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MESSAGE OF PATRON-IN-CHIEF

In an environment of rapidly transforming geopolitical realities, a constant and timely reckoning of policy substitutes is necessary to evaluate the veracity of present course of action. South Asia has long been a sensitive region, destabilized by the complexities arising out of international power play, bitter internal and mutual conflicts and hindered growth despite its enormous economic potential. Thriving in such an environment poses a huge challenge to Pakistan whose frontline status has often embroiled it in situations detrimental to its core interests.

The demands of desired progress entail a delicate strategic balancing and intricate policy maneuvers. It is incumbent upon the cognoscente to acquaint the decision-makers of the eminent potentialities in order to adjust to the shifting sands of regional and international phenomena. Fortunately, our intelligentsia is alive to this obligation and fully perceptive of the portents of future changes.

I congratulate the Editorial team of "*Margalla Papers*" for providing a platform that affords an uninhibited intellectual discourse aimed at situational and policy assessment. My appreciation is also due towards the contributors for their incisive inquisition into the thorny labyrinth of foreign relations which has made this publication a valuable study into geostrategic evolution. I sincerely hope that in its coming issues, "*Margalla Papers*" will emerge as a dependable source of creditable opinion on matters of national and international significance.

**Lieutenant General
Aamer Riaz, HI(M)
President National Defence University**

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the background of emerging global challenges, Pakistan is actively playing the role of a responsible nation to maintain peace in the region. Though our country is confronting with both internal and external variegated challenges yet we believe that days are not far ahead when we will achieve the ultimate destination of peace and stability both on the economic and social platforms. Pakistan Army has successfully met the target of defeating terrorism and militancy within the county by virtue of unprecedented professionalism coupled with the sacrifices which have been acknowledged by all nations in the world. The current operation '*Radd-ul-Fasaad*' to eliminate terrorists across Pakistan will prove peacemaker for the society and pacemaker for the economy; with special reference to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. We believe in peaceful coexistence and expect of all our neighbours' to honour our peaceful existence in the region. We strongly condemn all shapes of aggression and extremism and respect the integrity and sovereignty of our neighbors'.

Our professionalism and commitment which we have displayed during our war on terror has been acknowledged by the international power-players. This capability and performance of Pakistan Army remains unprecedentedly unique in the world. No doubt our achievements would not have been possible without the support of our nation.

The latest edition of *Margalla Papers*, offers a panorama of defence and security related strategic issues with the solution oriented objective judgments and views of various scholars in the relevant fields. The objectivity and impartiality is commendable. The peer reviewers and editorial boards deserve appreciation.

**Major General
Asif Ali, HI (M)
Director General
Institute for Strategic Studies Research and Analysis**

SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CPEC ON PAKISTAN

Raza Muhammad and Dr Lubna Abid Ali*

Abstract

Trade through economic corridors comprising land routes and sea-lanes has been rapidly multiplying in velocity and volume due to globalization. Velocity refers to the intensity and increase in the number of interactions. Volume is related with the density of goods that are being exchanged. Ancient Silk Road has been one such corridor. It connected China, Eurasia and the World with mutually beneficial trade and shared economic dividends having social, cultural and religious impacts. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is reincarnation of ancient Silk Road, albeit much larger in scope and magnitude. China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is one of the multiple strands of this whole that will connect 60 plus countries. Chinese vision for BRI revolves around voluntary participation and mutually beneficial trade respecting UN Charter. China is proposing a combination of loans, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Built Operate and Transfer (BOT) investments for realisation of BRI. Operationalization of CPEC will bring obvious advantages in multiple spheres including socio-economic impacts, mostly positive for Pakistan.

Keywords: BRI, CPEC, Ancient Silk Road, Mutually Beneficial Partnership, Socio Economic Dividends, advantage to People and Society.

Introduction

Taking theoretical insights from the work of Roland Robertson the process of globalization may be defined in the context of 'globalization'.¹ This ranges from nationalization particularity to the adoption of cosmopolitanism. By focusing on the intermingling of global and local is to accept the plurality and inclusivity in different geographic areas. Thus, "Commodities and the media are seen not as (totally) coercive but rather as providing material to be used in individual and group creation throughout the localized areas of the world".²

This means the world is moving towards growing migration, wide variety of identities and intercultural discourse. The focus is more on inclusivity and acceptance of differences. It may include preservation of specifics with possibilities of varied potentialities.

This study also attempts to focus on contemporary work on IR theory that combines geography and cultural studies.³ However the significance of this study is linked with the notion of global inequality and asymmetry and the core concern to

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bring change, Thus CPEC is reviewed in the context of a dynamic force to bring investment and change in the lives of ordinary people in the region.

China and Pakistan have an exemplary and diversified friendship developed over a period of seven decades. The leadership and people of both the countries, despite multiple challenges, have steadfastly stood with each other through thick and thin; now being termed as 'Iron Brothers'. CPEC is the latest expression of this mutually beneficial and multidimensional cooperation. In a time when Pakistan is facing multiple security, economic and social challenges, China's help in shape of CPEC appears to be an important enabler. Perhaps, it not only has potential to stabilise but also integrate Pakistan's economy into an evolving trade bloc of CPEC and BRI partner countries. CPEC is one of the multiple components of the BRI that is seen as revival of ancient Silk Route. This route has historically interconnected Eurasia for about three millennia. Silk and Spices Routes have traditionally handled commerce along with a peaceful sharing of culture, knowledge, language and beliefs.

After opening to the World in 1980s, China initially focussed on development of its coastal cities. Disparity in the levels of development in the West and interior China was realised by Mr Deng Xiaoping in 1992. He said that, 'by end of the century China must overcome the regional inequality'. Based on Deng's vision, President Jiang Zemin proposed the strategy of "Great Western Development" in late 1999.⁴ Decades of deliberations eventually evolved into BRI⁵ that was initially referred to as One Belt One Road (OBOR). It comprises two main segments: Silk Road Economic Built (SREB) and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR). Maritime Silk Road will connect Chinese Coast to Europe through South China Sea, Indian Ocean through Gwadar and South China Sea to South Pacific. On land, the SREB, aimed at building "a new Eurasian Bridge", shall comprise five major arteries; China-Mongolia-Russia, China-Central Asia-West-Asia and China-Indochina Peninsula Corridors, Bangladesh-China-India, Myanmar Economic Corridor and CPEC.⁶ CPEC is being termed as "Game Changer" and "Fate Changer" for three billion peoples of the region.⁷

Many countries have expressed intent to become CPEC and BRI partners. This includes UK⁸, New Zealand⁹, Russia¹⁰, France¹¹, Romania¹² and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) that also want to join the CPEC¹³. 37 world leaders participated in Second Belt and Road Forum at Beijing. Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Luxembourg, Jamaica, Peru, Italy, Barbados, Cyprus and Yemen were the latest countries to join the BRI club. President Putin praised the civilised and soft manner of China. Beijing published list of 283 deliverables related to the BRI.¹⁴ When fully operational, as a part of BRI, CPEC will link Pakistan with more than 60 Countries, housing two thirds of the World population, 55% of the global GDP and having approximately 75% of the global energy reserves. The BRI will comprise about 900 projects, valued at about 1.3 trillion US dollars.¹⁵

"The Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, issued by "The National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China with the State Council Authorization" envisages participation by choice, in consonance with the purpose and spirit of five principles on peaceful

co-existence, as enshrined in the UN Charter. The document offers macro level recommendations leaving most of the details to the partner countries.

It lays adequate emphasis to address concerns on climate change and to promote 'green and low carbon infrastructure construction'.¹⁶ President Xi Jin Ping's thought on the whole process is woven around the spirit of mutual respect, commonality of objectives of socio economic development of partner countries, connectivity, partnership rather than alliances, interdependence and mutually beneficial commerce.¹⁷ In a recent address at 55th Munich Security Conference the Chinese member of Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC), H.E. Yang Jiechi echoed Chinese leaderships' thought on upholding values like principle of sovereignty, dialogue, consultation, rule of law and win-win cooperation for achieving common development.

All countries aimed at "Working for a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind by Promoting International Cooperation and Multilateralism."¹⁸ This amply highlights that China in no way intends forcing its choices or dominate the cooperation of willing states envisioned towards attainment of the goal of shared gains and perceptions to mitigate the challenges of the 21st Century. Chinese Foreign Minister Mr Wang Yi elaborated these points further in a press conference on March 8, 2019 at Beijing and stressed that China's Diplomacy shall endeavour to 'bring certainty to a World full of uncertainties'.¹⁹

CPEC Summary Plan issued in February 2017 encompasses execution of CPEC vision and objectives through short-term projects till 2020, medium term till 2025 and long term up to 2030. Seven Joint Working Groups (JWG) comprising officials from both the countries have been constituted to oversee the execution of this Plan.²⁰ These JWGs are working under Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) on CPEC.²¹ Several figures are in circulation on the cost of CPEC. As of now the cost of project stands at US Dollar 58 billion.²² It's a combination of grants, soft loans, zero interest based loans and direct investment. Out of this amount only \$ 6.017 billion are the loans that government of Pakistan will have to pay. Pakistan will start repaying these loans with effect from 2021.²³

As Pakistan was going through severe power shortages affecting its people and economy; therefore early harvest projects included production of 10400 of Megawatt electricity as priority.²⁴ Major part of the finances goes into electricity producing projects, development of infrastructure, establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and building of Gwadar Port. These are Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), or Built Operate Own Transfer (BOOT) or Built Operate Transfer (BOT) projects. Major funding of these projects has been done by the Chinese Banks. Chinese companies, which have invested in these projects, are responsible to pay back these loans. Communication infrastructure warranted up gradation and expansion as well. These areas were therefore accorded priority in planning and execution of CPEC.

Progress and Dividends

An important point to emphasise is that CPEC is a fusion of Pakistan's Vision 2025 and the edifice of BRI. Both share the commonality of goals and purposes.²⁵ Pakistan has already started gaining socio economic benefits from CPEC. Following facts and figures related to current progress and future prospects of CPEC amply manifest the significance of this important project of socio-economic significance. Pakistan's GDP growth in 2017 was 5.2%: highest in 10 years. This is likely to rise to 7% by 2020. Despite the fact that break-even period as anticipated by the China Overseas Ports Holding Company Limited (COPHCL) for Gwadar is seven years, Pakistan started getting 9% of gross revenue right from the very first shipment. Out of 22 projects 11 have been completed. There are 20 more projects in the pipeline. About 75000 jobs have been created by CPEC. Out of these only 9500 are held by Chinese. 124 engineers were hired for various CPEC projects. The estimates of Centre of Excellence for CPEC Ministry of Planning and Development Pakistan visualises creation of 1.2 million jobs up till 2030.²⁶

Under CPEC Pakistan and China have started projects for production of 17045 Megawatt of electricity.²⁷ Close to 4000 Megawatt electricity has already been added into Pakistan's system. On May 28, 2019 Unit II of the China Power Hub Generation Company has added 660-megawatt electricity into Pakistan's National Grid²⁸, which sufficiently manifests smooth progress of the planned execution. About 990 megawatts are likely to be added in July 2019. The energy produced by the power-producing units under CPEC is much cheaper i.e. rupees 8/ per unit as compared to the rates per unit for electricity provided by previously installed Independent Power Producing units.

