

**‘INSURGENCIES’ IN SOUTH ASIA:
A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF INDIA’S
MAOISTS AND PAKISTANI TALIBAN**

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Abstract

Insurgency as a concept has evoked immense interest in modern day conflicts. Ranging from guerilla warfare to asymmetric violence and challenging the writ of the state for political motives, insurgency still remains an ambiguous phenomenon. In this regard, South Asia is viewed as a ‘breeding ground’ for the prominent insurgent movements; may it be the Maoists in India or Taliban in Pakistan. Nonetheless, such ‘uprising’ and armed resistance usually have both common and divergent denominators. On the other hand, it also brings into the fore the politics behind classification of armed conflicts specifically where the Taliban in Pakistan are concerned. In essence, both Maoists and Taliban are using violence against the state for achieving their goals and are observed to exploit the economic deprivations and ideological motivations as tools to mobilize the masses against their respective governments and existing state statute. In this regard, the study endeavors to evaluate the patterns of socio- economic grievances as well as political motives and gains insurgent movements are striving to exploit and obtain. The central argument rests on the notion that, sustainable strategies to counter and downcast these insurgent movements would not only result in socio economic stability of both terrorism struck countries but may also contribute to the overall regional stability and cooperation in South Asia.

Key Words: Insurgency, Socio-economic grievances, asymmetric violence, extremism.

Prelude

Since the last six decades, the South-Asian region has experienced significant 'anti-systemic ideological conflicts',¹ often classified as insurgencies or in approximate terms, viewed as a 'sustained armed resistance' phenomenon. They have in fact been more pronounced than most areas of East Asia and Latin America with continuity from the anti-colonial struggle to varying manifestations in the post-colonial arena. In this context, the politics of the 'Left' or of the other 'Radicals' has been synonymous with the activity generated by organized groups and networks. It mainly aims at changing the status quo to establish an egalitarian order, whether conceived by human mind or ordained by the Creator. The politics remain rooted in poverty and sense of deprivation, and its engine comes with notions of violent struggle against the established order. Classical manifestations of the phenomenon are the ones influenced by Marxist ideology and notions of a class struggle though subjected to differing interpretations and policy directions by various players. However, the same holds true for struggles against the status quo that are structured but derive their legitimacy from their mission which is perceived by them as 'divine righteous'.

While looking at South Asia, the Maoists in India and Taliban in Pakistan are the most significant examples of organized groups mobilized against the status quo. This is true because both have managed to develop as a well-structured movement with waging armed conflict against the government.² However, the classification of both the movements is sometimes considered divergent from each other. The Maoists in India are indeed a 'classical' example of insurgency in text bookish definitions and popular connotations of the word.

On the other hand, the official Pakistani position remains ambiguous in declaring the Taliban in Pakistan as insurgents, making it subject to politics in the backdrop of classical distinction of armed conflicts. However, in scholarly debate, the Taliban are mostly considered as insurgents in Pakistan.

Nonetheless, the phenomenon of such nature indeed provides an index of the ailing socio-economic condition of the respective countries. Furthermore, it also provides an insight into how masses can be mobilized in the name of belief system/ideology.

This research paper endeavors to analyze the Maoists in India and Taliban in Pakistan in the light of the theoretical and classical perspective of insurgencies. It aims to answer questions like, how did these insurgent groups manage to leave their mark at such a large scale? Is it their preparedness, motivational strength or weaknesses of the government in eradicating these armed resistances? And most importantly, can they be compared by analyzing their root causes and eventually dealing with them objectively? Needless to say that, the consequences of lack of institutional strength and make up of a country and fallout on its national security are indeed interwoven.

