# *Margalla Papers*
2005

"Internal Dynamics of Pakistan"

National Defence College
Islamabad, Pakistan

MARGALLA PAPERS 2005

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EXCERPT FROM PRESIDENT'S SPEECH TO THE SEMINAR HELD IN ISLAMABAD

OIC – CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE – ENLIGHTENED MODERATION

The West acquired knowledge and enlightenment from Islam during the dark ages and used them for self-development. But unfortunately we went on the decline and remained in our shells and refused to learn, and to acquire and assimilate from the West, till we got to the present depth of despair and despondency. We desperately need to face stark reality. Is the way ahead one of confrontation and militancy? Will the present path lead us to our past glory and also show the light of progress and development to the world? Do we at all possess any light to illuminate the world, and are we at all capable to lead and guide?

My friends, the time has come to re-think our position. What we need is a renaissance. The way forward is first of all to head towards enlightenment such as once we could boast of and which we are now obliged to acquire from others. We must learn to help one another. We have to concentrate on human resource development, and the best way for that is through poverty alleviation, greater education, better health and assured social justice. If we once decide that this is to be our new direction then we must also realize that this path cannot be achieved through confrontational approach. We have to adopt the path of moderation, a conciliatory approach, a pacific approach, in order to cleanse ourselves of the charge that Islam is a religion of militancy and is averse to modernization, democracy and secularism.

General Pervez Musharraf
President, Islamic Republic of Pakistan
June 1st, 2004

EDITOR'S NOTE

"Margalla Papers" is an annual publication of National Defence College, country's apex institution on studies related to national security. Based on contributions by prominent scholars and eminent writers of the country, it provides a forum for informed discussion and debate on topical issues impacting the national security. The "Institute of Strategic Studies; Research & Analysis" (ISSRA) of the College engages itself voluntarily in bringing the insights of scholarship to bear upon the advanced research on key issues facing the country.

There is no denying the fact that Pakistan today stands tall in the comity of nations as compared to the decade of nineties. The Western media on the whole is more positively inclined towards Pakistan today than it was only a decade ago. They are now seeing Pakistan as an Enlightened and Moderate Muslim State. On the political front, the country is much stable and open. The print and electronic media is free to express its views and opinions even against the President and the government. The economy has already crossed the take off stage and is moving towards sustainable growth. Poverty alleviation is being accorded a top priority.

The relations with neighbouring India are also on the road to improvement. While the resolution of Kashmir issue may take long time to materialize, the world now recognizes it as the key stumbling block to enduring peace and stability in South Asia. Despite all these positive developments, many fault lines exist in various fields which need to be addressed. With this background "Margalla Papers 2005" has been dedicated to the problems related to the "Internal Dynamics of Pakistan".

To provide an overall well-rounded view of these issues, sub themes covering various facets and dimensions were formulated and eminent scholars were invited to express their views. It is earnestly hoped that scholarly views of the writers providing insight to these issues would attract the attention of our valuable readers.

While providing a brief overview of the "Current Issue", we also avail this opportunity to inform our readers that the membership of the "Margalla Papers" has increased manifold both within and abroad. We look forward to receiving comments and suggestions to further improve our publication.

Editor

ANALYZING STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA*

Dr. Rifaat Hussain

South Asia's passage to overt nuclearization in May 1998 has been accompanied by mounting international concerns over the fragility of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan. Using the successive events of the Kargil war of 1999 and the May-June 2002 military stand-off between nuclear armed adversaries as paradigm illustrations of this fragility, many analysts have approvingly echoed President Bill Clinton's March 2000 characterization of nuclear South Asia as the "most dangerous place on earth."[1] This somber assessment of the South Asian security situation has been reinforced by the potency of the threat of "nuclear terrorism" posed by Al-Qaeda forces operating in the area and the impetus to horizontal proliferation provided by the activities of the so called "proliferation rings."[2]

This paper examines the issue of strategic stability in South Asia not only from the now familiar perspective of the "instability-stability" paradox[3] but also from the broader angle of the interplay between polarity, nuclear weapons and war. The paper argues that despite the absence of many of the positive elements associated with the Cold War model of deterrence stability, India-Pakistan nuclear equation remains stable as a matter of general deterrence.[4] The principal cause of this stability resides in the tacit convergence of Indian and Pakistani interests to avoid war as an intended outcome of their strategic competition. While intentional war between India and Pakistan seems to be a receding possibility, their deterrent equation remains plagued by crisis instability.

Defining Stability

Despite its wide usage in strategic analysis, stability is a contested intellectual construct with no consensus on its precise meaning and its surrounding conditions. Largely as a result of the intellectual inheritance of the Cold War, most analysts equate stability with peace and instability with war. But this definition tells

us little how to treat periods of crisis that fall between two extremes. To address this lacuna, John J Mearsheimer, has defined stability "as the absence of war and major crises."[5] His broader formulation of stability, however, lends it a strong status quo bias as attempts to challenge the prevailing configuration of power are seen as destabilizing. Yet this is misleading as it implies that static systems are always stable while dynamic ones are not. The concept of stability is larger and more complex than simply the presence or absence of war. As noted by Patrick A. MC Carthy, "it is overly simplistic and, more than not, inaccurate to label a changing system unstable or to label an unchanging system stable."[6] In the same vein, Bernard Loo has argued that strategic stability must be linked with geography to help create a "more nuanced idea of strategic stability" He defines strategic stability as a condition "where policy-makers do not feel pressured into making reactive changes from existing non-violent to violent strategies involving the large-scale use of military force in the pursuit of particular state interests. The concept of strategic stability does not rule out the use of military force. What it does rule out is accidental or inadvertent war, as well as knee-jerk reactions of policy-makers who feel that they are being pushed or pulled, almost against their will, towards decisions about the use of military force without prior consideration of other non-violent policy options."[7]

Stability may refer either to a state of a system, that is to its state of equilibrium, or to the system itself, that is to its ability to find equilibrium. Equilibrium and stability thus are not the same concepts, for equilibrium may be unstable.[8] The stable equilibrium is the equilibrium that fluctuates within given limits. Political equilibrium may be dynamic in the sense that the system keeps changing its internal arrangements in order to maintain its stability.

The stability issue is directly related to the polarity debate in international politics, namely, the debate regarding the optimal international structure for the preservation of stability. Taking an institutional perspective George Liska argues that stability will be best maintained when the "coveted values" (of security, welfare and prestige) are authoritatively distributed by institutions remain in line with the ever-changing *de facto* distribution of capabilities in the

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POLICY

Views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not represent the views of National Defence College, or of armed forces or any government agency.

system.[9] Richard Rosecrance concentrates on the domestic standing of elites and their attitudes towards the *status quo* as well on resources available in the system and its ability to offset disturbances to its equilibrium.[10] He associates stability with the ratio of disturbance over regulatory forces; a system is stable as long as the ratio is less than unity but unstable when it exceeds unity. Disturbance inputs include such forces as ideologies, domestic insecurity, disparities between nations in resources and conflicting national interests. The regulator mechanism consists of capabilities such as the Concert of Europe, the United Nations or an informal consensus among great powers how best to maintain peace. Morton A. Kaplan, Karl W. Deutsch, David J Singer and Kenneth Waltz, all agree that system structure is the main determinant of stability; although they disagree fundamentally on which structure makes for most stability. Kaplan, Deutsch and Singer defend the thesis that multi-polarity best preserves stability.[11] Waltz argues the opposite: that bipolarity is more stable. Waltz's argument that bipolar international systems best preserves stability hinges on four points.

First, in a bipolar world there are no peripheries, and consequently, "a loss to one superpower could easily appear as a gain to the other". Second, not only are geographical peripheries non-existent, so are issue area peripheries since "the range of factors included in the competition is extended as the intensity of the competition increases". Third, due to the resulting "constant presence of pressure and the recurrence of crises," limited wars may be avoided. Waltz, thus adds the maxim; "rather a large crisis now than a small war later" as a preliminary note to the Machiavellian maxim that "there is no avoiding war; it can only be postponed to the advantage of others." Finally, because of the extent to which "attention is focused on crises by both of the major competitors", "the limits of international politics are clearly defined and a strong emphasis is placed on the effective management of crisis situations."[12] At a minimum, crisis management refers to the ability of the parties in conflict, by credibly threatening escalation, to deter each other from escalation and to produce a crisis de-escalation outcome in accord with their interests.[13]

Deutsch and Singer advance two lines of argument to answer the question of why multi-polarity should support stability. Their first line of argument focuses on "interaction opportunities" and runs as follows. The greater the number of independent actors in the international system, the higher will be the number of possible pair-wise interactions (dyads). When these interactions display cross-cutting tendencies and tend to undermine deep lines of cleavage, as would be the case in a normally functioning multi-polar-system, negative feedback will function to provide for stability through flexibility of interaction.[14] Their second line of argument centers on the allocation of attention between independent actors in the system. Based on the assumption that a certain, relatively large, percentage of one actor's attention – the critical attention ratio – needs to be focused on another actor before a conflict between them can escalate, they argue that the more actors exist in the system, the less attention any one actor can afford to direct at any one other actor. As a result of the reduction in the average attention ratio below the critical attention ratio, fewer conflicts will escalate[15]. In short, their argument is based on the assertion that stability is causally linked to the quantity, diversity and qualities of interaction opportunities. The literature on crisis-management has explicitly linked crisis-behaviour to the structure of the international system. Bipolar configuration of power is posited to be more conducive to stability than a multi-polar one. As noted by James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff: -

> ➤ "In the bipolar system, alignments are clear, and realignments do not alter the balance of power significantly. In the multi-polar system, alignments may be unclear, and shifts may be important. Because of their greater ambiguity, multi-polar systems are more prone to changes in the perception of interests, to gambling or risk taking, and to miscalculations that make crises more dangerous. The tension between bargaining among allies and bargaining between adversaries is more difficult to manage in a multi-polar system crisis."[16]

That the structure of the international system is causally linked to the likelihood of "inadvertent wars" is one of the main

propositions suggested by Benjamin Miller in his study of the effects of polarity and military technology on the outbreak of major wars. He points out that while nuclear weapons drastically reduced the probability of calculated aggression and premeditated wars between the superpowers, "it was bipolarity that minimized the probability of inadvertent wars and made crisis management easier than it otherwise would have been."[17] It did so "by encouraging a delicate balance between resolve and caution, reducing the collective goods problem, facilitating control over unruly allies and the military, insulating the decision-makers from the pressure of domestic groups and moderating the destabilizing effects of miscalculations and misperceptions in time of crisis. Thus, the durability of the bipolar structure was the major factor that enabled the translation of the desire to avoid war into recurring tacit rules for the regulating the use of force in crises."[18]

Deterrence Stability

What is stability in the nuclear context? In broad terms stability refers to all those factors or conditions which work to ensure against the breakdown of nuclear deterrence.[19] Deterrence stability comprises three essential elements: *crisis stability, arms race stability, and political stability*. The first refers to absence of incentives to strike first with nuclear weapons in a crisis, the second to absence of incentives for rapid qualitative or quantitative expansion of a state's nuclear arsenal vis-à-vis that of an adversary, while the last one refers to the effectiveness of deterrence in reducing incentives for major coercive political changes – that is changes in behavior induced by the threat of the use of force. Nuclear deterrence is thus, as much a product of politics as it is that of perceptions and technology.

The objective of stability can be divided into two separate and, sometimes conflicting, concepts, "arms race stability" and "crisis stability". Arms race stability is achieved by stopping or moderating the competition in nuclear arms race. This competition increases the risk of war by introducing more threatening weapons and by making more nuclear weapons available for expanded roles and missions. Agreements that establish mutual constraints on the

size and quality of nuclear arsenal or ban certain activities completely contribute to arms race stability. Crisis stability, on the other hand, is achieved by eliminating the incentive for either side to launch a preemptive counterforce attack in an effort to obtain military advantage by significantly blunting the other side's capacity to retaliate. The danger of such a counterforce attack would clearly be greatest at the time of a major political crisis or military confrontation, when escalation to nuclear war might be judged a real possibility. Crisis stability, or the reduction of the risk of nuclear war in a crisis, can be increased by measures that assure the survival and effectiveness of retaliatory strategic forces in the face of a preemptive counterforce attack. Both the deployment of more survivable retaliatory systems and the elimination of highly vulnerable strategic systems that are tempting targets contribute to crisis stability. This objective can also be supported by constraining strategic offensive forces that threaten the survivability of retaliatory forces and by constraining strategic defensive forces that threaten to prevent retaliatory forces from reaching targets. A high level of crisis stability does not eliminate the possibility of military engagements escalating into nuclear war, but it does reduce pressure to preempt if nuclear war appears imminent by reducing the perceived need to use vulnerable weapons before they are destroyed. According to Leon Signal strategic stability means that an effective strike is always possible, crisis stability means that there are no targets that would tempt a first strike, and arms race stability means that neither of the other two problems is feared from the other side's weapons development.[20]

Deterrence stability is crucial to war prevention between nuclear adversaries. As pointed out by Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin: -

> ➤ "A balance of deterrence - a situation in which the incentives on both sides to initiate war are outweighed by the disincentives - is stable when it is reasonably secure against shocks, alarms and perturbations. That is, it is stable when political events, internal or external to the countries involved, technological change, accidents, false alarms, misunderstandings, crises, limited wars, or

changes in the intelligence available to both sides, are unlikely to disturb the incentives sufficiently to make deterrence fail."[21]

Contending views of Strategic Stability in South Asia

South Asia's passage to overt nuclearization in 1998 has led to the formation of "two camps of deterrence theorists…over whether a nuclearized subcontinent will prevent a major conflict and foster escalation."[22] These two camps might be called deterrence optimists and deterrence pessimists.[23] Embracing Winston Churchill's observation in 1953 that in a nuclear-armed world "safety would be the sturdy child of terror and survival the twin brother of annihilation,"[24] deterrence optimists maintain that nuclear weapons by making war catastrophically costly generate incentives for war avoidance between nuclear rivals and therefore create stability between them. Kenneth N. Waltz, the intellectual architect of deterrence optimism, attributed four benefits to military postures based on nuclear deterrence: -

> ➢ "First, deterrent strategies include caution all around and thus reduce the incidence of war. Second, wars fought in the face of strategic nuclear weapons must be carefully limited because a country having them may retaliate if its vital interests are threatened. Third, prospective punishment need only be proportionate to an adversary's expected gains in war after those gains are discounted for the many uncertainties of war. Fourth, should deterrence fail, a few judiciously delivered warheads are likely to produce sobriety in the leaders of all of the countries involved and thus bring rapid de-escalation."[25]

Drawing upon these core Waltzian assumptions, deterrence optimists have put forth the nuclear peace thesis which states that wars between nuclear-armed nation-states will be unlikely to start, and, if they do, the conflicts are likely to be limited because the belligerents will stop fighting short of the intensity needed to bring abut the resort to nuclear weapons.[26] The position of the deterrence optimists is firmly rooted in the structural strand of the intellectual

tradition of "realpolitik" which finds the key to interstate instability in the structure and distribution of power in the international system.[27] In essence it argues that when a "parity relationship is combined with the enormous absolute costs of nuclear war, a deliberate (i.e., a "rational") war is at once unthinkable and virtually impossible. As pointed out by Zagare and Kilgour: -

> ➤ "Every deterrence theorist believes that the high cost of war in the nuclear era has rendered states more prudent and, simultaneously, raised the provocation level necessary for outright conflict. When these effects are combined with the pacifying tendencies of a bipolar system, a world order is produced that, when properly managed, is unlikely to be characterized by major interstate war."[28]

Following this logic, Ashley Tellis has argued that India-Pakistan deterrence is more stable than it is given credit for: -

> ➤ "The prospects for deterrence stability are ...high because no South Asian state is currently committed to securing any political objectives through the medium of major conventional and, by implication, nuclear war. This condition is only reinforced by the high levels of "defense dominance" obtaining at the military level, and thus it is not at all an exaggeration to say that deterrence stability in South Asia derives simply from the Indian [and] Pakistani ... inability to successfully prosecute quick and decisive conventional military operations, especially with respect to wars of unlimited aims...what makes this situation meta-stable is the fact that neither India nor Pakistan ...has the strategic capabilities to execute those successful damage-limiting first strikes that might justify initiating nuclear attacks in a crisis."[29]

The intricate relationship between system structure, the cost of war, and the characteristics of weapon systems is reflected in the following tenets of structural deterrence theory: -

➢ Parity relationship, when coupled with high war costs, is especially conducive for peace. This assumption lies at the heart of the notion of mutually assured destruction. By contrast, when the cost of outright war is low, even parity may be insufficient to preclude confrontation, suggesting that "war is always possible among states armed only with conventional weapons."[30]

➢ Asymmetric power relationships are associated with crises and war. The most dangerous form of asymmetry is a situation when neither state can deter the other, that is, when costs are mutually low, but one of them calculates an advantage in attacking first.

