INDO-US TIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

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On January13, 2004 President George Bush formally announced the "Glide Path" agreement enabling India to "seek US cooperation in space, nuclear, high-tech and missile defence areas."[1] Describing the "trinity" agreement as a "milestone" that would "transform" Indo-US ties, President Bush claimed that the "the vision of US-India strategic partnership that Prime Minister Vajpayee and I share is now becoming a reality." He went on to express the hope that "cooperation in these areas will deepen the ties of commerce and friendship between our two nations and will increase stability in Asia and beyond."[2] Echoing President Bush's sentiments, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee also described the agreement as "milestone in bilateral ties"[3]

The conclusion of the "glide path" agreement marked the consolidation of the process of American strategic engagement with India unleashed by the demise of the bipolar configuration of power in the early 1990s. This paper analyses key elements of emerging strategic partnership between India and United States and evaluates its implications for Pakistan, an adversary of India and a principal US ally in the ongoing global war on terror.

Historical Overview

Despite the US military build-up of India as a major staging area for China and Burma during the Second World War and exceptionally strong advocacy for freedom for India by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, relations between India and United States, after the former gained independence from Britain in August 1947, did not have an auspicious beginning. Several factors made them "comrade at odds." Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's espousal and vigorous pursuit of "non-alignment" which Washington dubbed as "immoral", his "instinctive dislike for America and the Americans",[4] Washington's reluctance to commit itself to a "program of economic assistance to India,"[5] and its unwillingness to

side with New Delhi on the Kashmir dispute caused them to become "estranged democracies."[6]

The American decision to forge a military alliance with Pakistan in the mid-fifties as part of its global strategy of containment of communism was perceived in India as a hostile act that brought the cold war to its doorstep. India responded by ordering arm purchases from "sundry non-US sources" and by laying "foundations for a domestic arms production industry" to thwart the possibility of "Pakistani Patton tanks clanking down Grand Trunk Road to New Delhi."[7] India also began to cultivate friendship with Moscow. During the Khruschev-Bulganin visit to India in November 1955, the two Soviet leaders offered aid and declared the Kashmir issue had been settled by the people of the area. In 1957, Moscow vetoed a Security Council resolution proposing a plebiscite to determine the status of Kashmir.

Soviet-Indian cooperation was further cemented by their adversarial perceptions of China. Following the outbreak of the Sino-India border war in 1962, Soviet military and economic aid was rushed to India in order to help it withstand the increasing Chinese military pressure. The Sino-Indian border war also proved to be a boon for Indo-American ties. President Kennedy offered "support as well as sympathy" to Nehru. Concerned with India's fate, Washington dramatically increased military aid and agreed to "train Indian pilots and to supply mobile radar units to help protect Indian cities."[8] The two countries' air forces conducted joint training exercises and American U-2 spy planes, engaged in surveillance of Tibet, were allowed to land and refuel in India. In 1964, New Delhi "permitted the Americans to attempt to place a nuclear-powered sensor at Nanda Devi, a Himalayan peak, in order to monitor Chinese missile development."[9]

The inconclusive 1965 India-Pakistan war during which the United States withheld military supplies to the two combatants and thereby ended up "hurting Pakistan's U.S.-created military capability more than India's diversified weapon base," made India more determined to implement its extensive rearmament goals through foreign help and an expanded domestic arms industry and

military organization. China's passage to nuclear power in 1964 and the outbreak of Sino-Soviet armed clashes in 1969 coupled with Sino-American rapprochement, engineered by Henry Kissinger in July 1971 with Pakistan's help led India to solidify its extensive economic and military links with Moscow.

The Sino-American opening was perceived by India, as well as the USSR, as a threat to their security. On August 9, 1971 India signed a twenty year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. Although not a formal military alliance, the treaty nevertheless committed the two countries to closer cooperation. The agreement also promised material benefits for both contracting parties. For India, it meant greater Soviet diplomatic and an increased flow of state of the art armaments. Most important, it served as a guarantee of Soviet support to India in the event of aggressive Chinese action. From the Soviet standpoint, the treaty's chief benefit was that it "enabled Moscow with a number of its concerns notably, fear of China and the incipient Sino-American rapprochement."

