




Margalla Papers
2004

**"Changing Global and Geo-Strategic
Environment: Implications for Pakistan"**



**National Defence College
Islamabad, Pakistan**

MARGALLA PAPERS 2004

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EDITOR'S NOTE

“Margalla Papers” is an annual publication of National Defence College, country’s apex institution on studies related to National Security. Based on contributions by prominent scholars and eminent writers of the country, it provides a forum for informed discussion and debate on topical issues impacting the national security. The Research Wing of the College engages itself voluntarily in bringing the insights of scholarship to bear upon the advanced research on key issues facing the country.

As is well known, 9/11 has changed the global environment so rapidly, that most of the countries including Pakistan had to shift from their old stances on various issues, aligning their policies to face the changed realities of the world. Operation Enduring Freedom, the US-led invasion of Iraq undertaken in total defiance of world opinion and the recent nuclear proliferation issue, all having serious ramifications for Pakistan need to be addressed for rendering viable recommendations for the Muslim Ummah in general and Pakistan in particular. With this background, the Margalla Papers 2004 has been dedicated to **“Changing Global and Geo-Strategic Environment: Implications for Pakistan”**

To provide an overall well rounded view of these issues, sub themes covering various facets and dimensions were formulated and eminent scholars were invited to express their views. It is earnestly hoped that scholarly views of the writers providing insight to these issues would attract the attention of our valuable readers.

While providing a brief overview of the “Current Issue”, we also avail this opportunity to inform our readers that the membership of the “Margalla Papers” has increased manifold both within and abroad. We look forward to receiving comments and suggestions to further improve our publication.

Editor

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE CHANGED GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

Najmuddin A. Shaikh

“Islam is vibrant and forward-looking. But more than that, we claim it is the most tolerant of faiths. How does the world judge our claim? It looks upon us as terrorists. We have been killing each other. And now we want to spread that violence and terror abroad. *Naturally*, the world regards us as terrorists”¹.

“There is no external threat which can do any harm to us. We are capable of handling any external threat. The enemy lies within and this element of religious and sectarianism may pull us down”².

“Increasingly, our image is being shaped by the extremist actions of a tiny minority that exists on the fringes of Muslim societies.

We must not allow them to hijack our religion, to preach religious and sectarian hatred with impunity, and to tarnish the image of Islam and Muslims. We must reclaim our Faith from these usurpers and project the real moderate and tolerant spirit of Islam to the world. (President Musharraf's speech at OIC summit 16th October 2003)

*"The United States is not interested in Pakistan coming under the influence of Afghanistan.... There has to be a way out for Pakistan... We are going to try and play an effective role"*³.

“He has declared that Pakistan will be an enemy of terrorism and extremism, wherever it exists, including inside his own border. He understands that terrorism is wrong and destructive in any cause. He knows that his nation cannot grow peacefully if terrorists are tolerated or ignored in his country, in his region, or in the world. He is committed to banning the groups that practice terror, closing their offices and arresting the terrorists themselves”⁴.

“Mr. Musharraf's forthright public condemnations of Islamic extremism, which began well before Sept. 11, leave little doubt that

he genuinely would like to fashion a moderate Muslim state that would resemble Turkey rather than Taliban-ruled Afghanistan... Mr. Musharraf wants U.S. help in persuading India to begin negotiations on Kashmir and the Bush administration should weigh whether it can help galvanize a peace process without compromising its longstanding neutrality in that conflict. But it must be clear, too, that continued collaboration between Islamabad and Washington depends on Mr. Musharraf's campaign against Islamic extremism proving aggressive and unambiguous in deeds, as well as in words"⁵.

"Pakistan continues to be the most dangerous place on Earth because of its mix of nuclear weapons, unstable politics, religious fanaticism and the involvement of senior military and intelligence officials in terrorist networks, including al Qaeda and the Taliban. Two recent assassination attempts against Musharraf underline the fragility of his rule"⁶.

"Last year India's economy was the second fastest-growing in the world, at 7.4 percent. Its business leaders speak confidently of becoming global players in their fields. In this Indian future, a continuing cold war with Pakistan is a drag. During the same period, however, Pakistan went down a different path, one of radical Islam and domestic dysfunction. The results? In 1985 its per capita gross domestic product was 6.5 percent higher than India's; today it is 23 percent lower. Its birthrate is soaring at a frightening 2.8 percent, while India's is 1.7 percent and dropping. Thirty percent of Pakistan's economy is consumed by its military.

President Musharraf has broken Pakistan's fall. And he realizes now that to modernize Pakistan he needs peace with India. But the country is proving hard to turn around; the rot has set in deep"⁷.

There could perhaps no more succinct or authoritative exposition of the challenges and opportunities that confront Pakistan in today's environment than was contained in President Musharraf's speech to the joint session of Pakistan's parliament on the 17th January. The President said, "**Pakistan is today facing four dangerous allegations**". He listed them as alleged responsibility

for "spreading terrorism from tribal areas to Afghanistan", "cross-border terrorism" in Kashmir, proliferation of nuclear weapons and an impression of our society as being intolerant" "Besides these negative impressions, the Muslim Ummah, of which Pakistan is an important member, is faced with difficulties and confusion and Islam is being projected as a religion of extremism"⁸. While the President did not explicitly say so it is clear that in the eyes of the world all the three issues/allegations that can be termed as relating to the outside world flow from the growth of extremism within the country.

The President's acknowledgement of the world's negative perception of Pakistan is not new. As the quotation above shows, the President had warned Pakistan's religious leaders in June' 2001, long before the events of 11th September and their dramatic fallout in all parts of the world but particularly in Pakistan's immediate neighbourhood, that our conduct internally and externally had led the world to regard "us as terrorists". When the American Deputy Secretary of State Armitage spoke in August 2001 of preventing Pakistan from coming under the influence of Afghanistan he was merely repeating what the world had been saying about Pakistan for many years. By that time we had become inured, it seemed, to allegations by Western intelligence agencies that in virtually every investigation of terrorist incidents in the West the trail led back to Peshawar or through Peshawar to Afghanistan. From the late '70s, "Religious Fanaticism", "Radical Islam", "Militant Islam", "Sectarian Strife" were phrases that appeared with regular frequency in reports on Pakistan's internal polity and even more ominously in reports on Pakistan's relations with its neighbors.

And yet there is no doubt that religious extremism was anathema to Pakistan's Founding Fathers. Pakistan was conceived as a homeland for the Muslims of South Asia- a homeland in which the Muslims could realize their full economic potential and order their lives in accordance with the precepts of the moderate and tolerant version of Islam traditionally practiced in South Asia. It was the Muslim religious parties in British India that opposed the creation of Pakistan. They opposed it on the basis of their rejection of the Nation State and implicitly of the concept of a system of rule that

was democratic. It was perhaps natural in these circumstances that after the creation of Pakistan they enjoyed little or no support from the Pakistan electorate.

The President was right in maintaining in his above mentioned address that even today after two decades of growing extremism and increasingly frequent sectarian incidents the vast majority of Pakistanis was "moderate" who totally reject extremism.⁹ While religious parties have garnered an unprecedented number of seats in the National Assembly and control two Provincial Assemblies the percentage of the total vote that they secured this time was no higher than in past elections when they went virtually unrepresented in the National and Provincial Assemblies. The turn around in their political fortunes was owed therefore not to any increased popularity but to the alliance of religious parties that, with encouragement, they were able to cobble together and to the concrete assistance they received from sources who, in a grievous misjudgment, believed that this would best serve the national interest.

The religious parties have now become a formidable force. Their rise to power with the support of the electorate cannot be questioned but there is a very real apprehension that current "moderate" leaders will give way to the extremists from whose ranks the parties derive their street power.

While there is no doubt that such misjudgments, about the use to which religious parties and religious extremists could be put, contributed to our current sorry plight there is also no doubt that external factors played, at least in the early years, an equally important part. The Americans, no doubt encouraged by their regional allies opted for the slogan of "Islam in Danger" rather than "Afghan independence in Danger" to encourage recruitment of fighters within Afghanistan and throughout the Muslim world to resist the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and to set up, with the help of religious parties, Madarasahs and training centers in Pakistan to imbue the right Islamic Jihadi spirit in Pakistani and Afghan recruits. The popularization of a regressive, rigid and doctrinaire version of Islam started here.

In a separate but related development, the Iranian Islamic Revolution with its emphasis on the export of revolution in the initial phases and subsequently the Iran-Iraq war caused fissures within the Islamic world and no where more so than in Pakistan. In the struggle for the hearts and minds of Muslims Pakistan became the secondary battle field on which the Iran-Iraq war was waged. This ominous development provoked little by way of determined action not because Pakistan had become a "soft nation" (though this is a charge that is frequently leveled by our own people as much as by outsiders) but because the ruling regime at that time felt that the arousing of strong sentiments of orthodoxy in the Sunni majority to counter the Shia bid for political power could be harnessed to perpetuate its rule which otherwise enjoyed little popular support. Sectarian strife, hitherto virtually non-existent, then became a dangerously divisive part of Pakistan's domestic scene.

The contribution of foreign forces to the erosion of the fabric of our domestic polity was undeniable. Our misfortune however was that long after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, long after the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war and the movement for conciliation between Shia Iran and Sunni Arab states, and long after the partial restoration of democracy in Pakistan, there was no diminution in the deleterious spread of extremism and sectarianism in Pakistan. Did this happen only because Pakistan had become a "soft nation" incapable of taking the ruthless action needed to eliminate these dangers or was official laxity in this regard attributable to the mistaken belief that the forces these divisive trends generated could be manipulated, despite their very different agendas to serve Pakistan's perceived foreign policy interests?

Whatever the rationale there is little doubt that in each case steps taken to serve perceived foreign policy goals- ostensibly at low cost- only helped exacerbate the internal problem. Support for the Taliban-seen as the guarantors of an Afghanistan that could provide Pakistan "strategic depth"- helped convert large swathes of our tribal areas and cities like Chaman into strongholds of the Pak-Afghan Taliban where the governments writ did not run. The support for the freedom struggle in Kashmir in the name of Islam rather than in the name of Kashmiri nationalism and Kashmiriyat, provided with or

without official support-gave fresh impetus to forces based in Pakistan that boasted of an agenda for over throwing all secular or moderate regimes in the Muslim countries.

Today Pakistan is a country under siege or at the very least Islamabad, the country's capital and Rawalpindi, its twin city and the home for the Army's headquarters are besieged. The two assassination attempts on the President, both on occasions when he was traveling from one city to the other, have occasioned the sort of security precautions that block traffic on the main traffic arteries in the two cities for hours on end. In Karachi, the only seaport of Pakistan and the principal centre of commercial and industrial activity, bomb blasts and the attendant insecurity have become common place occurrences. Sectarian killings, in mosques or in carefully planned attacks on specific individuals continue to occur at irregular intervals provoking the bitter comment that unlike fixed hunting periods for game birds it is "open season" for the killing of Shias.

Internationally, Pakistan faces the allegations that the President listed and that have been mentioned earlier. Official investigations so far have led senior Pakistani officials to offer informal briefings to western newspapers in which the venality and corruption of individuals have been identified as the motivations for the supply of nuclear technology and equipment to other states. There are nevertheless suggestions that as and when the culprits are indicted they will plead Islamic solidarity rather than personal gain as the motivations for their actions. The cost of acquiring or disseminating technology relating to weapons of mass destruction is extremely high. In Pakistan's case the officially articulated view in Washington suggests acceptance that these were the acts of individuals but such forbearance is clearly owed to the perceived need-in the light of the Afghan situation- to maintain relations with the present government in Pakistan on an even keel.

Similarly on the other allegations - Pakistan's perceived Afghan and Kashmir policies - there is a belief that the extremist agenda and vested interests are responsible for deviations from declared official policy.

Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan's Foreign Policy in the Changed Global Environment

In the United States the attack of 11th September has effected a sea change in public perceptions. In recent months, President Bush's overall approval rating has fallen. A majority now feels that the war in Iraq was wrong and many now believe that President Bush has not done well with the economy. But his stand against terrorism still has the support of a large majority.¹⁰ It is apparent that this is a facet on which Bush will continue to focus. The Americans also not only accept but insist that the war against terrorism should continue for as long as it takes to eliminate this menace and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Given this circumstance, it must be accepted that, were it not for the Afghan situation, there would be as much of a berating of Islamabad by US officials as there is by the western press.

There are differences between the leading powers-permanent members of the Security Council and such countries as Japan and Germany on a number of issues. There is, however, unanimity on the subject of fighting the scourge of terrorism by one means or the other. There are some who argue that the root causes of terrorism need to be addressed alongside the coordinated battle against those who use terrorism as a tool for political or other ends. Some attention is being paid to this facet but as the examples of Palestine, Afghanistan and Kashmir show that the main focus continues to remain on eliminating terrorist activity and it seems to be more and more widely accepted that only when such terrorism has been eliminated would the international community be prepared to put its weight behind the search for solutions to the root causes.

This was made evident when the American perspective, mistaken or otherwise, was explained by Richard Holbrooke, the former US ambassador to the United Nations in a conference in Doha, organized by the Qatar financed U.S.-Islamic World Forum and the Brookings Institute. He admitted that "If we cannot contain and reverse the growing chasm between the West -- and especially the United States -- and the Islamic world, it will become the underlying structural flaw that will worsen many other problems," including terrorism, the Middle East problem and global poverty". But he went on to add that Americans had been shaken by the attacks of September 11, 2001, in a way that much of the rest of the

world still did not understand, and that "Every American who follows foreign policy understands your views. But at the same time, I urge you to understand that American views are for the most part quite different on this issue. As we seek progress in the Middle East, it must be understood ... that the United States will never turn its back on Israel."¹¹

In France the wearing of the Hijab or headscarf by Muslim girls has been banned along with a ban on Jewish skull caps and large crosses or other symbols of Christianity. Ostensibly designed to emphasise French secularism the ban has been seen as aimed primarily at the Muslim headscarf and has evoked protest demonstrations but there seems to be little prospect that the ban will be rescinded. Of the countries in Europe, France has the largest Muslim population and therefore the greatest concern about this issue but there seems to be every prospect that other European countries may also follow suit. In the meanwhile many of the advanced countries have followed the American example and in fact have gone further than them in restricting visas for travelers from Muslim countries. The restriction is particularly stringent in the case of Pakistan where most European embassies either refuse to entertain visa applications or suggest that securing clearance for the visas will take up to 12 weeks.

In the Muslim world Iran after protracted negotiations has signed the additional protocol to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement, thus giving the IAEA access to all its nuclear facilities and has at the same time suspended its uranium enrichment programme. It has also provided information to the IAEA regarding the sources of the nuclear equipment and material that it had acquired over the last many years. This has won them debate for the trade agreement with European Union they were looking for and has avoided a crisis in relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency which could have led to sanctions being imposed by the UN Security Council. There are also currently some contacts which may lead to the surrender by the Iranians of some Al-Qaeda leaders who reportedly have sought shelter in Iran. The current domestic crisis in Iran, occasioned by the effort of the conservatives to shut the reformists out of the

forthcoming elections and the intervention by the Rahbar, Ayatollah Khamenei is also being largely influenced by the active presence of the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is noteworthy that after initial skepticism the Americans are prepared to acknowledge that the Iranians are not playing a disruptive role in Iraq. It is equally noteworthy that even the "conservatives" in their effort to eliminate or curb further the limited political power of the "reformists" are now turning a blind eye to the flouting of dress restrictions and the rules of public behaviour imposed by the clerics as part of the Islamisation of Iranian society. The manner in which the current crisis will be resolved in Iran is not clear but what is clear is that much of what was seen as "extremist dogma" will be curbed or done away with in both Iran's domestic polity and its foreign policy.

In Libya a sea change in policy has been effected with the agreement reached after months of negotiations on Libya agreeing to dismantle under international supervision all programmes for the production of weapons of mass destruction and seeking western, particularly American cooperation in the rebuilding of its oil industry.

In Saudi Arabia after some terrorist attacks that targeted prominent Saudis as much as they targeted foreigners a large scale operation appears to have been launched to identify Al-Qaeda adherents and sympathizers and those belonging to other terrorist or extremist organisations. The Saudis have displayed, while expressing their ire about the charges against Saudi Arabia in the American press, considerable sensitivity to American concerns even with regard to their internal system of education and governance. Steps are apparently being taken also to revise some of the text books that allegedly preached an extreme brand of Islam. In the latest development Saudi and American authorities are jointly approaching the United Nations to place on the "terrorist list" Saudi-based organisations suspected of funding extremist Islamic organisations in other parts of the world. While making the announcement, Crown Prince Abdullah's foreign policy adviser, Adel Jubair, said "No two countries coordinate counterterrorism efforts more closely than the United States and Saudi Arabia.". At the end of the day, we're the main targets in al Qaeda's cross hairs."¹²

Saudi and American officials are cooperating in denying diplomatic status in the USA to Saudi clerics sent by the Saudi Ministry of Religious Affairs to work in Saudi financed Islamic institutes in the USA.

In Syria, domestic extremism had been curbed with an iron hand since the days of Hafez Al-Asad but there were repeated western allegations that the Syrians provided shelter and concrete assistance to extremist organisations. The current international environment being what it is the Israelis could bomb a so-called camp of an extremist organisation in Syria without provoking anything more than token international protest.

There have also been questions about Syria's development of WMD. In an interview to the "Daily Telegraph" of the UK Bashar Al-Assad said that "Syria has a right to defend itself by acquiring chemical and biological weapons". On the other side pressure from the USA and the UK on Syria is growing. Prime Minister Blair is quoted as saying that he hoped he hoped Syria would follow Libya's example of disavowing all programs of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and that "We offer Syria the possibility of a partnership for the future. But it is important that they realize that the terms are very clear and have been set out by ourselves and the Americans many times." "The issue of weapons of mass destruction can be dealt with diplomatically if people are prepared to do so, but it does have to be dealt with,"¹³

The threat is clear and the capacity to resist is low given the fragility of the economy and relative inexperience of the new Syrian leadership. Negotiations have been going on for some time and it seems likely that there too there will be agreement reached with the Americans on the dismantling of programmes that the Americans allege are designed to produce weapons of mass destruction and to apprehend those elements suspected of being terrorists. This is the price Syria will have to pay to secure American pressure on Israel to resume negotiations with Syria on the Middle East peace settlement. In Indonesia, the Bali bombing and other less well publicized terrorist incidents have prompted a crackdown on organisations like the Jamayeh Islami termed an affiliate of al Qaeda. In the other

Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan's Foreign Policy in the Changed Global Environment

countries of South East Asia with Muslim majorities or substantial Muslim minorities initial denials of the presence of terrorist organisations there is now acknowledgement of their existence and a strong official effort-backed in many cases by the United States- to eliminate them and their networks. It also seems evident that while the religious parties had considerable support among the voters earlier the recent acts of terrorism have eroded this base of support. The elimination of extremism in Pakistan is not only therefore an imperative for repairing the damage to Pakistan's domestic polity though this is the most important reason for doing so but it is also important if Pakistan is to avoid facing international pressures that could take the form of the sort of international sanctions that brought Libya to its knees and the threat of which caused Iran to relent. This is the reality that we have to contend with.

The task is one that only Pakistanis can accomplish for themselves. The US perspective on this was spelt out when speaking to reporters in Washington, General Abizaid Commander of the US Central Command said that "The biggest threat in the global war on terrorism is the threat posed by extremists in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan". Pakistan, he added, had been a vital ally in the war on terror and should continue to receive as much US assistance as it needed to defeat extremism but this was not a matter that could be resolved by US military power. "This", he said, in a statement of the obvious, "is a battle of ideas as much as it is a military battle and we've got to help him (Musharraf) fight that battle".¹⁴ The challenge is internal but the international climate creates an opportunity for getting the international support that could help to meet the challenge.

End Notes

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2. "President Musharraf's Speech" October 04, 2003.
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4. President Bush at Joint Press Conference with President Musharraf in Washington, February 13, 2002.
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7. Fareed Zakaria, "Opening in South Asia" Washington Post, 13 January 2004.
8. "President Wants Jihad Against Extremism", Dawn January 18, 2004.
9. "Pakistan Leader Jeered in Parliament Speech Criticizing Extremism", The New York Times January 18, 2004.
10. Mr. Bush retains a powerful advantage on national security. Sixty-eight percent, including majorities of both Democrats and independents, gave him high marks for the campaign against terrorism, and 68 percent said the Bush administration's policies have made the United States safer from terrorist attacks. Sixty-four percent said they considered him a strong leader. (Nytimes180104 "Poll Bolsters Bush on Terrorism but Finds Doubts on Economy") The New York Times January 18, 2004.
11. "Israel at center of annual U.S.-Muslim forum Washington criticized for strategic relationship", CNN January 10, 2004.
12. "U.S., Saudi Arabia Fettering Charity Linked to Terrorism", The Washington Post January 23, 2004.
13. "Syria entitled to possess WMD: Assad" Jerusalem Post January 6, 2004.
14. "Pakistan, S. Arabia face major terror threat: US", Dawn January 30, 2004.

Author

Mr. Najmuddin A. Shaikh joined the Foreign Service of Pakistan in 1961 after obtaining a B.Com from the Sind University. He subsequently did Master's from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Mr. Shaikh served in various capacities in missions abroad and at home. These included Moscow (65-68), Tehran (68-70), Baghdad (73-77) and Washington (79-83) before his Ambassadorial Assignments in Canada (87-89), Germany (89-90) United States of America (90-91). His last assignment was as Foreign Secretary from 94 to 97. Mr. Shaikh retired in 1999 and since then has been a frequent contributor of articles on security issues to newspapers and a regular commentator on TV and Radio.

RETHINKING THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF PAKISTAN

Dr. Shireen M. Mazari

This paper examines the dynamics of Pakistan's national security, focusing on concerns and objectives. At a basic level, security is indivisible and is something a state can have more or less of. Security has an objective and subjective dimension as well as an internal and an external dimension. At a minimal level, a state includes within its security parameters territorial integrity, national sovereignty and the absence of fear of threat to these values – which as a basic feature is common to all states. Of course, with the growing interdependence amongst states within the international system, *sovereignty* itself has, over the decades, altered in its conceptualisation.

Although there is a tendency to focus on the external dimension when dealing with issues of national security, the indivisibility of this notion implies that the internal dimension of security is equally critical. Just as foreign policy emanates from domestic compulsions, so external security is interlinked to the internal dynamics of a state's security. In fact, the internal dimensions of security have become critical within the context of nuclearisation and the changing nature of warfare. Increasingly, with the advent of ever more lethal weapons, the cost-ineffectiveness of the military solution through occupation has meant that traditional warfare has given way to other unconventional means. In the same way, with the battlegrounds extending beyond the military front to the civilian population-industrial areas and civilian spheres of activity, the socio-ecological costs of traditional war have increased manifold - especially with the advent of nuclear facilities and industries like the chemical industry, which can have a tremendous fallout if destroyed. Since many industrial centres are close to population concentrations, the destructive fallout is further multiplied.

Also, while the international community has failed to outlaw war *per se*, it has become more and more unacceptable for states to use all-out military means to resolve their conflicts. Instead, the use of the military option is increasingly justified within some multilateral cover. In the present day world, war has now expanded to include many unconventional means like guerrilla warfare, psychological warfare including the use of terror, economic warfare and indirect intervention in the territory of a rival state. In many ways, while for Clausewitz war was a continuation of politics by other means, now it is almost as if politics has become an extension of war by other means. And in these "other means" is included all manner of tactics short of direct all-out military confrontation. One major tool of "other means" is subversion.

To subvert, as the Chambers English Dictionary defines the word, means "to overthrow; to overturn; to pervert". Subversion means, "overthrow; ruin". Since, in a conflictual relationship between hostile actors, the aim of each is to ruin the other, so subversion becomes a natural strategy for each. Given the decreasing relevance and acceptability of conventional warfare, states in conflictual relationships opt for indirect interventions in enemy territory in order to destabilise and weaken the polity. As such then, low intensity conflicts become a more viable option – low intensity conflict referring to a level of violent engagement short of all-out war. Given the transnational linkages that sub-national groups within a state have these days, and given the reach of modern communications, the boundaries between external and internal, domestic and foreign have become increasingly blurred – highlighting once again the criticality of civil society in the security equation.

This is especially true for South Asia in general and Pakistan in particular. Pakistan's security environment has been altering since the nuclearisation of the region and then the events of 11 September, 2001 (9/11). The overall changes have accentuated the security problems for Pakistan – especially because at one level there has been an increasing enmeshing of the external security dynamics with the internal political dynamics.

Internal Security Dynamics. One can identify four levels at which the internal dynamics of state-society relations impact directly on Pakistan's security framework – with the first level itself altering the dynamics of the other three.