Classification of insurgencies: Origination and Objectives

Insurgency has been an area of interest for many political and social scientists. It has been a global phenomenon and has often been characterized in distinction with armed struggle; both being defined separately primarily on the basis of semantics. However, major definitional aspects are broadly agreed upon. Insurgency being a diverse phenomenon is of numerous kinds and classifications, it may be defined as:

A struggle between a non ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the no ruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.³ Or

‘An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict... [In other words] an organized protracted

politico- military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control'.⁴

Furthermore, Steven Metz and Raymond Millen define insurgency more precisely as:

'Insurgency is a strategy adopted by groups which cannot attain their political objectives through conventional means or by a quick seizure of power. It is used by those too weak to do otherwise. Insurgency is characterized by protracted, asymmetric violence, ambiguity, the use of complex terrain (jungle, mountains and urban areas), psychological warfare, and political mobilization all designed to protect the insurgents and eventually alter the balance of power in their favor.'⁵

On practical grounds, insurgency is an 'armed resistance' from within a State, which challenges its control. The insurgents use guerilla and hidden force for achieving their goals. An active insurgent group has an organization that consists of a mobile main force and two paramilitary forces (regional force and local militia) that conduct limited operations to augment the effect of main force. Since the insurgency is based on manipulative motivations, its first goal is to survive. All insurgencies have important commonalities, but each one of them has distinct and peculiar features.

Motivation

Every insurgent movement has a key origination factor that plays the role of driving force making the energy of masses to orient in certain direction. Here in the next section, various origination factors will be discussed that may act as the purpose of mental as well as psychological motives for an insurgent group to involve in violent and aggressive activities to articulate the origins of certain human aggressions.

First, insurgencies based on *ideological grievances*: Ideological basis that lead to insurgent movements are among the most frequent causes of insurgency. Islamic and communist insurgencies are the most prominent types of ideological based insurgencies in the contemporary world. The more divided and mal-communicated a society is, the more chances are there for rebel and insurgent movements to originate.⁶ So in divided societies, ethnic conflicts and insurgent movements are at the center of politics, and pose an obvious challenge to the cohesion of state and sometimes to peaceful relationships among states. These divides create powerful, affiliations that are often at the root of violence as a result of their perceived deprivations.

Second, insurgencies based on greed: Greed is the main driving force of origination of various insurgent movements.⁷ For many individuals or groups, a conflict becomes an opportunity to make career in terms of finance and they see conflicts as ways of gaining benefits out of it in form of power, influence and wealth. This greed element is seen also reduce the insurgent movements to mere criminality sometimes like in the case of economically under developed or developing countries where the rich and poor divide is wide, in these countries the ideological or political origins of the insurgent movements are masked by greed of power and wealth.

Third, insurgencies based on State capacity: Governance and state capacity that include measures of government effectiveness, rule of law, corruption, as well as economic development are interrelated with the vulnerability of insurgency. The inability of any government to meet the ever increasing expectations of the masses generates what Ted Robert Gurr refers as 'Relative Deprivation', which serves as an important prerequisite for frustration among population leading to violent expression.⁸

Objectives

The nature of an insurgent movement is well understood on the basis of its objectives. The objective is in fact a key for determining the future shape and orientation of an insurgent behavior. Similarly, the prominent insurgent movements after the Cold War Era had objectives classified as Revolution, Reformist insurgency, Separatist movements, insurgencies based on resistance and Commercial insurgencies.

First, revolutionary insurgencies: These types of insurgent movements are aimed at replacing the existing political order and transforming the political as well as social transformation of the statute. Revolutionary insurgencies are more of spiritual insurgency which is the fruit of the Cold war, driven by the problems of modernization at a rapid pace. The Third World states faced an inability to meet the psychological need of their populations, especially during the rapid development, originating frustration and discontent that was used by the insurgent strategists which is civil wars and insurgent movements took momentum after the Cold war era.

Second, reformist insurgencies: The core of this insurgency is dismissal of a regime including its formulated political, economic and social system. The broad term of a 'reform' or 'modernization' are used to indicate the clear objective of such insurgent motivations where arms are lifted and violence is used for the purpose of bringing about a change or altering the existing policies of an existing government. Insurgents often tend to blame certain Western ideas and practices that were borrowed and defectively applied by the local elites on the society. The insurgent strategists thus use this discontent and provide alternative system which they think serves the purpose of having authenticity and a good adaptability to their nation state's institutional framework.

