ANALYZING STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA*

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South Asia's passage to overt nuclearization in May 1998 has been accompanied by mounting international concerns over the fragility of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan. Using the successive events of the Kargil war of 1999 and the May-June 2002 military stand-off between nuclear armed adversaries as paradigm illustrations of this fragility, many analysts have approvingly echoed President Bill Clinton's March 2000 characterization of nuclear South Asia as the "most dangerous place on earth."[1] This somber assessment of the South Asian security situation has been reinforced by the potency of the threat of "nuclear terrorism" posed by Al-Qaeda forces operating in the area and the impetus to horizontal proliferation provided by the activities of the so called "proliferation rings."[2]

This paper examines the issue of strategic stability in South Asia not only from the now familiar perspective of the "instability-stability" paradox[3] but also from the broader angle of the interplay between polarity, nuclear weapons and war. The paper argues that despite the absence of many of the positive elements associated with the Cold War model of deterrence stability, India-Pakistan nuclear equation remains stable as a matter of general deterrence.[4] The principal cause of this stability resides in the tacit convergence of Indian and Pakistani interests to avoid war as an intended outcome of their strategic competition. While intentional war between India and Pakistan seems to be a receding possibility, their deterrent equation remains plagued by crisis instability.

Defining Stability

Despite its wide usage in strategic analysis, stability is a contested intellectual construct with no consensus on its precise meaning and its surrounding conditions. Largely as a result of the intellectual inheritance of the Cold War, most analysts equate stability with peace and instability with war. But this definition tells

us little how to treat periods of crisis that fall between two extremes. To address this lacuna, John J Mearsheimer, has defined stability "as the absence of war and major crises."[5] His broader formulation of stability, however, lends it a strong status quo bias as attempts to challenge the prevailing configuration of power are seen as destabilizing. Yet this is misleading as it implies that static systems are always stable while dynamic ones are not. The concept of stability is larger and more complex than simply the presence or absence of war. As noted by Patrick A. MC Carthy, "it is overly simplistic and, more than not, inaccurate to label a changing system unstable or to label an unchanging system stable."[6] In the same vein, Bernard Loo has argued that strategic stability must be linked with geography to help create a "more nuanced idea of strategic stability" He defines strategic stability as a condition "where policy-makers do not feel pressured into making reactive changes from existing non-violent to violent strategies involving the large-scale use of military force in the pursuit of particular state interests. The concept of strategic stability does not rule out the use of military force. What it does rule out is accidental or inadvertent war, as well as knee-jerk reactions of policy-makers who feel that they are being pushed or pulled, almost against their will, towards decisions about the use of military force without prior consideration of other non-violent policy options."[7]

Stability may refer either to a state of a system, that is to its state of equilibrium, or to the system itself, that is to its ability to find equilibrium. Equilibrium and stability thus are not the same concepts, for equilibrium may be unstable.[8] The stable equilibrium is the equilibrium that fluctuates within given limits. Political equilibrium may be dynamic in the sense that the system keeps changing its internal arrangements in order to maintain its stability.

The stability issue is directly related to the polarity debate in international politics, namely, the debate regarding the optimal international structure for the preservation of stability. Taking an institutional perspective George Liska argues that stability will be best maintained when the "coveted values" (of security, welfare and prestige) are authoritatively distributed by institutions remain in line with the ever-changing *de facto* distribution of capabilities in the

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system.[9] Richard Rosecrance concentrates on the domestic standing of elites and their attitudes towards the *status quo* as well on resources available in the system and its ability to offset disturbances to its equilibrium.[10] He associates stability with the ratio of disturbance over regulatory forces; a system is stable as long as the ratio is less than unity but unstable when it exceeds unity. Disturbance inputs include such forces as ideologies, domestic insecurity, disparities between nations in resources and conflicting national interests. The regulator mechanism consists of capabilities such as the Concert of Europe, the United Nations or an informal consensus among great powers how best to maintain peace. Morton A. Kaplan, Karl W. Deutsch, David J Singer and Kenneth Waltz, all agree that system structure is the main determinant of stability; although they disagree fundamentally on which structure makes for most stability. Kaplan, Deutsch and Singer defend the thesis that multi-polarity best preserves stability.[11] Waltz argues the opposite: that bipolarity is more stable. Waltz's argument that bipolar international systems best preserves stability hinges on four points.

