

ISSN 1999-2297



Margalla Papers

2009

Special Edition

*“The Contemporary Environment:
Is a Neo-Cold War in the Making?”*

Margalla Papers

2009

**National Defence University
Sector E-9 Islamabad
Pakistan**

www.ndu.edu.pk

Margalla Papers

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Foreword

It is our privilege to unfold the compilation of scholastic inputs that flow from the seminar titled: “The Contemporary Environment: Is a neo-Cold War in the Making?”, held at the NDU on 28th May, 2009. The compilation brings into the fore an ensemble of rich though diverse view points on the emerging trends in the contemporary environment and provides a window on the post-unilateral world.

The focus of the scholastic exercise was to identify transforming patterns in the world order, and to anticipate and assess implications for Pakistan’s standing in this context. The evolving changes though may not unfurl tomorrow, are fore-warner of the erosion of uni-polarity and of new challenges and opportunities that are in store. It is thus important to weigh policy options for Pakistan.

The seminar was indeed a landmark event in consonance with the mandate of NDU as a national think tank. This occasioned an impressive reunion of the academia and practitioners towards an intellectual discourse of significance to us. This compilation mirrors the seminar in terms of an overview and five research articles made in two working sessions. After revision, four articles are being published in this issue while Dr. Maleeha Lodhi was unable to submit her article.

The theme reflected in the seminar and this compilation remains a subject of continuing interest at the NDU campus. It is our hope that academia and practitioners will continue the dialogue process in a more focused forum and the emerging prescriptions will receive due attention in the policy relevant circles.

Major General Azhar Ali Shah
Director General
Institute for Strategic Studies, Research & Analysis

AN OVERVIEW OF THE SEMINAR

A day-long seminar titled “The Contemporary Environment: Is a neo- Cold War in the Making?” was held at NDU on 28th May, 2009. The seminar was aimed at generating intellectual debate on global transformations and the challenges and opportunities which these changing patterns may unfold for Pakistan. It was part of a series of deliberative exercises which NDU undertakes periodically in fulfillment of its role as a national think tank.

The discussion on the overarching theme was carried out in two working sessions with six sub-themes besides the inaugural. The first working session was dedicated to the study of emerging trends in the contemporary environment while the second dealt with the challenges and opportunities likely to emerge in a post-uni polar world.

THEMATIC FOCUS

The academic exercise was built on the premise that the world order is dominated by US supremacy which is mainly manifested in unilateralism and pre-emption. Other nations are obligated to assess the probable direction of American policy while finding space for their survival strategies. However, there are perceptible indicators for a dynamic change in the world order; already manifested in phenomenal rise of China as economic and political heavy weight, consolidation of EU and financial crisis on the Western horizons. These may well be seen as a catalyst for change, beyond uni-polarity. The emerging change in the world order would be critically important for Pakistan in view of its geopolitical disposition at the crossroads of three regions. This poses a challenge for the scholars to study and identify likely impact relevant to evolving national strategies.

PARTICIPATION AND PROFILE

Seminar was distinct as an impressive reunion of the academia and practitioners towards an intellectual discourse of significance in the contemporary arena and for Pakistan in particular. The session chairs and six presenters were an impressive blend of academia and practitioners. Concurrently, the audience

represented a broad spectrum from policy relevant circles, think tanks, academia, NDU faculty and course participants/students on the campus. The interaction amongst presenters and the audience provided a stimulant for discussion on the occasion. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Nawabzada Malik Amad Khan was Chief Guest at the inauguration session.

A SUMMARY RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

At the inaugural, President NDU while welcoming the participants, underscored importance of the seminar from the standpoint of assessing global transformations from uni-polarity to a multi polar order and identifying possible variants that are likely to emerge in the decades ahead. The change though not imminent tomorrow, is the fore-warner of the erosion of uni-polarity, and of new challenges and opportunities that may be in store for Pakistan.

The chief guest delivered a key note address on Pakistan's national interests and objectives in the wake of global transformations, identifying essentials in the national agenda namely; promoting and ensuring national security, political stability and national integration. In this context, he flagged the importance of having a multi dimensional foreign policy, matching with the demand of evolving world order. The policy must, therefore, rest upon a full appreciation of the evolving political and economic environment in order to protect and promote national objectives.

Session –One

Re-visiting the Environment: Emerging Trends

The first working session was chaired by Dr. Pervez Iqbal Cheema with three speakers Dr. Tahir Amin, Dr. Nazir Hussain and Dr. Aftab Kazi respectively. The session evolved around the emerging trends of the contemporary environment with particular reference to a theoretical overview, sustainability of *Pax Americana* in the context of case studies of Afghanistan and Iraq, and competing interests of the major economies.

Following are the highlights of the first session:-

- The contemporary environment is fraught with US dominance since the end of the Cold War. The uni-polarity has been expressed in unilateralism and pre-emption over a decade, the ongoing Global War on Terror (GWOT) being its last manifestation.
- The two American invasions on Afghanistan and Iraq have unfolded questions about the limits of American supremacy and put series constraints on the doctrine of *Pax Americana*.
- In addition, the emergence of major economies with multiplicity of interests is appearing to be one of the major catalyst for change in the upcoming political system.
- The emerging patterns seem to be turning the voyage of uni polarity to multi polarity as number of events and entities are appearing at the surface for transformations in the contemporary environment. This calls for a closer study of the processes of dynamic change.

In the moderator's concluding remarks, it was emphasized that a framework is required to interpret the international realities and to address the challenges through a body of theoretically embedded ideas. In order to understand and analyze the contemporary world environment, there is a need to have an in-depth access to various orders existing in the international politics.

Session –Two **A Post Unilateral World: Challenges and Opportunities**

The second session was chaired by Ambassador Najmmudin A. Sheikh with three speakers Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmad and Dr. Shireen M. Mazari respectively. The session unfolded discussion on possible variants of a post uni-lateral world, necessity to redraw rules of engagement amongst the international community, and challenges and opportunities in the way of recasting Pakistan's strategy.

Following are the highlights of the second session:-

- The emerging patterns are already indicative of a significant shift in the international political system, now headed towards a post-unilateral world.
- The change in power structure continues dramatically: uni-polar power of US facing limits on its very status and relatively declining due to the rise of the rest which means a rise of new economic realities as well as non-state actors.
- The configuration of the post unilateral world provides a window on the upcoming challenges and opportunities that are in the making for the next decade or so.
- There is a need of redrawing the rules of engagement in the multi-polar environment and also, the perspective on new approaches for international entities.
- In this context, it is a necessity for Pakistan to recast strategy concurrent with changes in the contemporary strategic environment. Pakistan has its inclination towards US in many ways but a post-unilateral environment will have its own demands.
- Pakistan should revisit its policy in the changing environment and formulate foreign and domestic policies with national consensus and cohesion, while taking the domestic dynamics into account.

In the moderator's concluding remarks, it was underlined that US would no more be able to maintain the qualities of a superpower as per Huntington's definition in the coming decades. Therefore, Pakistan in order to pursue its national interests, must embrace the degree of realism characterized by proper information and analysis of the facts of a dynamic situation.

FINDINGS

- Uni polarity is already declining. The future picture is imprecise to-date and can varyingly be described as multi polar or non polar. The US may still be a dominant

military power but with reduced muscle in the wake of emerging new entities.

- There is an unprecedented transfer of economic power and wealth from West to rest of the emerging influential blocs (EU, Russia and China). Consequently, this flow of wealth also brings a major change in their military prowess. These transformations are directed towards a big shift in the international political system.
- The direction of Pakistan's policy must be in consonance with the evolving global realities in the coming decade. It would be unwise to continue putting 'all eggs in one basket'.
- A much needed diversification in Pakistan's posture should be adequately reflected in the quality and depth of relationships with EU, Russia and China. The policy direction should keep all options open to establish tracks of cooperation and collaboration with these region or countries.

What Next?

The organizers while reviewing the findings of the seminar, felt that the outcome in as much as it relates to policy options for Pakistan needs to be kept up for an extended dialogue process. It is, therefore, projected that the seminar should be followed up with a round table for a more focused discussion among resource persons: session chairs and paper presenters of the just concluded seminar, together with participation of NDU faculty.

FORGING A DOCTRINE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN A POST-UNILATERAL ENVIRONMENT

Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmad

Introduction

There is no doubt that global power is diffused today in multiple ways, and it will be more diffused in future, but this does not mean that we have effectively entered a uni-polar era. However, at least the beginning of the end of post-Cold War unilateral period led by the United States is certainly visible with the emergence of new regional powers and influential non-state actors. Given that, the best we can do at this stage is to draw a hypothetical sketch of a workable doctrine of international community in a post-unilateral environment to be fully realized at sometime in future, which is what this paper essentially intends to do. My principal argument is that as power in the international system gets more diffused with the emergence of newer, potentially positivist state and non-state actors and forces, the existing institutions of global governance have to be reformed and consolidated, newer, more representative global governance entities must be created, and traditional, Western-dominated version of multilateralism must be replaced by fairer and more pluralistic form of multilateralism—all of this to accommodate the mutually compatible or competitive aspirations and interests of all the important old and new players and forces at the international stage in political, security, economic and political domains.

Foreseeing the future or pre-planning for an expected world order or disorder is a crucial scholarly undertaking, as policy planners must have indigenously-produced literature about future course of world politics beforehand to choose their options from in order to successfully adapt the country's foreign policy to a new international reality whenever it completely manifests itself. However, in any futuristic academic exercise, great care must be taken while discussing future outcomes of the changes currently under way in the international system. That is why I should make three clarifications at the outset. First, the reference in my paper's title to a post-unilateral environment does not imply that new

powers at the world, state or non-state, have risen enough to effectively end what Charles Krauthammer had described in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet demise as America's 'uni-polar moment.'¹ At this stage, we can only talk about probabilities not certainties. An ever greater diffusion of international power in both hierarchical and horizontal directions in the foreseeable future is, therefore, a probability, or, at best, a near certainty.

Second, the question whether the future trend in international relations will be cooperative, competitive or prone to conflict should also be seen in probable terms. For the avoidance of conflict, the sustenance of a healthy competition or a trend towards greater cooperation involves a number of ifs and buts during the ongoing transition beyond unilateralism. When scholars talk in certainties, they risk being proven wrong. Remember Paul Kennedy had predicted the fall of the United States in 1989, and instead the Soviet Union disappeared from the world within two years of the publication of his international best-seller, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*.² The same appears to be the case with another recent best-seller: Fareed Zakaria's *Post-American World*,³ wherein the author highlights an interesting paradox in a world facing political turmoil and yet experiencing sustained economic growth, and makes an absolutist judgment, saying 'If America's economic system is its core strength, its political system is its core weakness.' Little did he know that, the same year, within months of the release of his book, America and the world would experience an economic crisis never seen since the Great Depression three-quarters of a century ago.

Third, I understand that rampant anti-Americanism across the world quite often leads non-Western scholars and or their liberal-leftist counterparts in the West to predict the decline of Western civilization, capitalist system and the American Empire. Of course, everyone is entitled to nurture such wishes, but this does not mean the global reality will also conform to such wishes. The current economic crisis has become a reference point to articulate such wishes, even though the fact is that the crisis is global, affecting China as much as America; that the democratic West may have greater resilience to overcome it, and also the fact that it is possible to reform unregulated capitalism and its social consequences through effective governmental regulation,

international cooperation and institutional reforms.

A cautious outlook on predicting the future course of events is important. However, this does not mean that we should not plan beforehand, however uncertain the future course of world politics may be. Even if we have not yet fully entered the post-unilateral era, we must appreciate the emergence of powerful new global forces, which may eventually lead us to an age of non-polarity,⁴ to use Richard Haass's phrase, or to a multi-polar world. What sort of a future international political, security, economic and cultural order can we envision at this stage? Can we do anything at this stage to prevent the emergence of a global order based on the age-old balance of power politics, with all of its uncertain and potentially risky consequences? Zakaria, Haass, Zbigniew Brzezinski,⁵ Jim Garrison,⁶ Kishore Mahbubani,⁷ James Skillen⁸ and James Hoge,⁹ Jr are among the leading scholars who have recently attempted to answer these questions, while underscoring the urgent need for the United States to speedily adapt to emerging realities of international politics. One major problem with all of these perspectives on the subject, some of which I shall cite briefly later, is that they aim to ensure American or Western leadership of the world in transition.

My argument is different: it is for the creation of a genuinely democratic and more pluralistic international governance model beyond unilateralism, which recognizes the multiplicity of global forces with all of their paradoxes and contradictions, an international order created with due American or Western help not as leaders but as partners, an international structure modeled on globalization from below rather than globalization from above, and one that facilitates the full realization of multiple social values, cultural norms, and religious aspirations of people and nations at the core as well as at the periphery of international system. For all of this to happen, it is important to go beyond traditional neo-realistic interpretations of the international reality, meant essentially to retain traditional Western monopoly over the global system. Even if social constructivist approaches in the past have been largely irrelevant, and even if liberal institutional arguments appeared a bit idealistic, if globalization and whatever it entails is a reality and newer powers have emerged effectively on the international scene, there is no

escape from not seriously considering the non-neo-realistic discourse on world politics in its moment of integration and transition. In fact, the good news is that even from within the Western neo-realist school of thought, credible new arguments in support of reforming the institutions of global governance are being increasingly articulated now.

As I stated before, for now, we can only talk about a doctrine of international community in a post-unilateral environment hypothetically. However, for the purpose, it is important to lay down a proper context for the purpose of understanding the nature and dynamics of the shift in global power underway currently and whether the existing international structure and its representative institutions are evolving in accordance with the shifts in global politics. Only then we can talk about a set of new principles facilitating and governing the conduct of international community at the world stage.

Shifting Strands of Global Politics

As for the contextual backdrop of my main thesis in this paper, let me begin by arguing that international relations have never been a static phenomenon, as shifts in relative power of actors at the world stage continuously take place. Given that, it is important that our understanding of the world we live in should also evolve accordingly, and we are not stuck with a worldview that has no relevance with the evolving realities of a world in transition. Global politics is always characterized with three tendencies; namely, cooperation, competition and conflict. We live in a world where integrative and disintegrative processes are simultaneously at work. There are factors contributing to peace. There are issues leading to war. There is always hectic competition going on among major players of the world. Sometime, this competition causes conflict. Some time, it leads to peace. This was true before, and the same is applicable now, and will be in future. There is nothing wrong in competition as long as it does not lead to conflict. The prevention of conflict and the sustenance of a healthy competition at the international stage, however, require consolidation and creation of a network of representative international institutions, which can

effectively regulate competitive relationship among major world players as well as all other important forces at the core and periphery of international system in political, security, economic and cultural spheres.