Third, separatist insurgencies: Most states are divided by ethnicity, culture, opportunity, and sometimes power or wealth. The energy for separatist insurgencies

springs from a particular deprived segment of the population who feel unbearably excluded from the state's political, economic or social opportunities. They aim at independence or separation for a certain clan or group of people who are the majority inhabitants of a region within a state and feel that they are not being given the right of self determination and freedom to choose their path.⁹

Lastly, resistance insurgencies: This type of insurgencies aim at compelling foreign power (military) to withdraw from an area or region. The dependence of a state government upon presence of a foreign military force within the boundaries can spark great opposition for the population of that state. It often acts as a unifying narrative for insurgent groups who can use this foreign intervention as a tool to launch an armed insurgent movements against the external military powers.

Regardless of the causes and motivations that govern the insurgent movements, one objective of insurgency is to mould the perception of public regarding its legitimacy, which is often challenged. In this regard, violence is used as an instrument of persuasion, which eventually serves the purpose of attracting and mobilizing the supporters, threatens the opponents of insurgency and finally isolates them from the state framework. The 'armed propaganda'¹⁰, hence uses or threatens to use the military power in order to shape the perception of public and opponents as well as allies about their ideology, situation and influence that their consequent decisions and course of actions are going to be based upon.

Maoists in India – Historic Perspective

For more than 40 years, the Maoist insurgency as an armed organization, has aimed at seizing power from the Indian state.¹¹ The origins of this 'revolutionary Marxism' in India is traced back to 1960s, when the communist radicals separated from the Communist Party of India- Marxist (CPI-M) and later formed Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (CPI (ML)). The phenomenon was also called

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Naxalite insurgency, the nomenclature derived from insurgency in Indian state of Naxalbari in 1967, regarded as the epicenter of the Indian Maoist militant activism. The radical communist outfits have by and large experienced polarization. However, later in the year 2000, after a decade of the announcement of neo liberal economic reforms by state of India, attempts were made to combine all the Naxalite splinter groups. In September 2004, unification of the splinter groups took place under the umbrella of two prominent and large Maoist groups MCC and CPI (M-L) People's war.

Mao insurgency can hence be characterized as an insurgent movement mobilized against socio-economic grievances of the masses at large. The role of greed was far less than grievances which were the motivation to participate in this insurgency.¹² The insurgents believed that through violent guerrilla warfare and action by the deprived classes of the Indian states would ultimately knock down the existing political and economic structure and establish a new communist dictatorship in New Delhi.¹³ Since three decades, the Maoists have claimed the lives of nearly 12000 civilians and 3000 security personnel.¹⁴ Their ultimate dream is to establish a 'people's democratic state' that provides justice to the ones who are the sufferers of poverty and unjust practices as well as unequal land distribution.¹⁵



Source: <http://naxal/naxalitemaoist.wordpress.com/>

Resultantly, the Maoist insurgency spread from the border of Nepal in north to Karnataka varying in degree of severity in the south comprising of seven Indian states forming a 'red corridor'.

In recent history, the Maoists have managed to further enhance their operational capacity. They have strengthened their regional linkages by setting up Regional Bureaus which includes both zonal and state- level jurisdictions in order to enhance political and military mobilization. There have been reports of Maoists in India forming connections internationally, with groups in Philippines, Turkey, Germany, France, Holland and Italy. The CPI- M is also part of the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA).¹⁶

Maoist leaders have a strong support for any ethnic group that pledges to secede from Indian Republic and also they have expressed their sympathies with many radical insurgent groups including the radical Islamist group like Al- Qaeda.¹⁷ They have an argument that all radical organizations and insurgent movements have the same agenda that is to remove puppet regimes imposed and improvised by the West and to introduce new egalitarian social order.¹⁸