➢ As the absolute costs of war increase, *ceteris paribus*, the probability of war decreases.[31] As John Mearsheimer puts it: "the more horrible the prospect of war, the less likely it is to occur."[32]

Questioning the analytical and historical validity of these precepts of structural deterrence theory, deterrence pessimists argue that notwithstanding their enormous destructive potential, nuclear weapons fail to produce stability because of a range of political, technical and organizational factors. Some of the specific problems that trump stability between nuclear states include risk acceptant or irrational leaders, command-and-control difficulties, and preemption incentives for small arsenals. Applying these concerns to nuclear South Asia, A Katsouris and De Goure have highlighted the following dangers: -

➢ "…an Indo-Pakistani nuclear-arms race presents several distinct areas of concern. Nuclear weapons could be stolen. They could be launched by accident or without the authorization of senior political leaders. Political extremists on either side could use nuclear weapons for coercive purposes or simply launch an ill-advised conventional war that escalates unpredictably. If a conventional war does begin, or is looming, one side plausibly could decide to launch a strike first. Or poor

communication and early-warning systems could mislead one party into believing that it is subject to a missile attack when it is not...Present circumstances in South Asia represent a security challenge without historical parallel...."[33]

Scott Sagan has argued that "India and Pakistan face a dangerous nuclear future ... imperfect humans inside imperfect organizations ...will someday fail to produce secure nuclear deterrence."[34] Concurring with Sagan, P.R. Chari states that South Asian proliferation undermines a "widely held, *a priori* belief...that nuclear weapons states do not go to war against each other."[35] In the same vein, Michael Krepon, a self-proclaimed deterrence pessimist, has identified a number of "conditions" that tend to undermine processes of escalation control and stability of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan. These destabilizing factors include: "uncertainties associated with the nuclear equation" between India and Pakistan, "India's vulnerability associated with command and control", Pakistan's "nightmare scenario of preemption" due to India's "move toward a ready arsenal", the shifting of the "conventional military balance in India's favour", "the absence of nuclear risk reduction measures on the subcontinent", the tendency by both governments to "resort to brinkmanship over Kashmir, and, "the juxtaposition of India's nuclear doctrine of massive retaliation with a conventional war-fighting doctrine focusing on limited war".[36] Clayton P. Bowen and Daniel Wolven have also underscored the destabilizing impact of the inherent tension between imperatives of survivability and dynamics of escalation that beset the emerging India-Pakistan deterrent equation. They write: -

> ➢ "Stable deterrence requires, among other things, a safe and reliable command and control system that can assure neighboring countries both that an accidental or unauthorized launch in a time of crisis is next to impossible, and that retaliation in the event of nuclear attack is possible...Our analysis shows that the process of making a deterrent survivable presents problems for making it controllable. *The conclusion we draw,*

therefore, is that as things now stand on the subcontinent, a decision to make a nuclear capability "survivable" is apt to make that capability provocative. Therefore, even if India and Pakistan meet the requirements of credibility and survivability of their new acquired nuclear forces, it is very unlikely that these forces will not be provocative in one way or another. If this Catch 22 produces a seemingly reasonable deployment plan to assure survivability, the very unreasonable outcome of regional instability may occur as a result"[37] (emphasis original).

The Kargil War and Deterrence Stability

The Kargil War of 1999 has been posited as a classic case of stability-instability paradox wrought by South Asia's overt nuclearization. Glenn Snyder identified the stability-instability paradox as a situation where credible threats at higher level may lead to instability at lower levels.[38] Using the Kargil conflict as a case study, S. Paul Kapur, has argued that "nuclear weapons not only failed to prevent war, they directly underlay Pakistan's decision to encroach on Indian territory at Kargil and trigger the conflict… The Kargil conflict shows that nuclear weapons in fact have had significant destabilizing effects on the South Asian environment. More generally, the case indicates that where a newly nuclear state wishes to alter the territorial *status quo* and is weaker than its enemy, nuclear proliferation can increase the likelihood of conventional conflict."[39]

Was Kargil launched by Islamabad because it felt that the country had the security of the nuclear umbrella? Pakistani analysts have questioned the validity of this claim made by deterrence pessimists. Major General (Retd) Mahmud Ali Durrani has observed that "Kargil was the result of flawed strategic thinking in Pakistan and not as a result of going nuclear."[40] Maleeha Lodhi has attributed Kargil's occurrence to "systemic flaws" in Pakistani decision-making process which "is impulsive, chaotic, erratic and overly secretive…playing holy warriors this week and men of peace the next betrays an infirmity and insincerity of purpose that leaves the

country leaderless and directionless."[41] Shireen Mazari has asserted that the Kargil operation was a defensive move by Pakistan to counteract Indian designs for incursions along the Line of Control.[42] These alternative interpretations of Pakistani motives for launching the Kargil war call into question the widely held belief that Kargil incursion was an offensive, war-fighting move induced by Pakistan's possession of the absolute weapon. Instead of viewing Kargil as an instability end of the stability-instability spectrum induced by the induction of nuclear weapons in South Asia one can see its occurrence as a manifestation of extreme dissatisfaction by Islamabad with the prevailing regional *status quo*. Recent scholarly work has focused on the role played by *status quo* evaluation in deterrence success. As Van Gelder observes: "it is too often forgotten that successful deterrence requires not only that the expected utility of acting be relatively low, but that the expected utility of refraining be acceptably high."[43] The very fact that planning for Kargil was longstanding[44] and predated the May 1998 nuclear tests by Pakistan clearly suggests that its genesis lay more in the Pakistani perceptions of the instability of the territorial *status quo* in Kashmir than in the nuclearization of the subcontinent. As pointed out by Robert G. Wirsing: -

> ➤ "There is great likelihood, in fact, that Pakistani expectations of military gains from Kargil were quite modest, that the main motivation was simply to bring relief to Pakistan's exposed beleaguered transport routes along the LOC by bringing India's own primary route within range of Pakistani artillery, and that Pakistani decisions were caught significantly off guard by the effort's stunningly swift escalation into a major conflict."[45]

Drivers of Deterrence Instability between India and Pakistan

Scholarly analyses have identified several drivers of nuclear instability between India and Pakistan. Major General (Retd) Mahmud Ali Durrani lists "territorial disputes", "mistrust", "lack of institutionalized crisis management mechanisms", "lack of

understanding of the nuclear strategy and deterrence" as principal elements of deterrence instability between India and Pakistan.[46]

Michael Ryan Craig describes "dangers created by geographical proximity;" "lack of stable, tacit agreements on *de facto* boundaries where disputes about territory still exist;" "the presence of ethno-religious cleavages which are integral to the two states founding national identities; "the existence of violent internal exigencies;" "the persistent lack of feasible and reliable early warning sensors;" "the lack of reliable nuclear safety and warhead access devices;" "the relative absence of dedicated command and control architectures that allow reliable civilian control during heightened tensions," as sources of India-Pakistan deterrence instability.[47] The "robustness" of India-Pakistan deterrent equation has also been questioned by Sir Michael Quinlan due to the following negative factors:

> ➤ There lies between them the unsettled core issue of Kashmir which has been the cause of three wars and many near-war situations.

> ➤ Both countries share a long territorial border, not just in Kashmir, and their capitals and heartlands are much closer together than Moscow and Washington.

> ➤ Neither country seems able to base its nuclear capability primarily in submarines to avoid pre-emption risk; similarly the task of constructing a deployment mode based on hardened underground silos place far back from the common border is almost an impossible one, at least in the near future.

> ➤ Neither side has an advanced early warning system against missile attack;

> ➤ It is not clear that either side has had a command and communication system of the sophistication achieved in the East-West setting.

> Also it is not clear if either side had developed a system of political control of operations that combines the necessary rapid responsiveness with thorough involvement of advice and prudent safeguards.

> It also cannot be assumed that either side, at least initially, will have the safety procedures, standards and devices, like electronic locks, progressively developed in the East-West setting."[48]

The presence of these destabilizing factors in South Asia coupled with the outbreak of the Kargil war in 1999 in a nuclear environment and the prolonged India-Pakistan military standoff in 2001-2002, has led many analysts to argue that the prospects for strategic stability between India and Pakistan are decidedly bleak. As summarized in Table One (below) there are at least five different causal paths that can generate conditions leading to deterrence failure between India and Pakistan: (1) escalation of conventional war into nuclear one, (2) preemptive attacks launched in times of crises due to perceptual mistakes, (3) accidental use of nuclear weapons resulting from malfunctions of men or machines, (4) nuclear war initiated by terrorist organizations, and (5) disarming surprise attack. Yet the likelihood of each of these scenarios materializing is constrained by a number of conditioning factors (mentioned in second column of the table) and is counteracted by a variety of preventive measures (listed in column 3) that each side can adopt to stave off deterrence failure. This is not to suggest that India-Pakistan deterrence is secure against the risks of failure. This is merely to point out that the task of the management of their deterrent equation is not an impossible one. It can be made to work provided both are willing to work together to seek strategic stability as an overarching goal. The resumption of India-Pakistan peace process since February 2004 and the announcement in June 2004 that both sides had agreed to take a number of steps[49] including the setting up of a dedicated hotline between their respective foreign ministries offers a bright ray of hope in this regard.

Table 1: Strategic Stability in South Asia

Paths to Nuclear War	Factors Affecting Likelihood of Path Way to nuclear war	Actions to reduce likelihood of path
1. Escalation of Conventional war	• India-Pakistan conventional war • Balance of Conventional forces • Vulnerability of nascent nuclear force • Misperception/misc alculation	• Crisis prevention and management • Maintain balance of general purpose forces • Reduce vulnerability of nuclear forces improve command/control • Openness, transparency, predictability?
2. Preemption in crisis	• War appears imminent and unavoidable • balance of nuclear force • Misperception/misc alculation	• Crisis prevention and management • Maintain balance of nuclear forces • Reduce vulnerability of nuclear forces • Maintain ability to launch vulnerable forces on warning
3. Accidental or unauthorized use	• Procedures and devices designed to prevent accidents and unauthorized use • Permissive Action Links) • Communication systems	• Improve procedures and devices • Improve communication systems • Crisis prevention and management
4. Initiation by a terrorist group	• Terrorist groups access to nuclear weapons and delivery systems	• Limit access to nuclear weapons and delivery systems • Assertive command and control • Crisis prevention and management
5. Surprise Attack	• Extreme India-Pakistan hostility • Balance of nuclear forces • Vulnerability of nuclear forces • Misperception/misc alculation	• Strengthen incentives for peace • Maintain balance of nuclear forces • Reduce vulnerability of nuclear forces • Achieve arms control/limit first - use strike capabilities • Counterforce capabilities. Ensure survivability of command and control systems

*   A slightly modified version of this article will appear in the *Summer 2005* issue of *Contemporary South Asia*.

End Notes

1. Charles Babington and Pamela Constable, "Kashmir Killings Mar Clinton Visit to India," The *Washington Post*, 22 March 2000, A1.

2. "Proliferation Rings" refer to the phenomena of "second-tier nuclear proliferation in which states in the developing world with varying technical capabilities trade among themselves to bolster one another's nuclear and strategic weapons efforts.   Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, "Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime," **International Security** vol. 29, no. 2 (Fall 2004): 5-49.

3. See Michael Krepon, ed. **Strategic Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia** (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Centre, 2004), Ch.1.

4. Patrick Morgan draws a distinction between general deterrence and immediate deterrence. The former refers to a policy stance of regulating an adversary relationship and balancing power over a long period of time through maintenance of a satisfactory level of forces. In immediate deterrence, the actor has a military capability and issue threats to a specific opponent when the opponent is already contemplating and preparing an attack. "Immediate deterrence situation is a crisis, or close to it, with war distinctly possible, while general deterrence is far less intense and anxious because the attack to be forestalled is still hypothetical." Patrick M. Morgan, **Deterrence Now** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). P. 9

5. Quoted in Frank C. Zagare and D.Marc Kilgour, **Perfect Deterrence** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 4. Following John J. Mearsheimer Zagare and Kilgour define a system or a deterrence relationship as stable when "the status quo is likely to survive" and a system or a deterrence relationship as unstable when "a crisis or war is possible." **Ibid**. p.5.

6. Patrick A. MC Carthy, **Hierarchy and Flexibility in World Politics: Adaptation to shifting power distributions in the United Nations Security Council and the International Monetary Fund** (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1996), p. 11.

7. Bernard Loo, "Geography and Strategic Stability," **The Journal of Strategic Studies**, vol. 26, no. 1 (March 2003), p. 156.

8. According to Kaplan, a stable system is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable equilibrium. On the other hand, a stable

equilibrium is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the existence of a stable system. Morton A. Kaplan, **System and Process in International Politics** (Boston: Brown and Little, 1957), pp. 6-7.

9. As quoted in Patrick A. MC Carthy, **op. cit.**, p. 13.

10. Richard N. Rosecrance, **Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective** (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963)

11. Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multi-polar Power Systems and International Stability." **World Politics** (April 1964): 390-406.

12. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," **Daedalus** , vol. 93 (Summer 1964), pp:881-909.

13. It is worth pointing out that crisis management requires novel concepts of planning, control and conduct of military operations and that these requirements may strain the experience, imagination, and patience of military professionals. Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George have mentioned the following seven requirements of crisis management for leaders: 1. maintain top-level control of military options; 2)create pause in the tempo of military actions; 3)coordinate diplomatic and military moves; 4)confine military moves to those that constitute clear demonstration of one's resolve and are appropriate to one's limited objectives; 5)avoid military moves that give the opponents the impression that one is about to resort to large –scale warfare and, therefore, force him to consider preemption; 6)choose diplomatic-military options that signal a desire to negotiate rather than to seek a military solution; 7)select diplomatic-military options that leave the opponent a way out of the crisis that is compatible with his fundamental interests. Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, **Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time** (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 206-207.

14. Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability." **World Politics** (April 1964): 392-396

15. Ibid.pp. 396-400.

16. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. **Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey** Fifth Edition. (New York: Longman, 2001), p. 588.

17. Benjamin Miller, **Why Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in World Politics** (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), p.61.

18. Ibid. pp. 66-67.

19. Jerome H. Kahan has suggested three key elements of a policy of stable deterrence.

20. Leon V. Signal, "No First Use and NATO's Nuclear Posture," in John D. Steinbruner and Leon V. Sigal, eds. **Alliance Security: NATO and the No First Use Question** (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1984).

21. Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, **Strategy and Arms Control** (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), p. 50

22. Michael Krepon, "The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia," in Michael Krepon, ed. **Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia** (Washington, D.: Stimson Centre, 2004), p. 3.

23. Analysts of South Asian security have drawn attention to at least three paradoxes spawned by nuclearization of South Asia: the instability/stability paradox, the vulnerability/invulnerability paradox and independence/dependence paradox. Simply put, instability/stability paradox states that by precluding general war, the destructiveness of nuclear weapons seems to open the door to limited conflicts. The vulnerability/invulnerability paradox refers to the increased risks of unauthorized use, accidents and theft of nuclear assets that arise from attempts to secure them against preemptive strikes. Dependence/Independence paradox refers to the inability of the feuding nuclear rivals to effectively manage situations of crisis without the involvement of the third parties. For an excellent discussion of the dilemmas posed by each of these three paradoxes see Michael Krepon, "The Stability-Instability Paradox: Misperceptions and Escalation Control in South Asia," **Stimson Centre Report** (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson, May 2003), Scott D. Sagan, "Perils of proliferation" **Asian Survey** (November 2001), Feroz Hassan Khan, "the Independence-Dependence Paradox: Stability Dilemmas in South Asia," **Arms Control Today** (October 2003).

24. Quoted in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Gregory Raymond, **A Multipolar peace? Great-Power Politics in the Twenty –first Century** (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 38.

25. Kenneth N. Waltz, **The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better** (Adelphi Paper, 171) (London: IISS 1981), p. 24.

26. This "peace through peril" thesis is well summarized by Kegley and Raymond: "when both sides in an enduring rivalry can mutually assure each other's destruction, the terror of utter devastation preserves peace between them." Charles W. Kegley, Jr and Gregory Raymond, **A Multipolar peace?**

Great Power Politics in the Twenty-first Century (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 38.

27. While the structural deterrence theory finds the key to interstate stability in the structure and distribution of power, decision-theoretic deterrence theory focuses on the interplay of outcomes, preferences, and choices in determining interstate conflict behaviour. Factors such as strategic uncertainty, subjectivity and rationality form the core assumptions of decision-theoretic variant best exemplified in the game of Chicken.

28. Franck C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, **Perfect Deterrence** (London: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 9.

29. Ashley J Tellis, **India's Emerging Nuclear Posture**: 741-743

30. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," **International Security** vol. 18 no. 2 (Fall 1993),p. 77.

31. Several policy implications flow from these axioms of the classical deterrence theory:

   ➢ Quantitative arms races, which serve to increase the cost of conflict, can help prevent wars.
   ➢ By contrast, qualitative arms races, which threaten to provide one side or another with a first-strike advantage, increase the probability of preemptive war.
   ➢ Comprehensive and effective defense systems make conflict more likely.
   ➢ The selective proliferation of nuclear weapons can help prevent war and promote peace.
   ➢ Accidental war is the greatest threat to peace.

32. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," in Michael E. Brown, et. al, eds. **Theories of War and Peace**(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), p. 17.

33. Andreas Katsouris and Daniel Goure, "Strategic Crossroads in South Asia: The Potential Role for Missile Defense," **Comparative Strategy** vol. 18 (1999), p. 178.

34. Scott Sagan, "For the Worse: "Till Death Do Us part," in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, **The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed** (New York: Norton, 2003), p. 106-7.

35. P. R.Chari, "Nuclear Restraint, Nuclear Risk Reduction, and the Security-Insecurity Paradox in South Asia," in **The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinksmanship in South Asia,** Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne (Washington, D.: Stimson Center, 2001), p. 16

36. Michael Krepon, "The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia," in Michael Krepon, **op.cit.**

37. Clayton P. Bowen and Daniel Wolven, "Command and Control Challenges in South Asia", **The Nonproliferation Review** (Spring-Summer 1999), pp. 25 and 33-34.

38. Glenn Snyder, "The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror," in Paul Seabury (ed.). **Balance of Power** (Chandler: San Francisco, 1965), p. 198

39. S. Paul Kapur, "Nuclear Proliferation, The Kargil Conflict, And South Asian Security," **Security Studies** 13, no. 1 (Autumn 2003), p.81

40. Major General Mahmud Ali Durrani, Retd, "Pakistan's Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons," **CMC Occasional Paper** (New Mexico, Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, July 2004), p. 31.

41. Maleeha Lodhi, "Anatomy of a Debacle," **Newsline** (July 1999).

42. Shireen M. Mazari, **The Kargil Conflict , 1999: Separating Fact from Fiction** (Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies, 2003), pp. 42-43

43. Timothy J. Van Gelder, "Credible Threats and Usable Weapons: Some Dilemmas of Deterrence," **Philosophy and Public Affairs** , vol. 18 (1989), p.163.

44. According to Hassan Abbas "the Kargil operation had been discussed at least twice before in earlier years. It was first discussed during the time of General Zia ul Haq who was given a briefing by the Military Operations Directorate. Zia turned down the plan on grounds that "it would lead us into full-scale war with India." Hassan Abbas, **Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror** (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p.170.

