assistance of developing countries in areas like; drought, floods, and to develop clean energy.[54]

The Rising Water Scarcity. Gradual diminishing of fresh water is very vital non-traditional security threat. As per the global statistics, only 3 percent fresh water is available for the human consumption. The remaining 97 percent is either seawater or otherwise unfit for the human use. Out of the available fresh water, 70 percent is utilized for agriculture, 20 percent for industry and human beings are utilizing the remaining 10 percent only.[55] There is an acute shortage of the fresh water in the South Asia. In India alone, 700 million people[56] lack clean drinking water. This shortage also causes death of roughly 2.1 million children[57] annually at the age of less than five years in India.

The main source of South Asian water is the Tibetan Plateau, housing world's fifth largest fresh water resources amounting to 5000 cubic km.[58] Together with South Asia; this plateau provides water to Southeast Asian countries, constituting 47 percent of the

world's population.[59] Like other regions of the world, the lakes and rivers of South Asia are also drying up or else being polluted rapidly. Since China is planning to divert the Tibetan water to its north and northeastern provinces, therefore, South Asia is likely to face more water scarcity than ever before. Otherwise, the Ganges River in India and Indus River in Pakistan have hardly left with enough water for dropping into the seas, which seriously affects the surrounding agricultural land. Moreover, the Dal Lake in Indian Occupied Kashmir and Manchar Lake in Pakistan are facing water shortages and assimilation of salt particles respectively.[60]

According to an estimate by 2030, requirement of food grains would increase by 67% in all developing countries[61] particularly in the South Asia. To meet this requirement of additional grains, there would be a need of adequate fresh water, which is running short of the regional requirements. By 2025, all the countries of the region less Bangladesh would face severe water shortages.[62] Pakistan will be facing a short fall of 102 billion cubic meter of water per year, whereas Bangladesh would have 1133 billion cubic meters of fresh water per year as excess. Other South Asian countries would be facing corresponding shortages of water by 2025. [63]

Contrary to other regions of Asia and Europe, there have been poor water management in South Asia. India, the major country of the region has been unjustly manipulating the regional water. Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan are the main victims of Indian water burglary.[64] Being upper riparian country, it has frequently violated the 1960 Indus Basin Water Treaty, which clearly lays down the water distribution formula between India and Pakistan. Over the years, India has constructed a number of dams aimed at; either the illegal diversion or storage of the water of the Pakistani rivers.[65] It has also impelled Afghan Government to construct Kama Hydroelectric Project, using 0.5MAF of Pakistan water on Kabul River[66] by providing all out financial and technical assistance in the construction of the project. As a pursuance of its water manipulation, it is predicted that by 2015, all the rivers leading to Pakistan would be left with less than 50% water as compared to the current quantity of water.[67]

In case of Bangladesh, another lower riparian country, India is violating the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty (GWST) and is not allowing the exact share of the former from the waters of Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers. Contrary to Pakistan and Bangladesh, Nepal, the only Hindu state in the world, is an upper riparian country. In spite of having a formal agreement between India and Nepal through the "Treaty of Mahakali", concluded in February 1996, India is not permitting Nepal to establish hydroelectric projects to meet its basic energy needs. Presently, Nepal is utilizing only 1 percent of its available potential of 83000 megawatts hydroelectric power potential.

Meeting the Energy Needs. In the South Asian environment, energy has an intimate linkage with the water. Hydroelectric power project have proved the most cheap and feasible energy resources. Water storage through dams serves multiple purposes like management of water for irrigation as well as production of electricity. Indian water manipulation has badly affected this particular aspect. Nepal having one of the largest hydroelectric potential is able to utilize only 1 percent of it and electricity is available to its only 40 percent population.[68] In Bangladesh, less than 30 percent [69] people have the electricity available to them. India too is facing power shortages up to 15000 to 20000 megawatts[70]. Pakistan is passing through the worst energy crises of its history with power shortages ranges from 1500 to 2500 MW.

To meet the energy shortages, natural gas, thermal energy resources, and nuclear energy means are being made use of by the South Asian countries. The recent Indo-US and Indo-Russian nuclear deals may be sustaining the growing energy needs of India, but other regional countries would continue suffering the energy shortages for a long time. Owing to its geo-politics, Pakistan has the potential to become the energy hub for the regional countries including China. Oil and gas from Central Asia and Middle East to India and other South Asian countries and China can be transported through the Pakistani soil, which would enhance regional integration.

Small Arms and Light Weapons. At the global level, the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) has become nuisance. SALW include; pistols/ revolver, hunter rifles, Machine guns, rocket launchers and other light weapons that can be carried by one or two personnel. According to an estimate, over 639 million[71] SALW are in circulation in the world, which means one SALW for every 10 people on earth. 8 million SALW are manufactured each year mainly by; US, Russia and China. According to one estimate, 500,000 people[72] become victim of SALW each year. The trade volume of small arms is $ 4-5 billion per year and civilians purchase 80% of these.

There is a growing use of SALW in South Asia too. All internal conflicts in South Asia; eight in India, two in Pakistan, two in Afghanistan and one each in Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have been fought through SALW. In South Asia, there are over 75 million firearms, out of which 63 million are held by civilian population[73]. India has 40 million; Pakistan has 20 million, and three million in Nepal and Sri Lanka[74]. Indeed such weapons are the, "slow weapons of mass destruction."[75] There exist a linkage between illegal SALW and underdevelopment, which further promotes transnational crimes and terrorism. Former Indian Premier Indra Ghandi, Former Pakistani Premier Benazir Bhutto, Bangladeshi President Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and many others key persons in South Asia were killed by SALW.

In South Asia, Afghanistan can be taken as a case study. In the post-Soviet withdrawal scenario, a disarmament programme was launched in 1989, which focused only on weaponry, and thus the ex-combatants did not feel integrated into society, providing the basis for transnational terrorist training camps. More than a decade later, the US has also started supplying Northern Alliance troops with SALW[76] before launching attack on Taliban Administration in October 2001 and even thereafter.

HIV /AIDS Pandemic. Until the end of 20th century, HIV/AIDS was regarded as a health issues. It was only after January 10, 2000, that United Nations Security Council[77] convened the first ever meeting in which HIV/ AIDS was declared as the threat to the

international peace and security and a form of non-traditional security threat. As per global estimates, there lived 39.4 million[78] people with HIV /AIDS in the world in 2004. Out of these 37.2 million are adults (15-49 years age bracket) and 2.2 million children are of less than 15 years of age. It is expected that by the end of 2010, the number of the AID/ HIV affected people would rise to 45 million worldwide. So far, 25 million people have died of HIV/AIDS. In 2004 alone, there died 3.1 million people, which mean that as on average almost "three times as many persons continue to die from AIDS related illness every day, than died during the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001.[79]

This deadly disease is not limited to its epicentre, Sub-Saharan Africa, rather has spread all around the globe. As per UNAID, the World Bank estimates, there live 3-3.5 million people with this deadly disease in South Asia. Ever since the detection of the first case of the HIV/AIDS in 1980s, in South Asian region, until 2007, the country wise detail of infected people in South Asia is: India; 2.45-3 million people, Pakistan; 80,000 and Nepal; 75,000, Bangladesh; 11,000, Afghanistan; 1000, Bhutan 500 people.[80] "South Asia today is home to the second highest number of people living with HIV/AIDS, with approximately 13 per cent of the world total. The epidemic poses the greatest threat to India, which is home to 97 per cent of South Asia's HIV/AIDS infected population. According to another estimate, India had 5.1 million people with HIV/AID in 2005 and this strength would increase three times by 2010.[81]

The pandemic is not restricted to an individual affected by HIV/AIDS virus but it spread on to its family and subsequently will have a plethora of wider economic, political, demographic, and social implications[82] requiring deliberation and careful handling. The economic aspect linked with such scourge is that those affected by it would not be able to earn for themselves or for their families. Apart from this, there would be less or selective economic activities in areas affected by HIV/AIDS. Socially, the people living with the syndrome get a stigma and subsequently are isolated, which is worse than the ailment even. In quantitative terms HIV/AIDS is amongst

the first five causes of the deaths, as it kills three million people each year; a ratio, ten times more than the armed conflicts.[83]

The Way Forward

Non-traditional security threats do not respect borders; hence, it is difficult to find their solutions at national level. Rather countering these threats demands synergistic international or at least regional efforts. Within South Asia, there is a need for comprehensive responses at political, economic, and social level, all to be coordinated at the platform of SAARC. Owing to the perpetual trust deficit among the South Asian states, the foremost requirement would be to restore the trust in order to bring harmony of thought processes among the regional stakeholders. Overcoming this nightmare would enable us to embark upon the resolution track of the non-traditional security threats in South Asia as a cohesive force.

Prospects for a Collective Regional Response

An empirical and temporal assessment of non-traditional threats to the safety and security of South Asians shows that its 1.6 billion people are more vulnerable to hazards of migration, displacement, human security, environmental degradation, natural calamities, water scarcity, energy deficiency, HIV/AIDS, and small arms proliferation. Unlike the traditional sources, the non-traditional security threats present a bigger challenge as well as opportunity to South Asia. These threats are common in nature, beyond the management capacity of an individual state and can be tackled jointly. Hence, if the states work together at SAARC forum and make it more effective and powerful; the effects of traditional security threats will be largely mitigated. Except water issues, there appears no worthwhile variance among the South Asian nations for a regional approach to solve the non-traditional security threats. Water too is becoming a compulsion for every state to be resolved justly, while taking into considerations the requirements of each country. The following recommendations proffer the way forward.

Collective Pledge to Resolve Environmental Issues

Since no country can 'wall itself off from threats to the environment', therefore the problems linked with the environment always bring collective dilemmas or goods for every country in the world in various ways from state to state. Moreover; these issues have their political, economic, health, ecological and even military dimensions, hence cannot be dealt in isolation. Instead, there are interstate qualms and grumbles. For example, an issue or doing serving interest of one country may become a nuisance or cause harm to another country. Analyzing the global warming, the borderless issue has become a great threat for countries like Maldives, which may submerge under sea by the end of 21st century. Nevertheless, the industrial countries like India are not restraining from this global remorse; on the plea that, industrialization is must for its economic development and provide job opportunities to the unemployed masses, a collective benefit of humanity. Similarly, developing countries desire that developed countries should make efforts to reduce the effects of greenhouse gases, which is not acceptable to industrial world.

The recommended recipe is that, through a collective wisdom, the limits of industrial growth should be clearly defined for each country especially the major industrial world. In order to reduce the effects of the climate change, measures like increase in the growth of forests and vegetation in the affected areas could be accorded a top priority. Moreover, the passive measures like reduction in the use of fossil fuels by shifting over to the renewable means of energy, which is comparatively clean and less hazardous to the environment and human health.

Disaster Management Strategy

The phenomenon of the natural disaster is a reality, but it is beyond the control of human beings to unerringly forecast as to when and where a natural disaster is going to come about. However, what is in the hands of human beings is to prepare and arrange for dealing with the dangers, which natural disasters bring about. This

uphill task has to be undertaken at the level of individuals, community, and the governments.

At the level of the governments, an early warning system has to be emplaced and made effective in the environs of all those locations which are likely to be engulfed by the natural disasters like; earthquakes-prone areas and the coastal areas vulnerable to hurricanes. The people of these areas must have comprehensive information about the evacuation routes and safe locations for the subsequent stay until the danger is over. In order to bring perfection, the locals of threat prone areas may rehearse these precautionary measures. For an efficient handling, there is a need that people of all these areas should be forewarned through a campaign as what should be the modus operandi for initial handling of the situation, until the national and regional efforts are mobilized and could reach them. There would be a requirement of the training of local volunteers who on occurrence of the disaster could provide immediate assistance like; rescue and first aid, psychotherapy and food supply etc. These volunteers later on could be incorporated into damage assessment and rehabilitation activities. Indeed, these are the risk reduction strategies, meant to minimize the damage through psychological preparation of the people.

In this regards, establishment of a South Asian disaster management body on the lines of National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), already functional in India and Pakistan, would go a long way in disaster mitigation by ensuring; rescue, relief and rehabilitation phases of the disasters. As a lesson from the earthquake of October 2005, Tsunami of December–2004 and Hurricane Katrina of 2005, the areas where there are dangers of the earthquakes, people should be educated to make houses that can sustain the high scale earthquakes. Similarly, all levees and dams in the hurricane and flood prone areas should have strength enough to sustain the violent water currents.

Need for a Joint Commission to Deal with the Water Challenges

Indeed, the "food security is non-negotiable" and it is linked with the availability of adequate quantity of fresh water. Irrespective

of its size and military power, no country would like to give up its rights over the water, as survival of its people depends upon this essential commodity. Since water security is more rapidly pushing the region towards a potential armed conflict, therefore for a stability and peace in South Asia, there is a need for the establishment of a "joint commission", as regional forum for the resolution of regional water related issues. Being the upper riparian country, China should also be included in the commission. The forum should be able to redress the water concerns of all the stakeholders while taking the existing treaties and agreements into consideration. Resolution of the regional energy crises linked with the water (hydroelectricity) could also be resolved under the same forum.

Integrated Efforts to Eradicate HIV/AIDS

Apart from the global drive against the HIV/AIDS, there is a requirement to gear up the regional efforts at the level of South Asia to address this humanitarian catastrophe by allocating more resources and enforcing strict precautionary measures. Rather isolating people living with such like syndromes, integrate them into the society through provision of cheaper drugs and worthwhile employments through a process of social mobilization. Since HIV/AIDS is becoming an important non-traditional security threat and is spreading rapidly to the countries having less of it, therefore its further transmission could be subdued through a well-orchestrated campaign, created to bring awareness among the masses against this malady.

Dealing with Human Security and Migrations

Human security is all encompassing, the physical security, as well as the provision of the basic human needs by a state to its people. An unhindered availability of the necessities would strengthen the relationship between governments and its subjects. Being at the lower plinth of HDI, the South Asians are seriously endangered from this form of the non-traditional security threat. At the regional level, human development and security can be ensured through; diminution of interstate conflicts, warranting the policy of

non-interference in each other's affairs, reducing defence expenditures, establishment of joint projects in the field of education, health and poverty eradication.

Since migrations and displacements are a continuing process, therefore, to minimize its effects, South Asian countries need to establish a centre under the umbrella of SAARC to regulate the migrants including internally displaced ones, and their speedy return to the parent states and areas, upon restoration of stability. Establishment of South Asian fund, financed by regional countries and international community for the migrants and displaced people would go a long way in lessening their snags.

National Responses

Apart from the regional approach, there is a dire need of a state level solution of the issues related to small arms and light weapons through domestic legislation. This can be accomplished by imposing strict restrictions on their unauthorized use or even possession. Since pollution is badly damaging the environment besides creating health hazards to everyone in the region therefore, industries and automobiles violating the rules in this respect should be ceased to function until become free of risks. Other contributory factors should be trounced through plantation and enhancing the greenery. In connection with the human trafficking and its connected crimes, there is a need to create a sense of awareness during the movements within and across the borders.

Conclusion

In today's highly globalized world, where a threat to one is taken as a threat to all, every state requires international or at least regional cooperation to make itself secure. South Asia is witnessing the emergence of a multi-threat environment where traditional security challenges are no longer a stream of single point threats. Rather, the region has become a raging river of new challenges, often-indistinct signals that require fast and smart analysis, rapid and robust action plans, and well-orchestrated, cross-boundary responses.

The prevalent non-traditional security threats looming over the regional horizon are posing great danger to the human security in South Asia. In over 90 percent cases, South Asia faces a similar threat gamut; therefore call for a comparable, harmonized, sincere, and dedicated mode to counter them. Espousing of an integrated and unanimous strategy at the regional level would diminish the traditional differences and collides, rampant in South Asia since the end of colonial rule.

Author

Dr. Raja Muhammad Khan is PhD in International Relations. Currently he is Associate Professor and Academic Coordinator in Faculty of Contemporary Studies in National Defence University. He has been Deputy Director Regional Studies in Institute for Strategic Studies; Research and Analysis (ISSRA) NDU. He has been Senior Research Scholar in the Research Wing of former National Defence College. His area of expertise includes South Asia, Asia-Pacific, Foreign Policy of Pakistan and Global Energy Resources.

Notes

[1] Susan L. Craig Chinese, Perceptions *of Traditional and Non-traditional Security Threats*. This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined, in Title 17, United States Code, and Section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States, Code, Section 105. 2007.

[2] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

[3] Imtiaz Alam, (ed), *Poverty in South Asia: South Asian Policy Analysis Network*, (Lahore: 2006), p. x.

[4] Ibid. p. ix

[5] Ibid. p. ix.

[6] Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers, William W. Behrens Ed *The limits to growth*, (New York: Universe Books 1972).

[7] The Independent Commission on International Development Issues, *North-South A Programme for Survival* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Pres 1980).

[8] Mahbub ul Haq, "New Imperatives of Human security", RGICS Paper No. 17, RGICS. Rajiv Gandhi Foundation, N.D.

[9] Institute of Regional Studies, Non-*Traditional and Human Security*, (Islamabad: IRS. 2007). p.xxxvi.

[10] Richard H. Shultz, Paper Presented by him at the International Security studies program. The Fletcher school of Law & Diplomacy.
[11] Robert S. McNamara, *The Essence of security*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).
[12] Barry Buzan, *Rethinking Security after the cold war*: *Corporation & Conflict*, vol 32(I), (Sage Publication, 1997).
[13] Carnegie Corporation Strengthening the Work of the United Nations, *A Sustained Strategy for Peace*. (New York Spring 2006), Accessed at http://www.carnegie. org/results/ 13/page8.html. dated 20 December 2009.
[14] United Nations*, A more secure world: Our shared responsibility*; Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.United Nations Department of Public Information : 2004).
[15] Alan Collins, *Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional and Global Issues*, (New Delhi: Viva Books. 2005), p.94.
[16] Ralf Emmers, Mely Caballero Anthony and Amitav Acharya, *Studying Non-Traditional Security in Asia*. (Marshall Cavendish Academic: 2006).
[17] Ibid. 95.
[18] Stanley Foundation, Nontraditional *Security Threats in Southeast Asia*, Policy Bulletin; the; 44th Strategy for Peace Conference, Airlie Center, Warrenton, VA. October 16-18, 2003.
[19] Ibid
[20]: Wikipedia, *South Asia*. Acessed at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ South_Asia. dated 22 Dec 2009.
[21] Barry Turner, (ed), The *Statesman's Year Book-2009*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan Publishers: 2008).
[22] Riaz Haq, *South Asia Slipping in Human Development*. (October 6, 2009). http://www. riazhaq.com/2009/10/south-asia-slipping-in-human.html.
[23] Ibid.
[25] Dr. Syed Rifaat Hussain, *Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Challenges in South Asia*. Accessed at http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=There+is+acute+requirement+ for+a+South+ Asia+ Disaster+Preparedness+and+Management+System.+This+system+will+promote+ regional+cooperation+to+ensure+security+from+natural+disasters.+&aq=f&oq= &aqi. Dated 16 Dec 2009.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Earthquake hazard zoning of India. Accessed at http://www.absoluteastronomy. com/topics/ Earthquake_ hazard_zoning_of_India#encyclopedia dated 15 dec 2009.
[28] Wikipedia, Accessed at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004 dated 15 Dec 2009.
[29] Dr. Syed Rifaat Hussain, *Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Challenges in South Asia*. Accessed at http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=There+is+acute+requirement+ for+a+South+ Asia+ Disaster+Preparedness+and+Management+System.+This+system+will+promote+

regional+cooperation+to+ensure+security+from+natural+disasters.+&aq=f&oq=&aqi. Dated 16 Dec 2009.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Pardeep Sahni and Madhavi Malalgoda Ariyabandu, (eds), Disaster Risk Reduction in South Asia. (New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India: 2003). p. ix. Accessed at http://www.google.com/ search?hl=en&q=There+is+acute+requirement+for+a+South+Asia+ Disaster+Preparedness+and+Management+System.+This+system+will+promote+regional+cooperation+to+ensure+security+from+natural+disasters.+&aq=f&oq=&aqi= dated 10 Dec 2009.

[32] Ghos Partha S. *Population Movements and Interstate Conflicts*. in Ranabir Samaddar edited Peace Studies: An Introduction to Concept; Scope and Theme. Volume -1. New Delhi: Sage Publications,……..

[33] Weiner Mayon, *Rejected Peoples and Unwanted Migrants in South Asia*, Economic and Political Weekly. (August 21, 1993).

[34] United Nations, *World Migration Report 2003*. Accessed at www.un.org/Pubs/ whatsnew/ e03174.htm dated 10 Dec 2009.

[35] United Nations, *World Migration 2005: Costs and Benefits of International Migration*, Accessed at www.un.org/Pubs/ whatsnew/ e03174.htm dated 10 Dec 2009.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Cit Opt. Human Development Report (2009). p. 65.

[39] Richard W. Mansbach and Kirsten L. Rafferty Introduction to Global Politics. , (New York: Routledge: 2008), p.646.

[40] Ibid. p. 645. Heather Peter, The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History and the Barbarians, Oxford University Press; USA, December 2005. P. 125.

[41] Ernest Hemingway, *Swine Flu, Fear*, and the Middle Ages, The Lay Scientist. (December, 11, 2009).

[42] Felicity Barringer Study shows only six nations achieved Environmental goals, *The New York Times*, January 6, 2006.

[43] Ibid. p.645.

[44] South Asia: Data and Statistics, accessed at http://web.worldbank.org/ WBSITE/ EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,menuPK:158851~pagePK:146732~piPK:146813~theSitePK:223547,00.html dated 20 Dec 2009.

[45] Richard W. Mansbach and Kirsten L. Rafferty, *Introduction to Global Politics*. (New York: Routledge, 2008). p.653.

[46] Ibid.

[47] M.D. Khalequzzaman, *Recent floods in Bangladesh: Possible causes and solutions*, *Natural Hazards*, Department of Geology. (Newark, DE: University of Delaware, 2004).

[48] Encyclopædia Britannica, *Slash-and-Burn Agriculture,* Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 26 Dec. 2009.

[49] *The Greenhouse effects.* Accessed at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ kids/ greenhouse. Html dated 26 Dec 2009.

[50] Shahidul Islam, *Climate change is a battle for existence in the Maldives,* (November 26, 2008).
[51] Ibid.
[52] http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=+ UN+climate+conference+ in+poznan+ &aq= f&oq=&aqi=
[53] Shahidul Islam, *Climate change is a battle for existence in the Maldives* (November 26, 2008).
[54] Copenhagen Accord on Climate Change, December 12, 2009.
[55] Richard W. Mansbach and Kirsten, L Rafferty *Introduction to Global Politics,* (New York: Routledge. 2008), p.675.
[56] Ibid. p. 676.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Dr. B. H. *Nepal Managing Nepalese Water*, South Asia Journal, 8th Issue, April-June 2005.
[59] Ibid. p.147.
[60] Richard W. Mansbach and Kirsten, L Rafferty Introduction to Global Politics. (New York: Routledge, 2008), p.676.
[61] NDU Journal- Volume – II. (Islamabad: 2008), P. 143.
[62] Ibid. p.146.
[63] Richard W. Mansbach and Kirsten, L Rafferty *Introduction to Global Politics*, (New York: Routledge. 2008), p.676.
[64] Asif Haroon Raja 'India's water aggression against neighbours', *The New Nation* , Bangladesh, (July 22, 2009).
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Institute of Regional Studies, *Non-Traditional and Human Security*, (Islamabad: IRS, 2007). p. 40.
[69] Ibid.
[70] *India To Suffer From 20,000 MW Energy Shortage As Monsoon Fails Due To El Nino, Archive for 'Energy Shortages'*, July 15, 2009.
[71] Prof. R.K. Gorea. *Impact of Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in South Asia, Medicine, Conflict and Survival*, Volume 25 Issue 4, Rutledge, 2009.
[72] David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne D. Eisen, *Global Deaths from Firearms: Searching for Plausible Estimates* ; Texas Review of Law & Politics, number 1, Vol- 8 and Jayantha Dhanapala, Multilateral Cooperation on Small Arms and Light Weapons: From Crisis to Collective Response, 9 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 163 , 2002.
[73] Cit op 71
[74] Ibid.
[75] Kivimaki, T. and Ruohomaki, 'Small Arms, Light Weapons and Human Security', in Ruohomaki, O. (ed.), Development in an Insecure World, (Hakapaino Oy, Helsinki), p.164. Mike Fell; Is Human Security our Main Concern in the 21st Century? Journal of Security Sector Management, Cranfield University Shrivenham, UK, Volume 4 Number 3 – September 2006.
[76] Ibid. p. 162.