There cannot be two opinions about the fact that the world we live in today is changing very fast. This change is visible in four different ways.¹⁰ First, in recent decades, we are moving away from a Euro-centric world to an Asia-centric world. This is a gigantic shift taking place in our times, since Europe and the West had dominated global politics for several centuries. The economic rise of China and India in a continent where Japan and South-East Asian countries like Singapore and Malaysia had already made their mark underscores the global shift from the West to the East. Progress achieved by some Middle Eastern countries like the UAE and Qatar is also contributing to Asia's rise. The same can be said about the emergence of regionalism initiatives in resource-rich Central Asia such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

Second, the Westphalian international system premised on the pivotal position of state in world politics and economy is in a state of crisis due to globalization., which has positively empowered a variety of non-state actors, including non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations. In a state-dominated international system, international relations generally revolve around great power politics, and developments in the periphery are also driven by it. In an age of speedy communication, peripheral actors, whether they are non-state or state actors, have gained political currency at the international stage. So is the case with international public opinion, whose significance even the United States as a dominant military power of the world cannot afford to ignore.

Third, another positive consequence of globalization is the emergence of various regionalism and regionalization networks around the world, which are either a by-product of globalization or a reaction to it. It is true that the evolution of European Union preceded the emergence of globalization as a truly international phenomenon, but its enlargement and consolidation in security, political, economic and foreign policy arenas has occurred during

this period. The same can be said about Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and, to some extent, North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). For its part, SCO is a classical example of regionalization or regionalism as a response to globalization or globalization becoming a catalyst for its emergence. SCO serves a variety of mutually compatible interests of China, Russia and Central Asian states. As for the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Economic Cooperation Organization and the African Union, their political importance at the international stage is still limited due to a variety of reasons. However, if the reasons for their relative non-functionality as compared to ASEAN, for instance, are sufficiently addressed, all of them can become effective regionalism or regionalization entities with a corresponding international acknowledgement.

Finally, there is this one negative consequence of globalization: that of the emergence of international terrorist and criminal networks, which operate trans-nationally while benefiting enormously from the forces of globalization in communication, transportation and financial spheres. In the absence of globalization, terrorism and crime would have had only a peripheral or local significance. The emergence of international terrorism has, in fact, aggravated the crisis already facing the Westphalian state system from the positive attributes of globalization. Pre-empting terrorism threatens political sovereignty, the fundamental basis of state system as it has evolved since the middle of 17th century. Which law to apply to terrorists—who are neither criminals nor soldiers but whose actions can be potentially more catastrophic than both—is a question posing serious dilemma to international law, which has taken as many centuries as the state system to evolve at the current stage.

The world of the future may be Asia-centric as China and India rise economically with the consequent probability of their political and military prowess. Global power may be more diffused tomorrow due to the rise of not just Asian powers but also two other state actors constituting the so-called BRIC; namely, Brazil in south America and Russia in Eurasia (the two others being India and China). If globalization is an organic reality of the world, then surely

non-state actors, representing both positive and negative consequences of globalization, will have greater salience in world politics in the days to come. However, for now, and perhaps for some decades from now, the United States and the European Union will retain significant clout in world politics. The United States at present dominates the world in military, political, economic and cultural domains. The European Union is the most viable regionalism entity the world has produced thus far. It is true that the US and the EU have different conceptions of the world and contrasting preferences for how the world should be governed. But this is natural since the US is a state power and the EU is a regional bloc. Therefore, they can be expected to follow different policies and have competitive interests. However, the fact that the US and the EU together constitute the core of the West, along with other developed countries such as Australia and Canada as their partners, cannot be simply ruled out.

Adjusting to New Global Realities

The United States may be a dominant international player, and the European Union may be a pivotal regional bloc. But the problem is that neither of them, as respective leaders of the Western world which has dominated international scene for several centuries, has fully acknowledged the great shifts underway in global politics, and therefore, not contributed to corresponding transformation of the existing international system and reformation of its governing institutions. The EU has been busy consolidating itself internally while enlarging in its neighborhood, and thereby failing to play a more proactive role in a global order transformation accommodative of emerging powers in institutions of global governance. The US at its moment of power has entangled itself in world affairs in a manner that has tarnished its reputation in global public opinion. Its neo-conservative policies practiced during two terms of the Bush Administration have hugely backfired, leaving no option for the Obama Administration to start reaching out to the world in ways that a fast globalizing era of greatly diffused international power requires.

While neo-conservatism, premised on the unilateral pursuit

of American power, even if it was largely exercised in the guise of fighting international terrorism, pushed the US in one direction; the world, characterized by the rise of newer regional powers and powerful forces of globalization in international society and business, was moving in another. That explains why the political and security crises facing the world since the Soviet demise a couple of decades ago have worsened. What if the United States at its moment of power and the world at its moment of integration, to borrow Garrison's description,¹¹ had moved in the same direction! What if the EU—as the world's most effective bloc and an entity whose experience with democracy, liberty and human rights and holistic external approach enjoys global recognition—had acted proactively in international domain during the shift in global politics that has been under way in recent decades! Most probably, we might have had entirely different, inherently positivist outcomes for an international order even during this transitional stage of world politics, instead of waiting for the age of uni-polarity to end effectively for such eventuality to be realized.

What this means is that American and European or Western conduct in world affairs at a time of visible power shifts in global politics will be extremely important in determining the direction of the future world. The American propensity of getting things done globally in their own way, quite often through coercive means—or, more precisely, pursuing narrow self-interests in the cover of lofty ideals—will most probably prevent the emergence of a more cooperative global order. The European tendency of not proactively sharing the benefits of their own pluralistic governance model with the rest of the world will have a similar effect. More broadly, if the West continues to jealously guard its traditional domination of the international system at a time when a host of new, powerful regional global actors and forces require reshaping of the present world order, then the ensuing great-power struggle for power may generate more conflicts, and conflicts, old and new, may conflagrate.

Emerging Scholarly Debate

Western governmental policies, especially those of the United States, may not have yet started to adapt to and be supportive

of the changing power configurations of the world, but a blurring of the boundaries in Western scholarship of the left and the right, the liberal and the realist as well as that of critical perspectives on the issue is visibly noticeable in recent years. A number of leading scholars, including former top US officials, have not only acknowledged the depth and intensity of global power shifts but also come forward to articulate a critical discourse on the doctrine of international community in a future post-unilateral environment. That the demand of reshaping the world order and reforming international institutions accordingly is predominantly emanating coming from Western scholarship, and not merely from traditional non-Western critics of Western policies or their liberal-leftist compatriots in the West, constitutes the most critical scholarly discourse, a development which deserves our serious attention.

Let me start by citing a recent conversation I had with John Mearsheimer,¹² the leading proponent of Offensive Realism theory of International Relations. He would normally defend the exercise of American power to ensure US primacy in world affairs in a unilateral environment. But when I asked him whether he supports Obama Administration's policy of troops' surge in Afghanistan, his response was that the United States should, instead, have a dialogue with Taliban and then get out of Afghanistan. Remember also that together with Stephen Walt, Mearsheimer recently authored perhaps the most important work on the US policy towards Israel, titled *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy*.¹³ This is the first time that two leading American neo-realists purely on realistic and pragmatic grounds have exposed the extraordinary power of the Israeli lobby in US politics and how significantly it is damaging US strategic interests in the Middle East. Mearshiemer, however, does acknowledge that their new discourse on US-Israel ties has not yet been embraced by the policy makers, even though it has generated a critical debate within the American Jewish community.

This example may not directly relate to the subject matter in this paper; but some other scholars, who served on eminent government positions in the United States in the past or whose works are considered influential in US policy making circles, have, indeed, made serious recommendations for reshaping US policy in

response to recent global shifts, and reforming the existing world order accordingly.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, for instance, argues: “It is time to face the fact that the G-8 summit of ‘world leaders’ has become an anachronism. Contrary to claims, its membership represents neither the most advanced economies nor genuine democracies...A more representative body—even if still informal and outside the UN system—could address, in a way more in keeping with the spirit of the times, such basic issues as equity in nuclear proliferation, the proper division of burdens in alleviating global poverty, or the common need of rich and poor countries to face the implications of global warming. G-8 discussions of these issues today are conducted within historically anachronistic confines.”¹⁴ He further writes: “Global leadership now must be accompanied by a social consciousness, a readiness to compromise regarding some aspects of one’s sovereignty, a cultural appeal with more than just hedonistic content, and a genuine respect for the diversity of human traditions.”¹⁵

Haass sums up his recent article in *Foreign Affairs* by suggesting that “multilateralism will be essential in dealing with a non-polar world. To succeed, though, it must be recast to include actors other than the great powers [which he identifies as representatives of UN agencies, NGOs, businesses, and other social sectors]. The UN Security Council and the G-8...need to be reconstituted to reflect the world of today and not the post-World War II era.” Hoge argued in the same journal some years ago that at “the international level, Asia’s rising powers must be given more representation in key institutions, starting with the UN Security Council. This important body should reflect the emerging configuration of global power, not just the victors of World War II.”¹⁶ Skillen makes a broader argument by saying that the “unavoidable challenge to all states, and especially to the United States, at this point in history is to decide how to cooperate in governing themselves and in building the right kind of international and transnational institutions.”¹⁷

Mahbubani concludes his recent work by arguing:

“Ironically the best principles to apply in creating a new world order—or, in fact, restoring the old one—are the principles that America applies in creating its domestic order. First is the principle of equality: there should be one set of laws for all nations...Second is the principle of inequality: no international order can survive if special weight is not given to the interests and perspectives of the major powers...of the day, not the major powers of 1945...Third is the principle of equity: no social order or international order can survive if the needs and interests of the very poor are neglected...Fourth is the principle of even-handedness: both sides in any intractable dispute should feel that the international order treats them fairly...Fifth is the principle of free market economics,” for which, he argues, “there is no North-South or East-West divide.”¹⁸

Zakaria says there “is a fundamental tension in US foreign policy. Does the country want to push its own particular self-interests abroad, or does it want to create a structure of rules, practices, and values by which the world will be bound? In an age of rising powers, the United States’ overriding goal should be the latter—so that even as these countries get more powerful, they will continue to live within the framework of the current international system.” He further argues that the United States would have to abide by international rules if it expects other great powers to follow them. Then, like Brzezinski, Haass and Hoge, Zakaria builds a case for reforming existing international institutions, including adding more veto powers in the Security Council—even though, for the purpose, his portrayal of Hinduism as an inherently tolerant faith and India as a natural Western ally is questionable.

Finally, Garrison offers a powerful discourse rooted essentially in the neo-liberal, institutional creed. He urges the United States to act according to the requirements of an integrated world, and be the final empire or see its role as a transitional empire. “American leadership at this time in history is crucial,” he argues, “provided that America combines its light with its power in such a way that the integrating institutions and mechanisms needed for the effective management of the global system are infused with the same kind of radical democracy with which America itself was founded. A global system of governance, based on inclusive

democratic principles, would make impossible the emergence of any other nation-state with imperial ambitions, for the planet will have united as a single matrix of collaborative, self-regulating connections.” To highlight the ineffectiveness of existing international institutions in tackling global challenges, Garrison refers to Jean-Francois Rischard’s recent work explaining the limitations of the nation-state system in managing scores of issues affecting the planet, the humanity and the global commerce. He cites Rischard as saying, “The complexity of many global issues and their lack of boundaries do not sit well with the territorial and hierarchical institutions that are supposed to solve them: the nation-states.”¹⁹

Like Rischard, a few other specifically European perspectives on the subject are also worth-mentioning. According to David Held, in the “transformed world, institutions such as the UN and bodies such as the IMF are flawed in two crucial ways: Firstly, many have a system of representation that is anachronistic and too skewed to the old western powers that have had their own way for a long time. Their other flaw is that they depend for their finance on the goodwill of the powerful countries. Markets alone don't work and unrepresentative systems don't work so the challenge is: can we make our global governance institutions more representative and better funded? The world is facing crucial tests on climate change, on nuclear proliferation. Also, in light of the huge financial crisis, there is urgent need to create new financial institutions to transform the old Bretton Woods systems into an effective system of global regulation. In the absence of a truly representative world governance system, the post-1945 international order is in serious risk of fragmenting into regions, competitive geopolitical power situations and potentially into a much nastier world.”²⁰

The neo-conservative, unilateral policies of the United States in an era of global integration and power shifts have damaged US credibility in playing a leading role for bringing about the requisite transformation in world order and governance even in post-Bush era. Given that, some European scholars have started to build a case for the EU acting as a catalyst for the evolution of new multilateral international governance, security and economic order, modeled on its own internationally-acknowledged achievements in all of these

spheres. Dirk Messner makes a convincing case for the purpose when he argues that “the transition from a quasi-unilateral, US-dominated power constellation to a multi-polar one can lead to a creeping erosion of multilateral institutions—as neither the old world power, the USA, nor the rising global powers in Asia, such as China and India, are investing in the stabilization or even the further development of the multilateral order. At present the European Union is the most important actor in world politics which is firmly pursuing a multilateral concept of the world order...If Europe managed to be effective in this demanding sphere the EU could assume a key role in the transition from the uni- to the multi-polar power constellation, and contribute to limiting conflict and ensuring stability in the international system.”²¹

According to Charles Grant, the EU may be better positioned as compared to the US to persuade rising Asian powers such as China to be part of a cooperative multi-polar system framed by international rules. He argues: “Of the major powers, he says, only the EU can be relied upon almost always to champion the United Nations, other international bodies and treaties. According to him, the EU should propose to China that they build a strategic partnership, focused on issues that cause tensions between them but which, if tackled in a serious dialogue, could help to strengthen global governance. The priorities should be climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, Africa and maintaining an open global trading system. If Europe can use such a partnership to draw China towards multilateralism, the whole international system will tilt away from balance of power politics.”²²

Rethinking International Order

It is, thus, absolutely clear from above discussion that while the actual process of transforming the international system may not have begun yet, creative new ideas are certainly being expressed increasingly to lay down the conceptual basis for such transformation in order to accommodate the interests and aspirations of new state actors and non-state social and business forces. Such a transformed international order should surely be grounded in much fairer form of multilateralism, not the Western version of

multilateralism that has remained in vogue since the Second World War. For the latter's moral basis is significantly eroded by recent neo-conservative unilateralism of the United States, and its legitimacy is seriously questioned by the rise of Asian powers such as China with a corresponding shift in global power constellations.