45. Robert G. Wirsing, **Kashmir In The Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age** (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), p.48

46. Major General Mahmud Ali Durrani, Retd, "Pakistan's Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons," **CMC Occasional Paper** (New Mexico, Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, July 2004), p. 31.

47. Michael Ryan Kraig, "The Political and Strategic Imperatives of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia," **India Review**, vol. 2, no. 1 (January 2003), p. 3.

48. Michael Quinlan, "Nuclear Tests in the subcontinent: Prospects and Significance for the World," **International Affairs** (April 1999), p.6.

[49] Following the two-day talks at the Additional Secretary level that were held in New Delhi on June 19-20, 2004, a number of steps designed to ensure nuclear stability between the two countries were announced. These included the following: -

➢ "Existing hotlines between Directors General of <u>Military</u> Operations to be upgraded, dedicated and secured.

➢ Dedicated hotline to be established between Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan.

➢ Draft agreement handed over by Indian side requiring both countries to work towards concluding an agreement on technical parameters on pre-notification of flight testing of missiles.

➢ Unilateral moratorium on further nuclear tests was re-affirmed by both sides; unless in exercise of national sovereignty, it decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests.

➢ Commitment by both sides to continue bilateral discussions and hold further meetings towards implementation of Lahore MOU of 1999.

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TERRORISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY DYNAMICS OF PAKISTAN

Salma Malik

In the post - Cold War world, terrorism poses unique challenges to the liberal democratic state. It would not be incorrect to state that terrorism is an antithesis to democracy. The aim of terrorism is clear: to influence public opinion through symbolic violence, and to date there is no clear understanding of exactly what the "political formula" is that leads to terrorism.

In spite of the rising challenges of globalization on the one hand and internal fragmentation on the other, the contemporary nation - state, is still the most viable political entity, and nations without states are still struggling in their quest for statehood. However, with the end of bipolarity, feelings of irredentism, nationalism, religion and ethnicity stress the international system. Bruce Hoffman claims that these sentiments, not ideology, are fueling terrorism and forecasts that these forces "…long held in check or kept dormant by the cold war may erupt to produce even greater levels of non-state violence…."[1]

By no means an issue specific to a single country or a region, terrorism has international implications and for a candid and honest analysis there is a need to trace the origin and genesis of this malaise. In our culture more often than not the delineation between a *Just* cause and a *Terrorist* activity has not been on clear-cut lines. But nonetheless there is no denying the fact that this menace, which has already become endemic to our society, requires concerted efforts to be countered and eradicated at all levels.

Until the beginning of the 1980s, this issue was not so dangerously intrinsic in Pakistan especially the aspect of religious intolerance and sectarian violence. In fact religion was by and large a personal issue, deeply ingrained in the national identity but demarcated from the daily functioning of the state. Many reasons such as the advent of Zia's Martial Law and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan correspondingly strengthened the clergy's hand, the

influx of arms and money from the US, Saudi Arabia and other countries sponsoring the jihad against the Soviet Occupation forces. Besides Indian state terrorism in Kashmir and elsewhere, the rise of transnational religious groups and most importantly Pakistan's own domestic situation were instrumental in making the country a hotbed of terrorist activities.

However, the issue of terrorism took on a global significance, in the wake of September 11th terrorist acts. Suddenly the world became sharply divided amongst those supporting the US in its unilaterally pronounced war against terrorism and those who did not. For Pakistan it presented both an opportunity to manage its domestic sectarian and terrorism problems and also to regain its lost diplomatic standing and reclaim its status of a trusted US ally. However, this placed the Pakistani administration in a precarious situation. At the home front, it had to face immense pressure from domestic forces, both religious and secular for its decision and secondly, the international support is also entirely conditional, balanced precariously. The fear of a sudden and swift withdrawal of support due to changes in US strategic priorities is causing deep concern in the country. In spite of the fact that the government has tried to manage the situation to its advantage, it is already facing extreme wrath from domestic forces for the negative fall out of this decision and much remains to be seen, what dividends lie in store for Islamabad.

This paper would attempt to address the following questions: First, to define what constitutes terrorism, the reasons behind its rise in Pakistan, its consequences, both internally as well as at external level. What steps were taken by the Pakistani establishment to tackle the rising menace of terrorism in the society? Was the Pakistani establishment's anti-terrorist posture in response to the US call for collective combat against terrorism or was it dominated by domestic concerns? What repercussions the Pakistani establishment has to face as a result of these policies? And lastly what more needs to be undertaken.

What is Terrorism?

Terrorism has proved increasingly elusive against attempts to formulate an agreed definition, mainly because it has constantly shifted and expanded its meaning and usage in a long chain of conflicts and violence. The adage that 'one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter', reveals the wide range of variation in its interpretation. Simply stated, terror is 'extreme or intense fear'. It is a psychological state which combines the physical and mental effects of dread and insecurity. Terrorism thus implies a system or a concept in which terror is applied to cause fear, panic and/or coercive intimidation to exert direct or indirect pressure to achieve political objectives. Invariably the people are the main targets and the means employed are frequently violent though not necessarily extreme or excessive. It is a simpler explanation and may seem inadequate to capture the full magnitude of problems and new factors that are now associated with terrorism worldwide. But it provides a literal beginning by combining the intrinsic meaning with its purpose and application.

Walter Laqueur concluded that, 'terrorism constitutes the illegitimate use of force'.[2] While another writer, James M. Poland defined, 'terrorism as the premeditated, deliberate, systematic murder, mayhem and threatening of the innocent, to create fear and intimidation in order to gain a political or tactical advantage, usually to influence an audience'. The shifting focus from the accepted national objectives, which provided some political legitimacy to terrorism and the increasing lethality of violence, at times being irrationally excessive, have become the cause of serious public concern worldwide. Its fallout has been highly favorable to state terrorism, which thrives on the weakened opposition and operates even more boldly and brutally, as is being demonstrated by Israel and India following 11th September incident.

Implications for Pakistan

A large part of the rise in terrorism, sectarianism and extremist politics in Pakistan lies in the country's political history, its civil- military relations in which interest groups have retained

state power at the expense of democratic and socio-economic development. To strengthen and prolong their rule, various civil as well as military governments in the past have formed domestic alliances, mainly with the clergy, strengthened and manipulated marginalized political groups in an attempt to weaken stronger and popular- based political groups for instance the rise of Muhajir Quami Movement in the province of Sindh in the late 1970s - 80s as a counter weight to the Pakistan People's Party. In this process the civil society got badly undermined and the breakdown of democratic norms was compounded by problems such as the deterioration of justice system & the rule of law besides, lack of accountability as evidenced in massive corruption, smuggling, drug-trafficking, criminal violence, power personalization and Human Rights abuse. Thus, this increased polarization along ethnic and especially religious sectarian lines, marginalization and suppression of political opposition, alienation of ethnic minorities, together with extremist religious movement lead to political violence and intimidation. Compounded by economic failure, injustice and stagnation made worse by the relentless political penetration and enervation of state bureaucracy.

As they gathered momentum, these pathologies of governance choked off the horizontal relations of trust, cooperation, honesty, reciprocity and public- spiritedness that constitute the social capital of a vigorous prosperous democratic society based on "civic community." In the following lines, three main problem areas would be highlighted, mainly the Afghan Jihad and the problems associated with it, such as the unchecked refugee inflow, cross border trafficking of all kinds, gun running and weapons proliferation, the infamous madrassah culture giving rise to issues of sectarianism, religious intolerance and extremism coupled with militancy, and violence.

Afghan Jihad

Owing to traditionally strong cultural, religious and social ties between the people of the two countries and over 1000 miles of porous Pak- Afghan border, naturally got Pakistan involved in the Afghan war. Generally it can be said that Pakistan's role in the

Soviet - Afghan war and acceptance of millions of refugees, has had serious implications for the country. To begin with, it entirely changed the country's orientation from a moderate Islamic state to an increasingly theological one. For President General Zia-ul-Haq it came about as a blessing in disguise. Firstly, it brought him closer to the US, making Pakistan a frontline state in the CIA sponsored war, and secondly, through the call for Jihad, Zia managed to gain the much needed legitimacy and clergy's backing which otherwise would have been not too easy to achieve.

Secondly, and the most glaring repercussion, was and remains the proliferation of weapons, both small and heavy, that resulted in enhanced violence, free gun running and display of firearms. Coupled with drugs, trafficking of illicit firearms as well as smuggling of commercial goods increased corruption and crime and the consequent loss of faith in the government's writ. As stated by Naseerullah Khan Baber, former Interior Minister, "drugs, terrorism and weapons were the fallout of Pakistan's role in Afghan Jihad," as a result of which "Afghanistan had become a training ground for terrorism that was being imported into Pakistan and other parts of the world."[3]

Some of the military training camps and religious schools in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan became breeding grounds for ethnic and sectarian violence as well as terrorist training camps. During the Soviet occupation, Afghan and Soviet forces even conducted raids against Mujahideen bases inside Pakistan and a campaign of terror bombings and sabotage in Pakistani cities. In 1987 alone, some 90 percent of the 777 terrorist incidents recorded worldwide took place in Pakistan.[4] The Afghan jihad correspondingly, gave rise to a violent gun culture in the Pakistani society, promoted trafficking and smuggling of counterfeit goods and currency in the country and also proved highly instrumental in the establishment of the infamous madrassah culture in Pakistan.

Pakistan, in spite of being a developing country with many problems of its own, accepted and at one point single handedly sustained not less than three million or so refugees on its soil. From the very outset, the government policy towards these incoming

refugees was flawed. In spite of not being a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Follow up Protocol, it was not binding on Pakistan to allow the refugees to enter its territory, but on sheer humanitarian grounds these refugees were accepted. The Pakistani government did initially try to register these refugees, but as the number grew with time, not only was that practice disregarded, but they were free to go anywhere in the country. Resulting in their spreading out far and wide, thus giving rise to resentment amongst the local population as well as increased demographic shake ups. Besides seeking local citizenship, the refugee population was spread over 300 camps mainly in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan and represented over 20% of the local population. In certain areas they even outnumbered the indigenous population.[5]

The most alarming repercussion of the Afghan Jihad was the rise in narco- smuggling and introduction of Kalashnikov culture, which became a hallmark of the 1980s. Where in the year 1980 there were virtually no heroin addicts in Pakistan, by 1981, the number reached 20,000 and within four years the number grew to an alarming 365,000 figure. According to one survey, by the year 1999, Pakistan had an estimated five million addicts.[6] An extremely precarious and dangerous situation for a country such as Pakistan, for where on one hand, narcotics and drug money fuelled law and order problems, corruption, money laundering on the other hand it was encouraged by the foreign governments financing the Afghan Jihad so that the money earned from this channel could be spent in the purchase of arms and weapons from the international black market, thus creating a vicious cycle which after more than a decade continues unabated.

Weapons Proliferation

According to the 1998 census, Pakistanis owned around 2 million *licensed* firearms. In addition, officials of the Ministry of Interior believe that there are roughly 18 million more illegally held.[7] Although weapons have somewhat always been available in the arms bazaars within the NWFP, such as Darra Adamkhel and Landi Kotal; the major impetus and free flow of modern light

weapons increased manifold after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Given the nature of the proxy war millions of tons of military material were imported into the region, including a variety of weapons. Other countries also contributed in one way or another by providing the warring Mujahedin, with direct or indirect assistance both in material and finances, for example China wary of Soviet designs contributed weaponry, where as Saudi Arabia came forth with financial assistance.

As a front line ally, Pakistan became the conduit for this massive military assistance program, its top Intelligence outfit, the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) managing the receipt and distribution with the American CIA, coordinating the supply of weapons. With a bitter Vietnam experience still fresh in memory, the United States, did not want to be seen as providing direct military assistance for the Mujahedin, and for this reason massive amount of arms were purchased from all a variety of sources. Interesting trends could be witnessed in this undercover arms pipeline; the CIA would procure through Egypt large amounts of antipersonnel mines originally produced in Italy and so on. During this time period weapons even of Israeli and Indian makes could also be found in circulation. The CIA would then arrange for the arms to be either flown to Islamabad or shipped, via Oman, to Karachi.

Madrassah Culture

Traditionally, the Islamic religious schools *Madrassah* have been a sanctuary for the homeless and displaced people, sustaining and supporting thousands of poor people who otherwise lack access to formal education and served an important humanitarian role. In Pakistan, as in many developing countries, where education is not mandatory and many rural areas lack public schools. – Religious madrasahs on the other hand, located all over the country have been a regular source of free education, free food, housing, and clothing. According to a World Bank estimate only 40 percent of Pakistanis are literate. However, over a period of time, these religious institutions have become *Schools of Hate* as in the words of Jessica Stern, for not only most of these schools offer religious education

alone, at worse, some extremist madrasahs preach Jihad without understanding the concept: They equate jihad -- which most Islamic scholars interpret as the striving for justice (and principally an inner striving to purify the self) -- with guerrilla warfare only, with their own interpretation of social justice.

During the Soviet Afghan war, Madrasahs were already seen as "the supply line for jihad,"[8] *Jihad* a highly revered tenet of Islam, has been used specially during the Afghan occupation by Soviet troops by vested interest groups, to exploit the common man's sentiment and allegiance to the cause in the name of religion. And after the end of the Afghan war, violence and militancy was spread in the name of jihad. During the 1980s, madrasahs were promoted as a way to garner the religious parties' support for the military rule and to recruit troops for the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. At the time, many madrasahs were financed through *Zakat*, giving the government at least a modicum of control. But with time, funds and donations by wealthy Pakistani at home or abroad, private and government-funded organizations belonging to the Persian Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, and Iran increased which exacerbated the problem as these donors carried their specific interests, and with lessening state control, the madrasahs were now free to preach the warped and narrow version of a violent Islam as propagated by these actors.

Out of the estimated 40,000 to 50,000 madrasahs, only about 4,350 have registered with the government.[9] These schools encourage their graduates, who often cannot find work because of their lack of practical education, to fulfill their "spiritual obligations" by fighting against Hindus in Kashmir or against Muslims of other sects in Pakistan. Such Madrasahs have become fiefdoms of the clerics who run them according to their biases. Hence, they oppose government policies towards any kind of regularization, or registration of the institution, for they fear that they could get secularized, the unchecked flow of finances being provided to them may get stopped or questioned and their authority might get curbed.

9/11 and The Changing Scenario for Pakistan

Following the events of 9/11, Pakistan actively joined the US-led international coalition against terrorism. However prior to this, President Pervez Musharraf mindful of the growing menace of terrorism at home had initiated various steps to curb and check the problem. One such action being the nation wide arms control campaign, which was initiated in Autumn 2000. Its main aim was to purge the society from gun running and make the country a weapons' free society. Besides two large sectarian based organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Jhanghvi and the Sipah-e-Mohammad were also banned, which initially were put on a watch list and later banned altogether along with few other such organizations after their activities were found harmful. However 9/11 not only brought Pakistan to the center stage of global politics, but also helped the government intensify its anti-terrorist activities. Pakistan's contribution in the war against terrorism has been crucial and acknowledged worldwide.

In the pre-9/11 period, Pakistan was suffering from a negative image problem due to various factors, such as: its support to the Taliban since 1994; corruption of the political elites; bad economic conditions; nuclear explosions in 1998; alleged support to the Kashmiri freedom struggle; the Kargil conflict and a military coup against a democratically-elected regime in 1999, and so forth. Pakistan joined the US-led coalition in anticipation that it would help instantly addressing all these problems. Though it was abundantly clear to the regime that joining the US-led coalition would mean, cutting off relations with the Taliban regime, thus effecting the precariously balanced Pakistan's Afghan policy and also carried implications for the freedom struggle in Kashmir, given that both the US and India have evolving strategic relations.

Pak – US Anti-Terrorism Cooperation

Besides, the formation of a *Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism and Law Enforcement,* Pakistan also provided basing and over flight permission for all U.S. and coalition forces, and deployed a large number of its troops along the Afghanistan border in support

of *Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)*. By no means a small feat, as at the same time, Pakistani troops were also engaged along its western border to counter an unprecedented Indian military concentration. In return there was a revival of the *US –Pak. Defence Cooperation Group (DCG)* in September 2002, after five years. The first joint US Pakistan military exercises also took place since 1987, with approximately 120 soldiers from each country participating. The renewal of *US Assistance to Pakistan's Security-related Programmes* brought about a US assistance worth US$396.5 million for FY 2002, an allocation of US$56.5 million for FY 2003, and further entertaining the request for another US$120 million worth of assistance for FY 2004.

According to rough estimates, regional terrorism efforts have caused the Pakistani economy losses in excess of $10 billion since October 2001.[10] In addition the US pledged 73 million dollars for border security, to be utilized specifically for intelligence gathering equipment and three helicopters for the interior ministry. Finally the Lifting of nuclear and democracy related sanctions. However, it must also be added that the reciprocal initiatives promised for Pakistan as envisioned in the earlier pronouncements of the West, did not come through in full. Nor did the Western governments make any significant contributions to address the issues arising out from the negative portrayal of Pakistan and Islam's image in their media. Besides, there is a growing perception amongst the people that with Afghanistan no longer as significantly important after Iraq, Pakistan has once again lost its chance, there would neither be any tariff relief nor trade concessions, besides the fiscal aid package would also be conditional.

Domestic Political Dynamics

Following the events of 9/11 and the subsequent developments in the region and around the world, there has been an increase in the anti-West and anti-American sentiments at the civil society level in the Muslim World in general and Pakistan in particular. This has happened specifically after having seen the devastation that followed the American bombing of Afghanistan, resulting in the loss of thousands of innocent civilian lives as

'collateral damage'. Besides, anti-American sentiments are a direct response to the malicious Western media campaign against Islam and the Muslims. There is a general perception that the Western media works in tandem with their respective governments, and these developments have impacted upon the electoral process in the country. One of the significant outcomes of this anti-US resentment is reflected in the success of the six-party alliance of religious political parties Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) in the October 2002 elections. All major parties in this alliance have been supportive of and traditionally have had links with various Afghan organizations, and were extremely critical of the US military operation in Afghanistan.