Sind Engro Coal Mining (SECMC) and International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) are working hand in glove for attainment of objectives of conservation and sustainable management of bio diversity in Tharparker. SEMC has aligned its investments in socio economic sector with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).²⁹ China council for International cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED) will ensure implementation of strategic policies on 'greening Belt and Road' with due cognizance to UN 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. For preservation of environment, the coal-fired power producing plants installed under CPEC are using 'super critical' technology to ensure very reduced sulphur dioxide emission.

Pakistan and China have reinvigorated their partnership in the field of education and training for equipping the Pakistani youth with appropriate capacities to be the part of successful execution of CPEC. For the said purpose, Pakistan has created "CPEC Consortium of Business Schools" under the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan (HEC). The Consortium will augment Pakistan-China inter university collaboration. China Association of Higher Education (CAHE) and HEC are working closely on exchange and scholarship programmes.³⁰ The China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) announced master degree scholarships programmes for the South East China University.³¹ Presently about 50 faculties of universities of both countries are connected through exchange programmes. 2000 plus Pakistani students are studying on

scholarship in Chinese universities. Hundreds of engineers are on training. Multiple vocational training centres have been opened in Pakistan.

Gwadar Port is a \$ 5 billion BOT project. With a depth of 20 Meters, ability to host 200,000 DWT ships, having 120 berths and handling capacity of 400 million tons cargo per year, will be one of the largest seaports of the World. It also enjoys clear advantages in terms of economy of time and cost over Chabahar.³² Pakistan will get 9% of gross revenue of the port and 15% gross revenue from the Gwadar Economic Zone.³³ It has already got 5 Quay cranes. Facility of 100,000 metric ton storage has been built. Desalination plant, power generation and sewage disposal plants are already functional. Till Last year-end Gwadar had handled 400,000-ton cargo. Gwadar Port will be completed by 2028.³⁴

Pakistan and China have concluded the Plan for Second Phase of CPEC that can be expressed as 'One Corridor, Many Doors': the newer vision for CPEC. In this phase no project has been dropped; rather Joint Working Groups on agriculture and socio-economic development have been added to the existing groups.³⁵ Contrary to the misperception of diverting funds from CPEC, its projects have been augmented by allocation of requisite funds.³⁶ During 8th JCC Meeting, the year 2019 has been declared as year of Industrialisation. During the Prime Minister of Pakistan's visit to China in November 2018³⁷, new multi-cooperation agreements were added. This not only manifests both leaders and Governments commitment to the BRI and CPEC rather indicates enhanced focus on socio economic development, industrialisation and trade and investment to benefit people at grass root level.³⁸

An additional grant of \$ 1 billion has been kept for low gestation, low cost but high input projects for less developed areas of Pakistan. Vocational training, capacity building of provinces, improvements in health care and agricultural shall receive added emphasis. Recently concluded Belt and Road Forum (BRF) at Beijing has brought more advantages for Pakistan under new Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in its exports to China that would increase by \$ 500 million per year and could jump to \$ 6 billion per year.³⁹

Appraisal and Findings

It seems to be an opportunity for change and development for both China and Pakistan. It offers a mechanism to lessen sufferings of their people by speedy developments in social, economic, education, agriculture, and health sectors. PM of Pakistan Imran Khan during his address at ground breaking ceremony of Mohmand Dam on May 2, 2019, praised the exemplary progress made by China for lifting 700 million people from below the poverty line over past three decades as unique in the World history. This has been made possible through long-term focus on socio economic development in the less developed areas. He quoted this example for emulation and making best use of CPEC for the purpose of lifting deprived Pakistanis living below the extreme poverty line to lead a respectable life.⁴⁰ It is hoped that evolving economic opportunities from the CPEC would help alleviate sufferings of 24.3% of our population that lives below the poverty line.⁴¹

In the backdrop of BRI, CPEC figures out to be an undertaking of great magnitude. In a project of this kind possibility of some contradictory views, delays, hiccups and irritants cannot be precluded. These should not be taken as something abnormal. At the same time these must not be allowed to impact negatively on the progress of a useful enterprise like this. CPEC being the pilot project of BRI is progressing at a reasonably good speed. The results are visible in shape of infrastructural development, enhanced energy production, newer jobs, gradually improving businesses and improved focus on socio economic development in Phase II of CPEC.

37 heads of states and officials from 150 countries attended the second BRF forum.⁴² The number of expected members in the BRI is 60 plus countries. This is likely to enhance politico-economic significance of the CPEC and multiply its dividends for emancipation of societies of the member countries. When socio economic gains trickle down to the people they will have more jobs, better income, better living standards thereby becoming less exploitable by the exploiters with vested interest. The shared and interdependent economic prosperity makes the destinies of nations intertwined thereby bringing them closer to each other. The shared gains shall create connectivity between masses belonging to CPEC as well as BRI partner countries, thus gradually increasing commonality of interest and reducing animosity leading to building of mutual trust and forge longer lasting peace and stability in the region.

The increasing membership of the BRI also indicates a gradual shift in trends of global competitiveness from geo-security to geo-economy. China has till now desisted military confrontation and promises not to be offensive in pursuit of its aspiration. Chinese effort for expansion of her sphere of influences focuses on economic cooperation with mutual respect and shared gains. One cannot be really sure that China and USA will be able to get out of the Thucydides Trap or not? China is attempting to challenge the global economic order and by implication global power status of USA.

They may resort to a cold war and then use of military instrument to attain respective national interests. It is a common perception that in post 2nd World War Greater World powers have been successful in avoiding military confrontation. It can be hoped that governments, decision makers, scholars, analysts and writers have realised that to cater for increasing population, depleting resources, decreasing jobs and degrading ecology the focus has to shift to emancipation of their people and societies. The rivalry should preferably be restricted to economic competition only.

Pakistan serves as a conduit between Afghanistan, Central Asia and Indian Ocean.⁴³ Afghanistan's joining of CPEC would enhance mutual gains and bring the people and countries closer. While Afghan businessmen use Pakistan as a link for their trade, President Ashraf Ghani had made access for Pakistan to Central Asia conditional to allowing of Afghan- India trade through Wagah Border. Pakistan and China therefore are working on the alternative access to central Asia through China.⁴⁴ However, grant of land access to Afghanistan and India for their mutual trade could be considered. Well thought out agreement encompassing appropriate trade and security checks may act as a CBM leading to resolution of mutual disputes.

CPEC appears to draw not only regional but also international rivalry due to competing China – US interests.⁴⁵ The US and India seem to be uncomfortable with the concept and manifestation of CPEC due to conflicting interests in the global political system⁴⁶, which is likely to create challenges in implementation of the CPEC. Thus, Pakistan, China and other partners have to craft a joint strategy for timely manifestation of this project for sustainable socio-economic development of the region. Few Pakistani entrepreneurs are also worried about their share of the dividend. They apprehend major share going to Chinese companies. They fear that maximum business and the benefit will go to the Chinese companies.⁴⁷ However, the fact remains that Pakistan shall accrue ample socio-economic gains that will continue to multiply over the years.⁴⁸

Anti CPEC propaganda, mostly emanating from foreign sources and occasionally from within Pakistan, sows apprehensions like: falling into debt trap, takeover of major projects due to payment default by China like Hambantota of Sri Lanka, CPEC may prove to be like East India Company etc. Pakistan China bond, which has now been termed as Iron Brothers, spreads over 70 Years. China assisted Pakistan across a broad spectrum from socio economic assistance to development of defence industry to make Pakistan militarily and economically strong. Most of the investment in CPEC is by Chinese companies on loan from Chinese banks including Gwadar Port. The projects are on FDI, BOOT and BOOT basis. The loan to be paid back by Pakistan is only 6.3 billion USD that has to be reimbursed in easier installments. China has proven to be a friend in need, latest example being Pakistan India tension on Pulwama attack. Therefore, Chinese intent cannot be suspected of negativity. China will immensely benefit from CPEC, and so shall Pakistan and other member countries.

Pakistan has time and again reaffirmed its commitment to earlier realisation of CPEC.⁴⁹ To cater for visualised threats to CPEC the Government of Pakistan has decided set up a CPEC Authority by merging CPEC Support Project and CPEC Centre of Excellence directly under the Minister of Planning, Development and Reforms.⁵⁰ It shall oversee multiple aspects, Joint Cooperation Committee as well as security. For provision of appropriate security to CPEC Government is improving capabilities of its Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs). Pakistan Army⁵¹ and Pakistan Navy⁵² have dedicated exclusive troops and established special mechanism for provision of security to CPEC including Gwadar Seaport.

Impact on Society and Economy

The infrastructural development brings speedy development in the country through better connectivity. The areas falling along the route of CPEC have already started benefitting. Gwadar is developing at a much faster pace. The property prices in Gwadar have increased manifold.⁵³ About 7500 new jobs have been created; the number is expected to climb to 1.2 million by 2030. When operationalized it will translate into socio-economic uplift of the people ushering an era of comparative prosperity and better living standards. Many problems in a society are due to poverty and illiteracy.

The law and order situation to an extent is also related to socio- economic condition of the masses. Betterment in socio-economic conditions is likely to have

positive impact on overall governance in Pakistan. Similarly more jobs and better education, while alleviating poverty and enhancing knowledge and education, will reduce the availability of exploitable human resource to the exploiters: extremists and criminals. This will help the country in internal stabilisation. The Chinese, Russian, Saudi and other foreign countries investments and presence of foreigners in the country are expected to deter direct external threats as well. Enhanced economic dividend will also augment human security.