Several other factors necessitate the reinvention of multilateralism, including "the increasing significance of private actors (multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations and other civil society actors), as well as the growing complexity of globalization, and which require a degree of political control beyond the nation state which is too much for the existing international organizations: the crises of the inclusive global governance arenas (such as the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, the Kyoto process) and the increasing significance of exclusive forms of global governance in clubs (trend towards bilateral trade agreements; alliances against the Kyoto process; upgrading of the G-7/8 instead of using the UN as the nucleus of global cooperation; the coalition of the willing in Iraq) are all indicators of the weaknesses of the established multilateral system."²³

The above discussion seems to prove the point I made in the beginning: that growing diffusion in international power and the consequent multiplication of world power centers in post-unilateral global environment would require significant reordering and reshaping of the existing international order. The global institutions that regulated international conduct in political, economic and security spheres since the Second World War have lost much of their relevance in an era of globalization and regionalism. The global challenges in fast emerging post-unilateral era include issues affecting the health of the planet, crises impacting the humanity at large, and conflicts of interests involving global trade and commerce. Global civil society and international public opinion today enjoy as much political currency in the international structure as great powers or superpowers traditionally did. The emergence of international terrorism and growth in global inequality are indeed a negative consequence of globalization, but the same broader global integrative process underway in recent decades has produced positive outcomes in the form of several regionalism and

regionalization networks. Never before has the world been so much in need of an enhanced level of international cooperation as at present.

Given that, a doctrine of international community in post-unilateral environment must entail consolidating and revamping the existing international institutions, primarily the United Nations, and creating a network of new institutions incorporating global trends towards regionalization and regionalism, and meeting visible aspirations of the global civil society for greater human rights, democracy, equality and justice. Multiplicity of actors at the international stage—be they traditional great powers such as the United States or China, or regional blocs such as the European Union or Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or a host of non-state actors, including multi-national organizations and non-governmental organizations—requires a truly multilateral framework for international decision-making aimed at securing global common goods, rather than realizing their respective self-interests. The essence of an extra-national system is the creation of integrating governance mechanisms that bring nations and social sectors together at a higher level of synthesis and interdependence in issue areas in which they have common concern but which none of them, acting alone, can solve. Yet by acting together, they all attain their self-interest.²⁴

We already have a network of international institutions, some of which like International Criminal Court (ICC) created recently. The problem is that they don't perform their functions properly. The expectation from the ICC that it will build upon the impressive performance of successive International War Crimes Tribunals at The Hague has been marred by its cumbersome decision making process, which may be an outcome of the fact that the very power that sponsored its creation in the 90s—namely, the United States under Clinton Administration—refused to join it under the Bush Administration. The latter's neo-conservative outlook also hugely damaged the international nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, as the United States signed a controversial nuclear deal with India. On the other hand, the performance of the International Atomic Energy Agency remained satisfactory, as it continued to pursue a

relatively independent posture on the Iranian nuclear issue despite tremendous US pressure. Likewise, UN peacekeeping operations in several regional conflict zones, especially of the fourth-generation sort undertaken in East Timor and Kosovo have been quite successful. Therefore, not all is bad in terms of the functional output of existing international bodies tasked with managing or resolving conflicts, providing security to the world, helping to alleviate poverty and developing the under-developed world. There are many areas in which their performance is less than satisfactory, which obviously requires reformation matching the requirements of a globalizing era. In the last two decades, civil society groups and representatives of business enterprises have seen an ever-greater participation in institutions of global governance and development, even though an all-inclusive participation may still be lacking in this respect.

The World Bank and the IMF are relics of the Bretten Woods system, which, as argued by several scholars in their recent works, has become irrelevant due to the emergence of new, powerful actors at the international stage. One option having an important symbolic value could be to change the nomenclature of these organizations, terming them as International Reconstruction Fund (IRF) and Emergency Relief Fund (ERF), and expanding and diversifying their membership and democratizing their decision-making by including representatives of the new regional powers, private businesses, civil society organizations, regional blocs and developing countries. The G-20 can be further expanded so that the world at large can sit together and manage global crises such as the current economic crunch collectively—creating a new structure of international monetary, trade and commerce rules and procedures so that the world should never experience the sort of “market fundamentalism,” to use George Soros’s words,²⁵ it did in recent decades and the path of capitalist growth is corrected for greater societal health and fairer global economic order.

The UN system as a whole and its core body, the Security Council, also needs to be reformed and democratized in accordance with the new global realities, a constant theme in the largely Western scholarly perspectives cited above. However,

accomplishing this gigantic but absolutely necessary task will be easier said than done, if all the bids for the purpose made under former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan are kept in view. China would love to have greater share in global decision-making, but it might continue to oppose Japan's permanent membership of the Security Council, which should have been given to Japan decades ago when it emerged as an economic power to reckon with. One option is to let regional blocs, instead of great powers, have veto power status in the Security Council. The problem is that most of the regional blocs, including the OIC and SAARC, have not matured enough to represent their respective regions. The EU, ASEAN and NAFTA may qualify for such status. But can we imagine the US accepting such a proposal in the case of NAFTA? Or, would France or Britain be prepared to surrender their right to veto for the sake of EU's permanent membership of the Security Council? Or, would China and Russia be ready to exchange their privileged global status with SCO? Let's consider the case of India. With right comes responsibility. India's rising economic power may qualify it for a permanent seat at the Security Council, but can be legally or morally justified in the presence of Kashmir conflict?

Given that, it is easy to talk about democratizing the UN system, but the issue gets quite difficult when we start talking about actually doing it. Similar dilemmas emanate from threat terrorism or counter-terrorism poses to state sovereignty and international law. Enhanced international cooperation to combat terrorism may erode the necessity of pre-emption, but then what to do when pairs of potentially hostile states such as India and Pakistan facing a security dilemma are unable to cooperate in collectively managing a common terrorist threat? In this respect, India attempted to mimic American preemption in Iraq at least in theory as recent as in the aftermath of November 2008 Mumbai attacks. President Barack Obama may have disbanded Guantanamo Bay, but the dilemma that terrorists, as neither soldiers nor criminals, pose to international law still continues. One option suggested by Mary Robinson is to treat them as international war criminals²⁶ and try them in the ICC is, however, worth-considering. In retrospect, the fact that international order needs to be reshaped, international institutions need to be reformed and multilateralism needs to be re-invented in response to

all the global shifts identified before, the real question is how. And this is the question that needs to be addressed now rather than later.

The principal problem arises when we actually go about reforming the existing international order, as great powers and emerging powers tend to pursue their respective interests for retaining or enhancing relative power at the world stage. Consequently, much of the talk about reforming the existing system does not go beyond rhetoric and the ground reality favors neo-realism. Since the international system is anarchic, states, great or small, will pursue their interests and will seek relative power. It is, therefore, difficult to avoid the obvious contradiction, also visible in this paper, a narrative suggesting reforming of an international system, in which traditional and emerging key state players still base their perceptions and policies on essentially neo-realistic principles. That anarchic reality of the world system is still important for the policy planners and decision makers of major world state actors, however, does not mean that academic scholarship on the subject should not be suggestive in its argumentation.

Even if the international reality is anarchic today, and this may be the case in the foreseeable future, there is no harm in building a case for systemic reformation, especially in the wake of the current shifts in global power politics and the rising significance of non-state actors. For in the absence of that the crises we face today will aggravate tomorrow. Such crises can only be addressed fully if the US and the developed world are willing to accommodate the aspirations of the under-developed world in newer, more effective global institutions, if the Chinese are willing to let Japan play a greater role, if India perceives Kashmiri settlement as an essential part of its quest for enhanced international status commensurate with its growing economic clout—so on and so forth. Likewise, the gap between what great powers rhetorically preach and actually practice in world affairs has to erode.

Conclusion

In sum, the international community is pluralistic in every respect, politically, economically, socially, cultural and religiously.

It is but natural, therefore, that institutions of global governance would have to reflect this pluralism. Democracy, free market economy and human rights are universal ideals, and the entire world must march to realize them. However, what we need to acknowledge is that the pace towards realizing such ideals can be different from nation to nation and culture to culture. And we have to simultaneously recognize that only by adhering to another universal principle of peaceful co-existence, one of the founding norms of the UN Charter, that nations of the world, however big or small they may be, can eventually get to this noble end together. No one civilization or power can self-assume the role of an international messiah, as American neo-conservatives did recently, to impose their version of international order on the rest of the world, thereby creating further disorder globally. The crises at hand, from terrorism to global warming, are truly transnational in character, so is the human quest for peace, freedom and prosperity. Addressing such crises and realizing such quest requires a pluralistic global governance model and fairer form of multilateralism, amid all the recent shifts in global politics.

Author

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SUSTAINABILITY OF PAX-AMERICANA IN THE LIGHT OF IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN EXPERIENCES

Dr. Nazir Hussain

As distinct from other peoples on this earth, most Americans do not recognize, or do not choose to recognize, that the United States dominates the world through its military power. Due to government secrecy, they are often ignorant of the fact that their government garrisons the globe. They do not realize that a vast network of American military bases on every continent but Antarctica actually constitutes a new form of empire.

Chalmers Johnson '*Sorrows of Empire*'

The post World War II era witnessed a gradual but substantive rise in the US political influence characterized by modern military inventions and the follow up military strategies and doctrines to maintain its “atomic monopoly” and to deter the conventional might of the Soviet Union with its nuclear capability. The role of being sole Super Power obsessed the US policy makers in devising strategies not only to contain the Soviets to minimum but to expand their area of influence to the maximum. The same US intentions were apprehended by the Soviets in their so-called Soviet text; “The political aims of American imperialists were and still are to enslave economically and politically the European and other capitalist countries and, after the latter are transformed into obedient tools, to unify them in various military-political blocs and groups directed against the socialist countries. The main aim of all this is to achieve world domination.”¹

President John F. Kennedy in response to this text categorically declined this policy version and declared in his address at the American University; Washington DC on 10th June 1963 “the peace that the United States sought was not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war. But the fact

that dominated Americans' mindset and became evident in the years afterwards that the US was conducting the policies to execute the strategy of "preventive wars" in an effort to secure their empire."

However, the American dream of global hegemony was built on the ashes of Kuwait crisis (1990-91) and the demise of the Soviet Union. The UNSCR 678 by invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter authorized the 28 State Coalition from six continents led by the US to invade Iraq. Subsequently, the US President announced the New World Order to mark the beginning of American global supremacy. The announcement was supplemented by the academic impulse in the shape of François Fukuyama's 'End of History', which predicted the 'triumph of western civilization' and Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' theory. The US presence in many parts of the world at the expense of Russian inward moves, the expansion of NATO, the US missile shield of MND and TMD, and building of regional hegemony; Israel and India made it the 'unrivaled global power.' The global hegemonic ambition was further boosted in the wake of 9/11 terrorist attacks, which once again authorized the US through UNSCR 1368 to enunciate the policy of 'we and us.' It gave license to kill, invade and attack any country in the name of terrorism and thus 'unilateralism' was born. A Global War on Terror (GWOT) was waged on Afghanistan against the non-state actors; Al-Qaeda and Taliban.

The US second Iraq invasion of 2003 was opposed by many important global players including the US European allies such as France and Germany besides China and Russia. The US moves for UN authorization was blocked and the 'coalition of the willing' was formed. However, the stiff resistance, human and material costs and international public opinion converted the coalition into 'coalition of the unwilling' and then 'coalition of the leaving.' The US suffered heavy casualties, the war costs became too much to bear; 'three trillion dollars,' which gave birth to global economic recession. The US withdrawal from Iraq and the humiliation in Afghanistan, where even after eight years the 'global war on terror' could not be won beyond Kabul, put severe limits on the American supremacy. Moreover, new regional alignments in the shape of South American alliance of Bolivia, Cuba and Venezuela, the rise of 'Shia crescent'

led by Iran in the Middle East and the Russian-Chinese strategic alliance through SCO, besides the Russian nostalgia of being the past empire, opposing the NATO expansion, asserting its influence in its immediate periphery and testing new military hardware, made the US policy-makers unnerved about its unchallenged global role. Therefore, the paper aims at analyzing these trends and indicates whether it is an end to the US global hegemony or the beginning of a 'new cold war' or the initiation of global multilateralism?

Conceptual Framework

The term Pax Americana is abstracted from the term Pax Romana of the Roman Empire. Pax Romana hinted at the period of peace in Rome. Whether the subjugated policies of US can be taken into the context of negative peace is debatable. The term is subjected to greater criticism since it is in vogue. The supporters think it to have a direct link with US foreign policy. The supporters of the concept were mostly neo conservatives, who took it in the realist paradigm of strengthening defense policies to protect state sovereignty and supreme national interests. This version gained importance in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks. On the contrary, critics characterized this version as the American Imperialism and over powering tendencies of the state policies. The later group of academics achieved more fame in lieu of current US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These endless wars have questioned US war planners since it is not the first and does not seem to be last episode of committing atrocities on other nations. The Vietnam defeat gave a jolt to this concept but the war in Afghanistan with the collapse of Soviet bloc revitalized its energies and motivated US spirits to again make use of the preventive wars.²

The term 'unilateralism' was coined by Frederick H. Hartman in 1951 and later developed as a conceptual tool to depict the *Patterns of Power*. Hartman defines it as a state, gradually; assume military ascendancy over all other states to promote its national security objectives, without the cooperation and participation of any other country or bloc of countries.³ Hartman's notion of unilateralism sounds paradoxical on ground realities of US pursuance of power politics in the international relations. Since the

Cold War era, there have been strong allies that acted as US policy tools not only to deter its security threats from and across the region but to enhance its maneuverability to get the valuable resources by establishing its military bases across the world. However, advocates of US unilateralism argue that other countries should not have "veto power" over matters of US national security.⁴ Whether the world remained under the bipolar system in the past or it is experiencing the multipolar system today, the true essence of unilateralism was and still prevails distinguishing US on military and strategic fronts.⁵

The Cold War Alliance

The Cold War era was of strategic realignment that destined the countries to take refuge in either of the two blocs. The alliance building was not the only visible characteristic of Cold War era vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, since it has been witnessed that after the collapse of bipolar system with the disintegration of USSR, alliance building remained at its place and strengthened itself on functional basis. Whether this coalition or alliance building was on consensus on political issues or based on Pax American influence loaming over the hearts and minds of other capitalist states is debatable. But the successive default US policies in the pursuance of Vietnam War, Iraq-Kuwait war, Afghan war 2001 and Iraq invasion 2003 and now the GWOT is entering into South Asian countries, clearly supports American hegemony in global politics. Upon the ending of the Cold War, the US had the option to strengthen the global institutions of governance and moving towards an "integrative world policy framework, especially in the global commons of security, economics, and human rights and democracy."⁶ But the preemptive measures in the face of imminent potential threats aggravated the international public opinion about the US policies.

