

## **SOME THOUGHTS ON THE DILEMMAS CONFRONTING THE COUNTER-INSURGENT IN A DEMOCRACY**

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### **Introduction**

Democracy and Counter-Insurgency Operations do not sit easily together.<sup>1</sup> The entire situation of the counter insurgent in a democracy, some believe, is a massive dilemma in itself. It seems as if it is so horrific that the forces of such a state should ever consider turning their eyes inwards towards the ranks of their own society and in this repulsion is born the softly thought suspicion that all is not well in the state of Denmark and the consideration that perhaps the wound is symptomatic of a gravely weak society.

Democracies confronted by a revolutionary group can attack, concede, bargain or delay or employ a combination of two or more of these strategies. Much depends on the idealism and resolution of the leadership and people of the country concerned but all of these "options" can be costly in political terms for a democratic state. Not all nations are threatened equally and a lot depends upon the nature aims and setting of the insurgency.

This paper will attempt no solutions but merely seeks to outline the major areas wherein the dilemmas lurk and in so doing point up the fact that the simplistic solutions so readily adopted by so many owe their existence more to the determination of their owners to avoid reality and political exigencies than they do to any desire to respond to it.

### **Lessons From Northern Ireland: The dilemma of Political Resolve**

Past colonial experience, including Vietnam under the French and the Americans, has seen insurgency operations in rural and urban environments and indeed as we continue to see most prominently in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, the campaign in Malaya was required to counter an essentially rural insurgency, whereas in

Aden most of the action was concentrated in urban areas. Insurgencies can be inspired by communism, anti-colonialism, tribalism, religion, nationalism or minority fears. Local circumstances can be very different and although the dilemmas for the authorities are not always fundamentally different, any counter-insurgency actions have to be tailored to the type and scale of threat. The British involvement in Counter-Insurgency was inevitable, given their colonial and post colonial responsibilities<sup>2</sup>. Although the British gained a lot of experience, the lessons, principles and techniques derived from earlier operations have limited relevance to other conflicts. Military leader facing the internal security problem in Northern Ireland from 1969 no doubt considered the lessons which had been learned in the twelve years of the Malayan Emergency, and perhaps more significantly from Aden and Cyprus; but these lessons could not supply the definitive answer to a conflict taking place in a very different set of social, political and geographical circumstances. The British have had to relearn some old lessons, but Northern Ireland was hardly a colonial situation with the majority of one million Protestant and many of the Catholics wishing to remain a part of the United Kingdom. But the Northern Ireland situation was clearly similar to a colonial situation in the sense that the final outcome depended not so much on the IRA's capacity to inflict unacceptable losses on the security forces, as on its power (and the power of the Protestant extremists supporting the British), to persuade the British Government and British people that it had become impossible to hold on in the Province.

What was so significant about the Northern Ireland internal security problem was how resolute *politically* the British government had been to outfight the insurgent forces in all aspects of the struggle which lasted, in a sense, into the new millennium before the Irish Republican Army formally and publicly called it a day and settled for a political solution<sup>3</sup>. The political will of a democracy is invariably the prime target of the insurgent whether in the colonial or metropolitan environment. Of course the various sets of ground rules, such as Thompson's "Five Principles" cannot be ignored by any government faced with an Insurgency<sup>4</sup>. Some of these 'rules' apply some of the time in certain situations. What is required all of



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the time is close coordination between politician, police, military and paramilitary; a consideration of political matters before all else and perhaps most important of all the ability to be as ready as possible before any insurgency breaks out -timing being the essence in this kind of struggle. The sooner the central power reacts, in the most appropriate way, the less time will be available for the insurgent to organize and start to apply revolutionary war principles and stages. McCuen states that 'the most serious and the most common error of counter - revolutionary warfare is to do too little too late'<sup>5</sup>. This simple, but important principle has been disregarded over and over in the current insurgencies afflicting coalition partners in the so called 'war on terror'.