When seen in conjunction with the BRI, CPEC is not only a trade corridor. It is likely to go much beyond that. It will be connecting Pakistan to Central Asia, South Asia, West Asia, Middle East, Europe and North Africa. The interconnectivity will endow economic, socio-cultural, anthropological and educational advantages on the Pakistan, all partner Countries and the Regions. In due course the partner countries will become part of a trade bloc comprising 60 plus countries having population of three billion with intertwined destinies. It will gradually evolve into a mutually beneficial trade bloc⁵⁴ with obvious political influence in the international arena. Another default advantage could be cooperation amongst member countries on issues like countering the growing extremism, drug trafficking and gun running etc. collectively.

Our energy shortfall and distortion thereof cost Pakistan about 18 Billion: about 6.5% of the GDP.⁵⁵ CPEC early harvest projects have increased production of the electricity to an extent that if managed appropriately the electricity load shedding should be completely over in next few months. It will help in better productivity; more jobs increased GDP and better living conditions thereby benefitting the masses in multiple ways.

CPEC is offering great chance to make best use of our youth bulge, currently estimated to be about 60% of the population, through better opportunities for higher education and vocational training. HEC Pakistan and CAHE China have already operationalized the collaborative mechanism for the said purpose. China is expected to provide 21000 Scholarship to Pakistan in next three years. This will improve the chances of their employment on better wages with obvious socio economic advantages.

The connections and trade relations have been impacting various aspects of the trading partner countries over centuries. The impacts and effects span over socio-political, cultural and religious spheres. We may see a kind of hybrid culture after 25-50 years in Pakistan. It may become a more diversified multicultural country adopting dress, food, culture and manners etc. of partner countries especially Chinese. We may see more of intermarriages marriages, increased Feminism and gender equality. However, massive efforts are needed to educate people on misuse of the institution of marriage, as few cases of such kind emerged in recent past.

Over the year's large number of China Towns with typical Chinese Culture and style of entertainment, as seen in many places in the World, may also emerge here. Few of the social aspects of the Chinese culture may be at a tangent to our social and religious values. This may also draw criticism from the conservative elements of our

society, specially the clergy. Traditionally Pakistani Nation is a good host, yet understanding each other's cultural sensitivities is considered essential.

Chinese culture imbedded in five to six thousand years of its civilisation is rich in tradition. The importance of Art and Culture and enhanced value of customs and traditions following Chinese style may be adopted by our society. China has started reviving the Confucianism. In 2007, Confucius Birthday was celebrated with official sponsorship: few term it re-entry of Confucianism in Chinese society. It has had positive effects on Chinese society. The positives may be adopted by our society over the coming years. Few aspects of Confucian teachings like Filial Piety (family system with respect and care for elders) Virtues, Values, Dutifulness, law abidance etc. contain similarities with our culture and Ideology.⁵⁶

Chinese concept of modernization is not westernization rather easternisation with focus to improve in the fields of education, science and technology, infrastructural development and social uplift etc. This could help our people suitably emulate. Chinese as a nation have developed a culture of hard work and better work ethics. Intermingling and working together could instill these attributes in our society.

Phase II of CPEC encompasses steps to alleviate poverty, empower youth through vocational training, improve health facilities in underdeveloped areas and help improve agriculture sector. These steps are in line with Prime Minister of Pakistan efforts under the poverty reduction project called "Ehsaas". This is likely to bring major improvements in life of people from underdeveloped areas living below the poverty line.

Recommendations and Conclusion

The global and regional economic competition, as well as Pakistan's restive inner front breeds multiple challenges for implementation of CPEC and BRI. However, the opportunities outweigh the challenges. Therefore, Pakistan and China must continue with their commitments provide requisite politico-diplomatic support and physical security to the CPEC. Institution of appropriate laws on presence of foreigners, purchase of property and investments by them are also considered essential.

CPEC can be turned into a useful foreign policy instrument to improve relations with Iran, Afghanistan and India by providing them land access for trade. It could help in convincing Afghanistan to become a CPEC partner and establish better Pakistan-China-Afghanistan trilateral relationships. Intertwined economic stakes and confluence of counter terrorism and anti-narcotics objectives could further augment these ties. The prospects of shared economic dividends can also act as enablers to improve bilateral and multilateral cooperation to mitigate prevalent differences and contentious issues.

The short, mid and long-term plans made for CPEC by Pakistan and China have to be strongly supported by the governmental and non-governmental institutions to forestall bureaucratic hurdles, procedural interruptions and internal or external opposition to minimise delays and ensure desired progress. Appropriate mechanism needs to be established and operationalized to ensure this. Announcement of

government of Pakistan to merge various CPEC organs into a single Authority is considered to be a step in the right direction.⁵⁷

CPEC can only change fates if its positive socio-economic impacts reach down to the people living below the poverty line. Benefits in the field of education, vocational training, agriculture cooperation, and health sector must result in economic emancipation of the masses especially from underdeveloped areas. This will require appropriate measures at all levels of implementation.

Flight of capital in shape of profits must also be controlled and scrutinised by CPEC Authority and Security Exchange Commission of Pakistan. A good percentage of the profits earned from Pakistan should stay in Pakistan in shape of reinvestments. People need to be prepared to host a large number of expatriates predominantly Chinese. Special efforts have to be put in to educate people on Chinese culture and way of living. Similarly Chinese must be made aware of our societal norms, religious and cultural sensitivities.

Stability in Afghanistan is considered to be an essential pre-requisite for actualisation of the vision of connecting Afghanistan and ultimately Central Asia and full operationalization of the CPEC. Pakistan should continue its efforts to develop good bilateral relations and support global peace efforts for intra Afghan dialogue and negotiation with Taliban. Of course, stability is a prerequisite for the economic development. To combine geography and economy for the prosperity of an integrated society requires shared perceptions of security as well.

NOTES

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WASHINGTON'S NEW COLD WAR AGAINST RUSSIA

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Abstract

This article will explain the recent renewal of the Cold War policy by the United States (US) against Russia through Colour Revolutions and regime change. Far from being a new strategy, it is the revival of geopolitics that blends with geo-economics in order to forestall a far more serious decline of the US, especially in terms of its global hegemony. This “new” policy is based on the old post-World War I US strategy of preventing a deepening economic relationship between Russia and Germany, or a Russia-China pact. As history witnessed, it was the Rapallo Treaty of 1922, which dismayed the Western allies after the World War I, as it threatened to make both Germany and Russia more independent of Anglo-American (Western) influence and control, especially with regard to their naturally dynamic economies.

Keywords: New Cold War, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Russia, Security, Challenges, Opportunities.

Introduction

After the World War-II, the US pursued a geopolitical strategy, which was immortalized by the first general secretary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), who asserted that the purpose of NATO was “to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.”¹ In fact, geo-strategist Halford Mackinder too propagated this strategy after World War I in 1919.² While the strategy, known euphemistically as *containment*, served the US elite for four decades but after the cold war, there appeared to be a far lesser need for such an intrusive and domineering global strategy. With the demise of Soviet Union, Russia lost its satellites in Eastern Europe, the US became a dominant hegemonial state, and “Europe strove to define an independent identity,” writes Henry Kissinger. These structural changes, as per Kissinger were in essence “renunciation” of the Westphalian system of 1648.³

However, after the chaotic Yeltsin years, in the 1990s, the subsequent recovery and simultaneous rise of Vladimir Putin to power in Russia; the US policymakers decided to weaken a resurgent Russia, which could become a serious challenge to its hegemony. Contrarily, the Russian elite considered “the post-Cold War settlement was unbalanced, even unfair.” After the annexation of Crimea, Russian perceptions were that: “It looks like the so-called ‘winners’ of the Cold War are determined to have it all

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and reshape the world into a place that could better serve their interests alone,” stated Putin during the annual *Valdai Discussion Club* in October 2014.⁴ It was thus no coincidence in 2000, just as Putin became President that Washington initiated a series of so-called *Colour Revolutions*, which in reality were a euphemism for overthrowing the sovereign and often democratically elected governments, all within the former territorial sphere of influence of the former Soviet Union, which Russia naturally viewed as its domain. These manipulated overthrows started with Yugoslavia and ended in Ukraine. It was obvious that the Kremlin could not afford to sit by idly with regard to this blatant encroachment of what it regarded as its traditional sphere of influence. Putin stated in March 2014: “If you press ‘a spring to its limits,’ ... ‘it will snap back hard’.” This was what the US had done: “plotting ‘colour revolution’ against Russia, ‘lying to us,’ making decisions ‘behind our back,’ such as with NATO enlargement and missile defence in Europe, and trying ‘to sweep us into a corner’ for having an independent foreign policy.”⁵ According to Putin the USA was “still pursuing the ‘infamous containment policy’ ... directed against Russia....”⁶ This became the trigger for Russia’s foreign policy’s perpetual quest to regain a strong state status in the 21st century. The Ukraine was the pivot around which Washington knew it would instigate a violent Russian response that could then be easily exploited by the Western, and mostly US controlled mass media, in order to demonize Russia. Even Mearsheimer asserted in fall 2014 that:

*The crisis was largely the ‘West’s fault’... Major Powers do not respond graciously to hostile alliances pushing up to their borders. The United States and its NATO partners should have understood that, by meddling in Ukraine ... they were guaranteeing a predictably aggressive Russian response.*⁷

Kotkin observes that “Putin does not recognize the existence” of Ukraine’s separation from Russia, which Putin ostensibly intended not to leave behind as a potent weapon to be used by the Western powers against Russia.⁸ Interestingly, Russia, according to Kotkin perceives the neighbouring smaller states “less as potential friends than as potential beachheads for enemies.”⁹ Anti-West sentiments are profoundly pronounced under Putin’s presidency. One can assume such sentiments were due to Washington’s exploitation during Russia’s debilitation and enervation period under President Boris Yeltsin and beyond. In fact, despite the US-Soviet World War II alliance - their relations continued to be still fraught with deep distrust.¹⁰ Factors behind this collision course of US-Russian foreign policies are explained and scrutinized in the subsequent sections of the article.