The demise of the Soviet Union and the victory in the Kuwait Crisis provided the much awaited role to the US supremacy when on the ashes of the Kuwait Crisis President George Bush enunciated the New World Order;

Out of these troubled times, our objective a new world order can emerge? Today, that new world is



struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we have known. What is at stake is more than one small country, it is a big idea, a new world order... to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind... based on shared principles and the rule of law... The illumination of a thousand points of light... The winds of change are with us now?⁷

And almost exactly ten years later the dream came true when in the wake of 9/11 terrorists attacks the UNSC authorized the use of force against the terrorists and their harborers. The UNSCR 1368 of September 2001 ‘unequivocally condemned in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks which took place on 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington (DC) and Pennsylvania and regards such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security; And called on all states to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting or harboring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable.’

Taking advantage of global sentiments against terrorism President Bush announced his policy of ‘we and they’;

‘The search is under way for those who are behind these evil acts, have directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and to bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.’⁸

American Primacy

The new-found US global role prompted the American writers such as Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth to state that ‘if America’s current global predominance does not constitute unipolarity, then nothing ever will. And despite what many have argued, no serious attempts by others to balance the US

power are likely for the foreseeable future. The sources of American strength are so varied and so durable that the country now enjoys more freedom in its foreign policy choices than has any other power in modern history. But just because the US can bully others does not mean it should. If it wants to be loved as well as feared, the policy answers are not difficult to find.⁹ The following table shows that the military strength of other great powers is lagging behind the US. In today's era its strong defense posture of the states that guides their foreign policy stature.

Military Strength of Major Players

Country	Population	GDP	Def Bud	Total A/F	Reserves
China	1,322m	\$3.35tr	\$46.7b	2.105m	0.8 m
USA	301m	\$13.7tr	\$622 b	1.498m	1.082 m
India	1,129m	\$1.209b	\$28.5b	1.288m	1.155m
DPRK	23m	NA	NA	1.106m	4.7m
Russia	141m	\$2tr	\$32.99b	1.027m	20m

Source: Military Balance 2008, IISS

US Pre-emptive Strategy

With an unprecedented global support against the terrorism President Bush announced his National Security Strategy 2002;

It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first....to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.¹⁰

Henry Kissinger usually says that the "American strategic doctrine does not really talk about what is commonly defined as preemptive action", but deals with what is usually considered "preventive use of force: measures to forestall the emergence of a threat capable, at some point in the future, of being overwhelming."¹¹ It sounds like taking the matter other way round. According to this version the credibility of US sources of information have to be precise but history reveals that chances of error cannot be avoided on practical grounds. The US policy of executing war plan against Iraq is a classical example in this regard.

Bush's Pax-Americana

George Bush's unilateralist approach gave him smooth rise from the governorship of Texas to get twice elected as a President of the United States. The "black and white" approach to take decisions in international conflicts affected the US foreign policy.¹² The Bush administration's first National Security Strategy asserted American dominance as the lone superpower, a status no rival power will be allowed to challenge. And it provided a reason the world should accept this state of affairs: the expansion of peace and more freedom. A Pax Americana will be "in the service of a balance of power that favors freedom." It makes a case for preemptive response when there is evidence of an "imminent threat."¹³

President Bush devised new strategy in the aftermath of 9/11 stating that United States is willing to act alone and to act preemptively against any adversary who challenges America's military superiority. "The United States must and will maintain the capability to defeat any attempt by an enemy--whether a state or non-state actor--to impose its will on the United States, our allies, or our friends."¹⁴ Reading between the lines show that there is vague wording in this context that signifies that US has the ultimate power to throw the states to the stone ages if they tend to threaten US sovereignty and interests. But there is fear for the allies and friends of US since it will be protected for its massive military might but the bitter fruit of rivalry is likely to be eaten by relatively weaker states allying with US.¹⁵ This is precisely what is being witnessed in the 'Global war on Terror.'

Global War on Terror

Prof. Jules Dufour, asserts that ‘the 2000 Global Report published in 1980 had outlined "the State of the World" by focusing on so-called “level of threats" which might negatively influence or undermine the US interests. Twenty years later, the US strategists, in an attempt to justify their military interventions in different parts of the world, have conceptualized the greatest ‘fraud’ in US history, namely "the Global War on Terrorism" (GWOT). Major elements of the conquest and world domination strategy by the US refer to 1) Control of the world economy and its financial markets, 2) Taking over of all natural resources, and 3) Geopolitical Outreach: Network of Military Bases.’¹⁶ The 9/11 incident followed the New World Order characterized by securing American interests in the form of Pax Americana.¹⁷

World-wide US Presence

The world-wide US presence is manifested by their regional commands; EUROCOM (European Continent), CENTCOM (Middle East, South Asia and Central Asia) PACIFICOM (Australia and Pacific Ocean), NORTHCOM (Homeland and Canada), SOUTHCOM (Latin America) and AFRICOM. These commands not only control the respective regions and show the physical American presence but also take care of the US global/regional interests. The newly established AFRICOM was first announced in 2006 and became fully independent command in October 2008, with its headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. Gen. William Kip Ward is the Commander and Admiral Robert Moeller his deputy. The operational headquarters of this command would be established in Djibouti. The rationale for AFRICOM is ‘the threat of global terrorism and the risk posed by the weak states, ‘empty spaces’ and countries with large Muslim population as vulnerable territories where terrorists may find safe heavens and political support.’¹⁸ They have over 200 military/naval bases/facilities globally which can take care of any eventuality in the regional and global sphere.¹⁹

The NATO Expansion

After the Soviet achieving nuclear parity with the US, NATO as a security alliance emerged in April 1949, to deter the Soviets from approaching the Western Europe. Founding members of this alliance were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, UK, US. With the passage of time, there was increase in the membership of this alliance along with inclusion of other issues into its security agenda. The first membership enlargement turned out in 1952 with the addition of two countries Greece and Turkey; second enlargement added only Germany in 1955; third Enlargement took place in 1982 by involving Spain into the NATO alliance; fourth enlargement took place in 1999 with Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia; fifth enlargement in 2004 after the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions added Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia into it and in the recent sixth enlargement of NATO in 2009 added Albania, Croatia.²⁰ Some of the NATO expansions, especially the last few, were at the expense of the Russian interests as some of the former Soviet Republics joined the alliance. It is therefore, all but natural that the Russian Federation has objected to the inclusion of Ukraine and Georgia into the NATO alliance.²¹

Challenges to the US Dominance

However, the present US global dominance and unilateralism has been facing multiple challenges; Domestic economic recession, the Russian resurgence, Shanghai Coop Organization, Emergence of Anti-US South American Alliance and the Rise of Shia Crescent. These challenges may not altogether erode the US military might but would definitely limit its power to act alone.

The US Economic Recession

The US has suffered an economic loss of over \$7 trillion since 1970s and the current inflation has gone into double digits. First time since the World War II the unemployment is rising steadily. The dollar has lost 60% of its value against Euro and it is

losing its reserve currency role. Prices of oil and gold have risen to 400% and many of the banks and financial institutions have been bailed out by the Bush administration.²² In these circumstances the US is severely curtailed by the Congress and the US public opinion to commit further military proactivism in the world. The Afghan and Iraq wars may consume \$3 trillion in the longer run putting severe economic constraints on the dwindling domestic economy.

The Russian Resurgence

The global system is making a major shift now. The US war in Iraq and Afghanistan has absorbed American military resources dramatically. It is overstated to say that the United States lacks the capacity to intervene anywhere else in the world as a hegemon. Russia, as an emerging power in the existing unipolar world has the history of re-emergence for couple of times, for example the Czarist Russia and then the USSR. After the shift in the balance of power from bipolar to unipolar, the US as a unipolar power tried to increase its influence while letting its enemies not to get back in the world's politics as a power. So US, the European Union and NATO moved closer to Russia. After the event of 9/11, US legitimized its force and presence in the surrounding areas of Russia. But Russia's history compelled it to realize its importance as a new imperial power in the world and in Europe as well. Europe relies on much of its energy resources from Russia, which has used the energy supply as a foreign policy tool. After a deal for an anti-missile defense radar station was signed by Washington and Prague, a Russian company sharply reduced the flow of oil to the Czech Republic.²³

Russia's military modernization and its increasing military cooperation with China and the Central Asian states through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) shows the world that Russia today is a greater challenger to the US in the former Eastern Europe. Moreover, Russia and Venezuela have been strengthening their close relationship as emerging multipolar alliance against American global power. The two are scheduled to hold joint naval operations in the Caribbean. Venezuela has used much of its oil revenues to purchase Russian weapons in an effort to modernize the armed forces and strengthen its own ability to deter any possible

attack. Hugo Chávez has welcomed Russia's growing geopolitical presence as a counter-balance to US power. Russian invasion of a European republic, Georgia, its navy to Latin America for military exercises in America's backyard, and its threats to cut off energy supplies to Europe as a real threat to the US in Europe. The possible Russian military exercises with Venezuela suggest that Russia thinks it no longer needs the West and can act against neighbouring countries with minimal consequences.²⁴

The hopes that Bush administration had from its policies of pursuing the 9/11 consequences could not exercise the Pax Americana concept at the large scale. This was surely the triggering point for Russia to assert its influence on the world and this was done by invading resource rich part of Georgia. A *New York Times* columnist Paul Krugman argued that the Russian move on Georgia, in particular, signaled "the end of the Pax Americana, the era in which the United States more or less maintained a monopoly on the use of military force."²⁵

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

The increased prominence of the SCO has led policymakers and scholars to question if the organization might complicate the United States' ability to secure its interests in the region. Some experts believe that Russia and China want to use the SCO to curb US access to the region's vast energy supplies. Similarly, the SCO's call for the United States to withdraw its military forces from the region was seen as an explicit challenge to the US military presence in Central Asia. Lastly, SCO members are uneasy about certain US policies, particularly its support for democratic reforms.²⁶

The "color revolutions" in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, which unseated leaders loyal to the Kremlin, have also led Russia to view the US presence in post-Soviet states with suspicion, while Beijing sees US forces along its western border as part of Washington's strategy to contain China.²⁷ Therefore, both these states are moving closer against the possible encirclement by the US and to safeguard their respective sphere of influence in the region.

South American Anti-US Bloc (A Triangle of Cuba, Bolivia and Venezuela)

An immediate and much more potential challenge to the US is emerging in its backyard. With decades old anti-Cuban stance the US Latin American policy has earned many foes than friends. The joining together of Bolivia and Cuba with Venezuela and active outside backing by China and Russia could pose a severe challenge to the US hegemony in the region. Highlighting the island's economic integration with other Latin American nations, on April 29, 2006, Bolivia joined Cuba and Venezuela in signing Chavez's Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America (ALBA) trade agreement. ALBA, a proposed alternative to the controversial US sponsored Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), presents a socialist vision for regional commercial cooperation. The socialist-based agreements are increasingly popular in the region, and on July 18, ALBA's future initiatives were discussed among 100 representatives of Latin American groups during Argentina's Peoples Summit, which hoped to configure possible solutions to neoliberalism-induced distortions in regional societies.²⁸

The Rise of Shia Crescent

By toppling Saddam Hussein, the Bush administration has liberated and empowered Iraq's Shiite majority and has helped launch a broad Shiite revival that will upset the sectarian balance in Iraq and the Middle East for years to come.²⁹ That notion is of hegemonic Iran that is attempting to dominate the region through an array of Shiite proxies. It is believed to stretch from Beirut via Hezbollah, Gaza to Baghdad and finally from Iran to Saudi Arabia to Yemen.³⁰ Israeli President Shimon Peres anxiously stated that 'it would be catastrophic for the region if Iran succeeds in using Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah to expand its influence and establish 'Shia hegemony.'³¹ The same was echoed by Shaul Mofaz, the Israeli Defence Minister in 2008 when he stated that 'Any return of the Golan Heights to Syria would result in an 'Iranian foothold' on Israel's border and would thus not only be politically naïve but irrational.'³²

The US despite of its serious threats to Iran to roll back from its Uranium Enrichment could not harm it. The deterrence posed by Iran as the hub of Shia domination is great in the face of the US regional presence. General Yahya Rahim Safavi, the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards said that “the Americans know better than anyone that their troops in the region and in Iraq are vulnerable. I would advise them not to commit such a strategic error,”³³ also the series of default strategies pursued in the wake of 9/11 could not motivate the US Congress to approve another strategic blunder in Iran.

Limits of Power: Afghanistan and Iraq Case Studies

During the last 8 years the GWOT is far from over, ISAF/NATO has no control out of Kabul. The GWOT is breeding more terrorism, human and material casualties are soaring and the ‘Do More’ policy for Pakistan has made it a scapegoat. President Obama has decided to continue with the Bush policy of more forces to be stationed, and the Af-Pak is coined to put Pakistan under pressure. The success rate of war in Afghanistan and Iraq can be judged from the casualty rate and the objectives achieved during these wars.

As of July 13, 2009, the US Department of Defense has reported 729 US soldiers killed and 3162 wounded in the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.³⁴ The CNN reports total coalition deaths at 1227. On the other hand 4576 Afghan National Army Personnel have been killed and about 10,960 civilians have been wounded.³⁵

Iraqi Invasion of 2003

The UNSCR of November 8, 2002 to invade Iraq was not approved. The US was compelled to create a ‘Coalition of the Willing’, which later became the ‘Coalition of the un-willing’ and then the ‘Coalition of Leaving.’ As of July 2009 the US has suffered 4326 casualties and another 31,430 have been wounded.³⁶ On the other hand about 1.2 million Iraqi civilians have been killed and about 4 million displaced.³⁷

According to a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report published in October 2007, the financial costs of the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan could cost taxpayers a total of \$2.4 trillion by 2017 when counting the huge interest costs because combat is being financed with borrowed money. The CBO estimated that of the \$2.4 trillion long-term price tag for the war, about \$1.9 trillion of that would be spent on Iraq. Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist of the World Bank and winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, has stated the total costs of the Iraq War on the US economy will be three trillion dollars in a moderate scenario, and possibly more in the most recent published study, in March 2008.³⁸

Iraq War and US Public Opinion

President Bush admitted that he was misled by the intelligence agencies on Iraq. On the other hand the US soldiers have refused to serve in an 'illegal' Iraq war, the US public opinion is bitterly opposed to the Iraq war; 'we cannot give our children's blood for securing Iraqi oil.' Some 300,000 of the 1.6 million US soldiers who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan suffer from the psychological traumas of post traumatic stress disorder, depression or both.³⁹

The US rationale behind waging such bloodshed against Iraqi civilians and US soldiers themselves was not convincing to change the world opinion, based on US covert intentions to get the access to oil. The torture and atrocities inflicted by US in Abu Gharib and Guantanamo bay is still an untold tale. The world wide protests for abusing humanitarian rights have aggravated anti-US sentiments around the globe. The new US administration pledged to close these torture centers but still these policies remain declaratory. Under these circumstances it seems difficult for US to maintain the illusion of the "benevolent imperialism of Pax Americana."