**Dilemmas of the "Who" and the Terrain**

The insurgent will be either local or to various degrees, alien or both. If he is local it might indicate that the counter insurgent is up against local grievances backed by local personnel with local knowledge. If he is alien, the problem may not be so deep rooted. He may be the standard traveling agitator at work whose very strangeness can be used against him. Conversely, the stranger's presence might indicate the reverse, that the local problem is but part of a grater struggle with all that implies. He may have the sympathy, even the gratitude, of local inhabitants for his part in the struggle or he may be seen as an interfering outsider importing trouble. None of this much matter in itself and certainly it is not peculiar to democracies. What does bring forth a dilemma lies in the establishment of this 'who'. The plucking out of an individual need be nothing more than that in some societies, but in democracy, and especially in a part of it experiencing unrest, relationships matter and it is these relationships which are the particular problem area for the counter insurgent personnel. There is a need to be sure of the 'who' factor before and during action taken against the insurgent for if his relationships within the society form which he has been plucked are not understood or are ignored then the real process of democracy in action can ensure reaction against the states personnel in their legitimate attempt to erase illegitimate insurrection. Worse still, ill judged reaction could give some legitimacy to the insurrection.

Staying with the 'who' factor, any insurgent has two jobs to do to gain the support of a proportion of the population and impose their will upon the government either by military defeat or by enduring harassment. Now the insurgent may adopt, or perhaps have to adopt, a variety of means to achieve his objectives. He might use non violent demonstrations or he might employ small and effective armed groups. These in turn might direct their fire at security forces or their bombs at the local populace. Whatever their approach, the response must constantly bear in mind the fact that no campaign of subversion will make headway unless it is based on a cause with wide popular appeal. But the counter insurgent will also be always faced by the dilemma that an insurgency's existence implies a base of popular support that actively aids or at least tolerates the insurgents. Mao Tse-tung spoke of guerrillas as fish in the sea, a metaphor that suggests a great sea of support exists and that fish cannot survive outside it.

What all this memory work adds up to is the truism that over reaction coupled with an interested audience spreads revolutionary tendency and increases general discontent. Gunning down swathes of demonstrators might well be immediately militarily effective or even aesthetically pleasing to some but the essential dilemma is that this action in such a state might well be counter reductive and may in fact bring about much more of the same. In a totalitarian state, wherein the individual's actions tend to be dictated more by permission and expediency than by opinion and defense of rights, such considerations may be slight. The democrat is ultimately the servant of all members of his society and he is compelled to bear this in mind. Thus the insurgent in such a society cannot but be aware that the gloves must always be on his opponent's hands for it is only thus that his opponent can maintain the public credibility without which he would not be permitted to function. Thus, it is that the counter insurgent that is faced with a dilemma relatively new to history, the need to protect his society without employing all of the means at his disposal.

The dilemmas posed by the insurgent then can be summarized as follows. He must be found in a common



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inflammatory manner. This can be slow and ineffective. He must be identified in such a way that further spreading of his tendency is not encouraged out of sympathy or thanks. The military threat which he presents must be responded to effectively but without undue force, without involving the innocent and without creating martyrs. This process again can be slow, ineffective and thus self defeating as well as creating resentment in a public which would also resent heavier tactics.

It is an area rife with dilemmas but the main dilemma is that posed by the fact that the partial answer to the question of 'who' must include the fact that the insurgent is within a democracy and is thus entitled to the unwitting and often unwilling protection of the general public. Thus the counter insurgent is in a war that any blow not fully absorbed by the insurgent will strike his fellow citizens and may even rebound on himself. Consistent, effective and wholehearted defensive action in such circumstances must be difficult.

However, no man is an island. Insurgents do not simply appear from the depths of tourist coaches with nothing better to do than attempt to overthrow the local government. They are thrown up by circumstances, by situations and in this area also lay traps for the counter insurgent of a type which are only to be found in democracies.

Once again, this area can be roughly shaken down into two sub division, the physical and the spiritual (for want of a better word). By physical, I simply mean problems of terrain and environment. By spiritual I mean the legacy of historical events.

The dilemma of terrain is simple but impressive. Simply put it runs thus; if the counter insurgent treats terrain in this type of military situation as such then he will lose. He may destroy the immediate enemy but the havoc wrought to achieve this end will destroy the fiber of his society.

The geography and demography of a democratic state can often assist the insurgent movement. The concentrations of

population in large cities can offer a vulnerable target for the terrorist wing of an insurgent movement. Even in liberal-democracies there is often a significant element in cities that feels deprived; a city proves a concentration of vital but soft targets; attacks in densely populated areas will normally bring an immediate and possibly disproportionate reaction from the media, and the city can provide a secure base for terrorist organization.