Militarization of Civil Society. Whether it is a conflict between hostile student organisations or political rivalry, or an argument between two individuals, Pakistan's civil society has seen an increasing resort to violence to resolve all manner of conflicts. This militarization of civil society – its preference for a violent course of action over other means of exercising influence – became marked after the imposition of martial law following a military coup in July 1977. Militarization is directly linked to the concept of militarism – which denotes a “social formation and structure”¹ reflecting it at the behavioural level of state and civil society. Both militarization and militarism reflect the prevalence of a conflictual framework at the level of the state and civil society, where increasing violence comes to mark conflict behaviour – not only of the state but also of civil society within the state.

The 1977 coup and Zia's Afghan policy altered the dynamics of societal conflicts and enmeshed domestic and external policies more intensely together. With political parties banned and all venues for protest through legal means closed, polarisation within society intensified. Cleavages and conflicts within civil society, which had shown a violent trend under Z. A. Bhutto's increasing use of the coercive elements of the state, grew worse under the successor military rule. The ban on political parties led to an increasing focus on seeking identity through group membership based upon ethnicity, sectarianism and the traditional *biradari* (kinship) system. As it did then, such a development further bolsters the prevalent conflict within society, as polarization develops vertically.²

The militarization of society continued to prevail in the post-Zia period and still continues to act as an accentuator of civil society cleavages, leading to a general decline of law and order. This, in turn, weakens the domestic polity's fabric and thereby undermines the external projection of national interest. It also allows for easier internal penetration by external powers for subversive purposes. Until

deweaponization of civil society is affected extensively, democratization of the polity will not lower the level of militarization of society. This has been illustrated in the post-Zia period – from 1988 to the present.

Political Structures and Stability. The second level of internal state dynamics is the prevalence or otherwise of a democratic political culture and stable political structures.

Pakistan has yet to evolve a substantive democratic culture. Political stability throughout has been undermined not only by the erratic democratic experiments but also by the societal violence and polarisation that has come to mark the post-1977 political culture. The violence that came with the availability of weaponry and the abundance of drug money defined this political culture into the end of the nineties. Even though the ethnicity factor has subsided during the last two general elections, political polarisation has even now become ever more acute as the intolerant culture of kinship and sectarianism has undermined broad-based national political agendas. The acute nature of political dissent, and the lack of evolution of democratic institutions has often held external policy hostage to politics of intolerance and violence.

Additionally, the weakening of state institutions by successive governments has meant that institutional decision-making has tended to be replaced increasingly by personalized decision-making, often with no formal records being kept. The result has been the erosion of policy continuity and formulation of long-term objectives. Instead, the state tends to be dominated by ad-hocism, with new governments first trying to undo their predecessors' decisions – or, at the very least, introducing a completely new set of policies which leave earlier ones half-implemented or totally reversed. All these tendencies undermine the external credibility of the state, in terms of alliance and investment reliability.

Growth of Ethnic and Sectarian Groups. The development of vertical polarisation within civil society – a legacy of the Zia period – has continued to define Pakistan's political landscape. Although the ethnicity factor has become less violent and critical over the last few

years, within the national polity (as seen by the success of national parties over ethnic parties in the provincial and national electoral results in the last two general elections), the continuing instability along the Durand Line can threaten to raise this factor once more in the future – especially the continuing disenfranchisement of the Pakhtun community in Afghanistan and the Afghan refugee problem which continues to persist. Presently, the sectarian issue continues to haunt the national polity.

Sectarian conflict also has grown within Pakistan in the post 1977 period so that external powers have found it expedient to use Pakistan for their proxy wars. The revival of political activity, instead of undermining sectarianism, sustained it because political parties found powerful support groups amongst the sectarian elements. The sectarian issue within Pakistan's domestic polity has had a negative fallout on Pakistan's relations with neighbours like Iran.

The success of the religious political coalition Motehada Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) in the last elections has added a new factor in Pakistan's political spectrum, which may also cause instability domestically – given that the MMA may take the provinces under its rule in one direction while the other provinces move in a substantively different developmental direction – and which will impact Pakistan's external relations. However, it is too early to predict the future impact of the MMA on the national polity over the long term – since the survival of the coalition itself is debatable.

The present government's move to ban extremist religious outfits is a recognition of the problem presented by these militant groups and it is also a recognition of the fact that the efforts to privatize "*jihad*" across the LOC by some of these groups has undermined Pakistan's operationalisation of its external policy.

Socio-economic Development. Corruption within the state apparatus, uneven development, neglect of the agricultural sector and an unhealthy dependency on the textile sector has undermined economic progress. An undocumented economy has allowed a parallel economy to develop, which has further eroded national resources. All these factors have led to an overwhelming dependence on external

financial resources. This external dependency affects Pakistan's external policy options, limiting many alternatives, which donors may not permit. Also, most external financial inputs have gone into non-revenue generating activities, thereby further burdening the nation.

Economic compulsions are also making it increasingly difficult for Pakistan to put the issue of trade with India on the back burner till political conflicts between the two are resolved. If the pressure continues, Pakistan's external security imperatives may well be further jeopardised. Along with the economic underdevelopment, social development is impeded by an uncontrolled population growth, which so far the state has been unable to control.

External Security Dynamics

Three major issues now impact Pakistan's external security environment in an altered fashion:

- The relationship with the US
- The issue of WMD
- The Pakistan-India relationship

These issues have impacted other aspects of Pakistan's security environment, including its relationship with its allies and its interaction in international fora – and, most critically, they have further enmeshed the external dimension of security with the internal.

Pakistan's relationship with the US. The Pakistan-US relationship is an increasingly dialectical one, having multiple levels of operationalisation.

The War on Terrorism

Post-9/11, Pakistan became a frontline state once again for the US – this time as a partner in the US-led War on Terrorism. Having backed the Taliban regime, Pakistan had to do an about-face on this support after the link between Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda and the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the US was established; and the support extended by the Taliban to Osama bin Laden made the

Taliban regime the main target of the US-led war on terrorism in Afghanistan. However, as the war in Afghanistan has progressed, and the US has been unable to establish law and order in that country, Pakistan has seen a direct challenge to its sovereignty along the Pakistan-Afghan border region. The US has been seeking hot pursuit across the Durand Line which Pakistan is not prepared to grant – and this has often lead to clashes between Pakistani and US forces. Also, because of the exclusion of the Pashtuns from the power structures in Afghanistan, there is a coalescing of these forces with the Taliban remnants and as the US frustration increases over its inability to capture Osama bin Laden, Pakistan comes under political fire from Washington which in turn aggravates the Pak-US relationship.

The Pashtun factor has also brought the Afghan issue into the internal dynamics of Pakistan's political structures. The MMA government in the NWFP is increasingly at odds with Islamabad over the intervention of the Pakistan army into the tribal areas in pursuit of al-Qaeda remnants, who may have crossed over into Pakistan after the US attacks on Afghanistan began. The presence of the army in the tribal belt, for the first time, has had mixed results. While some tribal leaders resent the erosion of their authority and are using the threat to tribal values as a pretext to garner support from the MMA provincial government, the army's policy of building communication infrastructure and providing schools and health facilities will help bring this area into the national mainstream – a move that was long overdue.

Meanwhile, the emergence of the Northern Alliance into power in Afghanistan has meant that Pakistan has a hostile neighbour in post-Taliban Afghanistan and the growing Indian presence there has further aggravated the problem for Pakistan. India has opened six consulates in Afghanistan, including along the border towns like Kandahar and Jalalabad. India has also established two air bases in Tajikistan and for Pakistan there is now the possibility of a two-front multiple level threat from India (discussed below).

Another new development in Afghanistan that has long-term strategic implications for the region, including Pakistan, is the

presence now of NATO in Afghanistan. This is a qualitative expansion of the NATO operational framework and could lead to a new involvement of NATO in Asian security matters. With NATO on its borders, both China and Pakistan have to study the implications for their long-term security.

The Pre-emptive Doctrine of the US National Security Strategy Paper and Its Impact on Pakistan

The invasion of Iraq and the promulgation of the pre-emptive doctrine by the US has a direct bearing on Pakistan's security concerns because the doctrine focuses primarily on Muslim states in its expansive reach of pre-emption at the political, economic and military levels. Also, Pakistan as a member of the Security Council, has come under US pressure for support on UN SC resolutions tabled by the US. Pakistan has also come under pressure on the issue of the sending of Pakistani troops under US command to serve in Iraq. This issue has a strong domestic fallout for Pakistan – which is why Pakistan has made a policy statement that it will only send forces under a UN mandate. However, the US draft resolution on the issue still calls for a multinational force (not a UN force) under US Command – which will not resolve the issue for Muslim states like Pakistan.

The pre-emptive doctrine also refers to the vague notion of “failing states” and the more precise definition of “rogue” states. Given the linkage with the notion of axis of evil, these categorisations have a direct bearing on Muslim states, in the long term, especially given the last characteristic of a “rogue state”, which identifies a rogue state as one which *“rejects basic human values and hate the United States and all that it stands for.”* So, at the end of the day, any government or state that is seen as hostile to the US will merit preemptive action on the part of the US.

The military aspects of pre-emption have reasserted the primacy of military power in international relations because the military aspect of the pre-emptive doctrine has to be seen together with the US Nuclear Posture Review of 2002. In the Review the US has tried to rationalise the use of nuclear weapons, even against

states that do not possess them. Deterrence has been set aside as having become redundant. Now this directly impacts countries like Pakistan which have built up a minimum deterrence through a policy of nuclear restraint.

The Bilateral Pakistan-US Relationship

Post-9/11, Pakistan and the US once again got drawn into an intensive cooperative relationship – within the context of the war on terrorism. As a result the US has been given extensive access to Pakistan's intelligence and security structures, but there is a growing questioning of this relationship within Pakistan – especially since the US has yet to live up to its quid pro quos, especially the financial ones such as the one relating to market access for Pakistan's textiles. US Aid has, however, once again established its presence in Pakistan with programmes being initiated in the health and education sector.

President Musharraf's visit to the US earlier this year (2003) did result in a \$ 3 billion economic and military aid package, but Congress has yet to approve it and already many conditionalities are being linked to this package. Also, in terms of military aid, the US has shown no willingness to transfer state-of-the-art weapon systems to Pakistan. Even in terms of sale of weapons the US has so far not acceded to Pakistani requests for F-16s or the Phalcon system that the US is allowing Israel to transfer to India. So far the military aid and sales relates to spares and some defensive systems to help in the war on terrorism. Latest reports suggest that the US will allow the sale of \$9 billion of modern arms to Pakistan, but there is little yet on the terms and conditions – including Congressional Conditionalities. There is an expectation that the sale will include vision devices, missiles and radars – but not the Phalcon system. The US also seems to be willing to sell transport aircraft and spares for the Pakistan Navy's Harriers and Sea King helicopters.

Pakistan has expressed concern over the Phalcon sale to India since this directly destabilises the strategic nuclear balance established in South Asia. The Phalcon sale to India is part of a massive US-India strategic partnership which has a strong defence

component – and is linked to the Indo-Israeli relationship which centres on defence cooperation. The US-India relationship directly impinges on the US-Pakistan relationship because of the defence aspects whereby the transfer of certain weapon systems to India impacts on the security threat perceptions of Pakistan.

As stated earlier, US pressure on Pakistan is also growing on the issue of the sending of Pakistani forces to Iraq. Pakistan has made it clear that it will do so only under UN mandate and/or on the request of the Iraqi people and the OIC or GCC. The problem for Pakistan is that it is not feasible for its forces to serve under a US commander answerable to the US government. This is totally different from serving under a UN Commander answerable to the Secretary General and the UN SC – a system under which Pakistan has sent its forces on many occasions. But as the US gets bogged down in Iraq, the pressure on Pakistan will continue to grow.

All in all, it is becoming evident that the US-Pakistan relationship is going to come under increasing stress – especially given the proclivity of the US media to make Pakistan the scapegoat for all manner of issues, which, in turn, leads to a growing hostility towards the US within the Pakistani polity. Thus, in the long term, the Pakistan-US relationship will have to be defined within the framework of issue-specific cooperation with clear-cut quid pro quos.

The Issue of WMD

The whole issue of WMD has become highly politicized, with the result that the non-proliferation agenda has been cast aside. Instead, only certain states' WMD programmes are going to be targeted and presently these states are Iran, Syria and, to a lesser extent it seems, North Korea. For Pakistan the problem arises because it has become the favourite whipping boy on the proliferation issue and is accused, willy nilly, of providing nuclear assistance to Iran and North Korea. This is despite the fact that India has a science and technology collaboration agreement with Iran and an extensive uranium enrichment programme – and in the case of North Korea if it was going the enrichment route, it would not have

needed to challenge the UN inspectors and so on. The revelation in early December 2003 that some Pakistani scientists may have given assistance to Iran in the nuclear field, for monetary reasons, further increases the West's discomfiture with Pakistan's nuclear capability.

For the future, countries like Pakistan will be dragged into the WMD issue. For Pakistan, the issue is critical because this pretext could be a means of trying to target Pakistan's nuclear programme which sits uneasily with the US. And since WMD remains one of the rationalisations for the US pre-emptive doctrine, the present framing of the WMD issue impacts and aggravates Pakistan's security concerns.

The Pakistan-India Relationship

Post-9/11, the Pakistan-India relationship deteriorated further with India trying to use the War on Terrorism to bring Pakistan and Kashmir into the terrorist ambit. While this policy did not succeed totally, what India has managed to do is to frame the Kashmir issue purely in the context of "cross-border" infiltration and Islamic fundamentalism so that the real nature of the Kashmir dispute has been sidetracked. Pakistan's gestures of compromise and accommodation on Indian and international concerns have not met with any reciprocity from the Indian side and India has failed to give any response to the Pakistani suggestion to have international monitors along both sides of the LOC.

India played a game of brinkmanship by mobilising its forces along the Pakistan-India border, but eventually the ploy failed to work so both sides have recently begun to move away from the brink and towards re-establishment of normalcy. However, this time round, Pakistan would like to see restoration of "normalcy" linked to commencement of bilateral dialogue. Unfortunately, at present, the BJP's internal politics has prevented the Indians from having a clear-cut policy towards Pakistan and there is a feeling that not much will happen in the way of dialogue before the Indian elections – but sometimes leaders can break the deadlock as President Musharraf did most recently on the issue of over flights and restoration of air links between the two states. Perhaps most critical

has been the latest statement (in an interview with *Reuters* in early December 2003) on Kashmir by President Musharraf, where he once again reiterated his call for both Pakistan and India to put aside their stated positions on the dispute and arrive at a solution through negotiation. The expected SAARC Summit in January 2004 is expected to provide the necessary breakthrough between Pakistan and India but so far there is no certainty that the bilateral dialogue will resume.

Meanwhile, there is the new diplomatic offensive being undertaken by India to increase people-to-people contact between various groups of Indians and Pakistanis including school children and businessmen. This builds up the pressure on the Pakistani state to seek accommodation with India without the necessary moves for dialogue on Kashmir. The wooing of the business community by India is the most threatening, since economic interests can be a strong motivating factor for restoration of trade ties despite outstanding core issues like Kashmir.

For Pakistan, the US-India relationship also raises some new security concerns not only in terms of the destabilisation of the military balance in the region, but also in terms of the energy security issue. The US and India have an agreement to jointly patrol the Indian Ocean from the Red Sea to the Malacca Straits, thereby controlling the critical oil transport routes. Also, joint US-India military exercises in sensitive areas like Ladakh close to Pakistan and China, sends negative signals in terms of the security concerns of these two neighbours of India.

India's increasing presence in Afghanistan also directly aggravates Pakistan's security concerns – especially in terms of low intensity conflict (LIC) in the volatile provinces of Balochistan and the NWFP. The Indian consulate in Zahedan, close to the Pakistan-Iran border, has already been indulging in covert activities aimed at destabilizing Balochistan and the Pakistan government has had to register a protest with the government of Iran on this count.

Meanwhile, India's acquisition of weapon systems like the Phalcon means that Pakistan will have to reconsider its unilateral

policy of nuclear restraint. The acquisition of missile defence by India means that Pakistan will have to increase its missile production and go in for an expansive second strike capability. All this undermines the existing stability of the strategic deterrence.

All the developments discussed above show a need for Pakistan to not only evolve a long-term comprehensive assessment of its national security, taking into account the internal and external factors, but also to visualize a comprehensive proactive policy on security. While Pakistan's security challenges have become more acute, new opportunities are also arising as the region undergoes major changes. As external and internal dimensions of security become more enmeshed, one with the other, there is a need to improve the internal political landscape and evolve national consensus on critical security issues.

Also, while the short-term situation may present acute security problems, the long-term offers a host of opportunities especially now that the sub-regional Asian divides have dissipated in strategic terms – both, militarily with the introduction of medium range missiles in South and West Asia, and politically, with the intervention of the global war on terrorism and the operationalisation of the US pre-emptive doctrine. In this expanded security milieu, waiting for events to happen and then simply reacting to them will be insufficient to bolster the state's security. Instead, proactive policies need to be formulated which are consonant with the needs of the domestic polity and the trends in the external environment.

End Notes

- ¹ See, for instance, M.Thee, "*Militarism and Militarization in Contemporary International Relations*" in A.Eide & M Thee, editors, *Problems of Contemporary Militarism* (London: Croom Helm, 1980. Pp. 15-35. Also see, P. Wallensteen, J. Galtung & C. Portales, editors, *Global Militarization* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985).

2. A. Hussain, "The Crisis of State Power in Pakistan", in P. Wignaraja & A. Hussain, Editors, The Challenge in South Asia (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1989), Pp. 199-236.

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EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UN IN THE CHANGED GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

Shahid M. Amin

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington have changed the course of world history. These attacks, which were attributed to Al-Qaeda, a secretive Islamic group led by Usama Bin Laden, shook the world's sole Super Power, the USA, to the core. Its pride was hurt and its sense of security badly shaken. To take revenge, the powerful neo-conservative lobby in the US influenced President George W. Bush to launch a global war against terrorism. It is notable that nearly all countries of the world shared the sense of outrage and concern felt by the US at 9/11 and were at least initially, supportive of the declared US goal of a global war against terrorism.

Since 9/11, the US has embarked on two major military operations. Firstly, the refusal of the xenophobic Taliban regime in Afghanistan to hand over Usama Bin Laden resulted in the US-led attack on Afghanistan in October 2001. The UN gave its blessings to the US action and even the majority of governments in the Islamic world extended support to the US in this war. At the same time, there were deep misgivings all over the world about the very idea of a forcible change of any regime – even one as unpopular internationally as that of the Taliban -- and the use of force by a Super Power against a small and relatively powerless country. In the Islamic world, despite support of their governments for the US action, public opinion was angered by what was seen as the destruction of a Muslim state. Besides, some circles in the Islamic countries saw the US action against Afghanistan as the manifestation of a historical animus against the Islamic world. This revived talk about a new crusade against Islam and a clash of civilizations.

The wounds in the Islamic world had not quite healed when, in March 2003, the US-UK coalition attacked Iraq. Unlike the case of Afghanistan, the US-led invasion of Iraq was undertaken in defiance of world opinion. No doubt, the US tried initially to secure

UN support for the attack on Iraq, but having failed in that objective, it decided to bypass the Security Council. In particular, Arab and Muslim opinion was outraged by the US attack on Iraq, although it should be noted that some Arab states, as also Turkey, did provide military facilities to the US during the war. Of course, the opposition to the Iraq war was worldwide and there were large demonstrations against it in the Western world itself. In particular, France, Germany and Russia were highly critical of the US attack. The NATO alliance was deeply split on the issue.

Prior to the attack, the US had asserted its right to take unilateral action where it deemed it to be in its national interest. In his report to the US Congress on September 20, 2002, President Bush announced a strategy for pre-emptive action against "hostile states" and terrorist groups alleged to be developing weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, he said that the US would not allow its military supremacy to be challenged in the way it was during the Cold War¹. In a sweeping blueprint for global supremacy, President Bush made it clear that the US would not allow any rival power to challenge its military might; would launch pre-emptive military strikes against security threats even when they were not imminent; and would not shrink from compelling others to fall in line. The three notable features of the Bush Doctrine can also be described as follows: a "distinctly American internationalism" based on uncontested military superiority; unilateralism as against multilateralism; and pre-emptive strikes against hostile regimes or those that sponsor terrorism². In particular, the US has decided to target countries possessing -- or suspected by it to be possessing -- weapons of mass destruction. This concept of unilateralism and pre-emption, which really constitutes the Bush Doctrine, has caused concern all over the world.

While the Bush Doctrine has attracted worldwide attention, and is seen as a direct response to 9/11, in actual fact, the doctrine of pre-emption and first-strike has been advocated by US policy-makers ever since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. The present US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz had espoused this concept as early as 1991 in a report prepared for the Pentagon. He had predicted that US military intervention would

become “a constant feature” of world affairs. The US would “retain pre-eminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs that threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends.” This included a first-strike option or “pre-emption” against potentially hostile states engaged in the development of weapons of mass destruction³.

According to another American strategist, Charles Krauthammer, “the true geopolitical structure of the post-Cold War world is that of a single pole of world power that consists of the United States at the apex of the industrial west... American preeminence is based on the fact that it is the only country with the military, diplomatic, political and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself⁴.” Philip Bobbitt, whose book *The Shield of Achilles* (2002) summarizes current US strategic thinking, states that the advocates of this particular US school of thought which includes Krauthammer hold that even collective security schemes like NATO are “little more than a psychological fig leaf for the robust American assertion of power (and thus reserve a special contempt for the U.N.)⁵.”

Note needs to be taken of another important dimension of the nature of global warfare, brought out in particular by 9/11. The terrorists who attacked New York and Washington brought to the fore the role increasingly being played by non-state actors in global politics. While terrorists -- working in isolation, or with some degree of support from one or more states -- have been around for quite some time, this issue has been dramatized by 9/11, as it affected the vital interests of the world’s sole Super Power. Thus, terrorism by individuals or by small groups has emerged as a key global issue.

According to Bobbitt, in the 21st century, the great powers will repeatedly face five questions regarding the use of force: “whether to intervene, when to do so, with what allies, with what military and nonmilitary tools, and for what goals⁶.” Apart from outright war, Bobbitt suggests several possible nonmilitary strategic alternatives viz. “economic sanctions, covert action, bribes and financial incentives, sustained campaigns of precision air strikes,

novel military and political uses of intelligence products, information warfare, missile defense, simulation, the use of proxy forces, and the entire range of new technologies and tactics⁷.”

The above account suggests that many US strategists have been considering new strategies to meet the challenges to the US in the 21st century. However, 9/11 has clearly influenced Washington's decision to adopt the concept of preemption and unilateralism, which have become official policy with the announcement of the Bush Doctrine.

Against this background, it can be said that the post-9/11 world is quite different from the world that existed prior to that date. In particular, the US attack on Iraq was a defiant assertion of unilateralism and its sole Super Power status. Many analysts fear that this has gravely damaged the credibility of the UN and the whole concept of collective security on which it was based. The existing system of international legality has taken a body blow. There are fears that the US has set a bad precedent and that lesser powers might take this as a cue to launch their own pre-emptive strikes against smaller neighbors. Indeed, the world had hoped that the 21st century would have heralded a just world order based on enhanced collective security enshrined in the UN Charter. These prospects had been boosted in 1991 by the end of the Cold War and the fifty-year old East-West confrontation. Instead, the Iraq War of 2003 looks to some observers like a grave retrogression to the law of the jungle of the previous centuries.

While the foregoing apprehensions are not unfounded, there could be an excess of pessimism in such judgments. Firstly, a closer examination of the historical record shows that the US is not the first country to bypass the UN while resorting to unilateral military action. The UN has been bypassed repeatedly by many countries in the last fifty years. North Korea attacked South Korea in 1950 without a UN mandate. Israel attacked the Arabs in 1956 and 1967 without UN authorization, as did Egypt in 1973 when it launched its own attack on Israel. India attacked Pakistan in 1965; Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990 without any notice to the UN or anyone else. The former Soviet Union launched military invasions

against Hungary in 1956, against Czechoslovakia in 1968 and against Afghanistan in 1979 without any UN cover. The UN and the international community condemned most of these attacks, but only in the case of Korea in 1950 and Iraq in 1990, the UN was able to organize a collective response.

Secondly, it can be said that while each such unilateral use of force weakened the standing of the UN, it did survive and even bounced back. This is because the world needs a central body like the UN and keeps coming back to this forum despite reverses.

Clearly, the UN has often not been able to deliver on the promises made in 1945 when this body was set up in the flush of victory against three of the most dangerous expansionist, totalitarian states – Germany, Italy and Japan. As it turned out, the hopes for a brave new world were soon dashed to the ground as the Cold War between the East and the West paralyzed the UN. For the first thirty years or so, the repeated use of Soviet veto rendered the UN Security Council more or less ineffective. The premise of the UN Charter was that the five Great Powers would act in unison on key issues. This did not happen almost from the very start because of the great chasm that developed between the US and the Soviet Union. Only rarely when Washington and Moscow were in agreement, e.g. in opposition to Israel's attack on Egypt in 1956 and stopping the Indo-Pakistan War in 1965, did the UN surface as a credible body for peace-making. For the rest, the use of veto, or the threat of its use, often prevented the Security Council from playing an effective role to maintain peace in the world. Thus, for instance, ever since 1957, the Kashmir dispute was left in limbo due to the Soviet veto.