Lessons from Iraq War

John Keegan, a well known military historian has summed up the Iraqi experience; 'Iraq gives an awful warning about the dangers of Western interference in the affairs of a Third World

country. The Iraqis had rebelled against foreign rule before, and it should have come as no surprise that they rebelled again. Do not be too quick to use military force. You may regret the consequences.⁴⁰ Whereas Paul Craig, assistant secretary of treasury in the Reagan administration states that 'Republicans have us at war in two countries as a result of lies and deceptions... We have alienated the entire Muslim World and most of the rest.'⁴¹

In this context the US decided to withdraw its forces from Iraq. President Bush and Premier Maliki signed the US-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement. The agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq and the organization of their activities during their temporary presence in Iraq is a status of force agreement (SOFA) approved by the Iraqi government in late 2008 between Iraq and the United States. By this agreement the US combat forces will withdraw from Iraqi cities by June 30, 2009, and all US forces will be completely out of Iraq by December 31, 2011. Later, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced in Baghdad that UK forces will be leaving Iraq by July 2009. Brown was in Iraq on December 17, 2008 to meet with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a day after the Iraqi government drafted a law paving the way for the troop withdrawal next year and six years after Britain joined in the US-led invasion. Brown and al-Maliki said in a joint statement that "The role played by the UK combat forces is drawing to a close. These forces will have completed their tasks in the first half of 2009 and will then leave Iraq."⁴²

Future of Global Power Balance

Analyzing the US global role and the challenges it faced what lies ahead in the global balance of power. Robert Jervis, a well known American sociologist believes that 'the common sense and most academic thinking would argue that a hegemon's prime objective should seek to maintain the prevailing international system but that is not the world in which we live today. Measured in any conceivable way, the United States has a greater share of world power than any other country in history. Whether it is referred to as the world leader by those who approve of its policies or an empire

by those who oppose them, it is a hegemon in today's unipolar world.⁴³ Whereas for some like Subhash Kapila states that 'Russia under the leadership of Vladimir Putin has set the country on a course of strategic and military resurgence. This was facilitated by rising Russian oil revenues. The Global Power Balance 2020 would be bipolar in nature, multipolar in a political and strategic myth, but the United States would have strategic edge over Russia in a bipolar world and a New Cold War is inevitable due to competitive strategic rivalry between USA and Russia.'⁴⁴ However, for Niall Ferguson 'Each of the potential hegemons of the 21st century, the United States, Europe and China, contains within them the seeds of decline, and Islam lacks the resources of a superpower. Critics of US global dominance should pause and consider the alternative. If the United States retreats from its hegemonic role, who would supplant it? Not Europe, not China, not the Muslim World, and certainly not the United Nations. Unfortunately, the alternative to a single superpower is not multilateral utopia, but the anarchic nightmare of a new Dark Age.'⁴⁵

Conclusion

Believing in the dictum that "in politics change is constant" the US has to revise its foreign policy keeping in view the broader agenda in order to restore its Pax Americana influence over the entire world, which now seems dwindling. As Harry Magdoff and Paul Sweezy state that "the United States, it seems, has locked itself into a course with the gravest implications for the whole world. Change is the only certain law of the universe. It cannot be stopped. If societies are prevented from trying to solve their problems in their own ways, they will certainly not solve them in ways dictated by others. And if they cannot move forward, they will inevitably move backward."⁴⁶

The US policy of dealing with Iraq and Afghanistan wars showed radical approach to solve supposed problems. These conflictual situations were not the first that confronted US and it pursued similar war plan and with almost similar defeated results. Though apparently US pursued the strategies of rescuing US citizens from its enemies by using preemptive strikes against other nations.

This has made US security more vulnerable as the chances for preemptive reaction (now from the non state actors) are greater. This will surely hamper America's political, economic and moral slump, leading to the decline of Pax Americana.

Moreover, if the US wants to maintain its global leadership role it has to build global and regional partnerships to strengthen its position. These partnerships would not only be built with its traditional and new allies but also with potential foes and adversaries. President Obama's slogan of 'Change' has to be both at the domestic and foreign spheres for a peaceful and prosperous global order. The choice lies with the US leadership; would they like to move for a multipolar world or initiate a new Cold War. But only a leadership with responsibility and vision would lead the world affairs.

Author

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FROM UNIPOLARITY TO MULTIPOLARITY: CHARTING A STRATEGY FOR PAKISTAN

Dr. Shireen M. Mazari

The bipolar system premised on permanent opposing blocs was the unique feature of the post-WWII international system. The system was reflected in the notion of the Cold War where the nuclear deterrence ensured that the main rivals never fought a direct military conflict with each other. So the system was dominated by a range of conflictual relationships from economic warfare to psychological war to proxy wars – all intended to avoid a direct military confrontation between the two main protagonists. The destructive quality of nuclear weapons shifted the focus to their political use – and deterrence reformulated the traditional notion of defence. So politics really became a continuation of war by other means – thereby standing the Clausewitzian dictum on its head. The system was a bipolar system with two clear poles rather than a multipolar system with a number of poles of power and influence.

Post the disintegration of the Soviet Union two major developments have taken place:

One – there is no balance at the systemic level anymore Two – the sole super power has shifted from being a status quo power to a unipolar imperial power – in Morgenthau's definitional framework of types of states. A status quo power being one which aims at keeping its power level and shows no interest in changing the distribution of power; an imperialist power aims at acquiring more power.

So the present world order shows no balance anymore and there is a dialectic that is operational right now in the system between unipolarity and a slowly emerging rather weak challenge of multipolarity. In fact, the US continues to see itself as a unipolar power that needs to establish global strategic structures attuned to its policy goals – and there is little room for hostile states in this new design.

The nature of this unipolarity is premised upon the following:

- **A Preemptive doctrine with a global reach.** In order to understand the implications of this doctrine, which underlies the US design for a new global order, we need to look at the three dimensions that broadly comprise the operational sphere of the doctrine – political, economic and military. A common principle underlines all these three dimensions – that of preemptive interventionism.

The political dimension includes regime change and restructuring of states. In other words, the internal dynamics of states are the concern of the US and its allies – that is, the US now feels it has the power and influence to shape the world, including the internal dynamics of states. Muslim states are particular targets of this, under the guise of spreading democracy – (‘guise’ because where democracy brings up results unfavourable to the US or its allies, then these results are not accepted) – and, as is now becoming more overt, Pakistan is a specific target, in terms of restructuring, of this new preemptive doctrine.

As for the economic dimension, the US has demonstrated clearly that it will use economic means to further its security agenda. Included here are both positive and coercive tactics. These range from the promotion of economic growth and economic freedom to the traditional use of aid and international institutions like the World Bank and the IMF to impact on the economic well-being of states to the new concept of freezing of assets of states and groups found threatening to the security of the US. And all this is encompassed within an overall policy of seeking control of strategic resources like energy.

The military dimension of unipolarity is premised on the US argument, given clearly in its National Security Strategy paper of 2002, that international law recognizes the legitimacy of preemptive strikes and that the US has for a long time “*maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security.*” It refers to the need to take “*anticipatory action to defend*

ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively." This doctrine implies an open-ended framework for preemptive military action and the extensive reach of this doctrine is clear when, in the context of weapons of mass destruction, the US has declared its intent of taking "proactive counter proliferation efforts": "*We must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed.*"

- **Containment.** The US sees it as a necessary goal of sustaining its unipolarity of power to contain the threat of rising powers – primarily China – and states that are suspect in the eyes of the US, primarily Muslim states. Here again, a nuclear Pakistan comes under particular US attention.

The principles of geopolitics have been revived in a new policy of Containment - where it creates security linkages under multiple alliance-forms, cooperative structures and treaties.

- **End of deterrence at the global level.** Deterrence had been premised on mutual vulnerability and an acceptance that nuclear weapons had no military value *per se* in terms of war fighting. But now the US is committed to the development and deployment of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). BMD comprises two components – NMD and TMD. (*While the NMD is a fixed, land-based, non-nuclear missile defence system with a space-based detection system – the envisaged TMD focuses on rapid deployment and with an element of high manoeuvrability.*) With the US now adamant on deploying its BMD system, it is also signing agreements with states like India and Japan to help them develop their missile defence systems which are being seen as TMD systems for the US.

Thus, the notion of deterrence, which was the mainstay of strategic stability within the bipolar world, has been sidelined on the grounds that deterrence was effective only against a "risk-averse

adversary” – which is no longer the case in the context of terrorists and failing and rogue states.

In this context, for the first time the US is seeking to establish the military viability of nuclear weapons – as well as declaring a first use nuclear policy against non-nuclear states that are seen as threats to the US and may possess other WMD. So, with deterrence having been relegated to backstage, the strategic stability established over decades has been undermined.

All these trends of course were already developing post-bipolarity, but 9/11 allowed greater opportunity for these trends to take hold. However, as US power is being stretched to test its limits, one is seeing a dialectic between the US and its allies supporting unilateralism - and the rest of the international community which is trying to reassert the primacy of multilateralism. In many ways the focus is centred on the UN and the challenges to it through the new notion being favoured by the unilateralists – the notion of “coalitions of the willing”.

UN reform is a part of the struggle between differing approaches towards the building of a new international consensus just as the growing penchant for the US and its allies to act outside of the UNSC framework through coalitions of the willing.

How is the notion of coalitions of the willing being operationalised beyond the purely military? Through agreements like the PSI, ITER, etc. This latter framework does have some organisational underpinnings – especially NATO. While the UN Charter sees a subsidiary role for collective defence organisations like NATO, the US wants to push NATO as an alternative to the UNSC collective security system – and a major move in this direction has been the presence of NATO in Afghanistan.

So, to build up a picture of the new global environment and the world order being created therein:

- There is emerging a new international framework devised by the sole superpower which is premised upon a

system of core states, which will then ally with semi-core states and so on. This will see new strategic alliance systems, while old ones like NATO will be expanded. The politico-military reflection of the core states alliance will be on coalitions of the willing, prepared to act outside of the framework of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Central to this development of core states, is the post-9/11 US National Security Strategy, first brought out in 2002 and later updated. Clearly the core states include Britain, India, Israel, Japan and Australia and states like Poland in the “New Europe” of Bush. The strategic criticality of India had not only been stressed in the 2006 updated Security Strategy Paper of the US, which declared that: *“India is now poised to shoulder global obligations in cooperation with the United States in a way befitting a major power.”* This perspective is also reflected in the 123 Indo-US nuclear agreements and the manner in which the US has pushed it through the IAEA and NSG. The latest regional reflection of this is the US effort to bring in the Indian military into Afghanistan and the push to force Pakistan into giving India land trade access through Wagah.

- Also, new strategic notions are being pushed forward that challenge traditional security notions. e.g. the rejection of deterrence & the efforts to rationalise military use of nuclear weapons; notions of preemption and regime change; the democracy agenda.

In this context, we are seeing the nuclear nonproliferation global agenda also being altered with only the nuclear programmes of some states now being a matter of concern for the coalitions of the willing, while other states’ nuclear programmes, like those of Israel and India, are being accepted as kosher despite the nonproliferation regime.

However, there is also an interesting pull coming in against unipolarity that is now becoming more evident. While the sole super power has shown its willingness to resort to military power and

other non-violent punitive measures to deal with states not falling in line with its agenda, this excessive use of a non-accommodative approach is resulting in also showing the limitations of such an approach. The Iran nuclear issue has shown these limitations with the US now realizing that its own allies may not be prepared to opt for punitive measures against Iran for their own interests. Some Latin American states are also challenging the psyche of the Monroe Doctrine for that region.

So, there is going to be room for manoeuvre for smaller states. But this would require the smaller states to develop an ability to sustain their position over a period of time by knowing their strengths and weaknesses in unambiguous terms.

Perhaps the greatest challenge to US unipolarity is going to come from Russia, which has seen its position in its own neighbourhood erode especially post-9/11 with US intrusions into the CAS and the so-called coloured revolutions in the old Soviet territories of Ukraine etc. A more assertive Russia is now seeking to regain lost ground and one reflection of this was the 2008 Russian move into Ossetia, challenging a West-leaning Georgia. It was ironic to hear the US leadership refer to the UN norms and declare that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations must be rigorously honoured – given how the US is doing exactly the opposite in Iraq and Pakistan! Also, having undermined the UN itself, it is interesting to note that now the US needed to fall back on that organization to try and show the Russian action in Ossetia as having no legitimacy! Yet, when Russia called an emergency session of the UNSC, no consensus could occur because the US, UK and its allies rejected a phrase that called on both sides “to renounce the use of force”. Equally ironic is how the US wants Stalin’s directives to be respected vis a vis South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both regions having enjoyed autonomy till the collapse of the SU.¹

Crucial issues between the US and Russia include, one, energy and the control of pipelines to Azerbaijan and Central Asia.²

The second factor is NATO’s eastward expansion – thereby directly threatening Russian security. It is in this context that the Five-point Medvedev Doctrine was significant since it stated that:

One, Russia recognised the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law for interstate relations. Second, the world should be multipolar as a single-pole world is unacceptable (clear rejection of US primacy) and domination will not be allowed. A unipolar world is unstable and conflict ridden. Third, Russia is not seeking a confrontation with any other country and has no intention of isolating itself. Fourth, protecting the lives and dignity of Russian citizens wherever they may be is an unquestionable priority for the country (sounds similar to US preemptive doctrine though not as all-encompassing). Russia's foreign policy will be based on this need and Russia will also protect the interests of its business community abroad. Medvedev also stated that it should be clear to all that Russia will respond to any aggressive acts committed against it. Fifth, as with other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests – these regions are home to countries with which Russia shares special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbours.

Medvedev concluded by stating that: “As for the future, it depends not only on us but also on our friends and partners in the international community. They have a choice”.