First, in a bipolar world there are no peripheries, and consequently, "a loss to one superpower could easily appear as a gain to the other". Second, not only are geographical peripheries non-existent, so are issue area peripheries since "the range of factors included in the competition is extended as the intensity of the competition increases". Third, due to the resulting "constant presence of pressure and the recurrence of crises," limited wars may be avoided. Waltz, thus adds the maxim; "rather a large crisis now than a small war later" as a preliminary note to the Machiavellian maxim that "there is no avoiding war; it can only be postponed to the advantage of others." Finally, because of the extent to which "attention is focused on crises by both of the major competitors", "the limits of international politics are clearly defined and a strong emphasis is placed on the effective management of crisis situations."[12] At a minimum, crisis management refers to the ability of the parties in conflict, by credibly threatening escalation, to deter each other from escalation and to produce a crisis de-escalation outcome in accord with their interests.[13]

Deutsch and Singer advance two lines of argument to answer the question of why multi-polarity should support stability. Their first line of argument focuses on "interaction opportunities" and runs as follows. The greater the number of independent actors in the international system, the higher will be the number of possible pair-wise interactions (dyads). When these interactions display cross-cutting tendencies and tend to undermine deep lines of cleavage, as would be the case in a normally functioning multi-polar-system, negative feedback will function to provide for stability through flexibility of interaction.[14] Their second line of argument centers on the allocation of attention between independent actors in the system. Based on the assumption that a certain, relatively large, percentage of one actor's attention – the critical attention ratio – needs to be focused on another actor before a conflict between them can escalate, they argue that the more actors exist in the system, the less attention any one actor can afford to direct at any one other actor. As a result of the reduction in the average attention ratio below the critical attention ratio, fewer conflicts will escalate[15]. In short, their argument is based on the assertion that stability is causally linked to the quantity, diversity and qualities of interaction opportunities. The literature on crisis-management has explicitly linked crisis-behaviour to the structure of the international system. Bipolar configuration of power is posited to be more conducive to stability than a multi-polar one. As noted by James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff: -

> ➢ "In the bipolar system, alignments are clear, and realignments do not alter the balance of power significantly. In the multi-polar system, alignments may be unclear, and shifts may be important. Because of their greater ambiguity, multi-polar systems are more prone to changes in the perception of interests, to gambling or risk taking, and to miscalculations that make crises more dangerous. The tension between bargaining among allies and bargaining between adversaries is more difficult to manage in a multi-polar system crisis."[16]

That the structure of the international system is causally linked to the likelihood of "inadvertent wars" is one of the main

propositions suggested by Benjamin Miller in his study of the effects of polarity and military technology on the outbreak of major wars. He points out that while nuclear weapons drastically reduced the probability of calculated aggression and premeditated wars between the superpowers, "it was bipolarity that minimized the probability of inadvertent wars and made crisis management easier than it otherwise would have been."[17] It did so "by encouraging a delicate balance between resolve and caution, reducing the collective goods problem, facilitating control over unruly allies and the military, insulating the decision-makers from the pressure of domestic groups and moderating the destabilizing effects of miscalculations and misperceptions in time of crisis. Thus, the durability of the bipolar structure was the major factor that enabled the translation of the desire to avoid war into recurring tacit rules for the regulating the use of force in crises."[18]

Deterrence Stability

What is stability in the nuclear context? In broad terms stability refers to all those factors or conditions which work to ensure against the breakdown of nuclear deterrence.[19] Deterrence stability comprises three essential elements: *crisis stability, arms race stability, and political stability*. The first refers to absence of incentives to strike first with nuclear weapons in a crisis, the second to absence of incentives for rapid qualitative or quantitative expansion of a state's nuclear arsenal vis-à-vis that of an adversary, while the last one refers to the effectiveness of deterrence in reducing incentives for major coercive political changes – that is changes in behavior induced by the threat of the use of force. Nuclear deterrence is thus, as much a product of politics as it is that of perceptions and technology.