The end of the Cold War raised hopes for a more concerted action by the UN and the emergence of a new world order. The UN did put up a united front in 1990 to force Iraq to vacate its aggression against Kuwait. But this unity could not be maintained in the case of the crisis in Bosnia and Kosovo in the latter part of the 1990's. Russian (as also Chinese) support for Yugoslavia again paralyzed the UN Security Council. Eventually, the US-led military action against Yugoslavia was taken under the umbrella of NATO. The UN was again bypassed. However, it should be recalled that the

US was supported by the Islamic world and many other countries in the liberation of Kosovo.

The foregoing record suggests that, on several occasions, many countries have bypassed the UN, including the US. However, the UN has continued to survive and has even been resurrected after many a crisis. In fact, a question could be asked as to why there has been such an outcry when the US resorted to unilateral military action against Iraq in March 2003? One answer could be that the US had itself been a great advocate of the concept of collective security and reliance on the UN. It had never before resorted to war in the teeth of such opposition from the majority of world opinion. The reversal of the US attitude has, therefore, caused greater dismay. Another answer could be that the international community is uncomfortable with the idea of a sole Super Power seeking to run the world according to its whims. By raising such an outcry over the bypassing of the UN in the Iraq War, the world community sent a clear message to the US that it must not ignore world opinion and resort to unilateralism. The US policy-makers cannot but be disturbed by the growing anti-Americanism in the world unleashed by the Iraq War. This cannot be in the long-term strategic interests even of the world's sole Super Power.

Moreover, it needs to be said that although the US, in the final resort, did bypass the UN in the recent Iraq crisis, and has been condemned for the same, it did seek to carry the UN with it for the greater part of the crisis. The US attitude towards the UN in the Iraqi crisis has not been one of defiance. Had that happened, the credibility of the UN would have been damaged far more. In fact, the US has argued that UN Security Council Resolution 1441 had held Iraq guilty of "material breach" of its obligations stretching back over 16 previous UN Resolutions in 12 years. Moreover, Resolution 1441 gave Iraq one last chance to come into compliance or "face serious consequences." The US has contended that "serious consequences" meant the use of force, and thus its military action against Iraq carried UN sanction. Of course, most countries have not accepted the US interpretation but it would be an exaggeration to say that the US acted in total defiance of the Security Council.

To some extent, it can be argued that in the case of Iraq, the US has since been forced to partially revise its previous policy of bypassing the UN. The US did manage to topple the Saddam regime quickly in the military campaign but has since run into serious difficulties in winning the elusive peace in that country. The US has thus gone back to the UN to secure wider international support for its handling of post-war Iraq. Indeed, if the current resistance to US military occupation of Iraq continues, Washington might find it expedient to use the "fig leaf" of the UN to extricate itself from that country. Washington might well have learned a lesson from the Iraq War about the limits of unilateralism. Similarly, the UN has played an important role in the developments in Afghanistan in the post-Taliban period. Both instances show the continued relevance of the UN.

While judging the effectiveness of the UN, it needs to be recognized that the world body basically reflects the unity or disunity in the international community. Where there is cooperation, the UN institutions have done well enough, e.g. in the non-political spheres, as shown by the good work done by WHO, UNESCO, ILO, the World Court, etc. However, in the political arena, which is the domain of the UN Security Council, particularly on the key issue of peacekeeping, the UN has rarely been a success story throughout its existence. But the relative ineffectiveness of the UN did not destroy the premise on which it was based. The UN has always had the capability of becoming functional the moment the veto-wielding countries could reach a consensus amongst themselves. In any event, whether the UN is effective or not, it is also clear that the world would be far worse off if there were no UN. There is always a need for a forum where the countries of the world can sit down together to put forward their respective point of views on various issues. Even in the event of disagreement between any two countries, the protagonists would still like to project their point of view to other countries and canvass for support. The UN provides and will remain an institutionalized forum for this purpose.

Finally, a few words about the implications for Pakistan of the effectiveness of the UN in the changed global environment. No doubt, Pakistan's security concerns have been aggravated by the

damage done to the UN by the Iraq War and the US inclination to act unilaterally. This could encourage regional bullies like India to become even more defiant and aggressive in handling their neighbors. It is clearly in Pakistan's interest to join all those who are opposed to unilateralism and the bypassing of the UN. Pakistan should be even more insistent on strengthening international cooperation -- not only at the UN but also at various global and regional levels, whether it is the OIC or SAARC or NAM. This is one aspect of the equation.

The other aspect is that Pakistan cannot ignore the existing international realities, among which the most important one is the sole Super Power status of the USA and its propensity to act unilaterally. The strategic doctrine of Pakistan has throughout been that it faces a mortal threat from its neighbor India. Accordingly, the worst scenario from the point of view of Pakistan's security would be if the US were to make a common front with India against Pakistan. It is clear that India has sought since 9/11 to cash in on the US obsession with (Islamic) terrorism to get Pakistan bracketed as a state breeding and abetting terrorism. The presence of fanatical Islamic groups in Pakistan could give some credibility to Indian accusations. Also, there has been growing anti-Americanism in Pakistan and a great deal of emotional talk. This could also help India. To prevent a deterioration of relations with Washington, Pakistan must maintain its credentials as a progressive, moderate Islamic state. In fact, extremism has become a cancer in Pakistani society and needs to be eliminated in our own national interest. Towards this end, we must, on the one hand, act decisively to curb terrorism and extremism in Pakistan and elsewhere. On the other hand, Pakistan must continue to make the US realize that a lasting solution to the problem of terrorism lies in removing the causes that nourish terrorist activities, viz. the injustice done to Muslim peoples in Palestine, Kashmir and elsewhere.

End Notes

1. Peter Beaumont, *DAWN*, September 23, 2002
2. Afzaal Mahmood, *DAWN*, September 28, 2002.

3. Carol Brightman, *DAWN*, September. 27, 2002
4. *Foreign Affairs* 70 (1991) pp. 23, 24, 27.
5. Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles*, p. 270
6. Philip Bobbitt, *ibid*, p. 338
7. *Ibid*, p. 318

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PAKISTAN, INDIA, CHINA TRIANGLE: THE CHANGING GEO-STRATEGIC REALITIES AND INDO-PAK CONFLICTS

Dr. Moonis Ahmar

Introduction

President Musharraf's recent visit to China and the far reaching developments taking place in South, Central and West Asia, regions after September 11, 2001 undoubtedly influence Indo-Pak relations on the one hand, and Sino-Pak and Sino-Indian relations on the other hand. Warming up of Sino-Indian relations since early 1980s and the normalization of Sino-Russian relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union tend to raise a number of questions for the policy-makers of Pakistan. If the Indo-Pak relations are a hostage to the unresolved Kashmir dispute and the lack of meaningful regional cooperation in South Asia is primarily the outcome of New Delhi-Islamabad tension, the role of China in South Asia could be of immense significance.

During the cold war days, the notion, "my enemy's enemy is my friend" worked quite well in the context of Indo-Pak rivalry, U.S-Soviet confrontation, Sino-Soviet discords and Sino-Indian tussle. Pak-U.S strategic alliance, Indo-Soviet security understanding and Pak-China cooperation shaped the dynamics of South Asian security environment during the cold war days. With the shifting of paradigm in the global power politics in the aftermath of the end of the cold war, collapse of the bi-polar structure resulted into new realignments and readjustments by Pakistan, United States, India, China and Russia. Indian-U.S. relations which remained average during the cold war years began to improve after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Likewise, Sino-Soviet relations which remained tense began to improve with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Russian Federation as the successor state of the USSR. China and India, which fought a border war in 1962, also embarked on the process of normalization. But, in the entire spectrum of global and regional political and security changes

after the end of the cold war, Indo-Pak relations remained conflict ridden and the two neighbors went through a series of crisis after September 11, 2001 threatening peace in the South Asian region.

This paper will examine the triangle of Pakistan, India and China by examining following important realities:-

- The impact of Sino-Indian normalization process on Indo-Pak relations, particularly on the Kashmir dispute.
- The possibility of Beijing playing some sort of conciliatory role in the process of Indo-Pak conflict resolution.

The likelihood of Russia and China following a policy of “engagement” in South Asia with a single aim to defuse Indo-Pak tension and create plausible conditions for the just and peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

The impact on the events of September 11 and after on Sino-Indian, Pak-Indian and Sino-Pak relations. From a pragmatic standpoint, Pakistan’s foreign policy is at the crossroads because if the Kashmir conflict loses its momentum and India is successful in neutralizing popular assertion against New Delhi’s military occupation over the Kashmiri people, it will be highly problematic for Pakistan to put pressure on the international community for supporting the Kashmiri right of self-determination. China has traditionally been supportive to the cause of Kashmiri liberation, but in the recent past, it has modified its position and is advising both India and Pakistan to resolve that conflict bilaterally. Pakistan also supports a peaceful solution of the Kashmir conflict but its predicament is India is unwilling to talk on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir without Islamabad stopping what New Delhi says, “cross border terrorism.” Can Pakistan seek the Chinese support as far as the question of resolving the Kashmir dispute is concerned, or Beijing’s tacit neutrality on that matter is a source of advantage for India?

The Triangle

China, India and Pakistan are situated in geo-politically and geo-strategically sensitive regions of West and South Asia. Although, China's core interests lies in South East and East Asia, its borders with four South Asian countries and its role in South Asia also exists to a large extent.

The triangle of China, India and Pakistan in the changing global scenario after September 11, 2001 provides an opportunity for furthering the process of economic development and effectively dealing with sources of insecurity in South Asia. According to an Indian writer,

India, Pakistan and China, the three powers which determine the strategic profile of this region, constitute a security triangle. The southern Asian Security triangle is characterized by the geo-strategic and geo-political intertwining of the security policies of all three powers. The nature of one country's politics and policy preferences have an immediate impact on, and response from, the other two. The dynamics of the three-power relationship in southern Asia has predominantly been one of enduring antagonism between India and Pakistan, ambivalent friendship and discords between India and China, and close cooperation and strong friendship between Pakistan and China.¹

Three factors seem to influence the China-India and Pakistan triangle. First, the role of the United States in West and South Asia after September 11 centers on war against terrorism. Pakistan is America's strategic ally in its war against terrorism, whereas, Washington also shares its perceptions with New Delhi on the issue of terrorism and the activities of various terrorist organizations trying to destabilize India, particularly in its controlled parts of Jammu and Kashmir. With China, the United States shares the activities of Islamic extremists in the Chinese province of Xinjiang. For America, India and China, the threat of terrorism backed by religiously motivated extremist groups must be dealt in a comprehensive manner. Second, China, India and Pakistan share their borders with Jammu and Kashmir, a strategically important but

politically volatile region. Since mid-1970s, Beijing has adopted a relative neutral policy on Kashmir, calling upon Pakistan and India to resolve that conflict by direct negotiations. Beijing also refused to support Pakistan's drive to call a special UN session on Kashmir. During the Kargil crisis, China advised Islamabad to deal with that issue in a tactful manner and refused to condemn India. The future of Kashmir is thus significant to China, India and Pakistan because all the three countries understand the fact that instability in that region will negatively affect their domestic situation. Beijing is aware of the fact that the Muslim assertion in Xinjiang province will get an impetus if Muslim extremists gain control in Kashmir. Third, China, India and Pakistan are nuclear powers and are mindful to the fact that sustained unresolved conflicts in South Asia possess the threat of nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan.

In the China, India and Pakistan triangle, it is China which is in a position to play a conciliatory role in South Asia because of its close relations with Islamabad and growing ties with New Delhi. By not taking sides on the Kashmir conflict, China aims to encourage both India and Pakistan deal with their contentious issues bilaterally and peacefully. Apart from Kashmir, there is another dimension to China, India and Pakistan conflict, i.e. the issue of Tibet. With the neutrality of China on the Kashmir dispute, India has also followed a policy on Tibet which accepts Beijing's suzerainty on that area. Since long, India was supporting Tibet's independence movement from China and had also assisted the spiritual leader of Tibet, Dalai Lama to mobilize international support for the cause of Tibetan independence. This may not be the case now as India has moved away from that position.

Sino-Indian Normalization and the Kashmir Dispute

During the visit of the Indian Prime Minister Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee to Beijing in June 2003, the two Asian powers agreed to deepen their relations while disregarding their border dispute. India also agreed to downplay the issue of Tibet and accept the reality of Chinese sovereignty on that territory. Despite the massive economic growth of China, one cannot undermine the fact that India and China are natural competitors in the long run. In that scenario, the United

States sees India capable of countering Beijing in Asia and wants to maintain close relations with New Delhi so as to seek Indian cooperation in this regard.

Since the visit of the former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in 1988, the process of Sino-Indian normalization has got an impetus. According to a Chinese writer, the signing of the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control on the China-India Border Areas in 1993 and the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the military field along the Line of Actual Control on the Indo-China Border Areas in 1996 has shown that both sides have adopted a wise two-step approach on the boundary question. The first step is to ensure peace and tranquility along the LOC for a long period and the second step is to realize the final settlement when the conditions are mature.²

The joint working groups (JWG) established by China and India to deepen their cooperation in trade, commerce, tourism and in other areas were reinforced by the adoption of several confidence-building measures along the disputed sites of Sino-Indian border. As a result one can see the boosting of bilateral trade between the two Asian giants, i.e. China and India and also freezing of their bilateral conflicts. The question is, what are the implications of Sino-Indian rapprochement on Pakistan and how Islamabad should deal with that issue? For some circles, "although the Sino-Pak military equation is likely to remain a contentious issue in Sino-Indian relations, it will be partly countered by the Indian desire to woo China from its pro-Pakistan tilt by a continuation of the policy of Sino-Indian normalization."³

Pakistan and China have made it clear that their relations are independent of Sino-Indian ties. That both Beijing and Islamabad view their friendship to be strong enough to withstand various challenges. But, in reality, one can see a steady change in China's policy vis-à-vis South Asia during 1980s and afterwards. Two divergent perceptions exist in the realm of growing Sino-Indian rapprochement. First, India and China are natural competitors and to some extent are potential enemies because of the fact that the two

major powers of Asia are aspiring to play a global role but at the same time are unable to resolve their contentious issues and effectively deal with the threat perception against each other. For instance, the former Indian Chief of Army Staff, General K. V. Krishna Rao while participating in a get-to-gather program organized by the Vijayawada Book Festival Society on the eve of the inaugural of its 14th book festival said that "China is the real enemy for his country but not Pakistan. A superpower (China) is in the making in our neighborhood. We cannot afford to be passive onlookers to the phenomenon as it (China) has the dubious track record of cheating our country in the past."⁴ Whatever development takes place on the Sino-Indian normalization front, one cannot overlook the presence of a lobby in India which views Beijing with suspicion and asserts the observation that the real threat for New Delhi is not Pakistan but China.

Second, there exists another element in India which is quite optimistic about the future of Sino-Indian ties and considers it essential for a successful foreign policy. Gone are days when tension and propaganda warfare between the two neighbors used to have support base in the official circles of Beijing and New Delhi. In a speech delivered at a conference held by the Indian Institute of Defense and Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, the Indian External Affairs Minister, Yashwant Sinha categorically rejected the contention of theorists that a conflict between India and China is inevitable because a substantial measures of success has been achieved by now in the endeavor to establish mutual understanding between India and China."⁵ The benefits of Sino-Indian cooperation are manifold than active conflict between the two neighbors. China is India's biggest neighbor and India is China's second biggest neighbor. Both countries, after the end of the cold war and in the post-September 11 situation need each other instead of getting bogged down in unresolved issues.

As far as the implications of Sino-Indian peace process on the Kashmir dispute are concerned, it has become quite obvious that unlike 1960s and mid 1970s when Beijing used to render clear support to Islamabad's stand on that dispute, a qualitative change has taken place in China's policy. According to a Pakistani writer,

Factually, a visible improvement in the tone and context of Sino-Indian relations had been achieved with China stressing the need to settle the Kashmir dispute through bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan, without formally abandoning its stance that the state was a disputed territory, in deciding whose future both the UN resolutions and the Simla agreement remained relevant.⁶

In retrospect, the first public expression of the revised Chinese approach to the Kashmir problem was made by Deng Xiaoping in his interview given to an Indian journal *Vikrant* in June 1980. In that interview he described Kashmir as a bilateral problem between Pakistan and India which the two countries should settle amicably.⁷ Since then, China has moved from its traditional support to Islamabad on the Kashmir cause while advising both India and Pakistan to resolve that contentious issue through a process of dialogue.

During the 1994 UN Human Rights Conference in Geneva, Pakistan failed to seek the support of China in order to raise the Kashmir dispute from that forum. According to Beijing's judgment, the Kashmir conflict in its present form will only harm peace in South Asia. But, the Chinese leadership has not been able to suggest to Pakistan what to do in a situation when New Delhi is unwilling to seriously talk on the Kashmir dispute and has kept a massive military force to quell insurgency in that area. China's position on the Kashmir dispute is somewhat described by a Chinese writer who argues that,

In recent years, China has adopted a separate policy in its relations with India and Pakistan. China's stand on the Kashmir question was clearly explained by Chairman Li Ruihuan during his visit to India in 1993. He pointed out to the Indian journalist that both India and Pakistan were China's neighbors and friends and China seriously hoped that India and Pakistan could settle this problem in an appropriate manner through peaceful negotiations.⁸

Therefore, sensing the futility of conflict between India and Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir, the Chinese leaders emphasized negotiated settlement of the Kashmir problem at the bilateral level

and through dialogue.⁹ At times, they called for dealing with the Kashmir problem in accordance with the Simla Agreement and the relevant resolution of the United Nations. Yet, as remarked by a Pakistani writer, "China cannot be indifferent to the present and future developments in Kashmir. What happens there has implications for China's internal security and peace and stability in the region. China is not in favor of a military solution of the Kashmir problem."¹⁰ The reason shaping China's approach on the Kashmir dispute is not difficult to figure out. China feels that, and India subscribes to such a feeling, that when Beijing and New Delhi can agree to normalize their relations, despite the presence of border conflict, why cannot India and Pakistan follow that model? It is yet to be seen to what extent there is semblance between the Kashmir dispute and the territorial dispute between China and India.

China's Potential Role in Indo-Pak Reconciliation

As mentioned earlier, change in Chinese foreign policy in late 1970s resulted into a new security situation in South Asia with Beijing dropping an all out support to Pakistan on its conflicts with India and urging both neighbors to settle their discords through a process of dialogue. Therefore, it is not wrong to argue that, "any improvement in Sino-Indian ties is not directed at Pakistan and China wants to deal with South Asia on a regional basis while forging good neighborly relations with all states. Hence Beijing welcomes peace moves between Islamabad and New Delhi, but it would avoid getting involved in any way in an India-Pakistan peace moves."¹¹ According to Chinese Central Television, Chinese President Hu Jintao said that, "China as always supports Pakistan-Indian reconciliation and will play a constructive role in South Asian peace and stability."¹² Beijing is supportive for a peaceful and stable South Asia because of two main reasons. First, China's policy of modernization and development requires peace with its neighbors. That is the reason why Beijing, despite unresolved conflicts, decided to promote good neighborly relations with New Delhi. Second, China understands that by siding with Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute, it will not be able to secure a better position in the region. On this account, one can quote a Chinese writer who argues that China emphasizes the common interests that can be

maximally accepted by all countries and which can bring a healthy atmosphere to the whole region. A stable and prosperous South Asia is suitable for Chinese interests as long as China maintain good neighborly relations with India and Pakistan. But it does not prevent China from showing its sympathy for a certain country or countries on certain events under diplomatic principles.¹³

Another important dimension of China's policy in South Asia is the security and strategic perceptions which it shares with Russia on the issue of terrorism and Islamic extremism. China and Russia, along with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are important members of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and they view with concern the activities of terrorist groups in Central, West and South Asian regions and feel that India and Pakistan should share with them information and other important issues concerning terrorism. Without Indo-Pak reconciliation, it will be difficult for SCO to curb militancy and terrorism particularly when the two major instable areas i.e. Afghanistan and Kashmir provide a fertile ground to religious extremist groups.

Conclusion

With the unleashing of normalization process between China and India and the possible thaw in Indo-Pak relations, it is possible that the triangle of Pakistan, India and China will get a new shape. All the three countries, having a history of conflicts, have made it clear that their relations with each other must not be misinterpreted and misunderstood. If Indian and Chinese relations are warming up, it doesn't mean that Pakistan should feel insecure, or the close ties between Beijing and Islamabad must not send wrong signals to New Delhi. Such an approach is positive in nature. The only thing which matters in the changing dynamics of global and South Asian politics is the ability of China, Pakistan and India to ameliorate their relations so that peace and stability could be ensured in the region and the decades old confrontation going, on particularly between India and Pakistan, is reduced.

At some stage, India and Pakistan can also think of linking up with SCO so that the two countries, which have suffered greatly because of the menace of terrorism, can share with China, Russia and the Central Asian states the modalities for dealing with that issue. China is no doubt a viable link for India and Pakistan as far as promoting security cooperation with Russia and Central Asia is concerned.

End Notes

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9. jGhayoor Ahmed, "Musharraf's visit to China," *Dawn*, (Karachi), November 1, 2003.
10. Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Op.cit.*, p. 98.
11. Zubeida Mustafa, "How effective is the China card," *Dawn*, November 12, 2003.
12. See *The News International* (Karachi), November 3, 2003. Although China would not like to play the role of a mediator in Indo-Pak conflict resolution, it is certainly not ready to continue favor Pakistan

over India. Sohail Mahmood, "China and South Asia: Current Foreign Policy Dynamics" in *National Development and Security* (Rawalpindi) Vol. VI, No. 1, August 1997, p. 34.

13. "Searching for convergence: China's policy toward South Asia in the post-cold war era," *Peace Initiatives (Mumbai)* Vol. II, No. 1, March 1996, p. 18.

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ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS IN THE CHANGED GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

Dr. Pervez Tahir

In less than two decades, the interaction between nations has witnessed such profound changes that the ordinary words such as the 'international arena', 'world scene' and even 'universal' fail to capture the extensive and intensive transformation that has been taking place. Globalisation broadly refers to this process of change. As a result, the global environment has changed in at least four key areas: a highly liberalised trade regime, free and rapid movement of capital, accelerated diffusion of knowledge and real-time flows of information.

A basic feature of this global order is that it cannot be wished away. Large countries such as India and China, ideological blocs such as ex-Soviet countries, even small inward-looking states such as Communist Cuba and Marxist West Bengal in India, who had all managed to stay out of international economic order in the past, are all vying to benefit from globalization. Opting out is no more a choice.

There is also a limiting feature for the group of countries called developing countries. The main factors in globalization — trade, capital technology knowledge, information — are factors whose supply abundant in the developed countries. Labour, the only factor with abundant — supply in developing countries, is not allowed to move freely. In fact, the war on terrorism has placed further restraints on whatever movement of labour was there in the form of migration.

This changed global environment presents the economy of Pakistan a number of challenges, two of which can be described as the most important: *competitiveness and investment*. As a matter of fact, it is a dual challenge facing up to which requires directed as

well as interrelated effort in terms of policy reform and institutional changes.

Competitiveness is the buzz word of globalization. Competition is between firms, not nations. In the free marketplace, firms have to compete to avoid bankruptcy or annihilation. This does not strictly hold for nations. It is said that capital knows no nationalities in a globalized world. It moves wherever it finds the highest return. The same is becoming increasingly true of products. In many cases, it is difficult to determine the national origin of a product. Transnational corporations operate across the world to produce or obtain the large number of components going into a product. Firms no more produce complete products.

Firms compete by cutting costs or by introducing new products. Both cases involve the application of technology, the former by improving the method of organizing the use of various inputs and the latter by investing in research and development. Both cases also involve higher labour productivity, defined as the cost-effectiveness of labour in the process of adding value to the use of resources or inputs.

At the level of the firm, the key inputs are labour and capital. In Pakistan, there have been very few studies on productivity at this level. As productivity is a significant contributor to the GDP growth in dynamic economies, productivity indicators of key factors such as labour and capital and total factor productivity have been estimated. Labour productivity slowed down from 45.7 per cent in 1980s to 18.6 per cent in the 1990s for the economy as a whole and from 94.5 per cent to 43 per cent for the manufacturing sector. Thus 'cheap' labour said to be in abundant supply in Pakistan is not necessarily cheap in an economic sense. Productivity of capital increased by 11.5 per cent in the 1980s but declined by 1.2 per cent in 1990s. It was stagnant in the manufacturing sector. Similarly, total factor productivity fell from 3.2 per cent to 1.75 per cent for the economy and from 5.4 per cent to 1.6 per cent in the manufacturing sector.