Thus, presently, the global environment is in a state of flux and the emerging picture is far from clear. Russia has realized that the US is stretched and off-balance especially in the Muslim World. In the Greater Middle East idea (and Pakistan is now seen as part of the ME!) the US is attempting to restructure the entire region, but it may not get the restructuring it seeks. Amid the new US strategic designs which in West Asia rely heavily on Russian cooperation or at least Russian restraint, there is now a Russian challenge in its traditional area of influence – especially in Central Asia and Iran – also extending to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

As for the war on terror, it also seems to be in a state of flux – it began with a war against terrorism and then degenerated into the invasion of Iraq and then reaching a new low point within the context of “collective responsibility” being exercised by Israel supported by the Bush-Blair combine to kill innocent Arabs in Lebanon – and even in definitional terms the US had altered the

paradigm of the war against terror to a war against “Islamic fascists”.³

In the context of South Asian region itself – its strategic dynamics began altering when the US began evolving its strategic partnership with India. But with the presence of Extra Regional Forces (ERFs) and with the inclusion of Afghanistan into South Asia through SAARC, is there a clearly demarcated South Asian entity now in strategic terms - especially given missile ranges in the region and the external players?

In any event, what we traditionally refer to as South Asia is at the crossroads of the new global architecture, where the focus on the ME merges and shifts towards a focus on China. Also, with the new centrality of the energy issue, South Asia has the potential to be the hub of new energy corridors. Perhaps most critical for Pakistan has been the emergence of a strong Indo-US strategic partnership with a vital military component including nuclear.

Charting a strategy for Pakistan

Given the altered regional dynamics and global structural fluidity with unipolarity still dominating but multipolarity beginning to resurface, Pakistan has to ensure that it cannot only sustain but increase its relevancy regionally and globally – as well as in the context of its bilateral relations. There are also two types of multipolarity that are going to confront each other: One is the UN-based multipolarity with consensus norms and principles for governing international relations; and the other is the US-sponsored multipolarity premised on coalitions of the willing which challenges all existing international norms. For Pakistan the former alternative holds greater possibilities since the latter is untenable given its underlying premise of India as a core state.

So what is required is a new strategy that extricates Pakistan from its present debilitating “alliance” with the US which has increased the threat dynamics for Pakistan. More than ever before there is a need to formulate a home-grown foreign and security policy which focuses not only on internal cohesion but also on an

external policy that is in synch with internal dynamics and allows a broader vision of the world – beyond merely a US-centric approach.

One thing should be clear to our decision makers – a strategic partnership with the US is neither a possibility nor is it desirable in the long run given our divergent world views – especially in terms of China, India and the Muslim World. But we can have issue specific cooperation – and that should be the focus in our interaction with the US – with clear quid pro quos and greater transparency.

In fact, given the present problem of terrorism, Pakistan is increasingly facing a two-pronged terrorist threat – one from within emanating from the militants/extremists from among its own people, and two, from state terrorism At the hands of the US, both psychological in terms of verbal threats and physical in terms of drone attacks.

Both threats have to be dealt with in differing ways. With the US, it is more straightforward – create space between us and the US in the context of the so-called war on terror now renamed by Obama as the war against Al-Qaeda. Can we extricate ourselves from the US grip, given the economic and other aid issues? Yes, because it will be too costly for this country if we do not, although the US has, as in the fifties and sixties, made strong inroads into the elite segments of our society – especially in the bureaucratic structures (civil and military; serving and retired) as well as the political elites who continue to pose the “either-or” alternative. But the fact of the matter is that we still have some space to renegotiate our relationship with the US, rather than continuing to give them more access internally. For instance, on the drone issue, simply close the drone base at Bandari, 87 kilometres south of Kharan in Balochistan. Stop NATO logistics supplies as this is a source of great instability and violence within Pakistan. As for military assistance, we have done quite well without it at the strategic level and our nuclear deterrence with all its components is totally independent of the US. Let us not forget the costs of acquiring US weapon systems even at the tactical level – especially in terms of supplies of spares.

But the issue of the US goes far beyond, because it undermines our ability fight our own war with extremists at home. The US has successfully shifted the centre of gravity of the war against Al Qaeda to Pakistan and has pushed our leaders into a situation where violence, polarisation and now the massive movement of IDPs has destroyed the social fabric in this country.

We need to be aware of the US eventual aim for Pakistan: To undermine the state – either balkanize it or make it totally dependent upon Indian hegemony (see the recent MoU on trade signed under Washington’s tutelage) but in any event, take control of the nuclear assets. The US knows only too well that as long as the military is strong and cohesive the latter cannot happen – so its tactical aim is to undermine the military from within. That is why the hasty push into military action in Swat and FATA – with all the ensuing instability. There is every danger of civil-military conflict despite the early support of the military action from the major part of civil society.

Perhaps the most positive impact of distancing ourselves from the US will be that it will immediately alter the operational environment favourably for the Pakistani state to fight its internal challenges.

These internal challenges need to be fought on multiple fronts – and with the active involvement of civil society especially our private business sector. With the issue of our own homegrown terrorism that has become more lethal post-9/11, we have to have an overarching political policy within which there is a strong military-law enforcement element. But dialogue and economic/political incentives have to go alongside military action – people have to have a stake in the system and have to feel they are not only protected by the state but also have a better life within the state structures. In other words, the people have to be safely isolated from the militants. It is the failure of the state over the years to be responsive to the people, which has created the space for the militants and continues to do so.

Also, the state has to recognize the external actors lending support to the militants to keep Pakistan destabilized – the Indo-US connection in FATA and Balochistan (why is US-occupied Kabul allowing militant Baloch organizations to have their offices there?). A major question is what sort of linkage is there between the Pakistani Taliban and the US as some newspaper analyses have hinted? Is this why the ISI and CIA have fallen out? Pakistan will have to revisit its strategic assumptions made in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 which have impacted our security negatively.

Beyond the bilateral relationship with the US, we need to bolster our regional relationships – especially with neighbours like China and Iran. The strategic partnership with China has to be given central focus – at present our relationship with China has been neglected and made secondary to the US relationship and this has to be rectified. With Iran, there is always a reluctance and suspicion of Iran but the fact is that it is a neighbour with whom we share a common history and religio-cultural links. With the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, we should have been able to rework the relationship but the US has been a negative factor here also especially with our allowing it to destabilize Iran from Balochistan through the terrorist group Jundullah. The irony is that while our relations with Iran and the US continue to deteriorate unless we redirect ourselves, the US-Iran relationship will improve and we will be isolated on that front also.

I feel we need to adopt a more proactive external strategy that moves in the direction of multipolarity. For instance, why not a community of power framework with neighbouring Muslim states where there is no conflict, there are common ties and interests and an underlying military and economic capability.

Looking beyond the war on terror, Pakistan should be focusing on an indirect approach to globally increasing our relevancy. This can be done by pushing for a more vital OIC and adopting a more proactive role in multilateral UN-based international forums, such as the CD in Geneva.

In fact, we have a vital stake in the way AC&D norms are charted for the future. Not only do we need to ensure that the altering nonproliferation regime is made nondiscriminatory, we need to protect our vital interests in the CD on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). We have to resist the US attempts to push through their draft of the FMCT which will place Pakistan at a permanent imbalance vis a vis nuclear deterrence against India (we lost a golden opportunity in 2008 in the IAEA and NSG forums on the issue of the Indo-US nuclear deal)

There are opportunities in the present fluidity of the international system but if our leadership continues to reduce us to an international beggar we will continue to lose our ability to chart our own future. So most critically we need to put our begging bowl aside and overcome our psychological confidence deficit that has cast its shadow over us post-9/11.

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Notes

¹ In 1990 Georgia's ultranationalist leader abolished the autonomous regions and invaded South Ossetia – bitter war followed with 1000 dead. A Russian force supervised an uneasy truce but in August this year, Georgian president Saakashvili ordered his forces to invade and when Russian peacekeeping base was also pounded, Russia responded. But for the US and its allies what was important was that Georgia was its faithful ally –

Despite bad propaganda, the *Financial Times* helped the Russian case by revealing that the Pentagon had provided combat training to Georgian special forces just before the Georgian attack on August 7 – and perhaps had actually orchestrated the war in the Georgian enclave.

² – The Clinton govt had selected Georgia as an energy corridor to bypass Russia and Iran – that is why Georgia was also given large military assets.

³ This was interesting because fascist, according to the dictionary definition, refers to: “anyone with extreme right wing, nationalistic, etc. views or methods” – and fascism is linked to extreme nationalism, militarism, restrictions on individual freedom, anti-communism”, etc. Of course, religion was not linked to fascism although the role of the Christian Church in Italy and Germany under Mussolini and Hitler was questionable, at the very least. But now Bush has referred to the fight against “Islamic fascists” as opposed to a global war on terror regardless of the religion of the terrorists. Of course, in terms of definitions, Bush could be described as a born-again fascist and Israel is definitely reflecting Zionist fascism – so is the war on terror descending into a war amongst differing brands of fascism?

WORLD ORDERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

Dr. Tahir Amin

Introduction

This paper focuses on three questions: What are the major theoretical debates in International Relations theory in the post-cold war era? (2) How do we define a world order and what different world orders exist in the contemporary world? (3) What are the implications of our theory for Pakistan?

The major arguments of this paper are the following: (a) The notion of a single world order usually dominates both in the discourse of IR theories as well the practice of world politics. Both the scholars and the practitioners of the diplomacy conveniently overlook the fact that the western liberal world order, though dominant at the moment, is only one of the world orders which exists in contemporary multi-cultural, multi-religious and plural world. There exist multiple world orders which are operating at the global scale and they deeply influence both the theory and the practice of international politics.¹ Besides liberal world order, there also exist Sinic, Russian -Slavic, Indic and Islamic orders, to name a few among many other world orders which overlap, interpenetrate and co-exist simultaneously.(b) Pakistan finds itself sandwiched among the conflicting pulls of these competing world orders. If the decision-makers do not show sensitivity to these world orders, there will be grave consequences for Pakistan's integrity and continuing survival. What Pakistan needs is a vision and an appropriate strategy to get out of its dilemmas. The challenge for Pakistan is to produce a viable Islamic democratic model in congruence with the norms of global society.

Major Theoretical Debates

What is the nature of the post-cold war International system? Five paradigms dominated the discourse of IR in the post-cold war

era: “End of History”, “Clash of Civilizations”, “Multipolarity”, “Complex interdependence” and “Coming Anarchy”. Francis Fukuyama termed the post-Cold war era as the “End of History”, thereby meaning that the West had won the cold war and the liberal capitalism had achieved an unabashed victory over other ideologies². He claimed that the world had no other alternative than to pursue the ideals of liberal democracy in political sphere and the principles of market economy in the economic sphere. Huntington, on the other hand, believed that there were many alternatives as the religious and cultural identities were being revived in the post-cold war era. In his view, future world order would be characterized by the clash of civilizations rather than a global society.³ Fault lines among civilizations, in his opinion, will be the battle lines of the future. John Mearshiemer believed that we were in a state of transition i.e. from unipolarity to multipolarity and the West should selectively encourage nuclear proliferation to maintain their hegemony.⁴ Joseph Nye argued that we were heading towards complex interdependence and soft power was more important than hard power.⁵ A network of global regimes must be reconstructed by the United States and the western countries to maintain their hegemony. Robert D. Kaplan emphasized the role of environmental factors and the consequent coming anarchy in the world.⁶ He thought that the world was moving towards chaos and anarchy as a consequence of mismanagement of environment.

The above five paradigms greatly influenced the global debate about the post- cold war world order. However, all of these paradigms, despite their different assumptions about the world order share certain common features. They are articulated by the American writers who are trying to comprehend the changes in the world order. They are essentially realists who are preoccupied with the maintenance of status quo. They wish to preserve the hegemony of the West, and their explicit goal is to maintain the balance of power in the short run and to establish an institutionalized hegemony in the long run. Furthermore despite their emphasis on cultures and religions, they lack sensitivity and sophistication in the assessment of other cultures. An interpretative understanding of others values is lacking in their work.

What Different World Orders Exist?

We take world orders to be geographically –linked socio-historical entities, identifiable on the basis of patterned regularities discernable among international or world actors, involving their conscious and unconscious relationships with each other and / or with their social and natural environments.⁷ The concept of world order is more inclusive than that of “international order”, our acting units need not be nations/states. Indeed, ethnies, nations, firms, parties, interest groups, class, or status groups, armies, churches, communities, states and empires can be units of a world order. World order boundaries do not have to be absolute and mutually exclusive, so we expect to find overlapping, and even interpenetrating orders and smaller possibly regional orders within more encompassing, truly global world orders. World orders are typically multi-dimensional, normative, and cosmological.

It is necessary to understand these multiple world orders hermeneutically because they represent distinctive world views with both compatible as well as incompatible values. The biggest challenge, in my view, which this world faces, is whether we shall move towards the much predicted “Clash of Civilizations” or a global society based on shared values among these contending world orders. Looking at the four major events of contemporary international politics, Indo-US nuclear deal, founding of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Danish Cartoon Controversy and Kyoto Protocols, we analyze the nature of these contending world orders and their complex interactions.

Four Puzzles

The Indo-US nuclear deal (2007), founding of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001, Danish Cartoon Controversy (2005-2006), and Kyoto Protocols (1997) are the four major events of recent international politics which fall within four major domains of IR theory, international political security, international political economy, international political community and International political ecology respectively. Choice of these events is arbitrary but they present interesting puzzles to a student of

IR, which reveal both the contending world orders and their complex interactions.

Indo-US nuclear Deal

The first puzzle is about the Indo-US nuclear deal which was signed between India and the United States in March 2006 and took the world by surprise⁸. Pakistan has been a close ally of the United States through out its history, a principal partner in the war against terrorism and has a vital role in stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. India, on the other hand, has been a non-aligned country thorough out its history, has not been a front line state in the war against terrorism and has its own ambitions of becoming a global power. The United States not only announced a broad-based strategic partnership aimed at bolstering India's strategic and military capabilities, but also offered close cooperation in nuclear technology and space as well. The nuclear deal signed between India and the United States has enormous global and regional implications. It will help India become a major power in the 21st century, thus facilitating an early rise of a multi-polar world and will undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime at global level.⁹ It will not only weaken the US and European countries's stance against the Iranian nuclear programme but will also give a green signal to other would be powers to aspire for the nuclear capabilities.¹⁰ At the regional level, it will destabilize South Asia by triggering another nuclear and missile race with Pakistan. The India-Pakistan peace-process will be put on hold and the possibility of resolving Kashmir dispute between the two countries will fade away.

A variety of explanations have been offered to understand the motivations of the two states regarding this deal. The most widely held explanation focuses on India's role as a potential counterweight against China in an emerging multi-polar world. Other explanations stress the necessity of building an axis of democratic states-US, EU, Japan and India against the axis of autocracies- Russia, China and Iran. Some scholars believe that the US, though preeminent power at the moment has been in a relative decline and the deal signifies a shift in the international political

security environment. We believe that most of the above explanations contain a significant element of truth but are partial in nature. To a student of world orders, it appears to be a rapprochement between two world orders, Indic and Liberal world orders. The two world orders have joined hands in a broad collaboration against the rival world orders in the backdrop of unfolding multi-cultural, multi-religious and plural world. It is not only the United States but also most of the European Union states, Australia, Israel and Japan which are collaborating with India on the broad-based partnership.