In this regard, the government in India adopted various approaches as their counter-insurgency strategy. It did not involve a 'Winning Hearts And Mind – WHAM strategy' but a 'raw state coercion'¹⁹ and 'enemy centric approach'²⁰ through the use of specialized and well equipped police force. The more successful one was the 'Grey hound approach'²¹ involving special commando units which carried sweep operations. However, it did not halt the spread of Maoist insurgency in the occupied territory, as prerequisite of reconciliation and bridging the gaps between state and insurgents was still missing.

Taliban in Pakistan

While looking at Pakistan, the tribal areas- FATA, which were marginalized constitutionally, politically and economically from rest of the country since its inception, has been a breeding ground for the popular ‘insurgent groups’ broadly categorized as Taliban. The area is a buffer zone between Pakistan and Afghanistan inhabiting approx 4.5 Pakistani tribesmen.²² Due to its geo-strategic location, it has rather become a playground of opportunities for regional and global forces striving to extend their sphere of influence. The reasons for the ever disturbed situations of FATA are none other than socio economic grievances due to government’s hands-off policy towards these tribal areas. In any case, it was not expected that the Taliban led militancy in the FATA region would swell up to the level of a full-fledged ‘insurgency’. It was only after the change in tactics adopted by the Taliban in the year 2004 which paved their way towards this transformation.²³

Consequently, the vacuum then left by the government provided an opportunity for anti state and religious extremists to exploit it even for their own benefits. This dates back after the Soviet retreated from Afghanistan in after a battle with the ‘Afghan Mujahideen’ and other fighters. Eventually, these ‘trained’ warriors converged into ‘war lords’; mainly as they were abandoned and were not able to integrate into the country’s mainstream.



Source: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27225593>

The main objectives of the Taliban after gaining adherence from the locals of FATA was to unite all the various other groups of Pakistan and launch attacks on NATO/ISAF forces operating in Afghanistan, launching a defensive jihad against the Pakistani military forces, the imposition of *Shariah* (Islamic rule), and aspirations to unite against NATO forces in Afghanistan. Now, they successfully operate in the whole country as they are well aware of the, guerrilla tactics, sabotage and subversion. While main training facilities and bases are situated in South and North Waziristan Agencies, recruits from religious Madrassas in South Punjab, Karachi and other parts of state are also done having deprived population seeking to join this insurgent organization as a protest owing to grievances and deprivations.²⁴

These Taliban generally carry an anti-West complexion as a re-enactment of resistance that originated in the colonial era. Currently, the Taliban have emerged as the most significant existential threat to the state of Pakistan. They have maintained a reign of terror in the effected regions. Their 'armed propaganda' operates in such a way that after gaining sufficient amount of control over a region, they ask the local people to stop supporting the government and aid the Taliban in implanting 'Shariah'. Those who do not agree to follow them are threatened with death as in the case of execution of many tribal leaders who opposed their ideas and were a hurdle in the strengthening of their rule. The people suspected to be spies are executed publically several times.²⁵ Many criminal gangs and other commercial insurgent groups are also attached with them in order to pursue their own interests in the umbrella of the Taliban insurgency. These splinter groups and criminal gangs employ looting, kidnapping, smuggling and arms dealing in order to generate profits for their own selves while fuelling the insurgency in the long run.

Nonetheless, the support extended by the masses to Taliban is subject to uncertainty. In this regard, the locals who do not have a clear consensus, and are motivated either by socio-economic pressures, half-baked knowledge of Islam, and also lack of education and awareness perceive them as

righteous, also certain religious groups have pro- Taliban feelings that is a matter of uneasy judgments for Pakistani government and military forces. On the other hand, the elite and educated population having sound knowledge and exposure regard the ideas of Taliban insurgency as a spill over effect from the Afghan Taliban and regard it as alien for Pakistan's system of governance and socio- political structure.