Russian Quest to Regain Grandeur

If we take the Western mass media at face value, than it is obvious that Russia under Putin is out to tyrannize and bully the Ukrainian population into surrendering to Kremlin’s imperial quest for domination, not just in the Ukraine, but also in the entire region. This is the dogmatic Western mainstream media image. However, such reporting omits far more than it is willing to state. Namely, since the end of the Cold War, the US elite has been deliberately pushing Russia into a corner, leaving it with only

two options: either capitulate to US demands or reassert its position in what Russia has regarded, for centuries, to be its legitimate sphere of influence. It was clear that Kremlin could not accept capitulation; instead it had to oppose and challenge this imperial strategy that is in line with its historical legacy. Secondly, Putin could not acquiesce to loss of Russian prestige that occurred after the end of the Cold War, and evidence suggests that the Kremlin is “determined to restore it, in part by expanding Russia’s borders,” states Treisman.¹¹ Ostensibly, Russia’s Crimean annexation was planned under pressure that the Kremlin might lose its strategically pivotal naval base in Sevastopol, and NATO’s expansion was another factor behind the Kremlin’s move with its “dream” to regain its past grandeur.¹² The Russian elite believe that the US caused recent deterioration of their relations. In this context, they point to US interference in Russia’s internal affairs for many years, particularly United States’ meddling in Ukraine. Russian policymakers object to the US efforts to bring Ukraine into NATO. This would obviously move the US-led military alliance right up to Russian territories, and to NATO’s deployment of missile defence systems in Eastern Europe that the Kremlin asserts could be used for offensive objectives. In fact, NATO’s missile deployments followed the USA’s unilateral withdrawal from the US-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002.

Hidden War against Russia

Reunification of East and West Germany was a key event in the modern history. It is known that President Mikhail Gorbachev was instrumental in allowing the reunion of Germany, but he wanted a guarantee from the US and the West that a united Germany would not become a member of the NATO. This was the traditional Russian fear since the World War II. Incidentally, during World War II the Nazi invaders had massacred about 18-27 million Russians.¹³ When US President Bush Sr. was reluctant to give such a guarantee, Gorbachev pushed for a pledge that NATO would not be expanded eastwards toward Russia. This was likely the minimal assurance that would satisfy the conservatives and anti-Gorbachev factions in Russia, before agreeing to reunification of Germany, and hence to let East Germany quit the *Warsaw Pact*. History recorded that Gorbachev received Washington’s assurance that NATO would not expand eastward.¹⁴ In response to that solemn US pledge the once mighty Soviet Union promised Washington and NATO to systematically dismantle its huge nuclear arsenal. For this, the Russian *Duma* ratified the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) which came into force in April 2000.¹⁵ Both sides made ratification dependent on their adherence to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which prohibited an active missile defence shield by both sides.¹⁶

NATO’s expansion commenced about four years after the US pledge not to expand it eastward. This move was not only a breaking of the trust that had developed in the Western and Russian capitals, but was vital in raising fear and even paranoia of Russia’s encirclement by hostile US and Western forces along its borders.

NATO is the biggest military machine ever assembled, and according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) it accounts for 70% of the world’s total defence spending,¹⁷ while the US defence budget is 36% of the global defence spending, whereas Russia’s being a mere 4.1%.¹⁸ In 2016, the US spent \$ 611

billion on defence and, on the other hand, Russia spent \$ 69.2 billion making its budget merely 10.2% of the US. China's defence budget was estimated at \$ 215 billion, making it about a third of the United States.

This makes Russia the 3rd biggest arms spender, closely followed by Saudi Arabia, which spent \$ 63.7 billion.¹⁹ On top of this, due to the US-European Union (EU) sanctions (imposed in 2014), which caused a deep recession, and led to collapse of the *Ruble* and the toppling of oil prices Russia slid even to 4th rank of global defence expenditures in 2015, behind Saudi Arabia.²⁰ However, before 2016, at one point Russian arms export levelled off at the \$ 50 billion mark.²¹

Ikenberry argues that the "far-flung system of multilateral institutions, alliances, trade agreements, and political partnerships' - still reigns...." He insists that not only Russia, China and Iran are incapable of displacing the US as the dominant force behind this order; they also don't have an alternative model. Replacing this system is not an option as "at the end of the day they are about 'gaining voice within the existing order and manipulating it to suit their needs,' not replacing it."²² This makes Russia not a revisionist power but merely a part-time spoiler. Ikenberry asserts that Putin's annexation of the Crimea "reflects 'Russia's geopolitical vulnerability, not its strength'." He argues that "Putin may be 'winning some small battles,' but 'he is losing the war,' as the circle of democratic states and NATO allies draws closer to his borders."²³ He sums up that "Russia is not on the rise; to the contrary, it is experiencing one of the greatest geopolitical contractions of any major power in the modern era."²⁴

It was clear, if Ukraine would be incorporated by mighty NATO; this would create substantial vulnerabilities and weakness for Russia easily exploitable by Washington and, in the worst case scenario, can be used to even destabilize Russia itself. All these factors coupled with other escalatory risks between US and Russia primarily due to latter's first-use nuclear policy against a conventional attack, US deployment of advanced conventional weapons capabilities, missile defence systems and absence of conventional arms control, non-reduction of strategic offensive weapons and confidence-building measures are few irritants/causes of bilateral instability along with other hotspots like Syria and the Baltic region.

This worst case scenario was in no way a figment of some conspiracy writers' imagination, as recent Russian history reveals, in form of the Yeltsin era (1992-2000) when the US power elite used its pliant tool - the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which it controls via voting rights, to wage economic warfare via "shock therapy" in order to undermine the immense wealth of Russia through Western dollar-holding speculators, as Russia was economically at its weakest, having suffered through a very recent stock market crash and drastic *Ruble* devaluations in 1998.²⁵ During this utterly corrupt era, a tiny handful of Russian businessmen seized invaluable state-owned raw material assets and became billionaires overnight. They became the *oligarchs* and their wealth made them into the new masters of post-communist Russia, but their wealth depended on and was denominated in *Dollars*. Washington believed that the *oligarchs* were tied to the West and specifically to the US. As Engdahl exposed, "Washington's

strategy had been to take control of post-Soviet Russia by taking control of its new billionaire oligarchs.”²⁶

Tightening the Noose around Russia

Washington used another *Colour Revolution* in Georgia in November 2003 to encroach further into the former Soviet territory.²⁷ This “Rose Revolution” caused dismay among the Russian elite as it feared that the covert regime overthrow technique would be used even in Russia itself.²⁸ Russian worries were not allayed when, in 2003, the Bush administration provided the small Central Asian former Soviet republic of Georgia with direct military assistance and advisors. This was yet another clear violation of the promise given to Russia about not extending NATO eastward. During October 2004, Putin visited Beijing to formalize an agreement relating to the border issues, which Kremlin termed as “unparalleled heights” in Sino-Russia relations. Simultaneously, a re-energized Russia and the rising China began to emerge as a potential counterweight to US hegemony, which propelled Washington to accelerate its pace of strategic manoeuvres to encircle both Russia and China with military bases and alliance systems stretching right from the Far East to Europe, along with NATO’s simultaneous push toward the Russian hinterland, and the US initiation of its “pivot to Asia” policy of 2012.²⁹

Since 2008, the outgoing Bush administration exerted “enormous pressure on a reluctant European Union and governments to admit two former Soviet Republics, Georgia and Ukraine, into NATO.”³⁰ But even that wasn’t enough provocation for Washington as: “That new NATO expansion came in the wake of a bold announcement in early 2007 by the United States Government that it planned to install advanced missile bases and radar stations in two former Warsaw Pact countries, now NATO members: Poland and the Czech Republic.”³¹ Washington tried to justify its missile bases claiming that they are allegedly a defence against the “rogue states” like Iran and North Korea. This is not spurious as Iranian missile threats nor its matching warheads are not only non-existent but would also require a huge effort by Iran to materialize in the first place. Moreover, Iran is fully aware that the US would annihilate it if it were ever to fire such missiles against the US, or even against its allies.³² Thus, the United States’ claimed defensive missile system is not defensive at all, as it provides the US - in any future military conflict with Kremlin, a major offensive advantage.³³

These events show that Washington’s encirclement is not just focused on Russia, as the US is very actively using a “containment” policy against China and North Korea; by 2010 this resulted in an arms race between the US and China.³⁴ This led to Pyongyang’s testing of Hydrogen weapons and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs, range 6,700-8000 km) in September 2017. Yet, most paramount is the transforming geostrategic trajectory of Middle East where the US has aggressively moved to topple the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria.³⁵ Having already deposed Qaddafi’s Libyan government, the US is also supporting radical groups there to topple the government.³⁶ Moreover, it is obvious that the US aggressively provoked the Iraq War of 2003,³⁷ and still has its troops in Afghanistan.³⁸ Iraq was a longtime ally of the

former Soviet Union, just like Libya was, and Syria still is, while Afghanistan, before the Soviet invasion, was also a client state of the Kremlin.³⁹

The Origins of Anti-Soviet/Russia Grand Strategy

It was Sir Halford Mackinder, the British father of geopolitics, who came up with the Heartland Theory. He believed that Russia was the “geographical pivot of history.” In a crucial policy paper in 1904, Mackinder “asserted that control over Russia would determine who would or could control the vast expanses of Eurasia, and by extension the entire world.” Mackinder saw that “either a Russo-German alliance, or a Sino-Japanese empire that conquered Russia, would be able to contend for world hegemony.”⁴⁰ Mackinder heavily influenced the future US geo-strategists. While the Second World War was still ongoing, he was invited by the influential *Council on Foreign Relations* journal *Foreign Affairs*, in the US, to give his thoughts on post-war geopolitics. “The resulting article, published in 1943, ominously presaged the Cold War. Even before the outcome of World War Two was clear, Mackinder wrote:”

(T)he conclusion is unavoidable that if the Soviet Union emerges from this war as conqueror of Germany, she must rank as the greatest land Power on the globe. Moreover, she will be the Power in the strategically strongest defensive position. The Heartland is the greatest natural fortress on earth. For the first time in history, it is manned by a garrison sufficient both in number and quality.⁴¹

The *Washington Post* writer Michael Dobbs described what transpired in Belgrade. It went back to a secret closed-door meeting in October 1999. In Belgrade in-depth opinion poll of 840 voters of Serbia onto an overhear projection screen was flashed by the US pollster Doug Schoen, drawing the strategy for tumbling the remaining Europe’s rulers of communist-era. His simple as well as effective message was; Milosevic, four lost wars survivor, seventy-eight days of NATO bombing, global sanction decade and two main street uprising remained “completely vulnerable” to a well-effective electoral challenge. According to the results of the poll, oppositional unity was the key. In the later year, it brought down Milosevic!⁴²

Gotov Je (He’s Finished) became the slogan of the revolution. The organizing group behind it was called *Otpor* (resistance).⁴³ Interesting is how initially the US supported Milosevic, during the early 1990s, but; later US official propaganda demonized Milosevic as the next Hitler in terms of atrocities committed. This total reversal suggests a hidden agenda on Washington’s part.⁴⁴ Behind *Otpor* was the US State Department, which was led by US Ambassador to Serbia, Richard Miles. The US Agency of International Development (USAID) had channelled the funds through commercial contractors and through the so-called NGOs – NED, NDI, and International Republican Institute (IRI).⁴⁵ Conspicuous about all these US organizations is that they are overtly supportive of democracy.