American concern for regional stability in the South Asian region was influenced by India's decisive victory over Pakistan in their 1971 war. Washington unambiguously acknowledged India's supremacy in the area, and gave up the notion that Pakistan could ever be the military equal to India. President Nixon's report to Congress in February 1972 clearly expressed this changing U.S. perception of the sub-continental power balance. The report said: "The crisis of 1971 transformed South Asia. Of interest to us will be the posture South Asia's most powerful country [India] now adopts towards its neighbors in the subcontinent."[10]

India's pro-Soviet proclivities had several consequences. These included "imposition of restrictions on America's and other nations' foreign trade and economic relations with India" and "restrictions on India's import of Western technology".[11] More non-proliferations sanctions and restrictions followed after India conducted its first nuclear test in May 1974. Designed to limit India's access to nuclear materials, goods, and technology, these

American sanctions, in reality, turned out to be a mere "headache" and failed to inhibit India's nuclear ambitions.[12]

During the 1980s Indo-US relations were dominated by Washington's efforts to "coerce India into joining the non-proliferation regime."[13] Undeterred by these American technology-denial policies, New Delhi accelerated its drive to acquire nuclear delivery capabilities. In 1983 India launched the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program with the aim to manufacture, among others, the 150-250-km-range Prithvi and 1,500-2,500-km-range Agni surface-to-surface missiles. Several developmental trials of the Prithvi and the first test of the Agni were conducted in the eighties.

The revival of Pakistan's strategic ties with Washington after the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that New Delhi failed to condemn, further contributed to strains in Indo-American ties. Reacting strongly to Reagan administration's decision to provide $3.2 billion in military and economic assistance to Pakistan, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi complained that "We have faced this tilt...many years" and "resurrected long-standing Indian arguments against U.S. military assistance to Pakistan."[14]

New Delhi's protestations on the weapons issue resulted in the U.S decision not to provide E-3A airborne early warning aircraft to Pakistan and to "alert India about transfers of weapons to Pakistan that would be of concern to it."[15] Indo-American relations became more positive following Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's official visit to Washington in July 1982. Besides resolving the contentious Tarapur issue, the visit launched an initiative for science and technology cooperation and led to the designation of 1985 as "the Year of India," during which a "mammoth Indian art and cultural exhibition would tour the United States."[16]

The positive momentum generated by Indira Gandhi's 1982 visit continued after her assassination in October 1984. In November 1984 India and United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Technology Transfers under which Washington agreed to "support India's weapon procurement strategies...in return

for assurances that the advanced technology transferred would be protected from leaks and used for agreed purposes."[17]

In 1985, Rajiv Gandhi, who succeeded his slain mother as Prime Minister, paid an official visit to Washington. While avoiding conveying an impression that his country shared strategic and defensing perspectives with the United States, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi told his hosts that "the people of India and America are not allies in security strategies, but they are friends in larger human causes – freedom, justice and peace."[18]

The Post-Cold War Era

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 changed the global and regional context for Indo-American ties. The end of the Cold War had three important consequences for Indo-US ties. First, India's strategic alliance with Moscow was no longer a matter of serious concern in Washington. Second, the rupture in U.S.-Pakistan security ties symbolized by the imposition of Pressler sanctions against Islamabad removed a major hurdle in the improvement of relations between New Delhi and Washington. Third, with the Soviet Union gone as a pillar of security, India was compelled to rework its relations with the United States, the sole superpower

Thus, as part of its overall strategy of seeking constructive engagement with all the major powers, India under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao became very "eager for closer relationships with the United States."[19]

Building on earlier efforts by Indira Gandhi and Ronald Reagan to launch the two countries on a friendlier course in the early 1980s especially after they signed an MOU in 1985 to promote technological cooperation between the two countries, Narasimha Rao paid an official visit to United States in May 1994.

Consistent with his economics first approach, Prime Minister Rao emphasized the opportunities for growing business and political ties between the world's two largest democracies. In his address to a joint session of Congress, he highlighted his country's interest in

developing economic, investment and trade relations with the United States. He told his audience that India was neither a threat to peace nor an irresponsible nuclear actor. He mentioned India's support of bans on nuclear weapons testing and fissile material production for weapons purposes and urged further steps, including an agreement on "no first use" of nuclear weapons, to lead the world toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.[20]