Pakistani public views with concern any possibility of compromising state sovereignty even to a little degree, such as the dissatisfaction surrounding the WANA operation, to flush out foreign militants, allowing foreign troops to be stationed on Pakistani soil and foreign intelligence agencies to operate within the country, or the signing of non-transparent agreements for cooperation on the war on terrorism. The assassination attempts on the president and later the prime minister is also indicative of the fact that the outlawed militant outfits are on a constant look out to seek an opportunity to sabotage totally the government's initiative. There is no doubt that the nation backed President Musharraf's decision for joining the anti-terrorism coalition for safeguarding the national interests. But the conditions and limits of collaboration needs to be defined now, especially in view of the deteriorating security situation on Pak-Afghan border, where clashes between US and Pakistani and Afghan and Pakistani troops are being reported with more frequency.

Fighting Terrorism: Domestic Response

President Musharraf in his January 2002 speech clearly outlined the government's posture towards terrorist outfits. With five more extremist organizations banned and barred from operating under new names, bringing a total tally to seven. The offices and assets of these organizations were sealed and confiscated and not less than 400 activists along with their leaders were rounded up and

arrested. Prior to this in a September 2001 address to the nation, President Musharraf pointed out four critical priority areas that needed to be preserved: 1) Security of the country, 2) Economy and its revival, 3) Strategic nuclear and missile assets and 4) the Kashmir cause. The Kashmir issue, which is of critical importance to Pakistan, was duly highlighted in both of Musharraf addresses.[11] While enunciating the government's policy on the issue of terrorism and replying to Indian allegation about Pakistan's alleged involvement in the October and December 2001 terrorist acts in Held - Kashmir and Delhi, the President stated:

> *"These are the three problems, which create confusion in our minds. I want to lay down rules of behavior concerning all the three. Let us take the Kashmir Cause first. Kashmir runs in our blood. No Pakistani can afford to sever links with Kashmir. The entire Pakistan and the world know this. We will continue to extend our moral, political and diplomatic support to Kashmiris. We will never budge an inch from our principled stand on Kashmir. The Kashmir problem needs to be resolved by dialogue and peaceful means in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people and the United Nations resolutions. We have to find the solution of this dispute. No organization will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir. We condemn the terrorist acts of September 11, October 1 and December 13. Anyone found involved in any terrorist act would be dealt with sternly. Strict action will be taken against any Pakistani individual, group or organization found involved in terrorism within or outside the country. Our behavior must always be in accordance with international norms. I would also like to address the international community, particularly the United States on this occasion. As I said before on a number of occasions, Pakistan rejects and condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used for any terrorist activity anywhere in the world. Now you must play an active role in solving the Kashmir dispute for the sake of lasting peace and harmony in the region."[12]*

Deweaponisation Campaign

In response to the rising social violence and the easy availability of automatic weapons, in the autumn of 2000, the government initiated a National Arms Control & Recovery Campaign. The main goal of the campaign was to facilitate 'de-weaponization" through confiscation and prosecution of illegally held arms. A three-phase program, initially owners were encouraged to register licensed weapons. During the second stage owners could surrender illegal firearms over a two-week amnesty in June 2001. Although the number of weapons received was not expected to be great, the hope was that these measures would break the culture of freely carrying Kalashnikov rifles in public and facilitate future police intervention. In May 2001, the cabinet approved a *New Arms Control Policy and Action Plan for the Recovery of Illicit Weapons*. Earlier, a ban was imposed on the display of weapons throughout the country in February 2000, while issuance of fresh arms licenses was stopped totally from March 2000.

However sincere the government's arms recovery action plan might have been, unfortunately there was poor implementation and follow up. Especially after the 2002 elections, the campaign failed to meet up with its desired goals. More important was the targeting of the illegal arms market, but with Afghanistan still a troubled region, the warring factions continue to equip themselves with the required armaments.

Madrassah Reforms

Although there have been attempts to bring about reforms in the madrassah even during Zia's time period, but without much success. As part of the Musharraf plan, not only the mosques were to be reformed, i.e. all mosques would be registered, and no new mosques are allowed to be built without permission so to prevent its abuse.

While conducting operations, the Pakistan army invariably rounded up suspects, who mainly came from the Arab world as well as central Asian States. With no restrictions placed on the entry of

such activists in the past, the country hosted thousands of foreign jihadis in its various madrasahs and other places, mostly run by Arab NGOs, with virtually no documentation or registration in place. Besides arrests of wanted Al Qaeda suspects, the government by March 2002 identified for expulsion some 300 foreigners from the country.[13]

The National Security Council as early as December 1999 had formed a working group to recommend effective madrassah reforms without affecting the autonomy of madrasahs. On the basis of recommendations suggested, three model seminaries one each in Islamabad, Karachi and Sukkur were set up, and they function under the Pakistan Madrassah Education Board (PMEB).[14] Established under the August 2001 Ordinance the PMEB was basically to monitor the admission of both students and teachers in these seminaries, as well as set an appropriate curriculum for them. The government in June 2002 proposed another ordinance, for voluntary registration and regulation of the madrasahs. However, not only do the clerics dismiss these ordinances and find these model institutions as a showpiece with little relevance to, and impact on religious education but also dispute the government's involvement in mandatory registration and official financial scrutiny.

Under the ordinance no new madrassah would be set up without permission from relevant district authority, and the existing ones were to voluntarily register themselves with their respective PMEB chapters. Not only would the finances of these institutions be monitored, with any foreign grant, aid or exchange of personal (both students and teachers) taking place without a *no objection certificate* by the Ministry of Interior. Secondly, the madrasahs administration would not be allowed to indulge in fueling extremist or sectarian sentiment. Proper routing of finances for the madrasahs has been one of the most difficult aspects, since there are very effective informal methods of monitory transactions.[15]

Through the regulatory system, the government plans not only providing the madrasahs with books, computers etc. but also allocate budget for hiring teachers, as well as launch teachers' training programs, besides the syllabus and courses taught at the madrasahs

would be monitored.[16] However the problem the government is already facing is that in spite of claiming that there are 10,000 unregistered madrasahs, the number is much more. Not all madrasahs are willing to register, thus working on mere speculations is not enough.

Not all the madrasahs that exist are attached to some militant organization or spreading sectarianism, thus it is wrong to treat them as identical units. Secondly, the government's plan lacks a focal point with responsibilities dispersed amongst various ministries including concerned agencies. Thus many a times there is found an overlapping in the tasks assigned as well as a lot of confusion prevails at implementation phase. Effective madrassah reform requires a central regulatory authority that would regulate the functioning of theses institutions, and also provide a focal point for donors, foreign governments, media as well as facilitate coordination between the various government departments. Laws and not temporary ordinance should be implemented, with availability of credible data as a necessary prerequisite to address the problem. Finally and most important is the need to create a nation wide financial Intelligence Unit to supervise, monitor and coordinate financial intelligence both within and outside the country.

Conclusion

The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks against the United States have radically-and permanently-altered the balance of power politics in South and West Asia, a fact that makes Pakistan very jittery. The United States can no longer afford to isolate a nuclear Pakistan and still hope that nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia — especially preventing the theft of fissile material or technology — remains a viable and effective policy. Pakistan's perspective regarding the balance of power in the region has to be seriously taken into consideration by Washington. This is because the United States may be able to find a long-term solution to terrorism only by committing itself to the maintenance of the balance of power in Pakistan's neighborhood. This means helping shape a regional order in South Asia with a resolved Kashmir issue as essential ingredients of a stable balance of power.

The fly in the ointment, however, is the willingness of the United States to commit itself to the role of a facilitator — along with Pakistan — and to ensure that this commitment remains unchanged for the next five to 10 years. As the lone superpower, America's strategic interests are much too cumbersome to remain focused on one particular region for long, even though South and West Asia remain highly explosive regions. But the U.S. "war" on transnational terrorism will have to go much beyond capturing or killing Osama bin Laden. Peace and stability in South and West Asia will neither be easy, nor materialize anytime soon, but neither can Washington afford continuing instability over the longer term.

End Note

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COUNTERING THE THREAT OF TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN

Shabana Fayyaz

Central Argument

Today Terrorism is hybrid and complex in nature and scope. Driven across the continents by the non-state actors, violence is the mode of terrorism. Countering this multi-headed phenomenon requires a multi-pronged, multi-national, and sustained policy by the governments across the globe. The military means to uproot the scourge of contemporary terrorism are the short-term fixes and must be complimented by long-term political, economic, and diplomatic initiatives. That is, to come up to the challenge of terrorism the point of departure for a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy should be an understanding of what terrorism is and what terrorism is not. That is, "Terrorism is not an ideology (or religion) but a strategy which may be used by individuals, groups or states for different purposes".[1] Thus, the debate on what constitutes terrorism and how it should be countered remains as inconclusive and vibrant as the debate on what is meant by security in the international system.

The aim of this paper is to highlight the various facets of the debate on ever changing phenomenon of international terrorism and how to respond to it, within the international and national security communities. To understand the discourse at the theoretical and practical level, the paper is divided into three inter-related parts. Part one probes the unresolved nature of what is meant by terrorism? And how it threatens the present international system? Part two of the paper charts the two broad ways of thinking at the academic and policy making level as a way out of terrorism carnage. Part Three attempts to apply the definitional and operational strategies and debate on terrorism to understand the prevalent security scenario of Pakistan. In conclusion, the debate is wrapped up with some plausible recommendations for a pathway out of terrorism facing us today.

The discussion in the paper is based on the following assumptions as means to understand the unresolved puzzle of terrorism and counter-terrorism facing international community today: -

> Security is seen in holistic terms. That is, what constitutes a security threat to state and individual can range from territorial integrity, extreme poverty, spread of infectious disease, internal wars, to the, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime and terrorism. The traditional conception of security to be seen only as military and hence physical threat to state's integrity coming from outside its frontiers needs redefinition and reflection. The threats to state can originate from within having ripples felt within the state and beyond.

> To counter the diversified and complex nature of security challenges faced by states today, threats such as terrorism needs to be approached and understood at the national (that is, domestic), regional and international level. Unilateralism is not the answer to the challenge, nor can the security of one state come at the expense of insecurities of many in international system.

> Finally, it is argued that to effectively counter the terrorism, one needs to locate this phenomenon not in seclusion to other threats to security facing the world today. That is, terrorism does not happen in vacuum and its solution or way out lies in adopting a concerted and comprehensive strategy at the national and international levels.

Given this background the point of departure is, in Richard Ullman's words:

"A threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of the state or (2) threatens significantly to the narrow range of policy choices

available to the government of a state or private non-government entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state."[2]

This leads us to the part one of the paper that looks into the inconclusive and open-ended debate on the key question of what is meant by terrorism at the theoretical and practical level.

Part One: Debate on What Terrorism Means Continues

Although, the international community remains divided on a universal definition of what is meant by terrorism, yet it remains committed to confront it through variety of means and ends. To quote Bruce Hoffman.[3]

"In the post 9/11 environment, terrorism's power to coerce and intimidate, to force changes in our normal behavior, and to influence our policies and affect how and on what we spend money has, increased enormously."[4]

According to literal meaning, the word terror means extreme fear and thus terrorism implies the act of violence to instill fear and influence unarmed target, which may be a government, particular group, or a particular individual. Terrorism can be defined "as an act or threat of violence against non-combatants with the objective of exacting revenge, intimidating or otherwise influencing an audience."[5] Who carries acts of terrorism? Is it non-state groups or state or government? This remains a matter of debate both for academics and policy-makers.

After 9/11, most analysts assess terrorism as transnational theater of non-state actors - a threat inter-connected to the organized crime, proliferation, non-legal financial transactions, diverse world views, plus ever-widening gap between "have and have-nots". Globalization, the increased interconnectivity between people and nations – have added a new dimension to the terrorist threat. In words of an eminent specialist on terrorism, Rohan Gunaratna:

"The current and emerging threat is from networked terrorism - groups that recruit in one theatre, train in another, and

strike in third. By harnessing the forces of globalization, post Cold War terrorist groups have evolved from rag-tag groups to sophisticated multidimensional groups. In addition to attacks against civilians (terrorism), soldiers (guerrilla warfare), infrastructure (sabotage), ethnic and religious cleansing, terrorists contest elections and invest in businesses"[6]

International terrorism that ushered with the 9/11 WTC incident revealed the inability of the international institutions and States to keep pace with the changes in the nature of threats. The impact was not confined to the United States alone, and meant more than a physical and human loss[7]. On the one hand it reflected a strong message of discontent with the present international system and a complete disregard of international institutions such as United Nations to resolve difference of perceptions. On the other hand, the need to have a coordinated and comprehensive response to tackle the ever-changing face of terrorism is more urgent than ever before.

In other words, the need to have a broader vision of security and formulating an adequate counter-terrorism strategy has become one of the most difficult and at the same time most intensely debated and critical policy issue. This leads us to the second part of the paper that synthesis the debate on countering the threat of terrorism after 9/11 within the international academic and policymaking communities as Behavioral versus Structural.

**Part Two: How to Counter International Terrorism –
Behavioral versus Structural Approaches**

Countering the threat of terrorism is an open ended challenge, and defies universal formula. Discourse on counter-terrorism is replete with the various definitional and operational tracks to the phenomenon of terrorism, ranging from military strategies (targeting leaders, the annihilation of groups), diplomatic negotiations (international facilitation, and mediation), political bargaining (power sharing, enhanced cultural and linguistic autonomy), and, sometimes a dialogue that may involve giving in to the demands of terrorists (for example, incases of Hijacking, Kidnapping and so on). For the purpose of academic analysis of the

debate on how to counter a diversified and transnational nature of threat of terrorism facing all states, one can locate it under two broad umbrellas: Behavioral versus Structural.

This leads one to underscore that there exists a theoretical and practical gap on setting a way out of the terrorism carnage both in the academic writings and policy pronouncements (that lead to policy adoption) of the global actors. That is, how one defines a problem determines how one is set about to find a solution to it.

Behavioral Approach. This approach defines the violent events (such as, 9/11 WTC incident) as anomalous to the international system and the perpetrators as irrational, abnormal or deviant radicals, religious fanatics or political ideologues. Thus a response and solution to such events require nothing less than a total military campaign. Why, because the groups that perpetrate such mega crisis are not worth talking to, as they understand only the language of force and not dialogue. One can locate number of statements given by dominant world players from time to time under this line of thinking.

The United States and its allies have embraced the Behavioral approach and thus have embarked on an open-ended campaign against the terrorism. At times this has materialized into an international campaign with the United Nations blessing as was the case of military campaign against Afghanistan (2002). While at other times, pursuit of unilateralism or action of few powerful nations is suggested as a remedy. To quote President George Bush:

"Make no mistake, the United States will hunt down and punish those responsible."[8]

Similarly, United Kingdom Prime Minister Anthony Blair a staunch ally of the United States observes:

"This terrorism is the new evil in our world today. It is perpetrated by fanatics who are utterly indifferent to the sanctity of human life…. We, like them (the US), will not rest until this evil is driven from our world".[9]

Taking a slightly different line that calls for military action along with the international consensus, Russian President Vladimir Putin states:

"There is no doubt that such inhuman actions cannot be left unpunished. The whole international community must rally in the fight against terrorism".[10]

Structural Approach, in contrast the Behavioral approach, focus on the asymmetric international environment, genuine grievances including exploitation of rich and powerful nations of the poor and under developed nations, and feeling of alienation and humiliation suffered by the "left behind" actors, nations or states. As a result, structural approach translates the events of violence, as a product or reflection of a deeper malaise that is part and parcel of the present international system. Thus to counter the challenge of contemporary terrorism, long-term changes in the rules, structures and processes of international system is proposed. The preferred strategy of dealing with the terrorist groups is an understanding the root causes of their collective grievances and initiate a dialogue that may involve policy changes. Most of the developing world leaders have largely embraced the structural point of view and reject the force as an answer to the contemporary face of terrorism.

Similarly, academics and experts working on security issues continue to stress the need to move beyond the rhetoric of force and understand the factors that trigger terrorist incidents. Bruce Hoffman stresses the importance of understanding the aims and goals that terrorists pursue as a way to counter their moves in future. That is, "all terrorists have goals....effort to understand how they think in order to anticipate their next move; we need a new theory of what terrorist want".[11]

Like Wise, Jessica Stern Observes

"….. The War we are waging is ineffective. This much is certain: If we hope to stop terrorism, we need to understand what motivates those who perpetrate it……… Thread that connect all terrorist mind is the feeling of humiliation".[12]

Another interesting observation is made by Dr Robert Bowman, USAF retired veteran, in open letter to the US President Bush in April 2002:

"We are not hated because we practice democracy, freedom, and human rights. We are hated because our government denies these things to people in third-world countries whose resources are coveted by our multinational corporations. And that hatred we have sown has come back to haunt us in form of terrorism and, in the future, nuclear terrorism. Once the truth about why the threat exists is understood, the solution becomes obvious. We must change our government's ways".[13]

At this juncture the question is, can one relate and apply the above sketched two broad strands of international discourse on countering the threat of terrorism to the security imperatives of Pakistan after 9/11?

Part Three: Pakistan Countering the Threat of Terrorism

Post 9/11 – A Mixed Picture

Two parallel images of Pakistan following its decision for "unstinted support[14]" to the US in the Global War on Terror are: "Global partner and front-line state", and, "Troubled – with parts of it remaining a nursery for future and present militants". How to cope with the twin challenge of putting one's house in order plus redefining geo-strategic relationships at the bilateral, regional, and global levels – have set in motion a journey into "uncharted path"!