While the insurgents carry on their aggressive and coercive acts for destruction of society, they manipulate the religious sentiments by declaring to have a noble agenda of establishing *Shariah (Islamic rule)* in the country. People, who are deprived of social justice and economic incentives groaning under the heavy weight of poverty and insecurity, tend to overlook these acts of the so called *Jihadist*. However, despite these indicators, the Pakistani government is uncertain to declare the Taliban as insurgents. One of the main reasons to the hesitation rests upon the fact that to recognize this movement as insurgency would be construed as an indication that the recognizing state regards the insurgents as legal contestants not merely as lawbreakers. Therefore, insurgents and rebel groups would be recognized as lawful combatants.²⁶ Technically, the recognition of an insurgency in international law may also bring about the 'internationalization of an event'; hence, Pakistan as a third party can identify the situation as an insurgency according to its own political interests without any commitment.

The government in Pakistan first adopted measures like bar of support from tribal's to Afghan Taliban and convening tribal jirgas, 'Aman lashkars' and sanctions. However, when these measures did not serve the purpose, due to the close religious and cultural proximity, an armed offensive in the form of military operations were also conducted. Military operation did not yield effective results till then. Jirgas, economic sanctions, lashkars, payment of money, registration, use of force and even peace agreements failed to cope up with the increasing militant support in the FATA region, and ultimately Pakistani Taliban trained and sponsored by Afghan

Taliban and Al Qaeda, emerged as one of the most significant challenge to the government of Pakistan

Common Denominators of Maoists and Taliban/points of convergences

The insurgencies of Maoists in India and Taliban in Pakistan also entail interplay of diverse underlying convergences for maximizing their goals. In other words, both Maoist's and Taliban may not be necessarily viewed in isolation from each other. The question of whether one can compare Pakistan's Islamist militants to Maoist insurgents in India shows that commonality between both the 'insurgencies' is their ideological motive although they might differ in their respective nature. An appraisal of their commonalities of interest provides a lead to this discourse.

Firstly, with the Taliban ranked second in the list of most active non-state actors of the year 2013 and CPI- Maoists not far behind with the fourth rank,²⁷ both claim to champion the cause of social justice in their respective domains. This they did by overpowering the 'ideological grievances' of the society. In India, the Communists have been successful in appealing to various ethnic fractions for example in Punjab, Sikhs have been the prime party advocating Communism, in Assam Bengalis, in Kerala a community of poor tribe called Ezhava, and in Tripura a group of indigenous hill people are ideologically motivated people.²⁸

In Pakistan, the Islamist affiliation that leads to insurgent motivation was more obvious in rural communities as well as urban fractions in particular the Waziristan region and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, where they use religious exploitation to gain public support and regard their version of religion to be the only means of social justice and righteousness.

Secondly, both the insurgent groups have been able to exploit the divide between rich and poor resulted by globalization in these countries where the rapid economic

growth was unable to make a considerable difference to the poorest sections of the population, making them vulnerable for insurgent leaders to exploit their grievances against poor governance and claim support. They hence, exploited grievances rooted in marginalization of the society. Maoist insurgent groups are active in eastern and central India, these regions are having majority of population below poverty line.

In 1967, Naxalbari violent uprisings, the peasants targeted the landlords, burnt land records and captured their lands along with cancelling their old debts. The main aim of this insurgency was as states in CPI (ML) agenda for 1970 and CPI (ML) agenda for 2004 was to liberate the rural areas and then capture the cities. This movement was also launched in the densely forested and hilly areas of Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal. There, Naxalite used to drive Landlords out of villages; people were given justice by establishing courts for the redistribution of land and there was planning done to commence mass mobilization of the poor rural population. It was a form of class struggle that was against the rich people, feudal lords, land lords, Government employees, as well as anyone who was to be suspected as a police agent.