[77] Ibid. p. 232.
[78] Alan Collins, ed., *Contemporary Security Studies*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 233.
[79] Ibid.
[80] Markus Haacker and Mariam Claeson. ed. *HIV and AIDS in South Asia: An Economic Development Risk*, Washington, DC. The World Bank, 2009.
[81] Dr. Syed Rifaat Hussain; *Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Challenges in South Asia*. Accessed at http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=There+is+acute+requirement+for+a+South+Asia+Disaster+Preparedness+and+Management+System.+This+system+will+promote+regional+cooperation+to+ensure+security+from+natural+disasters.+&aq=f&oq=&aqi. Dated 16 Dec 2009.
[82] Ibid. p. 232.
[83] Alan Collins, ed. *Contemporary Security Studies*, (New York: Oxford University Press2007), p. 234.

WAR AND STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT: ACTORS FOR CHANGE AND FUTURE WARS

Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal

War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin; it is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

The Nation State is concurrently encountering both traditional and non-traditional challenges to its national security. The economic growth and the rising demand for resources in the global politics have not only increased interdependency among the states, but also have led to increased competition between the global players. This competition is not limited in the political and economic realm, but also operative in the military sphere. That is why, almost all the sovereign states have been intelligently monitoring their strategic environment and solidifying their defensive-fences by investing in their respective armed forces. According to estimate, the world spent $3.5 million every day on weapons and soldiers, and that each year more than $42 billion worth of conventional arms were sold to developing nations.[1] The investment in the military buildup entails arms race among states. The Realist School of thought predicts that arms race construct strategic environment, in which war becomes inevitable. Arms race between the strategic competitors erodes confidence, reduces cooperation in the relationship, and makes it more likely that a crisis (or accident) could cause one side to strike first and start a war rather than wait for the other side to strike.

The neo-realist's theorists underline that the structure of the strategic environment controls and impacts all actors. Though the strategic environment constrains the state behavior, yet the strong actors (Great Powers) do influence the orientation of strategic environment. It is because the fates of all the states in the international system are affected much more by the acts and the interactions of major ones than of the minor ones.[2] The power-

balancing characteristic of the strategic environment place special importance on the handful of great powers with strong military capabilities, global interests and outlooks, and intense interactions with each other. These powers generally have the world's strongest military forces and the strongest economies to pay for military forces and for other power capabilities. These large economies in turn rest on some combination of large populations, plentiful natural resources, advanced technology, and educated labor forces.[3]

The novelty of the current 'strategic environment' is the way threats and security challenges are interlinked, e.g. energy security, climate change, information technology, capital flows, armed conflict, transnational and local terrorism, organized crime, proliferation, scarce resources, and refugee issues. All these challenges are interconnected in an unprecedented fashion. Thus, the present strategic environment is unprecedented in its complexity. The sovereign state is facing challenge from both the threat of the rational opponent—sovereign state or a military alliance of sovereign states. This made the strategic military threats and risks more predictable. Secondly, the non-state actors,[4] i.e. benign and malignant multinational organizations are posing multidimensional challenges to the state's sovereignty and national security. They contain immense penetrating capacity in the alien societies through the information-revolution and economic-interdependency. Hence, the political elite of modern nation state must be able to comprehend the challenges in the strategic environment represented by both conventional and transnational entities.

In the military context, the transnational terrorist organizations represent a new phenomenon and threat, which was not part of traditional military thinking. In spite of the fact, that terrorism is an old phenomenon, the counterterrorism strategy is inept in combating menace of terrorism effectively. In the United States 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Pentagon called the post-9/11 global conflict the 'Long War' against 'dispersed non-state networks'. This definition of the conflict reflects the scale of the threat, but not its complexity, and it does not address the means of coping with the threat.[5] This strategic complexity demands a much broader conception of war, strategy and strategic environment

than we hitherto employed, and thereby the strategic response ought to be consigned to more than military matters alone.

The objective of this study is to critically examine the concept and significance of war and strategic environment in the twenty-first century to understand the relationship between them; and also identify actors which could transform the current global strategic environment. While discussing the strategic environment and war, the attempt has been made to clarify the definitional problems of strategy; strategic environment; and war. Notably, the debate is limited within paradigm of realist school of thought in general and traditional notion of security in particular. This study is divided into five sections. The first section deals with the theoretical debate on the strategic environment. In this section attempt has been made to define and elucidate the theory of strategy in both classical and modern sense. The second section elaborates the role of sovereign state in the strategic environment.

Second section contains a brief discussion on the concept and kinds of war. It is followed by a discussion on the current important strategic actors. The final section contains discussion on the anticipated categories of war.

Strategic Environment: Conceptualization

The term strategy is now generally used to describe the use of available resources to gain any objective. Governments have strategies to tackle the problems of education, public health, pensions and sanitations. In simple terms, strategy seeks to cause specific effects in the environment—to advance favorable outcomes and preclude unfavorable ones.[6] In the discipline of Strategic Studies, however, the term strategy is used in its traditional or original sense only: that is, as meaning the art of the military commander.[7] The word 'strategy has its origins in the Greek word *strategos,* which is normally translated as 'general'.[8] The word strategy also refers to the office of general. Thus, the word strategy has a military heritage, and classic theory considered it purely wartime military activity — how generals employed their forces to win wars. This reflects that it has primary role in war or any military

operation. In this context, definitions of strategy are abounding. The leading military analysts highlighted linkage between strategy and war in their works. For instance, Sir Liddell Hart defined strategy as: "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy." Similarly, Collin Gray argues that strategy is "the relationship between military power and political power."[9] Robert Osgood expressed similar view point: "military strategy must now be understood as nothing less than the overall plan for utilizing the capacity for armed coercion — in conjunction with the economic, diplomatic, and psychological instruments of power — to support foreign policy most effectively by overt, covert, and tacit means."[10] These scholars' perceptions confirm that strategy involves the actual use or the threat of the use of force in international relations. More precisely, the making of strategy involves the use of military means to achieve political ends in particular instances.

The preceding discussion reveals that military force is not only used in the inter-state conflicts alone, but it could be used to address the challenges caused by the intra-state conflicts. Hence the strategy deals with the various aspects of the force application, i.e. both in internal and external milieu of the state and against visible and invisible cum diffuse threats to fulfill the ends of the policy. This kind of setting is referred by the strategic analysts as the 'strategic environment'. The strategic environment is a complex system consisting of systems within systems. Notably, the system having human beings its integral component is always dynamic because individuals are socially and psychologically changeable in different circumstances. The strategic environment, encapsulated by the U.S. Army War College is "a world order where the threats are both diffuse and uncertain, where conflict is inherent yet unpredictable, and where our capability to defend and promote our national interests may be restricted by materiel and personnel resource constraints. In short, an environment marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA)."[11] In the words of Harry R. Yarger the strategic environment means:

For the state, the strategic environment is the realm in which the leadership interacts with other states or actors to advance the well-being of the state. This environment consists of the internal and

external context, conditions, relationships, trends, issues, threats, opportunities, interactions, and effects that influence the success of the state in relation to the physical world, other states and actors, chance, and the possible futures.[12]

The understanding of strategic environment is prerequisite to achieve the political objectives. Sun Tzu's famous dictum: "know your enemy; know yourself," necessitates adequate grasp or comprehension of the strategic environment in which we operate. Central to any such understanding is knowledge, about our war-fighting capability; our enemies; and our auxiliary forces.[13] The strategic decision-makers always intelligently chalk out their strategy according to the classic strategic hierarchy i.e. 'Shape-Deter-Respond'. Its order of priorities is: first, influence the environment in which we function — political, diplomatic, economic, social, cultural, military, geographic — towards our interests; second, if shaping is not entirely successful, deter behavior that might be inimical to those interests; and last, if deterrence fails, respond as necessary anywhere along the spectrum of influence from, say, soft sanctions at one extreme to war at the other.[14]

State pre-eminent actor in Strategic Environment

Since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, the State has been the pre-eminent actor in the strategic environment. All other actors in this environment — individuals, international organizations, etc — are either less important or unimportant. Harry R. Yarger pointed out that: "The strategic environment functions as a self organizing complex system. It seeks to maintain its current relative equilibrium, or to find a new acceptable balance. In this environment, some things are known (predictable), some are probable, some are plausible, some are possible, and some remain simply unknown."[15] In this complex environment the state's primary responsibility is to pursue its national interest. The national interest is a multifaceted and can be oriented on political, economic, military, or cultural objectives. The most significant interest is the state survival and security. The structural realists posit that the world is anarchy – a domain without a sovereign. In that domain, states must look to themselves to survive. Because no sovereign can prevent states from

doing what they are able to do in their strategic environment, therefore, war is possible. Kenneth N. Waltz pointed out: "The state among states, it is often said, conducts its affairs in the brooding shadow of violence. Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so—or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbors."[16] Hence, the strategic environment legitimizes the states' preparation for war for the sake of their survival.

The sovereign states vigilantly monitor their strategic environment and sanction financial resources for their military buildups. It is because; the key to survival in war is military power – generated either internally or through alliances, and usually both.[17] In the words of Czeslaw Mesjasz; "The traditional meaning of security is deriving from foreign policy and international relations— 'objective security' 'military security'. Security is treated as an attribute of situation of the state, equivalent to absence of military external conflict."[18] Moreover, mistrust, insecurity, and the imperatives of self-help incline states to hedge their bets by balancing against the strongest state rather than climbing on its bandwagon. This is the safer strategy because states fear that a strong or potentially hegemonic state could threaten them, even if they initially align with it.[19] Therefore, the states always struggle to acquire and maximize their power, especially military power to pursue their objectives or defend goals that could include prestige, territory, or security. Power in the international system is the ability of an actor or actors to influence the behavior of other actors — usually to influence them to take action in accordance with the interests of the power wielding state. There are two general components of power: hard and soft. Hard power refers to the influence that comes from direct military and economic means. This is in contrast to soft power, which refers to power that originates with the more indirect means of diplomacy, culture, and history.[20] Thomas Schelling pointed out four different ways in which power could be used, i.e. deterrence, compellence, coercion, and brute force.[21] Importantly, when state employs brute force in pursuit of its objective or interest in the international system, it is launching a war.

War, State & Strategic environment

In the relations of states, with competition unregulated, war occasionally occurs. It is because war is a normal way of conducting disputes between sovereign political groups. Rousseau pointed out that if one had no sovereign states one would have no war.[22] Importantly, War has been defined in various ways. In simple, one can define it as the use of armed forces in a conflict, especially between countries. It is a sustained inter-group violence (deliberately inflicting death and injury) in which state military forces participate on at least one side — on both sides in the case of interstate war and generally on only one side in the case of civil war. The conventional view is that for a conflict to be classified as a war, it should culminate in at least 1,000 battle deaths. This definition allows for the inclusion of other wars such as a civil war within a state.[23]

Many analysts are convinced that state is a product of war. The State come into being and has its geographical extent delineated as the result of political processes in which the actual or potential use of force often plays a considerable part; the similar processes may dissolve and destroy them. This is not of course universally and necessarily the case. Many states have come into existence without war, for example, the birth of Pakistan and independence of Bharat (India) from the British occupation in August 1947. Importantly, the independence and partition of subcontinent was possible only because the communities concerned made clear both their will and capacity to assert their independence by force if they were debarred from attaining it by peaceful means. In the words of Michael Howard, "the cost of holding a rebellious India in check indefinitely was rated by the British as being impracticably high, and other colonial powers came ultimately to the same conclusion."[24] Howard added, "Israel owes her existence as a state, not to recognition by the United Nations, but to her victories in the wars of 1949 and 1967."[25] North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces, instead of the United Nations, liberated Kosovo in 1999. The United States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom to prevent Saddam Husain from acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction in March 2003. These factors prove

that use of force remains an important fact in the community of sovereign states.

Military Role: Categorization of War

The military role is viewed as a consequence of responses by military establishment to requirements and conditions in the larger social order.[26] It can be divided into two categories. First, and most evident, is the traditional and primary role of acquiring a sufficient monopoly in the means of force and violence to accomplish three purposes:

- Defend the society from external aggression — *Defensive War.*
- Conduct aggressive military action against actual or potential enemies — *Preventive war or Offensive war.*
- Maintain law and civil order within the society — Low Intensity Conflict or in extreme sense *Civil War.*[27] Edward Rice called this category 'wars of the third kind'. Such wars are usually fought in what used to be called the Third World and rely heavily, although not exclusively, on guerrilla warfare. The concept is more accurate than the term 'low-intensity conflicts', which sanitizes what can be extremely intense armed conflicts.[28]

War and Systemic Change in Strategic Environment

In the international politics it is an established fact that privileged state or dominate state always tries to preserve the status quo in the system. In the pursuit of status quo the dominant power generally tries, but fails, to reduce its commitments or expand its resources base. Therefore, no state or empire has ever been large, rich or powerful enough to maintain hegemony over the political world, let alone to establish political and military supremacy over the globe.[29] Despite, the fact that world is too big, complicated, and plural the dominant power attempts to hold its dominant position by initiating a preventive war against a rising challenger. Jack S. Levy

argued: "Whether intended or not, a hegemonic war determines who will govern the international system and whose interests will be primarily served by the new international order. It leads to a redistribution of territory, a new set of rules, and a new international division of labor."[30] Conversely, the cyclical theory or Organski concept of the power transition underlines that the likelihood of a major war leading to systemic change is greatest when the military capabilities of an underdog state begin to approach those of a dominant power. The rising state will initiate a war in order to gain political influence commensurate with its newly acquired power. All kinds of wars, i.e. hegemonic, preventive or liberating, have altering impact on the regional or strategic environment.

Significant Actors: Drivers for Change

The key actors in world politics are sovereign states. Among the sovereign states, the Super Power(s) and Great Power(s) have important role in the orientation of strategic environment. The present leading powers — United States, Russian Federation, Great Britain, France, and China — being permanent members of the United Nations Security Council have veto power in the Council. They greatly influence the decision-making processes in the United Nations. These five states are also nuclear weapons states. That is why, they cannot be nuclear blackmailed and militarily coerced. In the economic and technological realm Germany and Japan are also leading members of the international community and they do influence the strategic environment of the international system. Though, they did not develop their own nuclear deterrence capabilities, but both the states enjoy positive nuclear security guarantees. In addition, it is an open secret that Germany and Japan maintain advanced nuclear programs, therefore, it is said that they have nuclear bombs capability in the 'basement'.

There are a few Regional Powers, in addition to a Super Power and the Great Powers, which have acquired and preserve military potential to influence their respective regions' strategic environment. India is a significant actor in the Southern Asian strategic environment. Pakistan is an important actor in the South-West Asian strategic enclave. Both India and Pakistan are overt

nuclear powers since May 1998 and greatly influence the Indian Ocean strategic environment. Though North Korea's role was earlier limited in the Korean peninsula, its nuclear weapon tests in October 2006 and May 2009; and subsequent testing of long-range ballistic missile broaden its strategic sway. Israel has marshaled immense strategic potential by its advanced military buildup, including clandestine nuclear weapons program and strong alliance with the United States and Western powers. Importantly, Israel has maintained an opaque nuclear posture, i.e. neither confirming nor denying its nuclear capability since the late 1960s. The scientists' team headed by Yevgeni Jenka Ratner did a cold testing, in which each one of the processes that together create the explosion is checked by simulation, at RAFAEL nuclear facilities on November 2, 1966.[31] Later Israel conducted nuclear test with the connivance of South Africa on September 22, 1979 over the South Atlantic.[32] Presently, Tel Aviv possessed around 100-170 nuclear weapons deployed on missiles, aircrafts and submarines. [33] Barry Lando pointed out: "Foreign experts have long concluded that Israel is the sixth-largest nuclear weapons power in the world — ahead of India and Pakistan."[34] Israeli leaders have consistently argued that nuclear weapons are important for the country's security because it is surrounded by rival Arab states. [35] Its policies have deterministic impact on the Middle Eastern and Arab states strategic environment. The following two tables manifest the strategic capability of the influential states in the global and regional strategic environments.

International Actors	**Defence Budget in US $ 2008**	**Active Troops**	**Reserve Troops**	**Population**
United States	693 bn	1,539,587	979,378	303,824,646
Russian Federation	36.35 bn	1,027,000	20,000,000	140,702,094
United Kingdom	59.7 bn	160,280	199,280	60.943,912
France	41.1 bn	352,771	70.300	64,057,790
China	61.1 bn	2,185,000	800,000	1,330,044,605
Japan	47.3 bn	230,300	41,800	127,288,419
Germany	39.86 bn	244,324	161,812	82,369,548

International Actors	Defence Budget in US $ 2008	Active Troops	Reserve Troops	Population
Regional Actors				
India	25.3 bn	1,281,200	1,155,000	1,147,995,898
Pakistan	3.56bn+297 m(FMA US)	617,000	?	167,762,040
North Korea	?	1,106,000	4,700,000	23,479,089
Israel	9.26bn+2.38 bn(FMA-US) =11.64 bn	176,500	565,000	7,112,359

Source: *The Military Balance 2009*, International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Routledge, January 2009), pp, 31, 119, 124, 158, 217, 249, 345, 353, 381-382, 391, 394.

Status of Nuclear Forces in 2009

Country	Strategic	Non-Strategic	Total Operational	Total Inventory
United States	2,200	500	2,700	9,400
Russian Federation	2,787	2,050	4,837	13,000
United Kingdom	160	n.a	<160	185
France	300	n.a	~ 300	300
China	180	?	~180	240
India	60	n.a.	n.a.	60-80
Pakistan	60	n.a.	n.a.	70-90
Israel	80	n.a	n.a	80
North Korea	<10	n.a	n.a	103
Total	5,847	2,550	8,187	23,375

The exact number of nuclear weapons in global arsenals is not known; each country guards these numbers as closely held national secrets. The status of nuclear forces in 2009 was compiled by Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists and

Robert Norris of the Natural Resources Defense Council (both with support from Ploughshares Fund) and are based on publicly available information and occasional leaks.[36]

The United States

In the contemporary global strategic environment the most important and trend-setting Great Power is the United States, which is also qualified to be considered or labeled as a sole-super-power due to its hard and soft powers potential. It has unprecedented accumulation of military and economic power. The preceding tables manifest the margin of the military power that separate the United States from every other country. The American defense budget exceeded, in dollars expended, the military spending of the next fifteen countries combined, and the United States had military assets — highly accurate missiles, for example — that no other country possessed.[37] The combination of overwhelming economic and military power gives the United States enormous political influence throughout the world. T.R. Reid pointed out: "the US with its globe-circling missiles and its bristling naval task groups and its fleet of long-range bombers, with planes in the air every minute of every day, has built a military force that can carry American power anywhere on earth, almost instantly."[38] Though it towers rest of the great powers, yet it has failed to accomplish its global agenda, unilaterally.

The developments in the aftermath of 9/11 have proved that United States has certain limitation and, thereby it cannot individually solve puzzles such as global terrorism and nuclear proliferation. In this context, it requires the cooperation of other states. Kenneth N. Waltz claimed: "The biggest early effects were felt in the policies and politics of the United States. The new Bush administration instantly turned from strident unilateralism to urgent multilateralism"[39] The United States very much depend on the support of other actors in pursuit of its strategic objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the war on terrorism the US is dependent on the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Pakistan. Similarly, to contain the North Korean and Iran's nuclear programs, it is relying on the collective effort of states such

as, Russian Federation, China etc. On 15 June 2006 the members of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in their Shanghai Summit Declaration, categorically rejected Bush Administration's unilateral approach and supported the right of all countries to safeguard their national unity and their national interests, pursue particular models of development and formulate domestic and foreign policies independently, and participate in international affairs on an equal basis.[40] Despite these realistic accounts, the United States have primacy in the international strategic environment.

Russian Federation

The demise of the former Soviet Union, outcome of the Cold War and wars in Chechnya dented Moscow's capacity to influence the international strategic environment. However, gradually Moscow restored its image as a significant international actor. The high oil and gas prices in the international market brought an impressive growth in the Russian economy. The national and international image of the Russian armed forces has risen after the successful military operation launched against Georgia from August 7-12, 2008. It was the first time that Russian forces fought in a conventional operational setting since the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, the Russian Navy and Air Force have deployed in areas of the world where there had not been a significant Russian military presence for some time. These deployments have more to do with the harder line in Moscow's dealings with the US and its allies.[41] In February 2008, a naval battle-group from the Northern Fleet led by the carrier *Admiral Kuznetsov* completed a two-month deployment, which included a period in the Mediterranean. This was one of the longest deployments undertaken by the Russian Navy since the Cold War, and it was hailed by military and political leaders in Moscow as a sign of Russia's re-establishment as a global maritime power and an exhibition of the capacity to defend its interest abroad. Similarly celebrated was the October 2008 deployment, first to the Mediterranean and then to the Caribbean, of the nuclear-powered missile cruiser *Pyotr Veliki* (Peter the Great). The stated objective of this deployment was to carry out joint naval training with the Venezuelan Navy. This deployment exemplified Moscow's cooperation in the Washington's sphere of influence.[42]

United Kingdom and France

In May 2008 the United Kingdom expressed its intention to proceed with plans to build two new Queen Elizeabeth-class aircraft carriers.[43] It displayed London's desire to maintain an expeditionary-warfare capability. In practice, United Kingdom would seek to increase its influence, certainly to 'punch above its weight', by serving as America's faithful lieutenant.[44] According to France's White Paper on defence and security policy, published in June 2008, Paris has been focusing on the troubled arc from North Africa through the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. France maintains its bases in the region at Reunion and Djibouti, as well as planned base at Abu Dhabi. Importantly, United Kingdom and France role in the current international strategic environment is very much dependent on the strategic outlook of the United States.

China

In the current global system, China is the most obvious power on the rise having the world's third largest economy.[45] According to James F. Hoge, Jr., "China's economy is expected to be double the size of Germany's by 2010 and to overtake Japan's, currently the world's second largest, by 2020."[46] The rising economic strength of China has been contributing positively in the steady improvement in its long-range military capabilities.[47] For instance, China has been in the process of modernizing its strategic missile forces. China deploys several types of ballistic missiles, but only DF-5 (13,000 kilometer range) is an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile by Western standards and is capable of reaching the continental United States.[48] The trends indicate that in the near future, its long-range striking power would be multiplied. Many strategic analysts, therefore, have a consensus that China's economic and military development would enable China as an important balancer in the global strategic environment. Thomas J. Christensen's claimed: "with certain new equipment and certain strategies, China can pose major problems for American security interests."[49] In his confirmation hearing on January 17, 2001, Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, while rejecting Clinton Administration's depiction that China is a strategic partner declared

China was a competitor and a potential regional rival of the United States.[50] Similarly, in the Southern Asia, China's emerging economic and strategic power is viewed by India and Japan as a strategic challenge. Therefore, Tokyo and New Delhi have been cementing their bilateral strategic alliance and at the same time they are strengthening their strategic cooperation with the United States.