Three years on its decision to rethink and redefine its national priorities[15], the blurring of distinction or fire wall between external and internal security dimension is a well recognized fact both at the policymaking and academic level. The President of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf statements resonate this line of thinking from time to time:

"The country does not face any threat from outside. We should be concerned with the threat from within, posed by the

extremists. It is this threat that we should be more concerned with...... We all have to play our role to eliminate the hatred from the society".[16]

Pakistan's response to the challenge of terrorism is an ongoing and uphill task and oscillates between the "behavioral" and "structural" approaches, discussed overleaf. President Musharraf adopting a structural approach in line with the majority of leaders of the developing world observed at the United Nations General Assembly ministerial meeting observed:

"Anti terror responses must be accompanied by a "clear, long term strategy, striking at the root of the problem if we are to ensure final success against this scourge...... what we are doing is insufficient to win the ultimate war against them".[17]

Explaining the country's efforts to counter the threat of terrorism at the internal and external levels President Musharraf maintained:

"I see the war on terror in two dimensions..... The first dimension is its immediate one that is on fighting terror heads-on militarily. And then there is the strategic long term dimension that is getting at the core of what creates terrorists, an extremist, militant environment which then leads onto terrorism.... That is the resolution of political disputes".[18]

The policies being pursued by the government are a mix and match of military and non-military means. The aim is to create a "moderate and economically prosperous" state at peace within and outside. How far this aim is accomplished is too early to predict, as the problems that are part and parcel of homegrown extremism are the result of earlier state policies of neglect (economic, educational, social harmony, political) and turning a blind eye to the domestic terrorism as merely a law and order issue;

The military campaign launched by Pakistan Army in its Tribal Areas known as FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas)[19] is a matter of debate and concern both for the government

and people at large. The military has justified the actions as essential to get rid of remaining AL-Qaeda elements that fled Afghanistan following US military campaign and are being sheltered and treated as "guest" by the local tribesmen sympathetic to the "Al-Qaeda cause".[20]

The policy being pursued by the government can be termed as "carrot and stick", that is a combination of military operations, political pressure, "policy of amnesty"[21], economic sanctions and initiation of development projects[22] relating to building of infrastructure (roads, bridges, communication network), educational, social, and political. To quote ISPR Director General Major Shaukat Sultan, "the government adopted both direct and indirect strategies to flush out militants from South Waziristan. When Tribal Jirgas, Lashkars, and other tactics failed then the government opted for the military action".[23]

The present scenario in FATA reflects a mixed picture, which reaffirms a proposition of the paper that terrorism does not happen in vacuum and thus necessitates a solution that is concerted and comprehensive in aims and means. Along with the military tactics, reform at the structural level is essential. This in turn calls for a sustained effort to rid the country of the militarist mindset being promoted by the sectarian outfits and Madrassas and promote a social order based on peaceful co-existence and mutual harmony.

Conclusion: A Pathway Out of Terrorism – A sustained and Concerted Approach at Global and National Levels

What emerges from the foregoing discussion on countering the threat of terrorism at the international and national levels is the absence of a universal recipe to deal with the challenge of present and future – an ever changing face of international terrorism!

The following points can be regarded as a way forward or plausible recommendation:

> ➤ The definitional enterprise of international terrorism has become more complex given the diversity of global

security threats stretching from violence and war within states to the spread and possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons, and transnational organized crime. That is, "Today's threats recognize no national boundaries, are connected, and must be addressed at the global and regional level as well as national levels.....we all share responsibility for each other's security .... Mutual recognition of threats to human and state security calls for broad perspective on security".[24]

➢ The problem of countering terrorism requires a middle path in between the Behavioral and Structural arguments discussed earlier. While first position prescribes armed/military confrontation the later advocates dialogue, or at the very least, a combination of peaceful and forceful methods.

➢ The challenge for the international community as well as national governments is to register and adjust the behaviorist concern with the structuralist aspirations and visions of a free, fair and just world. This in turn requires, a holistic approach to the international security as well as national security.

➢ The international (as well as national) security is indivisible from the economic development and human freedom. Thus to counter the threat of terrorism, a concerted, sustained, and proactive/preventive approach should be aimed at.

➢ Weak states are vulnerable grounds (or sanctuary) for terrorist group's recruitment, indoctrination, and transit for staging actions in other parts of the world. Plus a victim of terrorist group operations, if the government in place is against terrorist regional/global agenda.

➢ In nutshell, military option can be a part of the overall strategy that essentially incorporates the political, economical, and educational elements in its fold. The military option is a short-term fix and may lead to opening of new avenues for international terrorist organizations. A long-term approach to counter terrorism requires multi-pronged and a multi-national approach.

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> The traditional elements of state power needs to be complemented by the non-traditional aspects of security – a vibrant civic and political community, economic stability, and moderate educational and religious institutions – a way out of terrorism carnage!

End Notes

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[2] Richard Ullman, "Redefining Security", *International Security*, Vol. 8 (Summer 1983), pp: 129; 133 – 135.

[3] Bruce Hoffman is a leading academic authority on Terrorism, these days associated with the RAND (USA).

[4] Http: //www.globalagendamagazine.com/2004/brucehoffman.asp

[5] For a detailed analysis see Jessica Stern, *The Ultimate Terrorists,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 11 – 30.

[6] Rohan Gunaratna, "International Terrorism: What Kinds of Response?" Http: //www.un-globalsecurity.org/index.asp

[7] According to the World Bank estimates," 9/11 2001 attacks alone increased the number of people living poverty by 10 million; the total cost to the world economy probably exceeded 80 billion dollars. These numbers would be far surpassed by an incident involving nuclear terrorism". Http: //www.worldbank.org

[8] Quoted in, Paul Medhurst, *Global Terrorism,* New York: United Nations Institute For Training and Research, 2002, p: 357.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid

[11] Bruce Hoffman, op.cit.

[12] Jessica Stern, "Militant Groups: Beneath Bomb and Bombs, a Cauldron of Humiliation", *Los AnglesTimes Opinion,* 06 June 2004.

13. Quoted in, Paul Medhusrt, *Global Terrorism,* op.cit, p: 358.

14. Pakistan's President General Pervaz Musharraf on September 19, 2001, in a public address to the nation proffered five reasons for choosing to offer "unstinted cooperation":

  ➢ Secure Pakistan's strategic assets
  ➢ Safeguard the cause of Kashmir
  ➢ Prevent Pakistan from being declared a terrorist state
  ➢ Prevent an anti-Pakistan government from coming to power in Kabul
  ➢ Have Pakistan re-emerge politically as a responsible and dignified nation
  Http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/Sep-2003/main/top5.asp

15. "…. At this juncture I am worried about Pakistan only….. I give top priority to the defense of Pakistan….Defense of any other country comes later"
President Musharraf address to the nation, quoted in, *The News,* September 20, 2001.

16. Quoted in, *The News,* December 19, 2004.

17. President Pervaz Musharraf, address to the U.N. General Assembly's Ministerial Meeting, 23 September, 2004.
Http://www.spitimes.com/2004/09/23/Worldand nation/Leaders_to_UN_Atteck.shtml

18. President Musharraf comments to the reporters following a meeting with the British PM Tony Blair, December 2004, London. Http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/Europe/12/06/musharraf.london/

19. Note:
FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan) consist of seven Tribal Agencies and six smaller Frontier Regions, strung along a slightly oblique north-south axis. FATA shares a border with the Afghanistan, officially known as the Durand Line – porous in nature. The terrain spread over an area of 27000 square kilometers and home to three and a half million people, is primarily a semi-arid mountainous region.
Article – 1 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan treats FATA as a separate entity, to be administered by the Federal Government as prescribed in Article – 247 of the Constitution. Accordingly, FATA is outside the executive authority of the NWFP (North West Frontier Province) and the Governor, NWFP, in his capacity as an Agent to the President, regulates its affairs. No Act of Legislature extends to FATA unless approved by the President and the jurisdiction of the superior Courts is very limited in its applicability to the matters relating to the region. The Political Agent in an Agency and the Assistant Political Agent in a Frontier Region represents the Government and embodies the executive writ of the Federation of Pakistan.

20. For a authoritative account on Al-Qaeda's Organization, Ideology and Strategy, see, Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al-Qaeda,* New York: Columbia University Press, 2002

21. The Governor of NWFP acting as agent of the President of Pakistan, in December 2003, announced Amnesty for the foreigners who would surrender to the Government and not act or be involved in terrorist activities within Pakistan or across border, can continue to live in the Agency as per Riwaj and Tradition as Hamsaya. This was followed by the famous "Shikai Agreement" in which major harbourers were given amnesty; following its failure in June 2004 a major military operation was launched in Shikai Valley. Similar agreements were being made with the tribes in Wana also.

22. "The Government has increased budgetary allocations for FATA from about 1 billion rupees in 2000-2001 to almost Rs. 6 billion for the current financial years. Donor Agencies would be contributing an additional sum of Rs. 1.78 billion for various projects". This was stated by the Governor, NWFP, addressing a national seminar on "Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Challenges and Responses", organized by IPRI, September 7, 2004, Islamabad.

23. Quoted in, DAWN, December 9, 2004.

24. The United Nations Report, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, The United Nations, December 2, 2004.

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CHANGING DYNAMICS OF CENTRE - PROVINCES RELATIONS

Shafqat Mahmood

Introduction

It is important to acknowledge that Centre province relations are once again passing through a difficult period. While this is not entirely unusual, a new dynamic has entered the equation. Many of the disaffected groups in the smaller provinces are now resorting to terrorism. This is particularly visible in Baluchistan and the tribal areas but occasional violent acts in Sindh have also been seen. This factor complicates an already complex picture. Not only political issues have to be resolved with sagacity and determination but the factor of terrorism has also to be concurrently addressed.

Another aspect not entirely new has assumed greater significance in the recent past. This is the perception in the smaller provinces that Punjab and the Centre are different sides of the same coin. There always was a Punjab factor in centre province relations but with shortage of irrigation water becoming a major issue in Sindh and parts of Baluchistan, this aspect has assumed greater significance. Any resolution to the issues between the centre and provinces would have to include an arrangement that removes this feeling of Punjab domination.

There are some common issues common to all provinces and solutions have to be found that will impact everybody. Yet, there are some issues that are specific to a particular province and answers will have to be found that satisfy specific needs. It is with this in mind that problems in each province other than Punjab are discussed separately so that local issues are highlighted leading to a solution.

Baluchistan

There is simmering unrest in Baluchistan with Baluch nationalist deeply suspicious of the Federal government. They believe that the centre is only interesting in exploiting the resources

of the province without giving anything substantial in return. There is also a fear that the centre is trying to change the demography of the province by bringing non Baluchis to Baluchistan in large numbers.

It is in this context that something seemingly good as the development of Gwadar is looked at with suspicion. In a newspaper interview the Baluch leader, Ataullah Mengal, has openly voiced the concern that development of Gwadar will lead to a large influx of non Baluchis which will change the demographic balance in the province. His main concern is political; that with the increase in non Baluch population the power balance in the province will change. He obviously has in mind the Sindh situation where the influx of immigrants from India changed the dynamics of political power in the province.

There is no obvious solution to this problem. If the province has to develop people will have to brought in from outside. Once a certain person has started to live there, he or she cannot be denied civic or political rights. The concern of the Baluch nationalist leaders while not without foundation has no obvious solution.

The perception that Centre is exploiting natural resources of the province is focused on mineral resources, in particular mining of gas reserves. There is a feeling that the indigenous population has not been suitably compensated for something taken out form its area. This has led to acts of terrorism particularly in the Bugti area. While rocket attacks on gas installations around Sui are part of an elaborate blackmail attempt by a tribal leader to extort more money from the Federal government, it is not seen by Baluch nationalists in this light. They see it wrongly as some kind of armed struggle against exploitation of the province. So far this may be a fringe opinion of some extremists but the trend is disturbing and must be seen as a threat to the federation.

This perception can only be countered if sufficient funds are made available for development. So far some money has been handed over to the Sardars but this has obviously not filtered down to common people.

It is instructive that the centre's desire to build military cantonments in the province has evoked such an angry response. The nationalists see them, wrongly in my opinion, as part of plan to subjugate them. Whatever truth, perceptions are more important than reality and there is much that the centre has to do change this perception in a positive direction.

Sindh

The grievances in Sindh are largely political but now the shortage of irrigation water has created a tangible and potent cause of unrest. The political reasons are simple. The centre since the time of Zia has targeted the political leadership of Sindh and tried to eliminate it physically or politically. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the undisputed and wildly popular leader of Sindh was hanged, inflicting a deadly wound on the psyche of the people of Sindh. His daughter, Benazir Bhutto may have many faults but has been treated more harshly than others accused of similar complaints. Her husband has only now been bailed out after eight years in jail. Interestingly, he has already served whatever sentence would have been given to him if convicted of corruption.

There is heavy central interference in the politics of Sindh province. Again and again after elections PPP majorities in Sindh have been forcibly turned into minorities. The latest example being the 2002 election where the PPP once again emerged as single largest party in the country and yet was not only denied a role in the centre but was also forcibly kept out of the government in Sindh.

There is a widespread perception in rural Sindh that the centre in cahoots with an ethnic party has decided to permanently deny a place at the top to its real leadership. This perception started in the later seventies and has strengthened over a period of time. We are now hearing reports that some kind of dialogue is taking place between the government and the PPP. Let us hope it leads to a positive conclusion.

The country has been in the grip of drought for the last many years. This has meant that there is an overall shortage of water. This

requires careful water management and the shortage has to be shared equally by everyone. Yet the people of Sindh believe that their share of the water has been given by the centre to Punjab. This is factually wrong but it is a perception that exists widely. The political grievance of Sindh has now been given a tangible substance in the shape of this problem. For the first time ever, we have heard of some attempts at blowing electricity pylons etc in rural Sindh. This is not a major problem as yet but one can only hope that it is not a precursor of things to come.

A great deal needs to be done to clarify this erroneous perception. No real attempt has been made to reach out to the people in Sindh and tell them the real story. People and resources must be committed to this task.

NWFP

The NWFP considers itself a senior partner in the management of the Federation, so its grievances are limited yet on the jobs issue and certainly on the matter of Kalabagh dam, there is a deep suspicion of the Federal government. There is also a feeling among some elements that the centre is always keen to suppress genuine Pakhtun identity. In this context the issue of renaming NWFP keeps cropping up again and again. It is rightly said that if other provinces can have names suggesting linguistic or ethnic identity why shouldn't the frontier. There is no reason for the Centre to be difficult on this issue and an alternate name should be considered.

The fighting currently going on the tribal areas of the frontier is not essentially an issue of centre province relations because the people being targeted are terrorists. Yet, this issue has the potential of destabilising the entire province. Already we are starting to see some incidents of terrorism in places outside the tribal areas, such as Hangu, and this may spread to other places.

There is also the danger that as the casualties among the local people mounts, it has the potential to become a centre/ tribal area issue and by extension a centre Pakhtun issue. The battle

against foreign extremists using our territory for their purposes and their local partners must be fought but force has to be matched with political action. The casualties to our armed forces are mounting by the day. We must find a way to isolate the locals from the foreign extremists and bring this matter to a swift conclusion.

The issue of Kalabagh Dam has simmered for a long time. With water scarcity a genuine and frightening prospect, the necessity for new water reservoirs has assumed greater significance. The easiest to start is the Kalabagh dam, because a fair amount of preparatory work has already been done. However it is going to lead to a very negative reaction in NWFP and Sindh. One way out is to find other places to create water reservoirs. Some options in this connection have been mentioned and need to be explored. In any case, Kalabagh Dam has become such a politically sensitive issue that its negatives far outweigh the positives.

I am not going to refer to problems in Northern Areas and Azad Kashmir because this would be beyond the scope of this paper but it must be kept in mind that all is not well there either. Particularly the people in the Northern areas feel disenfranchised and something must be done to bring them into the mainstream of the country.

Common Issues

I have described the factual position of the situation on the ground. Some of these issues are a problem of perception. Others are political. Some people will argue that problems are also created by a faulty constitutional arrangement governing the relations between the centre and the provinces. Leaders of an organization called PONM have called for a new constitution because they don't accept the quantum of provincial autonomy in the current one. Do we need a new constitutional arrangement to govern the relationship between the centre and the provinces?

Constitutional Issues

In my opinion the quantum of provincial autonomy envisaged in the 1973 constitution is adequate. We have seen in the past that when there have been governments of different parties in the centre and the province, provincial governments were able to resist central encroachment and bullying. An example would be Nawaz Sharif government in the Punjab and PPP in the centre during the period 1988 to 1990. Same was the situation in Baluchistan where Akbar Bugti's government was able to resist the centre.

In one respect changes can be made to make the provinces feel more secure. The 1973 constitution provides for a Federal list, a concurrent list and the residue left to the provinces. It is about time that the concurrent list was done away with. There are 59 items in part one of the federal list and eight more in part two of the federal list. This is and should be enough.

As regards the concurrent list, there are 47 items in it and there is no reason why they should remain with the federation. For example what business is it of the federation to legislate on mechanically propelled vehicles or welfare of labour or trade unions? Provinces are fully competent to handle this and all other matters mentioned in this list.

Shared responsibility in these matters can lead to unnecessary bickering. The council of common interest envisaged under article 153 of the constitution to mediate disputes has failed to perform its function basically because the federal executive authorities have never considered it necessary to invoke this council. Therefore the only solution is to do away with concurrent jurisdiction. I may add that this was also envisaged by the original framers of the constitution.

Revenue Sharing

Another matter that has created a bad blood between the Centre and the provinces and also between the provinces is the

question of sharing revenues. The agency envisaged in the constitution to be a problem solver on this matter has become a problem. The national finance commission created under article 160 of the constitution has not been able to adequately address the needs of the provinces.

The 1990 NFC award envisaged a distribution of net proceeds of income and sales tax plus some other duties according to a formula of 20 percent for the federation and the remaining 80 percent to be distributed between the provinces on a population basis. This distribution formula was changed in the 1996 award by adding some more taxes. Now the federation keeps 62.5 percent and the remaining 37.5 is distributed to the provinces. According to one estimate this has deprived the provinces of at least 50 billion annually in revenue.

The latest National Finance Commission has been meeting for over a year now and has not been able to come up with a satisfactory award, despite the fact that the centre is in a position to force its will. There are such intractable issues involved that the matter keeps getting postponed.

There are some other revenue and planning matters in which the federation acts to restrict provincial autonomy envisaged in the constitution. Additional taxation measures are often called surcharges to deny provincial share. This is obviously resented by the provinces. Provincial projects of 100 million and above are also subject to federal approval. These are surreptitious violations of the constitution on the part of the centre.

The point being made above is that the quantum of provincial autonomy envisaged in the 1973 constitution is adequate with some modifications. It is the practice that has militated against the spirit of the constitution and hurt the feelings of the provinces.