Small wonder, the decade of lower productivity growth, the 1990s, experienced a lower GDP growth of 4.6 per cent per annum

and manufacturing growth of 4.8 per cent per annum compared to the higher productivity growth decade of the 1980s, when GDP growth was an impressive 6.5 per cent per annum and manufacturing growth surged to 8.2 per cent per annum.

What are the critical ingredients of competitiveness? Countries now compare themselves with others by using their position in the *Global Competitiveness Report* prepared annually by the World Economic Forum. However, UNIDO prepares score boards which inform about more relevant information in the context of industrial competitiveness in developing countries. The first, Competitive Industrial Performance Index, is a measure of the ability of an economy to organize production and export competitively. Given at Annex Table 1, it shows that Pakistan ranked 55th in 1985 and 60th in 1998 in a group of 87 countries, faring far worse than India, Indonesia and Thailand. Annex Table 2 gives three indices, each identifying an important driver of industrial performance. There is a Skills Index, which placed Pakistan behind Nepal and Bangladesh, and a technical education index, with similar ranking. The three countries have the same ranking of 61 for Research and Development compared to 46 for India. In terms of foreign investment and infrastructure indicators, all South Asian countries rank lower than the Philippines (Annex Table 3).

The Perspective Plan 2001-11 recognizes the crucial significance of productivity growth. Annex Table 4 indicates negligible total factor productivity growth in the base period of 2001, projects it to contribute 0.3 percentage points in the GDP growth of 5 per cent for 2003-04 and 0.5 percentage points in the GDP growth of 6.3 per cent projected for 2010-11, the terminal year of the Plan.

But the bane of GDP growth in Pakistan in recent years has been the low rate of investment. As can be seen in Annex Table 5, total investment rate fell in 1992-93 to as low as 14.7 per cent by 2001-02. In the same period, fixed investment, defined as investment in plant, machinery and other durable assets, has similarly fallen from 19.1 per cent of GDP to 13.1 per cent. It remained stagnant at 13.1 per cent in 2002-03. What is noticeable is

the dramatic reduction in public investment from 9.1 per cent to 4.5 per cent of GDP. Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) has been slashed from 7.6 per cent of the GDP in 1991-92 to 3.3 per cent in 1992-93. Private investment also fell, but more slowly. It has somewhat revived since 1999-2000. Its more dynamic component, the large-scale manufacturing sector has begun to regain its momentum. Annex Table 6 indicates that from a low of 1.43 per cent in 1998-99, it has moved up to 2.64 per cent of GDP in 2002-03.

To achieve the targeted GDP growth rate of 6.3 per cent by the last year of the Perspective Plan, the rate of investment would have to go up to 20.6 percent. The real challenge would be to jump start fixed investment and take it to 19 per cent by 2010-11. Assuming that the privatisation programme will have been completed by that year, 15.78 per cent of this fixed investment must come from private sector (Annex Table 7).

The prospects of achieving this level of private sector investment and growth are intimately related to the preparedness of the economy to meet the challenge of competitiveness. It is not only the textile challenge of 2005 posed by the WTO regime. In the past 3-4 years, textile industry has invested around \$ 3 billion to position itself for the challenge. There are definite limits to raising productivity in textile and other traditional industries. Quantum jumps are required for the high enough growth to make a difference to rising poverty, unemployment and marginalization. This would be possible only through technology-related industrial development. Macroeconomic stability and a liberal and market-friendly framework is only a necessary condition for this transition. The sufficient condition is to provide an adequate knowledge infrastructure, which is best achieved through appropriate public investment.

Public policy has reduced average import tariff from 80 per cent in 1985 to 15 per cent. Investment Policy 1997 put in place a liberal regime of rules and procedures. Fiscal deficit is low and current account has been in surplus. External debt has begun to decline and foreign exchange reserves have crossed \$ 11 billion. Yet

total investment is low and foreign investment very small. Non-economic factors like law and order and the varying perceptions about the country's image are important, but a number of economic concerns remain. Pakistan's labour costs are higher than India and China. Utilities, particularly electricity, cost relatively more. Port handling costs 50 per cent more than Mumbai. Despite an improved regulatory framework, a host of irritants remain. Compared to competitors, customs clearance, business start-up, telephone and electricity connection take longer and business inspections are more numerous.

Technology needs to play a greater role to raise the level of sophistication of industry and its exports. Several steps have been initiated. Federal Public Sector Development Programme now devotes higher allocations for higher education, science and technology and information technology. Specific projects related to enhanced competitiveness are being planned and funded. Some of them include trade facilitation, R&D in trade and industries, strengthening of laboratories and related facilities and new quality control laboratories. Ministry of Science and Technology has set up Pakistan National Accreditation Council for accreditation of certification bodies (ISO Guide 62, 66 & 65), accreditation of laboratories (ISO 17025) and registration of personnel, training course providers. A National Quality Policy is in the offing. As a lead industrial competitiveness agency, the National Productivity Council has been set up under the Minister of Industries, with National Productivity Organization functioning as its professional secretariat. Benchmarking is critical to encourage and monitor productivity growth. National Productivity Organization has started this process from cotton spinning. The concept of setting up a textile city near Karachi port is also a step in the direction of promoting and establishing best-practice.

However, as already pointed out, there are limits to raising the level of sophistication of exports by concentrating on the traditional textile industries. The country would be competing only to protect its share in a shrinking market. Board of Investment, Export Promotion Bureau, National Accreditation Council and National Productivity Organization have to coordinate better to find

a technological niche for exporting to fiercely competitive but rapidly growing sectors of the world market.

Table 1
Competitive Industrial Performance Index, 1998 and 1985

Economy	Rank		Index Value	
	1998	1985	1998	1985
Singapore	1	6	0.883	0.587
South Korea	18	22	0.370	0.247
Malaysia	22	30	0.278	0.116
Philippines	25	45	0.241	0.044
Hong Kong	30	18	0.204	0.320
Thailand	32	43	0.172	0.058
China	37	61	0.126	0.021
Indonesia	49	65	0.054	0.012
India	50	50	0.054	0.034
Pakistan	60	55	0.031	0.028
Sri Lanka	69	71	0.017	0.008
Bangladesh	73	74	0.011	0.008
Nepal	79	79	0.006	0.001

Source: UNIDO (2000)

Table 2
Drivers of Industrial Performance, Ranking 1998 and 1985

Harbison-Myers Index of Skills ^a			Tertiary Enrolments in Technical Subjects ^b			Financed Research and Development		
Economy	1998	1985	Economy	1998	1985	Economy	1998	1985
South Korea	10	6	South Korea	1	1	South Korea	13	23
Singapore	29	37	Philippines	26	28	Singapore	14	19
Philippines	32	23	Hong Kong	31	24	Malaysia	34	38
Hong Kong	39	39	Singapore	33	4	Hong Kong	40	46
Thailand	45	48	Indonesia	51	63	China	44	46
Malaysia	55	51	Thailand	54	49	Indonesia	45	41
Indonesia	56	57	Malaysia	59	62	India	46	36
Sri Lanka	58	53	India	62	51	Thailand	48	39
China	59	67	China	66	64	Philippines	57	40
India	69	60	Sri Lanka	68	61	Sri Lanka	60	0
Nepal	71	66	Bangladesh	69	58	Bangladesh	61	0
Bangladesh	76	72	Nepal	70	66	Nepal	61	0
Pakistan	77	69	Pakistan	75	69	Pakistan	61	0

Source UNIDO (2002).

^aThe Harbison-Myers Index is the average of the percentage of the relevant age groups enrolled in secondary and tertiary education, with tertiary enrolments given a weight of five. ^b Ranking is based on tertiary enrolment as percentage of the population. Technical

subjects include pure science, mathematics and computing and engineering.

Table 3
Drivers of Industrial Performance, Ranking 1998 and 1985

Per Capita Foreign Direct Investment			Royalty & License Payments Per Capita Abroad			No. of Telephone Mainlines per 1,000 People		
Economy	1998	1985	Economy	1998	1985	Economy	1998	1985
Singapore	1	1	Singapore	2	1	Singapore	10	16
Hong Kong	5	8	Hong Kong	4	2	Hong Kong	11	17
Malaysia	19	11	Malaysia	6	33	South Korea	23	26
Thailand	45	42	South Korea	19	20	Malaysia	37	41
South Korea	48	49	Thailand	28	37	Thailand	51	62
China	49	65	Indonesia	42	34	China	55	77
Philippines	52	62	Philippines	46	45	Philippines	64	66
Indonesia	53	59	China	57	64	Sri Lanka	67	70
Sri Lanka	64	53	India	60	58	Indonesia	68	73
Pakistan	72	64	Pakistan	61	54	India	69	72
India	77	71	Bangladesh	65	63	Pakistan	70	71
Nepal	81	75	Nepal	65	-	Nepal	76	86
Bangladesh	85	76	Sri Lanka	65	-	Bangladesh	83	85

Source: UNIDO (2002)

Table 4

Sources of Growth

	Benchmark	Projections	
	2000-01	2003-04	2010-11
Total Growth	2.6	5.0	6.3
From Factor Accumulation	2.6	4.7	5.8
From Non-Factor Sources	-	0.3	0.5

Source: Planning Commission (2001)

Table 5

Overall Investment Trends

(% of GDP)

Year	Total	Fixed	Private	Public	PSDP
1991-92	20.1	18.5	9.8	8.7	7.6
1992-93	20.7	19.1	10.0	9.1	5.7
1993-94	19.4	17.9	9.6	8.3	4.6
1994-95	18.4	16.9	8.7	8.2	4.4
1995-96	18.8	17.2	9.0	8.2	4.4
1996-97	17.7	16.2	9.4	6.8	3.5
1997-98	17.3	14.7	9.6	5.2	3.9
1998-99	15.6	13.9	7.9	6.1	3.4
1999-00	16.0	14.4	8.4	6.0	2.6
2000-01	15.5	13.9	8.4	5.5	2.1
2001-02	14.7	13.1	8.4	4.8	3.5
2002-03	15.5	13.1	8.6	4.5	3.3

Source: FBS, Planning Commission

Table 6

Private Investment in Manufacturing

(% of GDP)

Year	Large Scale	Small Scale	Total
1995-96	2.20	0.54	2.74
1996-97	2.13	0.55	2.68
1997-98	1.86	0.57	2.43
1998-99	1.43	0.61	2.04

1999-00	1.90	0.57	2.47
2000-01	1.96	0.58	2.54
2001-02	2.56	0.59	3.15
2002-03	2.64	0.58	3.22

Source: FBS, Planning Commission

Table 7
Ten Year Perspective Development Plan 2001-11
Macroeconomic Framework
(Value in Current Prices)

	Benchmark	Projections	
	2000-01	2003-04	2010-11
Real GDP Growth (%)	2.6	5.0	6.3
Agriculture	-2.5	3.5	4.2
Large Scale Manufacturing	7.8	7.5	8.3
Inflation Rates (%)	5.0	5.0	4.0
Total Unemployment Rate (%)	10.4	9.4	6.1
As % of GDP			
Total Investment	14.7	16.5	20.6
Fixed Investment:	13.0	14.9	19.0
- General Government	2.17	2.54	3.23
- Private Plus Public Corporations	10.87	12.41	15.78
National Savings	13.1	15.4	20.0
External Resources	1.6	1.1	0.6
Consumption (as % of GNP)	88.9	84.4	79.8
Memo Items			
GDP mp (Rs. Billion)	3,472	4,611	9,259
Per Capita Income (Rs.)	24,188	30,476	54,107
Marginal Rate of Savings (%)		30.2	29.2

Source: Planning Commission (2001)

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CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR MUSLIM UMMAH IN THE PREVAILING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND ROLE FOR PAKISTAN

Nazir Hussain

The changing global strategic environment posed a serious challenge to the Muslim Ummah¹ in the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attacks. The entire world focused its attention on the possible root-cause of terrorism, which allegedly were pointed towards some of the Muslim countries. The US 'war on terror' first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq totally shattered the unity and strength of the Muslim Ummah. The fact that the 'war on terror' was launched with the notion of 'with us or with the terrorists' led many of the Muslim neighbors of Afghanistan and Iraq to side with the international coalition against terrorism. Thus many of the Muslim countries not only became direct supporters of international war against Afghanistan and Iraq but also provided reasons for furthering the US 'war on terror' in other Muslim countries of the Middle East.

It was therefore, the collective will and strength of the Muslim Ummah and the religion of Islam, which became the global target of hate and abuse, thus posing a serious challenge to the very notion of Islam and Ummah. In the changing global scenario, where two of the Muslim countries are totally devastated and many more are seen as potential future targets, and Islam the religion of universal peace is being maligned and equated with terrorism, the Muslim world is in a very precarious position. At the one hand the Muslims have to restore the true image of Islam and on the other hand provide the real unity among the Muslim states to face these challenges.

Therefore, this paper is an attempt to analyze the challenges faced by the Muslim Ummah in the changing global environment developed after 9/11, the prospects of meeting these challenges and the role Pakistan can play in this regard. However, this paper is not an exhaustive analyses of all the challenges and prospects faced by

the Muslim Ummah but is an attempt to highlight major challenges only, which create crucial impact on the Muslim Ummah and Islam.

Prevailing Global Environment

The end of Cold War and the demise of Soviet Union created a unipolar world, which professed the 'End of History' and 'triumph of western capitalism'. The new found global strategic environment gave an added overconfidence to the US, which set about the agenda of 'American Global Supremacy' in the world.² The regional happenings, first in Afghanistan and Central Asian, and then in the Gulf, both being the Muslim heartland, provided the US with a *casus belli* to directly intervene in regional affairs, which were considered detrimental to 'peace and security of the world'. Thus the US had already made its permanent presence in the Muslim heartland of 'Eurasia'³ and aligned itself with regional players, which put the Muslim players of these regions into a totally disadvantageous situation. Therefore, the post Cold War period saw the weakening and waning of Muslim strength on the face of regional and international hagemon emerging/being created to undermine the opposing regional actors.

The post-9/11 global strategic environment further complicated the situation for the Muslim World. At the one hand Afghanistan and Iraq became the first victim of global 'war on terror' and many more being threatened, and on the other hand the very regimes in the Muslim World were being subject to close scrutiny and criticism, which had been supporting the US policies for the last many decades. The discussions about 'un-popular regimes', 'squandering of oil wealth', 'lack of gender equality', and 'terrorist breeding states' became the norm of the day in the print and electronic media of the Western world. In fact the media played a crucial role to target the Muslim World; both as a religion and the state. The forces inimical to Islam and Muslims, exploited the global strategic environment to unleash state terrorism to silence their internal opposition,⁴ which were asking for their political and economic rights, enshrined by the international law and the United Nations.

In a situation like this, the very religion of Islam became the direct object of criticism by all and sundry. All kinds of accusations started appearing in all directions against Islam and the Muslims.⁵ Forgetting even that the very notion of Islamic Jihad and the Muslims across the world were employed by the West to defeat the 'Evil Empire' in Afghanistan, which itself became a breeding ground for *Jihadis* with official patronage from the Western world. But now Islam became to be known as intolerant, extremist, anti-modern, rigid and terrorizing. The entire global campaign was launched to discredit Islam and the Muslim. Therefore, for many in the Muslim world, the West, especially the US tends to employ the war against terror to subjugate the Muslim countries in pursuit of an imperial agenda.⁶

Under these circumstances, the internal weaknesses of the Muslim Ummah in the shape of socio-economic underdevelopment, political non-representation, scientific and technological backwardness, military shortcomings, and strategic disorientation compounded the complexities. The Ummah by itself became an object of self-criticism and soul-searching in the absence of a united voice against international discrimination as an organization and entity.

Challenges Faced by the Muslim Ummah

The foremost challenge is that Islam is being equated with terrorism. Despite condemnation of terrorism and terrorists activities by all the Muslim countries individually and through Arab League and Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) collectively,⁷ terrorism has become synonymous with Islam and the Muslims. The entire Western media project discrimination against the Muslims regularly. Now even the Islamic religious symbols and institutions, like headscarf, beard and Mosque, are being ridiculed in non-Muslim world.⁸ Every Muslim is being taken as a potential terrorist out to destroy the world at the first opportunity.⁹ Added to this is the doctrine of preemption and unilateral military actions against Muslim countries without the mandate from the United Nations, which is being pursued with greater defiance by Israel and India; Syria was attacked by Israel as the allegation of terrorists hideouts in Syrian territory and Pakistan was

threatened with pre-emptive unilateral actions by India to wipe out the so called terrorist networks.

The other challenge is the political and economic deprivation, which has been employed constantly to suppress the Muslim populace. The control of economic assets-oil, gas, natural resources and cash deposits-by the multi-nationals are a source of economic exploitations and adding to the socio-economic miseries of the Muslims. For a vivid example, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have now become international borrowers after having been most affluent Muslim countries. The permanent stationing of foreign troops in the Gulf after Kuwait crisis is added strains on the economies of Muslim states in the Gulf. Because the Muslim regimes are constantly being made fearful of different theories and notions to keep them busy in heavy military purchases/spending to benefit the Military Industrial Complexes and Multi-national Companies of the West.

Added problem to the above situation is lack of popular political participation in the Muslim World. The Muslim rulers try to perpetuate their regimes through borrowed security and ignore the popular support within their countries. It creates the wide gap between people and the rulers, which is often exploited by the external actors. The Shah of Iran had to flee, despite being the 'policeman of the Gulf' and Saddam had to hide despite his 'ruthless rule' and ultimately humiliated after being captured, highlight this political vacuum between the rulers and the ruled. Depriving the people to political participation adds to the deprivation syndrome and they not only become hostile to their own rulers but a ready source for internal security, which again benefits the external actors/factors. The 'democracy gap' separating the Muslim from the rest of the world is huge. In this regard it has been pointed out that only 11 out of 47 countries in the Muslim majority states are electoral democracies, or 23% as against 110 of the remaining 145 countries that accounts for 76%. Of the 16 Arab states in the Middle East, not one is classified as an electoral democracy.¹⁰

Moreover, the political problems of the Muslims, Palestine and Kashmir, still remain unresolved even after five decades of negotiations with numerous United Nation resolutions, constantly

defied by India and Israel, creates the undesired resolve of these two people to revolt and get their political rights through violent means. If this political deprivation is suppressed by state terrorism, it is a natural breeding source for violence and revolt.

The above problems at the one hand highlights the indifference of the Western world to the political rights of the Muslim people and on the other hand it shows the lack of unity in the Muslim world and put a question mark on the role of OIC. The Muslim countries are divided by various misperceived notions and have varying approaches to global problems, which even make them to clash in world forums. There is no united voice and Muslim leaders lack vision to grasp the global strategic dynamics, which can benefit the Muslim world.

The OIC came into being as an accident in the wake of Israeli occupation of Al-Quds in 1969. There were no organizational and well-conceived vision for the OIC, therefore, it remained adhoc even today. The very name of OIC, the Organization of Islamic Conference and not the Organization of Islamic Countries speaks about the short-sightedness of this organization. In the 34 years of its existence, the OIC has been unable to show any real progress in resolving the inter-Muslim disputes and raise a united voice against Muslim causes, it shows the ineffectiveness of this highest Muslim organization in the world, and adds problems for the Muslim people and their rightful-legitimate causes.

The above are some of the few crucial challenges, which the Muslim Ummah faces today, otherwise the list is very long and exhaustive. Now in this unfavorable environment, what are the prospects of these challenges being met by the Muslim Ummah, which can sail them through with success and trust.

Response and Prospects to meet these Challenges

The very word of religion Islam means peace and Allah describes in the Quran that 'there is no compulsion in religion'.¹¹ The Divine message also reveals that the best religion is Islam,¹² and the followers of this religion wherever they are forms one Ummah, which is justly balance.¹³ The entire life of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) is the

true reflection of peaceful nature of Islam, his living in Mecca under tremendous oppression and his establishment of City State of Madina, where Muslims, Jews and the non-believers lived together reflect the universal approach of peace. Then why the followers of this religion be treated and equated with terrorism, intolerance and religious extremism.

Probably the major cause lies within the Muslim world, some of the Muslims who deviated from the true path of Islam and created their own brand of Islam, dominated world's perception about the Muslims. Therefore, there is an urgent need to project the true and original path of Islam. That Islam, which was revealed and practiced by the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and that resulted into Muslim forming the second largest religion of the world. Islam lays emphasis on self-correctness, *Jihad-e-Akbar* (the major struggle and strive), so Muslim have to correct themselves, be moderate, tolerant and modernist.

In this regard, President Pervez Musharraf has offered the idea of 'Enlightened Moderation', which is aimed at correcting the Muslim societies from within. This 'Enlightened Moderation' would not only correct the societal extremism, which has penetrated into the Muslim societies but would also help in to correct the image of Islam in the world.¹⁴

The related cause of Islam/Muslim bashing is a deliberate effort to project them as terrorist and religious extremist through print and electronic media by the vested quarters. However, it is important to note that no religion of the world entails extremism, intolerance and terrorism.¹⁵ This requires the second remedy related to the self-correctness, that is to create a Muslim media channel to project political and strategic world view of the Muslim world. It has already been demonstrated by *Al-Jazeera*, how powerful and dreaded a Muslim channel can be. *Al-Jazeera* nullified the 'CNN/BBC effect' and on several occasions the channel was banned. The 9th OIC summit in Doha-Qatar authorized to establish such a channel and \$150 million were allocated in this regard but nothing substantive has been done in this regard for the last three years. There is an urgent need to operationalize this plan with all seriousness and dedication. This

Challenges and Prospects for Muslim Ummah in the Prevailing Global Environment and Role for Pakistan

Muslim channel with an Islamic News Agency would not only project the true and original image of Islam and the Muslims and undo the media onslaught against the Muslims but would also project a united voice and approach of the Muslim world on global issues and regional problems.

It leads to certain inter-related responses to meet the prevailing challenges; education, economic development and people participation. Muslims were the greatest inheritor of knowledge and education, Muslims were the pioneer in scientific and technological innovations, and Islam makes obligatory on its followers, both male and female to seek knowledge from cradle to coffin, then why Muslim are lacking in education. No progress in the contemporary world is possible without science and education, therefore, the Muslim world must launch 'Educational Emergency' to make the entire Muslim world educated with special emphasis on science and technology. Then education brings awareness, tolerance, and understandings for others. People would be aware of their political and economic rights, which require from the Muslim rulers to involve masses into political process, give them right to exercise their right of free speech and expression. Democracy may not be the solution to every socio-economic problem¹⁶ in the Muslim world but people's participation is necessary to do away with borrowed security umbrellas. The involvement of the people would give internal strength and the political divide between the ruler and the ruled would be bridged.

However, one should not overlook the important democratic gains that have been made recently in the Muslim countries. The September 2003 parliamentary elections in Morocco were the freest in that country's history; in October 2003 Bahrain voted to elect a parliament for the first time in 30 years, an election in which women also contested; in November 2003 parliamentary elections in Turkey brought into power a moderate-Islamic party; Saudi Arabia is to hold municipal elections first time in its history, and in Afghanistan some 20 parties have joined together in a broad coalition called the National Democratic Front that will provide a strong democratic alternative to the warlordism and fundamentalism in the proposed 2004 elections, in Iraq the people are demanding a democratically elected government.

These few examples manifest that the Muslims' identity with democratic and participatory governance is very much practiced.

The contemporary world is centered on geo-economics, which dominates global strategic interests of the regional and international actors.¹⁷ There are very few countries in the Muslim world, which excel in economics and trade but generally there is a dismal performance. The trade within the OIC countries and at the regional and international trade blocs is alarmingly negligible and non-existence, which put the Muslim countries in competition against each other. The 57 OIC countries have over 1.25 billion population, possess 1/5th of the world landmass, 70% of world energy resources, and supply 40% of raw materials to the world. But as a group OIC has less than 5% of the world GDP, the collective GNP of all the Muslim countries stands at \$ 1200 billion whereas that of Germany's alone is \$ 2500 billion and that of Japan \$ 5500 billion. The trade and direct investment is also very dismal; OIC share in world trade is only 6-8%, hardly \$15 billion FDI is attracted by all OIC countries, which is equivalent to Sweden's or Thailand's alone, whereas China alone has more than \$50 billion of FDI. The human resource and technological disparity is even greater. The Ummah collectively can boast only of 500 universities and 1000 PhDs every year, whereas Japan alone has more than 9000 universities and Britain alone produces 2000 PhDs every year.¹⁸ This is indeed an alarming state of affairs for the Muslim world.

In this regard President Pervez Musharraf proposed a joint economic and business commission of the OIC states, which would enhance cooperation and enable the Muslim countries to achieve the objectives of socio-economic prosperity.¹⁹ The two decade old idea of a Common Islamic Market could be put into practice to create a trade bloc and boost trade within the Muslim world. Former Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahatir Muhammad's idea of rich Muslim countries investment in poor Muslim countries could bring about an economic revolution, which would be beneficial for the entire Muslim world.²⁰ However, till the time these ideals are not met, the Muslim countries should focus on internal trade and tap all international investment opportunities. A world already discriminatory politically and

economically against the Muslims, creates the compelling reasons to invest in developing Muslim countries.