The objective of stability can be divided into two separate and, sometimes conflicting, concepts, "arms race stability" and "crisis stability". Arms race stability is achieved by stopping or moderating the competition in nuclear arms race. This competition increases the risk of war by introducing more threatening weapons and by making more nuclear weapons available for expanded roles and missions. Agreements that establish mutual constraints on the

size and quality of nuclear arsenal or ban certain activities completely contribute to arms race stability. Crisis stability, on the other hand, is achieved by eliminating the incentive for either side to launch a preemptive counterforce attack in an effort to obtain military advantage by significantly blunting the other side's capacity to retaliate. The danger of such a counterforce attack would clearly be greatest at the time of a major political crisis or military confrontation, when escalation to nuclear war might be judged a real possibility. Crisis stability, or the reduction of the risk of nuclear war in a crisis, can be increased by measures that assure the survival and effectiveness of retaliatory strategic forces in the face of a preemptive counterforce attack. Both the deployment of more survivable retaliatory systems and the elimination of highly vulnerable strategic systems that are tempting targets contribute to crisis stability. This objective can also be supported by constraining strategic offensive forces that threaten the survivability of retaliatory forces and by constraining strategic defensive forces that threaten to prevent retaliatory forces from reaching targets. A high level of crisis stability does not eliminate the possibility of military engagements escalating into nuclear war, but it does reduce pressure to preempt if nuclear war appears imminent by reducing the perceived need to use vulnerable weapons before they are destroyed. According to Leon Signal strategic stability means that an effective strike is always possible, crisis stability means that there are no targets that would tempt a first strike, and arms race stability means that neither of the other two problems is feared from the other side's weapons development.[20]

Deterrence stability is crucial to war prevention between nuclear adversaries. As pointed out by Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin: -

- "A balance of deterrence - a situation in which the incentives on both sides to initiate war are outweighed by the disincentives - is stable when it is reasonably secure against shocks, alarms and perturbations. That is, it is stable when political events, internal or external to the countries involved, technological change, accidents, false alarms, misunderstandings, crises, limited wars, or

changes in the intelligence available to both sides, are unlikely to disturb the incentives sufficiently to make deterrence fail."[21]

Contending views of Strategic Stability in South Asia

South Asia's passage to overt nuclearization in 1998 has led to the formation of "two camps of deterrence theorists...over whether a nuclearized subcontinent will prevent a major conflict and foster escalation."[22] These two camps might be called deterrence optimists and deterrence pessimists.[23] Embracing Winston Churchill's observation in 1953 that in a nuclear-armed world "safety would be the sturdy child of terror and survival the twin brother of annihilation,"[24] deterrence optimists maintain that nuclear weapons by making war catastrophically costly generate incentives for war avoidance between nuclear rivals and therefore create stability between them. Kenneth N. Waltz, the intellectual architect of deterrence optimism, attributed four benefits to military postures based on nuclear deterrence: -

- "First, deterrent strategies include caution all around and thus reduce the incidence of war. Second, wars fought in the face of strategic nuclear weapons must be carefully limited because a country having them may retaliate if its vital interests are threatened. Third, prospective punishment need only be proportionate to an adversary's expected gains in war after those gains are discounted for the many uncertainties of war. Fourth, should deterrence fail, a few judiciously delivered warheads are likely to produce sobriety in the leaders of all of the countries involved and thus bring rapid de-escalation."[25]

Drawing upon these core Waltzian assumptions, deterrence optimists have put forth the nuclear peace thesis which states that wars between nuclear-armed nation-states will be unlikely to start, and, if they do, the conflicts are likely to be limited because the belligerents will stop fighting short of the intensity needed to bring abut the resort to nuclear weapons.[26] The position of the deterrence optimists is firmly rooted in the structural strand of the intellectual

tradition of "realpolitik" which finds the key to interstate instability in the structure and distribution of power in the international system.[27] In essence it argues that when a "parity relationship is combined with the enormous absolute costs of nuclear war, a deliberate (i.e., a "rational") war is at once unthinkable and virtually impossible. As pointed out by Zagare and Kilgour: -

> ➢ "Every deterrence theorist believes that the high cost of war in the nuclear era has rendered states more prudent and, simultaneously, raised the provocation level necessary for outright conflict. When these effects are combined with the pacifying tendencies of a bipolar system, a world order is produced that, when properly managed, is unlikely to be characterized by major interstate war."[28]

Following this logic, Ashley Tellis has argued that India-Pakistan deterrence is more stable than it is given credit for: -

> ➢ "The prospects for deterrence stability are …high because no South Asian state is currently committed to securing any political objectives through the medium of major conventional and, by implication, nuclear war. This condition is only reinforced by the high levels of "defense dominance" obtaining at the military level, and thus it is not at all an exaggeration to say that deterrence stability in South Asia derives simply from the Indian [and] Pakistani … inability to successfully prosecute quick and decisive conventional military operations, especially with respect to wars of unlimited aims…what makes this situation meta-stable is the fact that neither India nor Pakistan …has the strategic capabilities to execute those successful damage-limiting first strikes that might justify initiating nuclear attacks in a crisis."[29]