Share in Services

Similar is the story regarding share in the services. Although a provincial quota has existed for a long time, Baluchistan

particularly and to some extent rural Sindh has always complained of lower representation. Obviously this is an issue or a perception that has to be aggressively countered. If indeed there are certain shortages of some provinces in federal services, they need to be made up. If everyone quota has already been met, then this message has to be effectively delivered through the media.

Water Issues

The issue of new dams must be brought before the council of common interest. There is little doubt that we are facing a huge water crisis in the years to come. Unless new reservoirs are made, agriculture in the country potentially faces irreversible damage. This must be resolved in such a way that everybody is reasonably satisfied. Let me say again. Kalabagh or other dams are not a Punjab issue but a national issue. Blaming Punjab for it may serve political interests but is factually wrong.

Problems between Punjab and Smaller Provinces

One reason Punjab gets so much flak is because Army has ruled the country for so long. Army rule in the eyes of the people of smaller provinces translates into Punjabi rule because our armed forces are overwhelmingly Punjabi. This has created a great deal of hatred against Punjab. The only solution of course is that army should not intervene and take over the country. But, this is easier said than done.

Now I come to a slightly tricky matter. Since Punjab is considered by other provinces to be overbearing and domineering, it has been proposed that some new provinces must be carved out of it. This proposal has been around for a long time but has always been shelved because fears of political backlash. It is time that this should be revisited.

It is easy to divide Punjab into three provinces on linguistic basis. Saraiki speaking areas in southern Punjab can be one province, central Punjab the second and Northern Punjab or potohar

the third. If this is done, in one go, many of the perceptual problems of smaller problems against Punjab can be done away with.

Conclusion

Centre province issue is *the* most important domestic issue facing the country. There are some genuine grievances of the provinces and others that relate to negative perception. It is fundamentally important to tackle both issues on a priority basis. These issues must be accorded the right kind of attention. Their neglect has led the situation go from bad to worse. This paradigm has to be changed if we have to go forward as a nation.

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THE CHALLENGES OF HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN

Dr. Nasim Ashraf

Abstract

This paper explores the challenges posed in the area of human development in Pakistan. Pakistan has made little progress in key indicators of human development - education and health - due to years of neglect in policy making and implementation issues. Based on available data, it is highlighted that despite achieving a respectable growth rate, Pakistan has not been able to reduce poverty as other nations have (with similar or even lower levels of GDP per capita). Poor human development has also hampered economic growth.

The paper brings out the principal challenges of human resource development in Pakistan, which are mainly the untrained, unskilled and uneducated workforce with low productivity perpetuated by rising population, which is unsuited to the demands of globalization and the 'new' economy. Finally, the paper discusses the integrated approach adopted by the government which is likely to improve the human resources and make poverty alleviation a reality in Pakistan.

KEY WORDS: human resource; human development; poverty; Pakistan

INTRODUCTION

Human resource is a combination of the *education, training and motivation embodied in people.* Human resource development is the primary factor that influences the direction and pace of socio-economic development in any country. The real wealth of a country is its human capital – its people. Without creating the critical mass of a qualitative human resource, a country cannot sustain a high growth rate. It is the quality of education that enables a country to make full use of its manpower for development.

Human development is simply **"a process of enlarging people's choices**[1]**"** and aims at creating an environment in which people can utilize their potential to the maximum and become more productive.

Nexus between Human Development and Security

It is important to note that human security is directly linked with human development[2]. Progress in one area enhances the chances of progress in the other. But failure in one area also heightens the risk of failure in the other. Marginalized or limited human development leads to a backlog of human deprivation – poverty, hunger, disease or persisting disparities between ethnic communities or between regions, leading to security issues in a given country.

Human development paradigm, as developed by the late Dr. Mahbubul Haq, an eminent Pakistani social scientist, is concerned not only with *building human capabilities through investment in education and health, it is also concerned with using those capabilities fully through an enabling framework for growth and employment.* The human development model regards economic growth as essential, but pays equal attention to its quality and distribution, its link to human lives and to its sustainability[3].

According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), human development means to give people access to the resources essential for a decent standard of living and participating in communal life and particularly in making decisions that affect them[4]. *Human development is thus, about making individuals, as productive economic agents and empowering them.*

It is measured by the Human Development Index (HDI) developed by UNDP. A score of 1 is perfect while lower scores reflect lesser level of human development.
Human Development Index (HDI) is a measure of socio-economic progress, and includes:

> ➢ Longevity: as measured by life expectancy at birth

> ➤ Knowledge: measured by adult literacy (2/3) and combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrollment (1/3).
> ➤ Income: measured by current global average real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) dollars.

Current Situation of Human Development in Pakistan

Although, human resources are of great importance for a poor country like Pakistan, unfortunately, the nation faces a crisis in human development, which is evident from the annual reports of UNDP on Human Development. Pakistan HDI ranking is very low - 142 out of 175 countries according to *Human Development Report 2004* - depicting the poor level of human development in the country (see Figure 1 below).

Figure 1: HDI Comparison

Source: *Human Development Report* 2004 – UNDP

A high GDP does not necessarily mean a high degree of human development which is indicated below by a comparison of selected countries showing their standing on HDI, including Pakistan (Figure 2).

Figure: No.2: HDI vs. GDP per capita

Source: SAARC Human Resource Development Center 2002

Vietnam has been able to decrease poverty by one half between 1990-2000 because of its relatively higher investments in female literacy and basic health care (see Figure 3 below).

Figure 3: Comparison of Human Development Indicators: Vietnam vs. Pakistan

	Income (US $)	Women aged 20-24 who have not completed primary education %	Gender Gap	Female illiteracy (%)	Child Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births)	Maternal Mortality Rate (per 100,000 live births)
Pakistan (1995)	500	0	0	0	20	100
	400	20			45	160
Vietnam (1995)	112	74	33	74	127	340
	0	100	50	100	150	400

Source: UNESCO Report (2001)

Margalla Papers 2005

In the context of South Asia, Pakistan has the lowest net enrollment rates in the region according to the UNDP *Human Development Report* (see below).

Figure 4: Net Primary Enrollment Rate (%)
Regional Comparison

Country	Rate
Maldives	99.0%
Sri Lanka	97.0%
Vietnam	95.0%
Bangladesh	89.0%
Nepal	72.0%
Pakistan	66.0%

World Average	**84 %**
South Asia Average	**79 %**

Source: *Human Development Report 2004 - UNDP*

Pakistan has the highest rate of infant and under-5 child mortality in the region, according to *Human Development Report* (see below).

Figure 5: Infant Mortality Rate (Deaths per 1,000 Live Births) Comparison

Country	Value
Sri Lanka	17
Vietnam	30
Bangladesh	51
Maldives	58
Sudan	65
Nepal	66
India	67
Bhutan	74
Pakistan	83

Source: *Human Development Report 2004 - UNDP*

This persistent under-achievement in access to health and education is in part attributable to the exclusion of significant segments of society from access to development benefits. This low standing in human development needs to be redressed in view of the nation's commitments.

The Millennium Development Goals

Pakistan is a signatory to the UN Millennium Declaration 2000, which set targets called **The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)** -- such as achieving Universal Primary Education, reduce child mortality and improve maternal health -- that obligate the country to making all-out efforts to promote human dignity, and reduce poverty in half by 2015, both of which are linked to human development.

It has been shown through research that initiatives in health and education can play an important role in alleviating poverty and accelerating GDP growth, in addition to enhancing the human development resource of a country. Paul Streeten[5] et al. have shown in an important study of eighty countries that improvements in literacy have made a considerable contribution to growth. Similarly, improved hygiene, sanitation, and preventive health care can lead to reduced frequency of disease, reduced cost of medical treatment and increased productivity and incomes of poor households.

Challenges of HRD in Pakistan

Pakistan faces numerous HRD challenges, which are described below:

1) Low Education Attainment Level

According to official sources, the current literacy rate in Pakistan is 54.0 per cent (see Table 1 below).

Table 1: Literacy Rate (%) vs. Population Growth (%)

Year	Literacy Rate Population Growth*	Change by Percent-age Point	
1996	40.9	1.3	2.47
1997	42.2	1.3	2.45
1998	43.6	1.4	2.42
1999	45.0	1.4	2.34
2000	47.1	2.1	3.40
2001	49.0	1.9	2.06
2002	50.5	1.5	2.00
2003	51.6	1.1	1.94
2004	**54.0**	**1.5**	**1.90**

Source: *Pakistan Economic Survey* 2003-04, p.123; (* fiscal year)

The educational challenges facing Pakistan are huge (see below) starting with primary education (Classes 1-5), which lays the foundation for the subsequent stages of education. Although the nation's gross primary school enrolment rate has gone up to 83 per cent (2001) against the target of 100% enrolment[6], almost 50 per cent of the children who enrol drop out before completing the primary cycle; only about 17 per cent of primary school graduates enrol for secondary education; less than 2 per cent of the relevant age group enrols for technical and vocational training; and there are huge gender gaps at all levels of education.

Causes of Poor Education Indicators in Pakistan[7]

- ➤ The quality of education provided by government schools has been dismal and continues to deteriorate;
- ➤ Enrollment in these schools continues to fall due to outdated curriculum and textbooks, damaged buildings, and absent teachers;
- ➤ High opportunity cost in the form of loss of income, distance to school, and safety concerns further

discourages parents from sending their children to school.

There is no mechanism at the provincial level for addressing universal primary education (UPE) completion, i.e. to increase enrollment; decrease dropout and improve quality education in Classes I-V; especially the most important area of early childhood learning.

Less than 1% of education resources are allocated to projects promoting adult literacy[8], an indication of the neglect of this key target group (15-49). High illiteracy among rural women creates a shortage of available teachers for primary schools, further affecting the quality and output of primary school education.

Therefore, unless UPE and adult literacy is ensured quickly through a concerted national education campaign, particularly for women, the government's target of 86 per cent literacy may not be achieved by 2015.

2) Low Health Coverage

Health is key development indicator of a country. Unfortunately, the poor state of health sector in Pakistan perpetuates poverty as unhealthy citizens cannot perform at an optimal level of efficiency and cannot contribute effectively to economic development. The nation pays a heavy economic cost for this deprivation, as the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) Survey 2001 shows that almost 90 working days are lost in illness in poor households.[9] This is evident from the following table (see Table 2 below).

Table 2: Pakistan Health Indicators compared with the Region[10]

Indicators	Pakistan	India	Bangladesh	Bhutan	Maldives	Nepal	Sri Lanka
Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000 live births)	82	67	51	74	58	66	17

Maternal Mortality Ratio (per 100,000 live births)	350	407	230	255	160	415	59.6
Children with low weight-for-age %	37	47	47.7	18.7	30	48.3	8.5
Low Birth Weight Newborns %	37	23	19.5	15.1	17.6	23.2	16.7
Physicians Per 10,000 Population	7.3	5.6	2.5	1.7	8.4	1.6	3.7
Hospital Beds per 10,000 Population	6.8	6.9	3.4	16	17.4	1.5	29
Total Life Expectancy at Birth (years)	63.4	61	62.6	61.3	66.1	60	70.3

Source: World Health Organization *Basic Indicators*

3) Exclusion of people due to rising poverty and unemployment

There is a reciprocal relationship between poverty and human development. Lack of health and education reduces people's productive capacity which curtails their employability and earning power thus, increasing their poverty. On the other hand, poverty makes it difficult for the people to have access to health and education and thus restricts their development not only as economic agents, but also as responsible citizens.

Although the country has achieved a very healthy economic growth recently with 6.4 per cent growth rate recorded during 2003-04[11], poverty continues to pose serious challenges. This is evident from high unemployment and poverty levels. According to the *Pakistan Economic Survey 2003-04*, the unemployment rate in

Pakistan has increased from 5.3 per cent in 1995 to 8.2 per cent in 2004.

In order to reduce the poverty level to half, as per one of the key Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), major efforts will be needed to take the poor households in Pakistan above the poverty line through focused socioeconomic pro-poor policies.

4) Lack of Planning and need to learn from International Best Practices

Pakistan never had a coherent, long-term policy for educating its masses. Although, successive governments had made the achievement of universal primary education a priority in each five-year plan, there remained a huge gap between planning rhetoric and actual implementation. Similarly, adult literacy has not been a priority of successive governments, yielding an increased level of illiterate population in the country.

During the first five-year plan period (1955-60), the number of illiterate adults was 20.9 million, and 5.9 million children were out of school. By the time the 8th five-year plan (1993-98) was put forward, there were 50.8 million illiterate adults and 9.6 million out of school children.[12]

Pakistan must learn from the best practices of developing countries which have adopted successful models of human development, especially in maternal care, poverty alleviation, education and population planning. Pakistan, with a sustained political will, should implement a coherent integrated plan to improve its HDI on a war footing.

5) Inadequate and non-optimal utilization of budgetary allocations

The low budgetary allocations for education and health over the last 50 years are also significantly responsible for poor human development and low social indicators of Pakistan. Education and health, to which human development is fundamentally linked, have

not received proper government attention. From 1997-98 to 2001-02, national expenditure on education has been only 1.7 per cent of the GDP[13] while the recommended allocation for developing countries is 4.5% of GDP. Despite enhanced allocations from 2000-2004, total expenditure on education and health remains far below acceptable allocations, even by the standards of Pakistan's regional neighbours.

More importantly, whatever resources that are allocated for education and health sectors, are not utilized efficiently and effectively.

6) **Rising population accentuates poverty & reduces productivity**

A high population growth rate exacerbates poverty in the country, thus affecting the already low human development profile. The following alarming figures show that[14]:

> ➢ Pakistan's population has increased five times since 1947
> ➢ 5 children are added every minute, which comes to 2.9 million per year
> ➢ Population doubling time is 37 years with a current growth rate of 1.9%
> ➢ Poverty, measured by the international standard of earning less than $1 a day, was estimated at 32.1% in 2000-01 (from 30.6 per cent in 1998-99)[15].

Research undertaken both in developed and developing countries reveals that for an increase in output, the quality of labour is more important than the quantity. Cheap and abundant labour is an advantage. However, this advantage is lost if labour is not productive. Labour in Pakistan has low productivity because human resource development (HRD) has been a low priority area in Pakistan in both public and private sectors.

With 40 per cent of children and 45 per cent of women in the child bearing age (15 to 49 years) suffering from malnutrition, not only is the health and productivity of existing population adversely

affected, but also of future pregnancy outcomes.[16] Pakistan National Human Development Report 2003 concludes that "a predominant proportion of major earners in poor households are unskilled workers engaged in low productivity and low income occupations".[17]

Thus, Pakistan needs to curb its population rate to a manageable level – close to replacement levels - for two main reasons: first, the existing backlog of deprived human lives can be catered for properly, and secondly, the growing population does not become a drag on the already meager resources and add to the huge untrained and unskilled pool of human resources.

7) **Poor Governance and Lack of Capacity at the District Level**

The sub-optimal utilization of available resources (both financial and human) and outcomes leading to the dismal human development situation in Pakistan are caused by the implementation gaps in delivery of social services (such as education and health)[17].

The key factor for implementation gaps is the lack of institutional capacity of the government line departments needed for better management of the existing educational and health institutions in a more efficient and cost effective manner, and implementing new policies and programmes that are required in these sectors in view of their new responsibilities under the Local Government Ordinance (LGO), 2001.

Thus, there is a need to facilitate the recently empowered local governments in initiating change management and capacity development in effective planning, optimal utilization of financial resources and efficient human resource management at the district and *tehsil* levels.

8) **Mismatch between education and required occupational skills**

It is widely recognized today that vocational and technical education enhances the productive capacity of individuals and leads to higher output[18]. Yet, Pakistan produces very few people with

technical skills and often these skills are inappropriate for either domestic or global markets.

Most of the plans for technical/vocational education have been conceived without due analysis of the employment situation or the changing patterns of the skills and competencies required as a consequence of changing technologies. This has resulted in an unbalanced development of various technical education levels, leading to a mismatch between the output of educational institutions and the job market.

9) Training gaps

A major human resource issue in Pakistan is the training, nurturing, and retention of technically skilled manpower. There are 29 training institutes under the ministries of commerce, industries and production run by the private sector, which are imparting training in the skills of textiles, surgical, leather, plastics and chemicals, but there is a dire need of upgrading their training outfits to bring them to global standards.

The current training gaps cannot be filled in by the public sector alone. The private sector needs to look into creative ways to improve trainings, so that the value imparted can be utilized on a sustained basis.

This includes establishing specialized training centres on priority basis in sub-sectors such as food technology, petroleum, forest products, micro industries electronic engineering, textiles, etc., with special attention given to the technical vocational schools and special science and technology schools with arrangement for greater use of practical experience.

10) Gender Bias and Inequality

Promoting gender equity and empowerment of women is one of the serious challenges for developing countries. In a conservative society like Pakistan, women face major hurdles in achieving socio-

economic progress and economic empowerment. This is clear from the current scenario of Education and Health in Pakistan:

> ➤ Female literacy rate is nearly 42 per cent while the literacy rate for men is 66%[19]; it means that nearly two women out of every three are illiterate (compared to one man out of every three men).
> ➤ About 60 mothers die each day from pregnancies and childbirths[20];
> ➤ Married women with no education stand at 75%[21].

This inequality and imbalance is partly to be blamed on the poor economic conditions of Pakistan where men are preferred over women. Consequently, more attention is given towards their educational and health needs. Unless gender equity is established, Pakistan will never attain prosperity and reduce poverty.

11) Lack of Public Private Partnerships

The consensus of development experts is that Pakistan's sustained economic growth can be achieved with emphasis on the quality of its human capital. There is a need to mobilize the entire civil society groups and development partners to achieve this overarching social development goal, through creative and efficient use of all available resources.

Although NGOs and grassroots efforts have played a major role in spreading primary education, basic healthcare and family planning services, they lack scale for maximum outreach, which exists only with the government sector. Hence, there is a need for public private partnerships for improving social sector delivery in Pakistan.

12) Brain Drain

The last decade (1994-2004) has seen an increase in the international mobility of highly skilled, talented individuals in response to the expansion of the knowledge-based economies[22]. This international movement of human capital can be identified, in

practice, as the movement of scientists, doctors, educationists, engineers, executives, and other professionals across frontiers. Since the great majority of these migrants move on a permanent basis, this brain drain represents loss of valuable human resources.