On the other hand, Taliban in Pakistan have been able to exploit the socio-economic division in the tribal areas of the country where education is scarce and poverty is on the rise. According to an estimate, Pakistan's tribal areas- Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have a population of about 3.5 million which is only 2.4 percent of the total population of Pakistan and falls below the poverty line.²⁹ Taliban have been able to exploit the unique legal position of FATA in the Constitution of Pakistan with the Political Agent and Tribal elders-Maliks being the sole regulator of the social life. The rich and poor divide of this area was well exploited by the Taliban in order to influence the local with their idea of '*Shariah*'.

Thirdly, both the insurgent movements aim at taking control of parts of the country by using coercion to keep out

the writ of state. The tactics they use involve suicide attacks, an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and small arms attacks with other bombings in order to compel government and create a strong insurgent movement. Among major attacks the September 22, 2008 a suicide bomb attack on Marriot Hotel, Islamabad killing 57 and the October 2009 suicide attack on GHQ, Pakistani Army Headquarters killing 14 people are prominent while other several attacks took place and are still taking place varying in casualty counts.

Fourthly, managing territories within a state suggests a non-political idea of governance, one that both Indian Maoists and Pakistani militants seem to show.

Fifthly, both have the potential to cause existential threat to their respective states, which can be rather minimized at times.

Points of divergences

The review of the politics of Maoist's in India and Taliban in Pakistan indeed reveals a relationship between socio-economic grievances and ideological uprisings. Undoubtedly, poverty and sense of deprivation continue to shape the germination ground for the two streams. However, in some areas both the movements have adopted different lines, which are discussed below:

Firstly, in Pakistan, the Taliban are scattered in the tribal belt of FATA along with other rural as well as urban centers of Pakistan in a loose organization, while the Maoists are primarily confined to their parts of states that form the red corridor and extend their powers as a de facto control in these areas.

Secondly, Taliban in Pakistan use religion and its ideology as a motivational tool to accomplish their agenda. Conversely, the motivation for Maoist's is based on socio-economic grievances regardless of any religious affiliation, so it serves

the purpose of representing the deprived people in the secular India.

Thirdly, the Taliban have gained power enough to strike at the heart of the country's major cities. They have managed to increase their area of influence from the tribal areas to the settled areas of KPK and even fled to Southern Punjab. On the other hand, in India, the Maoists mostly remain confined to the country's interiors, although their influence is spreading across large parts of its rural areas.

Fourthly, Pakistani Taliban is an extension of the 'Mujahidin', bred and nurtured in the Soviet war in Afghanistan. They are the ones who were abandoned after the war was over and had no other option to take up an armed resistance against the government in order to safeguard their identity. Hence, as discussed earlier, the elite and educated population having sound knowledge and exposure regard the ideas of Taliban insurgency as a spillover effect from the Afghan Taliban and regard it as alien for Pakistan's system of governance and socio-political structure of the country.

In India, the Maoist insurgency has rather grown organically from its origins as a local 1967 uprising by communists over a land dispute in the village of Naxalbari in West Bengal, from where its name was derived as 'Naxalites'. They remain localized, and have a goal to bring a world proletarian revolution by overthrowing the semi-feudal, semi-colonial system under the neo-colonial form of indirect rule and exploitation.

Fifthly, the Pakistani Taliban, as the group is called, wants the imposition of *Shariah* in the country and do not recognize the existing Constitution. Most of the group's violent attacks, which are routine occurrences, specifically target civilians. The question of support for these militants is underpinned by local grievances over social injustice is highly debatable. Majority of Pakistani population dismiss the Pakistani Taliban and think that they are, adopted from an alien religious philosophy

imported from the Middle East by al Qaeda, and criminals and thugs have joined in for a mission to gain money and power.

While in India, even those who do not support the insurgency, acknowledge that poverty and the marginalization of rural areas– especially among the indigenous tribal population, have contributed to the mobilization and support.

The Maoists are not motivated by religious ideologies; rather they emphasize on eradicating socio-economic disturbances in the rural areas and have gained massive support over a passage of time.