The last but of course not the least is the restructuring of the OIC. The 34 years old house needs new leasing, new approach and vision, and some weight to implement its own decisions. The restructuring of the OIC was on the discussion agenda in the 6th OIC summit in Senegal in 1991 and 7th OIC summit in Casablanca-Morocco in 1994 but nothing concrete happened. However, it is heartening to know that on the initiative of Pakistan the restructuring of the OIC is already in the offing and the organization would be modeled to cater for contemporary needs.²¹ Nonetheless, there is a need to organize summit meetings after every two years with minimum agenda to be deliberated upon and decided and implemented within the next two years. These summits should be issue oriented with an institutional framework for implementation of summit decisions and not merely meeting places of Muslim rulers.

Role for Pakistan

Pakistan is an important country of the Muslim world in many spheres. Strategically, it is the frontline state against war on terror thus commands international importance. Geopolitically, it is situated almost in the heart of the Muslim countries and connects different regions of vital importance like Central Asia, Middle East and the Gulf, and South Asia. Technologically, Pakistan is one of the most advanced country in the Ummah, having mastery in various sciences. In terms of human resource and skill, Pakistan provides the backbone to many countries in the Ummah. Pakistan has been in the forefronts to voice and raise concerns for the cause of the Muslim countries and Islam. And in OIC, Pakistan holds special position along with Malaysia, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Therefore, Pakistan is in a position to help to revive the Muslim awakening and lead them into the 21st century with unity and prosperity.

In this connection Pakistan has already taken the lead in three different but inter-related fields; correcting the image of Islam and the Muslims; restructuring of the OIC; and emphasizing the need for science and technology. President Pervez Musharraf in his address to

the 10th OIC summit highlighted the need to correct the image of Islam and the Muslims for which he presented the idea of an 'Enlightened Moderation'. This enlightened moderation would have two prong strategy; one to correct the Muslim societies form within and shun intolerance, extremisms and religious fundamentalism; and two to resolve the Muslim political problems, like Palestine and Kashmir-the root cause of political deprivation of the Muslim hence ready grounds for all sorts of extremist tendencies.²² The idea of 'Enlightened Moderation' was praised by the international community and also made part of the final declaration of the 10th OIC summit.

The related idea of restructuring the OIC was also presented by President Pervez Musharraf in the summit, for which he proposed a two way approach; one the assembling of experts/intellectuals from the Muslim countries who would place recommendations for restructuring; and two the convening of a special OIC summit at the end of 2004 to approve the recommendations and chalk out an effective mechanism to implement all the decisions. Again the proposal was not only appreciated but was made part of the final declaration in toto.²³

Then Pakistan's leading role in education and emphasis on science and technology make it a leading country in the Ummah. Pakistan is the chairman of Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) Standing Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation (COMSTECH), with its headquarters in Islamabad. For this purpose funds were also allocated by the OIC member states and the work is in progress with speed and vigor. However, there is urgent need to start an 'Emergency Educational Program' in all fields of education to educate the Muslims in the members countries, because without education no progress in the modern world is possible.

Another important field in which Pakistan has the leading potential is the establishment of a Muslim media channel. This requires an urgent action on war footings because of the enormous disadvantages the Muslim world is facing in the absence of its own international media network. It was good to have \$150 million allocation in the 9th OIC summit in Doha-Qatar for this purpose but nothing substantive has been done in this regard. The experience of

Pakistan in the media development is an asset for the entire Ummah, which can benefit in this vital field. Pakistan, like other innovative and bold initiatives, must also take an initiative in this regard and lead the Ummah with practical benefits.

Conclusion

The Muslim Ummah faces daunting challenges in the contemporary global environment. It needs to address the internal weaknesses and vulnerabilities, like disunity, reduction of poverty and illiteracy, and increased trade within. The 10th OIC summit in Malaysia was a good beginning to address these challenges and come out with practical solutions. To some extent the summit has been successful but it is yet to be seen that the summit decisions are also practically implemented.

Previously, the Muslim Ummah has met the challenges faced to it individually. Like Mahatir Muhammad of Malaysia led his country to economic miracles on the face of tough economic competition and US resistance, Muhammad Khatami of Iran refuted the 'Clash of Civilization' theory with wisdom and philosophy by presenting the theory of 'Dialogue Among Civilization', an idea that engulfed the entire world and the United Nations declared the year 2001 as the year for this purpose, and President Pervez Musharraf embarked on launching an international war against extremism and religious terrorism, which even endangered his own life several times, and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah declaring a war against international terrorism. However, the time has come now for collective efforts to revitalize the Ummah, exploit its hidden potentials and lead the Muslims in the next millennium with dignity, trust and prosperity in political and economic spheres. The proposals presented at the 10th OIC summit in Malaysia, with Pakistan presenting key proposals, are efforts in this direction, however it is yet to be seen how soon the decisions are implemented. But one thing is sure that time is running out, it is time for the Muslim Ummah to remake the history with their strong will power or else they would become a history themselves. As Quran says, 'Verily never will Allah change the conditions of a people until they change it themselves'. (*Al-R'ad:11*)

End Notes

1. The word 'Ummah' is taken from Quran to describe the Muslim community of the world. However, the word is generally referred to the Muslim states, which are member of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). But the member states of the OIC have different languages, cultures, traditions and world views, the only binding force for them is the religion of Islam. Therefore, the term Muslim Ummah would be used to describe the Muslim countries in the world, who are members of OIC.
2. There are various studies on the subject but see, Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "American Primacy in Perspective", *Foreign Affairs*, July-August, 2002, Martin Walker, "Bush's choice: Athens or Sparta", *World Policy Journal*, Summer 2001, and Joseph J. Sisco, "From World Disorder to a Reshaped Global Order: Myth or a Possible Opportunity?", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Winter, 2002 to name a few.
3. A term coined by Brzezinski to highlight the geopolitical importance of the area for US foreign policy. For details see Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Strategy and its Geopolitical Imperatives*, New York: Basic Books, 1997.
4. See Nazir Hussain, "Israel's State Terrorism and Regional Peace: Post 9/11 Scenario", *Strategic Studies*, vol. XXII, no. 3, Autumn 2002 and Fahmida Ashraf, "State Terrorism in Indian-Held Jammu and Kashmir", *Strategic Studies*, vol. XXI, no. 1, Spring 2001
5. See Samuel P. Huntington, "The Age of Muslim Wars", *Newsweek*, December 17, 2003, and Daniel Pipes, *A New Round of Anger and Humiliation: Islam after 9/11*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2002.
6. See the speech of Mahatir Muhammad at the 10th OIC Summit at Putrajaya-Malaysia on October 16, 2003 at www.bernama.com/oicsummit
7. See Putrajaya Declaration of 10th OIC summit October 18, 2003 at www.bernama.com/oicsummit
8. See Madeleine Bunting, "Secularism gone mad", *The Guardian*, December 18, 2003.
9. Patrick Scale, "Has Bush administration declared a war on Islam", *Gulf News*, November 28, 2003.
10. Farrukh Saleem, "Facts on Ummah", *The News* (Daily Islamabad), October 26, 2003.
11. *Holy Quran*, Sura Al-Baqra, Verse 256.
12. *Holy Quran*, Sura Al-e-Imran, Verse 19.

13. Holy Quran, Sura Al-Baqra, Verse 143.
14. Inayatullah, "Putrajaya and enlightened moderation", The New October 21, 2003.
15. See Nazir Hussain, "Dialogue Among Civilisations in Asia and the World", The Iranian Journal of International Affairs (Tehran), vol. XIV, no. 1&2, Spring-Summer 2002.
16. See Doug Bandow, "Democracy for whom?", The Japan Times, October 31, 2003 and Ronald Meinardus, "Democracy: a most contentious ideal", The Japan Times, November 14, 2003.
17. Mirza Aslam Beg, "Harmonising global trends", The News, December 13, 2003.
18. From the speech of President Pervez Musharraf at the OIC Business Forum organized by the Asian Strategy and Leadership Institute at Putrajaya-Malaysia on 15th of October 2003 see at www.bernama.com/oicsummit
19. Ibid.
20. Text of the speech of Mahatir Muhammad to the 10th OIC summit at www.bernama.com/oicsummit
21. See Putrajaya Declaration of 10th OIC summit October 18, 2003 at www.bernama.com/oicsummit
22. See the speech of President Pervez Musharraf at the 10th OIC summit on 16th October 2003 at www.bernama.com/oicsummit
23. See Kaleem Omar, "Restructuring the OIC", The News, October 20, 2003, and Sultan Ahmed, "Making the OIC effective", Dawn, Islamabad, October 23, 2003.

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US INTERESTS IN SOUTH ASIA IN POST 9/11 ERA: EFFECTS ON PAKISTAN

Rizwan Zeb

Introduction

All is changed utterly,” wrote the Irish critic, playwright and poet of the modern age, WB Yeats, some seventy years ago.

More than two years have passed since September 11, which changed the world and the international order. In the war against terror, old allies came together, and new enemies were created. Pakistan, which was considered a failing state in US foreign policy circles, and was suffering from increasing global isolation, regained the “most allied ally of the US” status.

The US war against the Taliban and its hunt for the alleged mastermind of 9/11, Osama bin Laden, made Pakistan a very important partner in the global alliance against terrorism. Pakistan was in a position to provide the US with vital intelligence that made it necessary for the United States to renew its diplomatic and military relationship with Islamabad. Any air sortie from aircraft carriers or from the US air base in Diego Garcia had to over fly Pakistani territory, and therefore required Islamabad’s permission.

Pakistan also wanted to change its Afghanistan policy, which had proved to be inconstant. General Musharraf’s address to the gathering of the pious celebrating the birthday of the Holy Prophet PBUH on 5 June 2001, and the foreign policy documents, which appeared after the fall of the Taliban, are clear indicators that Islamabad was reconsidering its position before 9/11. This event provided the immediate reason. Above all, President Musharraf correctly calculated that if Pakistan did not cooperate with the United States, the Vajpayee administration, which was steadily improving its ties with the United States, would try to marginalize Pakistan. At worst, Pakistan itself could be targeted. This shift in Islamabad’s policy towards the Taliban, viewing them as a

strategic liability rather than an asset, was clearly acknowledged by "General Pervez Musharraf in his televised address to the nation on September 19. General Musharraf said that "at this juncture I am worried about Pakistan only" and that "I give top priority to the defense of Pakistan. Defense of any other country comes later."¹

By joining the international coalition against terrorism, President Musharraf, not only safeguarded country's national interest but also managed to end his international isolation and came across as a popular leader at the global level. He also succeeded in obtaining promises of American assistance totaling almost one billion dollars

Apparently, since 9/11, Pakistan-US relations have improved at a steady pace and a lot of misgivings have been removed by staying constantly in touch at the highest levels of leadership. This renewed relationship is founded on more mature grounds because the limits are also known. The United States is a global actor and Pakistan's concerns are essentially regional.

However key questions remain, how durable is the relationship? Is the fight against terrorism the only glue that binds the United States and Pakistan together? What happens to U.S.-Pakistan relations if and when the U.S. shifts its priorities from counter terrorism and Afghanistan to other considerations? Can the U.S. and Pakistan find some durable basis for cooperative interaction?

This article endeavors to answer these questions by examining the US policy objectives towards south Asia especially Pakistan and the change in Pakistan-US relations which took place after the 9/11 attacks and its impact on Pakistan.

Pakistan-US Relations: Post Cold War Developments

In the post cold war era, Pakistan lost its traditional significance in the eyes of the American policy circles. Ironically, India emerged as a state, which America could not ignore due to its economic potential and size.

Though Pakistan remained an important moderate Muslim country but India was perceived to have more cards and a better hand overall with its own influence in the Middle East, Far East and a much larger role in international trade.² India was also perceived in United States, as one becoming stronger or making good progress in economic development, trade promotion and spread of democracy and was increasingly perceived as a favorable partner.³

It was this perception which led to the "Discovery of India" tour by former President Bill Clinton. Bush administration that replaced Clinton's followed the some policy regarding India. Since then there is steady development in the US-India relation. On the other hand, Pakistan remained insignificant for United States in the pre 9/11 world.

On the eve of 9/11 terrorist attacks, Pakistan was under four types of U.S. Sanctions.

First, President Bush (Senior), under Section 620-E of Foreign Assistance Act or the Pressler Amendment (as it is normally known) suspended economic assistance and military sales to Pakistan in October 1990.

Second, after the nuclear explosions by Pakistan, another set of military and economical sanctions were imposed on Pakistan under the Arms Export Control Act.

Third, under the democracy law, sanctions were applied on Pakistan after General Musharraf's assumption of power on October 12, 1999.

Fourth, in November 2000, the U.S. imposed 2-year sanctions on Pakistan's Ministry of Defense and Pakistan's Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Organization on receiving missile technology and equipment from China. In September 2001 sanctions were again imposed for two years on some Pakistani companies on the same charge.

In short, in Stephen Cohen's words on the eve of September 11, most observers saw India as *rising* and Pakistan *floundering*.

The War against Terrorism and Pak-US Relations

Soon after the 9/11 attacks, people at helm in Washington realized that Afghanistan cannot be approached *politically* or *militarily*, with out having Islamabad on their side. Due to its geographical position on the southern and eastern borders of Afghanistan it was the best location for supporting the US air campaign against Taliban, when operating from ships in the Arabian Sea or bases in the Persian Gulf. One of the major reasons for General Musharraf's joining the global alliance against terrorism was that if Pakistan did not cooperate with the United States, Pakistan would be marginalized and isolated by the US and the international community.

In his televisive address to the nation on September 19, 2001, Musharraf gave these reasons for joining the international coalition against terror: security; economic revival; to safeguard its "strategic assets"; and the Kashmir issue. In his January 12, 2002 address he stated that the decision to join the international coalition against terrorism was based on principles and in Pakistan's national interest."

According to the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, Pakistan has afforded the United States unprecedented levels of cooperation by allowing the U.S. military to use bases within the country, helping to identify and detain extremists, and tightening the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the spring of 2002, U.S. military and law enforcement personnel reportedly began engaging in direct, low profile efforts to assist Pakistani security forces in tracking and apprehending fugitive Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters on Pakistani territory. Press reports indicate that Pakistan has remanded to U.S. custody nearly 500 fugitives including AbuZubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Khalid Mohammed.

Indo-Pak Military Stand Off 2002

The attacks on Jammu State Assembly on October 2001 and the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001 resulted in a yearlong military stand off between India and Pakistan. The Indians used these incidents to bracket the Kashmir freedom struggle with terrorism. Colin Powell reacting on the car bomb explosion in Indian Occupied Kashmir said: "This clearly was an act of terror. We are going after terrorism in a comprehensive way, not just in the present instance of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, but terrorism as it affects nations around the world, to include the kind of terrorism that affects India".⁴

Yet the United States did not fully accept India's contention that Pakistan was to blame for the attack and asked India to provide concrete evidence. State Department spokesman, Richard Boucher said, "It was for the Indians to find out who was responsible for those horrible acts and take appropriate action".

US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage visited India and Pakistan in June 2002 as part of the US effort to defuse the tension between the two countries. This visit was followed by the visit of US Defence Secretary, Ronald Rumsfeld. He admitted" there is no Al Qaida activity in Kashmir

Alarm bells rang in Washington when Islamabad stated that it would have no recourse but to use nuclear weapons if India were to invade in large numbers, reacting on this, New Delhi modified India's position of no first use. The dangerous and heightened military readiness led to active crisis management diplomacy by United States. US Senator Richard Lugar recently wrote that the "war was averted, barely, thanks to intense, discreet diplomacy by the United States".

The turning point in the crisis came when the United States issued a warning to its citizens that they leave India, and airlifted non-essential government personnel. According to Stephen Cohen, "the U.S. decision also demonstrated to the Indian government that,

the new U.S.-Indian relationship could not be counted on to provide absolute support under all circumstances".⁵

The yearlong stand off came to its end with a pledge from General Musharraf to permanently stop cross border infiltration during Deputy Secretary Armitage's visit to Pakistan. Armitage also assured a proactive American role in the resolution of the Kashmir problem. New Delhi expressed its satisfaction with Pakistan's actions and crisis come to an end.

New US Interests and Challenges in South Asia after 9/11

SAIS Professor Walter Andersen recently wrote in his paper "India and Pakistan Challenge American Diplomacy" that since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States has been pursuing two geo-strategic objectives in South Asia. The United States continues its efforts to build a strategic relationship with India, the second most populous state in Asia. The second objective is to build up Pakistan as a frontline state in the global war on terrorism.

Rodney Jones divides the US policy interests in South Asia as: Strategic; Preventing proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction; Regional security and conflict-resolution; Promoting economic development and trade; and Democracy promotion.

Following can be termed as main US interests in South Asia in the post 9/11 environment:

- Prevention of a war or war like situation between India and Pakistan.
- Have active cooperation from both India and Pakistan in its war against terror.
- To prevent/ensure that nuclear weapon-related material goes into the hands of terrorists or rogue states.

- Many observers also maintain that now United States also seeks a solution to the Kashmir problem, which it perceives have the potential to provide a sanctuary to extremist Islamic military.

In the post 9/11 era, India continues to be the most important country in South Asia for the United States. United States continues to aspire for a long term political and security partnership, expand trade and economic relations. In keeping the fact that the Americans perceive India as a counter weight to China it will continue to work to expand political, security, military and intelligence cooperation.

USA South Asia Policy and Pakistan

Pakistan is considered as one of the most complex and difficult challenges for US diplomacy.⁶ Though US considers Pakistan as a very important ally in the on going war against terror, it is also a country considered by the Americans to be politically instable, entrenched with Islamic extremism. Its economic and social weakness and hostility towards India is alarming for the Americans. As the recent council of foreign relations report says that the United States has a "major stake in a stable Pakistan, at peace with itself and its neighbor.

In the wake of September 11 United States has following Pakistan-related interests:

- First, *terrorism* and terrorism related issues top the American agenda in Pakistan.
- Second, Islamabad's *nuclear program* has been and continues to be a concern for the Americans. The alleged movement of nuclear and missile technology to and from Pakistan is taken very seriously in United States, though recently American officials have said that no such movement is taking place any more but yet there are people in United States who advocate that the Pakistani nuclear weapons should be

neutralized. Another related concern is the nuclear arms race between India-Pakistan.

- Third, the *democratization* of Pakistan is an American interest. Yet they see it, just like many in Pakistan, in its long and short-term dimensions. In the long-term, a democratic Pakistan is seen as desirable, but getting there might disrupt the state in the short-term.
- Fourth, Pakistan's *hostile relationship with India* impinges on short and long-term American interests.
- Fifth, Pakistan's significance and role as a *moderate* Muslim state.

US Post 9/11 Policy & Effects on Pakistan

Pakistan-USA relations were greatly effected with the events of 9/11. Pakistan emerged as a frontline state from the marginal backwaters, against the America-led war against terrorism. The United States expressed gratitude for Pakistan's vital support in the international campaign. On the occasion of Musharraf's visit to the United States in February 2002, President Bush announced new bilateral programs which included: debt relief; democracy assistance; strengthening education; expanded defense cooperation; and cooperation in law enforcement, science and technology. In its *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, issued in September 2002, the White House has indicated that it would "invest time and resources [into] building strong bilateral relations with India and Pakistan." Adding that US-Pakistan relations had been "bolstered by Pakistan's choice to join the war against terror and move towards building a more open and tolerant society." US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said America considered ties with Pakistan long, 'strategic' and 'mutually beneficial,' adding that he looked forward to, "strengthening it in a variety of different ways."

In post 9/11 environment, Pakistan feels some what reassured that US. And Pakistani forces could jointly and effectively deal with Islamic terrorist forces in the region, especially the pro-Taliban/Al-Qaeda elements that may have slipped across the Durand Line after the October 2001 bombings. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the US presence in the region may restrain India from launching any conventional attack against Pakistan. The number of visits by foreign leaders to Pakistan following the September 11 event testified to the geopolitical importance attached to the region and the country. Second, reconstruction and revival of Afghanistan may restore normalcy and ameliorate the socio-political conditions of Pakistan's troubled western neighbor, thereby opening up the long-stalled prospects with the Central Asian republics.⁸

The United States and Pakistan launched a Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism and Law Enforcement. The Pak-US Defence Consultation Group was re-established to revive military ties. The group met in September 2002. Discussions on military cooperation, joint exercises, security assistance and anti-terrorism took place. International Military Education Training Program (IMET) was also revived.

In contrast to its earlier practice, US used a new and more proactive approach of crisis management to prevent escalation of the conflict during May and June 2002 between India and Pakistan. This was coupled with an acceptance in the Indian camp of a behind-the-scenes, low-key US role in pushing forward Indo-Pakistan peace process.

An important effect on Pakistan was the end of American sanctions on Pakistan. On September 22, 2001 and on October 27, 2001, President Bush in two separate orders removed nuclear test-related economic sanctions and sanctions on Pakistan related to democracy and debt arrearage through 2003. This removal of sanctions allowed the United States to extend \$600 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Islamabad. In 2002, Pakistan received an estimated \$624.5 million in development assistance and ESF.⁹

The U.S. economic assistance during 2002-2003 included \$ 600 million as fiscal support and over \$ 455 million for different development programs. Washington also re-scheduled \$379 million out of the \$3 billion owed by Pakistan. Washington also paid \$220 million to Pakistan for the facilities used during the Operation Enduring Freedom. Pakistan also received economic assistance from the World Bank, IMF and Asian Development Bank as well as economic assistance, debt relief and trade concessions from Japan and the European Union. In December 2001, the Paris Club recommended to its members the rescheduling of Pakistan's debts amounting to \$ 12.5 billion, for a period of 38 years.

In 2001 Pakistan's exports to USA were to the tune of \$2.2 billion and it imported items costing around \$556 million from the United States. During January -June 2002, total exports to USA from Pakistan came down to slightly more than \$1 billion. It imported goods worth \$ 316 million during the same period. 9/11 adversely effected the Pak-US. Number of orders were cancelled due to the uncertainty first due to the on going war against terrorism and then the standoff between India and Pakistan. The tourism industry was one of those who were the most effected.

President General Pervez Musharraf visited the U.S. in June 2003. This visit produced a number of important decisions:

- The U.S. offered 3 billion dollars five year economic assistance package, which is expected to commence in 2004. It is equally divided between assistance for economic development and military sales. Pakistan would be allowed to use economic assistance funds according to its needs, including for repayment of its bilateral loan to the U.S., which stood at 1.8 billion dollars in June 2003.
- It was also reported that the U.S. might provide C-130 and P3C Orion aircraft, Cobra and Huey helicopters to strengthen the border security arrangement, mainly the Pak-Afghan border. Pakistan is also expected to get communication gear and

spares parts for the equipment and aircraft already in use in Pakistan.

- A Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) was signed as a step toward a free trade agreement. An accord was signed for cooperation in science and technology.¹⁰

One prominent Pakistani analyst notes. Direct cash grants of approximately \$800 million, including a US grant of \$600 million are a relief. Remittances by expatriate workers have gone up considerably to around \$900 million. In addition, Pakistan has been able to secure more loans from international financial institution (IFIs), including the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The foreign exchange situation is also better than at any time in the monetary history of the country, with reserves of over \$5.6 billion. In terms of its foreign debt re-profiling, \$12 billion have been rescheduled for a period of 38 years, with a grace period of 16 years. Pakistan owes a massive debt of \$38 billion to the development world, the IFIs and commercial banks.¹¹

Another important effect on Pakistan was that for the first time in the history of Pakistan, it decided to deploy its troops in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in June 2003 to monitor the Pak-Afghan border so that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda personnel did use it as a hiding place.

The presence of Pakistan army in region minimized the chances for the Afghan warlords to smuggle things to and from Pakistan. They claimed that the Pakistan Army has crossed the afghan border and has entered into Afghan territory and have captured it. Number of border skirmishes took place in which they were badly beaten by the Pakistani troops. Thus creating a new crisis in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. This crisis has revived the age-old Durand Line issue. This crisis is a direct consequence of Pakistan's decision to dispatch its regular troops into FATA and post them on Pakistan-Afghanistan border on the insistence of the U.S. military authorities.¹²

Ironically, despite the fact that Pakistan is a major US ally in the war against terror, there are certain US policies that are adversely affecting Pakistan's relations with the U.S. and fueling anti-U.S. sentiments in Pakistan. The mistreatment of Pakistanis in the U.S. under the Patriot Act, 2001, the new registrations laws and the new procedure for issuance of American visa are cases in point.¹³

India's general importance in the American policy circle has not been impeded by the War on Terrorism. A US perception of India's future importance as a strategic partner remains a factor in the continuously developing Indo-US security cooperation. Interestingly, India has benefited evidently from the War on Terrorism. This ongoing War has given India a new hearing among audiences around the globe for its arguments that armed militants in Kashmir are terrorists, and that Pakistan's support for the Kashmiri freedom struggle demonstrates that Pakistan itself is a sponsor and source of international terrorism.