According to IMF[23], the migration rate of individuals (with tertiary education) from Pakistan to the OECD countries is more than 7.0 per cent. These figures, however, fail to take into account the sizable flow of professionals from the subcontinent to Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates and therefore, neglect an important component of the brain drain from the relevant source countries.

The government needs to adopt initiatives to reverse the brain-drain and attract trained manpower from abroad, as the implications of the brain drain are disastrous. An outflow of such strategic manpower seriously affects skill formation and creates a growth retarding effect.

13) **Paucity of highly skilled and specialized knowledge workers**

In addition to brain drain, Pakistan faces a shortage of highly skilled and specialized knowledge workers to meet the domestic requirements to compete in the knowledge-based sector. By most common indicators of skill creation, Pakistan does not perform well by regional standards[24]. According to the Harbison-Myer index[25], a classic index of skills based on school and university enrolments used by UNIDO to benchmark 87 countries, Pakistan ranks below all other South Asian economies (Table 3).

What is more worrying, Pakistan's score and its relative position have deteriorated since the mid-1980s, making it the only country in Asia in which the index declined over the 1985-1997 period.

Table 3: Harbison-Myer Index of Skills

Country	1998 (Country Ranking)	1985 (Country Ranking)
South Korea	36.1 (10)	26.8 (6)
Taiwan	27.8 (23)	22.5 (21)
Singapore	23.1(29)	14.8 (37)
Philippines	21.6 (32)	21.3 (23)
Thailand	15.6 (45)	10.8 (48)
Malaysia	11.1 (55)	9.2 (51)
Indonesia	10.4 (56)	8.3 (57)
Sri Lanka	10.1 (58)	9.1 (53)
China	9.8 (59)	5.2 (67)
India	8.1 (69)	7.1 (60)
Nepal	6.4 (71)	5.4 (66)
Bangladesh	4.3 (76)	4.0 (72)
Pakistan	4.1 (77)	4.4 (69)

Source: Lall, S. & John Wass (2004), *Industrial Competitiveness: The Challenge for Pakistan,* **Asian Development Bank Institute, p.54**

In Pakistan, science and technology sector has not been paid due attention. Only 2% of age group 18-23 is enrolled in university compared to 32% in Korea and 30% for both Japan and Germany[26]. Currently, it is estimated that Pakistan produces 50 PhDs every year[27] whereas 300 to 400 PhDs are needed in research institutes and universities[28]. In order to train high level manpower in accordance with national needs, the PhD programme at Pakistani universities needs to be strengthened. This is now being addressed by the HEC.

To achieve human resource development at an accelerated rate, knowledge-based growth must become the driving force of our development. In order to achieve this goal, we must upgrade our universities and research centres. Therefore, the government has to take a lead in facilitating the development of *higher education,* so that the universities of Pakistan reach international standards in education, research and development.

Human resource development is imperative for the local *Information Technology* (IT) industry to position the country as an important player in the international market. This is because IT has opened a new business frontier for Pakistan, as the U.S. has started outsourcing its IT needs, especially development of software and running of call centres.

A large cadre of academically and technically skilled manpower must be developed to meet both local and export needs to bridge the "digital divide"[29]. Government should assign high priority to information technology both in terms of policy and resource allocation.

The Way Forward

There is no automatic link between expanding income and promoting human welfare[30]. *A link between growth and human lives has to be created consciously through deliberate public policy*, such as public spending on social services, and fiscal policy to redistribute income and assets.

Such a deliberate and equitable public policy has been lacking in Pakistan over the last fifty years which what has led to the current state of both increased poverty and human deprivation. The current government has responded to the challenge by *integrating its Poverty Alleviation Strategy* with *National Human Resource Development Strategy*.

Currently Pakistan has aligned its development focus to the recommendations of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) that links poverty alleviation to the provision of education, health, nutrition and empowerment of women as well as to ownership of assets in rural areas by adopting the following priorities[31]:

➤ Accelerating economic growth;

➤ Improving governance and devolution;

> Investing in human capital; and,

> Targeting the poor and the vulnerable.

The salient features of this approach are the following:

1) Optimal utilization of resources

Sufficient resources must be allocated to achieve human development goals in Pakistan within a realistic and manageable timeframe. But, more importantly, whatever resources have been allocated for education and health must be used efficiently and effectively.

PRSP has earmarked high budgetary allocation for human development, with education sector getting the major share. During the year 2003-04, the education budget comprises nearly 70 percent of the total human development allocation (see Table 4 below).

Higher expenditure on education will help effectively reduce the poverty level in the country, as illiteracy is directly linked to poverty. Health care spending is another important area and the government has assigned priority with budget for the fiscal year 2003-04 being Rs 29.17 billion -- 30.4 percent higher than last year. During the year 2004-05, health expenditure will rise to nearly a quarter of all human development spending (Table 4).

Table 4: Pakistan's Human Development Related Expenditures (Rs. billion)

FY	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04*	2004-05**
Human Development (Total)	90.67	105.81	126.56	147.73
i. Education	66.29	78.61	88.84	102.38
ii. Health	19.21	22.37	29.17	36.08

iii. Population Planning	1.33	3.12	4.60	4.88
iv. Social Security & Welfare	3.66	1.30	3.68	3.90
v. Natural Calamities	0.19	0.41	0.27	0.49

Source: *Pakistan Economic Survey 2003-04*, Ministry of Finance p.47 * Budgeted, ** Projected

Economic growth is as much a process of knowledge accumulation as of capital accumulation[32]. Education must be thought of as an essential investment in national development. Therefore, Pakistan is turning its attention to all aspects of educational development. It is moving as quickly as possible towards universal primary education for both boys and girls and in all regions of the country with initiatives like National Commission for Human Development (see below).

This is being done with the help of the recently empowered local governments. The government is also proceeding with the reform of the *madressa* system by introducing a core curriculum in addition to providing religious education. Finally, the development of the tertiary education is also being addressed.

2) Improving Governance and Capacity Development at the District Level

Apart from increasing financial allocations, the key factor in delivery of social services is capacity development of provincial governments and district administrations to improve performance, and at the same time, ensure the optimal utilization of available funds through better management to fill the implementation gaps.

National Commission for Human Development (NCHD) was established in 2002 to specifically propose innovative solutions for

effective and transformed social service delivery in Pakistan. NCHD has set up a specialized Capacity Building program which operates at the district level to support the Government's Devolution Plan (LGO).

This program has assisted the recently empowered local governments at the district and tehsil levels in capacity development of the key stakeholders i.e. district level governments, including elected representatives and government functionaries; government line departments of education, health and community development, and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in effective planning, optimal utilization of financial resources and efficient human resource management.

3) **Public Private Partnerships**

In order to improve the quality of its human capital, the government has encouraged public-private partnerships with the twin objectives of improving social sector delivery in Pakistan, plus harnessing the creative and efficient use of *all* available resources for maximum outreach.

This strategy was put into practice by conceiving NCHD, which provides a classic example of such an initiative where human development endeavors are supported by a Public Private Partnership between the Government of Pakistan, the private sector and the international donor community.

NCHD is designed to enhance and develop the nation's human capital through strategic interventions by acting as an orchestrating body for human development efforts in Pakistan, both public and private, to help achieve the targets of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

NCHD acts as a support organization in education and health sectors, in achieving Mass Literacy, Preventive/Promotive Primary Health Care, and Capacity Development at grassroots by bridging the implementation gap between strategy and delivery through the introduction of best practices into social programs.

Education Programme

Through its formal Universal Primary Education (UPE) Programme, NCHD has been able to enrol over 1.0 million out of school children, reduce the drop out rate to less than 10% in its 16 operational districts compared to the national average of 50% and assisted in imparting training to over 19,000 teachers in UPE. Furthermore, NCHD's UPE Programme has added value by providing trainings to over 40,000 volunteers to create social capital at the grassroots level and ensure community participation in service delivery in education and health. The Adult Literacy Programme has established around 4000 Adult Literacy Centres where over 83,000 adults (comprising over 80% women) have been educated in basic literacy.

Primary Health Care Extension (PHCE)

Under the NCHD's PHCE Programme, 200,000 immunization shots have been given to children under five years of age, more than 165,000 children under 5 are being monitored for growth regularly, 228,000 women and 131,000 men have been educated on health issues, 678,000 women trained in preparing ORS at home, while 23,000 women receive antenatal care monthly in remote areas where no government facilities exist.

4) Pro-Poor Growth

Economic growth is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for human development, as evident from recent economic growth in Pakistan. It is not just the speed of growth which is important, but *the quality or type of growth*. In other words, it is not growth *per se* which is important; what is important is that the growth should be ***pro-poor*** --- **growth in sectors where the poor benefit the most.**

Accordingly, the government has identified five key sectors which can play an important role in achieving and sustaining a 7-8 percent growth rate with the poor benefiting the most[33]. These

sectors include agriculture, housing and construction, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), information technology, and the oil and gas sector. Among these, the first three sectors have the potential to generate pro-poor growth by creating greater employment opportunities.

5) **Improving Gender Equity**

In Pakistan, the traditional attribution of female and masculine standards of behaviour, division of labour and family responsibilities have been the main barriers in female literacy rate being lower than that of males. The issue of the female literacy is built on sharply differentiated gender roles; therefore, the programming of equitable provision of female education has to be addressed.

This vital national human development deficiency is being rectified under targeted programmes for adult literacy. Special emphasis is being paid on women illiteracy, with programs such as the successful Mass Education intervention of NCHD – Adult Literacy Programme, where over 80% literacy centres are earmarked for illiterate women.

6) **Curbing population growth**

The government is using the best practices' approach to curb the high population growth, following the successful example of developing countries such as Iran, because a growing, unskilled and uneducated manpower will simply stifle growth no matter how much is spent on developing industry, agriculture and services. The population growth is showing signs of subsiding, as the growth rate has steadily fallen from 2.47% in 1996 to 1.90%[34] in 2004 (see Table 1 above).

National Human Resource Development Strategy

In order to progress and compete internationally, Pakistan needs to harness the whole range of creative national capabilities, potential of high level manpower and its optimum utilization.

Human resource can only contribute meaningfully to economic growth and development when people are provided with the skills they can market, and also take advantage of the opportunities offered by the "new economy".

The current Government puts great emphasis on developing its large human resource. To complement the human development efforts in the country, a National Human Resource Development Strategy is being implemented concurrently, based on Skill Development and Training, as under:

First: Systematic planning for manpower development

An effective utilization of highly educated professionals (scientific and technical manpower which constitutes the most valuable asset of the country), is an essential prerequisite for achieving advancement. Hence, a viable Human Resource Development Strategy for highly trained manpower at the national level is being promoted consisting of the following three elements:

> ➤ Manpower and Employment Planning through preparation of a pragmatic policy, in collaboration with the sources of labour market information with a view to assess training needs.
> ➤ Vocational Training by providing apprentices training and certification in various occupations in the industry; and,
> ➤ Skill Development through Public-Private Partnership to identify needs of geographical area, prioritize them on market demand, and to facilitate the training of workers.

A number of initiatives have been implemented to realize these objectives. A National Talent Pool has been established under Ministry of Labour, Manpower & Overseas Pakistanis to identify key manpower occupations according to scarcity and to compile inventory of basic data of high level manpower in the country. Currently, the National Talent Pool has compiled detailed

particulars of 120,000 high level professional manpower including doctors, engineers, scientists, chartered / cost accountants etc.

A National Training Bureau has been created as an attached department of Manpower Division with the dual objectives to formulate and implement vocational training policies, and to facilitate training of skilled workers to meet domestic and overseas labour requirements.

Second: Developing IT Sector

Under the Government's HR Action Plan, a multi-dimensional strategy has been adopted to overcome the deficiency in human resources which involves initiation of new government-sponsored programmes. Four new IT Universities are being established to meet this need, along with a Virtual IT University, National Testing and Accreditation Services and Educational Intranet.

Existing IT institutes are also being strengthened and faculty hired from abroad. The training program includes training of medical and legal transcriptionists, data entry operators, training in Java and number of other tools, internet working and training of 15,000 government employees.

Third: Public Sector Reforms

Apart from imparting knowledge-based skills, the Government is restructuring governmental and civil service structures and systems for optimum human resource utilization. The lead for this initiative is provided by the successful examples of some newly industrialized and developing countries, such as Singapore and Zambia. This strategy of *building institutional capacity* includes designing of structures and systems for recruitment, training, career planning, human resource development and compensation.

Fourth: Fulfilling training gaps for facing Global competition

Investment in human resource development is necessary for preparing the Pakistani industry to face the globalization challenge by increasing the productivity of workforce and improving the quality of products. For achieving a substantial part of our industrial vision, particularly in view of the demands of World Trade Organization (WTO) from 2005 onwards, there is a need to create and nurture a well-developed human capital base, with skills and work ethics of highest quality.

The country needs to switch to a strategy of better educated, well trained employees with global orientation and with more productive forms of work organization. In addition to investment in machinery and technology, the government is investing in human resource development so that the skilled labour required for undertaking quality improvement is at hand.

Fifth: Learning from International Best Practices

Pakistan is keenly following the best practices from developing countries which have adopted successful models of human development and poverty alleviation, such as Sri Lanka, Vietnam, South Korea and Iran in their areas of excellence and expertise i.e., maternal care, poverty alleviation, education and population planning, respectively.

Targeted interventions, based on lessons learnt from best practices, is the new approach being adopted in delivery of social services in the country for optimal utilization of resources and cost effectiveness of projects.

Sixth: Enhancing knowledge-based human capital

Realizing the importance of higher education and the need to upgrade our universities and research centres, the present government established the Higher Education Commission (HEC). HEC assists universities and degree awarding institutes in the

pursuit of quality education, especially science and technology, in both public and private sectors. Its goal is to mobilize financial, technical, human and social resources for enhancing the quality of educational institutions, and facilitate the reform process initiated within these institutions.[35]

The HEC has taken several initiatives, including one to reverse the brain drain and attract trained manpower from abroad, which augur well for the future. The major thrust of programs being developed by the Higher Education Commission is directed towards developing a strong base of Ph.D. level highly qualified faculty members of Pakistani origin to bridge the nation's "Ph.D. deficit".

Conclusion

Pakistan faces considerable challenges in improving key indicators of human development - education and health - due to years of neglect in policy making and implementation issues. However, the current government has resolved to redress the nation's current state of poverty and human deprivation. The task may not be accomplished in the short-term, but by embracing a coherent integrated strategy of Poverty Alleviation and National Human Resource Development, backed by sustained political will, the government is likely to be successful in achieving the targets of the MDGs by the year 2015.

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He has also remained Chairman of the Oregon Medical Association Public Health Committee and President of Douglas Country Medical Society. Presently, he is serving as Chairman National Commission for Human Development.

THE CHALLENGE OF WATER SHORTAGE IN PAKISTAN

Dr. A. R. Kemal

Introduction

Despite rapid growth of the industrial sector, agriculture sector still accounts for 23 percent of GDP and 43 percent of the labour force. Water is the major input for the growth of agricultural output; an increase in the cropped area, optimal utilization of inputs and higher levels of productivity per hectare is inconceivable in the absence of optimal levels of water. Unfortunately the water availability has declined and at present with the annual per capita water availability of about 1,050 m^3, Pakistan is approaching the situation of chronic water stress.[1] Drought over the last few years[2] has been so severe that it has created a situation of water crises in the country and has deepened the inter-provinces water conflicts. At the same time it has also highlighted the need for creating reservoirs if such crisis is to be avoided.

The shortage of water in an area called "The Great Indus Food Machine" is quite disturbing [see Cool (1977)]. Planning Commission (1978) noted that "the Indus Basin with proper management could be several times as productive as it is now, and such a vast improvement will be necessary to maintain and enhance the welfare of the people of Pakistan". Unfortunately, since the commissioning of Tarbela Dam in 1976, Pakistan has not undertaken any mega project to meet the growing water demand. As a matter of fact, due to silting the total reservoir capacity in the country has declined.[3] Considering that Indus River System (IRS) rim-station inflows on average are 169.8 BCM, there is a possibility to increase the surface water availability by another 31.6 BCM [see PCST (2003)]. While harnessing the water requires huge amount of resources, it also requires that there is consensus amongst the various provinces on the construction of water reservoirs. It could also be used for generating hydroelectricity and thus reducing the cost of business for all the sectors of production, especially for the industrial sector.

In view of the sharply rising demand for water and limited potential of surface water, the need for optimal utilization of water cannot be over-emphasized. The water pricing rules, development of water market, and better irrigation systems and methods would help a great deal in this regard. Moreover, it needs to be noted that since 1976-77 average amount of water escaping to the sea exceeds 44 BCM which seems to be quite excessive. The non-availability of sufficient storage reservoirs for regulating the flood supplies of rivers particularly during monsoons is the main factor behind this wastage.

The need for an increase in the water availability through construction of reservoirs and optimal use of water resources is imminent. The present study examines major issues in the water sector in section II, and the development strategy for optimal utilization of water in Section III. Major conclusions are drawn in Section IV.

Major Water Issues

Low Storage Capacity

The average annual water inflow of watersheds of the Indus River over 1992-93 to 1999-2000 has been about 173 BCM[4] [see PCST (2003)]. However, these flows have not been uniform across the seasons. For example, flows for Kharif (summer) and Rabi (winter0 crop seasons have been 84% and 16% of the total annual flows [see Ahmad, Mohammad and Khan (2001)]. The storage capacity of Colorado and Nile rivers as a percentage of the average inflows is 500 and 175 percent respectively, and even in India it is 33 percent. Considering that slope of Indus can be used for generation of hydro power the need for reservoirs are even greater.

Table 1: Average Annual Flow & Storage Capacity at Some Major River Basins

River Basin	Average Annual flow (MAF)	No. of Dams	Storage Capacity (MAF)	Percentage Storage	Power (MW)
Colorado	12	4	60+	500	4,167

water charges are ascertained and as such the farmers have been using excessive water resulting in problems of water logging and salinity. Because of the low per unit of water employed and as such the productivity has been low. At present the government is implementing various schemes with the involvement of the communities with a view to ensuring that the water is optimally utilized. However, better water pricing and the development of water markets can go a long way in improving the water productivity.