India

India's pivotal position in Southern Asia, its strategic location between Western Asia and Southeast Asia, and its emergence as an economic power places it in a special league. Since the end of Cold War, India has been cementing its' relations with the United States. It has positioned itself to face the rise of China and began to work closely with the world's sole superpower. Washington reciprocated by supporting New Delhi's drive for Great Power status in the 21st century. India and United States finalized nuclear deal in October 2008 for a far-reaching strategic partnership. The Indo-US nuclear deal acknowledged India as a legitimate nuclear power, ending New Delhi's 30-year quest for such recognition.[51] The emergence of India as a major global player would transform the regional geopolitical landscape.

Pakistan

Pakistan occupies central positioning in the South-West Asian strategic environment. It can play indisputable role in the realms of the war on terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, engaging moderate Muslim countries, and access to Central Asia. Pakistan is a moderate Muslim country that has constructive influence in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. President Barack Obama placed Pakistan on the top of his foreign policy agenda, because without the sincere and practical support of Islamabad, Washington would not be able to carry on its present campaign against Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. President Obama appointed a special representative Richard Holbrooke for Pakistan and Afghanistan as part of a comprehensive strategy to combat the menace of terrorism. On September 8, 2009 US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates

acknowledged that "Pakistan is very important. It is important intrinsically to the United States."[52]

Presently, Pakistan is playing a front line state role in the ongoing War on Terrorism. Its geographical position on the southern and eastern borders of landlocked Afghanistan is the best location for supporting the US and NATO led ISAF military campaign against Taliban and Al Qaeda strongholds. In this context, the US President officially announced the designation of Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally of the United States in June 2004. Its Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), bordering Afghanistan has been exploited by Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda for their mobile training camps and sanctuaries. Pakistan's military operation targeting Tehrik-e-Taliban and its foreign associates like Al Qaeda members was accomplished successfully in Swat. The Armed forces have launched military operation in the South Waziristan. Moreover, Armed forces have been effectively chasing and purging both the local and transnational terrorists in FATA to restore government's writ in the area. The success of Pakistan's Armed forces in eliminating militants from its territory is a prerequisite for the culmination of ongoing war on terrorism.

Non-state actors: Transnational Terrorists

Washington and New York on September 11, 2001, Madrid, London on July 7, 2005, Islamabad on September 2008 and Mumbai on November 26, 2008 were not attacked by their rival powers but by loose-transnational terrorists groups who drew their inspiration from Al Qaeda headed by Osama bin Laden hiding in, and commanding from a failed state Afghanistan. The terrorists operate in small groups, are indistinguishable from the rest of the population and extremely mobile and lethal in their tactics. Though the terrorists prefer to hit soft targets, but hard targets (properly guarded) are not out of their reach. Their suicidal brigades successfully penetrated in the security alert areas and accomplished the desired goals.

The terrorist attacks and counter-terrorism strategies manifest a major transformation in the strategic environment. In

response to the 9/11 terrorists act, the United States launched a war on terror leaving only two options for other states, i.e. they could cooperate or they would be considered adversaries. Almost all the states, except the Taliban Regime of Afghanistan preferred the former choice. Consequently, United States launched protracted warfare against Afghanistan in October 2001 and preventive war against Iraq in March 2003. These wars, extra-legal detention of suspected terrorists, prisoner abuse, unsettlement of chronic Palestine and Kashmir disputes multiplied anti-Americanism in the Muslim world. These factors undermined the legitimacy of war on terrorism in the Muslim world and provided extremists and terrorists groups with a ready supply of recruits.

The United States and its like-minded states succeeded in changing the regime in Kabul and latter in Baghdad, but failed to deprive Al Qaeda a base in Southern Afghanistan and radical recruits from the entire Muslim world. This signifies a new era of strategic environment in which terrorism posed the most serious threat to international stability and the security of states. Sporadic international terrorist attacks can cause a temporary disruption of economies and services and above all increase perpetual insecurity of the civilians, whose protection is a state's primary responsibility.

Future strategic makeup

The destructive nature of nuclear weapons has minimized the prospects of war between the great powers. If conventional or nuclear war seems increasingly unlikely between the great powers, this benign prospect does not necessarily apply to relations between strong and weak states in the current strategic environment, or between states other than the great powers. Importantly, such wars did not cease during the period of the cold war, which is sometimes misleadingly called the 'long peace'. In the nuclear context, the dangerous strategic competition is a reality. For instance, three paradoxes: the instability/stability paradox; the vulnerability/invulnerability paradox; and the independence/dependence paradox have received significant attention from the South Asian security analysts. In simple terms, the instability/stability paradox states that by preventing total war or

all out war, the destructiveness of nuclear weapons seems to open the door to limited conflicts. The vulnerability/invulnerability paradox refers to the increased risks of unauthorized use, accidents and theft of nuclear assets that arise from attempts to secure them against preemptive strikes.[53] Importantly, the theft of nuclear assets is a contested assertion. The nuclear weapon states are well equipped to guard their nuclear weapons and sensitive to the personal reliability program due to the lethality of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the possibility that terrorists could obtain an actual atomic device or bomb-grade nuclear fissile material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) is very remote or near to impossibility. More precisely, nuclear weapons are heavily guarded in nuclear weapon states. The dependence/independence paradox refers to the inability of the feuding nuclear rivals to effectively manage situations of crises without the involvement of the third parties.[54] To be precise, the war will remain a mean to pursue the political objects in the rational decision-making context. Colin Gray argued: "The script for statecraft was first written by the Greeks and Romans, now it is played by Americans, Russians, the Chinese and the band of murderous religious zealots."[55] He added that "the United States is behaving towards Al Qaeda exactly as did imperial Rome towards the Jewish zealots (and indeed towards any revolting minority)."[56]

The nature and typology of future wars would be having both traditional and modern characteristics of warfare. The four distinct but interrelated dominant strategic battle-spaces would be direct interstate war, non-state war, intrastate war, and indirect interstate war.[57] In addition, twenty-first-century war would be as much about information as bullets. Today's, military trend setting power, the United States has been planning advanced forms of information warfare, including computer-based sabotage of an enemy's computing, financial, and telephone systems before a shot is fired in anger. This would be backed up by 'cyber attacks' on command and control centres, possibly with the aid of killer satellites.[58] Farzana Shah pointed out: "Cyber warfare is complex, more penetrating and detrimental than conventional warfare, fought on cyberspace using different tactics like Cyber espionage, Web vandalism, Gathering data, Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks,

Equipment disruption, attacking critical infrastructure, Compromised Counterfeit Hardware etc.[59] The aim would be to effectively blindfold enemy commanders by robbing them of communication with their troops and knowledge of their positions before physical hostilities begins.[60]

Anticipated Categories of War

The current strategic environment would germinate different categories of wars—hegemonic, preventive and defensive. The ongoing war on terrorism could be labelled as defensive cum preventive war. Since October 2001, the leading capitalist power, the United States, has been in a state of war. In October 2001 it launched Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban government and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Since then, the United States, NATO led ISAF forces have been fighting protracted asymmetrical warfare in Afghanistan. The possibility of other categories of the wars could not be rule out. For instance, many international scholars (dialectical or Marxists theorists) seemed convinced that about the possibility of war resulting from the tendencies of capitalist states to expand in search of external markets, investment opportunities, and raw materials.[61] The political systems of the developed world or great powers have been encouraging the institutionalization of capitalist system in their economic policies. In March 2003, Washington and its like minded states started Operation Iraqi Freedom without the formal approval of United Nations Security Council, due to the fear of Russian Federation and China opposition in the Council. Many analysts called President Bush's Iraqi invasion as an act of hegemonic war or neo-traditional imperialism which would have decisive impact on the global strategic environment. Robert Gilpin pointed out:

"The great turning points in world history have been provided by these hegemonic struggles among political rivals; these periodic conflicts have reordered the international system and propelled history in new and uncharted directions…. The outcomes of these wars affect the economic, social, and ideological structures of individual societies as well as the structure of the larger international system."[62]

Second, the War could be waged without a single bullet being fired between the belligerent states. The threats that the West and its partners face today are a combination of violent terrorism against civilians and institutions, wars fought by proxy by states that sponsor terrorism, the behaviour of rogue states, the actions of organised international crime, and the coordination of hostile action through abuse of non-military means.[63]

Third, the asymmetrical protracted warfare would be a prominent factor in the strategic environment. The asymmetric warfare is a broad and inclusive term, which tries to denote that two sides in conflict may have such drastically different strengths and weakness that they resort to significantly different (asymmetric) tactics to achieve relative advantageous. It indicates that the strong state vs. weak state war is not ignorable. The United States withdrawal from Vietnam War (1965-1975), Former Soviet Union withdrawal from Afghanistan War (1979-1988) and Israel from Lebanon (summer 2006) without accomplishing their desire objectives support this kind of warfare. The weak actor chalk out defensive protracted warfare strategy and by applying Guerilla Warfare tactics to exploit the political vulnerability of the strong state.[64] While analyzing the War on Terrorism, Lawrence Freedom opined: "As battle was joined, the human factor would weigh much more heavily than the technical. If it took too long there was a risk that the American people's patience would wear thin or that the fragile international coalition would buckle."[65]

Fourth, to ensure the nuclear threshold would not be crossed, the nuclear capable states will engage in quick incursions with limited objectives. For instance, on April 28, 2004 at the Army Commanders' Conference, India officially unveiled its new war doctrine 'Cold Start Doctrine'.[66] Walter C. Ladwig III pointed out that "The goal of this limited war doctrine is to establish the capacity to launch a retaliatory conventional strike against Pakistan that would inflict significant harm on the Pakistan Army before the international community could intercede, and at the same time, pursue narrow enough aims to deny Islamabad a justification to escalate the clash to the nuclear level."[67] The Cold Start is bite and hold strategy, which underlines that in any future conflict between

India and Pakistan, the former will follow a blitzkrieg type strategy based on joint operations involving the Indian Army, Indian Air Force and Indian Navy. This Strategy would enable India to mobilize quickly and undertake surprise attacks on Pakistan, keeping the conflict below the nuclear threshold or under the nuclear umbrella. It indicates that the limited war could be viewed as a practical mean to achieve the political objectives instead of total war.

Fifth, the intrastate wars will be more likely, which if left unchecked, could grow or become intolerable to the nation state in particular and international community in general. These wars might be fought along sectarian, ethnic, or religious lines. Some could attract foreign intervention and a few would not magnetize the foreign intrusion. The Kosovo War of March-June 1999 attracted the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Sixth, indirect interstate war would be fought between the adversaries. According to Steven Metz and Raymond A. Millen the "indirect interstate war entails proxy aggression by a state through the creation, encouragement, and support of insurgents, terrorists, armed criminal cartels, separatists, or militias which, in turn, undertake aggression against another state. It is a variant of state-on-state conflict, but one in which the aggressor camouflages its actions." [68] For instance, New Delhi alleged Islamabad for supporting Kashmiri freedom fighters in the Indian held Kashmir. Similarly, Islamabad is convinced that the Baluch separatists and other militant groups operating in Pakistan have been supported by New Delhi.

Conclusion

The trend to maximize military capabilities prove that in the contemporary strategic environment military force remains one of the important determinants to gain respect, instill caution, and ensure that diplomatic pressure is credible. This strategic approach underlines war as an acceptable and desirable way of achieving political objectives. The Global War on Terrorism in general and Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom in

particular validate war to be the best mean of protecting and forwarding the national interest of the state. In the South Asian context, the possibility of war is not ignorable because India and Pakistan have remained in a state of tension due to internal conflicts and external dangers. New Delhi and Islamabad have been diverting huge and precious financial resources to military sector for the development of both conventional and nuclear weapons. In brief, the upsurge in India and Pakistan military capabilities reveal that like sole super power-United States, and other Great Powers; both states are convinced that military capabilities are essential for guarding their national interests in the current regional and international strategic environment.

Author

Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal is an Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan. He is advisor on Non-Proliferation at the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, London. Prior to joining the University, Dr. Jaspal had been a Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad and Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Islamabad. He had contributed numerous chapters to books and published a number of research articles on security issues in the leading research journals in Pakistan and overseas.

Notes

[1] "Security Council 6191st Meeting," *United Nations Security Council,* SC/9746, September 24, 2009. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9746.doc.htm Accessed on September 26, 2009.

[2] Karen Ruth Adams "Structural Realism: The Consequences of Great Power Politics," in Jennifer Sterling-Folker, ed. *Making Sense of International Relations Theory* (New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited, 2007), p. 18.

[3] Joshua S. Goldstein, *International Relations,* Second Edition (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1996), p. 76

[4] The term non-state actor typically refers to any participant in the international system that is not a government. It is an entity or group that may have an impact on the internationally related decisions or policies of one or more states. Examples of non-state actors would be IOs, NGOs, MNCs, the international media, armed elements attempting to free their territory from external rule, or terrorist groups.

[5] General (ret.) Dr. Klaus Naumann, General (ret.) John Shalikashvili, Field Marshal The Lord Inge, Admiral (ret.) Jacques Lanxade, General (ret.) Henk van

den Breemen, With Benjamin Bilski and Douglas Murray, *Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World: Renewing Transatlantic Partnership* (Noaber Foundation, Dorpstsstraat 14, 6741 AK Lunteren, 2007), p. 42.

[6] Harry R. Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy* (Strategic Studies Institute, The United States War College, February, 2006), p. 17.
*http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.*mil*/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=641,*
Accessed on September 4, 2009.

[7] Hew Strachan, "The Lost Meaning of Strategy," *Survival,* Vol. 47, No. 3, Autumn 2005, p. 34.

[8] J. Mohan Malik, "The Evolution of Strategic Thought," in Craig A, Snyder, Edit., *Contemporary Security and Strategy* (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), pp. 13-14.

[9] Craig A. Snyder, "Contemporary Security and Strategy," in Craig A, Snyder, Edit., *Contemporary Security and Strategy,* Op. cit, p. 4.

[10] Quoted in John Garnett, "Strategic Studies and its Assumptions," in John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett, Phil Williams, *Contemporary Strategy,* Vol. 1 (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 4.

[11] Harry R. Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy,* Op. cit, pp. 17-18.

[12] Ibid, p. 17.

[13] As the army maxim has it, time spent on reconnaissance, on gathering information, is never wasted. It is for this very good reason that espionage was supported since the very beginning by the Hebrew Bible, Sun Tzu's Art of War, Kutaliya's Arthshaster, Islamic strategy and to date.

[14] Alan Stephens, Nicola Baker, *Making Sense of War: Strategy for the 21st Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 101.

[15] Harry R. Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy,* Op. cit., p. 17.

[16] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), p.102.

[17] Barry R. Posen, "European Union Security and Defence Policy: Response to Unipolarity?'' *Security Studies,* Vol. 15, No. 2, April–June 2006, p. 153.

[18] Czeslaw Mesjasz, "Complexity Studies and Security in the Complex World: An Epistemological Framework of Analysis," *Chapter (Draft Version),* Cracow University of Economics, Cracow, Poland, p. 2.

[19] Steve Yetiv, "The Travails of Balance of Power Theory: The United States in the Middle East," *Security*
Studies, vol. 15, No. 1, January–March 2006, pp. 70-71.

[20] Alan G. Stolberg, "The International System in the 21st Century," in J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. ed. *Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy,* 2nd Edition, (United States: U.S Army War College, June 2006), p. 9

[21] Ibid., pp. 9-10

[22] Michael Howard, *The Causes of War and other essays* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 9.

[23] Martin Griffiths, Terry O'Callaghan, Steven C. Roach, *International Relations: The Key Concepts,* Second Edition (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 326.
[24] Michael Howard, *The Causes of War and other essays,* Op. cit., p. 37.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ritchie P. Lowry, " To Arms: Changing Military Roles and the Military-Industrial Complex," *Social Problems,* Vol. 18, No. 1, Summer 1970, p. 3.
[27] The military is used to patrol the countryside, in riot control, as secret police, and conduct counter-insurgency operations.
[28] Martin Griffiths, Terry O'Callaghan, Steven C. Roach, *International Relations: The Key Concepts,* op. cit, p. 333.
[29] Eric J. Hobsbawn, *Globalization, Democracy, and Terrorism* (Great Britain: Little Brown, 2007), p. 23.
[30] Jack S. Levy, "Theories of General War," *World Politics,* Vol. 37, No. 3, April 1985, p. 351.
[31] Michael Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement: How Israel went Nuclear and what that means for the world* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2006), p. 268.
[32] Reference No. 1 in Saira Khan, *Nuclear Proliferation Dynamics in Protracted Conflicts Regions: A Comparative Study of South Asia and the Middle East* (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2002) , p. 214.
[33] In 1985, a Moroccan-born Jew named Mordechai Vanunu, who had been fired from his job working at the plutoinium-producing reactor in the Negev, defected and sold his story, with photographs, to the London Sunday Times. Jeremy Bernstein, *Nuclear Weapons: What you need to know* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 5.
[34] Barry Lando, "Israeli Nukes—Don't Ask Don't Tell," December 12, 2006. www.Arabisto.com, accessed on December 13, 2006.
[35] From the beginning of the creation of the state of Israel, wars were a reality in the Arab-Israeli protracted conflict. All of these wars were fought over territorial issues, and each time the Arabs fought against Israel while being part of some coalition. The probability of war with the Arab states has not changed over the years. Saira Khan, Op. cit, pp. 195, 206.
[36] Hans Kristensen, Robert Norris, "World Nuclear Stockpile Report," *Ploughshares Fund 2009,* September 11, 2009. http://www.ploughshares.org/news-analysis/world-nuclear-stockpile-report, accessed on October 23, 2009.
[37] Michael Mandelbaum, *The Case For Goliath: How America Acts As The World's Government in the 21ST Century* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), p. 3. See also Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited," *International Security,* Vol. 31, No. 2, Fall 2006, pp. 10-16.
[38] T.R. Reid, *The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), p.181.
[39] Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Continuity of International Politics," in Ken Booth and Tim Dunee, *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future off Global Order* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 348.

[40] The six original members of the Shanghai Cooperation are the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The four observer nations are India, Pakistan, Iran, and Mongolia. The declaration was available at <http://www.sectsco.org/html/01470.html>.
[41] *The Military Balance 2009*, International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Routledge, January 2009), p. 207.
[42] In October 2008, it was announced that a permanent Russian naval facility was being constructed in the Mediterranean, at Tartus on the Syrian coast. Ibid.
[43] *The Military Balance 2009*, International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Routledge, January 2009), p. 105.
[44] Colin Gray, "World Politics as Usual after September 11: Realism Vindicated," in Ken Booth and Tim Dunee, *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future off Global Order* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 230.
[45] "60 years on, China celebrates its global power," *Asia Pacific News,* September 29, 2009.
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/1007993/1/.html, accessed on November 12, 2009.
[46] James F. Hoge, Jr., "A Global Power Shift in the Making," *Foreign Affairs,* July/August 2004. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59910/james-f-hoge-jr/a-global-power-shift-in-the-making, accessed on November 12, 2009.
[47] Joshua H. Ho, "The Security of Sea Lanes in South Asia," *Asian Survey*, July/August 2006, pp. 558, 559.
[48] Joseph Cirincione, John B. Wolfsthal and Mariam Rajkumar, *Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), p. 141.
[49] Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for US
Security Policy," *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 4, Spring 2001, p. 7.
[50] John Isaacs, "Bush II or Reagan III?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* May/June 2001, p. 31.
[51] Ashton B. Carter, "America's New Strategic Partner?', *Foreign Affairs,* July/August 2006, p. 33.
[52] Anwar Iqbal, "US satisfied with Pakistani nukes' security: Gates," *Dawn,* September 9, 2009.
[53] In 1986, the NCI\SUNY International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism raised concerns about the vulnerability of tactical nuclear weapons to theft. In January 2006, the Georgian authorities arrested a Russian who was carrying 100 grams of highly enriched uranium. Phil Williams, "Terrorism, Organized Crime, and WMD Smuggling: Challenges and Response," *Strategic Insights,* Vol. VI, Issue 5, August 2007.
[54] For an excellent discussion of the dilemmas posed by each of these three paradoxes see Michael Krepon, "The Stability-Instability Paradox: Misperceptions and Escalation Control in South Asia," in *Stimson Centre Report* (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson, May 2003). Scott D. Sagan, "Perils of proliferation," *Asian Survey,* November 2001. Feroz Hassan Khan, "The Independence-

Dependence Paradox: Stability Dilemmas in South Asia," *Arms Control Today,* October 2003.

[55] Colin Gray, "World Politics as Usual after September 11: Realism Vindicated," in Ken Booth and Tim Dunee, *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future off Global Order* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 228. op. cit.
[56] Ibid., p. 229.
[57] Steven Metz, Raymond A. Millen, *Future War/Future Battle-space: The Strategic Role of American Land power* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2003), p. ix.
[58] For understanding United States planning about the future war(s) see Quadrennial Defense Review Report, The Secretary of Defense, 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC, 20301-1000, February 6, 2006.
[59]The Internet security company McAfee stated in their 2007 annual report that approximately 120 countries have been developing ways to use the Internet as a weapon and target financial markets, government computer systems and utilities. Farzana Shah, Indo-Israel Cyber Warfare Against Pakistani Nuclear Program," September 9, 2009. http://pakistankakhudahafiz.wordpress.com/2009/09/09/indo-israeli-cyber-warfare-against-pakistani-nuclear-program/ , accessed on September 12, 2009.
[60] Martin Griffiths, Terry O'Callaghan, Steven C. Roach, *International Relations: The Key Concepts,* Op. cit, p. 328.
[61] Martin Griffiths, Terry O'Callaghan, Steven C. Roach, *International Relations: The Key Concepts,* Op. cit., p. 327.
[62] Quoted in Jack S. Levy, "Theories of General War," *World Politics,* Vol. 37, No. 3, April 1985, p. 344.
[63] General (ret.) Dr. Klaus Naumann, General (ret.) John Shalikashvili, Field Marshal The Lord Inge, Admiral (ret.) Jacques Lanxade, General (ret.) Henk van den Breemen, With Benjamin Bilski and Douglas Murray, *Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World: Renewing Transatlantic Partnership* (Noaber Foundation, Dorpstsstraat 14, 6741 AK Lunteren, 2007), p. 44.
[64] For Asymmetric conflict outcomes see Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security,* Vol. 26, No. 1, Summer, 2001, pp. 93-128.
[65] Lawrence Freedman, "A New Type of War," in Ken Booth and Tim Dunee, *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future off Global Order* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 40. Op. cit.
[66] Dr Subhash Kapila, "India's new Cold Start war doctrine strategically reviewed," South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 991, May 4, 2004, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers10/paper991.html, Accessed on July 15, 2008.
[67] Walter C. Ladwig III, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine," *International Security*, Vol.32, No.3, Winter 2007/08, p.64.

[68] Steven Metz, Raymond A. Millen, *Future War/Future Battle-space: The Strategic Role of American Land power* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2003), p. 16. Op. cit.