The Indo-US "strategic partnership" has entailed frequent military consultations in the wake of September 11. 14 April 2002, an agreement worth \$ 146 million was signed to provide American radar to the Indian army.¹⁴ In mid-May 2002, both conducted an airborne assault exercise in Agra, the first in 32 years.¹⁵ They are also doing joint patrols in the Malacca Straits in the Indian Ocean. Further, both are planning a joint mountain warfare exercise in Alaska – the first time that Indian troops will set foot on US territory.¹⁶

The USA has also started a substantial military sales program. India has purchased US \$200 million worth of sophisticated counter-battery radars and a substantial number of General Electronic (EC) engines for India's LCA project. Possible sale of p-3 maritime surveillance aircraft is on the avail. USA has approved Israel selling India Phalcon airborne radars as part of an AWACs deal with Russia collaboration. A memorandum of understanding on high technology signed in March 2003 stipulates transfer of dual-use items, space cooperation and provision of missile defence system to India. It is speculated that the US could clear the sale of Israeli "Arrow antimissile system" to India or its

own "patriot system." The transfer of anti-missile system to India would be a very serious matter for Pakistan, as it would affect its minimum nuclear deterrence stability. On January 13, 2004, President Bush announced that both US and India have agreed to expand cooperation in civilian space program, civilian nuclear activities and high technology trade and that they have also agreed to expand our dialogue on missile defense.

Massive arms build-up by India would lead to generating insecurity syndrome not only in South Asia but also in the neighboring regions and the outcome would be quite opposite of what the United States foresee for the region.

Conclusions

At present the Bush administration considers Pakistan as an indispensable ally in the war against terror. American think tanks claim that the United States has a strong interest in friendly, stable, and long-term ties with Pakistan.

Since 9/11 the relationship has significantly improved. Though contentious issues exist and there is divergence on more issues than convergence. At present, as most observers have noted, Islamic extremism, Kashmir and Afghanistan are the main issues between the two. Both sides need to remain and move forward with extreme caution as any action from either party can improve or worsen the relationship. Both Washington and Islamabad have to discuss more on the issues on which both have divergence of opinion. Both sides are committed to strong relationship due to shared interests yet basis for any such partnership is not present at the moment.

There is a big lesson in post 9/11 American policy shift for Pakistan: Prior to 9/11, the Bush administration was reluctant to remove nuclear related sanction against Pakistan concurrently with India. Now it has promptly waived democracy-related sanctions because of what President Bush described as a shift in US. "National security interests." However it demonstrates that these sanctions on

Pakistan were not really related to the principals of nuclear or missile non-proliferation or of promoting democracy, but were inextricably linked to the policies designed to serve American interests. The lesson for Pakistan therefore is that in the *real politik* interests are paramount and moral principles are used to serve national interests.¹⁷ An eminent Pakistani analyst has very promptly said that it is time that the Pakistani decision makers should ask some questions from the United States, such as: if Pakistan is to responsible for its side of the Durand line, shouldn't the Americans be held responsible for failing in establishing a Afghan national army or for containing the Afghan warlords?. Why Pakistan is the only target of the western pressure on the issue of the transfer of nuclear related information to Libya and Iran? Why are they investigating the European brokers, middlemen and companies, who have sold or smuggled nuclear equipment to Tehran and Tripoli. Especially when their names have been given by the Iranians and the Libyans.¹⁸

In all likelihood Indo-US strategic partnership will not only continue but also grow further in the days ahead. This might create problems for Pakistan, as it cannot escape the geo-political realities of South Asia. There will always be an Afghanistan to its right and an India to its left, and an unsettled Kashmir in between. Therefore, Pakistan should continue to mend fences with India. As regards its relationship with United States, Pakistan needs to proceed with caution and keep in mind what Decimus Laberius said in first century B.C. "*Treat your friend as if he will one day be your enemy, and your enemy as if he will one day be your friend.*"

Figure 1: US Core Interests and Policies in South Asia

Periods	Cold War to 1990		1947		Post Cold War - 1990 to 1998		1998		Post 9/11, 2001 - Anti-Terrorism	
	India	Pakistan	India	Pakistan	India	Pakistan	India	Pakistan	India	Pakistan
<i>Policy Dimensions</i>										
<i>Alliance/strategic partner</i>	India not available	high US priority	India more receptive	US priority drops	US priority on hold	US priority receding	US courts strategic options	US priority pivots on WOT		
<i>Nuclear and WMD Non Proliferation</i>	high US priority	high US priority	high US priority	high US priority (Pressler)	US urging restraint, no deploy	US urging restraint, no deploy	US priority muffled	US worry nuke hijacking		
<i>Regional stability/security</i>	high US priority	high US priority	US priority in flux	US priority in flux	US focus on nuke use risk	US focus on nuke use risk	US tilts to India on Kashmir	US focus on anti-terrorism		
<i>Economic growth and trade</i>	economic aid mutual priority	US priority assistance	US praises economic reform	US aid inhibited by NP priority	India's IT sector takes off	US policy hemmed in	US prefers trade vs. aid	US targets assistance		
<i>Democracy Promotion</i>	India's democracy admired	US focus on institutions	India's democracy admired	US focus on elected govt	India still admired	US priority seesaws	US priority muted	US priority seesaws		

Source: Rodney Jones, "United States and South Asia: Core Interests and Policies and their impact on the security and economic developments of the Regional Countries, paper read at Institute of Regional Studies International Seminar "Major Powers & South Asia," held in Islamabad on August 11-13, 2003.

Table 1. US Assistance to Pakistan, FY2001-FY2004
(in millions of US dollars)

Program Account	or	FY2001 Actual	FY2002 Actual	FY2003 Allocation	FY2004 Request
CSH		--	14.0	15.6	25.0
DA		--	10.0	34.5	50.0
EMRA		--	25.0	--	--
ESF		--	624.5	188.0	200.0
FMF		--	75.0	224.5	75.0
IMET		--	0.9	1.0	1.3
INCLE		3.5	90.5	31.0	38.0
NADR		--	10.1	--	5.0
PKO		--	220.0	--	--
Subtotal		\$3.5	\$1,070.0	\$494.6	\$394.3
P.L. 480 Title I		0.5	10.0	15.0	--
P.L. 480 Title II		1.9	5.1	12.4	(d)
Section 416(b)		85.1	75.7	--	--
Total		\$91.0	\$1,160.8	\$522.0	\$394.3

Source: US Departments of State and Agriculture; US Agency for International Development.

Abbreviations:

CSH	Child Survival and Health
DA:	Development Assistance
ERMA	Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance
ESF:	Economic Support Fund
FMF:	Foreign Military Financing
IMET:	International Military Education and Training
INCLE:	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (includes border security)
NADR:	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and related
PKO:	Peacekeeping Operations
P.L.480 Title I:	Trade and Development Assistance food aid (loans)
P.L.480 Title II:	Emergency and Private Assistance food aid (grants)
Section 416(b):	The Agriculture Act of 1949, as amended (surplus agricultural commodity donations)

Note:

- a. Includes \$9 million in UN Family Planning Funds that currently are on hold pending presidential determination.
- b. Congress authorised Pakistan to use this ESF allocation to cancel approximately \$1 billion in concessional debt to the US government.
- c. Includes \$73 million for border security projects continuing in FY2003.
- d. Title II food aid accounts generally are held in reserve.
- e. Food aid amounts do not include what can be significant transportation costs.

Source: K Alan Kronstadt, "Pakistan US Relations," CRS issue brief Congress, Updated November 3, 2003. Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress.

End Notes

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KASHMIR AFTER THE 9/11: IMPLICATIONS AND OPTIONS FOR PAKISTAN

Dr. Major Muhammad Khan

General

'Kashmir', is described by Mughal Emperor Jehangir in The 17th century A.D, "as a garden of eternal spring or an iron fort to a palace of kings". The saga of Kashmir is sad and mournful. It is a piece of heaven on earth¹. It is the most beautiful landscape with snow clad mountains, high plateaus, gushing streams, rippling founts, lush green valleys, grassy pastures, juicy fruits, rich minerals and bewitching human beauty having no parallel. During its recorded civilized history, Kashmir's political borders varied from time to time i.e its borders have expanded and shrunk. At times it formed part of great neighbouring empires where as, most of the time, it remained independent having its own kingdom. As per Dr. Radha Krishan Parmu, under strong and magnificent Kings, the Himalayan mountain ranges secured the valley from foreign intrusions and under weak kings, owing to their complacency and laxity of control over the passes, Kashmir fell an easy prey to the adventurers, missionaries and conquerors. However, even when the state was part of any other empire or kingdom, it has always maintained its distinct identity. Kashmir assimilated foreign influences, like the sea receiving waters of different rivers from distant lands².

Kashmir got the status of princely state after 1846. British East India Company, which had taken control of the most of present Indo-Pak Subcontinent by then, sold the state to Maharaja Gulab Singh, (Dogra Ruler) for a sum of seventy-five lacs (Nanak Shai) on 16 March 1846. Dogras ruled the state till 1947, when colonial rule ended over the subcontinent and Pakistan and India came in to being as independent states. As per partition plan, being a Muslim majority state, Kashmir was to form part of Pakistan³. However, non-muslim Maharaja of Kashmir was forced by India to sign a so called instrument of accession with India, once the Indian forces had

already landed at Srinagar airport and resultantly war broken out between Kashmiris and Indian forces. India took the matter to United Nations Organization, where it was decided that future of the state will be decided through a plebiscite under UN auspices. Successive Indian governments, however under one or other pretext, dilly-dallied the process of plebiscite until it declared the state as its integral part. Pakistan however, did not accept Indian stance/claim on Kashmir and regarded the state as a disputed territory. Indian non-compromising attitude had caused three wars over the state in last fifty-six years without any decision⁴.

Kashmiris renewed their struggle for freedom from Indian yoke in 1989/90. The struggle was purely political. However, Indian state forces unleashed their brutalities on unarmed / innocent Kashmiri protestors. Resultantly Kashmiris also took arms for their protection. During this phase of struggle more than eighty thousands Kashmiris have been martyred beside events of torture, rape and illegal detention. In spite of her all out efforts, Indian forces failed to suppress the just struggle of Kashmiris in last fourteen years.

This paper examines the Kashmir dispute post 9/11 – implications and options for Pakistan, vis-à-vis Indian Strategic planning to involve Pakistan as a state sponsoring terrorism, while being a US partner in its war against terrorism. A brief history of Kashmiris struggle for their right of self-determination will also be examined.

Indian and Pakistani Staud on Kashmir

Pakistan's view point. Since partition of sub continent, Pakistan has a very clear view point on Kashmir, that, it is a disputed territory, whose decision has to be made in accordance with the resolution of United Nations Security Council. UNSC resolutions calls for a plebiscite under UN auspices by Kashmiris for determination of their right of self determination. Pakistan further reiterates that Kashmir is the core issue and the root cause of current tension with India. Nevertheless over a past few years, Pakistan has shown a flexibility in the stance on Kashmir. However this flexibility is just for a move forward to any favourable progress on

the issue. There is no change on principle stand of Pakistan on Kashmir. More recently President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf, has even said that we can show more flexibility on our stated position on Kashmir, acceptable to all the three parties.

Indian Stand on Kashmir. Official stand of India is that Kashmir as a whole is integral part of Indian Union. India officially claim that this dispute can be resolved if territories of the State presently under Pakistan are given to India. Till 1957, Indian leadership was accepting the disputed nature of the state. In 1955/56, Indian government got a resolution passed from IJK State assembly in favour of state accession with Indian Union. Since then Indian authorities started officially claiming it as her integral part. At time India showed little flexibility for the solution of issue but probably this flexibility was restricted to Indian acceptance of status quo i.e. LOC as permanent border. Since Simla agreement of 1972, while discussing Kashmir dispute, India emphasized on bilateralism and rejects the UNSC resolutions declaring them as out-dated having no credibility. India also declare the present uprisings in Kashmir, as the terrorism, sponsored from across the border by Pakistan⁵.

Pakistan being the ambassador of Kashmiris provides diplomatic, political and moral support to Kashmir cause. Kashmir has great effect on the foreign/ diplomatic policy of Pakistan. Pakistan cannot be separated from this dispute. With the passage of time both countries have hardened their claims on Kashmir and the issue has turned as a point of ego for both India and Pakistan. As a matter of fact it is the fault line of their ideological divide. Although a process of serious dialogue on the issue commenced in 1998-99 through track – II diplomacy, but Indian hawks did not let the process to go a head. In 12th SAARC Summit, both the states were able to melt the ice. It is expected that if there is sincerity, then there will be an improvement in the relations of both states in the days to come.

9/11 and Pakistan

The unfortunate incident of 9/11 which shook the whole world, badly affected Pakistan internally as well on external front. Al – Qaeda and Taliban administration of Afghanistan were directly made responsible of these terrorist attacks on Washington and New York. Geo strategic location of Pakistan and her deep-rooted links with then Taliban administration could not absolve Pakistan to remain unaffected immediately after the attacks. Moreover, Pakistan was among the one of the three states, which had recognized the Taliban Government in Afghanistan. Any effort of United States and world coalition against Taliban government in Afghanistan could not have been succeeded without active cooperation of Pakistan.

After a very critical weighing between its long term national interests and association with Taliban administration, Pakistan decided to side with the United States in its campaign against terrorism. Since the initiation of this campaign against terrorism was from Afghanistan, so Pakistan had to provide certain facilities like logistic support and exchange of intelligence information to United States and coalition. Owing to its common border with Afghanistan, this cooperation and support to US and coalition was only possible by Pakistan. Indian government also offered a similar cooperation including air bases to US in its war against Afghanistan, but, US rejected that.

India felt greatly upset and frustrated over Pakistan's close collaboration with the United States and world coalition. Pakistan also became a member of coalition partner in the war against terrorism. World community at large started appreciating Pakistan's role against terrorism and many leaders including heads of State visited Pakistan to loud her cooperation. Seeing the importance of Pakistan, India started her efforts to undermine Pakistan's relations with US led world community.

Through her leadership and media, India launched a massive campaign against Pakistan's role in war against terrorism. India tried to convince world community, that Pakistan itself was involved in "cross-border terrorism" in Kashmir against her (India). By sending

her diplomatic missions/political representatives to various world countries/foras, India challenged Pakistan's partnership with US led coalition in war against terrorism. While launching its propaganda campaign against Pakistan, India forgot the facts that Kashmiris had started their struggle against Dogra Rule in 1930s once Pakistan was non existent and Indian rule in 1947, when India and Pakistan became independent. The case of Kashmiris right of self-determination was approved by United Nations in 1949-50s, is still pending before world community for the want of Indian compliance. It is not new case. It has no relevancy with terrorism of 9/11. It is a just struggle of Kashmiris for their right of self-determination.

Kashmir's present intifida of 1989/90, was just a renewal of their continued struggle of past one century. Since 1989/90 India has employed its more than seven hundred thousand troops to curb the Kashmiris right of self-determination. In the process more than 80,000 Kashmiris have been martyred. According to both international and Indian human right groups, Indian occupation forces have been engaged in gruesome human-rights violations.

International community and United States, being supporter of Kashmir case in UNO in 1948/49, were not convinced with Indian logics of declaring Kashmiri movement as a terrorism and Pakistan as a country sponsoring/supporting this act. Indians were going all out trying to establish links between Kashmir movement and terrorism. Through collaboration with new Afghan government consisting (mainly of Northern Alliance having close historical ties with India), Indian government was able to shift a sizeable portion of captured Mujahideen from Afghanistan to India. Later these Mujahideen were portrayed as Al-Qaeda men, operating in Indian held Kashmir against Indian forces. They were even exposed to the world media⁶.

In their subsequent steps to represent Pakistan as a state, sponsoring terrorism, suicide attack near Kashmir Assembly at Srinagor on October 1, 2001 was presented by Indian government as an act committed by Pakistani backed militants or intelligence agencies of Pakistan. The incident was given a huge media coverage. Pakistan and Kashmiris also condemned the attack.

Empty

Kargil conflict of 1999, that India can go to a limited conventional battle with Pakistan without getting into a full fledged war. Washington's initiation of war against terrorism and Islamic militancy proved a catalyst that exasperated tension between India and Pakistan. United Nations Security Council's resolution 1373 of September 2001, on terrorism has made no distinction between terrorists and freedom fighters. Indian leadership planned to exploit the situation in their favour. Indian were going all out to launch a coercive diplomacy with a view to compelling Pakistan to settle the Kashmir dispute on its terms and condition.

Like US did in Afghanistan in October-November 2001, India also planned surgical strikes across LOC in to the Pakistani controlled part of Kashmir on the justification of combating terrorism and to destroy/dismantle the alleged terrorist camps. While evolving this strategy, Indian strategists perhaps miscalculated the response from Pakistan. Such type of action could have triggered an all out war with disastrous ramifications not only for India-Pakistan but for the security of entire world. Indian pursuit of this dangerous policy in the region was crafted by BJP leadership over the years. India has been sweating to become a regional (South Asian) super power, therefore it was a golden chance for its policy makers to get the Kashmir dispute settled for ever, and establish its hegemony in subcontinent. Since Kargil conflict, Indian strategists were making efforts to portray Pakistan as a Rouge State on account of terrorism. On domestic front BJP leadership wanted to secure stability for its party to win forth coming states election including IHK. These were the factors forcing Indian leaders to go for brinkmanship against peace loving Pakistan, but they badly failed.

For a year or so forces of India and Pakistan remained eyeball to eyeball contact on the Line of Control (LOC) as well as on international border. During this escalatory period in May 2001, unknown assailants once again attacked a military camp near Jammu, killing more than 27 persons. It was another effort to trigger a gradually cooling escalation. However, timely intervention of US, UK and other countries saved the confrontation between two nuclear powers. After more than a year, Indian forces started de-escalation from international border. However India did not reduce its forces

deployed in IJK. India failed to achieve its perceived goals, it had set for itself while carrying out mobilization of its armed forces.

Implications of 9/11 on Pakistan

On September 20, 2001, US President Mr. George W. Bush, while addressing to a joint session of Congress and the American people categorically stated, "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make, either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists". Further more, he asked every country to join the US in its war on terrorism. Earlier Mr. Colin Powell, US Secretary of State, Wendy Chamberlain, then US ambassador to Pakistan had in depth discussion with Pakistani President. On September 13, 2001, President Bush personally talk to President General Pervez Musharraf to sought Pakistan's cooperation in US campaign against Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Of course no military operation was possible in Afghanistan without active cooperation of Pakistan.

Although Pakistan had no option but to support US action in Afghanistan, yet President General Pervez Musharraf after having analysed the pros and cons of the unfolding situation addressed the nation on September 19, 2001. In his nation wide address, President of Pakistan explained to the nation about the circumstances under which Pakistan was compelled to cooperate with US in its war against terrorism in Afghanistan. He mentioned that owing to following four factors of national interests, he has decided to side with the US: -

- Security of Pakistan being a top priority.
- Revival of economy.
- Perseverance of strategic nuclear and missile assets.
- Safe guarding the Kashmiris right of self-determination.

Pakistan fully cooperated the US in its war on terrorism against Afghanistan. This cooperation is continuing against Al-

Qaeda/Taliban in the areas bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan. Although 9/11 incident had its worldwide effects but had major implications for Pakistan in the days to come. Some of the important implications of 9/11 on Pakistan especially with reference to Kashmir are covered in succeeding paras⁷.

Legitimacy of Kashmiris Struggle. As per the new rules set by US while initiating war against terrorism, no case justifies violence. With this revised definition and under the strong Indian propaganda against the struggle of Kashmiris, international community tends to view the armed struggle of Kashmiris in the context of terrorism. However, owing to Pakistan's cooperation against war of terrorism, the struggle of Kashmiris for their right of self-determination as given by UNO has not lost its legitimacy. Rather international community has acknowledged the status of Kashmir as an unsettled political issue between India and Pakistan.

In order to clarify Pakistan's position on Kashmir, President Pervez Musharraf in his address to the nation on January 12, 2002, said, that "Kashmir runs in our blood". He reiterated Pakistan's principled stand that, moral, diplomatic and political support will continue to be rendered to Kashmiris like past. In his subsequent interviews and addresses on world foras, President Musharraf made clear to world community in general and India in particular that Pakistan will never budge an inch from its principled stand on the right of self-determination of Kashmiris. In response to the reservations of world community that Pakistani soil is being used for training/harboursing the freedom fighters, authorities in Pakistan banned many so-called Jehadi organizations. Moreover, no organization/group was allowed to use Pakistani soil to carry out any sort of terrorist acts either within or outside the country. Being a prey of terrorism since last so many years in its history, Pakistan categorically condemned all sort of terrorism. We stand by the world community against war on terrorism.

Lifting of US Sanctions. After Pakistan's cooperation with US in war against terrorism, the already imposed sanctions on Pakistan were lifted. These sanctions were imposed on Pakistan and India in 1998, when both countries exploded their nuclear devices.

Pakistan is being used as front line state in their war against terrorism but lifting of sanctions from India, by US without its active cooperation in the war is not understood. India has only exploited the 9/11 incident to seek Washington's help in declaring Pakistan a terrorist state. Throughout in its history, Pakistan has been an active ally of US. Previously also Pakistan was used as a front line state from 1979-1990, in US indirect war against former USSR. While lifting sanctions, track record of both countries could have been seen.

Arms Race and Increase in the Defence Expenditures. In the field of defence spending, Pakistan has always adopted a reactive policy to the India. Pakistan never initiated an arms race in the region. Indian military spending as a percentage of GDP has grown from 2.10 in 1996 to 2.6 in 2002, whereas in the same teneour Pakistani defence expenditures gone down from 5.10 to 4.50. From 1996 to 2002, the percentage of central government expenditure (the military expenditure) of India was around 14.50-15 and that of Pakistan in the same period from 24.0 to 21.20. In the recent years, India is continuously increasing its defence outlays. For the financial year 2003-4 India increased the defence budget by 14%. As a result of Indian increase in defence budget Pakistan cannot remain aloof. After all defence of motherland has the prime importance for each Pakistani and government. In the recent years Pakistans defence budget is barely sufficient to keep its forces in operational readiness.

Shift in the Strategic Arms Balance. Post 9/11, India has purchased lot of sophisticated military hardwares including aircrafts for her air force from Israel, UK, USA and Russia. After consent of US, a deal has been finalized between India and Israel for the sale of Phalcon Radar system to India. It is a latest early warning system available with only very few countries of the world. Pakistan has protested to US for this new development. It has altered the strategic arms balance in the region in favour of India. This continuous arms race especially of India and a situation of confrontation between the two has adversely affected the economy of both India and Pakistan. Pakistan being a small state cannot match the defence spending of India. To maintain arms balance in the region, a lot of money is

incurred while depriving the other developmental projects in the country.

Changed Dimension of Kashmir Dispute. Post 9/11, Kashmir dispute has assumed a completely different dimension. It was over shadowed by US actions in Afghanistan and then Iraq. Unclear definition of terrorism provided a chance to prove this rightful indigenous movement of Kashmiris, as terrorism sponsored by Pakistan. India even tried her utmost in convincing US, UK, EU and World community to take action against Pakistan to eradicate terrorist network. For the satisfaction of international community, Pakistan banned many Jehadi organizations, particularly those having any sort of links with Al-Qaeda and Taliban. A number of organizations operating in Kashmir but having bad track record in the eyes of US were also banned. To some extent this was almost an acceptance of Indian allegations. However, world community was satisfied with these steps of Pakistan. At time, Pakistan was compelled to do more on protecting LOC. Pakistan even offered India for an impartial monitoring of LOC by UN observers, to which India refused. World community perhaps failed to understand that why can't seven hundred thousand Indian Army deployed along LOC, stop infiltration if at all there is any⁸.

Commitment of Pakistani Armed Forces (on Western Borders). Pakistan was asked by US to keep a certain number of her forces along Western border with Afghanistan at the time of US attack on Afghanistan. The force was to monitor/stop any infiltration from Afghan territory to Pakistan. When India mobilized its armed forces, Pakistan was compelled to move her forces from western to eastern borders, which was not American's interest. US assured Pakistan that India will not attack Pakistan. For assuring Pakistan, Mr. Colin Powel, Secretary of State and many other US officials visited Indo-Pakistan during US War on Afghanistan and there after. US and World Community persuaded India and Pakistan to exercise restraint in their conflict over the Kashmir dispute and start a process of dialogue.