Whenever such trouble breaks out, the counter insurgent has his hands bound. Normal responses to such trouble would be to flood it with troops, to clear it of inhabitants, especially in urban centers, or in rural areas to plaster it with high explosive, aerial, or artillery bombardment or something equally distressing. Such courses, except in unusual circumstances, are simply not available to the democratic commander dealing with an insurgency.

His terrain imposed dilemmas are these. First of all if he goes after his prey ruthlessly and single mindedly, he will possibly swell its ranks by his alienation of the local populace. If he does not so pursue he will probably alienate a good deal of the general population as well as his erstwhile leaders. Second, if he treats insurgent terrain as such, with all that implies, he will effectively make insurgents sympathizers out of whole sections of fellow nationals thus fairly drastically escalating the conflict. Once again, if he does not so treat it, he runs the risk of damaging the morale of his own troops and personnel and of permitting the conflict to prolong itself indefinitely by allowing the enemy that sine qua non, secure base areas.

These physical problems which, if improperly handed, may disenchant various sections of the public through annoyance, inconvenience or fitful bursts of fright are as nothing compared to the dilemmas posed by attempts at solving the historical puzzle he may well find himself part of. As stated previously, minorities are the culprits in almost all cases of insurgent activity in democracies. Minorities are to be found in every democracy currently in business – it can be no other way. Ethnic and religious minorities present special handling problems. Too much force or too little tact and understanding can turn a minor, though nasty, incident into a



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running civil war. Conversely, too much tact and understanding can have exactly the same effect. Political minorities are often remarkably volatile.

The counter insurgent in this situation is likely to discover that that he is trying to maintain, through the judicious but paradoxical use of force, similar values to those with whom he is in conflict. His task is to fight and suppress the insurgency – or rather the insurgents – the cause is meat for the politicians. His enemies in this struggle are likely to be hot in pursuit of their personal freedoms and the context in which these are sought predisposes them to hostility with the counter insurgent because of who he is and this exacerbated by what he does. He is also likely to find himself the enemy of all faction involved simply because he has permitted another faction to survive.

The situational dilemmas are thus once again clear but full of menace. To treat terrain as terrain is asking for social and political trouble. Not to treat it as such is demanding military trouble. To treat historical context and background as of no current import or relevance is to invite historic disasters. To treat it with respect and caution may be militarily unwise and may court the accusation of taking sides with a minority party or worse and may further aggravate a delicate problem and thus effectively or worse and may further aggravate a delicate problem and thus effectively delay the discovery of acceptable solutions.

### **Dilemmas of a Free and Open Society Itself**

Democracies can be the most open and free states in the international system of states. Although such freedom can result in strength from flexibility (as compared to the brittle strength and rigidity of totalitarian and dictatorial regimes), democratic societies are vulnerable. In any Parliamentary democracy there are many ways available for publicizing a cause, or campaigning for political change. The basic freedoms of speech, association and opposition are fundamental to such societies and most democrats would argue that dissent is a sign of health and should be tolerated. The problem with this civilized state of affairs is that some internal groups and

certain external agencies are more than skeptical of such ideal perceptions of democracy; they are impatient with what is often a very inefficient and bureaucratic system that accepts the principle of change but only according to slow democratic principles and procedures. Democracy can be exceedingly frustrating for people in a hurry, or imbued with other ideals, hate, or who are perhaps members of a traditionally peaceful minority convinced that their political aims will never be achieved. At least in totalitarian regimes the target for dissent is easily identifiable, whereas in a democracy, responsibility is far more diffuse. The very acceptance that group can organize and campaign is somewhat condescending, but often it is this freedom that undercuts the reason for insurgency, as the intensity of dissent is diluted. However, because there are few restrictions on individual freedom in democracies, individuals and groups with extreme views can act with dramatic consequences. It is so easy to threaten violence, to use fear to coerce, persuade, or gain public attention.

It is important to differentiate between insurgency groups, and their aim, in order to come to some conclusion about 'successes' or 'failure'. An insurgent groups' aim can be very limited, for some revolutionaries the very fact that they manage to force or encourage the media to relay their views is a sufficient success. In this respect the terroristic aspect of revolutionary war can be viewed as pure theatre. Other groups or organizations can be far more determined and have more adventurous aims. They could employ terrorism for publicity and then threaten further acts of terrorism if various concessions are not granted. Other insurgency aims could be anarchistic; be aimed at provoking repression and counter terrorism in order to bring down an already unpopular government (which is therefore likely to be non-democratic); to enforce obedience or cooperation; to punish; to make the people choose sides and to enforce their version of ideology whether political or religious.