SCO

The founding of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in June 2001 as a successor organization to the Shanghai Five group formed in 1996 is another important development in the contemporary international politics.¹¹ Its members include China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Its observers include India, Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia. SCO covers one of the largest geographical areas of any regional organization, and its members and observers collectively possess 17.5 percent of the world's proven oil reserves, 47-50 percent of known natural gas reserves and 45 percent of the world's population. Its original objective was to counter the threat of terrorism, separatism and extremism but overtime, its objectives have been broadened to include cooperation in energy, communication, infrastructure and economic matters.

SCO has been regarded by the Western security analysts as the "NATO of the East" aimed at countering western presence in Central Asia while other analysts have considered it as a joint Russian and Chinese effort to maintain status quo in Central Asia.¹² Chinese President Jiang Zemin put forward a definition of the Shanghai spirit in 2001 as "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect to different civilizations and common prosperity."¹³ The SCO charter adopted in June 2002 emphasized "sovereign equality of states and the rejection of hegemony and coercion in international affairs." The Astana summit Declaration of 5th July 2005 proclaimed that 'a rational and just world order must

be based upon consolidation of mutual trust and good neighbourly relations upon the establishment of true partnership with no pretence to monopoly and domination in international affairs.”¹⁴

It will be a mistake to regard SCO as a traditional collective security organization merely aimed at containing the Western influence in Central Asia. In fact, it is a powerful expression of collaboration between the two world orders, Russian-Slavic and Sinic world orders. Both have joined hands to form an alliance based on the non-western values. They wish to demonstrate to the world about the viability of a Eurasian model other than the European Union¹⁵. They have built anti-terrorist structures, conducted joint military exercises with the member states and have repeatedly reaffirmed their solemn commitment to the principle of non-interference in domestic issues of the member states. However, they have a broader agenda to turn the entire region of the member states into an effective economic grouping like European Union.¹⁶, However, there has also been an emphasis on non-western values in the context of a non-hegemonic and just multi-polar world.

Danish Cartoon Controversy

On 30th Sept. 2005, the largest newspaper of Denmark Jyllands-Posten published 12 defaming cartoons of the prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) which triggered world-wide protest against the paper and the government of Denmark for not openly condemning the symbolic vandalizing of the holy icon of the second largest faith in the world after Christianity¹⁷. The Danish press and the government initially defended the publication of the insulting cartoons by stressing that the freedom of expression was the fundamental value of the Western liberal culture which could not be compromised. Eleven ambassadors from the Muslim countries urgently requested a meeting with the Danish Prime Minister over the issue, but the request was not accepted by the Danish government. By June 2006 violent confrontations erupted through out the world¹⁸. There were big demonstrations by the Muslims in many major cities of the European countries but the protest was especially very strong and often violent in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Egypt, Syria, India, Sirilanka, Malaysia,

Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria and Somalia. More than 300 people were killed in the riots, Danish embassies were attacked in several countries and Danish goods were boycotted by the Muslim consumers in the Muslim World. The Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) and the Arab League held their meetings to review the situation.¹⁹

The western press held the Muslims responsible for the violence and blamed that they did not understand the liberal values.²⁰ The Muslims were portrayed as backward, irrational, fanatics and threat to the democratic values. The Muslim's perspective was that the western press should have respected the religious sensitivities of their minorities. They also felt that they were not only exploited politically and economically as minorities but they were also being insulted culturally as well.²¹ The Danish cartoon controversy was truly a clash between the liberal world order and the Islamic world order, reminiscent of the crisis which was triggered when Ayatullah Khomeini had issued a Fatwa (religious decree) against Salman Rushdie on his book *Satanic Verses*. The issue of two clashing set of values, held by the proponents of the two world orders was sharply focused.

Kyoto Protocols

The phenomenon of Global warming has become an issue of grave concern for the world.²² It is believed by the scientists that the temperature of the world is raising with multi-dimensional consequences for the humanity. Warming of the earth could lead to the rise in the sea level causing floods, changes in weather pattern leading to the crippling of the crops and possibly creating new hazards to the human health²³. The effect of climate change will also create resource scarcity and a significant increase in world population leading to political instability around the world. Responding to the concern that human activities are increasing concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, most of the nations of the world signed the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. Kyoto Protocol was signed on Dec.11, 1997 in the context of UNFCCC. The Kyoto protocol is an agreement under which industrialized countries will reduce their

collective emissions of greenhouse gases. The goal is to lower overall emission of six greenhouse gases- carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulfur hexafluoride, HFCs and PFCs –calculated as an average over the five year period of 2008-2012.²⁴ The agreement came into force on Feb.16, 2005 following ratification by Russia. A total of 163 countries have ratified the agreement. Notable exceptions include the United States and Australia.

The United States signed the protocol on Nov.12, 1998 but did not ratify the treaty. The Bush Administration disengaged from the treaty in late 2001 claiming that the treaty was “fatally flawed”. It believed that the consequences of the global warming were of dubious nature²⁵. Furthermore, the treaty did not bind the developing countries like China and India to reduce their levels of gas emissions. The US has been the biggest polluter of the environment, responsible for 36.1 percent of the gas emissions around the world. Had the US ratified the treaty, it would have to reduce the emission level seven percent below 1990 levels during the commitment period (2008-2012). The US disengagement from the treaty shocked the world and many thought that the Kyoto treaty was dead even before it could go into force. It is heartening the Obama administration has shown a renewed interest in ratifying the treaty however, it has yet to be seen how they proceed to rescue the Kyoto Protocol.

Despite the US refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol, more than 190 nations agreed to be on board. There appears to be a remarkable global consensus among multiple world orders that the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol should be adhered to.

Observations

Why did the US sign a nuclear deal with India but not with Pakistan? Why was the SCO found? Why did the Danish Cartoon Controversy become such a contentious global issue? Why did the Kyoto Protocol go into effect despite the oppositions from the United States? The answer to these puzzles are more comprehensively understood in the context of our theory of multiple

world orders in the backdrop of unfolding multi-cultural, multi-religious and plural world.

These world orders overlap, interpenetrate and coexist simultaneously. Rapprochement between the liberal world order and the Indic world order in the case of Indo-US nuclear deal, collaboration between Sinic and Russia-Slavic world orders in the case of SCO and the near confrontation between the Western liberal world order over the Danish Cartoon controversy and a near multilateral consensus (except the United States) among these contending world orders in the case of Kyoto protocols reveal a complex pattern of interactions.

These world orders are not exclusive because they interpenetrate each other in varying degrees. India, the core state in the Indic world order holds the status of an observer in the SCO. The Danish Cartoon controversy reveals that the Islamic world order deeply penetrates western liberal world order. Infact the Islamic world order, in varying degrees, penetrates in all above world orders, liberal, Indic, Sinic and Russian-Slavic.

In the most above-mentioned world orders, one finds a core state projecting the world view of its respective world order but there is no necessary one to one relationship between a world order and the states. Danish Cartoon crisis shows that Islamic order took most of the Muslim states including Iran by surprise. Consensus on the Kyoto protocol shows that despite the US refusal to ratify the treaty, the EU still strong supports the accord and finds itself closer to Russia than the United States, the core state in the liberal order.

Multiple world orders have both incompatible as well as compatible values. World orders are not like tectonic plates as portrayed by Huntington, which are bound to clash with each other because of incompatible values. Kyoto Protocol suggests that these contending world orders may also evolve a consensus on globally shared norms, thus paving the way for the emergence of a global society. However, there is dire need of a global dialogue among these diverse world orders to evolve a consensus on the globally shared norms.

Implications for Pakistan

What are the implications of our analysis for Pakistan? Pakistan is caught among the conflicting pulls of the competing world orders, liberal, Indic, Islamic, Sinic and Russian-slavic. Each World Order has its own agenda and wishes to transform Pakistan in accordance with its values. However, the nexus between liberal world order and Indic world order is the most ominous for Pakistan. Rapprochement between the two world orders is influencing the international politics of South Asia. For example, Af-Pak strategy recently announced by the Obama Administration symbolizes the Indo-American framework for Pakistan and Afghanistan. It excludes Kashmir which has been the root-cause of the Indo-Pakistan relations, a clear concession to India. It has the potential to push Pakistan towards chaos and instability. The continuing drone attack in Pakistan's tribal areas not only undermine Pakistan's sovereignty and inflict collateral damage but also make the current PPP regime look like a collaborationist regime, thus widening the gulf between state and society, a legacy of Musharraf era. Emphasis on the military surge in Afghanistan appears to be more a continuity of the Bush Administration's policy and possibly a last ditch effort on the part of the Obama Administration to seek a military solution of the Afghan imbroglio. What Afghanistan needs is the process of dialogue and reconciliation where alienated Pushtun majority of Afghanistan is brought back into the political process

Pakistan must not overlook or ignore the potential of Sino-Russian Slavic world order which has become a serious contender to the hegemonic designs of the Western liberal world order. SCO has indeed emerged as a potent regional organization with a broad-based agenda. Pakistan may use this card if the pro-India tilt of the Western liberal world order continues to persist. Keeping in view, the Indo-US nuclear cooperation and a broad-based collaboration with the western world order, Pakistan should try to become the member of SCO with an active role in the organization.

Islamic world order has a special relevance for Pakistan as it may constitute a source of strength for Pakistan rather than weakness in this multi-cultural, multi-religious and plural world. If

Pakistan successfully develops an Islamic democratic model which should be consistent with the norms of the global society, it may be a unique case in the Muslim world. What Pakistan needs is a vision and an appropriate strategy to get out of its dilemmas.

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Notes

¹ This paper is inspired by a research project on the dialectics of World orders jointly coauthored by Hayward R.Alker, Tahir Amin, Thomas Biersteker and Takashi Inuguchi.

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BOOK REVIEW

Mearsheimer, John J. **The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.**
(New York; W. W. Norton and Company, 2001), PP.555.

Air Commodore Ghulam Mujaddid

John J. Mearsheimer is a renowned scholar of Political Science at the University of Chicago. His book “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics” is a seminal work on the nature, behaviour and conduct of great powers in the modern and post-modern international systems. His has based his research on the theory of “offensive realism”. The theory has been propounded by Mearsheimer himself, and is essentially a structural realist theory. In order to test his propositions, Mearsheimer has taken the support of huge historical evidence on the behaviour of great powers since 1792 until end of the 20th century. He has divided his book in ten chapters.

The first chapter “Introduction”, is actually an ‘abstract’ of his book, in which he explains the behaviour of great powers to assert that security competition and war cannot be purged away from the international system. Mearsheimer holds that any optimism regarding great power cooperation is unfounded, and the evidence of “perpetual peace” among great powers is minimal. The United States still maintains huge military presence in Europe and Northeast Asia. The European powers are still apprehensive of Germany, and the same is true in case of Northeast Asian powers like China and Russia about Japan. The possibility of clash between China and United States over Taiwan exists. Mearsheimer asserts that “the sad fact is that international politics has always been a ruthless and dangerous business, and it is likely to remain that way” (p.2). He contends that great powers are never satisfied with the distribution of power and always try to change it in their favour. Their desire for more power continues until a great power attains the status of a hegemon. He observes that “great powers are primed for offence” (p.3). They seek to gain power at the cost of other states. It is the structure of international system that forces them to act aggressively against each other. He aptly remarks:-

“This situation, which no one consciously designed or intended, is genuinely tragic. Great powers have no reason to fight each other- that are merely concerned with their own survival- nevertheless have little choice but to pursue power to seek to dominate the other states in the system” (p.3).

The crux of the offensive realism theory is that great powers are ordained to look for opportunities to maximize their power at the expense of each other. This intense security competition leads to war and immense bloodshed. The theory focuses on great powers because they have the largest impact on the international politics. The theory tells us a great deal about the international politics since 1792 till end of the 20th century; and has been used to make predictions about great power politics in the twenty-first century.

Mearsheimer explains how offensive realism is different from other realist theories. ‘Human nature realism’ is actually the ‘classical realism’, and Hans J. Morgenthau is its main proponent. According to this theory, “states are led by human beings who have a will to power hardwired in them at birth” (p.19); and states have limitless lust for power. Then there is the theory of ‘defensive realism’, which is also called “structural realism”. Its basic assumption is that “states merely aim to survive...They seek security” (p.19); and, due to the structure of international system and its condition of anarchy, great powers focus on balance of power. Mearshiemer states that his theory of offensive realism is also a structural theory. However, its main variation with regard to defensive realism is the question of how much power do states want. According to Mearshiemer, the International system compels the great powers to maximize their power, till such time that one of the great powers achieves the status of a regional hegemon- the best state for any great power. This is done through aggressive behaviour;

“Great powers behave aggressively not because they want to or because they possess some inner drive to dominate, but because they have to seek more power if they want to maximize their odds for survival” (p.21)

Chapter two of the book, “Anarchy and the Struggle for Power”, is the most important chapter in which Mearsheimer explains this theoretical framework. The rest of the book is the historical evidence to prove various hypotheses of the theory. The author argues that the great powers have always been searching for opportunities to become stronger than their adversaries and have hegemony as their ultimate objective. When one power achieves preponderance over other great powers, then it becomes a status quo power. The argument pre-supposes an international system that has many great powers, and every one of them has revisionist intentions at the core of their action. The competition and struggle of great powers in such a system is carried out to maximize their share of the world power.

Mearsheimer bases his explanation on five “bedrock assumptions”, which are to be considered simultaneously to understand the competition among the great powers to achieve hegemony. The five bedrock assumptions are in fact the basic assumptions of the realist theory that are known to the students of political science and international politics: “the international system is anarchic”; “great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability”; and therefore, they are dangerous to each other; “states can never be certain about other state’s intentions”, especially when it comes to the use of military power; “survival remains the basic objective of great powers”; “Great powers are rational actors”, and take rational decisions (p.30-31). It is only when all the five assumptions are synthesized together that offensive behaviour of states comes to the fore.

Mearsheimer explains the behavior of great powers in terms of “fear”, “self-help” and “power maximization”. He argues that “great powers fear each other”, and from the standpoint of one great power, all others are its enemies. Their military capability coupled with uncertainty about intentions and absence of a central authority (the author calls it 911- the number one can call whenever help is required), is the main basis of this fear. This is best exemplified by the apprehensions of United Kingdom and France about the dangers of German re-unification at the end of the Cold War. Consequently, the political competition among the great powers is dangerous as it

has often led to wars with massive casualties and disasters. In such a system, states vie to ensure their survival. For this they resort to “self-help” measures, which also include forming alliances with other great powers, and to change them immediately when their survival so demands. In the World War-II, the United States fought alongwith USSR and China against Germany and Japan. But immediately after the war, enemies and friend were quickly changed to Germany and Japan to fight a long Cold War against USSR and China.