Findings

The lessons learnt in the course of the study may be divided into four broad categories

Insurgency – a significant threat with lack of time efficient response

Irrespective of the motivation and origination of insurgency, the counter-insurgency efforts have always been delayed by the political administration. This is true in both the cases; Maoists in India and Taliban in Pakistan. The underlying reasons being that the security breach by such movements is initially not expected to swell up to such a huge magnitude. While, this is true, the impetus for ignoring these movements in the beginning also rests upon lack of institutional and administrative strength and capability to deal with a ‘contagious’ resistance. Dealing with guerilla warfare and armed resistance posed from within the country required intense clarity on the phenomenon and ways of curbing it.

Poverty- A menace indeed!

Poverty remains pivot for the insurgency based movement in the given setting of both India and Pakistan. The phenomenon of massive support of an insurgent movement by

a large population is always origin and objective based. Generally, the theories of mobilization explain insurgent actions in the form of coercion rooted in some kind of self-interest, grievance or perceived motivations. Hence, poverty, conflict, radicalization and isolation are the driving forces that lead to socio-economic grievances and greed which are triggered by the internal actors and conflict entrepreneurs to prolong and aggravate the insurgency.

Influence of external players

Insurgency as a movement requires immense funding and monetary support. The insurgents find refuge for this purpose under the umbrella of third parties and external actors which are ready to infuse instability in a country. Both the Maoists and Taliban are heavily funded by external actors who have their own vested regional, economic and geo-political interests. Hence, curbing the financial assistance pouring in from outside the borders could help in dealing with any form of insurgency.

Ideological extremism fuels insurgency

The more ideologically divided a society is, the more vulnerable is the system to fall prey to insurgent activities. Formulating a holistic process which includes not only a military response but also full fledged counter-ideology propaganda is the need of the hour. This rests upon improving governance and efforts for creating an inclusive social institutional setup with equal economic opportunities and justice. Studying the root causes and situational environment that lead to the mass mobilization for insurgency is crucial for understanding of any case study, the root causes if traced back and addressed properly could play a constructive role in pacifying the phenomenon of insurgency effectively.

Conclusion

In a nutshell, both the Maoists in India and Taliban in Pakistan pose grave security challenges to the established

political, economic and social machinery of their respective countries. They adopt violent means and armed resistance to confront their governmental policies diverse from traditional notions of security challenges.

At the domestic front, there is need of a holistic approach towards diagnosis and interrelated prescription of the socio-economic issues which provide motivation for armed struggle phenomenon. It should include adoption of short term, medium term and long term policies. Thus, ranging from a swift search and sweep military operation along with bridging the gap between state and locals by using a 5-R approach: Restitution, Reparation, Rehabilitation, Rebuilding and Reconstruction for a conflict prone zone. As, a long term policy, educational, political, economic and social reforms should be introduced which empowers and facilitates participation of the locals.

Empowerment and mainstreaming is possible by inducing moves of promoting innovation, creativity and progressive growth in the indigenous cultural norms of a society. In this regard, a military operation should include a wholesome response, carrying a package which addresses several segments of greed and deprivations.

Similarly, it will be necessary to develop a fresh socio-economic structure for the entire region. Specifically, one that seeks economic betterment based on local resources and equal opportunities for the people. In this regard, acting as camp for the third parties is going to provide sustained hindrance to any kind of efforts to deal with such insurgent movements. It is high time that both the insurgents and the administration realize that, violence alone is neither an option to defend their rights, nor a feasible means to deal with such uprisings.

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²⁷CPI-Maoist ranked fourth among top ten insurgent groups, *Hindu*, Washington, February 14, 2014. Accessed April 5, 2014. <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/cpimaoist-ranked-fourth-among-top-ten-insurgent-groups/article5687187.ece>

²⁸Paul R. Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 389-92.

²⁹Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1967), 72.