To bolster Indo-American relations further, the Clinton Administration organized a series of cabinet-level official trips to India. Energy Secretary Hazel O' Leary traveled to India in July 1994 to promote commercial and government cooperation on energy and environmental projects. US Defense Secretary William Perry visited Pakistan and India in January 1995, "heralding Washington's interest to cooperate more closely with India on defense matters.[21] Perry, the first American defense secretary to visit the region since 1988, commended India's remarkable tradition of civilian control over the military and the two countries' evolving military-to-military contacts and technical cooperation. Commerce Secretary Ron Brown visited India on the heels of Perry's visit to underscore America's growing interest in India. Brown's visit yielded agreements worth $7 billion in economic projects.[22]

This positive post-Cold war trend in Indo-US ties was temporarily arrested by May 1998 India nuclear tests in the wake of which a "disappointed Clinton Administration imposed an array of congressionally mandated sanctions against India." Despite these sanctions, the Clinton Administration initiated a strategic dialogue between U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Indian Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh to help narrow differences on nuclear issues. Washington forceful "diplomatic intervention in the 1999 Kargil crisis to pressure Pakistan to withdraw its forces from the Indian side of the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir had a further positive impact."[23]

President Bill Clinton's five day visit to India in March 2000 "signaled a new, positive chapter" in Indo-U.S. ties. Clinton's visit marked a major U.S. initiative to improve cooperation with India in the areas of economic ties, regional stability, nuclear

proliferation concerns, security and counterterrorism, environmental protection, clean energy production, and disease control. President Clinton and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee agreed to institutionalize dialogue between the two countries through a range of high-level exchanges, and the two countries established working groups and agreements on numerous issues of mutual concern from increasing bilateral trade to combating global warming.[24] The "vision statement" signed by the two sides described India and United States as "partners in peace'. While expressing their resolve to "create a closer and qualitatively new relationship", it entailed a commitment to "deepen the Indian-American partnership in tangible ways".[25]

Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's reciprocal visit to Washington in September 2000 marked the intensification of the qualitative improvement in Indo-US ties. It also under scored the growing American willingness to embrace an Indo-centric view of South Asia.

The American eagerness to accord a very special treatment to Mr. Vajpayee was not only evident from the fact that he became the only head of government to have held two summit meetings with President Bill Clinton in less than six months during the latter's eight year long Presidency, but also from the positive atmospherics surrounding the visit itself.

For example, despite his frail health, which caused abridgement of his extended tour of the United States, Mr. Vajpayee was accorded a red-carpet treatment in Washington including the rare privilege of being allowed to carry out a sedentary examination of the guard of honor. Also, his abrupt cancellation of a scheduled press briefing was greeted with equanimity by an otherwise brash Washington press corps. Most significantly, Mr. Vajpayee's verbal excesses against Pakistan, a former most allied ally of Washington, were given uncritical acceptance by his American hosts and the American media.

Apart from the powerful symbolism of American public indulgence of him, Mr. Vajpayee's Washington visit was also

significant in several other respects. The most salient feature of the visit was the deepening and broadening of Indo-US strategic nexus formed during President Bill Clinton's landmark visit to India in March 2000. The joint statement issued after Clinton-Vajpayee meeting in Washington on September 16, 2000 went beyond the notion of Indo-US partnership outlined in the "vision statement" and explicitly stated that "closer cooperation and stronger partnership between the two countries will be a factor for shaping a future of peace, prosperity, democracy, pluralism and freedom for this world."[26]

President Clinton also articulated this belief in the necessity of Indo-US partnership for global peace. During his banquet speech in honor of the Indian Prime Minister on September 17, Mr. Clinton not only noted that "India and United States had built the strongest, most mature partnership" in which Indian "successes" were to become "American successes" but also said that together they "can change the world."

Another significant aspect of Mr. Vajpayee's reciprocal visit to Washington was visible American reluctance to annoy New Delhi by publicly reiterating Washington's longstanding position that Kashmir was the main source of tension between India and Pakistan. The Indo-US joint statement made no mention of the Kashmir dispute nor did it call for resumption of India-Pakistan dialogue to address the issue. It only indirectly referred to the matter by stating that "tensions in South Asia can only be resolved by the nations of South Asia', and that the two sides believed in the "unacceptability to continue violence and bloodshed as basis for solution of the problems of the region."

Bruce Reidel, Director National Security Council, promptly clarified President Bill Clinton's off-the-cuff reference to Kashmir as the core of difficulties between India and Pakistan, which had piqued the Indians as representing no change in the substance of American policy of treating Kashmir as a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. Far from acknowledging the centrality of Kashmir as the principal cause of animosity between India and Pakistan, the Indo-US joint statement made a significant concession

to the Indian view that the fundamental threat to peace in the region was the question of "international terrorism." Besides noting that "both India and the US are targets of continuing terrorism" and expressing "their determination to further reinforce bilateral cooperation in this area", it called upon the "international community to intensify its efforts" to combat international terrorism.