As described in *Full Spectrum Dominance*:

Through slick Madison Avenue marketing techniques and careful study of genuine protest movements, the US Government had, in effect, perfected

techniques for 'democratically' getting rid of any opponent, while convincing the world they were brought down by spontaneous outbursts for freedom. It was a dangerously effective weapon.⁴⁶

The Next Targets of Washington's 'Coloured Revolutions'

Within a month of the overthrow of the Milosevic government in Serbia, US Ambassador Richard Miles was inside the tiny Republic of Georgia in what was once part of the Soviet Union.⁴⁷ His assignment was to install a repetition of the Serbian overthrow in Tbilisi, Georgia.⁴⁸ At the time, in 2002, Saakashvili was Georgia's Justice Minister serving under President Eduard Shevardnadze; Miles, however, would teach Saakashvili on how to bring down Shevardnadze.⁴⁹

On its own website, Sharp's institute admitted to being active with opposition 'pro-democracy' groups in a number of countries, including Burma, Thailand, Tibet, Lithuania, Estonia, Belarus, as well as Serbia.⁵⁰ Conveniently, his target countries entirely coincided with the US State Department's target for regime change over the same time period.... Among the advisors to Sharp's institute at the time of the Serbia Otpor! Operation, in addition to Colonel Helvey, was a high-ranking US intelligence specialist, Major General Edward B. Atkeson, US Army (Retired).⁵¹ A former Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence, US Army Europe, and member of the National Intelligence Council under the director of the CIA, General Atkeson also served with the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State. Another advisor to Sharp's Albert Einstein Institution was former US Rear Admiral Gene R. La Rocque (Retired), head of the Center for Defence Information.⁵²

Just as rebellion was synthetically spreading in Georgia, another crucial part of the old Soviet Union and thus Russia's sphere of influence was suddenly added to Washington's "hit list." It was the Ukraine, which lies at the very heart of ethnic Russia, which was now also part of the targeted area of yet another US instigated Coloured Revolution.⁵³

A look at a map of Eurasian geography revealed a distinct pattern to the Washington-sponsored Coloured Revolutions after 2000. They were clearly aimed at isolating Russia and ultimately cutting her economic lifeline—her pipeline networks, that carried Russia's huge reserves of oil and natural gas from the Urals and Siberia to Western Europe and Eurasia – straight through Ukraine. The transformation of Ukraine from independent former Russian republic to pro-NATO US satellite was accomplished by the so-called 'Orange Revolution' in 2004 overseen by John Herbst, appointed US Ambassador to Ukraine in May 2003.⁵⁴ The pipelines traverse through Ukraine. In January 2005, the US State Department bought the Ukrainian Presidency for a mere \$ 20 million.⁵⁵

At a certain point in 2004, with the overthrows of governments in Georgia and the Ukraine, Putin felt compelled to take control over the one strategic asset Russia possessed and that the Western European NATO countries badly needed: Energy, as Russia is by far the world's largest producer of natural gas.⁵⁶

The Pipeline Wars of Eurasia

Full Spectrum Dominance explains why Washington would implement the overthrow of governments around Russia, in what was traditionally seen as the Kremlin's sphere of influence:

The unspoken agenda of Washington's aggressive Central Asia policies after the collapse of the Soviet Union could be summed up in a single phrase: control of energy. So long as Russia was able to use its strategic trump card—its vast oil and natural gas reserves – to win economic allies in Western Europe, China and elsewhere, it could not be politically isolated...The colour revolution in the tiny Republic of Georgia and the effort to draw Georgia into NATO under the new President, US-trained Mikheil Saakashvili, was in part aimed at securing a new oil pipeline route to get the vast oil reserves of the Caspian Sea near Baku in Azerbaijan.⁵⁷

As early as the Clinton administration British Petroleum (BP) had sought to build an oil pipeline that would avoid transit through Russia. Due to the mountainous terrain, the only conceivable route was from Baku across Georgia via Tbilisi, and then across the Black Sea to NATO country Turkey where it would connect with a pipeline to the Mediterranean Turkish port of Ceyhan. The paramount significance of this pipeline was that:

By 2003, Russian had become the world's second largest producer of crude oil, after Saudi Arabia. During the Soviet era the economies of Ukraine, Georgia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and the other Republics of the USSR had been fully integrated economically. After the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, its gas and oil pipelines and export routes across Eurasia continued to operate. Moreover, the former Soviet regions, including Ukraine, continued to receive Russian gas via the state gas monopoly, Gazprom, at highly subsidized prices below that charged in Western Europe.⁵⁸

Full Spectrum Dominance gives us a superb overview of what is at stake in terms of Washington's hegemony:

The Washington strategy of 'democratic' coups – the colour revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine – were designed strategically to cut China off from access to the vital oil and gas reserves of the Caspian Sea, including Kazakhstan and, ultimately Russia. ... The encirclement of Russia would allow for control of pipelines and other ties between it and Western Europe and the Middle East.⁵⁹

In the US elitist *Foreign Affairs* journal Zbigniew Brzezinski who worked as a consultant to British Parliament tells us why the US government has set its predatory eyes on Russia and Eurasia. For starters, China and India are in Eurasia. And after the US, the next six largest economies and military spenders are there. Eurasia accounts for 75% of the world's population, 75% of its energy resources, and 60% of its GNP. This means that together Eurasia's potential power trumps even the United States.⁶⁰

The Endgame for US Dominance over Russia

Whitney's article reveals the hidden new Cold War between the US and the aggrieved Russians:

The US wants to separate the continents, 'prevent the emergence of a new rival', install a tollbooth between Europe and Asia, and establish itself as the guarantor of regional security. To that end, the US is rebuilding the Iron Curtain along a thousand mile stretch from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery are being sent to the region to reinforce a buffer zone around Europe in order to isolate Russia and to create a staging ground for future US aggression. Reports of heavy equipment and weapons deployment appear in the media on nearly a daily basis although the news is typically omitted in the US press.⁶¹

When it comes to explaining all these drastic deteriorations in US-Russian relations even the right wing in the US is candid in its admitting that this represents the grand strategy for the US in 21st century. The war in Ukraine is the typical historical stumbling block needed to trap Russia there so that its trade route plans are frustrated.

Conclusion

Analysts of both the left and right agree that Ukraine has no link with democracy, sovereignty or even aggression of Russia; it is simply an issue of geopolitics. In this vicious game of geopolitics the US will do everything in its power to demonize Putin, to turn Brussels against Kremlin, and to sabotage the Russian economy.⁶² It is reverting to the centuries old game of Divide and Conquer. Keep your potential adversaries at each other's throats all the time: European vs. Russians, Shia vs. Sunni or one ethnic Ukrainian vs. other;⁶³ that is how empires were built.

The reason for the *Coloured Revolutions*, the war over the Ukraine and even the war over Yugoslavia all now make sense! Since US power elites believed that economic downturn of the US can be blocked only by initiating a conflict in the Central Asian region, distracting the plans for EU-Asia (which are economically-integrated) and by dismembering Russia. In order to assert its hegemonic designs over the two continents and to uphold its superpower image in the world Washington seems to be determined to play crucial role in the conflict.⁶⁴ Thus, anything less than this will be considered as a foreign policy defeat by power elites of the US. This indicates that Russia needs to formulate itself for chaotic, fratricidal wars on its borders and coloured regime change turmoil in its capital; it should resist reprisals from its trading partners, conspiracies to devalue its resource based revenues and attacks on its currency.⁶⁵

NOTES

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WITHERED PEACE AMIDST INDIA'S BELLICOSE RHETORIC

*Dr. Arshi Saleem Hashmi and Syed Moazzam Ali**

Abstract

Relations between Pakistan and India have been viewed largely from a classical realism perspective. India's government under Modi has redefined policy outlook towards Pakistan. An aggressive posturing is definitely to address domestic political gains by linking disturbance in Kashmir and internal security with Pakistan's alleged "interference". This however has serious repercussions on long term regional peace. The situation suffers due to the dilemma of different perspectives on what constitutes peace in South Asia. While Pakistan's emphasis is on cordial relations with all neighbours in the region particularly with India- with dignity and resolution of Kashmir issue. For India, peace is only possible if Pakistan accepts India's assertion that terrorism inside India is only due to Pakistan's policy of accommodating "terrorists" and facilitating their activities against India. This makes any meaningful dialogue to move towards peace simply unachievable.

Keywords: Regional Peace, Conflict, Hindutva, Human Security.

Introduction

While governments have primary responsibility to protect civilians and prevent violence, the complexity, scale and diversity of conflict means that no single entity, on its own, can ensure peace. A comprehensive network of relationships and actions is required. The need to discuss conflicts in the context of human security is important because "peace" cannot be achieved if it is established through use of force or authoritarian regime; the idea is of strong peace. Ignoring root causes and focusing on physical violence, any attempt to bring peace would be futile as the conflict would continue to reemerge with new shape and size.

Johan Galtung made the distinction between negative and positive peace.¹ Negative peace is the absence of direct physical violence, while positive peace is absence of structural violence that includes marginalization, injustice, discrimination. Although negative peace was desirable, Galtung argued that more focus should be put on attaining positive peace. Not only was this the best way to prevent future wars, but also to build societies based on human empathy and solidarity.² Any academic discourse on peace explains that while state centric approach is important to maintain the sanctity of borders and sovereignty, it is the people centric approach that brings long term

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dividends for prosperity. Absence of war is important for stability, but it is the absence of structural violence as defined by Johan Galtung that guarantees sustainable peace. In other words, negative peace (absence of war) should not be the only priority, in fact, positive peace (absence of structural violence) should be the only defining direction for peace between India and Pakistan. As mentioned above, classical realism would continue to put both Pakistan and India in zero-sum situation. India's current aggressive policy vis-à-vis Pakistan has further complicated the situation and focus is now on tit for tat response.

Obstacles to a Regime of Peace in South Asia

South Asia, despite growing rapidly remains one of the under developed regions in the world. The reasons are largely political in nature with negative impact on regional connectivity. While the world becomes more interdependent economically, South Asia still faces problems of low intra-regional trade, lack of energy cooperation and little intra-regional tourism. It is not just the traditional sources of conflicts that obstruct peace but a number of *non-traditional security threats*, that includes ethnically motivated insurgencies and religious extremism that undermine state's ability to manage the conflict. These internal conflicts are also important to examine because, in inter-state armed conflicts, a cooperative framework to manage and eventually resolve the conflict is often not well established or followed institutionally.