Terrorism's, as part of insurgency, significance often lies less in what actions have been taken than in what ordinary people fear may happen in the future. Although the actual amount of disruption and violence caused by terrorism employed during an insurgency in a democracy has often been exaggerated, due to the



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nature of the 'media-man', there is little doubt about the ease with which extreme groups can kick their views into the headlines. There is an odd psychological aspect about disasters and terrorism occurring in one place at one moment that always helps the insurgent and frustrates the Counter-Insurgent.

One of the crucial dilemmas that confront democracy faced with an insurgency is where the line between personal freedom and counter-insurgency restraints should be drawn. If too many liberties are undercut, popular support for government policy would be eroded very quickly – certainly amongst the more politically conscious elements in society. Popular support was crucial in the colonial insurgent situation but it is, arguably even more important in a politically sophisticated and aware democracy. Although many of the people have voted for the government and virtually all agree with the political system, allegiances can be strained. If an insurgent organization using terrorist tactics is allowed too much scope an elected government can be faced with some painful dilemmas ranging between submissions or resorting to methods that few democracies would welcome. The curtailing of individual liberties under emergency legislation some form of press censorship, the use of covert (and therefore probably 'unacceptable') methods to discover and eliminate terrorist cells, are all distasteful actions to a peaceful democratic state that has probably forgotten the realities and discomforts of war.

Democratic states are usually confronted with the dilemma of whether to classify a revolutionary movement's violence as criminal or political. Any special laws can cause a lot of confusion for the counter-insurgent forces and the legal profession. 'Special Status' problems had given the prisoners of the Maze in Northern Ireland an immediate and a local issue to fight about. Abu Ghariab and Guantanamo Bay has created their own peculiar headaches for the American. If any special powers are to be instituted they should be for a fixed term, simply drafted, published widely and applied impartially. The counter insurgent must act within the law- and the less special power that are enacted the less opportunity is given to the terrorist to make capital over threatened basic rights. The more that the government reacts by changing laws the more the insurgent

forces is encouraged to believe that their actions are having some effect. If the government departs from the usual legal framework it is in effect confessing to failure.

Any resort to torture to extract information or confessions is also likely to be detrimental to the morale of the counter insurgent forces especially the professional military amongst such forces. Yet the British gained a reputation for ruthlessness in proportion to the distance from London! By the identity card system; searching without warrant; hanging for the possession of illegal weapons; and severe punishments for aiding the rebels; shooting on sight in prohibited areas and the resettling of villages were all tough measures but within the law that was publicized widely<sup>6</sup>.

Insurgency violence can fact give the government the 'authority' or justification to implement special laws, but in this respect a lot depends on the scale and seriousness of the situation. Democracies should not need to be in any kind of dilemma if their leaderships have the courage of their convictions and the will to last out the struggles. Democratic politics and values placed against the usual extremism of the insurgent is an unequal struggle – in political terms. As Paul Wilkinson states, "the reforming and ameliorative character of liberal-democracies is the one reason why its citizens constitute such "hostile sea for the terrorist to swim in".<sup>7</sup>

### **Other Dilemmas**

Time is another constraining factor for all concerned in an insurgency situation. Insurgencies can last for much longer than originally anticipated.

A Democratic government will always be under pressure to show results. For example, western democracies cannot fight inconclusive wars because people want to relatively quick return for the sacrifices. Again, much depends upon the culture of the democratic state and the scale of the conflict. There are various stages that have to be reached before any successes can possibly be achieved. An appropriate strategy to ensure the security of the Counter Insurgent force base areas; preventative operations against



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the insurgents; the need of a long term plan to force the insurgents onto the defensive and for the seizure of the initiative – all these stages take time. Time is what the Counter insurgent and the central government needs, but democratic electorates and media are usually inquisitive and often impatient. Also, the success of a terrorist campaign will depend not so much on the terrorists themselves as on how the government reacts to them. Any over-reaction can help the insurgency cause. So long as the insurgency lasts, the government is under pressure – the government monopoly of force and authority is in question, and arguably, as long as the insurgent force exists, it is 'succeeding'. If one were to draw a basic lesson of the British counter insurgency action in Northern Ireland, fighting on its own territory, it was this: the patient and restraint in the use of force consistently for decades with a similar resilience in attempting to achieve a political solution.