The third noteworthy feature of Mr. Vajpayee's visit to Washington involved the increased primacy of "low-politics" concerns in Indo-US ties. Nearly two-thirds of the Indo-US joint statement dealt with non-military dimensions of bilateral ties including such areas as bilateral trade environment, greater commercial cooperation, investment opportunities, taxation, prevention and control of HIV/AIDS, environment safe technologies, civil aviation etc. The presence of these concerns in Indo-US ties along with traditional security issues, especially those dealing with nuclear and missile proliferation, means that political economy considerations are beginning to play an important role in shaping the future of these ties.

As Indo-US relations become more complex, more interdependent and broad-based, both sides will have incentives to avoid confrontation and to forge deeper engagement with each other. The joint statement clearly recognized this new dynamic. While acknowledging the need for both countries to "continue their dialogue on security and nonproliferation, including on defense posture, which is designed to further, narrow differences on these important issues, it stressed the fact that there was agreement that "wide-ganging architecture of institutional dialogue between the two countries provides a broad-based framework to pursue the vision of a new relationship."

The last but not least important aspect of Vajpayee's successful visit to Washington was the growing role of the Indian-American community in bringing the two countries closer. Using its large size, economic and financial largesse and superior organizing skills to the advantage of its parent country, the six-hundred thousand strong Indian-American community in the United States has become the principal internal driving force for Indo-US entente.

Indo-US joint statement recognized this new reality when it candidly stated that the vision of closer and stronger partnership between India and Unites States "draws strength from broad political support in both countries."

In an unprecedented official acknowledgement of domestic lobbying influences on Washington's foreign policy outlook, it went on to describe the "Indian-American community" as a "bridge of understanding between the two societies" and as a source of "strengthening the ties of commerce and culture between the two countries."

As a tribute to the positive role played by this resurgent community, the joint statement committed both leaders to "encourage people-to-people connections between the two nations, and to enlist the cooperation of all sections of their talented and diverse societies in support of that goal."[27]

The advent of the Republicans led by George W. Bush to power in 2001 intensified the Clinton opening to India.[28] Taking a "less absolutist" view of New Delhi's nuclear aspirations, the Republican Party platform described India as "one of the great democracies of the twenty-first century" and raised expectations that the Bush Administration would be "more sensitive to Indian security concerns, and more willing to accommodate India's own aspirations to be a great power."[29]

The new administration's senior appointments "further cheered New Delhi."[30] In his acceptance speech to the US Congress in 2000, Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, spoke warmly of the value of solid US-India relations and voiced support for lifting the Glenn amendment sanctions against India. He further said: "India has the potential to keep the peace in the vast Indian Ocean area and its periphery. We need to work harder and more consistently to help them in this endeavor."

The new US ambassador to New Delhi, Robert Blackwill, new assistant secretary of state for South Asia, Christina Rocca and the new deputy secretary of state, Richard Armitage all "argued for

closer US-India relations as a strategic counterweight to China."[31] As a result "everywhere one turned in Washington, there was talk about maintaining the momentum of the relationship, consolidating the gains of the past several years, and putting flesh on the institutional architecture erected during the two summits of the previous year."[32]

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 offered New Delhi a golden opportunity to further deepen its security links with Washington. New Delhi promptly endorsed President Bush's declaration of "war on terrorism" and promised full cooperation. In October 2001, in the run up to operations against Afghanistan, the US requested India to escort "high value US ships" through the straits of Malacca. The Indian Navy deployed one offshore patrol vessel (OPV) for three months at a time to escort US Navy auxiliaries like oilers and ammunition ships. Following the October 2001 deployment in the Strait of Malacca, India's Defense Secretary reportedly said that "India would not be averse to accepting the Sea Lines of Communication patrol role from Aden to Malacca."[33]In the six months between April and September 2002, over twenty such high value ships were escorted between Singapore and the northern tip of Sumatra.[34]

New Delhi reciprocated these overtures for better ties by muting its criticism of U.S. opposition to the Kyoto Protocol on global climate change and "reacted positively to President Bush's controversial missile-defense initiative."[35]

In doing so "New Delhi hoped to turn the war on terrorism to its advantage as a lever to end Pakistan's decade-long cover support for the anti-India insurgency in disputed Kashmir."[36] These Indian hopes were temporarily eclipsed when Pakistan itself joined the U.S.-led global campaign against terrorism and ditched the Taliban. The rejuvenation of Pak-US ties after 9/11 raised fears in New Delhi of yet another American strategic tilt toward Pakistan. These apprehensions, however, turned out to be ill-founded.