Increased Role of World Powers Specially US in South Asia. Following 9/11 and Indo-Pak escalation, US and major

world powers had increased their active role in the affairs of South Asia, especially with reference to Kashmir between two nuclear giants. Mr. Powel, while talking to Reuters in Sigonella (Italy), on July 27, 2002, said that, "ultimately we have to get the dialogue or else we will just be stuck on the plateau which would not serve our interest. We do not want to be backed where we were few months ago". Mr. Powel was very specific during his visit to India and Pakistan that Kashmir is the conflict impeding the process of normalization between two nuclear rivals in South Asia. In January 2002, British Prime Minister, Mr. Tony Blair visited India and Pakistan and stressed the need of dialogue over the disputed region and ease the tension. During Almaty Conference held in Jan 2002, Russian and Chinese leaders met President Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Mr. A.B. Vajpayee. They forced India and Pakistan to de-escalate and peacefully settle their differences/disputes.

Plight of Kashmiris Post 9/11. While rendering all out cooperation to US in its war against terrorism especially in Afghanistan, Pakistan assumed that US will help Pakistan in resolving the Kashmir issue. Although owing to Kashmiris renewed struggle of last thirteen years the dispute came into lime light but no worthwhile attention has been given to it by US or world community. Even owing to strong Indian propoganda campaign, at international level, there has been some concern about the plight of Kashmiris. As promised by President Clinton during Kargil conflict and Bush administration while asking Pakistan for cooperation in Afghan campaign, seemingly there is no tilt in US policy towards solution of Kashmir as per the wishes of Kashmiris. India on the other hand succeeded in drawing world attention to the acts of violence in Jammu and Kashmir and linked it with Al-Qaeda/Taliban. This repeated Indian allegations of terrorism became so problematic for Pakistan, that it had to put ban on a number of Jehadi organizations, which was equal to an acceptance of Indian charges.

Shift in US Policy Towards South Asia. At the end of cold war, US think tanks reviewed their policy. They formulated a new policy to find its new strategic partners at various parts of the

world. In South Asia, US found India as a new strategic partner. This shift in US policy was gradual and governed by three fundamental principles: -

- **Containment of China.** Post cold war china is a growing super power and a strategic competitor to US especially in the field of economy. India, owing to its past clashes with China, was most suitable to US to act as a counter weight to China in the region. US has very successfully exploited its links with India for its long terms strategic gains. However, China also has increased its diplomatic links with India which is a concern for US as well.
- **India as an Economic Market.** Owing to its huge size and population, India is a big economic market for US in the days to come. It has matured and well-developed political/democratic system most suited to America. Although during cold war, India apparently adopted policy of non alignment, but practically it was part of Russian Camp. However, even then it was getting maximum benefits from West and US. For future India will prove to be a great weapon and economic market.
- **Role of Indian Origin US Lobby.** Indian origin US Lobby is very active in the US camps for the interest of India. They even have started influencing domestic US politics in the favour of India in a myriad ways. This Lobby is working against the interest of Pakistan. Many senators/members of US Congress have been greatly influenced by this Lobby.

Pakistan although has always rendered its full support to US cause in the region especially in 1980s and 2001, yet owing to above-mentioned factors US has a very clear tilt towards India. This US future interest is compelling Bush administration not to take any steps towards resolution of Kashmir issue. Any US effort to pressurise India will hamper her interest in the region. Resolution of Kashmir may be an important task for US in the region, but this resolution may not be in the favour of Kashmiris or Pakistan. Post 9/11, US has shown more interest towards India. US even declared

India as her natural strategic partner/ally and offered her all defence oriented support, either, directly or indirectly. This has created a military imbalance in the region.

Election in IHK. Since the time Indian state sponsored elections were held in Indian occupied Kashmir in 1992, India has hardened its stance on Kashmir. Indian government has ensured a regime change in the occupied territory and asserted that after prolong militancy, it is a referendum in the favour of New Delhi by Kashmiris, as it is a coalition government of all Jammu and Kashmir political parties. This election had a great implication on Pakistan before, during and even after their conduct. Through propaganda at international level, India put onus on Pakistan to guarantee a peaceful conduct of state election while having 700,000 forces on LOC. After state assembly election, India again refused to hold dialogue with Pakistan on the plea that world should force Pakistan to stop cross border infiltration. Pakistan has called on the international community to facilitate the resolution of the dispute. Elections are an instrument to run the administration rather than an alternate of plebiscite. Post election in Kashmir, India feels more satisfied and has hardened its stance for any future negotiations on the disputed state. Election, of course were not fair but, enabled India to propagate to the world community that people of the state are now returning to the normalcy and it is Pakistan which is not allowing to cool down the militancy⁹.

Other Implications. 9/11 followed by US military campaign against Afghanistan, paved the way for an increased Indian involvement in Afghanistan. Post Taliban period of Afghan government is dominated by Northern Alliance, who had close historical relations with India. Even President Hamid Karzai had studied in Indian Universities. India fully exploited the change in Afghanistan by establishing its consulates and other supporting organizations for Afghans. She wanted to keep Pakistan out of the Afghan affairs. For reconstruction/re-building of war ridden country, India also provided a lot of financial support to Afghanistan. By keeping close links with Afghanistan, India succeeded in un-securing Pakistan's western borders to be used for her advantage as and when required. It is expected that as long as the present

government of Afghanistan is ruling there, having key ministries with Qasim Fahim and Abdullah Abdullah, Pakistan may not find a place in Afghanistan to play any role.

During the cold war era, India had its nexus with former USSR. Post cold war, India successfully managed to maintain fairly strong links with Central Asian States. New Delhi is keen to clean bold Pakistan in her relations with CARs. In the recent past India has established a military base in Tajikistan. It is an indicator that India is interested to play a greater role in the affairs of CARs. The base is operative since May 2002. It is located at Farkhar, an area close to the border with Afghanistan. In fact India is in the process of securing its following long-term strategic interests in the region:-

- To be a part of Great Game or otherwise safeguard its economic interests by laying hands on the enormous energy resources (oil and gas reserves) of CARs.
- To keep a close watch on the activities of Pakistan and China for their any likely future collaboration to secure energy resources.
- To stop formation of an Islamic Block between Pakistan, CARs, Afghanistan and Iran.

To achieve its goals as discussed above, India is anxiously/vigorously pursuing its strategic ties with even Iran. During past two decade there has been close ties between Iran and India. Post cold war an increase in the relations of both countries have been noticed. In fact Northern Alliance government of Afghanistan is friendly to both India and Iran. India has no direct road links with either Afghanistan or CARs. She has to pass through Pakistani territory for any excess to Afghanistan or CARs. Closer Indian ties with Iran provided her easy excess to CARs as well as Afghanistan. After great efforts Pakistan had secured its strategic depth by having closer ties with Afghanistan, of course against Indian wishes, in order to obviate the possibility of a two front military situation. This effort has fallen prey to the 9/11 incident. Rather Pakistan is at the

most difficult situation in history. It is almost encircled from East and West¹⁰.

12th SAARC Summit:- A Ray of Hope for Improving Indo-Pak Relations. The historical 12th SAARC Summit held in Islamabad from 4-6 January 2004. Ever since of its establishment, SAARC remained a prey to the Indo-Pak confrontation. Owing to this bitterness between two nuclear powers, other five countries of South Asia were no more than pawns on the South Asian chessboard. During 12th SAARC Summit, South Asia in particular and world in general was more interested to see a positive out come between India and Pakistan. January 6, 2004, Declaration between India and Pakistan came out as a pleasant surprise to the world. Masses of both countries are very happy and desire that improvement in relations should go ahead for permanent peace between two neighbours. As per Dr. S.M. Rehman, "it appeared that the mind set of the leaders at the helm of affairs, in both the countries, have off loaded the legacies of the past and are seemingly committed to reconstruct the present, and eventually the future, to extract a win-win situation for both".

Apparently development in Indo-Pak bilateral issues specially Kashmir issue has been re-started from where Agra Summit failed in July 2001. President Pervez Musharraf, in his press conference has said that a new history has been made in Islamabad towards the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. Analysing the past history of India, cynics view it as a strategic move of Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee to reduce world pressure for restoration of relations with Pakistan or to encash some tangible dividends in the forth coming Lok Sabha elections. From Pakistan's point of view it is a great success, as India has accepted, two, out of Four Points Strategy for the solution of Kashmir issue i.e beginning of dialogue between leadership of both countries and acceptance of Kashmir as a dispute. Irrespective of mind sets/hidden agenda of Indian leadership, 12th SAARC Summit, has provided a golden chance to both countries to solve the only stumbling block (Kashmir) for better South Asian future. A solution, which should be acceptable to all the three parties – Pakistan, India and Kashmiris¹¹.

Post Simla Agreement (1972), India has made a rhetorical stand that Kashmir is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. But practically after the end of cold war in early nineties, US has directly or indirectly seen a mediatory role, which not only raise its importance in the world community but will also confirm its status of sole super power. Dr Bernard Haykel, assistant professor, New York University, while delivering a lecture in Jammu University, was quoted by the 'Kashmir Times', as saying that, Kashmir was one of most important component of American foreign affairs policy and that is why it is very keen that the issue should be resolved at the earliest. As a matter of fact primary consideration of US in South Asia lies to avoid a confrontation between two nuclear countries, which of course will harm her interests in the region as well as at international level. America is actually performing the role of active peace broker in the subcontinent and is already acting as an "invisible third party" formulating the agenda and dictating terms¹².

Options Available for Pakistan

Kashmir dispute - an unfinished agenda of partition, could not be resolved even after three wars between India and Pakistan, which mean military solution of the future of state is not possible. United Nations Security Council has also failed to resolve it by implementing its resolutions on Kashmir in last fifty six years. India has rather hardened its stance on Kashmir by declaring it as her integral part. Kashmiris, in response to their right of self-determination are experiencing brutalities of Indian State forces since past half a century. Pakistan, being an ambassador of Kashmiris right at international level had to suffer disintegration in 1971. It also suffered on economic front due to huge defence expenditures. Under these conditions, how long will it take to resolve, is yet to be assumed.

Post cold war, as the Kashmiris struggle for freedom renewed, a number of options were considered for its solution. Indian inflexible approach did not let the dispute settle any way. Incident of 9/11 and events thereafter have changed the world scenario, against the Kashmiris rightful will. New world scenario of a war against terrorism coupled with Indian propaganda campaign of

involving Pakistan as a country supporting terrorism in Kashmir has placed Pakistan at the cross roads of its history. Had Pakistan not been a coalition partner in war against terrorism, perhaps Indian state crafted doctrine would have been accomplished long ago. Thanks to foresightedness and timely decision making of President, General Pervez Musharraf that country has been saved.

Kashmir, as president of Pakistan said on many occasions, runs in the blood of each Pakistani. No Pakistani can compromise over Kashmir. However under the changed international scenario, Pakistan cannot afford to have confrontation with India or any other world power. Policy of projecting political/legal aspects of the issue to the world community will only be helpful in the days to come. In order to redress misconception of world community over the Kashmiris struggle for their right of self-determination, by Pakistan, a few options are given in the succeeding paras.

Political and Diplomatic Projection of the Kashmir.

Pakistan cannot absolve herself from the Political, diplomatic and moral support to the Kashmiris right of self-determination. Kashmiris movement has always been peaceful and political. They took arms only when India unleashed a rain of terror on them specially at the out break of their recent renewed struggle. Kashmiris are neither extremist nor fundamental terrorist. They only demand their political and legal right of freedom which otherwise UNO has promised them. Now there is a requirement that Pakistan by sending various diplomatic missions (including Kashmiri representatives) should project / convince international community about its truth. True designs of Indian hawkish policy and state sponsor brutalities on Kashmiris must be made to known to the world at various foras. Misconception of world on this particular issue be projected by diplomatic missions of Pakistan which are already functioning round the globe. Frequent visits of diplomats and military attaches of international community be planned all along the LOC to depict true position.

Unity Among Kashmiri Leadership. There is a split among Kashmiri leadership on both sides of the LOC. For freedom from India, they all are united but having differences over the modus operandi. They may have differences over the airy options for the solution of Kashmir. Under the prevalent scenario, there is a great need to have a united leadership in both halves of state. Pakistan must convince India through international community to allow Kashmiris from across the Line of Control to sit with their brothers in Pakistani administered areas. Intra Kashmir dialogue is the only solution for a unanimous Kashmiris point of view, under a single leadership.

Involvement of US for Ultimate Solution of Issue As Mediator/ Facilitator. The role of United States, being the sole super power cannot be ignored in the present world scenario. Pakistan must exploit her decades old strategic allianceship with US to get the Kashmir dispute settled in accordance with the wishes of Kashmiris. United States already has an invisible role to play in South Asia as an active peace broker. After all Pakistan has gone all out to accomplish the US strategic global interest. Now it is a time for US to repay to Pakistan it has done for her in her entire history. It is only the United States which can compel India to settle the long-standing dispute. Moreover contrary to Indian claim of bilateralism, US is playing the role of third party either directly or indirectly. If US is not acceptable to India, any other country or individual or countries or individuals may be involved to mediate the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan¹³.

Confidence Building Measures, While Keeping Kashmir in the Lime Light. Although peace between India and Pakistan can only be effective once, the route cause of tension (Kashmir Issue) is resolved as per the aspirations of the people of State, yet under the changed scenario present package of CBMs is a well coming step. It should further continue without placing the bone of contention on back burner. All CBMs and trade ties must converge on Kashmir. Statement of President, General Pervez Musharraf dated 12 February 04 at National Defence College is a very encouraging and bold on the issues of Kashmir and nuclear.

Four Steps Formula for Solution of Kashmir. Four steps mechanism as suggested by President, General Pervez Musharraf, during Agra Summit (July 14-16, 2001) is a workable formula. First two steps have already been taken by India and Pakistan. As a result of official level negotiations between both countries, held in Islamabad in February 2004, it has been decided that future negotiations on all outstanding issues including Kashmir will be held from March to August 2004. Kashmir has formally been accepted as dispute by India and Pakistan. This mechanism will enable India, Pakistan and Kashmiris to reach for a final solution of Kashmir in a near future.

People to People Contact. Former Indian Prime Minister, Mr Inder Kumar Gujral, suggested the idea of people to people contact between India and Pakistan in May 2002. It is a good step being taken by people from all walks of life. There is a need that both governments should relax the visa granting procedure to the citizen of each other. People from all classes must also be allowed to visit IHK. These people can promote good will on both side of international border / LOC. They should also influence their government/officials for a better relations and solution of Kashmir problem.

Options for Solutions of Kashmir and National Interests. Serious dialogue and efforts are under way for solution of Kashmir issue. Centrality of issue has been accepted by India during 12th SAARC Summit. Beside track - II diplomacy is also on. United States is keen to resolve the issue at the earliest for safe guarding her own interest in the region. Various options ranging from LOC as permanent border to division and independence are under consideration. Pakistan is an agrarian country. Its future lies in Kashmir. Leadership of Pakistan should accept only that option which guarantee the future economic interest of Pakistan. Catchments areas (water sources) should never be allowed to remain in the hands of India¹⁴.

Indian Negotiations with APHC. As a result of a recent split in APHC leadership, Indian Deputy Prime Minister, Mr L.K.Advani had a round of talks with APHC. This talk was sequel to

the successful conclusion of 12th SAARC Summit in Islamabad. Any negotiations on future status of Kashmir or Kashmiris must be participated by Pakistan, being the most important party of issue. On one hand India stress on bilateralism, where as on the other hand negotiating with only a faction of Kashmiris to show her success to the world, that Kashmiris are ready to live under Indian Union. This tactical Indian move is to weaken the Pakistan's position on the issue. Beside any third party acting as a direct or indirect mediators/facilitators, any talks/negotiations on the state's future must be participated by Pakistan, India and Kashmiris¹⁵.

Beside Kashmir dispute, 9/11 has effected western border of Pakistan and our relations with Central Asian States. In view of india's deep involvement in the region, Pakistan cannot afford to be a totally silent spectator of whatever transpires there. Pakistan must not support any single group in Afghanistan. However, majority of Afghans being Pushtoos must have a domination in the government of Afghanistan. Pakistan must not give India, a free hand in Afghanistan. We must have our roots in Afghanistan and role to play there in future.

Economic ties with CARs must be increased in the days to come. Some alternative strategy for safe guarding our interest must be formulated in response to Indian military base at Tajikistan. Proposed gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan must be pursued. Pakistan must cooperate with China in Central Asia to counter Indian growing presence in the region. For a better relations with the CARs, Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) forum must be made use of. Pakistan must make all out efforts to keep India out of any political or economic grouping of Afghanistan and Central Asia like SCO and the 'Six Plus Two' arrangement. We must gain membership of SCO as well.

In the ongoing talks with India, Pakistan must convince her that arms race in the region is beneficial to none. It only increases the defence expenditures, while taxing the poor populace. Both countries have a sizeable portion of poor population. Freezing defence expenditures at present level if further reduction is not possible will be a well coming step for the region. Pakistan must

engage India in a meaningful dialogue. Present Indian move of dialogue may not be allowed to become a strategy of BJP government to hunt a success in the early conducted elections and refusing any further flexibility in future.

Conclusion

Owing to its strategic and economic significance, Pakistan cannot afford that Kashmir also meet the fate of Afghan Jihad/Taliban. As a whole Pakistani nation is very touchy on Kashmir and nuclear issue. There is a need, that we should take steps for reviving our policy on Kashmir. We are really at the cross roads of our history facing pressure on nuclear proliferation, Kashmir, relations with Afghanistan and biggest is the internal security threats. Pakistan's policy needs to be freed from any contradictions. Irrespective of political differences, we must not show irresponsible attitude on matters of national interest. Diplomatic pressure can best be countered by sending diplomats having international standing and clear national policies/interests.

12th SAARC summit has created new hopes. Whether forthcoming rounds of talks make a dent in the present dead lock or not, but all the past roads to peace between India and Pakistan are littered with failed summits and spectra of wars/conflicts. Let both sides keep the ground realities in mind for a sustainable progress towards rapprochement. Post nuclearization of South Asia, there can be no military solution to Kashmir. Indian efforts to destabilize Pakistan on economic front has also failed. Today world considers Kashmir as a nuclear flash point to be resolved on priority. International community do not accept Indian claim that Kashmir is its integral part.

CBMs and trade ties between India and Pakistan can only grow once the core issue is resolved. Suffering of Kashmiris in the forms of killing, destruction, rapes and depravity by Indian forces on daily basis have to be stopped. Pakistan has gone all out to curb extremists from its soil. Now ball is in the court of India and US led international community.

End Notes

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INDO-US TIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

Dr. Syed Rifaat Hussain

On January 13, 2004 President George Bush formally announced the "Glide Path" agreement enabling India to "seek US cooperation in space, nuclear, high-tech and missile defence areas."¹ Describing the "trinity" agreement as a "milestone" that would "transform" Indo-US ties, President Bush claimed that the "the vision of US-India strategic partnership that Prime Minister Vajpayee and I share is now becoming a reality." He went on to express the hope that "cooperation in these areas will deepen the ties of commerce and friendship between our two nations and will increase stability in Asia and beyond."² Echoing President Bush's sentiments, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee also described the agreement as "milestone in bilateral ties"³

The conclusion of the "glide path" agreement marked the consolidation of the process of American strategic engagement with India unleashed by the demise of the bipolar configuration of power in the early 1990s. This paper analyses key elements of emerging strategic partnership between India and United States and evaluates its implications for Pakistan, an adversary of India and a principal US ally in the ongoing global war on terror.

Historical Overview

Despite the US military build-up of India as a major staging area for China and Burma during the Second World War and exceptionally strong advocacy for freedom for India by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, relations between India and United States, after the former gained independence from Britain in August 1947, did not have an auspicious beginning. Several factors made them "comrade at odds." Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's espousal and vigorous pursuit of "non-alignment" which Washington dubbed as "immoral", his "instinctive dislike for America and the Americans",⁴ Washington's reluctance to commit itself to a "program of economic assistance to India,"⁵ and its unwillingness to

side with New Delhi on the Kashmir dispute caused them to become "estranged democracies."⁶

The American decision to forge a military alliance with Pakistan in the mid-fifties as part of its global strategy of containment of communism was perceived in India as a hostile act that brought the cold war to its doorstep. India responded by ordering arm purchases from "sundry non-US sources" and by laying "foundations for a domestic arms production industry" to thwart the possibility of "Pakistani Patton tanks clanking down Grand Trunk Road to New Delhi."⁷ India also began to cultivate friendship with Moscow. During the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to India in November 1955, the two Soviet leaders offered aid and declared the Kashmir issue had been settled by the people of the area. In 1957, Moscow vetoed a Security Council resolution proposing a plebiscite to determine the status of Kashmir.

Soviet-Indian cooperation was further cemented by their adversarial perceptions of China. Following the outbreak of the Sino-India border war in 1962, Soviet military and economic aid was rushed to India in order to help it withstand the increasing Chinese military pressure. The Sino-Indian border war also proved to be a boon for Indo-American ties. President Kennedy offered "support as well as sympathy" to Nehru. Concerned with India's fate, Washington dramatically increased military aid and agreed to "train Indian pilots and to supply mobile radar units to help protect Indian cities."⁸ The two countries' air forces conducted joint training exercises and American U-2 spy planes, engaged in surveillance of Tibet, were allowed to land and refuel in India. In 1964, New Delhi "permitted the Americans to attempt to place a nuclear-powered sensor at Nanda Devi, a Himalayan peak, in order to monitor Chinese missile development."⁹

The inconclusive 1965 India-Pakistan war during which the United States withheld military supplies to the two combatants and thereby ended up "hurting Pakistan's U.S.-created military capability more than India's diversified weapon base," made India more determined to implement its extensive rearmament goals through foreign help and an expanded domestic arms industry and

military organization. China's passage to nuclear power in 1964 and the outbreak of Sino-Soviet armed clashes in 1969 coupled with Sino-American rapprochement, engineered by Henry Kissinger in July 1971 with Pakistan's help led India to solidify its extensive economic and military links with Moscow.

The Sino-American opening was perceived by India, as well as the USSR, as a threat to their security. On August 9, 1971 India signed a twenty year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. Although not a formal military alliance, the treaty nevertheless committed the two countries to closer cooperation. The agreement also promised material benefits for both contracting parties. For India, it meant greater Soviet diplomatic and an increased flow of state of the art armaments. Most important, it served as a guarantee of Soviet support to India in the event of aggressive Chinese action. From the Soviet standpoint, the treaty's chief benefit was that it "enabled Moscow with a number of its concerns notably, fear of China and the incipient Sino-American rapprochement."

American concern for regional stability in the South Asian region was influenced by India's decisive victory over Pakistan in their 1971 war. Washington unambiguously acknowledged India's supremacy in the area, and gave up the notion that Pakistan could ever be the military equal to India. President Nixon's report to Congress in February 1972 clearly expressed this changing U.S. perception of the sub-continental power balance. The report said: "The crisis of 1971 transformed South Asia. Of interest to us will be the posture South Asia's most powerful country [India] now adopts towards its neighbors in the subcontinent."¹⁰

India's pro-Soviet proclivities had several consequences. These included "imposition of restrictions on America's and other nations' foreign trade and economic relations with India" and "restrictions on India's import of Western technology".¹¹ More non-proliferations sanctions and restrictions followed after India conducted its first nuclear test in May 1974. Designed to limit India's access to nuclear materials, goods, and technology, these

American sanctions, in reality, turned out to be a mere "headache" and failed to inhibit India's nuclear ambitions.¹²

During the 1980s Indo-US relations were dominated by Washington's efforts to "coerce India into joining the non-proliferation regime."¹³ Undeterred by these American technology-denial policies, New Delhi accelerated its drive to acquire nuclear delivery capabilities. In 1983 India launched the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program with the aim to manufacture, among others, the 150-250-km-range Prithvi and 1,500-2,500-km-range Agni surface-to-surface missiles. Several developmental trials of the Prithvi and the first test of the Agni were conducted in the eighties.

The revival of Pakistan's strategic ties with Washington after the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that New Delhi failed to condemn, further contributed to strains in Indo-American ties. Reacting strongly to Reagan administration's decision to provide \$3.2 billion in military and economic assistance to Pakistan, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi complained that "We have faced this tilt...many years" and "resurrected long-standing Indian arguments against U.S. military assistance to Pakistan."¹⁴

New Delhi's protestations on the weapons issue resulted in the U.S decision not to provide E-3A airborne early warning aircraft to Pakistan and to "alert India about transfers of weapons to Pakistan that would be of concern to it."¹⁵ Indo-American relations became more positive following Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's official visit to Washington in July 1982. Besides resolving the contentious Tarapur issue, the visit launched an initiative for science and technology cooperation and led to the designation of 1985 as "the Year of India," during which a "mammoth Indian art and cultural exhibition would tour the United States."¹⁶

The positive momentum generated by Indira Gandhi's 1982 visit continued after her assassination in October 1984. In November 1984 India and United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Technology Transfers under which Washington agreed to "support India's weapon procurement strategies...in return

for assurances that the advanced technology transferred would be protected from leaks and used for agreed purposes.”¹⁷

In 1985, Rajiv Gandhi, who succeeded his slain mother as Prime Minister, paid an official visit to Washington. While avoiding conveying an impression that his country shared strategic and defending perspectives with the United States, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi told his hosts that “the people of India and America are not allies in security strategies, but they are friends in larger human causes – freedom, justice and peace.”¹⁸

The Post-Cold War Era

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 changed the global and regional context for Indo-American ties. The end of the Cold War had three important consequences for Indo-US ties. First, India’s strategic alliance with Moscow was no longer a matter of serious concern in Washington. Second, the rupture in U.S.-Pakistan security ties symbolized by the imposition of Pressler sanctions against Islamabad removed a major hurdle in the improvement of relations between New Delhi and Washington. Third, with the Soviet Union gone as a pillar of security, India was compelled to rework its relations with the United States, the sole superpower

Thus, as part of its overall strategy of seeking constructive engagement with all the major powers, India under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao became very “eager for closer relationships with the United States.”¹⁹

Building on earlier efforts by Indira Gandhi and Ronald Reagan to launch the two countries on a friendlier course in the early 1980s especially after they signed an MOU in 1985 to promote technological cooperation between the two countries, Narasimha Rao paid an official visit to United States in May 1994.