DYNAMICS OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARENA: *IDENTIFYING THE CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS FOR RESPONSE*

Ambassador Arif Kamal

The Middle East, an organic landmass from the Nile to the Indus[1], is identified as 'the cradle of civilization' in history and a conflict-prone and energy-rich arena in the contemporary context. The region remains on a high pedestal from the geo-strategic perspective[2] in view of its images as the life-line of the world economy and the spill-over from Israel-specific tensions and turmoil. It also remains sensitive to Pakistan-India dynamics as a factor in the security environs.

The challenges in the regional scenario though rooted in historical experience, are expressed in the high stakes in the region's energy resource: oil reserves 65 % and gas reserves at 45% of the world.[3] The search for peace and security has thus been contingent upon the interplay of the region-based primary interests with that of the predominant extra-regional forces.[4]

The contemporary scene ought to be viewed in a three-fold light. Firstly, the most significant burden of history transferred to the region today relates to the post-Ottoman fragmentation in the Arab realm, inter-state territorial disputes, and hotbeds of conflict inherited from the colonial age, together with the emergence of Israel as a colonial implant. A lingering suspicion between Iran and the Arab flank of the Gulf also forms part of the legacy. Secondly, the continuation of conflicts, particularly the Arab-Israeli issue, over half a century carries impact on the social fabric of the region, raising serious questions regarding governance.

Last but not the least, *Pax Americana* has remained the overwhelming factor in the post-Cold War strategic environment vis-à-vis the region. The primary American agenda and related threat perception on questions such as energy, terrorism and Israeli security were indeed pace-setters in the arena in recent decades.

However, the scenario in the making calls into question the potency of unipolarity in the upcoming decade and raises expectations that the regional stake-holders will have greater maneuverability to move closer and take up shared responsibility towards security and cooperation in the arena.

Unipolarity at Play

Concurrent with the discovery of oil and gas, the region has been witnessing the presence of extra-regional forces that profoundly influenced its political and economic dynamics.[5] However, the post-Cold War era is characterized by an unprecedented American influence and freedom to act in the region.[6] The U.S preponderance was manifested first with U.S-led liberation of Kuwait and reaffirmed in its successive moves towards containment of two principal powers: Iran & Iraq. In the backdrop of ventures in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States carried massive military, air and naval re-deployment in the Gulf (in spite of an earlier withdrawal from Saudi Arabia) and brought its CENTCOM headquarter to Qatar. More significantly, it signed bilateral security agreements with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, binding up security needs of the Gulf monarchies directly with its own presence in the Gulf.[7] In the same logic, persistent efforts have been made to redefine the Arab threat perception: shifting the focus away from Israel to what is projected as Persian hegemony, and thus widening the gulf between two flanks of the waterway.[8]

The popular mindset has been registering a negative fallout of what is seen as *Pax Americana:* The neo-con vision of a new Middle East generates fears as if re-drawing the regional map or cultural re-engineering of the societies is in the making. In the past decade or so, the fate of Arab-Israeli conflict and prospects for a settlement became increasingly dependent on the scale and depth of American intercession with the parties. Concurrently, the lack of progress in the peace process has accentuated the sense of despair, deprivation and injustice amongst broad masses. The scenario shows a widening perception gap between state and street[9]. It also provides a germination ground for militancy.[10]

Contemporary Political Landscape

The political landscape as evolved in the backdrop of the U.S preponderance, is defined by an Israeli existence as the region's most powerful state and sole (though undeclared) nuclear power, a defiant Iran and uneasy coexistence between Israel and the Arabs. The most critical imprint on the contemporary scene flows from Iraqi quagmire and near-demise of the Middle East peace process, besides a number of related factors that are interwoven with the governance issue. It unfolds the 'domino effect' that has the potential of eroding the primacy of the U.S or capacity of its allies to deliver. It also carries seeds of challenges that are in the making for the next decade or so.

The American invasion of Iraq led up to the eclipse of secular Al-Baathists and abolition of the largest standing Arab army, ostensibly assuring greater security for Israel. However, this in effect, implied end of the 'Sunni dominated' Iraq, which was perceived 'strong and motivated enough to balance the radical Shiite Iran. The Iraqi quagmire has thus opened flood gates of Iranian influence beyond the traditional realm[11] and generated fears amongst status quo forces in regard to linkages amongst radicals transcending the so-called 'Shia Crescent'.[12] Concurrently, it has unfolded numerous destabilizing currents: Sunni-Shiite tensions have surfaced in Iraq and throughout the region. Second, Iraq has become a rallying point for militants from across the frontiers. Third, the country's political make-up fore-warns of a potential three-way division. In sum total, these factors serve as catalyst for anti-American sentiment on a larger canvas.

The emergence of Iran as an important regional player, in spite of decades long policy of containment, is phenomenal. It has acquired decisive influence in Iraq and proxies in the Arab-Israel conflict. In the U.S threat perception, Iran continues to be the 'single country that may pose the greatest threat to U.S interests'.[13] The regime in Tehran is also seen as an existential threat to Israel. It is, therefore, the object of continuing sanctions and greater pressure on the nuclear issue. Conversely, Iran's nuclear programme,

notwithstanding its scope, manifests the country's urge to seek recognition of the role it conceives for itself.[14]

The regional scene is characterized by recurring U.S choice for Israeli primacy in the Arab-Israeli equation. This runs counter to hopes amongst various stake-holders regarding the unique American capacity to work with both Arabs and Israelis. The peace remains illusive even though the so-called peace process is now more than fifteen years old. Successive variants for a forward move have died down. In the process, the Palestinian Authority that was initially seen as vanguard of the peace process, remains impotent in the wake of a post-Arafat leadership crisis, fragmented Palestinian polity and continuing Israeli intransigence. The rise of Hamas together with efforts to clip its wings, and the Israeli unilateralism have further eroded the prospects of meaningful advance towards a settlement.

The nuclearisation of South Asia, alongside the Arabian Sea, brought about a qualitative change in the strategic environment in the region of close proximity. The reciprocal nuclear tests: Pakistan following India (May 1998), created a deterrence within the region, matured the concept of nuclear responsibility, and unfolded compulsions--from within and outside--to take up the course of a sustained dialogue to address the unresolved bilateral issues. Concurrently, the broader region continues to receive fallout from two developments of high significance: First, the Global War on Terror (GWOT) brought into a sharper focus Pakistan's geo-political disposition and its relevance for peace and stability in a trans-regional setting. Second, Indo-Israel cooperation attained an unmistakable strategic dimension, adding strength to Israeli primacy in the Middle East.

Arms Race and Threat of Proliferation

The extra-regional presence has been a catalyst rather than a halting factor in arms race. As a region, "the Middle East consistently spends proportionately more money for arms purchases then any other region of the world, whether this is measured as a percentage of GNP or of total government spending".[15] The region

representing only five percent of world population, "accounts for 30 percent of world arms imports." [16]

Growing trend towards proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is yet another significant development that has all the potential to increase the existing instability manifold. Israel is already an undeclared nuclear power, generating deep sense of insecurity and an unavoidable desire in the Arab world to find balance of power. Iran which is suspected of pursuing a concerted effort in this direction, suffers from a crisis of confidence in the Arab world and therefore, not seen as a reliable counterpoise to Israel. This adds to the existing perplexity and unfolds opportunities for extra-regional powers to add up nuclear energy models, to the existing conventional arms race[17].

War on Terror

The regional stake-holders have been in unison in their appreciation of the phenomena of terrorism as a strategic threat in the post 9/11 global scene. They were, by and large, responsive to the international community's 'war on terror', sharing the policy direction as well as its fall out. Concurrently, there is an increasing level of discomfort with definition of terrorism within a U.S.-centric agenda. The states that are not in harmony with the US diagnosis, remain under scrutiny and even sanctions. The change of semantics with the advent of Obama administration has not brought about any significant change in the scenario. Second, the U.S definition of terror is all encompassing, leaving no room for the people's right of resistance against foreign occupation or alien subjugation. Last but not the least, apprehensions caused in the Bush era[18] continue to linger that the neo-Con intelligentsia is trying to turn the campaign against terror into a war against Muslim Civilization and Islamic religion. In a nutshell, myopic approaches to GWOT have enlarged perception gaps and given rise to avoidable notions regarding 'clash of civilizations'.

Impact on Governance

The impact of long-festering Middle East crisis on the social fabric has brought in the fore a number of issues regarding

governance. The issues can be viewed in the context of State vs. Street, inertia vs. reform[19] and the rise of non-state actors.

The perception gap between the ruling elites and 'man on the street' exists on a wider canvas in the region. The regimes seek umbrella from the West in the wake of limited choices under the unipolar order.[20] Conversely, broad masses are mainly anti-West and represent an acute sense of injustice that has come about in the past decades. The continuing conflict also enabled the regimes to delay any significant reforms in the governance process. The region, therefore, remains an area without sustained democratic institutions/participation and without a reliable 'vent for the popular steam'. The Palestinian Territories and Iran are perhaps lone exceptions. (Ironically, electoral process in both had reconfirmed primacy of the Islamists).

The non-state actors have gained profile and credence in the wake of successive failures of states in the Arab-Israeli conflict and lack of adequate participation in the decision-making process. They have, in cases, come up with enlarged roles compared with role of a state. For example, Hezbollah's resistance to Israeli invasion of Lebanon (July 2006) brought them a legendary status as this non-state actor was seen doing what all Arab regular armies had previously failed to do. Similarly, the rise of Hamas and its sustainability in the impoverished Gaza in spite of its eclipse from power is a point in case. More significantly, the non-state actors have demonstrated a convergence of interest as is mirrored in the consultative process between Hamas and Hezbollah[21]. It is interesting that the recipe for democratization and reform offered by the US for 'Broader Middle East', is seen as an alien imposition and when put to test, brought forth electoral gains for the Islamists.

Role of Ideology

'Islamic Revival' as against erstwhile nationalism and various radical streams are relatively newer phenomena on the region's political map. These are intrinsically linked up with a sense of denial and a missionary zeal to achieve what remains unfulfilled to-date.

It is important to recall key aspects of this phenomena. First, the ideological streams based on nationalism and socialism died down with successive setbacks in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The secular approaches to politics also face a down-turn (Ironically, some look at Sadam as the 'last secular ruler' in the contemporary Middle East). Second, the 'Islamic revival' is a wider phenomena, corresponding to the so called 'Broader Middle East'. Various streams representing this phenomena have gained popular ground and filled in the ideological vacuum in the absence of nationalist/secular activism. (This is illustrated in the activism displayed by various sub-streams flowing from the erstwhile Al-Akhwan including Hamas).They thrive on what is seen as a choice between the so-called corrupt elite and the vibrant religiously-motivated revivalists. The inability of traditional Arab regimes to counter the appeal of radical Islam, is indeed a dilemma for the U.S as well.

The prevailing sense of injustice has germinated militancy and extremist view points, not always providing feeder for terrorist infrastructure. Nevertheless, their identification with 'Islamic Revival' creates an ongoing image problem of higher proportions. The sectarian strife that runs in tandem with radical Islam, ought to be seen as a reactionary phenomena promoted by the vested interests.

Emerging Trends and Response Options

In the upcoming decade, the oil and gas assets of the Gulf will gain higher strategic value as the global economies are likely to come under the 'eye' of an 'energy storm', made of multitude of uncertainties. The market already mirrors a growing demand in relation to supply, (projected to increase 57% from 2000-2025), higher costs inherent in efforts towards diversification of sources and the perceived geo-political risks, either because of instability or threat of terrorism. The supply constraints mean that higher prices are likely to recur and persist for long. It also implies an ever growing importance of energy security.

The strategic choices made by the U.S. in the wake of the unipolar order, relate to military presence and control over the political direction of energy-rich region, besides diversification of sources of supply. It has relied upon pre-emption, under the Global War on Terror (GWOT), to carry forward its agenda. However, in the upcoming decade, the U.S. role will be constrained by the impact of an array of internal and external forces, the inherent limits of U.S. power, and the outcome of policy choices it had made over the years[22].

The United States is likely to remain a dominant power when compared with other extra-regional players in the region. However, its influence may not be all encompassing.[23] The limitations on the U.S. power may also flow from increasing challenges by the foreign policies of other countries. For example, the European Union's unwillingness to join the chorus against Iran and its differing approach to the Palestinian problem; and the 'resurgent' Russia's choice to demonstrate its independence from the United States on the two issues. No less important will be China's aversion to greater pressure on Iran in view of its growing stakes in the Gulf oil and, therefore, in stability of the region.

The regional stake-holders, in keeping with the diminishing unipolarity, are likely to expand their security bridges with Europe and with China corresponding to their stakes in stability. It is not clear as to how far the U.S would be able to keep China away from security cooperation with states in the region. However, there would be a growing skepticism within the region towards any Indian move to assume a hegemonic role in view of Indo-Israeli nexus. The perception regarding Pakistan as a factor complimenting the Gulf security system is likely to be re-enforced.

In the upcoming regional arena, Israel and Iran ought to be viewed as the most powerful states while there is no early end in sight of the post-colonial fragmentation in the Arab realm. It would be increasingly important as to how the three players find readjustments in the wake of diminishing uni-polarity. Israel is likely to remain an unpredictable factor in the situation, trying to perpetuate the Arab disarray and countering Iranian influence. The

regional climate would be eased if other regional players help Iran to come out of the 'containment syndrome' and downplay its rhetoric. Second, a gainful choice with the Arab camp would rest more on confidence-building with Iran and to evolve structures of cooperation, based on shared interest, rather than rely upon extra regional protective umbrella. In the context, Pakistan could play a positive supplementary role in enforcing the intra-region process in view of its strategic disposition, non-partisan image in relation to the erstwhile Iran-Arab divide and distinct status as a moderate Muslim nation in the periphery.

In spite of diminishing unipolarity, the climate in the region does not auger well for fast track progress on the Palestinian-Israeli front or an early wrap up of the Iraqi quagmire. The upcoming political scenario will thus continue to witness activism by 'Islamic revivalists', some with radical overtones, as they fill the political and intellectual vacuum in the Arab world. The non-state actors are also likely to remain assertive in the absence of conclusive progress in the Middle East Peace Process.[24] However, greater reform, even though incremental, and participatory democracy may neutralize the tide. Judged from the recent tests and trials, a greater democratization is likely to bring in an upsurge of the 'revivalist' political stream. However, recourse to alternates can only lead to further radicalization.

Similarly, the option of another war in the Middle East, whether propelled by radicals on the Arab-Israeli front or imposed for regime-leveling in Iran, is indeed fraught with a multi-dimensional crisis. Active hostilities on either front can unfold radicalization of the region, activating non-state actors all through, and bring de-stabilization of energy-based economies and strategic supply routes.

The Gulf, compared with others in the region, is likely to be in the focus of regional security perspective for the coming decades as well. To recall, the contemporary Gulf scenario is overwhelmed by the Arab flank's dependence on the extra-regional umbrella in keeping with the regimes' view of the perceived need for survivability. This dependence however comes in tandem with latent

fears of the overpowering impact of the unipolar order: apprehensions of being sucked into another war that can be destabilizing for all segments of the society. There is an inlaid desire for "Gulfanisation" of Gulf security. (The GCC was initially seen as a product of fears from Iran's "export of revolution", as augmented by extra-regional forces). However, with the settling down of the dust, there is increasing realization that economic and security interests of regional stake-holders, rooted in the need for uninterrupted oil flow, are very much similar if not the same. A growing space is now available for assuming regional responsibility as the region awaits the first signals of diminishing unipolarity.

The intelligentsia and policy-elite across the geographic and political divide in the region ought to re-visit the accumulated European experience of the past one century and see how the common stakes of today have buried the history of divisive conflicts in that continent. In this context, it is increasingly important to study as to how the region can advance regional cooperation on two tracks: First, the Arab League revitalizes its ranks and finds an active economic link with the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO); creating a shared community of interest up to Central Asia and Pakistan. Second, the Arab littoral states of the Persian Gulf and Iran work effectively to diffuse lingering tensions within the region; expand and upgrade the existing institutional framework for cooperation and assume the same stature and responsibilities in the Gulf arena as the EU did in Europe.

The de-stabilizing potential of the upcoming scenario, however remote, makes it increasingly important that the regional stakeholders act in concert to promote the process of dialogue from within the region and thus enlarge stakes of both state and non-state actors in peace and stability. It would be relevant to develop an approach that, first of all, engages and admits the non-state actors in the political processes and thus erode their radical postures. Concurrently, the regional stake-holders move with diligence and greater pace to energize the intra regional process and institutional frameworks of cooperation.

Author

Ambassador Arif Kamal is a former Pakistani diplomat, now chairing Global Studies at ISSRA/NDU. He had moved from teaching politics in the early 1970s to the diplomatic arena across the globe and a full-bloom professional career over 34 years.

Notes

[1] The nomenclature 'Middle East' has been a colonial (and later, a neo-colonial) convenience rather than a geographic expression. The connotation of this nomenclature has also been shifting like the 'shifting sands' of the region. For example, expression 'broader Middle East', now used by the US and G-8, is in fact synonymous with bulk of the muslim world. However, discussion in this paper is essentially related to the region from Indus to Nile which continues to evoke interest for its conflict-prone and energy-rich characteristics.

[2] Farah Naaz. "Security in the Persian Gulf", *Strategic Analysis,* Vol. XXIV. No. 12**,** (March 2001)

[3] Gal Luft "Dependence on Middle East Energy and its Impact on Global Security" available at http://www.iags.org accessed on 25th March 2009.
The share of oil reserves is varyingly described as 55%. For this comparative view, see Kenneth M. Pollack, "Securing the Gulf". *Foreign Affairs.* (July/August 2003), See at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030701faessay15401/kenneth-m-pollack/securing-the-gulf.html. Accessed on May 15, 2008.

[4] Mirza Aslam Beg, "Energy Security Paradigm for Persian Gulf Region in 21st Century". *Quarterly Journal, National Development and Security Rawalpindi, (*February 2000).

[5] Farah Naaz, "Security in the Persian Gulf", *Strategic Analysis*, . Vol. XXIV. No. 12 (March 2001)**.**

[6] Richard N. Haass, "The New Middle East" *Foreign Affair, (*ovember/December 2006).

[7] Kenneth M. Pollack, "Securing the Gulf". *Foreign Affairs.* (July/August 2003), See at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030701faessay15401/kenneth-m-pollack/securing-the-gulf.html. Accessed on May 15, 2008.

[8] Barry Rubin, "The Geopolitics of Middle East Conflict and Crisis", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, (September 1998).

[9] Kenneth M. Pollack, "Securing the Gulf", *Foreign Affairs (* July/August 2003) See at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030701faessay15401/kenneth-m-pollack/securing-the-gulf.html. Accessed on May 15, 2008.

[10] Mark Edmond Clark, "A possible path to change in US-Iran Relations". *PfP Consortium Quarterly Journal.* Spring 2005. See at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?lng=en&id=22782. Accessed on (ay 15, 2008)

[11] Kemp Geoffrey, "Iran and Iraq: The Shia Connection, Soft Power and the Nuclear Factor", *Special Report 156*, (November 2005): http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr156.pdf.
[12] The term "Shia Crescent" has been used by Jordan's King Abdullah twice during 2004-2006 to denote the expanding Iranian influence among states and non-state actors in West.
[13] Saxton Jim, "Iran's Gas and Oil Wealth", *The Joint Economic Committee Study of United States Congress*, (March 2006)
[14] Arif Kamal, "Dimension and Consequences of NATO Expansion to Eurasia: Reviewing Iran's Security Environment", *Criterion Quarterly*, (April/June 2008).
[15] Prince El-Hassan, "Future Prospects for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East" , *THE RUSSI JOURNAL,* http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/titlecontent=t777285713
[16] Ibid
[17] The UAE and Jordan are already responding to the French and American marketing endeavor in regard to nuclear power development.
[18] Mark Edmond Clark, "A possible path to change in US-Iran Relations". *PfP Consortium Quarterly Journal.* Spring 2005. See at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?lng=en&id=22782. Accessed on May 15, 2008.
[19] Daniel L. Byman, & Jerrold D. Green, "The Enigma of Stability in the Persian Gulf Monarchies", *Middle East Review of International Affair, (*September 1999) Vol.3. No, 3, See at http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue3/jv3n3a3.html. Accessed on May 15, 2008.
[20] Barry Rubin, "The Geopolitics of Middle East Conflict and Crisis", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, (September 1998)
[21] A convergence of inetrest amongst the non-state actors across the sectarian divide, was repeatedly expressed in the years 2004-06' e.g. Hizbollah and Hamas shared fora to mobilize political support. Similarly, Iraq's Shia leader Muqtada Sadr proclaimed himself as the "beating arm of both Hamas and Hizbollah…" (*Khutba* at Kufa Grand Mosque during 2004 revolt in Faluja).
[22] Richard N.Haass, "The New Middle East" *Foreign Affair, (*November/December 2006)
[23] ibid.
[24] Ibid

US-INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL: ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

Brigadier Sardar Muhammad, SI (M)

Introduction

Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh marked the beginning of a new era of US-India strategic partnership. Joint statement covered a wide range of important subjects; defense, economic cooperation, energy, space and agriculture. However, the center piece of the new relationship was undoubtedly the US-India agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation which has allowed India an access to US nuclear technology and flow of nuclear fuel.[1] The US persuaded its *friends and allies* i.e. the nuclear supplier group (NSG) of countries to do like wise.[2]

The US-India deal for peaceful nuclear cooperation has a historic and extraordinary significance. It has completely transformed the US-India relations bringing the two countries closer to each other than ever before. The deal envisages India to accept all the responsibilities and receive all the benefits of the world's leading nuclear states with advanced nuclear technology. It bestows India with the status of a *de facto* nuclear weapon state (NWS), and has provided a certificate of a responsible state with regards to nuclear proliferation. It has also allowed India not only to continue, but to potentially accelerate the buildup of its stockpile of nuclear weapon materials, which has wide ranging implications on the nonproliferation regime as well as stability in the region, particularly South Asia. The implications of the deal coupled with the US-India Defense Agreement have grave consequences for Pakistan. Indian access to fissile material from international market will entail a quantum increase in its nuclear arsenals. This factor will have substantial effects on Pakistan's minimum credible deterrence strategy.

The US-India nuclear deal for peaceful cooperation has sparked debate in the world. Critics of the deal see this development

as weakening of the non-proliferation regime and lessening of the credibility of nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The supporters of deal argue that India deserves full nuclear assistance for its impeccable record of non proliferation and being a responsible nuclear state. In such a scenario a Pakistani perspective on this deal is definitely needed. This paper focuses on bringing out a Pakistani perspective of the nuclear deal.

History of US Nuclear Cooperation with India

US- India nuclear cooperation is not a cold start however, history of US- India nuclear relationship is a blend of collision and collusion. In the beginning, Indian's nuclear programme was in friction with larger international non proliferation efforts. US- India nuclear cooperation started in mid 1950s, with the launch 'Atoms for Peace' proposal. India realized benefits of the 'Atoms for Peace' proposal, and promised to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes only. On March 16, 1956, US actively promoted its nuclear cooperation with India by providing heavy water for the Canada-India Reactor (CIR).[3] This nuclear cooperation is a watershed in the history of nuclear proliferation.

By the end of the 1950s, despite differences on the IAEA mechanisms, the US had trained many Indian scientists for processing and handling plutonium, with an access to thousands of classified documents and reports.[4] India exploited the missing safeguard clauses of the CIRUS deal and used the plutonium produced by CIRUS in its so called Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) at Pokhran.[5] Following India's 1974 PNEs, US partially, while Canada immediately suspended all nuclear cooperation with India.