Following the December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, which New Delhi blamed on Pakistan-based militant groups, India threatened war. New Delhi initiated full-scale military mobilization and in May 2002 war between India and Pakistan seemed a distinct possibility. Faced with the nightmare scenario of an India-Pakistan shooting war turning into a nuclear conflagration with devastating consequences for the region and the American anti-terror campaign against Al-Qaida, Washington exerted intense diplomatic pressure on New Delhi and Islamabad to pull them from the precipice. Washington helped defuse the crisis by extracting a pledge from Islamabad to permanently end infiltration across the Line of Control.[37]

Indo-US Defence Cooperation

Enhanced defence cooperation has been the most salient feature of improved U.S.-India ties in the post-Cold War period. Ever since the enunciation of the so called "Kickleighter Proposals", named for General Klaude Kickleighter, the former commander of the U.S. Army in the Pacific which called for the establishment of U.S.-Indian army executive steering council, joint training activities, and regular exchanges of high-level military personnel in the early 1990s, Indo-U.S. defence ties have now matured into a strategic partnership.

Conducted under the 1995 Agreed Minute on Defence Cooperation, this partnership involves efforts to promote cooperation at the level of "civilian defence leadership", "between the uniformed services" and in the field of defence production and research. [38] The structure of cooperation includes activities of five consultative groups: Defence Policy Group, Military Cooperation Group, Executive Steering Groups, Joint Technical Group, and Security Cooperation Group. The meetings of these groups has resulted in agreement in numerous areas including Missile Defence, regional security issues, peacekeeping training, humanitarian/disaster relief, counter terrorism, consequence management, environmental concerns, search and rescue, joint naval patrols, special forces training, dissimilar air combat training, Malabar exercises off the coast of India.[39]

These expanding military-to-military ties have been accompanied by increased US willing to sell sophisticated arms to India. Since President Bush lifted the nuclear sanctions in 2001, U.S. military sales to India "jumped from near zero to more than a $190 million" within a year.[40] In February 2002, Congress was notified of the sale of Eight "Firefinder" radars valued at $100 million. In May 2003 the State Department authorized Israel to sell to India the jointly developed U.S.-Israeli Phalcon airborne early warning system worth $1 billion.[41]

Following Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's visit to India in September 2003, Washington has reportedly agreed to review an Israeli request to sell the Arrow-2 ATBM (anti-tactical ballistic missile) to India.[42] The conclusion of the "Trinity" agreement referred to at the outset of this article marks a new level of strategic convergence between Delhi and Washington which is likely to be the most dynamic element in the bilateral relationship in the next decade.

Implications for Pakistan

How would this growing strategic convergence between India and United States impinge on Pakistan's security? Scholarly assessments of implications for Pakistan vary. Optimists have maintained that Indo-US entente does not endanger Islamabad's vital security interests as there are limits to which India-US strategic collaboration can grow. As pointed out by K. Alan Kronstadt:

"Despite [recent] developments there remain indications that the perceptions and expectations of top U.S. and Indian military leaders are divergent on several key issue, including India's role in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, approaches to countering terrorism, and a potential U.S. role in the resolving the India-Pakistan dispute. Moreover, the existence of a nonproliferation constituency in the United States is seen as a further hindrance to more full developed military-to-military relations."[43]

Pessimists, on the other hand, argue that the emerging community of security interests between New Delhi and Washington poses acute security dilemmas for Islamabad. According to one Pakistani observer:

"given the Indian efforts to strengthen their conventional military capabilities, the intentions of increasing their maritime boundaries, the blatant use of force against neighbours...it would not be presumptuous to suggest that India may have been given the nod [by Washington] to go ahead on its agenda of establishing itself as the South Asian policeman even if it means using force against recalcitrant neighbours."[44]

Regardless whether United States has committed itself to supporting India as a regional influential at the expense of Pakistan, there is little doubt that Washington's pursuit of strategic engagement with India marked by a substantial U.S.-India security relationship could have a perverse and destabilizing impact on Indian dealings with Pakistan. The Indian plans to acquire a theatre missile defense system from Israel and Russia as part of its efforts to "effectively neutralize Pakistan's missile capabilities" are especially worrisome from Pakistan's security standpoint.