Inter-state and intra state conflicts have shattered any hope for South Asia's economic, social and political transformation. Communal violence, ethnic conflicts and wars have deeply affected the growth of the region.³ The biggest challenge that demands serious preventive mechanism is to deal with diverse political experiences, conflicting ideologies, issues on ethnic identities and deteriorating economic conditions across and within the states.

India and Pakistan being two major countries of South Asia are locked in a hostile relationship for decades. The size of India geographically and economically has led to the perception of the country dominating the regional politics and influencing smaller nations. India on the other hand argues, the smaller neighbours gang up on multi-lateral regional fora. The tendency to see conflict in zero sum frameworks has led to deteriorated economies in the region. Thus, the uneasiness remains in the region creating obstacles to a regime of peace in South Asia. In order to break this vicious circle of depending on "local public opinion syndrome" which is often not truly representative of the people, the leaders need to bridge the differences and look for cooperation framework.

There have been many arguments about whether the conflicts which are considered to be internal are manifestations of inter-state conflicts, or they are two entirely different spheres where it is hard to find linkages. According to Dahal et al, "the three inter-state wars between India and Pakistan were closely linked to unresolved internal conflicts within the region. The official Pakistani position on the wars of 1948 and 1965 is that these were sparked off by internal developments inside Indian-controlled Kashmir.

Conversely, the Indian position is that these wars were the consequence of Pakistani interference in Indian internal affairs. The positions are reversed with reference to the 1971 war, where Pakistan claimed Indian interference in its domestic matters and India argued that the cause of the conflict was internal breakdown in East Pakistan."⁴ On the other hand, the porous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan changes the conflict dimension as the continuous flow of refugees as well as militants from one side of border to another creates extreme security issues especially with the presence of international forces in Afghanistan. Similarly, India and China have conflicting claims over Aksai Chin area and Arunachal Pradesh in India which are still not completely resolved despite confidence building measures between India and China. Officials of both India and China officially maintain that the territory is part of their area.

In 2006, for instance, the Chinese ambassador to India stated that all of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory.⁵ India reacted with a military buildup as reported in the media.

With such complexities, the line between the intra and inter-state conflicts in South Asia gets blurred making the conflicts even more intricate. Because of the multifaceted effects of internal conflicts in the region, a common understanding of the causes and preventive mechanism is important.

Unity Not Uniformity

The colonial past of the South Asian region provides some continuity through institutions and standards, the shared legacy of English language, rail, road and river connections which are now inactive in post-colonial independent states. There are many other factors that may contribute in bringing some stability for instance, the market forces that are increasing investment and trade in services and the private sector's interest in sectors such as hydropower in Nepal and Bhutan importance of India's realization that instability and lack of development in the neighborhood has great cost. There percussion of such costs include illegal immigration, drug trafficking, religious extremism and lack of credibility outside the region. The other factors include successful examples like ASEAN and EU and the growing realization of the financial costs of not cooperating and the benefits of taking collective attitudes in global multilateral trade, environment, climate change negotiations. In spite of the political and security challenges and many ups and downs in the short term, there are multiple supportive factors which can help in charting a cooperative framework. The choice is either we become prisoners of jingoism and religious hatred or we proudly own our sovereign status while acknowledging our identities. Acknowledgment of our own diversity will help consolidate our own nationhood hence, doing away the fear of losing the identity.

Regional and Local Political Dynamics

During his election campaign in 2014, Modi's provocative anti-Pakistan speeches remained the focus in media.⁶ BJP continued to stress on reorientation of its

foreign policy and India's status regionally and globally. The main focus of this reorientation seems to be to play tough on Pakistan while strengthening friendly relations with Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, thus it is a policy to isolate Pakistan in the region and blaming Pakistan for troubles in Kashmir. The reluctance on India's part not to engage with Pakistan continued since BJP came into power. Every initiative from Pakistan's side to resume talks were declined and even after four years in power, Modi government seems uneasy with any proposal to engage in dialogue for peace and stability in the region.

In the first year of power, the foreign policy agenda of Modi's government was to engage with neighbouring countries. Starting his official state visits, Modi went to Bhutan, and in just over a year he visited all of India's immediate neighbours, with the exception of an official visit to Pakistan, though he made a personal visit to attend Nawaz Shrif's grand daughter's wedding. That visit was in itself dramatic, he came to Pakistan on his way back from Kabul where he blamed Pakistan for terrorism in India. The complex relationship with its two powerful nuclear-armed neighbours, Pakistan and China, continued to mark by tensions and political and military standoffs. The changing regional politics of alliances and partnerships between China and Pakistan and Pakistan's renewed relations with Russia have resulted in new developments. India's involvement in Afghanistan facilitated by US has also contributed in making the regional environment more complex. Indian security establishment harps on the same tune crying for world's attention on the vulnerability of its security accusing Pakistan for violence inside its territory. The narrative is heavily based on 2008 terrorist attack and being victim of such attack by terror groups. The public speeches by Modi and other BJP members directly point Pakistan's security establishment, however, officially India maintain ambiguity as Roy Choudhry states, "any suggestion of a "rogue" element in the ISI responsible for these incidents, or a lack of authorization by the ISI chief, is dismissed by New Delhi.⁷ The duality of India's statements vis-à-vis Pakistan has led to the failure of India's grand plan for isolating Pakistan. The development in the region and Pakistan's engagement with other powers were reason enough to failure of India's narrative which could not bring desired results as perceived by Ajit Doval. The rising power of China and Russia's renewed interest in South Asia is redefining the regional politics with global implications.

With the US providing numerous strategic favors to India, including access to its most advanced weapon systems, Pakistan has moved to strengthen its longstanding strategic ties with China. Increasingly, the region has been polarized into rival Indo-US and Pakistani-China blocs, adding an explosive new element to both the India-Pakistan and US-China conflicts, and raising the danger that conflict between India and Pakistan is no longer a bilateral issue but it could draw in the world's great powers. A further consequence of Washington's downgrading of relations with Pakistan, its principal regional ally during the Cold War, in favour of India, is that it has emboldened the Indian ruling elite in its dealings with Pakistan.

BJP's Hindutva: Impact on the Trajectory of Indo-Pak Bilateral Relations

In order to discuss diplomatic uneasiness in the region due to deteriorating bilateral relations between India and Pakistan, an analysis of the motivation behind Modi government's anti-Pakistan rhetoric is required. BJP never hesitated in its anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim stance even after coming to power. Modi being the right wing hardliner proved that his political standing has more to do with anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim rhetoric than the economic genius that was portrayed through Gujrat model of development. Religion became a burning issue when the BJP, which was struggling to become a national party and an alternative to Congress adopted a resolution in June 1989 to build a temple of Rama in Ayodhya. The Ayodhya issue helped BJP immensely to exploit religion and mobilize masses in favor of Hindutva. It became such a emotional issue in Indian local politics which led to the fall of V.P. Singh government shattering the idea of a secular India with strong democracy. In July 1992, L.K Advani, the leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha, reportedly told the House: "You must recognize the fact that from two seats in parliament in 1985, we have come to 117 seats in 1991. This has happened primarily because we took up the Ayodhya issue".⁸ BJP popularized the narrative that the founding of India was not an independence from the British Colonial rule but the liberation from the Muslim invaders.

BJP having enjoyed public support using religion finds a tough situation when it comes to political administration and policy making. Though claim to be committed to the ideological agenda of RSS, Sandwich between political allies and the its ideological mentor, BJP pretended to change aggressive approach to Hindu nationalism. The change in nomenclature has not made significant difference. Now with focus on "cultural nationalism", the new phrases like true secularism and ensuring internal security are just to camouflage the same old stand of RSS influenced Hindutva ideology. In order to survive politically and reassuring its followers, BJP needs continues war like tense situation that feeds the environment with fear. The real question is how far Modi government would take this ultra-right wing aggressive behavior.

BJP Election Manifesto vis-a-vis Pakistan: An Agenda for "No Peace"

The warmongering agenda that BJP defines the current manifesto of BJP presents revisionist and hawkish undertones, which defines Modi regime's approach in the region particularly towards Pakistan.⁹ For instance, implementing the pledge to remove Article 370 declaring Kashmir as a non-negotiable issue and stepping back from guarantees for special status to state of Jammu and Kashmir as an autonomous state in the Indian Union. This shows the jingoistic approach to escalate tensions with Pakistan. The No first Use principle of Indian nuclear doctrine was considered a weak approach and BJP called for reversal of this policy that successive Indian regimes maintained to prove India's stand as a responsible nuclear state.

BJP's anti Pakistan Rhetoric: Indian Media Changing Security Dynamics

Indian media seems to be “convinced” of the BJP anti Pakistan oratory. BJP leaders do not need to do much, the fire brand “anchor persons” and “security experts” on media do their best to lead the public opinion against Pakistan given there is no major source of information on Pakistan available to common Indians. Pakistan is often shown and described through the lens of terrorism, low economic growth and absence of progressive civil society. Aggressive, abusive and illogical rant against Pakistan contributes to negative image of the country thus reinforcing Hindu nationalist agenda.

Tension at LoC and Prospects for Peace

Cross border firing continues with episodic breaks but it intensified significantly under Modi regime resulting in civilian casualties. Kashmiris being the victim of heavy shelling and now after revoking article 370, they are facing human rights violation by the Modi government. This unrestrained firing along the Line of Control (LoC) violating the 2003 ceasefire agreement, has had negative impact on peace and stability. In its drive for recognition as a great economic power at global stage, the BJP seems to ignore that regional peace and prosperity is the key without which India cannot enjoy the fruits of its rising economic power.

Policy of Restraint undergoing a Shift

Modi's Pakistan policy can be seen within the framework of both constructivism as well as realism. As constructivism requires finding new dimensions in the relationship and making ways to make it happen. The personal relationship between Nawaz and Modi followed that approach. Though the election campaign and manifesto stressed on India's resolve to *punish* Pakistan by pursuing a coercive approach once in power, however, this has not increased India's capacity to coerce its neighbor into any specific outcome. However, the rhetorical approach on bringing terrorism as the most important agenda is the indication of realism, which Indian regime is still continuing. Given the disparity between Indian and Pakistani economy, the realist in Modi demands an aggressive posture towards Pakistan.