At least as important as the need to be ready for political and military combat after an insurgency has begun, is the need for governments to prevent insurgencies by dealing with underlying causes. Misery, frustration, grievances, deprivation and despair compounded in some case by lack of education can cause some people to sacrifice their own lives (as well as other people's lives) in an attempt to achieve change. The Catholic minority suffered much in a Northern Ireland that was organized to suit a Protestant majority. Such corruption as the manipulation of electoral boundaries is not usual, but minorities can be frustrated even by the fairest electoral systems. The two party situations that have prevailed in the United Kingdom has been maintained largely by an apathetic majority mostly ignorant of the main political issues. Many politically aware minorities have never been able to visualize any possibility of being able to fundamentally alter policies. Too often the central government is some distance (geographical and political) from a deteriorating situation, and therefore out of touch with events. If action had been taken earlier in Malaya and Northern Ireland, local frustrations would have reduced. Prevention would require the central authority showing a greater respect for dissident groups and minorities which do not resort to terrorism. This is not always easy for political reason. There are usually so many other

priorities and demands upon the central government that small minority grievances cannot often be identified or dealt with in time.

A deterrent policy might assert that all acts of terrorism especially those involving random killing, should not go unpunished. But there are dilemmas for Democracy with such a policy. The deployment of the SAS in the Balcombe Street siege and even more dramatically during the Iranian Embassy siege are examples of a very positive policy<sup>8</sup>. In effect the then British government had declared that any revolutionary or terrorist group that decided to misuse the freedom of British society by killing people will in turn be killed. This is a deterrent policy. There is little doubt that the majority of the British people were delighted with the methods employed by the SAS in the Iranian siege. There are perhaps fewer dilemmas for the democratic government when the situation is obviously terroristic. Yet the Counter Insurgent force, in the glare of publicity, needs to be successful most of the time. Counter terrorism or counter-insurgency failures can demoralize the people, embarrass the government, encourage the insurgent and creates uncertainty for the future. However, it is likely that the people of a democracy are far more outraged by terrorist's action in their political environment, and therefore the Counter Insurgent forces can depend on a good deal of support, certainly in the early stages of an insurgency.

It is significant that there has been a rapid development of such groups as the alternating anti-terrorist squadron of 22<sup>nd</sup> Special Air Services Regiment of the UK, the West German GSG9 and Israeli Unite 269, and that such organizations are very secretive. Democracies cannot afford to display such units given the susceptibilities of small but vocal humanitarian and opposition groups. The "two wars" strategy of using covert and overt forces to disrupt and eliminate insurgency forces is also linked with this need to maintain a low profile in relation to a free society. The need for secrecy in Counter-Insurgency operations is necessary but potentially embarrassing for the central authorities. Open societies are invariably concerned about secrecy, but counter insurgency need intelligence and inside information about insurgency organization. The use of massive conventional military forces in populated areas,



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even when the insurgents decide to fight on fixed lines in such areas, ultimately may create hollow victory for the democratic forces because the force used is crude leading to collateral damage but above all the operations with all its horror are brought to the living room of the public. Even if censorship is practiced the rumor mills may do the damage that the censorship was put in place to prevent.

There is a certain international constraint upon states that wish to take overt military action against insurgency groups. A Democratic state does not necessarily have to break international law – but is likely to be condemned because it is a state acting against what is expected ‘state behaviour’. Although both sides in an insurgency aim to gain the ‘hearts and minds’ of a local population, the insurgent (especially the terrorist group) has little responsibility to any one and often campaigns outside the accepted rules of national and international diplomacy inter-state relations is bound to find it difficult to handle organization that do not play according to the rules of domestic and international politics. There are obvious problems for the Counter-Insurgent in trying to coordinate actions against an insurgent force that is international or has external aid.

Most movements consist from a few hundred to some thousands active members, the smaller the group the more difficulty it is for Counter-Insurgent forces to detect the opposition. But although there are operational advantages in small tightly organized cells, there are political disadvantages for the insurgent in terms of limited popular appeal. Also, people who might otherwise support the political programme of the insurgents, oppose them because of the terrorist methods they use.