The introduction of ATBM capability into South Asia by India[45] will most likely have a "cascading" effect on Pakistan by generating pressures for a bigger missile force as a counter-measure.[46] The ensuing "action-reaction" dynamic will exacerbate security dilemmas in the region and derail efforts to promote behavioral restraint.

Pakistan's need to rely on ballistic missiles as a critical element of its deterrent strategy against India is dictated by its lack of strategic depth. Being a country of about 803,943 square kilometers, in comparison with India which is about 3,166,829 square kilometers, Pakistan faces India along the length of a long axis where its major population centers, conventional military assets and lines of communication fall within the strike range of India's combat aircraft and short range ballistic missiles.

Most significantly, all of Pakistan airbases, nuclear and ballistic missile research and deployment sites are extremely vulnerable to massive Indian preemptive air strikes. In order to prevent India from taking advantage of these geographical vulnerabilities and to maintain the credibility of its nuclear deterrence through assured destruction, Islamabad is now in possession of about "30 nuclear capable missiles"[47] that can reach counter-value targets anywhere in India. It is thus not surprising that despite facing disparities in the ratio of conventional forces with India, Pakistan has tried to maintain parity with India by developing a potent force of short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles.[48] Yet the deterrent function of this Pakistani missile capability is running the risk of being eroded by India's quest for a missile defense system. As pointed out by Gregory Koblentz:-

> "India's acquisition of an ATBM could destabilize [the] nuclear balance by depriving Pakistan of an assured strike capability. Pakistani leaders may fear that during a crisis they would be vulnerable to a disarming first strike by India, which would then rely on its missile defenses to intercept any Pakistani missiles not destroyed on the ground.... Islamabad may also worry that India's defensive systems would be able to neutralize a nuclear strike by Pakistan, thus allowing India to engage in a conventional war without fear of nuclear retaliation from Pakistan. Given the large imbalances of conventional forces between India and Pakistan, the outcome of such a conflict is not really in doubt."[49]

These Pakistani fears lay at the heart of Islamabad's opposition to the missile defense deployments in the region. Reacting to New Delhi's public endorsement[50] of Washington's May 2001 announcement to deploy National Missile Defenses (NMD), Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf expressed concern that this move could "jeopardize strategic stability, trigger a new arms race and undermine international efforts aimed at arms control and disarmament."[51] In the same vein, Pakistan's Air Chief Marshal, Kaleem Saadat pointedly told Washington in November

2003 that its decision to allow Israel sell India very "sophisticated early warning systems...has the potential of further tilting the military balance, specially relating to air power, totally lopsided." He warned that should the "imbalance continue to grow at the present rate, it will soon reach a stage where one side may conclude that it can militarily overwhelm its adversary with ease. The chances of a miscalculation then become even greater."[52]

The acquisition of a sophisticated air defense system with anti-missile capabilities by India[53] would constrain Pakistan either to match India's defenses with similar systems or to build up its offensive forces to saturate India's defenses.[54] Either choice would invite countermeasures from India and thus lock both sides in a debilitating and destabilizing missile build up. Given broader Indian regional security concerns especially its long-term threat perceptions of China and the latter's strategic ties with Pakistan, India-Pakistan missile race would inevitably trigger a regional offensive arms race.[55] Such an arms race would ill-serve the cause of peace, security and stability in the region.

End Notes

1. "US, India finalize high-tech agreement," Dawn December 21, 2003.
2. "Deal with India not to include arms: US," Dawn January 14, 2004.
3. *Ibid.*,
4. Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 64.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 55
6. Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies1941-1991 (Washington, D.C: National Defense University Press, 1993).
7. Onkar Marwah, " India's Military Power and Policy," in Onkar Marwah et al., eds. Military Power and Policy in Asian States: China, India, Japan (Boulder: Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), p. 111.
8. Andrew J. Rotter, Comrade at Odds: The United States and India: 1947-1964(Ithaca: Cornell University Press,2000), p. 75.
9. *Ibid.*,
10. Quoted in Syed Rifaat Hussain, "Superpower and Major Power Rivalry in South Asia: the United States, the Soviet Union India and

China," in Lawrence Ziring and David. G. Dickason, eds. Asian Security Issues: National System And International Relations(Kalamazoo: Asian Forum , 1989), p. 151.