Road to Nuclear Deal

US always desired to have a close relationship with India due to its size, democratic values and economic potential. It was only latter's special ties with Soviet Union that came in the way during cold war. At the end of cold war, mending of fences between the two started in early 1990's. However, the advances were

imperilled by India's 1998 nuclear tests and the subsequent sanctions imposed by the US. Sanctions imposed against India after the May 1998 nuclear tests were finally waived in September 2001, by President Bush. Since then the US- India strategic relations have gained impetus.

On January 12, 2004, the Bush Administration and the Vajpayee government announced the 'Next Steps in Strategic Partnership' (NSSP) initiative. In this initiative the US and India agreed to expand cooperation in three specific areas: civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programmes and high-technology trade.

Sequel to such positive commitments by the US, on June 28, 2005, the US and India signed a 10-year Defence Framework Agreement. By signing this defence agreement the US and India entered into a new era of strategic partnership. These developments furthered the progress to the Indo-US civilian nuclear cooperation agreement.

Indian Objectives

The US-India civilian nuclear cooperation deal has been driven by a range of factors. India's motivation derives from number of considerations. Some of which are:-

- The deal provides a useful instrument to produce a paradigm shift in foreign policy and allows for deeper engagement with the US.
- It provides India with a workaround to deal with the non proliferation regime.
- Get recognition as *de facto* NWS; and accrue benefits as NWS without signing NPT.
- Overcome domestic shortage of uranium for its nuclear power programme.
- Get rid of technology denial and nuclear isolation.

US Objectives

Some of the US objectives in concluding the deal are as following:-

- Balance China's power.
- Transforming the relationship between the US and India and deepening India's integration with NSG and IAEA.
- Achieve a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes by India, Pakistan and China.
- Secure India's full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
- Achieve congruence of Indian policy towards Iran.
- Exploit commercial potential for US nuclear industry by participating in the projected build up of nuclear power plants in India.

Key Steps in Finalising the Deal

In general perception, the US-India nuclear deal has been finalised since 2005. However, several key steps were required to be taken before a nuclear cooperation agreement could be implemented with India. It took more than three years to come to fruition as it had to go through several complex stages, including amendment of US domestic law, a civil-military nuclear separation plan in India, an India-IAEA safeguards (inspections) agreement and the grant of an exemption for India by the NSG; an export-control cartel that had been formed mainly in response to India's first nuclear test in 1974. J.Hyde Act 2006 was signed on December 18, 2006 that removed the legal impediments for proceeding with the deal.

On August 18, 2008, the IAEA Board of Governors approved, and on February 2, 2009, India signed an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Once India brings this agreement into force, inspections will begin in a phased manner on the civilian nuclear installations India has identified in its Separation Plan.[6]

The next step was to approach NSG to grant a waiver to India to commence civilian nuclear trade. The 45-nation NSG granted the waiver to India on September 6, 2008 allowing it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other countries.[7]

The implementation of this waiver made India the only known country with nuclear weapons which is not a party to NPT but is still allowed to carry out nuclear commerce with the rest of the world. Finally the 123 Agreement; the bilateral agreement on nuclear cooperation for peace full purposes, was signed by US Secretary of State and Indian Minister for External Affairs on October 10, 2008. All these steps have been successfully completed and finally approved by the US Congress which allows the US to provide expertise and nuclear fuel with nuclear reactors to India.

Terms of the Deal

Major contours of the deal as enunciated in J.Hyde Act and 123 Agreement include:-

- India will separate civilian and military nuclear facilities in a phased manner.
- According to March 2006 separation plan, 14 of 22 indigenous Indian power reactors will be placed under an India specific safeguards agreement (6 are already under safeguards). Future power reactors may also be placed under safeguards, if India declares them as civilian.
- India agrees to continue its moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.
- India commits to strengthening the security of its nuclear arsenals.
- India agrees to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies.
- India adheres to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)and NSG guidelines.
- The US would deal with India for the purposes of cooperation in the civilian nuclear field at par with the five recognised NWS.
- US companies will be allowed to build nuclear reactors in India and provide nuclear fuel for civilian energy programme.
- India would be eligible to buy US dual-use nuclear technology.

- The US will ask its friends and allies to enable full peaceful civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India.
- India would work towards negotiating Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT).
- Advance nuclear energy research and development and training of experts and scientists.
- Development of strategic reserves of nuclear fuel by India to guard against any disruption of supply over life time of India's reactors (40years).
- If the agreement is terminated, the US will have the right to require the return of 'any nuclear material, equipment, non-nuclear material or components transferred' under the agreement as also any special fissionable material produced through their use.

Articles mentioned at 14a to k are part of J.Hyde Act and surprisingly there is no mention of such conditional ties in 123 Agreement. Indians rightly believe that they are not governed by J.Hyde Act .How would US achieve her foreign policy objectives mentioned in this Act is not understandable. One can argue that US has included these conditions to satisfy domestic legal requirements otherwise there is no binding on India to fulfill these requirements as the deal has already entered the operationalization phase.

Indian Reservations to Henry J. Hyde Act 2006 and Ambiguities in the Deal

Indian government, its scientific community and experts were not in agreement with number of clauses of Henry J. Hyde Act 2006. Their reservations were related to the US policy of opposition to acquisition of nuclear weapons by NNWS outside NPT, denial of enrichment technologies, restriction on nuclear testing, production of fissile materials for nuclear explosion and certain reporting and certification procedures.[8]

US President Bush seeking to allay concerns of India over the deal, assured Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that what India saw as prescriptive provisions would not be American foreign policy

stating that he said *"Extraneous and prescriptive provisions of the Hyde Act are only advisory and will not be my foreign policy"*[9]. In a statement issued shortly after signing the Henry J. Hyde US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, Bush indicated that he did not agree with provisions like Section 103 and Section 104(d)(2) in the legislation. Although, many of the Indian reservations have been addressed by the US, but there are certain grey areas in the deal which may not draw attention in the text form but can be critical in the operating processes in future. None the less, India seems confident on the terms of the deal being in its favour as Indian ambassador to US, Mr, Ronen Sen said, "No agreement on any issue can be long lasting unless it's perceived to be of mutual benefit. As democracies we have to take the deal in and through our own democratic processes."[10]

Impact of the Deal on Indian Nuclear Weapons Programme

Indian nuclear weapons programme has been constricted due to supply of uranium. It is estimated that, without the nuclear deal, their stockpile would have exhausted by 2007. India has also not been able to import uranium for its un-safeguarded nuclear reactors due to restrictions imposed by NSG. Indian power reactors at 75 percent capacity require about 400 tons of uranium per year. The plutonium production reactors, CIRUS and Dhruva, which are earmarked for nuclear weapons, consume perhaps another 30-35 tons of uranium annually. It is estimated that current uranium production within India is less than 300 tons a year, which is well short of current and envisaged requirements.[11]

US-India nuclear deal has promised India an access to the international uranium market. This will free up its domestic uranium for its nuclear weapons programme and other military uses and would allow a significant and rapid expansion in India's nuclear arsenal. India is believed to have a stockpile of perhaps 40-50 nuclear weapons, with fissile materials stocks for as many more. India plans an arsenal of 300-400 weapons within a decade.[12]

In his article '*Atoms for War? US-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India's Nuclear Arsenal'* Ashley J. Tellis, an

Indian born Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace does not concede to the idea that Indian nuclear programme is constrained by domestic uranium shortage. He argues that India possess reserves of 78,000 metric tons of uranium (MTU) and the total inventory of natural uranium required to sustain all the reactors associated with the current power programme (both those operational and those under construction) and the weapons programme over the entire notional lifetime of these plants runs into some 14,640-14,790 MTU—or, in other words, requirements that are well within India's reasonably assured uranium reserves.[13] However, he has endeavoured to measure the entire ore uranium reserves over entire notional life of power and research reactors. India does face a current shortage of natural uranium caused by constrictions in its mining and milling capacity.

Indian Vertical Non-Proliferation Commitments

Moratorium on Production of Fissile Material and Weapon Testing. The US policy enunciated in J. Hyde Act 2006 towards South Asia is 'to achieve at an earliest possible date, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes by India, Pakistan, and the People's Republic of China.'[14] Joint statement of March 2, 2006 cites India voluntarily putting a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes. US law seeks to look forward for such moratorium at unfixed early date and makes it conditional with China and Pakistan and does not make it a precondition for India with regard to this deal. India's agreement to continue its voluntary moratorium on testing is less binding than a signature on an international treaty like CTBT. Indians could exploit the loopholes in the deal as they insist that agreement is regarding the energy and not arms control.

India's Stance on FMCT. In the deal, India pledged to work with the US for the conclusion of a multilateral FMCT. India has been supporting the negotiation of such a treaty for some time, thus it is not a new undertaking. Moreover, it is not clear how meaningful this action will really be because the US itself has thrown the prospects for concluding this treaty into some confusion

by asserting that an FMCT cannot be adequately verified. Indian policy makers view that it may be US policy, there is nothing in any agreement India has signed that commits it to cap or reduce its weapon grade fissile material stockpiles. More so, much will depend on how the negotiations for the proposed FMCT proceed at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

US Non Proliferation Policy

The US Administration considers civil nuclear cooperation with India as a *win* for non proliferation efforts as it has brought India into the non proliferation mainstream. The argument notwithstanding, the US-India nuclear deal is a big departure of US from its long standing policy of non proliferation and a big blow to non proliferation regime. By signing the joint declaration, the Bush Administration has weakened the basic and long held non proliferation principle that a legal commitment to forswear nuclear weapons should be a pre-condition for countries seeking assistance in building civilian nuclear reactors.

The US-India nuclear deal implicitly endorses, if not indirectly assists, the further growth of India's nuclear arsenals. The plan's gaping loopholes would allow India to increase its current capacity to produce 6-10 additional nuclear bombs every year to several dozens per year.

Impact on NPT

The Indians have long claimed that the NPT unfairly grandfathered China into the nuclear club while keeping India itself out on the grounds that it had not tested a weapon when the treaty was completed. Bush Administration accepted this logic. That was why, rather than insisting that India join the NPT as NNWS, US has for much of the past seven years, tried to work out a genuine compromise with India.[15] The Bush Administration in this deal granted India the privileges of an NPT defined NWS. .India has been treated selectively by the US in this deal which undermines the rules of NPT. Furthermore, once the door has been opened to

exceptionalism, it will be all the more difficult to rein in imprudent exports by other members of the group.

US-India nuclear deal also has undermined NPT by devaluing the commitments made by non nuclear weapon states (NNWS) in order to receive peaceful nuclear technology assistance. First, the NNWS under the NPT cannot make nuclear weapons while India can make the weapons. Second, all of the NNWS under the NPT must accept safeguards on all of the nuclear materials and facilities. Under the US-India agreement, India needs to only accept safeguards on its designated peaceful nuclear facilities.[16]Deal has also demolished the norm of full-scope safeguards as a criterion for exporting nuclear materials, equipment and technology to non-signers of the NPT. The apparent double standard that allows India to escape full-scope safeguards and still obtain nuclear assistance while countries like Japan, Germany, and Brazil are held to a tougher standard is a prescription for trouble. Countries may not leave the NPT over this issue, although one can not be absolutely sure of that. But the commitments of countries to the treaty will surely be weakened and may show up in lower support for tough measures of enforcement for violators or nuclear norms.

Implications for Pakistan's Security

As the deal has reached its final shape, a 40 year agreement which can be further extended by 10 years, its implications on the security environment can not be ignored. It has affected international as well as regional security environment because of a nuclear neighbour in South Asia with whom Indian relations have followed a non- cooperative pattern. Moreover, approval of the deal by the NSG, involves concerns of the international community.

US- India nuclear deal is a segment of their larger strategic partnership. The deal has long term strategic implications for the region as whole and for Pakistan in particular. It seeks to strengthen India which could further impose hegemony in South Asia. From Pakistani perspective, US-Indian partnership could disturb Pakistan's strategic relationship with India which would, in turn, impact on Pakistan's role of a balancer in South Asia. Any further

increase in the strategic gap in conventional forces between India and Pakistan, therefore, would disturb the balance of power in India's favour.[17]

Indians have been successful to convince the US that the issues facing both the states are the same and India is the only country in South Asia which is a champion of democracy and that the countries in its periphery could all fail as states. India and the US should join hands in order to fight this before it engulfs civilised states like India and US. At a deeper level, it signifies that the US is willing to give an increasing role to India in the smaller South Asian countries internal affairs. The idea strongly contrasts with Pakistan's vital security interest which was to dilute Indian hegemony in the region.

The common ground identified for granting this deal to India is its democracy. On this very account Pakistan, in the US perception dose not qualify for such a deal. The consequences of the deal also enable India, to make qualitative and quantitative improvements in its nuclear arsenal and accentuate the imbalance in the region, thus would impact Pakistan's nuclear deterrence. The cooperation in space and sale of sensitive technologies to India would further weaken Pakistan's nuclear as well as conventional deterrence and Pakistan may be pushed into arms race. Sale of Ballistic Missile Defence as envisaged in Indo-US defence deal would force Pakistan to re-evaluate its credible minimum nuclear deterrence.

By recognition of India's civil nuclear energy requirements as legitimate, and acceptance of a separation between the civil and the military programmes, India which is a non-signatory to NPT, has implicitly been recognized as a *NWS* by US and, in due course will be accepted as such by the 45 NSG countries as well. It has left Pakistan out in the cold. Pakistan's weapons programme will remain suspected. As such, may be subjected to non proliferation interdiction measures like PSI, denial of dual use items, stringent end user certification requirements, sanctions on its various entities, etc. India joining PSI as envisaged by J. Hyde Bill will get the right to interdict Pakistani shipping.

US acceptance of India as a NWS gives weight to the notion that nuclear weapons enhance a country's status and power, an idea historically deep seated in Indian strategic thought and manifested in her nuclear weapon programme. It also means that the US accepts the notion that some states are entitled to have nuclear weapons, but is not willing to accept others. India by this deal has broken out of post 1998 sanctions and will enter a new cooperative and liberalized sanctions free regime, ostensibly for its civil programme but with convenient dual use applications. Its proliferation record notwithstanding, India has been recognised as a responsible state with regards to nuclear non proliferation, while A.Q. Khan legacy will continue to stigmatize Pakistan and use against it from time to time. On same very account, Pakistan has been denied similar deal.

Policy Options for Pakistan

Pakistan's strategic options in response to challenges emerging out of Indo-US strategic partnership and nuclear deal are not as bleak as they appear to be. In view of the emerging environment, Pakistan needs to adjust its security driven foreign policy in a realistic manner.

Following are some policy options for Pakistan to match the threats emanating from US-India nuclear deal:

- **Option 1: Go Alone.** Instead of asking for a nuclear deal of the same kind from any other state, Pakistan can opt to go alone and manage the situation itself in two ways. First, Pakistan follows restraint and adheres to its policy of minimum credible deterrence. Second, Pakistan can opt to increase its weapons potential, moves from minimum deterrence to sufficient deterrence. However, by doing so Pakistan's economy would have to bear the costs.
- **Option 2: A Package Approach from US.** Pakistan should continue to demand a package approach from US and demand from the US to treat both India and Pakistan without discrimination. If Pakistan is successful in attaining a similar kind of deal from the

US, balance of power that has shifted in favour of India would be restored. However, all this is contingent upon US agreement on similar deal for Pakistan which seems improbable at the moment.

- **Option 3: Looking up to China.** China and Pakistan have proved to be reliable and steadfast strategic partners. Nuclear cooperation is an important area under consideration in the strategic dialogue between the two countries. US- India deal has set precedence; Pakistan could seek similar nuclear cooperation from China.
- **Recommended Option.** Looking at the current scenario, it's not difficult to discern that US may not offer a similar deal to Pakistan. Acquiring a similar deal from Russia would also be equally difficult. Pakistan should exhibit strategic restraint rather than entering into an arms race with India. Hence the two best options for Pakistan are that it *should adjust its nuclear posture and fulfil the requirements of minimum credible deterrence with assured second strike capability; simultaneously it should manoeuvre and get China on its side and enhance nuclear cooperation with her.*

Conclusion

Indo –US nuclear deal on one plane has undermined the NPT regime while on other the assurance of uninterrupted and open-ended supply of nuclear materials, highly advanced weapons and technology to India through strategic partnership has destabilized the region. Provision of anti-missile system to India would further disturb the precarious strategic balance of in South Asia. Pakistan's legitimacy for nuclear energy must be argued with the US and NSG forum. Being an ally of US in the GWOT, Pakistan should continue to raise its concerns to US on differential treatment given to India in the name of 'individual relationships' and also keep asking for similar deal. At the same time should seek Chinese assistance for nuclear energy. On the strategic plane Pakistan should follow a "Policy of Restraint" and avoid arms race.

Author

Brigadier Sardar Muhammad, SI (M), was commissioned in Artillery Regiment in 1979. He is a graduate of Command and Staff College, Quetta and National Defence University, Islamabad and holds masters degree in Defence & Strategic Studies from Quaid –e-Azam University, Islamabad. Held various command, staff and instructional assignments including Brigade Major of Infantry Brigade, General Staff Officer-1 and, Deputy Director Military Operations Directrote, General Headquarters and Directing Staff at National Defence University, Islamabad. He also served as Deputy Senior National Representative at US CENTCOM, Tempa, Florida. He also served as Director Defence Studies at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis, National Defence University Islamabad. Presently he is Director Enforcement in Anti Narcotics Force Rawalpindi

Notes

[1] Joint Statement - President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, July 18, 2005
http://www.armscontrol.org/country/india/20050718_Joint_Statement_India.asp?print.

[2] ibid.

[3] The US provided four shipments of heavy water with each shipment constituting 18.9 tons of heavy water, see 'India: Nuclear Imports/Exports', Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI): Country Overviews, at
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/Nuclear/2860.html

[4] 'India's Nuclear Weapons Programme, The Beginning: 1944-1960', *The Nuclear Weapons Archive*,
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaOrigin.html

[5] On May 18, 1974 India tested a device with a claimed yield of 12 kilotons at Pokhran in Rajasthan, and called this test a "peaceful nuclear explosion." As an immediate reaction Canada suspends nuclear cooperation. The US allowed continued supply of nuclear fuel, but later cuts it off.
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/nuke/first-pix.htm

[6] http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2008/infcirc731.pdf

[7] "Nuclear Suppliers Group Grants India Historic Waiver - MarketWatch". Marketwatch.com.
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/nuclear-suppliers-group-grants-india/story.aspx?guid={BA6E4022-DBC8-4B43-B9DE-62608913CB8A}&dist=hppr. Retrieved on 2008-10-02.

[8] *The Hindu*, December 10, 2006
http://www.thehindu.com/2006/12/10/stories/2006121003561200.htm.
[9] *Reality behind the Bush Smokescreen*by by A Gopalkrishnan, Mainstream, Vol XLV, No 40
26 September 2007available at http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article333.html
[10] "India bound only by 123 agreement, not Hyde Act: Ronen Sen," March 13th, 2008
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/india-bound-only-by-123-agreement-not-hyde-act-ronen-sen_10026878.html
[11] Mian, Zia. et.al. "Fissile Materials in South Asia and Implications of the U.S. India Nuclear Deal", Draft report for the International panel on fissile materials. July 11, 2006.
http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/20060711_IPFM-DraftReport-US-India-Deal.pdf.
[12] David Albright, "India's Military Plutonium Inventory: End 2004", ISIS Report , May 2005.
[13] Ashley J. Tellis, "Atom for War? US-Indian Civilian Cooperation and India's Nuclear Arsenal", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
[14] J.Hyde Act 2006.
[15] William C. Potter, "India and the New Look of US Non-Proliferation Policy", *Non Proliferation Review*, Vol. 12, No. 2, July 2005.
[16] In the separation plan Indians have not agreed to place safeguards on their breeder program, including their breeder R&D program and the reactors needed to produce plutonium for the breeder. It means a large-scale future increase in India's weapon production capacity. This is in contrast to NPT parties with breeder programs like Japan whose programs are completely covered by IAEA safeguards.
[17] Inayat Mavara "US-India Strategic Partnership: Implications for Asia and Beyond", *Regional Studies* Vol. xxiv, No. 2, Spring 2006, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN POST 9/11 PERIOD: FROM DIPLOMATIC RETREAT TO RESURGENCE

Air Commodore Ghulam Mujaddid

Introduction

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991 was a water-shed event in the recent history. Not only did it end the Cold War conclusively, it also changed the bi-polar world order. The systemic changes unleashed by the implosion of the Soviet superpower are still being analysed. The Russian Federation emerged as successor state to the USSR. She had to struggle long and hard to withstand the birth pangs of its new socio-political identity. The Russian Federation is still adjusting to the dictates of its socio-political identity and geo-strategic structure - and so is the world at large. During the decade following her birth, the Russian Federation remained beset with huge political, economic and psycho-social problems. During this period, the Russian Federation had to drastically reduce the geographical scope of its international activities. A decade after end of the Soviet Union, the world witnessed yet another watershed event - the terrorist attacks on the American mainland on September 11, 2001. The strategic complexion of the globe changed yet again in less than a decade.

The international and national dynamics seem to have changed for better for the Russian Federation in the post 9/11 period. The relative political stability at home and astronomical price rise of oil and gas have provided a great boost to the Russian economy-- thus enabling Russia to reassert its great power role endowed to her by geography, strategic power and structure of the international system. At the same time, US overstretch in its Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has provided strategic space to Russia to pursue an assertive foreign policy, as is evident from the Russian intervention in Georgia in August 2008.

Problem Statement

The post-9/11 interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have

shown that the United States has not been able to turn its military preponderance into strategic advantage. This has resulted in the weakening of unipolarity and loss of United States "strategic authority". A politically stable and economically vibrant Russian Federation has moved into the space created by the "loss of United States' traction" in the world affairs. In the post 9/11 period, therefore, Russia's foreign policy is clearly assertive, and is focused on reclaiming her great-power role. For Pakistan, this situation provides an opportunity to diversify its strategic engagements.

Theoretical Basis of Russian Resurgence

The scholars of international relations agree that the great powers have the largest impact on international politics. "The fortunes of all states – great powers and smaller powers alike – are determined by those with greatest capability".[1] Great powers are determined largely on the basis of their relative geographic, economic and military capability; and their ability to shape the international environment. Russia is a great power on many accounts. It is the biggest country in the world, and is 1.8 times greater in size than the United States of America. Russia is a strategic superpower alongwith the United States and possesses a robust Triad of nuclear forces. It is the only Eurasian power in the world. In Europe, it is the biggest European power[2]. In Northeast Asia, it is one of the great powers alongwith China and Japan. In Central Asia, it is again a great power which influences the Central Asian Republics (CARs), Afghanistan, and South Asia including Iran, Pakistan and India. With huge hydrocarbon resources, especially the gas, Russia is an "energy superpower"[3]. Its geographic location gives it a natural advantage of being an oil-gas conduit to Central and Western Europe and Southeast Asia. Russia presently has the 3rd largest gold and foreign exchange reserves. It has a robust economy which is booming and is based on a firm resource base. It is the only country in the world which can challenge the United States of America militarily, and has the advantages of Eurasian landmass and physical location in the world's heartland. The United States on the other hand, is an "offshore power", and the "stopping power of water" is a big hindrance to its power projection in Europe, Asia and Africa.[4]

According to dictates of the structural realist theory, it is natural for the Russian Federation to enter into security competition with the United States of America. John J. Mearsheimer has argued that such a security competition among the great powers has been going on since 1792; and has continued even after the Cold War. Russia has the capability to thwart a US invasion of its homeland, has power projection capability comparable to the United States, especially in Europe and Asia, because of its geographic contiguity and expanse.