Mearsheimer points out that when a state achieves hegemonic position, it becomes a status quo power. According to the author, the United State has been a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere for at least the past one hundred years. He argues that in the absence of achieving a clear cut nuclear superiority, it is impossible for any state to achieve status of a global hegemon. No power has ever achieved the status of a global hegemon. Even the Unites States has not achieved this status as it lacks the ability to project power into the territory of another great power due to the stopping power of water. Regional hegemony is the best state for a great power. Mearsheimer argues that power and fear are connected to one another. The more is the power possessed by a state, more is the fear it generates. Also, there is difference between “potential” and “actual” power. According to the author, “a state’s potential power is based on the size of population and the level of its wealths” and its actual power is situated in “its army and the air and naval forces that directly support it” (p.43). The author maintains that ”land power” component of the military power is the key component even in the nuclear age.

Power affects the intensity of fear. Nuclear states fear each other less than those states which had no nuclear weapons. It is because nuclear weapons reduce the likelihood of war between states. But possibility of war always remains and so does a degree of mutual fear. When great powers are separated by large water bodies, their offensive capability reduces, and so does the level of fear. The distribution of power among states also affects the level of fear. The author believes that more fear is generated in a multipolar system which contains a potential hegemon, and this is referred to by the

author as “unbalanced multipolarity”. A multipolar system, without a potential hegemon is called “balanced multipolarity”. In such a system, power gaps among great powers are not very pronounced. The author postulates that the great powers balance each other against capabilities not against intentions. While stating “the hierarchy of state goals”, the author opines that survival is the number one goal followed by economic prosperity, welfare of citizenry, promotion of ideology, national re-unification and fostering human rights. It is accepted by offensive realism that great powers do pursue these non-security goals, but as long as they do not jeopardize the balance of power logic.

In chapter three “Wealth and Power”, the author defines power and gives methods to measure it. He looks at power as being based on material capabilities possessed by a state. Therefore, according to Mearsheimer, balance of power is done by employing tangible assets like nuclear weapons, armoured divisions and fleets. State’s power comprises latent power and military power. Latent power is made up of socio-economic ingredients which are state’s wealth, size and population. These ingredients go on to build the military power. In international politics, a state’s effective power is ultimately a function of its military forces vis-à-vis military forces of other states. Therefore, balance of power is essentially the balance of military power. Author’s offensive realism emphasizes force as the ultimate arbiter of international politics. At the same time, states pay serious attention to the balance of latent power also. The source of military power is the population and wealth of great powers. Out of the two, the author takes wealth alone to quantify military power, because wealth includes both demographic and economic dimensions of power. Mobilized wealth means the economic resources a state has at its disposal to build military forces, and how much wealth is available to spend on defence. Highly industrialized states have more surplus wealth than semi-industrialized states, and the states with high-tech industries are liable to produce sophisticated weaponry.

The author argues that distribution of wealth had been the main cause for rise or fall of the three European great powers - France, Germany and Russia -during the last two centuries. According to the historical evidence, German wealth in World War-I

was much more than Russia's; so German Army defeated the Russian Army. In World War-II, Russia was able to convert its superior latent power into military might much more effectively, so she defeated the German army. At times, wealthy states don't build additional military forces or enter into arms race, because they calculate that doing so would not give them better strategic position. So they hold back and wait for more opportune times. From 1815 to 1914, the United Kingdom was the wealthiest state in Europe. But she never translated her latent power into military might to become a hegemon, because it realized the huge problems in projecting its power across the English Channel. At times, states conclude that excessive defence spending might be bad for economy, and at other time wealthy allies can compensate for a state's expenditure on its military. Distribution of economic might cannot exactly be equated with distribution of military might. Germany had more than 3:1 advantage in economic terms over Soviet Union in 1942. However, over the next three years, Russian economy translated into military might with amazing efficiency, and Red Army prevailed over German Army. Although wealth is the foundation of military power of a state, but wealth is not synonymous with military might.

In chapter four "The Primacy of Land Power", Mearsheimer argues that power in international politics is largely a result of military forces a state possesses. There are four types of military powers among which states choose: independent sea power, strategic air power, land power and nuclear weapons. The author believes that land power is the dominant form of military power. Power of state is situated in its army and air and naval forces which support it. The offensive realism dictates that "most powerful states possess the most formidable armies" (p.83). Hence quantification of the power of land forces provides an approximate relative power balance of the great powers; and large bodies of water severely limit the power projection capacity of land forces. The stopping power of water- the oceans and seas- is an important limitation to the very concept of global hegemony.

The author disagrees with Mahan's theory of independent sea power and Douhet's theory of strategic air power. Mearsheimer maintains that wars are won by big battalions and not by sea or air

units. Even in the nuclear environment, where the great powers have involved in intense security competition, armies and “the air and naval forces that support them” is the core ingredient of military balance. Armies are the main instrument for conquering and controlling the land which is the ultimate political objective. Navy and air forces can’t conquer land; they only coerce the adversary.

As regards the nuclear weapons and the balance of power, the author observes that these weapons are revolutionary, as they can cause unprecedented destruction in matter of seconds. The author holds the view that even in case of mutually destructive nuclear deterrence, the security competition between great powers continues, and the land power remains the key component of the military power. However, possession of nuclear weapons adds caution to the use of military force by one great power against the other. He gives evidence of 1973 Arabs-Israel War, where Egypt and Syria fought against a nuclear Israel; the war between Russia and China along Ussuri River in 1969, where both had the nuclear arsenal; and India and Pakistan who were embroiled in serious crisis in 1990, and the border war in Kargil in 1999. He concludes that land power remains central to military power even in the nuclear age, although, nuclear weapons make great power war less likely.

In chapter five “Strategies for Survival”, the author discusses the strategies used by great powers to maximize their share of world power. The main objectives of a great power are: hegemony in their region; ability to project power across stopping power of water, achievement of wealth, development of large land forces and supporting naval and air forces and achievement of the nuclear superiority. “War” is the main strategy that the great powers employ to gain power. Then is “blackmail”, which is threat of force and not its actual use, to produce results. Blackmail is a complicated strategy because great powers are likely to fight it out than to be blackmailed. “Bait and bleed” is another strategy where a state weakens its rival by provoking a long and expensive war between the rival state and another state. Another strategy is “bloodletting”, where a state ensures that the war in which its adversary is involved, is made long and protracted. Soviet War in Afghanistan (1979 -1989) is a classical example of this strategy.

“Balancing” and “buck passing” are strategies to prevent an aggressor from upsetting the balance of power. Balancing is employed when states get together to balance or fight an aggressor. In buck passing, states try to get another great power to check the aggressor, and they themselves remain on the sidelines. The responsibility is passed on to the other state by the threatened states. Then there are avoiding strategies of “appeasement” and “band wagoning”. In these strategies, power is conceded to the adversary, and hence great powers don’t generally follow them. In bandwagon a threatened state joins the powerful state after recognizing that it can’t stand the aggressor alone. In appeasement, a state aims to adjust the behaviour of the aggressor by conceding some of its power to the aggressor. The most important strategies used by the great powers remain war for acquiring additional power, and balancing and buck passing for preserving the balance of power.

In chapter six “Great Powers in Action”, Mearsheimer examines the behaviour of great powers to prove that great powers seek regional hegemony. Based on exhaustive evidence from the history, the author establishes that revisionist great powers have been fighting with each other to maximize their share of world power. Also, when one of them achieves the status of regional hegemon, then it becomes a status-quo state. Great powers have not denied themselves the opportunity to shift the balance of power in their favour. And, the desire to acquire more power does not stop even when they have had the maximum of it. By examining the foreign policy behaviour of five dominant powers over the last 150 years, the author has skillfully established the above stated premises of the offensive realism. These powers have always expanded through conquest, invariably seized any opportunity to change balance of power in their favour, with gaining of power each one showed appetite to gain even more to reach the status of a regional hegemon. In the nuclear age, both the United States and the Soviet Union did not remain contented with Mutual Assessed Destruction (MAD) situation; both strived to achieve nuclear superiority over the other all the way till end of the cold war.

In chapter seven “The Offshore Balancers”, the author examines his theory by selecting the American and the British cases,

as they provide the strongest evidence against the offensive realism's argument that great powers are dedicated to maximize their power. It is a fact that the United States had become great power by 1898, yet it did not build a powerful military to conquer more territories in the Western Hemisphere. Similarly, in 1900s the United States was the most powerful economy in the world, yet it did not project her power to Europe or Northeast Asia. In the same vein, United Kingdom was substantially powerful between 1840 and 1860; yet it did not build its military power to dominate Europe. Mearsheimer explains the United States case by arguing that there were no worth while territories to be captured by her, and she was busy consolidating the huge North American landmass it had acquired. Similarly, the stopping power of water – the mighty Atlantic and the Pacific oceans were responsible to stop the United States from projecting her power into Europe and Northeast Asia. As regards the United Kingdom, the fact was that Europe was inhabited by many great powers at that time, which were difficult to be conquered. Moreover, stopping power of the English Channel hindered her power projection. Having examined this aspect, Mearshiemer goes on to establish the offshore balancing role of both the United States and the United Kingdom. "United States acted as an offshore balancer during the twentieth century to ensure that it remained the sole regional hegemon" (p.237). United Kingdom committed her military forces to the Continent when it could not pass the buck, or another power threatened to dominate Europe. She accepted the Continental commitment in both the World Wars; and in the Cold War continued to fulfill this commitment alongwith her forces in central Europe against the Soviet threat.

In chapter eight "Balancing versus Buck-Passing", Mearsheimer examines the strategies employed by the great powers to defend the balance of power by balancing or by passing the buck. The author highlights that decision to balance or to buck-pass is actually linked with structure of the international system. A bi-polar system favours balancing strategy. A multipolar system is more likely to offer buck-passing choice. Magnitude of threat and geography are the other factors in the decision to buck-pass. The author has examined Revolutionary and Napoleonic France (1789-1815) with respect to its strategic targets, calculus of power within France, and the power of other four states. The author concludes that

balancing against France by the European powers had remained problematic, and buck-passing had worked mostly for United Kingdom. The study of Cold War (1945-1990) is instructive in the sense that the end of World War-II had left the Soviet Union as the most important state in Europe and Northeast Asia. United State had no choice left to pass the buck. It had to “contain” the Soviet Union on its own. So it did throughout the Cold War. In a multipolar world, buck-passing is frequent. However, geography in the shape of common borders with the aggressor, or having buffer states or water body in between, has often influenced the decisions to buck-pass.

In chapter nine “The causes of Great Power War”, the author examines war as a strategy employed by the great powers to maximize their share of world power. The author acknowledges that security competition is a perpetual condition among the great powers, and war is an occasional happening. The author takes the help of the “structural theory” to explain the causes of war between states when at least one of the warring states is a great power. International anarchy is the main structural factor that causes war between states. As per the author “the main causes of war are located in the architecture of the international system” (p.337). The number of great powers and the distribution of power among them are other factors that influence war. Bipolar or multipolar configurations of the structure and power imbalance also increase or decrease the proneness to war. In a multipolar system, there is more chance of miscalculation of strength and resolve, which could lead to the decision to war. In a multipolar system, potential hegemons increase fear among other great powers. Fear leads to competition for power which is the recipe for conflict. The author draws heavily on the historical evidence from seven periods of European history starting from French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in 1792 to the end of the Cold War in 1990. The author states that during the 199-years of European history, there have been 24 great power wars including 3 central wars (war among all great powers), 6 great power vs. great power wars, and 15 great power vs. minor power wars. Consequently, bipolarity seems to be the most peaceful and least deadly architecture. Unbalanced multipolarity is by far the most war prone and deadly distribution of power that led to 3 central, 1 great power vs. great power and 5 great powers vs. minor power wars with

27 million military and as many civilian deaths. Balanced multipolarity falls between these two extremes with 1 great power vs. great power war and 9 great power vs. minor power war and 1.2 million casualties.

In the last chapter “Great Power Politics in the Twenty-first Century”, the author has discussed the future of the current century from the perspective of offensive realism. The author argues that despite the end of the Cold War and the optimism about great power cooperation, the realist theory holds as strong as ever. It is because the anarchic nature of international system has not changed; neither there are any signs that it would change. States do remain the most powerful actors in the system without any “night watch man” over them. He puts forward strong evidence from the decade of 1990-2000 to show that security competition among the great powers is on, both, in Europe as well as in Northeast Asia. There are one hundred thousand US troops each stationed in Northeast Asia and Europe. The author predicts that in the next about twenty years, there is likely to be greater instability in these regions due to changes in the power distribution and emergence of more powers. The author also predicts that the most dangerous potential threat to the United States in the early twenty-first century would be China.

‘Tragedy of Great Power Politics’ is a seminal work on the nature and behaviour of the international system from the perspective of the theory of offensive realism. The author has collected, analysed and presented huge historical data and record to support the cardinal aspects of his theory. There is little doubt that the author has made his points convincingly. He is very thorough and impressive in his realist arguments. However, his thesis that great powers are designed to behave in a ruthless, bloodthirsty and insatiable way to maximize their power because it is how the international system is structured-looks to be “deterministic” in character. I don’t really think that the system is absolute and all-powerful. There are scholars who say that international system is “socially constructed”, which means that the system is absolute because we have made it so; and anarchy is what states have made of it. If states followed some principles, norms and traditions, international anarchy can be reduced. The author seems to have ignored the impact of morality, international law, the United

Nations, and goodness of human nature on the state behaviour. Human beings and their social constructs – including the states - are not totally wicked and evil. It can't be. I look at this book with appreciation as regards its scholarly research. However, I don't wholly agree with the theory. Humanity and its structures have great promise, and are not slaves to structural determinism. The author has also not delved into the erosion of state sovereignty due to effects of globalization, and interdependence of great powers as manifested by politico-economic relationship within EU and between the United States and China. Similarly, the rise of non-state actors- both, with positive and negative roles- has also not been considered by the author while analyzing the behavior of great powers. I think realism of any sort has to take into account the influence and impact of these forces which were definitely not as pronounced in the past as they are now.

However, the book remains a must-reading for the students and scholars of international politics and strategic studies. It definitely helps in explaining the dynamics of international relations, and provides answers to some of the basic questions regarding the great power behavior.

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