The intricate relationship between system structure, the cost of war, and the characteristics of weapon systems is reflected in the following tenets of structural deterrence theory: -

- Parity relationship, when coupled with high war costs, is especially conducive for peace. This assumption lies at the heart of the notion of mutually assured destruction. By contrast, when the cost of outright war is low, even parity may be insufficient to preclude confrontation, suggesting that "war is always possible among states armed only with conventional weapons."[30]

- Asymmetric power relationships are associated with crises and war. The most dangerous form of asymmetry is a situation when neither state can deter the other, that is, when costs are mutually low, but one of them calculates an advantage in attacking first.

- As the absolute costs of war increase, *ceteris paribus*, the probability of war decreases.[31] As John Mearsheimer puts it: "the more horrible the prospect of war, the less likely it is to occur."[32]

Questioning the analytical and historical validity of these precepts of structural deterrence theory, deterrence pessimists argue that notwithstanding their enormous destructive potential, nuclear weapons fail to produce stability because of a range of political, technical and organizational factors. Some of the specific problems that trump stability between nuclear states include risk acceptant or irrational leaders, command-and-control difficulties, and preemption incentives for small arsenals. Applying these concerns to nuclear South Asia, A Katsouris and De Goure have highlighted the following dangers: -

- "...an Indo-Pakistani nuclear-arms race presents several distinct areas of concern. Nuclear weapons could be stolen. They could be launched by accident or without the authorization of senior political leaders. Political extremists on either side could use nuclear weapons for coercive purposes or simply launch an ill-advised conventional war that escalates unpredictably. If a conventional war does begin, or is looming, one side plausibly could decide to launch a strike first. Or poor

> communication and early-warning systems could mislead one party into believing that it is subject to a missile attack when it is not...Present circumstances in South Asia represent a security challenge without historical parallel...."[33]

Scott Sagan has argued that "India and Pakistan face a dangerous nuclear future ... imperfect humans inside imperfect organizations ...will someday fail to produce secure nuclear deterrence."[34] Concurring with Sagan, P.R. Chari states that South Asian proliferation undermines a "widely held, *a priori* belief...that nuclear weapons states do not go to war against each other."[35] In the same vein, Michael Krepon, a self-proclaimed deterrence pessimist, has identified a number of "conditions" that tend to undermine processes of escalation control and stability of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan. These destabilizing factors include: "uncertainties associated with the nuclear equation" between India and Pakistan, "India's vulnerability associated with command and control", Pakistan's "nightmare scenario of preemption" due to India's "move toward a ready arsenal", the shifting of the "conventional military balance in India's favour", "the absence of nuclear risk reduction measures on the subcontinent", the tendency by both governments to "resort to brinkmanship over Kashmir, and, "the juxtaposition of India's nuclear doctrine of massive retaliation with a conventional war-fighting doctrine focusing on limited war".[36] Clayton P. Bowen and Daniel Wolven have also underscored the destabilizing impact of the inherent tension between imperatives of survivability and dynamics of escalation that beset the emerging India-Pakistan deterrent equation. They write: -

- "Stable deterrence requires, among other things, a safe and reliable command and control system that can assure neighboring countries both that an accidental or unauthorized launch in a time of crisis is next to impossible, and that retaliation in the event of nuclear attack is possible...Our analysis shows that the process of making a deterrent survivable presents problems for making it controllable. *The conclusion we draw,*

> *therefore, is that as things now stand on the subcontinent, a decision to make a nuclear capability "survivable" is apt to make that capability provocative.* Therefore, even if India and Pakistan meet the requirements of credibility and survivability of their new acquired nuclear forces, it is very unlikely that these forces will not be provocative in one way or another. If this Catch 22 produces a seemingly reasonable deployment plan to assure survivability, the very unreasonable outcome of regional instability may occur as a result"[37] (emphasis original).