In the early seventies, liberal-democracies were led to believe that the Baeder Meinhoff group, the Japanese red Army, the Symbionese Liberation Army and the British ‘Angry Brigade’ were large movements which ought to be taken seriously. But in fact these groups varied from fewer than ten (the Angry Brigade) to about sixty (the Japanese Red Army) active members and their ‘victories’ were largely in the area of publicity. Few of these groups had any significant popular support and for the most important groups like the Angry Brigade and even the Baeder Meinhoff disappeared. Yet,

some insurgent groups have been more successful, either because their nationalist/separatist appeal has guaranteed them a lot of popular support (e.g. the ETA in Spain) or because they have received massive assistance from foreign powers (e.g. the PLO and the Mujahideen fighting the USSR in Afghanistan). What is significant is that the organizations that do remain in operation today are far more professional in political and military terms than before, and therefore can pose greater problems for Counter-Insurgency forces.

### **Conclusions**

Some basic questions remain: to what extent can democracies resort to force in order to contain the violent aspects of an insurgency and yet still retain popular support? How far can a democracy control the media for preventing an over-emphasis on relatively minor incidents which give the insurgents the publicity they seek? Should a government pass special laws against Insurgents and risk the creation of 'special status' problems when normal criminal laws concerning murder, kidnapping, robbing provide sufficient punishment? To what extent can a well established and respected democracy afford to negotiate a political solution with an illegal organization that resorts to horrific violence? There are no easy options for a democracy in facing such questions. Given that insurgencies can usually gain external help and can run to sanctuaries, democratic counter insurgency process can only hope for some form of containment of the problem. Revolutionary movements are likely to enjoy some limited success whenever they occur in a democracy because of the doubts and uncertainties in such societies that have been outlined above. But any insurgent success has, so far, never been widespread and has been condensed by most rational men. After initial drawbacks, democracies have usually been able to adjust to new threats as extreme groups isolate themselves because of the tactics that they employ.

Democracies are not always well equipped psychologically to deal with insurgency situations, although Marx has normally been read and there are legitimate avenues for groups to protest. Democratic priorities and concerns are directed in far more



productive and hopeful directions. Yet it is subtlety and patience that is required especially in the initial stages of a struggle and the will to carry on Democratic policies as well as containing the insurgency for an indefinite period.

#### End Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Democracy is one of those common terms which like beauty the meaning is deeply coloured by the beholders explanation of it. In the context of our discussion we offer a broader definition of democracy not just restricted to that of liberal democracies of the West. Democratic control of the armed forces in the UK and Pakistan may differ in degree but this does not imply that the military in Pakistan can operate against insurgents without restrictions and total disregard to public sensitivities. The dilemmas confronting counterinsurgents under consideration are those faced within own borders and not such as faced by the US in Iraq or the US/Europeans in Afghanistan although the latter situations may be referred to.
- <sup>2</sup> See Thomas R. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990) and Colin McInnes, *Hot War, Cold War: the British Army's Way in Warfare 1945- 1995* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1996)
- <sup>3</sup> Terrorist activities by the IRA ceased to exist by the late 1980's but it was not until 28 July 2005 that it put an end to armed campaign and declared a peaceful struggle (i.e. political). See BBC, "IRA declares end to armed struggle", 28 July 2005. Located at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/28/newsid\\_4948000/4948188.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/28/newsid_4948000/4948188.stm) accessed on 16 November 2007
- <sup>4</sup> Sir Robert Thompson articulated Counterinsurgency theory with the following 5 principles:
  - a. The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable.
  - b. The government must function in accordance with the law
  - c. The government must have an overall plan
  - d. The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas
  - e. In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas firstSee Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Lessons Learned from Malaya and Vietnam* New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966, pp 50-55.
- <sup>5</sup> John J. McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-Insurgency* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1966), p 159.
- <sup>6</sup> See Thomas R. Mockaitis, op. cit for the British counterinsurgency policy in Malaya
- <sup>7</sup> Paul Wilkinson, Briefing Note, *The Nexus of Terrorism & WMDs: Developing a Consensus How could a Leaders' Level G20 make a difference*, 12 – 14 December 2004, Princeton University, USA.

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- <sup>8</sup> Balcombe Street siege (1975) was a six-day siege in London after four IRA gunmen took two hostages but gave themselves up to police. The siege of the Iranian embassy in London (1985) was ended after a dramatic raid by SAS commandos. Five Iranian gunmen were killed and one was arrested. Nineteen hostages were set free.

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