As a Hindu nationalist party the BJP pursue an anti Muslim agenda and Modi's vote bank requires that he should consistently adopt an anti-Pakistan approach toward Pakistan. However, the constructivist lens provides a window of opportunity to Modi's foreign policy regarding facing the international community pressure and external compulsions. For instance, the developing China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and growing Chinese investment in it is a matter of concern to India. While on the other hand development of Gwadar port also raise serious concerns for India. Therefore, under constructivism Modi during Nawaz Sharif's regime softened his stand toward Pakistan in order to maintain a delicate balance in its external policy approach.

Aggressive Policy and Question of 2003 Ceasefire Agreement

The architects of "Surgical Strike" perhaps not aware of the fact that there is a de-facto international boundary that exists between India and Pakistan along the Line of control. If for a moment, Indian claim of "successful surgical strike" is accepted, it opens another front for India to respond, it was the first time the political leadership publically announced its violation of LoC and owned trans-LoC operations. The claim makes India violator of the LoC, thus a breach of 2003 agreement.¹⁰ Though Pakistan vehemently denied any such strike took place, India continue to boost its redefinition of "security policy" by a claim of violation of ceasefire agreement. Hence the action puts India in yet another complex situation where if it has to weigh in the repercussions of its aggressive policy towards Pakistan.

India's Dilemma

The boosting of a "successful" surgical strike puts India in a complex situation, with claims of trans-LoC border operation, jeopardizing the future of any meaningful engagements between the two countries. Violating LoC demonstrated India's assertion of its control over whole of Jammu and Kashmir. India is now facing a dilemma of facing the rising public expectation of hard approach and the reality of being cautious diplomatically. Policies are not based on public speeches foreign policy in particular is a complex process that goes beyond political posturing. The current Indian approach has toxic effects making it hard to maintain its claim of a responsible democratic secular state. The aggressive tone and gestures that favor the myopic intolerant view of the "other" may be good for media but it is completely out of step with the rule of interaction between nation-states. Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh summed up India's dilemma in these words, "The Modi government has slowly but surely undermined the values that any democratic polity should fiercely protect. Important national institutions vital for good governance are experiencing unprecedented new strains. Our neighbourhood is far less secured than it was in 2014. Our relations with neighbours have deteriorated in the last four years."¹¹ Former Minister Manish Tiwari highlighting the implications of ultra-Hindu nationalist orientation of Indian regional policy stated, "India has lost its eminent position in South Asia as a consequence of reckless adventurism in its neighbourhood. Today, the neighbourhood is bending towards China, with India looking on like a hapless bystander. Even in Afghanistan, where the attention of what remains of the 'Western Alliance' is focused, India is a non-player.

Though enjoying great partnership with the US administration, there are other voices in the US raising alarm on rising insecurity in the region due to Modi government's patronage to Hindu nationalists. The US National Intelligence Council (NIC) in its Global Trends report raised some important points, acknowledging that "the BJP is increasingly leading the Indian government to incorporate Hindutva into policy, may spark increased communal tensions in India, and further complicate relations with Pakistan and Bangladesh."¹²

Can We Expect a Change in Attitude?

Modi regime is now faced with dilemma of balancing its image as a responsible state in international political system and dealing with the pressures of local politics of Hindutva.

The hard school of thinking in India has nothing substantial to offer and this has become clear over the last 20 years. Nuclear capability of the two nations has changed the dynamics making Indian's conventional powers irrelevant. For Pakistan, reconciliation with Modi can only be possible if the BJP sheds off its *Hindutva* agenda, abandons anti-Pakistan rhetoric and makes an effort to cool down anti-Muslim sentiment within India. Unfortunately, the world community is ignoring the internal dynamics of Indian brinkmanship and unilaterally expects more and more bending from Pakistan.

Then emotional hype on "infiltration of terrorists" in Indian held Kashmir a consistent tool to divert attention from contentious issues. The current scene of India's internal politics suggests that the situation will last as such for some time. Stirring up Hindu-Muslim and anti Pakistan rhetoric would definitely bring the backlash affecting the most publicized "secular" "democratic" image. This wouldn't provide the same kind of benefits that it did at the domestic political level. By the same logic, however, Modi government would continue to accommodate communal violence by its affiliate groups to divert public demand for economic revolution promised in BJP manifesto.

Future of Peace in South Asia

Post 9/11 global politics redefined the dynamics of regional stability in South Asia. Pakistan's enhanced its policy focus more on the western border dealing with terrorism both internally and across the border in Afghanistan. While India's closeness with the US and its strategic partnership further added new dimensions in already complex relationship. This change in focus led to some to believe that the decade old hostile relationship between India and Pakistan would now take a back seat and for a few years Musharraf and Manmohan Singh regime did moved forward with peace initiatives. But as always, the no sustainable progress was made to ensure long term regional stability. India-US strategic partnership and growing Indian role in Afghanistan increased the level of mistrust between the two nations. Soon after coming in power, Modi government with full backing from the US unleashed a policy of portraying Pakistan as "state-sponsoring-terrorism" while deteriorating situation in Kashmir and India's high handedness led Pakistan to voice more forcefully its concerns internationally on human rights violations and use of violence against innocent people Kashmir. India's claim of cross border terrorism remains an old tactic of diverting the global attention from state oppression against the Kashmiris.

India is fundamentally satisfied with the territorial status quo in South Asia, including in Jammu and Kashmir.¹³ However Kashmir remains the least important issue. On August 5, Modi government abruptly made the decision to withdraw the special status given to Kashmir in Indian Constitution under article 370. This unilateral

decision tantamount to an "Indian Coup" where Kashmir's democratic freedom is abruptly abolished by executive decree. India's arbitrary bifurcation of the state into two union territories (Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh) is also legally contentious. The action has resulted in mass protests all over the world and international media has responded with questioning the Modi government's policy of human rights violations. The UN had special meeting on the issue after fifty years, other international organizations for instance, EU, Amnesty international, Human Rights Watch and Genocide Alert had special reports on the inhuman conditions in Indian Occupied Kashmir. Indian aggressive approach has exposed its anti-Muslim policies to fulfill the agenda of Akhand Bharat.

For India, dialogue for peace means engaging in confidence building measures, the future of Siachen Glacier, water management related to Wullar/Tulbul navigation project, Sir Creek, economic and trade cooperation, people to people contact and finally terrorism which appears to be the core issue. Pakistan's narrative on peace in South Asia starts with Kashmir conflict being the core issue and then of course engagement with India to resolve other problems. The difference of perspectives makes the realization of any meaningful cooperation between the two neighbours difficult. The complex web of perceptions is the major obstacle to peace and stability in the region. For India, CBMs is the way for final reconciliation between the two nations. For Pakistan, CBMs, though tried in the past under various initiative since 1965 war, that includes Tashkent Declaration, Simla Agreement, Agra summit and Lahore declaration produced no result because of India's lack of commitment on moving towards addressing the Kashmir dispute. The approach to "resolve" smaller issues with Pakistan, places India in its comfort zone, it is attractive to India because if agreed upon, India would find it more convenient to give concede on smaller disputes while this would put Pakistan in an uncomfortable situation to make compromise on bigger issues like that on Jammu and Kashmir.

According to Ashley Tellis, "given this inevitability, Indian policymakers want to avoid a sequential negotiation in which Islamabad pockets New Delhi's concessions on the smaller issues first and then stonewalls India when the most nettlesome obstacles finally come up for discussion. India's status quo disposition in regards to Pakistan is corroborated by its burgeoning ambitions outside of South Asia. India's economic success after its post-1991 reforms, the rise of China as a new great power, and the transformation of US Indian relations—to further enable New Delhi to steadily shift its focus beyond its immediate vicinity".¹⁴ India's security perceptions contradicts that of its neighbouring states resulting in tensions, lack of trust, little cooperation and other hostilities.

The future of peace in South Asia would remain bleak unless there is change in understanding the conflict. With different perception of the problem, any effort to engage positively for long term conflict resolution would continue to result in failure. What is thus required to adopt a different framework of understanding conflict, human security paradigm provides that framework as state security paradigm based on realism

has further strengthened the long claimed positions ignoring the changing security, political and economic dynamics in the region.

Human Security Paradigm for the Prevention of Armed Conflicts

The peaceful prevention of deadly conflict is a paradigm for addressing conflict issues, as well as a set of policies for building national and global security in the 21st century.¹⁵ It is an alternative to the policy of “preemptive” war and military dominance. It begins from the premise that war is not inevitable and that preventing the outbreak of violent conflict is less costly and can be more effective than responding, often through military force, once crises have already erupted. It seeks to understand the causes of conflict, both proximate and root, and to address them before disputes becomes violent. It seeks to address both immediate conflict issues and longer-term structural issues of injustice. Peaceful prevention frees up resources that can be used to meet basic human needs. Its benefits extend beyond any single state’s borders. One country’s armed conflict can result in economic destabilization and undermine human security for an entire region. At the same time, successful prevention of violent conflict in a country can contribute to the stability and resilience of the surrounding region. Communities and societies with the capacity to peacefully manage conflict can often better address other issues such as economic development, human rights, and political stability.

The preventive mechanism works through a policy of collaboration where the government in power device a strategy to take collaborative decision that result in win-win situation for both the parties to the conflict and provide some face saving opportunity that help in accepting the solution.

The cooperative mechanism should not only focus on implications of conflicts which usually becomes the main agenda in any of the initiatives taken in the region. But all the more important is to pay attention to the causes of the conflict. Any strategy to reduce conflict with eventual resolution largely depends on the leaders capacity to uphold and justify decisions keeping in view the interests of the parties to the conflict. Globalization has connected the world with innumerable benefits but it has also contributed in changing nature of the security threats. States are affected by cyber warfare, financial crimes, smuggling of weapons and Terrorism to name a few. There is a need to develop tools that are different from the ones applied in the past by identifying ways to help each other in identifying common approaches to combating these challenges.