The Kargil War and Deterrence Stability

The Kargil War of 1999 has been posited as a classic case of stability-instability paradox wrought by South Asia's overt nuclearization. Glenn Snyder identified the stability-instability paradox as a situation where credible threats at higher level may lead to instability at lower levels.[38] Using the Kargil conflict as a case study, S. Paul Kapur, has argued that "nuclear weapons not only failed to prevent war, they directly underlay Pakistan's decision to encroach on Indian territory at Kargil and trigger the conflict... The Kargil conflict shows that nuclear weapons in fact have had significant destabilizing effects on the South Asian environment. More generally, the case indicates that where a newly nuclear state wishes to alter the territorial *status quo* and is weaker than its enemy, nuclear proliferation can increase the likelihood of conventional conflict."[39]

Was Kargil launched by Islamabad because it felt that the country had the security of the nuclear umbrella? Pakistani analysts have questioned the validity of this claim made by deterrence pessimists. Major General (Retd) Mahmud Ali Durrani has observed that "Kargil was the result of flawed strategic thinking in Pakistan and not as a result of going nuclear."[40] Maleeha Lodhi has attributed Kargil's occurrence to "systemic flaws" in Pakistani decision-making process which "is impulsive, chaotic, erratic and overly secretive...playing holy warriors this week and men of peace the next betrays an infirmity and insincerity of purpose that leaves the

country leaderless and directionless."[41] Shireen Mazari has asserted that the Kargil operation was a defensive move by Pakistan to counteract Indian designs for incursions along the Line of Control.[42] These alternative interpretations of Pakistani motives for launching the Kargil war call into question the widely held belief that Kargil incursion was an offensive, war-fighting move induced by Pakistan's possession of the absolute weapon. Instead of viewing Kargil as an instability end of the stability-instability spectrum induced by the induction of nuclear weapons in South Asia one can see its occurrence as a manifestation of extreme dissatisfaction by Islamabad with the prevailing regional *status quo*. Recent scholarly work has focused on the role played by *status quo* evaluation in deterrence success. As Van Gelder observes: "it is too often forgotten that successful deterrence requires not only that the expected utility of acting be relatively low, but that the expected utility of refraining be acceptably high."[43] The very fact that planning for Kargil was longstanding[44] and predated the May 1998 nuclear tests by Pakistan clearly suggests that its genesis lay more in the Pakistani perceptions of the instability of the territorial *status quo* in Kashmir than in the nuclearization of the subcontinent. As pointed out by Robert G. Wirsing: -

> ➢ "There is great likelihood, in fact, that Pakistani expectations of military gains from Kargil were quite modest, that the main motivation was simply to bring relief to Pakistan's exposed beleaguered transport routes along the LOC by bringing India's own primary route within range of Pakistani artillery, and that Pakistani decisions were caught significantly off guard by the effort's stunningly swift escalation into a major conflict."[45]

Drivers of Deterrence Instability between India and Pakistan

Scholarly analyses have identified several drivers of nuclear instability between India and Pakistan. Major General (Retd) Mahmud Ali Durrani lists "territorial disputes", "mistrust", "lack of institutionalized crisis management mechanisms", "lack of

understanding of the nuclear strategy and deterrence" as principal elements of deterrence instability between India and Pakistan.[46]

Michael Ryan Craig describes "dangers created by geographical proximity;" "lack of stable, tacit agreements on *de facto* boundaries where disputes about territory still exist;" "the presence of ethno-religious cleavages which are integral to the two states founding national identities; "the existence of violent internal exigencies;" "the persistent lack of feasible and reliable early warning sensors;" "the lack of reliable nuclear safety and warhead access devices;" "the relative absence of dedicated command and control architectures that allow reliable civilian control during heightened tensions," as sources of India-Pakistan deterrence instability.[47] The "robustness" of India-Pakistan deterrent equation has also been questioned by Sir Michael Quinlan due to the following negative factors:

- There lies between them the unsettled core issue of Kashmir which has been the cause of three wars and many near-war situations.

- Both countries share a long territorial border, not just in Kashmir, and their capitals and heartlands are much closer together than Moscow and Washington.

- Neither country seems able to base its nuclear capability primarily in submarines to avoid pre-emption risk; similarly the task of constructing a deployment mode based on hardened underground silos place far back from the common border is almost an impossible one, at least in the near future.

- Neither side has an advanced early warning system against missile attack;

- It is not clear that either side has had a command and communication system of the sophistication achieved in the East-West setting.

- Also it is not clear if either side had developed a system of political control of operations that combines the necessary rapid responsiveness with thorough involvement of advice and prudent safeguards.