Kenneth N. Waltz in his scholarly article 'Intimations of Multipolarity' has analyzed the unipolar world order on the basis of structural theory. According to him, unipolarity is the "least durable of international configurations". It is because the unipolar power takes on too many tasks and responsibilities beyond its own borders, thus weakening itself in the long-run. Based on this argument, Waltz had predicted erosion of American unipolarity in 2002 when he observed,

American aspiration to freeze historical development by working to keep the world unipolar is doomed. In the not very long run, the task will exceed America's economic, military and political resources; and the very effort to maintain a hegemonic position is the surest way to undermine it. The effort to maintain dominance stimulates other countries to work to overcome it[5].

The other reason for short lived unipolarity, according to Waltz is that even if the unipolar power behaved with restraint and moderation, weaker powers would still worry about its future behaviour. Faced by specter of "unbalanced power", weaker powers hectically try to increase their own strength. In such a competitive situation, states with geographic, demographic and economic potentials of a great power cannot refrain from becoming a great power. "For a great capability country, not to become a great power is a structural anomaly".[6] The theoretical frameworks of Mearsheimer and Waltz, best explain the reasons for erosion of American power, They also explain the development of the Russian power commensurate with her national capabilities and status in the international order. Russia has resurged due to erosion of American power, as indeed, due to the development of her own inherent power

potential

Russian Foreign Policy in Post-Soviet Period (1991-2001)

The Soviet disintegration altered the structure of international system from bi-polarity to unipolarity. The United States became the sole superpower with ability to intervene in any part of the globe. Initially, the United States endeavored to establish herself as a responsible hegemon with emphasis on constitutionalism, legitimacy and efficacy.[7] She concluded international arms control and disarmament agreements with the Russian Federation. She also spearheaded the economic and technical assistance to Russia for safe and controlled dismantling of nuclear weapons stationed in the ex-Soviet republics. At the same time, the American abandoning of Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 had resulted in the Talibanization of Afghanistan in mid-90s, and this country became a haven for the militant non-state actors who had the global reach. Motivated by its history and ethno-religious grievances, Chechnya started to challenge the Russian domination in 1994. Simultaneously, Islamic resurgence in the CARs, especially Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan started to threaten Russian near abroad in the Central Asia.

In the years following the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russian Federation remained compulsively focused on the domestic situation. Adjusting to new socio-political and strategic realities, and managing the issues shaped by an imploded empire, was a mammoth task for the Russian leadership. The political chaos, loss of identity and prestige, and disorientation caused by the abrupt break up must have been traumatic for the Russian masses. Repair of the political system, foundational adjustments in the economic system, retrieval of nuclear weapons and their dismantling was a Herculean task, that consumed the best efforts of the Russian leadership, and kept its foreign policy completely slaved to the internal situation. Consequently, the Russian Federation chose to curtail its global role in this turbulent period. Such a "diplomatic retreat" had been most conspicuous in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Southeast Asia[8]. The foreign policy goals set by

the first Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in 1992 amply indicated that "all Russian foreign policy was indeed domestic" [9]. In the first post-Cold War decade, therefore, the Russian position in the international community was largely determined by its domestic compulsions.

Since the beginning of 1992, Russian political elite had always wanted to strengthen the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and use its multilateral forum to retain her influence in the erstwhile Soviet space. By mid-1993, all former Soviet republics, except the Baltics, had become CIS members, and a broad consensus had emerged among the Russian leaders to form a sort of 'Russian Monroe Doctrine'[10]. This consensus was based on the intense domestic political pressure based on historical legacy of the Russian Empire and on the need to ensure safety and protection of over 27 million Russians left in the former republics. President Yeltsin repeatedly talked of Russia's vital national interests in cessation of armed conflicts on the territories of the former empire, and Russia's special responsibility as guarantor of peace and stability in this region. Earlier in 1992, Russia had entered into a Collective Security Treaty with six states including Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Its purpose was to be the protector of peace and security in its Central Asian near abroad. Russia demonstrated its resolve to protect its Western and Central Asian near abroad, by sending its troops to quell ethnic conflicts in Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia and in Tajikistan in 1993.

Russian opposition to NATO's eastwards expansion reflects Russian anxiety to its security and the fear of being encircled. In response to the Russian opposition to its expansion, NATO announced a plan named 'Partnership for Peace' in January 1994. The plan was open to all the former Communist states in Europe, Russia and other republics of the former Soviet Union. It offered various forms of military cooperation, including joint exercises, the discussion of military doctrine, and seeking standardization of military equipment. The opposition to this plan in Russia was intense. On 22 July 1994, the State Duma attempted to block Russia's membership to the Partnership for Peace. Subsequently,

NATO worked out a formal 'Individual Partnership Program' (IPP) document specifying areas in which Russia could cooperate. After great hesitation, and persuasion by the West, Russia signed the IPP on 31 May 1995. There is little doubt that Russia was cajoled into signing the IPP, because at that time Russia was politically and economically weak, and was facing challenges in Chechnya and insecurity in the CARs.

Strobe Talbott has rightly commented that under Yeltsin, a reformist post-Soviet Russia accepted the inter-republic frontiers of the old USSR as international borders; it withdrew troops from the Baltic states; it cooperated with the West in ensuring the denuclearization of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine; it entered in a collaborative relationship with an expanding NATO; and it assisted in ending ethnic cleansing and slaughter in the Balkans.[11] In the first decade after the Soviet breakup, despite turbulence, turmoil and grave challenges, Russia avoided becoming internationally isolated and created a favourable international disposition by drastically reducing military spendings; became a member of the major global economic institutions like IMF and the World Bank; Russia also inculcated special politico-economic relationship with China in this decade. In the last years of Yeltsin era, Russian domestic plight was at its highest level, when Yeltsin brought in Vladimir Putin as the Prime Minister in June 1999. He became the acting president after Yeltsin's resignation in Dec 1999. In the subsequent elections held in March 2000, he was elected as the President of the Russian Federation by a majority vote. Since then, Putin has aimed at re-establishing Russia as a major international power.

International Order Post-9/11

Effects of 9/11 on international order are still being analysed. Some consider 9/11 as an event which has profoundly affected the behaviour of the world's "only superpower". The event is actually a watershed in the American history. It has had deep imprints on the psychy of the American people. America has changed after 9/11 attacks - both in its internal dynamics and its external behaviour. The US National Security Strategy (NSS) of September 2002 clearly depicts this American mindset. Given its power and the mindset, the

effects of American behaviour on the international order have been dramatic as well as traumatic. The main impact of 9/11 on international system was to dislodge the American commitment to liberty, constitutional norms and practices. The Neocons, strongly influenced by their sympathy with Israel and the Middle East oil, argued that the Middle East region represented the core of international politics, and the United State must dominate it at any cost.[12]

When the United States launched operations against Afghanistan is Oct 2001, and attacked Iraq in 2003, it typified that militarism and not the diplomacy and political engagement had became the US grand strategy. By so doing, the United State gradually lost its moral high ground and legitimacy to shape a global order. It also paved the way for its "imperial overstretch" as was to be confirmed by the results of both the wars so far. In 2002, Joseph Nye had predicted the erosion of American pre-eminence due to arrogance and indifference to the American values[13]. The opening article "Perspectives" in the Strategic Survey 2007 makes a very revealing observation on the current global scenario:

The effects of the profound loss of authority suffered by the Unites States since its invasion of Iraq were felt throughout the world over the past year. The weak pillar in the world's security architecture was plain to see…Meanwhile, Russia also sought to move into the vacuum left by the United States: President Vladimir Putin attempted to re-arrest his country's identity as a global power through verbal onslaughts directed at Washington – while at the same time using Russia's abundant gas and oil assets to the best diplomatic and financial advantage.[14]

The United State seems to have failed to shape the environment both in Iraq and in Afghanistan. In Iraq, the United States has suffered a colossal loss of moral high ground as well. There was no justification for this war. And, the recent acceptance of President Bush' top aides about the faulty intelligence is even more dangerous to the image of a superpower, whose intelligence and security apparatus is unable to collate accurate intelligence, and the Government goes to war on the basis of faulty intelligence.. The

tragic episodes of Abu Ghuraib and Guantanamo Bay manifest the decay of American values. The United States has not won its war against terror- neither in Afghanistan nor elsewhere in the world. Many scholars agree that the United States is more in danger of terrorists attacks today than 2001; and the world is a more precarious place now than what it was eight years ago. The United States' imperial overstretch is showing itself quite clearly. In 2002-2003, the United States' defence budget was around $230 billion. In 2009, it is more than $611 billion[15]. The American economy has experienced the worst slow down in its recent history. The days of the American supremacy seem to be over[16], as the United States is no more an economic superpower. The weakening of American authority has surely provided space to the Russian Federation as has been aptly observed by the strategic community[17].

Russian Foreign Policy Post-9/11

Moscow, in the meanwhile has capitalized on the strategic and economic space available to it after the 9/11 period. It has achieved internal political stability, established itself as a mature and dependable economic partner, and above all, provided an alternate model of socio-political behaviour[18]. Russia's changes in foreign policy since 11 September, therefore, are based on calculations of priority and interest, where risk is distinguished from threat and real needs are separated from unfounded ambitions. In the period prior to 9/11, Russia had strained relationship with the United States as she had intervened in Kosovo much to the dislike by Russia; had accused Russia of war crimes in Chechnya, and had undertaken the largest-ever expansion of NATO. Despite United States arrogant behaviour, Russia extended support to her after the terrorist attacks. President Putin made an immediate phone call to President Bush, showing Russian support for the United States. Putin also supported the US military action in Afghanistan. His offers of military assistance to the Afghan Northern Alliance, the use of Russian airspace for humanitarian aid, and his role in persuading Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to support the campaign were indicative of the Russian support. Irina Isakova argues that Russia increased its support to US after the 9/11 attacks, because it legitimized the Russian use of force against Chechens, which ultimately saved

Russia from an imminent threat to her integration.[19] This point of view has merit.

Since his election as the Russian President, Putin set out his goals of modernizing Russia and raising living standards while aiming for more stable democracy and ability to pursue strategic interests abroad. Putin visited USA, UK, China, India and many other countries to consolidate Russia's strategic and economic relations, and made substantial economic, defence and space technology contracts. Similarly, President Putin visited Saudi Arabia in February 2007- the first ever visit of any Russian leader to that country. A $25 billion "Gas Initiatve" and $ 03 billion deal on energy projects spread over five years was signed. Russia also made the highest level contacts with Iran, EU and Latin American countries, and successfully concluded many multi-billion dollar arms and energy deals. In the post 9/11 period, Russia has successfully used its foreign policy to gain economic strength. This course is acknowledged by the Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stating that "Russian foreign policy today is such that for the first time in its history, Russia is beginning to protect its national interest by using its competitive advantages"[20].

Strobe Talbott has also stated that Russia has adopted a more competitive posture in its dealings with the West and has tended to throw its weight around in its own neighborhood. "Russia is a resurgent nation-state with a chip on its shoulder, a bundle of petrodollars in its pockets, and the whip hand of being a major gas supplier. The Russians are trying to leverage their oil and gas wealth into both economic and political power".[21]

Steven Pifer, an expert on Russian affairs at the Brookings Institute, who served as the US ambassador to Ukraine during the Clinton administration, observes that Moscow's foreign policy has, over the past several years adopted an increasingly assertive tone. "To put the Kremlin's message in a slogan: Russia is back"[22]. Georgia, in August 2008, experienced the real size of the Russian chip. The speed of the Russian military retaliation to the Georgian attack on South Ossetia's capital was breathtaking. These operations and Moscow's subsequent decision to recognize South Ossetia and

Abkhazia as independent states reflect the Russian resolve against Georgia's pro-Western foreign policy course. It was aimed to send a message not just to Georgia, but to other Russian neighbors, EU and the United states[23].

Sergei. Lavrov in an interview at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in September, 2008, said that the Russian action to stop the aggression of Georgia against South Ossetia was firmly rooted in the right for self-defense as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. He observed that the military bases in Bulgaria and Romania, the outer space plans, putting new radars in the Baltic countries, and similar plans on the eastern borders of Russia and missile defense projects-are all being monitored and responded to by the Russian leaders[24]. Russia is certainly back in the international arena and its behaviour is that of a great power.

Russian Foreign Policy Concept – 2008

The Russian Foreign Policy Concept was originally approved by President Putin on 28 June 2000. Importantly, it was followed and implemented by him in letter and spirit. President Medvedev has approved and signed an updated Concept in mid-2008, which actually supplements the Concept approved by Putin, who, even as Prime Minister of Russia, wields the ultimate power. The document is an excellent expose of the Russian foreign policy. Its expression and content is befitting the status of a great power; and it is very articulate in its aims and objectives[25]. As per the Concept, there are six chief objectives of the Russian foreign policy:-

- "To ensure national security, to preserve and strengthen its sovereignty and territorial integrity, to achieve strong positions of authority in the world community that best meet the interests of the Russian Federation as one of influential centers in the modern world".
- "To create favorable external conditions for the modernization of Russia, transformation of its economy along innovation lines, enhancement of the

living standards, consolidation of society, strengthening of the foundations of the constitutional system, rule of law and democratic institutions, realization of human rights and freedoms and, as a consequence, ensuring competitiveness of the country in a globalizing world".

- "To influence global processes to ensure formation of a just and democratic world order, based on collectiveness in finding solutions to international problems and supremacy of international law, first of all provisions of the UN Charter".
- "To promote good neighborly relations with bordering States, to assist in eliminating the existing hotbeds of tension and conflicts in the regions adjacent to the Russian Federation and other areas of the world and to prevent emergence of the new ones".
- "To provide comprehensive protection of rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad."
- "To promote an objective image of the Russian Federation globally as a democratic state committed to a socially oriented market economy and an independent foreign policy".

Sphere of Influence

Of all the national interests, none has been articulated more frequently, clearly, and with greater consistency throughout the post-Soviet period as well as post-9/11 period than the consolidation of a Russian sphere of influence among the former countries of the Soviet Union.[26] Establishing Russian pre-eminence throughout the former Soviet Union is central to Russia's political, security and economic interests. The Georgian episode provides a convincing proof of the same. Politically, securing Russia's position as the of power and influence in its near abroad communicates prestige and confirms Russia as a great power and a pole of the multipolar world. The dictates of balance-of-power and the realist thinking in international relations call Russia to maintain a security belt around

its periphery, made up of states compliant with Russian policy preferences. Russia does not like the idea of these states being pulled into the orbits of other powers like NATO. Russia considers this to be detrimental to its national interest. This has been aptly put in its Foreign Policy Concept[27].

"Development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the CIS Member States constitutes a priority area of Russia's foreign policy...To achieve these goals Russia will…promote in every possible way the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as a key instrument to maintain stability and ensure security in the CIS area focusing on adapting the CSTO as a multifunctional integration body to the changing environment, as well as on ensuring capability of the CSTO Member States to take prompt and effective joint actions..."

Active Russian opposition to the popular pro-democracy movements, or 'color revolutions', in neighboring Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004 and Kazakhstan in 2005, indicate that Russian policy-makers and analysts don't believe in the democratic quality of these movements. They maintain that they were essentially chaotic, and dangerous; and movements like these could lead to instability in the Russia's doorstep and spheres of influence.

EU and NATO's Eastward Expansion

The membership of all the former Warsaw Pact and Baltic states in NATO and the European Union has altered the political geography of Europe and the dynamics of Russia-EU relations. What was once Moscow's extended security belt is now NATO's 'in area', and the EU. Countries like Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia are eager participants in a wide variety of NATO-sponsored activities designed to expand the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Some have openly embraced the goal of joining the EU and NATO. The Russian Foreign Policy Concept is quite explicit on the issue. "…Russia maintains its negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO, notably to the plans of admitting Ukraine and Georgia to the membership in the alliance, as well as to bringing the NATO military infrastructure closer to the Russian borders"[28].

The expansion of EU and NATO has created ample opportunities for tension. The Russian intervention in Georgia, however, is likely to have a sobering effect on the American and European enthusiasm; especially on NATO's eastward expansion.

Economic Interests and Energy Export

The Russian transition to free market economic system and globalization has been surprisingly rapid.[29] Russian economy has experienced an average growth rate of 7% for last nine years (till 2008). Its federal budget has been in surplus since 2000; the surplus was nearly $40 billion in 2007. Her foreign currency reserves have exceeded $580 billion in mid -2008, and the foreign investments have been substantial. The economy has greatly benefited from a fairly stable political system since the last nine years, with young and dynamic leadership. This leadership is dedicated to establish Russia at its rightful place in the world and skillfully use its foreign policy tools to boost Russia's economic capacity. There has been substantial reduction in poverty; and Russia has paid back all its sovereign debts of the Soviet era to the Paris Club and the IMF. The astronomical rise in the oil and gas prices till the beginning of 2008 has been a great boon for its economy. Russia is the second largest oil producer after Saudi Arabia, and the largest exporter of natural gas in the world. Moscow has sought to develop new pipelines routes from Kazakhstan and the Caspian Basin through Russia to Europe and China, and has endeavored to block the Western pipeline projects, which are trying to circumvent Russia in the same area.

Energy exports to Europe are the cornerstone of Russia's economic wellbeing, as well its trump card in relation to the other major powers. Control over pipelines to key markets constitutes a critical Russian interest, and she has also been largely successful in negotiating new pipeline projects.[30] Friendly and complaint governments on its periphery are essential to boost Russia's economic security and energy exports. Oil and gas exports are at the heart of the country's economic revival, and the country's proud claim to the status of "energy superpower". Russian officials and energy companies view Central Asian gas reserves as the critical

asset to boost the domestic production. Russia's current near-monopoly on access to Central Asian exports also gives it strategic leverage with supplier nations in Central Asia, as well as the European consumers downstream. Russia's intensive diplomacy in Central Asia in May 2007 was a signal of Russia's interest in locking in its access to this energy source. Preventing the construction of pipelines to Europe outside its own territory constitutes an important Russian objective. Moscow's endeavors to form the "Gas Opec" along with Qatar an Iran reflect the Russian resolve to regulate the energy supplies[31].

Middle East and the Islamic World

Relations with the Islamic world are important to Russia, and represent a major challenge for its foreign policy too. Russia has its own sizeable Muslim minority, estimated at 15% of its total population. Russian Muslims are no longer isolated from their co-religionists abroad, as they were during the Soviet era, and, they have experienced Islamic revival much like the rest of the Muslim world[32]. Although Russia has important economic concerns in the Middle East (energy and defence equipment trade), its main concern there is likely to remain security. The region's further destabilization is something that most Russian analysts view as potentially posing a threat to Russian security. Russian policy has thus been aimed at minimizing volatility and avoiding destabilization. This policy has entailed opposition to the war in Iraq, as a cause of greater regional instability; obtaining membership in the Organization of Islamic Countries in order to project the image of Russia as a friend of Islam; maintaining close relationship with Iran; and other steps intended to position Russia in Middle Eastern minds as occupying a respected place in the international arena. Putin's visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan in February 2007 was with the same objectives[33].

China, India and South Asia

Currently, Russian-Chinese relations appear to be excellent and improving, with the two powers jointly presiding over the SCO and professing a commonality of interests in central Asia and

elsewhere. The two also share the multipolar perspective of the world order. China has purchased high-tech military equipment from Russia. Given the structural realist dictates, their interests may not remain as complementary in the long run. However, both powers have much more in common than the divergences; and the maturity is likely to prevail. Cultural affinities, too, are sure to play a positive role in determining the Russia-China relationship. India, on the other hand, has special place in Russia's foreign policy. The relation between the two countries have substantial historical and strategic context. Russia continues to be the major source of Indian defence and space related equipment. The Troika of Russia-India-China has been prominently mentioned in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept. Its promotion forms one of the cardinal objectives of the Russian foreign policy. It would be generally correct to say that Russia's South Asia policy is also defined in terms of Indo-Soviet relationship. Both have convergence of views on the situation in Afghanistan, and share intelligence on the terrorist activities on regular basis.

Opportunity for Pakistan

Pakistan has been historically unenthusiastic in maintaining substantial relationship with Russia. In the current context, Pakistan-Russia relations have never recovered from the aftermath of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Although, Pakistani Presidents from Zia to Musharraf have paid visits to Moscow, the relationship has lacked trust, credibility and continuity. This trust and credibility deficit seems to have been precipitated by the lack of commitment from Pakistan's side. Pakistan's political elite seems to have less than adequate appreciation of the potential that exists in Russia. It seems to be too concerned with the possible negative reaction of the United State to the fraternal and closer relationship with Russia. May be, Pakistani larders and policy-makers need to appreciate that international politics is not an 'either/or' relationship. India is an excellent example of multi-vectored relationships with all the great powers, and of accruing immense political and economic benefits from them. The intelligentsia in Pakistan too, seems to be convinced that USA is the only superpower in the world. Consequently, Pakistan has placed most of its eggs in the US basket. There is little

understanding of the Russian power and its resurgence, in Pakistan. On the other hand, Russian Foreign Policy Concept mentions Pakistan in a friendly manner by stating that "Russia intends to further develop its relations with Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Libya, Pakistan and other leading regional States in bilateral and multilateral formats"[34].

In this context, it would be instructive to quote President Putin's message of facilitation to Pakistan on the eve of its Independence Day on 14 August 2005, "I am confident that relations between our two countries represent a considerable factor in maintaining regional and international stability and security….It is with satisfaction that I note active development of political contacts between Russia and Pakistan"[35]. He also said that participation by Russia and Pakistan in activities of SCO and OIC provided opportunities for growth of the two nations. The recent meeting of 14 October, 2009 between Prime Ministers Gilani and Putin on the sidelines of the Annual Meeting of SCO at Beijing is another indication of Russia's opening up for Pakistan. Prime Minister Putin offered to boost bilateral and economic ties and give new dimension to relationship between the two countries[36]. Pakistan should move forward and build good relationship with Russia.

Conclusion

Nature has endowed Russia with the potentials of a global power. But in the post-Soviet period, the Russian Federation was faced with grave challenges to its nationhood, identity and politico-economic transformation. During that time its foreign policy was basically its domestic policy. The domestic compulsions inhibited Russia from fulfilling its foreign policy role, especially in Africa, Middle East and Latin America. Russia had mainly concentrated at it's near abroad where it had vital security interests to look after. From 2000 onwards, Russian domestic politics and economy started to stabilize, and subsequently improved. At the same time, the Russian leadership began to assert Russia's great power role. As the structural realist theorists say- it is anomalous for a great power not to develop the power and behaviour befitting a great power. Surely, Russia is not an anomaly as a great power. The erosion of American

unipolarity and hegemony, as a result of its imperial overstretch, has also provided Russia with space to assert its great power stature. Russian retaliation in Georgia, its economic robustness, its diplomatic and strategic engagements as far away as the Latin American countries and the great confidence of its leadership-all indicate that Russia has acquired a status commensurate with its size and history, and its foreign policy is assertive and proactive.

For a country like Pakistan, the research into the dynamics of post-9/11 international order is important. The policy makers in Pakistan also need to appreciate the reconciliatory Russian overtures; and analyze the current Russian status in the world and its foreign policy priorities, so that Pakistan could reorient its own options and take advantage of the immense potential that exists in the Russian resurgence.