Extensive Seepage Losses in the Irrigation System

Due to inadequate drainage system Pakistan is facing problems of water logging and salinity. The continued use of lesser quality groundwater in the face of short and uncertain canal supplies have also added to the problem of salinization and alkalinization of productive lands. Besides there have been watercourse losses of around 45%. The application losses have been around 25% {Ashraf et al., (1977); WAPDA; Trout and Kemper (1980); PARC-FAO (1982)}. Efficiency levels of canal, watercourse and field application have been 79, 60 and 75%, respectively and the over all irrigation efficiency has been around 36% {Ahmad (1990)}. This shows enormous potential for improvements in the efficiency levels of water use.

Inadequate Operations, Maintenance and Poor Cost Recovery

The water charges are just a fraction of the total cost required to maintain the irrigation system. The allocations to irrigation declined due to severe fiscal constraint resulting in rather sharp deterioration in the irrigation infrastructure. Through the Community Participatory Development Programs (CPDP) the government is hoping that it would be able to protect the infrastructure. Besides the government has launched an ambitious water course development project and that would help in an improvement in the irrigation infrastructure.

Excessive Ground Water Pumpage

The indiscriminate use of ground water especially the brackish water has resulted in the loss of land. Moreover, in various areas especially of Balochistan, water table has gone down rather significantly. There is a danger of arsenic problems especially in the province of Balochistan.

Deteriorating Institutional Capacities

The irrigation departments of provincial governments are responsible for maintaining the irrigation infrastructure though some of the responsibilities are being devolved to the communities. WAPDA is responsible for development projects and in the recent past has not been able to get the requisite finances for the development of water resources from the Federal government. The capacity of all these institutions has deteriorated over time.

Water Availability and Poverty

Increased water availability enables households to improve crop productivity, grow high-valued crops, and generate higher incomes and employment. This helps in reducing the incidence and severity of poverty, especially if landholdings are equitably distributed. However, irrigation may also have negative implications for poverty. Poor canal design and faulty structures, inequity in water distribution, untimely water deliveries, and insufficiency of irrigation water results in the loss of agricultural productivity especially for the poor. The irrigation may also result in the conversion of fertile land to wasteland and resultantly loss of crops, fisheries and navigation, and arsenic contaminated groundwater for irrigation which could create serious health hazards. Less access to surface water and poor quality of groundwater at the tail-end reduces productivity and consequently has negative welfare impacts for the poor farmers.

Water Resource Development

For the long run growth of the economy development of water resources is absolutely important. The strategies for water development must address all the issues mentioned above, particularly the development of additional storage facilities, rehabilitation and optimal utilization of existing reservoirs, ensuring maximum crop per drop, overcoming the environment problems, and fairer distribution of water.

As noted earlier WAPDA has recently formulated vision 2025 for water development. Its effective implementation, however, is predicated on the availability of resources as well as the consensus of the provinces regarding the construction of dams. We may note that Kalabagh or Bhasha Dam would each cost around $8 billion and even if its implemented over an 8 years period, an allocation for just one of the dams annually would be Rs. 60 billion and exceeds total allocations for water in the Medium Term Development Framework (MTDF): 2005-10. MTDF allocated Rs. 293 billion for the water sector under the PSDP comprising allocation of Rs. 242 billion for the federal and of Rs. 51 billion for the provincial projects. With a throw-forward of Rs. 258 billion of the federal programme, it does not leave room for any new project in the plan.

Despite the Water Account of 1991, there have been disputes over the water. No doubt Indus River System Authority (IRSA) has been set up but the distribution of water on the historical basis has been causing confusion. With the system of telemetry and implementation of the 1991 Water Accord in a transparent manner would help in ensuring each of the provinces that construction of dams would not adversely impact them. The dams also involve displacement of the population and there could be problems of flooding and seepage. These need to be effectively tackled.

WAPDA Vision 2025 needs to be supplemented with sustainable groundwater development and exploration of non-conventional sources including hill torrents, saline waters, drainage effluents, and sweage water. Furthermore, optimal utilization of water through market mechanism; exploring latest irrigation

technologies and management tools; regulating framework for groundwater use; pollution control and management; promoting saline agriculture; artificial recharge of depleting aquifers; watershed and river sediment management; improving drainage facilities; and developing flood and drought management mechanism etc. would also go a long way in ensuring better water productivity.

The Medium Term Development Framework 2005-10 provides an integrated and holistic approach and suggests an increase in water availability by 14.67 MAF by conservation and augmentation means. Strategy of the plan includes:

> Increase in the availability of water through augmentation and conservation measures, including development of a consensus on large storage projects and efficiency improvements. Ensuring 'more crop per drop' through improved irrigation methods and practices, extensive research in developing crops with high yields, and lower water consumption and water saving techniques;

> Protection of groundwater from pollution and unsustainable abstraction. Detailed action plans including legal provisions for individual ownership of groundwater and possible metering would be prepared and various technologies used for undisturbed extraction and skimming of fresh groundwater layers overlaying saline water would be evaluated and improved techniques will be adopted; and

> Promotion of groundwater recharge wherever technically and economically feasible, with abstraction from the aquifer restricted to the sustainable recharge.

In the perspective of water shortages it needs to be conserved by improving the water-courses, land levelers and other instruments. The MTDF proposes acceleration in the watercourse improvement because it is the cheapest available option to minimize water loss. The MTDF estimates that average unit cost of water saved per acre-foot from watercourse improvements is around Rs. 12,000. It

proposes improvements of 68,500 water courses resulting in water saving of about 6.8 MAF. In addition, about 81,600 ha (20,1680 acres) of agricultural land will be precisely leveled. Watercourse improvement would also be vigorously monitored to enhance its effectiveness.

It is argued that by raising the user price of water to its true scarcity values would induce farmers to conserve water resulting into optimal use of water [World Bank (1993)]. However because of serous practical and political problems it has been rather difficult for the government to raise the water charges. Thobani (1997) argues that water markets need to be developed and such markets have worked well in various Latin American countries. He argues that in the absence of formal markets informal water markets get developed. However, such informal markets may be sub-optimal and be points out that in parts of South Asia, wealthier farmers with deep wells charge neighboring smaller farmers a high "monopoly" price for water. Moreover, in the informal water markets buyers lack the security of an enforceable contract.

If formal water rights are granted to the farmers it will provide an incentive for conserving water and reallocating it to higher-value uses. Tradable water rights allow leasing of water and spot sales and the government an monitor operations and effectively enforce laws and regulations aimed at preventing the abuse of monopoly power as well as protecting the environment. It also increases user participation in allocating water and planning new investments, while allowing businesses to invest in activities that require assured access to water.

Conclusions

Major conclusions of the study are summarized below:

➢ With the annual per capita water availability of about 1,050 m^3, Pakistan is approaching the situation of chronic water stress. Drought over the last few years has been so severe that it has created a situation of water

crises in the country and deepened the inter-provincial water conflicts;

➤ Considering that Indus River System (IRS) rim-station inflows on average are 169.8 BCM, there is a possibility to increase the surface water availability by another 31.6 BCM;

➤ While harnessing the water requires huge amount of resources, it also requires a consensus amongst the various provinces on construction of various water reservoirs which could also be used for the generation of hydroelectricity;

➤ The water pricing rules, development of water market, and better irrigation systems and methods would help a great deal to optimize the water resources;

➤ Since 1976-77 the average amount of water escaping to the sea exceeds 44 BCM which is quite excessive and the non-availability of sufficient storage reservoirs for regulating the flood supplies of rivers has been the main factor behind that;

➤ Major water issues include low water storage capacity; absence of holistic, integrated and sustained approach to water development; low productivity of water; widespread seepage losses; inadequate operations and maintenance; excessive ground water pumpage, deteriorating institutional capacity and the unequal water distribution;

➤ Effective implementation of WAPDA vision 2025 for water development is predicated on the availability of resources as well as the consensus of the provinces regarding the construction of dams. However, MTDF allocation for water resources does not have nay fund for new dams;

➤ Despite the Water Accord of 1991, there have been disputes over the water. With the system of telemetry and implementation of the 1991 Water Accord in a transparent way would help in ensuing each of the provinces that construction of dams would not jeopardize their share of water;

> The dams also involve the displacement of the population and there could be problems of flooding and seepage. These need to be effectively tackled;

> Sustainable groundwater development and exploration of non-conventional sources including hill torrents, saline waters, drainage effluents, and sewage water, and optimal utilization of water through market mechanism; exploring latest irrigation technologies and management tools; regulating framework for groundwater use; pollution control and management; promoting saline agriculture; artificial recharge of depleting aquifers; watershed and river sediment management; improving drainage facilities; developing flood and drought management mechanism etc, would also go a long way in ensuring better water productivity;

> Through improvements of 68,500 watercourses, there will be water saving of about 6.8 MAF; and

> Granting of formal water access to the farmers will provide an incentive for conserving water and planning new investments, while allowing businesses to invest in activities that require assured access to water.

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End Notes

[1] It needs to be underscored that countries with per capita water availability between 1,00 and 1,700 m^3 can be subject to frequent water stress and countries with per capita availability of below 1,000 m^3 experience chronic waer stress [see PCST (2003)].

[2] Drought had been so severe that the annual river flows have been less than the historical minimum of 118.5 billion cubic meters (BCM) since 1922.

[3] No doubt, use of groundwater has increased significantly to offset the short surface supplies. While this gives more control to the farmers on the

availability of water at the required time, it has adversely affected the quality of soil. Almost 70% tubewells in the irrigated areas are now pumping sodic water.

[4] Indus River provides 65% of total river flows, while the share of Jhelum and Chenab is 17 and 19% respectively.

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POPULATION GROWTH: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS

Dr. Pervez Tahir

Introduction

During the past two decades or so, Pakistan has managed to bring the rate of population growth from 2.99 percent to 1.90 percent (Annex-I). Even so, the absolute size of the population has risen from 90.3 million in 1983 to 148.7 in 2004. It is estimated to rise to 168 million by 2010 and 195.5 million at the end of the following decade. Among the six most populous countries, Pakistan has the highest rate of population growth. It makes the highest net addition to the world population annually after India and China. Even at the declining growth, population will double in 37 years. High fertility is the single most important contributor to this increasing size of the population. In terms of major demographic indicators, Pakistan lags behind the countries of the region. Table 1 gives this comparison. As can be seen, the highest population growth rate of Pakistan is associated with the highest Crude Birth and Death Rates, Infant Mortality Rate and Total Fertility Rate.

Table 1

Country	Crude Birth Rate (per 1,000 pop)	Crude Death Rate (per 1,000 pop)	Infant Mortality Rate	Total Fertility Rate	Natural Growth Rate
India	25	8	64	3.1	1.7
Iran	18	6	32	2.5	1.2
Sri Lanka	19	6	10	2.0	1.3
Pakistan*	28	8	82	4.1	1.9

Sources: 2004 World Population Data Sheet, Population Reference Bureau, Washington D.C. and Pakistan Economic Survey 2003-04.

At a simple level, a high population growth forces a society and its economy to run faster to stay where it is. As can be seen in Table 2, there is an enormous net requirement of social sector facilities and jobs and GNP by 2010 merely to maintain them at the per capita levels of 2000.

Table 2

	2000	2010	Net requirement
Health facilities	12,300	15,357	3,075
Primary schools	170,500	210,209	39,709
Housing units (Million)	19.7	24.3	4.6
Employment (Million)	37.0	45.6	3.6
GNP (billion Rs.)	3,120	3,842	722

Sources: Pakistan Demographic Survey 2000

Social Dimensions

Social dimension encompasses education, health, housing, jobs, urbanization and migration.

The East Asian experience indicated education is necessary for augmenting the stock of human capital. Higher levels of human capital are associated with higher rates of economic growth. Education is also strongly associated with fertility behaviour.

The progress of education in Pakistan has been slow. Estimates for 2002-03 male literacy are at 54%, 42% for females and far less in rural areas. With two third of the population in rural areas, low literacy produces a situation of very poor access to population welfare services. The situation of primary school enrolment is only slightly better. The objective of enrolling all children in the relevant 5-9 age group by 2010 is also made difficult by the rapid growth in the group due to high fertility. Similarly, for secondary education, rapid population growth increases the number to be served, the quality of education at all levels at the same time. Education has the greatest potential to influence the lives of the young. Most of non-student youth are employed in industry, agriculture and other fields in the private and public sector. Their productivity and their contribution to development are initially constrained by illiteracy or semi literacy in the case of drop-outs.

Advances in health and expanding access are an important feature of demographic transition. Typically the death rate drops

before the birth rate drops, which leads to high population growth. Population growth begins to slow down when birth rate also drops. The ultimate aim of population policy in Pakistan is also to achieve replacement level by 2020. However, the country spends only 3.5 percent of GDP on health and only 0.7 percent of it in public sector. According to one estimate, the expenditure on health is around 4 dollars per capita, compared to the requirement of 34 dollars per capita. Life expectancy has increased to over 60 years, but child and maternal mortality remain high. By 2002- 03, 36 percent of population was still without excess to save drinking water and 59 percent of the population was without sanitation.

A higher population growth rate in the 1990s resulted in an appreciable rise in the ratio of the current population of youth (15-29 years) to the rest of population. It is estimated that around 35 million population falls in this category, which is nearly one-fourth of the total population. This increase not only caused general economic difficulties but also many social costs. Amongst key issues affecting Pakistani youth are: unfavourable living conditions; unemployment and underemployment; inadequate access to basic education and a high percentage of illiteracy; problems of educational standards and the relevance of curricula; campus indiscipline; lack of vocational training opportunities; increasing violence, ill-health and un-hygienic living conditions; lack of sports and recreational facilities; drug abuse; migration; and lack of guidance and counseling services. These are but some issues which seriously affect the nurturing and appropriate development of this potential productive resource of national wealth.

Urbanization refers to the proportion of urban population in total population. Rural to urban migration is as important a demographic feature as the population explosion. The interaction between migration, mortality and fertility in the process of urbanization has significant implication for population growth. Fertility levels are generally lower in urban areas than in rural areas. In the 1998 census, urban areas were defined administratively but almost all cities have sprawled beyond their urban boundaries. The result is that Defence Housing Authority in Lahore, for example, is defined as rural. A definition based on urban characteristics would

also means a faster GDP growth per capita. Similarly, for a given GDP growth, faster population will lead to slower GDP growth per capita. Economic development and GDP growth are thus correlated. This does not necessarily suggest causation, the direction of which is always a matter of debate.

There is a view that population growth stimulated economic development in Europe during the period of industrial revolution by introducing innovation and technical change and a skilled and educated labour force. But today's developing countries can look towards the more developed countries for a stimulus than the population growth. They have experienced higher GDP growth rates than the developed countries achieved during their initial phases of economic transformations, but the population growth rates experienced by developing countries are also far higher.

Marxists used to be dismissive about population growth and its relationship with economic development. According to them, if all the problems are resolved, which ideally they would be in a socialist world, there would be no population problem as the economy and the people will have the ability to deal with it. The practice, however, varied in these countries. China, for example went all out for establishing a small family norm.

The dominant view, however, has been that population growth is detrimental to economic development. A higher growth of population simply means that investment must grow at an even higher rate to cover the demographic overhead and to add to the national product at the same time. In addition to growth of population, its size also matters. There is a certain carrying capacity of the economy and an optimum size of the population associated with it. It is, however, not easy to determine this optimum. In any case, what matters more than the growth and size of the population is its age structure. A young age structure implies a higher dependency ratio i.e. the ratio of workers to non-workers. Potentially, it also requires the economy to generate more and more jobs for the new entrants into the labour market.

A young population also presents the country an opportunity. In the case of Pakistan, if the young are imparted good education and trained in skills, vocations and technologies which are in demand in the economies with aging populations such as Europe, the country can reduce unemployment as well as enjoy large inflows of remittances. Pakistan has declared 2005 as Year of the Youth. It is the first time in 57 years history of the country that youths have been recognized as an entity to reckon with.

A Youth Policy is being formulated. It is aimed at providing youths an enabling environment so that they can play their role as politically and socially active citizens. The policy would also help devise an appropriate, viable and youth-friendly institutional arrangement where youth support and development programmes and initiatives could be initiated collaboratively and cost-effectively. It seeks to establish Youth Resource Centres, provide interest free loans to deserving youth and introduce "Pak Jawan" youth award etc. Most importantly, it would be backed up by a vocational training and skill formation plan.

High population growth is no doubt undesirable in economic terms. It creates pressure on resources thereby increasing unemployment and poverty. The consensus reached at the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo (Egypt) in 1994, stressed that early stabilization of population would make crucial contribution towards achievement of sustainable development and poverty reduction. Nevertheless, widespread poverty remains a major challenge to development efforts. Poverty is often accompanied by unemployment, malnutrition, illiteracy, low status of women, exposure to environmental risks and limited access to social and health services including family planning and reproductive health services. All these factors reinforce the vicious cycle of high levels of fertility, morbidity and mortality, and lead to low economic productivity and hence contribute to growth of poverty. Efforts to slow down population growth, reduce poverty, achieve economic progress and protect environmental degradation are, therefore, mutually reinforcing. Slowing population growth will contribute to reducing poverty and vice versa.

Population Growth

Mid year	Total Population (Million)	Growth Rate (%)
1983	90.30	2.99
1984	92.96	2.95
1985	95.67	2.90
1986	98.41	2.86
1987	101.18	2.82
1988	103.99	2.77
1989	106.84	2.73
1990	109.71	2.69
1991	112.61	2.63
1992	115.54	2.60
1993	118.50	2.56
1994	121.48	2.51
1995	124.49	2.47
1996	123.87	2.47
1997	126.90	2.45
1998	129.97	2.42
1999	133.01	2.34
2000	135.90	2.20
2001	140.36	2.06
2002	143.17	2.00
2003	145.95	1.94
2004(E)	148.72	1.90

Estimates Source: Population Census Organization and Planning & Development Division.

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