- It also cannot be assumed that either side, at least initially, will have the safety procedures, standards and devices, like electronic locks, progressively developed in the East-West setting."[48]

The presence of these destabilizing factors in South Asia coupled with the outbreak of the Kargil war in 1999 in a nuclear environment and the prolonged India-Pakistan military standoff in 2001-2002, has led many analysts to argue that the prospects for strategic stability between India and Pakistan are decidedly bleak. As summarized in Table One (below) there are at least five different causal paths that can generate conditions leading to deterrence failure between India and Pakistan: (1) escalation of conventional war into nuclear one, (2) preemptive attacks launched in times of crises due to perceptual mistakes, (3) accidental use of nuclear weapons resulting from malfunctions of men or machines, (4) nuclear war initiated by terrorist organizations, and (5) disarming surprise attack. Yet the likelihood of each of these scenarios materializing is constrained by a number of conditioning factors (mentioned in second column of the table) and is counteracted by a variety of preventive measures (listed in column 3) that each side can adopt to stave off deterrence failure. This is not to suggest that India-Pakistan deterrence is secure against the risks of failure. This is merely to point out that the task of the management of their deterrent equation is not an impossible one. It can be made to work provided both are willing to work together to seek strategic stability as an overarching goal. The resumption of India-Pakistan peace process since February 2004 and the announcement in June 2004 that both sides had agreed to take a number of steps[49] including the setting up of a dedicated hotline between their respective foreign ministries offers a bright ray of hope in this regard.

Table 1: Strategic Stability in South Asia

Paths to Nuclear War	Factors Affecting Likelihood of Path Way to nuclear war	Actions to reduce likelihood of path
1. Escalation of Conventional war	• India-Pakistan conventional war • Balance of Conventional forces • Vulnerability of nascent nuclear force • Misperception/miscalculation	• Crisis prevention and management • Maintain balance of general purpose forces • Reduce vulnerability of nuclear forces improve command/control • Openness, transparency, predictability?
2. Preemption in crisis	• War appears imminent and unavoidable • balance of nuclear force • Misperception/miscalculation	• Crisis prevention and management • Maintain balance of nuclear forces • Reduce vulnerability of nuclear forces • Maintain ability to launch vulnerable forces on warning
3. Accidental or unauthorized use	• Procedures and devices designed to prevent accidents and unauthorized use • Permissive Action Links) • Communication systems	• Improve procedures and devices • Improve communication systems • Crisis prevention and management
4. Initiation by a terrorist group	• Terrorist groups access to nuclear weapons and delivery systems	• Limit access to nuclear weapons and delivery systems • Assertive command and control • Crisis prevention and management
5. Surprise Attack	• Extreme India-Pakistan hostility • Balance of nuclear forces • Vulnerability of nuclear forces • Misperception/miscalculation	• Strengthen incentives for peace • Maintain balance of nuclear forces • Reduce vulnerability of nuclear forces • Achieve arms control/limit first - use strike capabilities • Counterforce capabilities. Ensure survivability of command and control systems

* A slightly modified version of this article will appear in the *Summer 2005* issue of *Contemporary South Asia*.

End Notes

1. Charles Babington and Pamela Constable, "Kashmir Killings Mar Clinton Visit to India," **The *Washington Post***, 22 March 2000, A1.

2. "Proliferation Rings" refer to the phenomena of "second-tier nuclear proliferation in which states in the developing world with varying technical capabilities trade among themselves to bolster one another's nuclear and strategic weapons efforts. Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, "Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime," **International Security** vol. 29, no. 2 (Fall 2004): 5-49.

3. See Michael Krepon, ed. **Strategic Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia** (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Centre, 2004), Ch.1.

4. Patrick Morgan draws a distinction between general deterrence and immediate deterrence. The former refers to a policy stance of regulating an adversary relationship and balancing power over a long period of time through maintenance of a satisfactory level of forces. In immediate deterrence, the actor has a military capability and issue threats to a specific opponent when the opponent is already contemplating and preparing an attack. "Immediate deterrence situation is a crisis, or close to it, with war distinctly possible, while general deterrence is far less intense and anxious because the attack to be forestalled is still hypothetical." Patrick M. Morgan, **Deterrence Now** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). P. 9

5. Quoted in Frank C. Zagare and D.Marc Kilgour, **Perfect Deterrence** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 4. Following John J. Mearsheimer Zagare and Kilgour define a system or a deterrence relationship as stable when "the status quo is likely to survive" and a system or a deterrence relationship as unstable when "a crisis or war is possible." **Ibid**. p.5.