Author

Air Commodore Ghulam Mujaddid is a Fighter Pilot who has flown around 2000 hours. He has two Masters Degrees in Defence and Strategic Studies from Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, and a Masters Degree in War Studies from Karachi University. He is a graduate of PAF Air War College Karachi and National Defence University Islamabad. Currently, he is on the faculty of National Security College of National Defence University, and is a Ph.D candidate at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

Notes

[1] John J. Mearsheimer, "The Tragedy of Great Powers Politics" (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), p.3

[2] This is taken from "Russian Foreign Policy Concept", announced by President of The Russian Federation Dimitry Medvedev in July 2008. English version downloaded from Kremlin website www.kremlin.org accessed 23 December,2008

[3] The seminal work on oil and gas reserves and politics by Leonardo Maugueri, *The Age of Oil* (New York: Routlegde, 2008), pp.155-168, contains the latest data on the total hydrocarbon reserves including those of Russia.

[4] Mearsheimer, "Tragedy of Great Power Politics", p.380

[5] See the article 'Intimations of Multipolarity' by Kenneth N. Waltz in The *New World Orde*r Birthe Hansen and Bertel Heurlin edits. (London : Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000)

[6] Ibid.
[7] William Walker, *Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Adelphi Paper 340 (London: IISS, 2004), pp.31-45
[8] Roger E. Kanet and Alexander V. Kuzhemiakin (eds), *The Foreign Policy of Russian Federation* (London : Macmillan Press, 1997). pp. x-xii
[9] Eugene B. Rumer, *Russian Foreign Policy Beyond Putin*, Adelphi Paper 390 (London: IISS, 2007), p.15
[10] Rger K. Kanet and Kozhemiakin.(eds), " The Foreign Policy Of Russian Federation", pp.10-11
[11] Comment in the testimony by Mr. Strobe Talbott to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 30 October 2007. Text released by Brookings under "Building a Constructive US-Russian Relationship", available at www.brookings.edu/testimony/2007/1030_russia_talbott.www.brookings.edu/testimony/2007/1030_russia_talbott, accessed 26 December, 2008
[12] William Walker, "Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order" , P.44
[13] Joseph Nye, "The Paradox of American Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), P.XVI
[14]. Strategic Survey 2007, pp.19-24.
[15] US Defence Budget Data available at www.opencrs.com/document/RL34473/2008-08-01/ , accessed on 7 November, 2009
[16] Anastasia Nesvetailova and Ronen Palan, "A Very North Atlantic Credit Crunch: Geopolitical Implications of the Global Liquidity Crises" in *Journal Of International Affairs*, Fall-Winter 2008, vol. 62, no. 1, pp.165-168 and 181-182.
[17] "Strategic Survey 2007".
[18] Charles King, "The Five-Day War; Managing Moscow After the Georgian Crises" in *Foreign Affair*, November-December 2008, vol. 87, no. 6, pp. 3-4.
[19]. Irina Isakova, *Russian Governance in Twenty-First Century* (New York : Frank Cass, 2005), pp.1-8
[20] Quoted by Maria Raquel Freire in " The Making of Russian Foreign Policy: The lines of (dis)continuity in a process of affirmation", Faculty of Economics, Coimbra University, Portugal, downloaded from www.uc.edu accessed on 10 December, 2008
[21]Testimony by Mr. Strobe Talbott to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 30 October 2007, quoted earlier.
[22]Interview , " Setting a Constructive Agenda" by Steven Pifer at CFR, downloaded from www.brookings.edu accessed on 7 November.2008
[23] Ibid.
[24]. Transcript of Interview of Russian Foreign Minister taken by David Remnick on 24 September, 2008, at Council on Foreign Affairs, available at www.c8r.org/publications/17384/conversation with sergey. lavrov, accessed on 17 October 2008.
[25] Office of the President of Russian Federation, "Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation" , downloaded from www.kremlin.org on 16 December 2008.
[26] See "Interview With Russian Foreign Minister".
[27] "Russian Foreign Policy Concept- 2008" , referred earlier.

[28] Ibid.
[29] See Statesman Yearbook 2007, pp.1035-1037, and CIA Factbook on Russia for latest details on Russian economy; downloaded from www.cia.org , accessed on 13 November 2008.
[30]Rumer, 'Russian Foreign Policy Beyond Putin", p.26
[31]News item in the Khaleej Times on 11 February 2007.
[32] Kanet and Kozhemiakin (eds), " The Foreign Policy of Russia", pp. 139-150
[33] News item in the Khaleej Times as referred earlier.
[34] "The Russian Foreign Policy Concept-2008".
[35] Reported in *Daily Times*, Islamabad, on 26 August 2005
[36] Reported in *The News*, Islamabad, on 15 October 2009

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY – AN ASSESSMENT OF PROMISES & DANGERS

Lieutenant Colonel Raza Ali Khan

"***We can help train an army, we can help equip an army, we can help build facilities for the army, but only the Afghan people can breathe a soul into the army."***

(Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, former commanding General, CFC-Afghanistan)[1]

"Today's problems are the result of yesterday's solutions".[2]
(President John F. Kennedy)

Introduction

Throughout modern Afghan history, the Afghan National Army (ANA) has been the backbone of Afghan security. Although it was mostly devoted to the government, it dealt mainly with revolts and major crises. Since its inception in the early 1900s, the ANA was considered a national institution. When the Mujahideen took over Kabul in 1992, their first move was to dismantle the ANA for their own private militias. The Mujahideen were under the impression that their forces would fill the vacuum of state power, but that was not the case. Instead of providing security to the Afghans, various militias started to fight with one another, and many cities were turned into ruins.[3]

The Afghan National Army (ANA) is a service branch of the Military of Afghanistan currently being trained by the coalition forces to ultimately take the lead in land-based military operations in Afghanistan. Afghanistan's Army was officially established in the 1880s when the nation was ruled by Emir Abdur Rahman Khan.[4] Prior to that the Army was mostly a combination of tribesmen and militia forces, as well as a special army force under the ruler of the country.[5] It was one of the key national institutions that Afghanistan lost during its prolonged civil war. Over a decade-long Mujahideen

resistance (1979-1992) against successive communist governments in Kabul took a heavy toll on the state resources and the internal cohesion of the Afghan Army. With the Soviet withdrawal in 1988-1989, the Afghan Army, which was largely trained, mentored, equipped, and financed by the Soviet Union, suffered from lack of resources and unity. The once highly professional Afghan army finally withered away with the fall of Najibullah's government in 1992. The Mujahideen government in Kabul (1992-1996) and the Taliban regime (1996-2001) both relied on their militias for internal security.[6] Combating the Taliban has been difficult because of weaknesses in the Afghan Army and police but also because the indigenous intelligence services have not traditionally been used to infiltrate and learn about dissident groups such as the Taliban.[7] After the fall of the Taliban regime in late 2001, the US-led coalition began to work towards creating a new Afghan National Army (ANA). It is believed that the method of establishing a small ANA garrison, building it up slowly, and having its personnel develop relationships with militia forces provides yet another mechanism of progress.[8]

To Afghanistan's misfortune, the United States shifted the central front of its war on terror to Iraq before stabilizing Afghanistan. This had a crippling effect on the Bonn process which sought to build permanent institutions of governance in Afghanistan and undermined the efforts aimed at developing an indigenous Afghan security apparatus. The Afghan Army, which was supposed to add force to the authority of Kabul, instead remains beset with numerous external and internal challenges like less pay and ethnic diversity raising questions of allegiance. Kabul's frustration over the lack of a well-trained and well-equipped national army seems to be growing as the West vacillates under the Taliban pressure.[9]

Aim

The article aims at bringing contemporary Afghan National Army under the sharp focus with a view to carryout an incisive appraisal of the promises and dangers in order to draw some relevant inferences.

Scope

The article will unfold as under:-

- Part – I - Existing status of ANA
- Part – II - Analysis / Assessment– promises & dangers

PART – I
EXISTING STATUS OF ANA

The President's Decree or "Petersburg's Decree" [10]

Hamid Karazai, the President of the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA), on December 2, 2002, during a meeting with representatives from the UN and the donor countries at Petersburg in Bonn, issued a decree for the establishment of the ANA.[11] The decree declared the United States as the designated lead nation for ANA restructuring' under the overall command of the 'legitimate Afghan civilian authorities'. It also designated the United Nations with Japan as the lead donor nation for preparing a comprehensive programme for the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) of various militia groups to augment the process of establishing the ANA. The decree envisaged a multi-ethnic and an all-volunteer national army of 70,000[12] by 2009[13]. In fact, the US Green Berets had already started training the first batch of Afghan soldiers by May 2002. Interestingly, according to the official website of the ANA, the ANA has been 'active' from the 1880s to the present.[14] However, according to analysts like Ali Ahmed Jalali, this was the fourth time in the last 150 years that the Afghan military was being recreated.[15] The current goal of the Afghan Ministry of Defense is to expand the Afghan National Army to about 134,000 troops. However, American President Barack Obama has called for an expansion of almost 260,000 Afghan troops in the next five years at a cost of $20 billion.[16] All costs of expansion of the army, including pay and new modern equipment, would be paid for by the American government.[17]

Nature and Composition of ANA

Composition. The ANA is to be a voluntary, non-partisan army dependent on a civil command structure. The ANA is said to comprise five ground manoeuvre corps and one air corps. The basic unit in the ANA is the Kandak (Battalion), consisting of 600 troops. Although the vast majority is infantry, at least one mechanized and one tank Battalion have been formed; more may be planned. An elite special force unit modeled on the U.S. Army Rangers is also being formed. [18] The plans are to include 3,900 men in six battalions under French and U.S. tutelage.[19] The ANA is supposed to have '76 battalions or Kandaks organized into 13 light infantry brigades, a mechanized brigade, a commando brigade, enabling units and the initial operation of an air corps by the end of fiscal year 2009'. It is said to 'primarily a light infantry based army equipped with towed artillery and mortars'.[20]

The ANA has five regional corps commands: 201st Salab (flood) Corps command based in Kabul (of which the 3rd Brigade, at Pol-e-Chakri, is to be a mechanised formation including M-113s and Soviet-built main battle tanks)[21]; 203rd Tandar (Thunder) in Gardez, 205th Atal (Hero) in Kandahar; 207th Zafar (Victory) in Herat; and the 209th Shaheen (Falcon) in Mazar-e-Sharif. The first corps command headquarters outside Kabul was established in Kandahar on September 19, 2004. The other three original commands were soon established in late 2004 and early 2005. The sixth Corps is the "National Air Corps", which is the old Afghan Air Force. Plans exist to separate this Corps again and reclaim the old Afghan Air Force role as a separate branch of the Afghan military.[22] The Afghan National Air Corps of the ANA was re-established in January 2005 and it comprises a few old Russian helicopters and transport planes.[23] The organisational chart of ANA is given below:-



Personal Strength. As of May 2008, total manpower is over 90,000 personnel with 100,000 expected by August of 2009.[24] Facilities and capacity planning efforts are rapidly adjusting to the significant increases in national recruiting efforts to meet manpower needs. A further proposal for expansion to 134,000 was announced in October 2008.[25] This was modified to a five year goal of 260,000 Afghan troops by President Obama and is supported by the Afghan Defense Ministry. According to Reuters, the strength of the ANA stood at 57,000 as of December 2, 2007.[26] By the middle of 2008, the ANA was expected to reach its targeted strength of 70,000.[27] However, according to the Afghan Defence Minister Abdul Rahim Waradak, an Afghan Army of 150,000-200,000 soldiers would be needed to secure the country.[28] In January 2008, it was announced by the Afghan Ministry of Defence (MoD) that the strength of the ANA would be increased to 86,000 by the end of 2008.[29] The figure has again been revised to 134,000 by 2014. As per the new US plan, about 10,000 troops would be trained each year for four years beginning in 2010.[30]

Ethnic Composition. The ethnic composition of the ANA remains a tricky issue. The ANA is envisioned by the Karazai government and others to serve as a unifying influence that will assist in overcoming significant internal centrifugal forces such as "deep ethnic, linguistic, sectarian, tribal, racial and regional cleavages and Qawm identity, emphasizing the local over higher-order formations. Striking the right ethnic balance at various levels in the army has been a great challenge, as it remains a key factor shaping people's perception and faith in the ANA as a national

institution. Though the ANA is said to be multi-ethnic in nature. In terms of the overall ethnic composition the army is relatively balanced, with an over-representation of Tajiks, a more or less fair share of Pashtuns (the largest ethnic group in the country) and an under-representation of Hazaras and Uzbeks. The officer corps, however, is predominantly Tajik, particularly the combat units.[31] According to a report, nearly 70 per cent of the battalion commanders are Tajiks.[32] Any ethnic imbalance in the ANA has the potential to trigger centrifugal leniencies within the army in times to come. The problem is not just the ethnic balance of the officer corps, per se, but the fact that as some senior Pashtun officers allege, the majority of these Tajik officers are networked around the Chief of Staff, Gen. Bismillah Khan, who through his influence and the ability to appoint officers is the majority share holder of the army. Defence Minister Rahim Wardak, a Pashtun loyal to President Karzai, only controls a small network of former comrade-in-arms of the 1980s jihad, and cannot even remotely compete with Bismillah Khan in terms of influence. [33]

Perks and Privileges. Soldiers in the new army initially received $30 a month during training and $50 a month upon graduation, though pay for a trained soldier has since risen to $120. Some recruits were under 18 years of age and many could not read or write. Recruits who spoke only Pashto experienced difficulty because instruction was given through interpreters who spoke Farsi. Growth continued, however, and the ANA had expanded to 5,000 trained soldiers by July of 2003. That month, approximately 1,000 ANA soldiers were deployed in the US-led Operation Warrior Sweep, marking the first major combat operation for Afghan troops. The table below gives a vivid picture of Afghan Soldier's deployment from March 2003 – August 2009:-

Serial	Troops Level (Soldiers)	As of
1.	1,750	March 2003
2.	6,000	September 29, 2003
3.	6,000	January 22, 2004
4.	7,000	February 2004
5.	8,300, plus 2,500 in training	April 30, 2004
6.	12,360	June 29, 2004

7.	13,000	August 2004
8.	13,500, plus 3,000 in training	September 13, 2004
9.	13,000	December 2004
10.	17,800, plus 3,400 in training	January 10, 2005
11.	26,000, plus 4,000 in training	September 16, 2005
12.	26,900	January 31, 2006
13.	36,000	January 10-22, 2007
14.	46,177	April 12, 2007
15.	50,000	June 6, 2007
16.	57,000	December 2, 2007
17.	76,600	May 14, 2008
18.	80,000	October 14, 2008
19.	90,000	May 19, 2009
20.	100,000	August 2009

Source: The official web site of ANA http://www.mod.gov.af/ and http://en.Wikipidia. org/wiki /Afghan National Army. Accessed on 13 January 2010.

With an expanded ANA, the Afghan government has forged a power-projection too to take advantage of the expanded Coalition presence throughout the country. ANA garrisons now exist in most urban areas.[34]

Training and Mentoring Institutions for the ANA

Members of the coalition forces in Afghanistan have undertaken different responsibilities in the creation of the ANA. All these efforts are managed on the Coalition side by Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A), a two-star level multi-national command headquartered in downtown Kabul.[35] The UN Forces are partnered with the ANA to mentor and support formal training through Task Force Phoenix (TF Phoenix). This program was formalized in April of 2003, based near the Kabul Military Training Center coordinating collective and individual training, mentoring, and Coalition Force support. Each ANA HQ above battalion level has an embedded Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) of NATO trainers and mentors acting as liaisons between ANA and ISAF. The OMLTs co-ordinate

operational planning and ensure that the ANA units receive enabling support. [36] The CJTF Phoenix has undergone six rotations in the last five years and has played a key role in establishing the ANA's five corps.[37]

Camp Black Horse, located on the outskirts of Kabul, which hosts the Canadian Afghan National Training Centre detachment, is providing training and mentorship to the ANA.[38] A French army advisory team oversees the training of officers for staff and platoon or company command in a combined commissioning/infantry officer training unit called the Officer Training Brigade (OTB), also located at Kabul Military Training Center. OTB candidates in the Platoon and Company Command courses are usually older former militia and Mujahideen 'officers' with various levels of military experience.[39] The British forces are tasked with the training of Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) of the ANA; Canadians conduct a two-week training programme in squad and platoon level tactics; French forces assist in training the ANA officers; German Forces provide trainers and mentors for the ANA Armours (tanks); Romanian forces are responsible for the ANA Advanced Individual Training (AIT); Mongolian forces provide instructors for the ANA Field Artillery; and Croatian, Italian. Dutch, Norwegian, Slovenian, Swedish, and Polish forces provide OMLTs. US forces are responsible for the overall mentoring and training of the ANA from Ministry of defence (MoD) to the company level.[40] The US Special Forces are training the ANA commando battalions at Camp Morehead in the south of Kabul. In July 2007 the Afghan army graduated its first battalion of commandos. The commandos underwent a three month course being trained by American Special Forces. They received training in advanced infantry skills as well as training in first aid and tactical driving. They are fully equipped with US equipment and have received US style training. The new Afghan commandos are the most elite branch of the rising Afghan Army. By the end of 2008 the six ANA commando battalions were expected to be stationed in the southern region of Afghanistan assisting the Canadian forces (which could not be ascertained).[41]

On the ANA side, all training and education is managed and implemented by the newly formed ANA Training Command

(ANTACT). All training centers and military schools are under ANTACT.[42] The Kabul Military Training Centre (KMTC) also comes under ANTATC-HQ. Formal education and professional development courses for the senior ANA officers are conducted by US and Turkish military instructors at the newly established National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA). The Command and General Staff College (CGSC), built by France in early 2004, prepares mid-level ANA officers to serve on brigade and corps staffs. The basic infantry training coursed for ANA troops was initially ten weeks, which later varied from eight to 14 weeks.

Headquarters at Camp Eggers, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), established in April 2006 and operating directly under US CENTCOM,[43] coordinates all programmes relating to training and mentoring of the ANA. It is 'a joint service, coalition organization with military personnel from the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Poland, Albania, Germany, France and Romania, as well as contracted civilian advisors, mentors and trainers.[44] To boost the ANA's regional commands, an Afghan regional Security Integration Command (ARSIC) is attached to it. The objective is to carry forward the mission of the CSTC-A at the regional command level, 'to plan, program and implement structural, organizational, institutional and management reforms of the Afghanistan National Security Forces'. Each ARSIC comprises a regional Corps Advisory Command (RCAC) responsible for planning, training and mentoring at the level of regional corps and below. Within each RCAC are a number of US-led Embedded Training (ETTs) whose functions range from 'daily mission planning and preparation to safety, unit training and moral and ethical training' for the ANA.[45]

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

The process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of armed groups was initiated in 2003 through the Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme (ANBP). This programme has had a main focus on former soldiers of the Afghan National Forces.[46] DDR deals with transforming "combatants, whether they are organized in formal national security forces,

paramilitary units, or private militias, into non-combatants." The DDR process has three steps. First, create a viable and seamless strategy that dismantles command and control structure and co-locates soldiers to communities. Second, limit the circulation and individual possession of weapons and small arms. Third, provide employment, educational opportunities, and community reintegration programs. Dismantling the factional militias was the key to stabilization. It entailed curbing the ability and desire of former combatants to renew violence and crating a national capacity to transform the war-instigated structures into peace-building institutions. This process involved replacing the war machines with a credible legal and political system, re-establishing public confidence in state institutions, and shifting from a culture of violent opposition to a peaceful competition for power and influence.[47] In areas where DDR program was implemented and warlords were disarmed, ISAF units have been hiring these same warlords as private contractors.[48] DDR is now used as a verb: to "DDR" a militia formation is to incrementally demobilize it and canton the weapons. DDR may be employed bluntly as a threat while at the same time DDR is an ongoing process throughout the country.[49]

PART – II
ANALYSIS / ASSESSMENT

Innumerable Advisers

Too many mentors are making the issue of ANA's training little complex. Often these advisers have overlapping responsibilities and jurisdiction. For instance, the above-mentioned but confusing training and mentoring entities carry a host of responsibilities, remaining from fighting the war on terror to supporting various humanitarian and reconstruction programmes, apart from building up the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Their main focus, however, has largely been on the militaristic agenda of the war on terror. With the induction and expansion of the ISAF under a separate NATO command, the Western coalition has become more diverse in terms of military doctrines and policy approaches.

Actually, most of the countries involved have no experience or the necessary expertise in counter-insurgency, and counter-guerrilla warfare. They are largely trained and oriented for conventional warfare. Trainers and mentors, especially from the former Warsaw Pact countries and from Mongolia, have largely retained their Soviet orientation, whereas the West European forces are largely modelled along the US military structures. This leads to disconnection among the entities involved in training and mentoring of the ANA. This not only is impediment in the standardization of training but it also serves as a hindrance to the evolution of the ANA as a unified force. The officer corps of the ANA is a mix of veterans of the Soviet-trained national army of the 1970 and 80s, veterans of the anti-Soviet resistance (including deserters from the old national army), former Mujahideen commanders, and more veterans of the anti-Taliban resistance. They are often at odds with US/NATO-trained young Afghan officers due to the wide gap in their orientation and military cultures.

The Language / Dialectical Barricade

Afghanistan is a multi-lingual country where often people are not bi-lingual. The existing language barrier further complicates the training and mentoring process for lack of Dari and Pashto interpreters and translators.

Another issue detrimental to the quality of training remains illiteracy amongst the soldiers and officer corps. For instance, in one of the corps, approximately 80 per cent of the soldiers and 50 percent of the officers in are illiterate. Only 20 per cent of soldiers have had a professional knowledge of how to serve in an army, while the rest are former militia fighters or young recruits. A comprehensive educational programme would be required to address this issue.

The ANA'S Never-ending Miseries

Domestic Factors. The strong tribal-ethnic character of Afghanistan, where people's loyalties as well as priorities to one's clan, tribe, and faction often supersede national considerations, makes the task of building national/state institutions a complex issue. The long-standing tribal/ethnic feuds, conflicts and competing ideologies are further hindrance to it. At the socio-political level, the relations between the centre and the province, between state and the people, have suffered badly. The ANA is far from being capable of carrying out operations against the Taliban without support from the Western coalition. It is also not in a position to disarm the militia group active in parts of the country and extend the writ of the central government. The Western coalition depended on the Mujahideen militias in their fight against the Al Qaeda and Taliban elements. The reluctance of the NATO to spare ground troops had, thus, made both NATO and the coalition forces dependent on them. Furthermore, the problems of desertion and difficult recruitment are recurring problems.

Problems Faced by Japan-led DDR Programme. A UN and Japan-led DDR Programme was launched in October 2003 with a three-year mandate to disband the militias comprising AMF. The

$141 million programme was part of the wider Security Sector Reforms (SSRs). The pilot phase DDR began in the northern Kunduz province in October 2003. The remaining four pilot projects were conducted in Gradez, Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Kandahar (where some Pashtun commander were active). The DDR had set a target of disarming 100,000 militiamen in three years. At the end of the programme, it was claimed that around 63,380 militiamen of the AMF were disarmed, resulting in the collection of 36,500 small and light weapons and 12,000 heavy weapons. The weapons recovered so far were reported to be old, rusted and often unusable. Therefore it is logical to conclude that many of the functional weapons are hidden and hoarded by the militia groups across the country. Unlike DDR, the DIAG Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) programme was launched in January 2005 had the support of the ISAF, the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A), and the European Union. According to DIAG assessments, there could be up to 120,000 persons, operating in over 1,800 IAGs. Since its inception, the DIAG is said to have fully or partially disbanded over 285 main IAGs that covers about 750-900 sub-groups. Reluctance to disarm grows when the post conflict government is politically clout and coercive capacity has to be enhanced through integrating or rebuilding the national military establishment to ensure a balanced representation of diverse ethnic, regional, and political factions.