11. Virginia I. Foran, "Indo-US Relations after the 1998 Tests: Sanctions versus Incentives," in Gary K. Vertsch, et al., eds. Engaging India: US strategic relations with the world's largest democracy (New York, London: Routledge, 1999), p. 42
12. *Ibid.,*
13. P.R. Chari, "Indo-US Relations: Non-Proliferation Concern," in *Ibid.*, p. 7
14. Satu P.Limaye, U.S.-India Relations: The Pursuit of Accommodation (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1993), p.42.
15. U.S. Ambassador to India Harry Barnes as quoted in *Ibid.*, p.70
16. Dennis Kux, Estranged Democracies, p.390.
17. Under the "nuclear end-use annex" of the MOU three things were agreed. One, U.S. technology was not to be used in unsafeguarded areas/facilities of India's nuclear program. Two, Indian nuclear facilities which were only partially safeguarded could not use American high technology. Three, case-by-case agreements could be reached whereby dual-use technologies would be cleared for use in unsafeguarded and partially safeguarded facilities if the use involved office/administrative tasks and not nuclear material directly. Limaye, *op.cit.*, pp. 200-5.
18. *Ibid.,*. p. 222
19. Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul, India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 211.
20. George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). P. 347
21. *Ibid.*, p. 355
22. *Ibid.*, p. 357
23. New Priorities in South Asia: U.S. Policy Toward India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, Chairman's Report of an Independent Task Force Cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society (New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, 2003), p. 15
24. K. Alan Kronstadt, "India-U.S. Relations," CRS Issue Brief for Congress October 9, 2003(Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2003), pp. 2-3.
25. Text of joint statement in Dawn March 20, 2000.
26. Text of US-India joint statement in The News (September 17, 2000).
27. *Ibid.*,

28. In her influential article "Promoting National Interest," Condoleezza Rice, stressed the need for maintaining close cooperation with India. She argued that the United States "should pay closer attention to India's role in the regional balance. There is a strong tendency conceptually to connect India with Pakistan and to think only of Kashmir or the nuclear competition between the two states. But India is an element in China's calculation, and it should be in America's, too. India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one." Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting National Interest", Foreign Affairs January/February 2000, p. 56. Echoing Ms. Rice's characterization of India as a rising great power which the United States must take seriously, Robert B. Zoellick, wrote: "India, the world's largest democracy and before long its most populous nation, will play an increasingly important role in Asia. To grow and prosper, it will need to adjust to the global economy. To contribute to its prosperity and regional security, India will need to lower the risk of conflict with its neighbors. And to have influence with India, America must stop ignoring it. A more open India, possessing a broader understanding of its place in the world, could become a valuable partner of the United States in coping with the Eurasia's uncertainties. In addition to proposing trade and investment liberalization, the United States should open a regular, high-level security dialogue with India on Eurasia and the challenges to stability." Robert B. Zoellick, ""A Republican Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs January/February 2000, p. 75

29. Robert M. Hathaway, "The US-India Courtship: From Clinton to Bush," The Journal of Strategic Studies vol 25, No. 4 (December 2002), p. 10.

30. *Ibid.*,

31. Addressing the Indo-American Chamber of Commerce and the Indo-American Society in Mumbai on September 6, 2001, U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwell recalled that as Governor of Texas in early 1999 President Bush had "one big idea" about Indo-US relations which sought to "transform fundamentally the very essence of our bilateral relationship" by "working together more intensely than ever before" and "thereby make the world freer, more peaceful and more prosperous." "The Future of US-India Relations," speech b y Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill, September 6, 2001, Mumbai, India available at http://usinfo.state.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?