6. Patrick A. MC Carthy, **Hierarchy and Flexibility in World Politics: Adaptation to shifting power distributions in the United Nations Security Council and the International Monetary Fund** (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1996), p. 11.

7. Bernard Loo, "Geography and Strategic Stability," **The Journal of Strategic Studies**, vol. 26, no. 1 (March 2003), p. 156.

8. According to Kaplan, a stable system is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable equilibrium. On the other hand, a stable

equilibrium is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the existence of a stable system. Morton A. Kaplan, **System and Process in International Politics** (Boston: Brown and Little, 1957), pp. 6-7.

9. As quoted in Patrick A. MC Carthy, **op. cit.**, p. 13.

10. Richard N. Rosecrance, **Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective** (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963)

11. Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multi-polar Power Systems and International Stability." **World Politics** (April 1964): 390-406.

12. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," **Daedalus** , vol. 93 (Summer 1964), pp:881-909.

13. It is worth pointing out that crisis management requires novel concepts of planning, control and conduct of military operations and that these requirements may strain the experience, imagination, and patience of military professionals. Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George have mentioned the following seven requirements of crisis management for leaders: 1. maintain top-level control of military options; 2)create pause in the tempo of military actions; 3)coordinate diplomatic and military moves; 4)confine military moves to those that constitute clear demonstration of one's resolve and are appropriate to one's limited objectives; 5)avoid military moves that give the opponents the impression that one is about to resort to large –scale warfare and, therefore, force him to consider preemption; 6)choose diplomatic-military options that signal a desire to negotiate rather than to seek a military solution; 7)select diplomatic-military options that leave the opponent a way out of the crisis that is compatible with his fundamental interests. Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, **Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time** (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 206-207.

14. Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability." **World Politics** (April 1964): 392-396

15. Ibid.pp. 396-400.

16. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. **Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey** Fifth Edition. (New York: Longman, 2001), p. 588.

17. Benjamin Miller, **Why Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in World Politics** (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), p.61.

18. Ibid. pp. 66-67.

19. Jerome H. Kahan has suggested three key elements of a policy of stable deterrence.

20. Leon V. Signal, "No First Use and NATO's Nuclear Posture," in John D. Steinbruner and Leon V. Sigal, eds. **Alliance Security: NATO and the No First Use Question** (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1984).

21. Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, **Strategy and Arms Control** (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), p. 50

22. Michael Krepon, "The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia," in Michael Krepon, ed. **Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia** (Washington, D.: Stimson Centre, 2004), p. 3.

23. Analysts of South Asian security have drawn attention to at least three paradoxes spawned by nuclearization of South Asia: the instability/stability paradox, the vulnerability/invulnerability paradox and independence/dependence paradox. Simply put, instability/stability paradox states that by precluding general war, the destructiveness of nuclear weapons seems to open the door to limited conflicts. The vulnerability/invulnerability paradox refers to the increased risks of unauthorized use, accidents and theft of nuclear assets that arise from attempts to secure them against preemptive strikes. Dependence/Independence paradox refers to the inability of the feuding nuclear rivals to effectively manage situations of crisis without the involvement of the third parties. For an excellent discussion of the dilemmas posed by each of these three paradoxes see Michael Krepon, "The Stability-Instability Paradox: Misperceptions and Escalation Control in South Asia," **Stimson Centre Report** (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson, May 2003), Scott D. Sagan, "Perils of proliferation" **Asian Survey** (November 2001), Feroz Hassan Khan, "the Independence-Dependence Paradox: Stability Dilemmas in South Asia," **Arms Control Today** (October 2003).

24. Quoted in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Gregory Raymond, **A Multipolar peace? Great-Power Politics in the Twenty –first Century** (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 38.

25. Kenneth N. Waltz, **The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better** (Adelphi Paper, 171) (London: IISS 1981), p. 24.

26. This "peace through peril" thesis is well summarized by Kegley and Raymond: "when both sides in an enduring rivalry can mutually assure each other's destruction, the terror of utter devastation preserves peace between them." Charles W. Kegley, Jr and Gregory Raymond, **A Multipolar peace?**

Great Power Politics in the Twenty-first Century (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 38.