Logistical Inadequacies. The ANA continues to suffer from logistical deficiencies at multiple levels. A June 2006 report by a retired US General had described the ANA as "miserably under-resourced". He quoted Afghan Defence Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak to reiterate that the ANA had "shoddy small arms, much worse than what Wardak had as a Mujahideen fighting the Soviets twenty years ago".[50] Waradak went on to record several times that the ANA was suffering from a lack of air mobility, tactical ground mobility, fire power, and other logistics and did not have enough instructors and trainers. The report also acknowledged that the Afghan police were in a bad state.[51] The growing Taliban insurgency and the resultant risk to the life of an average ANA soldier given the logistical shortcomings are also believed to be major factors behind a roughly thirty percent desertion rate.

Western Resilience and Predicaments

As the situation in Iraq worsened and the Taliban resurgence came to be publicly recognized in 2006-2007, the urgency of increasing the pace of development of the ANA was also realized. Given the rising cost of the Afghan war for the United State and NATO, both in terms of funding and casualties, the salary of an ANA is increasingly being regarded as a more economical option. According to an estimate, the salary of an ANA soldiers is about $70 a month, whereas it costs $4,000 per day to maintain a NATO soldiers in Afghanistan.[52] The stalemate between the US and its NATO allies on how to tackle a resurgent Taliban has also enhanced the need to raise the ANA at the earliest. However, the larger question of creating an effective, well-trained, well-led and well-equipped ANA is being compromised in the process. The emphasis is apparently more on raising the ANA's numerical strength, rather than on the quality of soldiering, given the looming threat of growing violence and high rate of desertion in the ANA.[53] In case the quality is compromised on quantity as it appears the case to be, the attainment of envisaged objectives will be doubtful.

Renewed Focus

Since 2006, the United States and NATO have renewed their efforts to raise the ANA. Efforts are being made to establish more regional training centres to augment the ANS's recruitment programmes.[54] In July 2006, the United States announced the decision to provide $2 billion worth of military weapons and vehicles to the ANA, just before the ISAF entered southern Afghanistan.[55] On February 1, 2007, anticipating the spring offensive of the Taliban, the United States further provided 800 military vehicles and 12,000 heavy and light arms to the ANA.[56] In December 2007, the United States announced its decision to supply 60,000 M-16 rifles to the ANA during 2008.[57] On January 15, 2008, the Pentagon announced a one-time deployment of an additional 3, 2000 marines for a period of seven months beginning in March, some of whom would be engaged in the training of the ANA and ANP.[58] The US Special Forces are also said to be building up 4,000 strong six commando battalions for the ANA, each comprising 640

commandoes. The NATO member states too have joined the United States in reinforcing the ANA. Turkey,[59] Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, Portugal, and Australia[60] have either supplied weapons, equipment, or helped in the process of training ANA forces since the beginning of 2007. Effort is also on to augment the Air Corps of the ANA. The United States is said to be spending $20 million for the maintenance of the existing infrastructure.[61]

Role of Asian/Regional Countries

There is also a view gaining currency among the Western countries that the role of regional countries and mechanisms has to be augmented in the ongoing efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. The regional/Asian countries have so far avoided any direct involvement either in the training and mentoring of the ANA or in assisting the Western forces by way of contributing troops due to the prevailing regional dynamics and power policies in Asia. However, countries like India, China, and Iran have been involved in training the Afghan police. Some of the Asian countries have also been providing non-lethal military equipment and other logistical aid to the ANA.

As a sign of US-NATO-Russia cooperation on Afghanistan, Russia agreed to extend transit facilities for non-lethal cargoes for NATO forces during the NATO Summit at Bucharest from April 2-4, 2008.[62] It is to be noted that ISAF and US coalition forces are heavily dependent on logistics transported via Pakistan because of the only viable route for logistics. However, despite her logistics related support and her consistent offers for participation in the rehabilitation process in Afghanistan, Pakistan has been totally ignored. Pakistan's inconsistent foreign policy towards Afghanistan and her role in ongoing War against Terror are considered to be the major contributing factors along with Indian growing influence in Afghanistan.

Russia had earlier contributed to ANA development especially from 2002-2005, and its military-technical assistance to Afghanistan reportedly totalled more than $200 million. It also assisted the repairing of helicopters and transport planes and

'delivered airport maintenance equipment, a missile defence system to protect the Kabul airport, communication equipment, truck, repair equipment, spare parts and manuals'.[63] In October 2005, Russia reportedly agreed to supply four helicopters and dozens of vehicles as well as communications and other equipments worth $30 million,[64] but later suspended its military assistance to avoid 'duplication' of US military aid.[65]

Chinese assistance to the Afghan security picked up after the visit by a high level delegation from the Afghan defence ministry in October 2005. China agreed to provide military equipment worth $2 million, and to train Afghan defence ministry officials.[66] In June 2006, China and Afghanistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) whereby China agreed to provide training to about 30,000 ANA soldiers by 2010 and allocated $3 million for the training.[67] There have been reports of the United States, NATO, and the European Union expecting India to do more in ensuring the stability of Afghanistan by way of deploying its forces and training the Afghan military. Quoting the Indian daily Deccan Chronicle, a June 2006 report of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (UK) stated that the United States has been keen on Indian forces contributing to the security of areas in and around Kabul.[68]

The Indian Ministry of External Affairs stated that. 'defence establishments in India hold training programmes from time to time for military personnel from other countries, including Afghanistan. However, there is no proposal to send Indian Army personnel to Afghanistan for training the Afghan Army'.[69] Even during the week-long visit of Afghan Defence Minister Wardak in April 2008, the Indian defence Minister A.K. Antony made it clear that India would continue with its efforts to rebuild Afghanistan but 'there will not be any military involvement there'.[70] It is interesting to note that NATO has also been negotiating with the Arab countries to provide team of military instructors and trainers for the ANA.[71] There are already troops from four Muslim countries in the ISAF.[72] In addition, it was reported in march 2007 that Jordan was providing commando training to nearly 100 ANA soldiers at its military facilities in Jordan.[73] The contribution by Muslim countries is likely to impact positively on the approach of Afghans. There might be

improvement in the willingness to assume responsibility by Afghans in an earlier timeframe.

The Hitch

There is a realization that the establishment of an effective Afghan security apparatus will take time for the ANA to develop into a self-sustaining force. Various alternative proposals have been made from time to time in view of the pressing need and somehow contain the Taliban guerrillas and bring down the level of violence in Afghanistan. There are many proposals under considerations. It ranges from arming/re-arming of the tribes in troubled areas for defence against the Taliban guerrillas; to cutting deals with the Taliban (now even US is considering rapprochements with Talibans); to use regional mechanisms to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan.[74]

Ironically, the differing perceptions in the trans-Atlantic alliance reinforce as well as undermine the development of the ANA as a force and as an institution. While the consensus on the need to train, equip, and strengthen the ANA is there, the urgency of checking the spiralling violence and militancy by adopting short-term measures such as cutting deals with local Taliban or creating tribal militia undermines this consensus and weakens the prospects of the development of the ANA. There is now a big question mark on the ANA's credibility and its perception among the Afghan people, which may accelerate the rate of desertion from the ANA. If the proposed arming or re-arming of the tribal militias, whether lashkars goes through and the Afghan situation worsens further, then joining these militias will be better option for these trained soldiers than staying within the ranks of a weak and inefficient ANA. The formation of informal entities like the Afghanistan national Auxiliary Police (ANAP) as an emergency measure to tackle the problem of local policing also takes the attention and resources away from the ANA and the ANP.[75]

Conclusion

Afghanistan has made a remarkable recovery in five years from a war-convulsed, strewn, and shell-shocked post conflict

trauma case an economically emerging democracy. Afghans have voted from president, elected a parliament, and embraced a new constitution. Parliament has flexed its muscles, too, refusing to be intimidated by executive prerogatives.[76] History shows that in modern state-building an army is a necessary part of the security solution. Therefore, the development of new credible defense forces in Afghanistan is a necessary and appropriate step that the U.S. has failed to comprehend. While the goal is to create professional security institutions that will provide for the individual and collective security of Afghans, the magnitude of the challenges to accomplish this goal was underestimated. The challenges confronting the ANA are both immense in proportion and diverse in nature and include ethnic and tribal diversity; recruitment and retention issues; Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR); the presence of spoilers; and acceptance by the people as legitimate armed forces. A strong element of political uncertainty and unpredictability that characterizes the war in Afghanistan makes the task of assessing the further prospects of the ANA quite daunting. Even six years after its creation, the ANA is far from playing any significant role in containing or fighting the Taliban offensive. The whole effort aimed at firming up the ANA is caught in the competing agendas of various forces and entities, both domestic and external, involved in the Afghan war. A whole range of elements are arrayed against its development as a unifying national force with an identity of its own.

In Afghanistan, ANA can emerge as symbols of nationalism, modernization, and professionalism. The challenges highlighted in this article are complex, and the product of long histories but not impossible given the time, commitment, and resources of the U.S. and its coalition partners. The ideal handling of the challenges presented by ethnic and tribal diversity, recruitment and retention issues, the DDR process, coupled with the presence of spoilers all hinge on several factors coming together. First U.S. and coalition partners must stay the course and see through what has been started in both countries. Second is the accomplishment of the DDR process. Third, ANA must address ethnic imbalances, alter values of the senior leadership to represent the values of their society, understand their subordination to civil authority, come to appreciate

their service as a matter of patriotism, and finally win the respect of the people. Fourth and last, and foremost is the adoption of an Afghan democratic government that is committed to developing proper civil-military relations.

Thus far, the path to reconstruction, though rocky, has been navigable, but not every hairpin turn can be anticipated, and there are still bandits on the road. The country being dealt with is not Vietnam, not Colombia, nor is Bosnia. It is Afghanistan, and it needs to be seen in its own light.[77]

> ***"All you need to know is that there was a before 9/11 and an after 9/11. After 9/11 the gloves came off."***
>
> ***– Cofer Black, CIA*** [78]

Author

Lieutenant Colonel Raza Ali Khan was commissioned in a Field Regiment, Artillery in September 1990. He is a graduate of Command and Staff College, Quetta and Command Staff College, Tehran, Iran. He has varied command, staff and instructional experience which include Brigade Major of an Independent Infantry Brigade Group, Instructor at the School of Artillery and an Aid-de-Camp. The officer is a regular contributor of articles in Pakistan Army Journal and Pakistan Defence Review. Presently, he is serving on the faculty of Command and Staff College, Quetta.

Notes

1 Cited in, 'Making of the New Afghan National Army : Challenges and Prospects', by Vishal Chandra, Strategic Analysis, Volume 33, Issue 1 January 2009, p 55
2 Hekmat Karzai, 'Strengthening Security in Contemporary Afghanistan: Coping with the Taliban', by Robert I. Roteberg. Vanguard Books, 2007, p79
3 Ibid. p69
4 Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_National_Army. Accessed on 29 June 2009
5 Ibid.
6 After Kabul fell to the Taliban in September 1996, the UN-recognized government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani shifted headquarters to Faizabad in the north-eastern province of Badakhshan.
7 Ibid. Robert I. Roteberg, P11

8 Sean M. Maloney, 'Afghanistan Four Years On: An Assessment', PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly, Volume XXXV, No 3 Autumn 2005, p27
9 Vishal Chandra, 'Making of the New Afghan National Army : Challenges and Prospects', Strategic Analysis, Volume 33, Issue 1 January 2009, p 55-65
10 Ibid.
11 President Hamid Karzai announced the decree during a UN conference on 'Rebuilding Afghanistan: Peace and Stability' held on December 2, 2002, in Germany. Among the high ranking officials present on the occasion were German Minister Joschka Fischer, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi, and High Representative of the European Union for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana. The decree is also known as the Petersburg Decree.
12 See 'Rebuilding Afghanistan: Peace and Stability', Petersburg (Bonn, Germany), December 2, 2002, at http: // www. unama-afg. org/ docs/-nonUN%20Docs/-Internation-Conferences&Forums/Bonn-Talks/decree%20ob%20army.pdf.(Accessed January 6, 2008.
13 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_National_Army. Accessed on 29 June 2009
14 See the official Website of the ANA, at http://ww.mod.gov.af/ (Accessed February 28, 2008).
15 Ali Ahmed Jalali, a former Afghan army colonel, was also Afghan interior minister (2003-2005). See Ali A. Jalali, 'Rebuilding Afghanistan's National Army; Parameter, 2002, pp. 72-86.
16 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_National_Army. Accessed on 29 June 2009
17 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_National_Army. Accessed on 29 June 2009
18 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_National_Army. Accessed on 29 June 2009
19 Ibid.
20 See 'Fact Sheet Afghan National Army', September 2007, at http://www.cstc-a.com/mission/AfghanistanArmyFacts.html (Accessed March 1, 2008). The Afghan Air Force was established in August 1924 and comprised some Russian aircraft obtained in 1921.
21http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_National_Army. Accessed on 29 June 2009
22 Ibid.
23 According to an Associated Press report, the ANA had 28 against helicopters and transport planes and the Russian had overhauled 11 of them in 2004. See 'Afghan Military Seeks Return of Fugitive Planes', January 11, 2005, at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/6814109/ (Accessed January 13, 2008).
24 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_National_Army accessed on 29 June 2009
25 Ibid.
26Hamid Shalizi, 'Afghanistan Army to reach Target Strength by March', at http: // www. reuters. com/article/worldNews/idUSUSL5175520071202 (Accessed march 3, 2008).
27 Ibid.
28 Will Dunham, 'U.S. Sees Three More Years in Building Afghan Army', July 13, 2006, athttp://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1950766&C=asiapac (Accessed July 13, 2006).

29 Najib Khilwatgar, 'Number of Afghan Troops to Be Raised to 86,000', January 20, 2008, at http:// www.pajhwak.com/viewstory.asp?Ing=eng&id=58854 (Accessed January 23, 2008).
30 James Blitz, 'US calls on Nato Allies to Fund Afghan Army Growth', September 19, 2008, at http:/www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8f85ffa2-85e3-11dd-alac-0000779 fd18c. html? nclick- check=1(Accessed September 20, 2008)
31 http://www.geopolemics.com/index-name-news-file-article-sid-98.htm. Accessed on 13 January 2010.
32 Antonio Giustozzi, 'Afghanistan's National Army: The Ambiguous Prospects of Afghanistan', May 1, 2008, at http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2374139 (Accessed May 3, 2008).
33 http://www.geopolemics.com/index-name-news-file-article-sid-98.htm. Accessed on 13 January 2010.
34 Sean M. Maloney, 'Afghanistan Four Years On: An Assessment', PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly, Volume XXXV, No 3 Autumn 2005, p25
35 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_National_Army. Accessed on 29 June 2009
36 Ibid.
37 See, the official Website of the Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix VI, at http: //www.taskforcephoenix.com/ (Accessed March 3, 2008).
38 For details visit http//www.globalsecurioty.org/military/wold/Afghanistan/Kabul.htm (Accessed February 29, 2008).
39 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_National_Army. Accessed on 29 June 2009
40 See 'Coiling Forces Information', March 4, 2008, at http://www.taskforcephoenix.com/cofor.htm (Accessed march 4, 2008).
41 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_National_Army. Accessed on 29 June 2009
42 Ibid.
43 All programmes relating to training and monitoring of the ANA since 2002 were initially coordinated by the office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMCA) under overall US command. Later OMCA came under the command of CFC-A, which was established in November 2003. OMCA was re-designated as the Office of security Cooperation-Afghanistan (OSCA).
44 'CSTC-A Fact Sheet', December 1, 2007, at http://www.cstc-a.com/mission /CSTC-AFactSheet.html (Accessed March 1, 2008).
45 See 'Fact Sheet on Afghan Regional Security Integration Command', September 2007, at http://www.cstc-a.com/mission/ARSIC.htm (Accessed February 27, 2008).
46 http://www.cmi.no/afghanistan/?id=339&Disarmament-Demobilisation-and-Reintegration-(DDR). Accessed on 13 January 2010.
47 Ali A. Jalali, 'The Legacy of War and the Challenge of Peace Building', published in Building a new Afghanistan, byRobert I. Roteberg. Vanguard Books, 2007, p32
48 Ibid. p32
49 Ibid. Sean M. Maloney, , p27

50 Reportedly, the ANA units 'do not have mortars, few machine guns, no MK 19 grenade machine guns, and no artillery. They have almost no helicopter or fixed wing transport or attack aviation now or planned. They have no body armour or blast glasses. They have no Kevlar helmets. They have no up-armored Humvees or light armor tracked vehicles (like the M113A3 with machine gun cupolas and with slat armor)'. See General (Retd) Barry R. McCaffrey, 'Academic report-Trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan (May 19-May, 26, 2006)', June 3, 2006. pp.6-7, at http:// www.washingtonspeakers. com/prod-images/pdfs/McCaffreyBarry.VisitToAfghnistan.05.06.pdf (Accessed march 7, 2007).

51 Ibid. Sean M. Maloney, , p27

52 Haroun Mir, 'Bolster the Afghan national army', February 16, 2007, at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/0216/news/edmir.php (Accessed February 17, 2007).

53 It is noteworthy that the ANA registered a quantum jump in its strength during 2006-2007 in response to the rising threat from the Taliban and their allies. If one goes by the official Website of the ANA, and by nearly 21,000 between January 2007 and December 2007, which is much higher than the average number of soldiers trained earlier. See 'Military to Double in Size in Two Years: Wardak', November 25, 2006, at http://www.onlinenews.com.pk/details.php?id=105269 (Accessed November 25, 2006).

54 In February 2005, the US dispatched 288 trainers for the ANA, in addition to be 300 already, assigned to various ANA units since 2002. See Stephen Graham, 'U.S. Doubles Its Troops in Afghan Army' February 20, 2002, at http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=517696 (Accessed February 21, 2005).

55 See 'U.S. to Give Afghans $2 Billion in Additional Military Equipment', July 4, 2006, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/03/AR200607031058.html (Accessed July 4, 2006).

56 See 'U.S. Donates Vehicles, Arms of Afghan Army, February 1, 2007, at http:// www.nytimes.com/aponline/world/AP-Afghan-US-Arms-Delivery.html (Accessed 1, 2007).

57 Of the 3, 200 marines, 2,200 joined the ISAF in the southern sector and the remaining 1,000 are helping to train Afghan army and police under US command. Ann Scott Tyson, 'More Recruits, U.S. Arms Planned for Afghan Military', December 5, 2007, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/04/AR2007120402086.html (Accessed January 25, 2008).

58 In May 2007, Turkey donated 24 Howitzers to the ANA. Nearly 110 ANA officers were to be trained by Turkey in using the donated weaponry. Ann Scott Tyson, '3,200 Marines to Deploy to Afghanistan in Spring', January 16, 2008, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/ article/ 2008/01/ 15/ AR20080115501381.html?wpisrc=newsletter (Accessed 16, 2008).

59 See 'Turkey Donates 24 Howitzers to Afghan army', May 12, 2007, at http:// paktribune. com/news/index.shmtl?177930 (Accessed May 20, 2007).

60 David Loyn, 'Afghan Army to "Treble in Size", December 2, 2007, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/south-asia/7123876.stm (Accessed March 30, 2008) and Grendan Nicholson, Australians to Joint Afghan in Battle', February 20, 2008, at http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/australians-to-join-afghans-in-battle/2008/02/19/ 12031190822599.html (Accessed February 20, 2008).
61 Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, 'Afghanistan's Air Corps Struggle to Rebuild', November 28, 2007 at http://www.afghanistannewscenter.co/news/2007/november/nov282007.html#4 (Accessed march 2, 2008).
62 See 'US Permitted Use of Uzbekistan Base' ,March 5, 2008, at http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/world/AP-NATO-Uzbekistan-html (Accessed 5, 2008).
63 See 'Russia ready to Resume Military Aid to Afghanistan-Diplomat', March 5, 2007, at http://en.rain.ru/russia/20070305/61570158.html (Accessed march 7, 2007).
64 See 'Russia to Supply Afghan Army', October 10, 2005 at http://www.washington post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/09/AR200510090085.html (Accessed October 10, 2005).
65 Vladimir Socor, 'Russia Returning to Afghanistan with Not-so Soft Power', March 16, 2007, at http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article-id=2372016 (Accessed May 28, 2008)
66 Ahmed Khalid Mowahid, 'Beijing to Provide Kabul Military Equipment', October 23, 2005, at http://www.pajhwak.com/viewstory.asp?Ing=eng&id=8023 (Accessed January 14, 2007).
67 Ahmed Khalid Mowahid, 'China to Train Afghan Soldiers on Logistics', June 24, 2006, at http://www.pajhwak.com.viewstory.asp?Ing=eng&id=20374 (Accessed January 14, 2007).
68 See 'US Seeks Indian Troops for Kabul', June 5, 2006, at http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/june-2006/us-seeks-indian-troops-for-kabul (Accessed September 25, 2006)
69 See "In Response to a Question Regarding a News Report on a Proposal to Send India Army Personnel to Afghanistan for Training the Afghan Army', April 26, 2007, at http:/meaindia.mic.in/.
70 'India Rules Out Military Involvement in Afghanistan', April 8, 2008, at http://in.news.yahoo.com/indiaabroad/20080408/r-t-ians-nl-general/tnl-india-rules-out-military-involvement-b9e311f.html (Accessed April 11, 2008).
71 See 'NATO Seeking Help from Muslim Nations to Train Afghan Army', November 28, 2007, at http:/www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2007/November/nov282007.html#4 (Accessed March 2, 2008)
72 Turkey has 750 personal, Albania has 140, Jordan has 90, and Azerbaijan has 40 personal. 'ISAF Troops Placement' April 1, 2008, at http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/equb/pdf/ isf_placemat.pdf (Accessed April 23, 2008).
73 Ahmed Khalid Moahid, Defence Minister Leaves for Jordan', March 4, 2007, at http://www.pajhwak.com/viewstory .asp?Ing=eng&id=32708 (Accessed March 6, 2007).

74 In December 2007, The Daily Telegraph reported that British secret service agentsa from MI6 have held half a dozen rounds of meeting or jirgas with senior Taliban fighters in Helmand where most of the British forces are deployed. British commanders had earlier signed a pact with the 'local elders' of the Musa Qala in Helmand in October 2006 to keep the Taliban at bay. The pact was soon rendered redundant as Taliban recaptured Musa Qala in February 2007 and held on to it for nearly ten months. See Thomas Harding and Tom Coghlan, 'Britian in Secret Talks with the Taliban', December 27, 2007, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/newa/main .jhtml;jsessionid=YAMVHMBG1YNHMQFIQMFSFGGAVCBQ01VO? xml=/new/2007/12/26/wafg126.xml (Accessed January 2, 2008).

75 Established in 2006, the auxiliary police is said to comprise thousands of mercenaries, includeing militias and criminal elements on government payroll. They are supposed to undergo a ten-day training course at the end of which the recruits are provided with an automatic weapon and posted at their home district. See 'Worries Arise about Quality of Afghan Auxilliary Police November 26, 2006, at http://www.canda.com/topics/news/world/story.html?id=1010b37b-a02e-4a2f-9dc7-8ab1dc40c92d&k=2965 (Accessed November 26, 2006).

76 Robert I. Roteberg, 'Building a new Afghanistan', Vanguard Books, 2007, pvii

77 Ibid. Sean M. Maloney, p32

78 Cofer Black, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), testimony before the Joint House and Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 26 September 2002, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1112400/posts.