Consistent with his economics first approach, Prime Minister Rao emphasized the opportunities for growing business and political ties between the world’s two largest democracies. In his address to a joint session of Congress, he highlighted his country’s interest in

developing economic, investment and trade relations with the United States. He told his audience that India was neither a threat to peace nor an irresponsible nuclear actor. He mentioned India's support of bans on nuclear weapons testing and fissile material production for weapons purposes and urged further steps, including an agreement on "no first use" of nuclear weapons, to lead the world toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.²⁰

To bolster Indo-American relations further, the Clinton Administration organized a series of cabinet-level official trips to India. Energy Secretary Hazel O' Leary traveled to India in July 1994 to promote commercial and government cooperation on energy and environmental projects. US Defense Secretary William Perry visited Pakistan and India in January 1995, "heralding Washington's interest to cooperate more closely with India on defense matters."²¹ Perry, the first American defense secretary to visit the region since 1988, commended India's remarkable tradition of civilian control over the military and the two countries' evolving military-to-military contacts and technical cooperation. Commerce Secretary Ron Brown visited India on the heels of Perry's visit to underscore America's growing interest in India. Brown's visit yielded agreements worth \$7 billion in economic projects.²²

This positive post-Cold war trend in Indo-US ties was temporarily arrested by May 1998 India nuclear tests in the wake of which a "disappointed Clinton Administration imposed an array of congressionally mandated sanctions against India." Despite these sanctions, the Clinton Administration initiated a strategic dialogue between U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Indian Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh to help narrow differences on nuclear issues. Washington forceful "diplomatic intervention in the 1999 Kargil crisis to pressure Pakistan to withdraw its forces from the Indian side of the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir had a further positive impact."²³

President Bill Clinton's five day visit to India in March 2000 "signaled a new, positive chapter" in Indo-U.S. ties. Clinton's visit marked a major U.S. initiative to improve cooperation with India in the areas of economic ties, regional stability, nuclear

proliferation concerns, security and counterterrorism, environmental protection, clean energy production, and disease control. President Clinton and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee agreed to institutionalize dialogue between the two countries through a range of high-level exchanges, and the two countries established working groups and agreements on numerous issues of mutual concern from increasing bilateral trade to combating global warming.²⁴ The "vision statement" signed by the two sides described India and United States as "partners in peace". While expressing their resolve to "create a closer and qualitatively new relationship", it entailed a commitment to "deepen the Indian-American partnership in tangible ways".²⁵

Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's reciprocal visit to Washington in September 2000 marked the intensification of the qualitative improvement in Indo-US ties. It also underscored the growing American willingness to embrace an Indo-centric view of South Asia.

The American eagerness to accord a very special treatment to Mr. Vajpayee was not only evident from the fact that he became the only head of government to have held two summit meetings with President Bill Clinton in less than six months during the latter's eight year long Presidency, but also from the positive atmospherics surrounding the visit itself.

For example, despite his frail health, which caused abridgement of his extended tour of the United States, Mr. Vajpayee was accorded a red-carpet treatment in Washington including the rare privilege of being allowed to carry out a sedentary examination of the guard of honor. Also, his abrupt cancellation of a scheduled press briefing was greeted with equanimity by an otherwise brash Washington press corps. Most significantly, Mr. Vajpayee's verbal excesses against Pakistan, a former most allied ally of Washington, were given uncritical acceptance by his American hosts and the American media.

Apart from the powerful symbolism of American public indulgence of him, Mr. Vajpayee's Washington visit was also

significant in several other respects. The most salient feature of the visit was the deepening and broadening of Indo-US strategic nexus formed during President Bill Clinton's landmark visit to India in March 2000. The joint statement issued after Clinton-Vajpayee meeting in Washington on September 16, 2000 went beyond the notion of Indo-US partnership outlined in the "vision statement" and explicitly stated that "closer cooperation and stronger partnership between the two countries will be a factor for shaping a future of peace, prosperity, democracy, pluralism and freedom for this world."²⁶

President Clinton also articulated this belief in the necessity of Indo-US partnership for global peace. During his banquet speech in honor of the Indian Prime Minister on September 17, Mr. Clinton not only noted that "India and United States had built the strongest, most mature partnership" in which Indian "successes" were to become "American successes" but also said that together they "can change the world."

Another significant aspect of Mr. Vajpayee's reciprocal visit to Washington was visible American reluctance to annoy New Delhi by publicly reiterating Washington's longstanding position that Kashmir was the main source of tension between India and Pakistan. The Indo-US joint statement made no mention of the Kashmir dispute nor did it call for resumption of India-Pakistan dialogue to address the issue. It only indirectly referred to the matter by stating that "tensions in South Asia can only be resolved by the nations of South Asia", and that the two sides believed in the "unacceptability to continue violence and bloodshed as basis for solution of the problems of the region."

Bruce Reidel, Director National Security Council, promptly clarified President Bill Clinton's off-the-cuff reference to Kashmir as the core of difficulties between India and Pakistan, which had piqued the Indians as representing no change in the substance of American policy of treating Kashmir as a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. Far from acknowledging the centrality of Kashmir as the principal cause of animosity between India and Pakistan, the Indo-US joint statement made a significant concession

to the Indian view that the fundamental threat to peace in the region was the question of "international terrorism." Besides noting that "both India and the US are targets of continuing terrorism" and expressing "their determination to further reinforce bilateral cooperation in this area", it called upon the "international community to intensify its efforts" to combat international terrorism.

The third noteworthy feature of Mr. Vajpayee's visit to Washington involved the increased primacy of "low-politics" concerns in Indo-US ties. Nearly two-thirds of the Indo-US joint statement dealt with non-military dimensions of bilateral ties including such areas as bilateral trade environment, greater commercial cooperation, investment opportunities, taxation, prevention and control of HIV/AIDS, environment safe technologies, civil aviation etc. The presence of these concerns in Indo-US ties along with traditional security issues, especially those dealing with nuclear and missile proliferation, means that political economy considerations are beginning to play an important role in shaping the future of these ties.

As Indo-US relations become more complex, more interdependent and broad-based, both sides will have incentives to avoid confrontation and to forge deeper engagement with each other. The joint statement clearly recognized this new dynamic. While acknowledging the need for both countries to "continue their dialogue on security and nonproliferation, including on defense posture, which is designed to further, narrow differences on these important issues, it stressed the fact that there was agreement that "wide-ganging architecture of institutional dialogue between the two countries provides a broad-based framework to pursue the vision of a new relationship."

The last but not least important aspect of Vajpayee's successful visit to Washington was the growing role of the Indian-American community in bringing the two countries closer. Using its large size, economic and financial largesse and superior organizing skills to the advantage of its parent country, the six-hundred thousand strong Indian-American community in the United States has become the principal internal driving force for Indo-US entente.

Indo-US joint statement recognized this new reality when it candidly stated that the vision of closer and stronger partnership between India and United States "draws strength from broad political support in both countries."

In an unprecedented official acknowledgement of domestic lobbying influences on Washington's foreign policy outlook, it went on to describe the "Indian-American community" as a "bridge of understanding between the two societies" and as a source of "strengthening the ties of commerce and culture between the two countries."

As a tribute to the positive role played by this resurgent community, the joint statement committed both leaders to "encourage people-to-people connections between the two nations, and to enlist the cooperation of all sections of their talented and diverse societies in support of that goal."²⁷

The advent of the Republicans led by George W. Bush to power in 2001 intensified the Clinton opening to India.²⁸ Taking a "less absolutist" view of New Delhi's nuclear aspirations, the Republican Party platform described India as "one of the great democracies of the twenty-first century" and raised expectations that the Bush Administration would be "more sensitive to Indian security concerns, and more willing to accommodate India's own aspirations to be a great power."²⁹

The new administration's senior appointments "further cheered New Delhi."³⁰ In his acceptance speech to the US Congress in 2000, Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, spoke warmly of the value of solid US-India relations and voiced support for lifting the Glenn amendment sanctions against India. He further said: "India has the potential to keep the peace in the vast Indian Ocean area and its periphery. We need to work harder and more consistently to help them in this endeavor."

The new US ambassador to New Delhi, Robert Blackwill, new assistant secretary of state for South Asia, Christina Rocca and the new deputy secretary of state, Richard Armitage all "argued for

closer US-India relations as a strategic counterweight to China.”³¹ As a result “everywhere one turned in Washington, there was talk about maintaining the momentum of the relationship, consolidating the gains of the past several years, and putting flesh on the institutional architecture erected during the two summits of the previous year.”³²

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 offered New Delhi a golden opportunity to further deepen its security links with Washington. New Delhi promptly endorsed President Bush’s declaration of “war on terrorism” and promised full cooperation. In October 2001, in the run up to operations against Afghanistan, the US requested India to escort “high value US ships” through the straits of Malacca. The Indian Navy deployed one offshore patrol vessel (OPV) for three months at a time to escort US Navy auxiliaries like oilers and ammunition ships. Following the October 2001 deployment in the Strait of Malacca, India’s Defense Secretary reportedly said that “India would not be averse to accepting the Sea Lines of Communication patrol role from Aden to Malacca.”³³ In the six months between April and September 2002, over twenty such high value ships were escorted between Singapore and the northern tip of Sumatra.³⁴

New Delhi reciprocated these overtures for better ties by muting its criticism of U.S. opposition to the Kyoto Protocol on global climate change and “reacted positively to President Bush’s controversial missile-defense initiative.”³⁵

In doing so “New Delhi hoped to turn the war on terrorism to its advantage as a lever to end Pakistan’s decade-long cover support for the anti-India insurgency in disputed Kashmir.”³⁶ These Indian hopes were temporarily eclipsed when Pakistan itself joined the U.S.-led global campaign against terrorism and ditched the Taliban. The rejuvenation of Pak-US ties after 9/11 raised fears in New Delhi of yet another American strategic tilt toward Pakistan. These apprehensions, however, turned out to be ill-founded.

Following the December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, which New Delhi blamed on Pakistan-based militant groups, India threatened war. New Delhi initiated full-scale military mobilization and in May 2002 war between India and Pakistan seemed a distinct possibility. Faced with the nightmare scenario of an India-Pakistan shooting war turning into a nuclear conflagration with devastating consequences for the region and the American anti-terror campaign against Al-Qaida, Washington exerted intense diplomatic pressure on New Delhi and Islamabad to pull them from the precipice. Washington helped defuse the crisis by extracting a pledge from Islamabad to permanently end infiltration across the Line of Control.³⁷

Indo-US Defence Cooperation

Enhanced defence cooperation has been the most salient feature of improved U.S.-India ties in the post-Cold War period. Ever since the enunciation of the so called "Kicklighter Proposals", named for General Klaude Kicklighter, the former commander of the U.S. Army in the Pacific which called for the establishment of U.S.-Indian army executive steering council, joint training activities, and regular exchanges of high-level military personnel in the early 1990s, Indo-U.S. defence ties have now matured into a strategic partnership.

Conducted under the 1995 Agreed Minute on Defence Cooperation, this partnership involves efforts to promote cooperation at the level of "civilian defence leadership", "between the uniformed services" and in the field of defence production and research.³⁸ The structure of cooperation includes activities of five consultative groups: Defence Policy Group, Military Cooperation Group, Executive Steering Groups, Joint Technical Group, and Security Cooperation Group. The meetings of these groups has resulted in agreement in numerous areas including Missile Defence, regional security issues, peacekeeping training, humanitarian/disaster relief, counter terrorism, consequence management, environmental concerns, search and rescue, joint naval patrols, special forces training, dissimilar air combat training, Malabar exercises off the coast of India.³⁹

These expanding military-to-military ties have been accompanied by increased US willing to sell sophisticated arms to India. Since President Bush lifted the nuclear sanctions in 2001, U.S. military sales to India “jumped from near zero to more than a \$190 million” within a year.⁴⁰ In February 2002, Congress was notified of the sale of Eight “Firefinder” radars valued at \$100 million. In May 2003 the State Department authorized Israel to sell to India the jointly developed U.S.-Israeli Phalcon airborne early warning system worth \$1 billion.⁴¹

Following Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s visit to India in September 2003, Washington has reportedly agreed to review an Israeli request to sell the Arrow-2 ATBM (anti-tactical ballistic missile) to India.⁴² The conclusion of the “Trinity” agreement referred to at the outset of this article marks a new level of strategic convergence between Delhi and Washington which is likely to be the most dynamic element in the bilateral relationship in the next decade.

Implications for Pakistan

How would this growing strategic convergence between India and United States impinge on Pakistan’s security? Scholarly assessments of implications for Pakistan vary. Optimists have maintained that Indo-US entente does not endanger Islamabad’s vital security interests as there are limits to which India-US strategic collaboration can grow. As pointed out by K. Alan Kronstadt:

“Despite [recent] developments there remain indications that the perceptions and expectations of top U.S. and Indian military leaders are divergent on several key issue, including India’s role in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, approaches to countering terrorism, and a potential U.S. role in the resolving the India-Pakistan dispute. Moreover, the existence of a nonproliferation constituency in the United States is seen as a further hindrance to more full developed military-to-military relations.”⁴³

Pessimists, on the other hand, argue that the emerging community of security interests between New Delhi and Washington poses acute security dilemmas for Islamabad. According to one Pakistani observer:

“given the Indian efforts to strengthen their conventional military capabilities, the intentions of increasing their maritime boundaries, the blatant use of force against neighbours...it would not be presumptuous to suggest that India may have been given the nod [by Washington] to go ahead on its agenda of establishing itself as the South Asian policeman even if it means using force against recalcitrant neighbours.”⁴⁴

Regardless whether United States has committed itself to supporting India as a regional influential at the expense of Pakistan, there is little doubt that Washington's pursuit of strategic engagement with India marked by a substantial U.S.-India security relationship could have a perverse and destabilizing impact on Indian dealings with Pakistan. The Indian plans to acquire a theatre missile defense system from Israel and Russia as part of its efforts to “effectively neutralize Pakistan's missile capabilities” are especially worrisome from Pakistan's security standpoint.

The introduction of ATBM capability into South Asia by India⁴⁵ will most likely have a “cascading” effect on Pakistan by generating pressures for a bigger missile force as a counter-measure.⁴⁶ The ensuing “action-reaction” dynamic will exacerbate security dilemmas in the region and derail efforts to promote behavioral restraint.

Pakistan's need to rely on ballistic missiles as a critical element of its deterrent strategy against India is dictated by its lack of strategic depth. Being a country of about 803,943 square kilometers, in comparison with India which is about 3,166,829 square kilometers, Pakistan faces India along the length of a long axis where its major population centers, conventional military assets and lines of communication fall within the strike range of India's combat aircraft and short range ballistic missiles.

Most significantly, all of Pakistan airbases, nuclear and ballistic missile research and deployment sites are extremely vulnerable to massive Indian preemptive air strikes. In order to prevent India from taking advantage of these geographical vulnerabilities and to maintain the credibility of its nuclear deterrence through assured destruction, Islamabad is now in possession of about "30 nuclear capable missiles"⁴⁷ that can reach counter-value targets anywhere in India. It is thus not surprising that despite facing disparities in the ratio of conventional forces with India, Pakistan has tried to maintain parity with India by developing a potent force of short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles.⁴⁸ Yet the deterrent function of this Pakistani missile capability is running the risk of being eroded by India's quest for a missile defense system. As pointed out by Gregory Koblentz:-

"India's acquisition of an ATBM could destabilize [the] nuclear balance by depriving Pakistan of an assured strike capability. Pakistani leaders may fear that during a crisis they would be vulnerable to a disarming first strike by India, which would then rely on its missile defenses to intercept any Pakistani missiles not destroyed on the ground.... Islamabad may also worry that India's defensive systems would be able to neutralize a nuclear strike by Pakistan, thus allowing India to engage in a conventional war without fear of nuclear retaliation from Pakistan. Given the large imbalances of conventional forces between India and Pakistan, the outcome of such a conflict is not really in doubt."⁴⁹

These Pakistani fears lay at the heart of Islamabad's opposition to the missile defense deployments in the region. Reacting to New Delhi's public endorsement⁵⁰ of Washington's May 2001 announcement to deploy National Missile Defenses (NMD), Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf expressed concern that this move could "jeopardize strategic stability, trigger a new arms race and undermine international efforts aimed at arms control and disarmament."⁵¹ In the same vein, Pakistan's Air Chief Marshal, Kaleem Saadat pointedly told Washington in November

2003 that its decision to allow Israel sell India very “sophisticated early warning systems...has the potential of further tilting the military balance, specially relating to air power, totally lopsided.” He warned that should the “imbalance continue to grow at the present rate, it will soon reach a stage where one side may conclude that it can militarily overwhelm its adversary with ease. The chances of a miscalculation then become even greater.”⁵²

The acquisition of a sophisticated air defense system with anti-missile capabilities by India⁵³ would constrain Pakistan either to match India’s defenses with similar systems or to build up its offensive forces to saturate India’s defenses.⁵⁴ Either choice would invite countermeasures from India and thus lock both sides in a debilitating and destabilizing missile build up. Given broader Indian regional security concerns especially its long-term threat perceptions of China and the latter’s strategic ties with Pakistan, India-Pakistan missile race would inevitably trigger a regional offensive arms race.⁵⁵ Such an arms race would ill-serve the cause of peace, security and stability in the region.

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 26. Text of US-India joint statement in The News (September 17, 2000).
 27. *Ibid.*,

28. In her influential article "Promoting National Interest," Condoleezza Rice, stressed the need for maintaining close cooperation with India. She argued that the United States "should pay closer attention to India's role in the regional balance. There is a strong tendency conceptually to connect India with Pakistan and to think only of Kashmir or the nuclear competition between the two states. But India is an element in China's calculation, and it should be in America's, too. India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one." Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting National Interest", Foreign Affairs January/February 2000, p. 56. Echoing Ms. Rice's characterization of India as a rising great power which the United States must take seriously, Robert B. Zoellick, wrote: "India, the world's largest democracy and before long its most populous nation, will play an increasingly important role in Asia. To grow and prosper, it will need to adjust to the global economy. To contribute to its prosperity and regional security, India will need to lower the risk of conflict with its neighbors. And to have influence with India, America must stop ignoring it. A more open India, possessing a broader understanding of its place in the world, could become a valuable partner of the United States in coping with the Eurasia's uncertainties. In addition to proposing trade and investment liberalization, the United States should open a regular, high-level security dialogue with India on Eurasia and the challenges to stability." Robert B. Zoellick, "A Republican Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs January/February 2000, p. 75
29. Robert M. Hathaway, "The US-India Courtship: From Clinton to Bush," The Journal of Strategic Studies vol 25, No. 4 (December 2002), p. 10.
30. *Ibid.*,
31. Addressing the Indo-American Chamber of Commerce and the Indo-American Society in Mumbai on September 6, 2001, U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwell recalled that as Governor of Texas in early 1999 President Bush had "one big idea" about Indo-US relations which sought to "transform fundamentally the very essence of our bilateral relationship" by "working together more intensely than ever before" and "thereby make the world freer, more peaceful and more prosperous." "The Future of US-India Relations," speech by Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill, September 6, 2001, Mumbai, India available at <http://usinfo.state.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?>
32. *Ibid.*,

33. Vice Admiral GM Hiranandani, "Patrolling the Indian Ocean," Indian Defence Review (April-June 2003), p. 9.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
35. New Priorities in South Asia *op.cit.*, p. 16.
36. Dennis Kux, "A Remarkable Turnaround: U.S.-India Relations," Foreign Service Journal (October 2002), p. 20.
37. This pledge was later codified in a joint statement issued in Islamabad on January 6, 2004, following a meeting between President General Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee on the sidelines of the 12th SAARC summit in Islamabad.
38. Colonel Steven B. Sboto, "Indo-US Military Cooperation," Indian Defence Review (July-September 2003), p.51.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 53
40. John E. Carbaugh, "U.S. looks increasingly to India as it explores new allies," US-India Friendship .net, p.2
41. K.Alan Kronstadt, "India-U.S. Relations," CRS Issue Brief for Congress (Washington DC.: Congressional Research Service, October 9, 2003), p. 10.
42. Ejaz Haider, "Israel's "Arrow" deal with India is Dangerous," Daily Times February 8, 2004.
43. K. Alan Kronstadt, "India-U.S Relations," *op.cit.*, p. 10.
44. Najam Rafique, "Indo-US relations in the post-Cold War Era and their implications for Pakistan," Strategic Studies (Spring and Summer 2000), p. 125.
45. New Delhi has adopted a dual-track approach to obtaining an ATBM capability: creating an indigenous system and buying the capability off-the shelf. The development of an Akash (Space) system – a low-to-medium altitude surface-to-air missile (SAM) – with its Rajendra phased array radar represents the indigenous route to ATBM capability while the impending acquisition of the Arrow ATBM and Phalcon airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft from Israel represents the "off-the-shelf" aspect of India's ATBM development strategy.
46. For a thoughtful discussion of the negative implications of theatre missile defense in South Asia see Gregory Koblentz, "Theatre Missile Defense and South Asia: A Volatile Mix," The Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer, 1997), pp. 54-62.
47. Ahmad Faruqi, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), p. 106
48. According to General Zinni, former commander in chief of the US CENTCOM "Pakistan's nuclear capability may be better than India's with more weapons and more capability," Quoted in *Ibid.*
49. Gregory Koblentz, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

- ^{50.} New Delhi's support for the Bush plan to deploy NMD was underpinned by several considerations. These included: "a strategic tie-up with the United States against China", "the desire to gain access to US surveillance data on Chinese and Pakistani missile tests" and "the moral appeal" of the superiority of defense over deterrence. For a good discussion of the last element see Rajesh Basrur, "Missile Defense and South Asia: An Indian Perspective," in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, Eds. The Impact of US Ballistic Missile Defenses on Southern Asia (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, July 2002), pp. 1-20.
- ^{51.} B. Muralidhar Reddy, "Musharraf opposes NMD," The Hindu , May 13, 2001.
- ^{52.} Address by Air Chief Marshal Kaleem Saadat, Chief of the Air Staff, Pakistan Air Force at Global Air Chiefs Conference, Washington, D.C 2002. Centre For Aerospace Power Studies (Karachi: November 2003), pp.12-13.
- ^{53.} New Delhi's impending purchase of the jointly –developed U.S. Israeli Arrow Missile Defense system from Israel which is designed to provide terminal boost phase intercept against short and medium range ballistic missiles will have a variety of implications for security in the region. Besides eroding Pakistan's confidence in the deterrent value of its F-16 and missiles, it would force the region to move out of the current state of mutual non-weaponized deterrence and create incentive for finding security in greater numbers.
- ^{54.} Some media reports claim that Pakistan has initiated negotiations with the Washington to acquire either the Patriot systems or the Hawk, or Nike-Hercules system. See "Pakistan to Acquire Anti-Ballistic Missiles from U.S.," Time of India (May 15, 2003). Islamabad would seek to deploy such systems to "insure that at least some of Pakistan's nuclear warheads and missiles would survive an Indian strike and be available as a deterrent." Andrew Feickert and K. Alan Kronstradt, "Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia," CRS Report for Congress RL32115 (Washington, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2003), p. 17.
- ^{55.} In view of the prohibitively high costs of missile defenses some Pakistani analysts have suggested that Pakistan should counter an Indian missile defense with "hardened and mobile basing, countermeasures, and a small numerical preponderance in relation to Indian defense capability." See Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "India's Endorsement of the US BMD: Challenges for Regional Stability," IPRI Journal Vol. 1, no. 1 (Summer 2001), PP: 28-43. The efficacy of these measures is seriously called into question by the "troubling

reality” that “Pakistan has less than two- dozen airfields from which to operate nuclear capable aircraft. Its missile production, main operating bases, and nuclear facilities are very few in number, and their geographical coordinates are publicly known.” Michael Krepon, “Missile Defense and the Asian Cascade,” in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, Eds. The Impact of US Ballistic Missile Defenses on Southern Asia (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, July 2002), p.79-

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