27. While the structural deterrence theory finds the key to interstate stability in the structure and distribution of power, decision-theoretic deterrence theory focuses on the interplay of outcomes, preferences, and choices in determining interstate conflict behaviour. Factors such as strategic uncertainty, subjectivity and rationality form the core assumptions of decision-theoretic variant best exemplified in the game of Chicken.

28. Franck C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, **Perfect Deterrence** (London: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 9.

29. Ashley J Tellis, **India's Emerging Nuclear Posture**: 741-743

30. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," **International Security** vol. 18 no. 2 (Fall 1993),p. 77.

31. Several policy implications flow from these axioms of the classical deterrence theory:

- Quantitative arms races, which serve to increase the cost of conflict, can help prevent wars.
- By contrast, qualitative arms races, which threaten to provide one side or another with a first-strike advantage, increase the probability of preemptive war.
- Comprehensive and effective defense systems make conflict more likely.
- The selective proliferation of nuclear weapons can help prevent war and promote peace.
- Accidental war is the greatest threat to peace.

32. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," in Michael E. Brown, et. al, eds. **Theories of War and Peace**(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), p. 17.

33. Andreas Katsouris and Daniel Goure, "Strategic Crossroads in South Asia: The Potential Role for Missile Defense," **Comparative Strategy** vol. 18 (1999), p. 178.

34. Scott Sagan, "For the Worse: "Till Death Do Us part," in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, **The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed** (New York: Norton, 2003), p. 106-7.

35. P. R.Chari, "Nuclear Restraint, Nuclear Risk Reduction, and the Security-Insecurity Paradox in South Asia," in **The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinksmanship in South Asia,** Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne (Washington, D.: Stimson Center, 2001), p. 16

36. Michael Krepon, "The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia," in Michael Krepon, **op.cit.**

37. Clayton P. Bowen and Daniel Wolven, "Command and Control Challenges in South Asia", **The Nonproliferation Review** (Spring-Summer 1999), pp. 25 and 33-34.

38. Glenn Snyder, "The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror," in Paul Seabury (ed.). **Balance of Power** (Chandler: San Francisco, 1965), p. 198

39. S. Paul Kapur, "Nuclear Proliferation, The Kargil Conflict, And South Asian Security," **Security Studies** 13, no. 1 (Autumn 2003), p.81

40. Major General Mahmud Ali Durrani, Retd, "Pakistan's Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons," **CMC Occasional Paper** (New Mexico, Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, July 2004), p. 31.

41. Maleeha Lodhi, "Anatomy of a Debacle," **Newsline** (July 1999).

42. Shireen M. Mazari, **The Kargil Conflict , 1999: Separating Fact from Fiction** (Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies, 2003), pp. 42-43

43. Timothy J. Van Gelder, "Credible Threats and Usable Weapons: Some Dilemmas of Deterrence," **Philosophy and Public Affairs** , vol. 18 (1989), p.163.

44. According to Hassan Abbas "the Kargil operation had been discussed at least twice before in earlier years. It was first discussed during the time of General Zia ul Haq who was given a briefing by the Military Operations Directorate. Zia turned down the plan on grounds that "it would lead us into full-scale war with India." Hassan Abbas, **Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror** (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p.170.

45. Robert G. Wirsing, **Kashmir In The Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age** (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), p.48

46. Major General Mahmud Ali Durrani, Retd, "Pakistan's Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons," **CMC Occasional Paper** (New Mexico, Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, July 2004), p. 31.

47. Michael Ryan Kraig, "The Political and Strategic Imperatives of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia," **India Review**, vol. 2, no. 1 (January 2003), p. 3.

48 Michael Quinlan, "Nuclear Tests in the subcontinent: Prospects and Significance for the World," **International Affairs** (April 1999), p.6.

[49] Following the two-day talks at the Additional Secretary level that were held in New Delhi on June 19-20, 2004, a number of steps designed to ensure nuclear stability between the two countries were announced. These included the following: -

- "Existing hotlines between Directors General of Military Operations to be upgraded, dedicated and secured.
- Dedicated hotline to be established between Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan.
- Draft agreement handed over by Indian side requiring both countries to work towards concluding an agreement on technical parameters on pre-notification of flight testing of missiles.
- Unilateral moratorium on further nuclear tests was re-affirmed by both sides; unless in exercise of national sovereignty, it decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests.
- Commitment by both sides to continue bilateral discussions and hold further meetings towards implementation of Lahore MOU of 1999.

Author

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