32. *Ibid.*,

33. Vice Admiral GM Hiranandani, "Patrolling the Indian Ocean," Indian Defence Review (April-June 2003), p. 9.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
35. New Priorities in South Asia *op.cit.*, p. 16.
36. Dennis Kux, "A Remarkable Turnaround: U.S.-India Relations," Foreign Service Journal (October 2002), p. 20.
37. This pledge was later codified in a joint statement issued in Islamabad on January 6, 2004, following a meeting between President General Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee on the sidelines of the 12th SAARC summit in Islamabad.
38. Colonel Steven B. Sboto, "Indo-US Military Cooperation," Indian Defence Review (July-September 2003), p.51.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 53
40. John E. Carbaugh, "U.S. looks increasingly to India as it explores new allies," US-India Friendship .net, p.2
41. K.Alan Kronstadt, "India-U.S. Relations," CRS Issue Brief for Congress (Washington DC.: Congressional Research Service, October 9, 2003), p. 10.
42. Ejaz Haider, "Israel's "Arrow" deal with India is Dangerous," Daily Times February 8, 2004.
43. K. Alan Kronstadt, "India-U.S Relations," *op.cit.*, p. 10.
44. Najam Rafique, "Indo-US relations in the post-Cold War Era and their implications for Pakistan," Strategic Studies (Spring and Summer 2000), p. 125.
45. New Delhi has adopted a dual-track approach to obtaining an ATBM capability: creating an indigenous system and buying the capability off-the shelf. The development of an Akash (Space) system – a low-to-medium altitude surface-to-air missile (SAM) – with its Rajendra phased array radar represents the indigenous route to ATBM capability while the impending acquisition of the Arrow ATBM and Phalcon airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft from Israel represents the "off-the-shelf" aspect of India's ATBM development strategy.
46. For a thoughtful discussion of the negative implications of theatre missile defense in South Asia see Gregory Koblentz, "Theatre Missile Defense and South Asia: A Volatile Mix," The Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer, 1997), pp. 54-62.
47. Ahmad Faruqui, Rethinking **the National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia** (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), p. 106
48. According to General Zinni, former commander in chief of the US CENTCOM "Pakistan's nuclear capability may be better than India's with more weapons and more capability," Quoted in *Ibid.*
49. Gregory Koblentz, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

50. New Delhi's support for the Bush plan to deploy NMD was underpinned by several considerations. These included: "a strategic tie-up with the United States against China", " the desire to gain access to US surveillance data on Chinese and Pakistani missile tests" and "the moral appeal" of the superiority of defense over deterrence. For a good discussion of the last element see Rajesh Basrur, "Missile Defense and South Asia: An Indian Perspective," in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, Eds. **The Impact of US Ballistic Missile Defenses on Southern Asia** (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, July 2002), pp. 1-20.
51. B. Muralidhar Reddy, "Musharraf opposes NMD," **The Hindu** , May 13, 2001.
52. Address by Air Chief Marshal Kaleem Saadat, Chief of the Air Staff, Pakistan Air Force at Global Air Chiefs Conference, Washington, D.C 2002. **Centre For Aerospace Power Studies** (Karachi: November 2003), pp.12-13.
53. New Delhi's impending purchase of the jointly –developed U.S._Israeli Arrow Missile Defense system from Israel which is designed to provide terminal boost phase intercept against short and medium range ballistic missiles will have a variety of implications for security in the region. Besides eroding Pakistan's confidence in the deterrent value of its F-16 and missiles, it would force the region to move out of the current state of mutual non-weaponized deterrence and create incentive for finding security in greater numbers.
54. Some media reports claim that Pakistan has initiated negotiations with the Washington to acquire either the Patriot systems or the Hawk, or Nike-Hercules system. See "Pakistan to Acquire Anti-Ballistic Missiles from U.S.," **Time of India** (May 15, 2003). Islamabad would seek to deploy such systems to "insure that at least some of Pakistan's nuclear warheads and missiles would survive an Indian strike and be available as a deterrent." Andrew Feickert and K. Alan Kronstradt, "Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia," **CRS Report for Congress** RL32115 (Washington, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2003), p. 17.
55. In view of the prohibitively high costs of missile defenses some Pakistani analysts have suggested that Pakistan should counter an Indian missile defense with "hardened and mobile basing, countermeasures, and a small numerical preponderance in relation to Indian defense capability." See Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "India's Endorsement of the US BMD: Challenges for Regional Stability," **IPRI Journal** Vol. 1, no. 1 (Summer 2001), PP: 28-43. The efficacy of these measures is seriously called into question by the "troubling

reality" that "Pakistan has less than two- dozen airfields from which to operate nuclear capable aircraft. Its missile production, main operating bases, and nuclear facilities are very few in number, and their geographical coordinates are publicly known." Michael Krepon, "Missile Defense and the Asian Cascade," in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, Eds. **The Impact of US Ballistic Missile Defenses on Southern Asia** (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, July 2002), p.79.

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