Cooperation amid Conflict

The resolution of any conflict is based on not just on elimination of violence but a total transformation to positive peace. Kashmir conflict appears to be a protracted conflict where the legacy of hostilities and prevailing mistrust has made any attempt to sustainable negotiations great challenge and the area remains prone to violence. International Crisis Group’s report substantiated the argument in its report where it

stated, "as there have been little signs of neither demilitarization, nor an effective end to human rights abuses by Indian security forces, Kashmiri alienation still runs deep and easily fuelling public resentment. This has made it extremely difficult to build viable and sustained dialogue between the main parties".¹⁶ The lackluster peace process has resulted in an environment of negative peace. T.V Paul argues, "as there have been few attempts to sufficiently address the root causes of the conflict, most mediation attempts and talks have been centered on conflict management, rather than conflict resolution".¹⁷ Peace Scholars like Peter Wallensteen discussing the lack of any meaningful effort to address the root causes of the conflict states, "this makes it hard to point out any particular success or failures of conflict resolution. International mediation efforts have arguably contributed to reduced tensions; however, this has had little overall effect on resolving the conflict". When introducing the concept of positive peace, Galtung implicitly argued, "peace is something more than 'absence of war.'"¹⁸ David Barash summarizes the dilemma, "by pointing to examples of violations of social and political right, segmentation, fragmentation and marginalization of groups within Kashmir, one can to some extent argue the presence of structural violence in Kashmir suggest a fundamental failure of conflict resolution."¹⁹

The rise of Hindu nationalism particularly under Modi regime is gradually transforming India into an intolerant extremist society where any attempt for increased Kashmir autonomy is violently resisted. This intolerance is based on the fear among the Hindutva supporters that accepting Kashmiris right of self-determination would destabilize the Indian federation. Successful resolution of Kashmir conflict has become hostage to Indian domestic politics. The current Indian regime has exploited Kashmir as an issue of Indian identity which is now deeply embedded in societal structures. This has diminished any prospect of public support for peaceful resolution of the conflict.

In South Asian context, the process of conflict resolution has become a complex task due to increasing structural changes and involvement of growing number of actors. Rhetoric of identity as main reason of domestic limitations for policy change has made it difficult to address causes of conflict and changes in its character.²⁰ Third party intervention to facilitate dialogue both formally and informally has helped reduce tension and prevent outbreak of war to some extent but these attempts have never been sustainable. One factor for this failure is reducing the conflict to essentially a territorial claim resulting in absence of any structural peace building from below bringing it to elite peace-making objective. As Curle points out, "successful peace-building requires a change at grass-root level through multilateral mediation, rather than traditional diplomacy".²¹

Need for Engagement

The competing outlook between India and Pakistan persists due to the security competition. To redefine their national strategies for a change in strategic objectives needs revolutionary steps. The Indian policy perspective is based on its satisfaction with the status quo on its current geographical boundaries though BJP's Hindutva narrative has put a dent in its long maintained position by public rhetoric of reclaiming the entire

sub continent. Pakistan on the other hand demands the re-opening of the issues which are still considered unfinished and unsettled, Kashmir being the most important one.

Engagement however, is in the interest of both states: 1) To help deescalate crisis given the nuclear status of the two nations, 2) to improve their global reputation as responsible nations believing in peaceful resolution of conflicts, 3) to ensure sustained economic development for the entire South Asian region by investing in human security through opportunities of trade and business for common people and finally 4) to break the cycle of uncertain stability that the two nations have been living with for decades feeding an environment of fear of catastrophic wars.

The absence of structural peace building and increasing violent characteristic of the conflict has contributed in limiting any scope of viable peace process. Describing the situation, Bose argues, "Kashmir will remain a zone of intractable and recurrent conflict". Nuclear capability has certainly works as a deterrence but the situation demands an conducive environment for long term resolution as T.V Paul states, "Pakistan's consistent suggestion for third party support shows that rivalry is negotiable rather than inevitable."²² Given the fact that there is rise in tension in recent years, both Pakistan and India should have a mechanism to engage without being hostage to domestic politics.

The ability to accommodate debate beyond political level will help achieve a meaningful settlement of the conflict. The more Kashmir becomes ungovernable for India, it would not only be disastrous for the Kashmiri people but a blot to India's claim of secular democracy. Instead of pursuing an aggressive desire to be recognized for its economic and military superiority vis-à-vis Pakistan, India needs pragmatism and reconsideration of its zero-sum perspectives.

Though cooperative framework is questioned in many scholarly works with different case studies, for instance Laurie Nathan questions "the credibility of the concept of security community when applied to regions like Africa suffering from internal instability and violence."²³ He focuses on the negative impact that internal violence can have on interstate relations. He states, "important not to define security in military terms only. Security in the 21st century is more than the absence of war or the threat of war. Increasingly it means: the security of our societies, our infrastructure, our energy supply. A modern security policy for the 21st century must rely even more on human security. And it must have a cooperative approach if it is also to be effective against the new asymmetric security threats."²⁴

In order to establish sustainable peace order in South Asia, a renewed step needs to be taken for unhindered cooperative security framework. Mutual trust is the key that paves the way for practical cooperation. A process of disengaging with the past hostilities of the 20th century is too be adopted leaving behind outdated thinking based on competing behaviour and hegemonic designs. Mohammad Ayoob sums up the complex security dilemma when he write, "a comprehensive security community can be best achieved when "territorial satiation, societal cohesion, and political stability"²⁵ prevail within states as is the case in most industrialized countries. The absence of these

internal traits, i.e., effective statehood, often leads, in turn, also to inter-state violence. This view tends to lead to the conclusion that the inter-state security dilemma is less due to the uncertainty of the state actors about the defensive vs. offensive intentions by the others. Rather, it is related to the prevalence of malign and predatory motives of the governments trying to stabilize their internal and external position."²⁶

There is always a chance of ignoring the vital issues while handling the violent conflict. Mary Kaldor argues that in the course of protracted asymmetric conflicts there comes a stage when the reasons for the conflict get subsumed under the violence and the desperate desire to stop the violence overwhelms all else. The danger is that resolution of the conflict will provide the desired cessation of violence but could sidestep the vital issues of justice and rights that were originally at the core of the conflict. In such cases the peace achieved predicates another cycle of violence with peace in interregnum. It truly presents the South Asian dilemma, where the violent conflicts have been managed with the aim to contain violence but the main issues remain unresolved.

The institutional apparatus of South Asian states remains infinitely stronger than other regions facing armed conflicts for instance the Arab world, even in countries that have been systematically undermining, if not dismantling it, over decades. The capacity for good governance and human security remains endemic across much of South Asia and the potential for conflict continues to increase. Good leadership with a vision to keep the state and the region free of armed conflict can initiate policy decision that can help realize the goal for peaceful South Asia. This has been the lesson of history, states which demonstrate rational attitude with wisdom and collective good, their people flourish, nation become stronger. If the states are caught up with irrational egoistic politics, corruption, opportunism and violent behavior, nations suffer; economies deteriorate, fall into the trap of civil war and sometimes collapse or disintegrate.

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PAKISTAN'S SECURITY COMPULSIONS: EXTERNAL & INTERNAL DIMENSIONS

*Muhammad Samrez Salik and Khadija Younus**

“While history has been unkind with Pakistan, its geography has been its greatest benefit.”
(Stephen P.Cohen)

Abstract

The international security environs are undergoing drastic transformation. The related changes/evolution has diverse implications for countries both in the developed and developing world. In this regard, Pakistan as one of the major stakeholders in the regional security dynamics is impacted in multiple ways; creating opportunities and challenges simultaneously. Emerging Multi-polar world order, ever-increasing globalization with free movement of people, ideas & finances and rise of non-state actors are underlining the need to have an in-depth analysis of strategic national security appraisal for Pakistan. Consequently, this article takes into account perspectives on internal security paradigms; economic, political, governance and internal peace & security, for evolving a collective security perspective. Taking guidance from Quaid-i-Azam's vision of “Peace within and Peace without”, the article propounds proposals for collective national security policy formulation to reap maximum benefits from the increasingly pre-eminent geo-economic developments underway in the region and beyond.

Keywords: Multi-Polar World, National Security Perspectives, Territorial Integrity, Socio-Political Stability, Geo-Economics.

Introduction

The concept of security is challenged, yet essential to emphasize government issues of state security and progress in the present chaotic world.¹ Currently, three main trends are influencing issues identified with Pakistan's security mechanism. Firstly, the re-distribution of power from West to East and North to South is fostering Multi-polar World Order. Secondly, the fast-paced globalization and swift technological developments encouraging free movement of things, funds, individuals and thoughts, uniting and isolating people at the same time. Thirdly, the rise of non-state actors, utilizing weapons of fear and intimidation for political dividends, has been posing national security challenges.² In consolidation, these issues are testing the security of states in different ways. With an enormously central strategic location, Pakistan by virtue of developments along its eastern and western borders, has been impacted by the mutuality of these dynamics. The prognosis for future suggests that maneuverings in Pakistan's neighborhood are likely to intensify to harm its national security and

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development. At the same time, having a history replete with turbulence, wars, calamities, disasters and to top it off dismemberment, defence and security attains higher priority for Pakistan. On the domestic level, impacted by the security conundrums of the region, internal dynamics of security are likely to emerge as a source of key concern. Such dynamics underline the ever – increasing importance of national security policy formulation with the support and consent of all stakeholders which must be rigorously implemented as a national duty.

This work intends to dilate upon Pakistan's security challenges and opportunities while underlining the most important perspectives and recommendations for making internal and external security impregnable. The primary appraisal of security environment portends not only challenges but also opportunities through the prism of history for augmenting long - lasting security. It is argued that there exists a collective resolution infused with positivity for betterment and improvement in the country today. In this milieu, tapping on potentials including Belt and Road's Initiative (BRI) connectivity projects especially China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), present multiple opportunities for improving directional, formational and capability - related dimensions of security for Pakistan. This positive vibe if seized and translated by our leaders, holds the capacity to considerably direct the nation towards a path of prosperity. Nevertheless, the path is beset with difficulties, which merits realization and unwavering commitment by all of us.

Geographical Perspective

Human society is closely knitted to its geography as the history of both is a mirror image of each other. The relationship between characteristics and necessities of the environment of a state has been established since time immemorial³, whereas the geographical location of a country defines its geo-strategic significance. The biggest strength of Pakistan lies in her strategic location, that in seventy years of her history, Pakistan has twice played role of a front line state for the US, and now a third time for China. Hence, geo-strategic location has enormous strategic politico-economic significance.⁴ It is seen as a "Zipper State" for three key regions of Asia i.e. Central Asia, Middle East and South East Asia. In the immediate neighborhood, China, India, Iran and Afghanistan share long land borders with Pakistan with a long coastline of North Arabian Sea. The Middle East and Central Asian states form the extended neighborhood of Pakistan.

Robert D Kaplan reiterates that geography is an indispensable "backdrop" to the human drama of ideas, will and chance.⁵ The same goes true for Pakistan which suffered immense losses due to its geography besides reaping fruits too. The management of its Eastern wing which was naturally prone to floods and cyclones continued to multiply problems for the newly born state after independence in 1947. After the war of 1965 with India, the country was still reeling out of cascade of shocks when in 1971 the enemy again struck, resulting in dismemberment of Pakistan. The problems did not end here; as playing twice the role of a frontline state for the US has not come without a price in its checkered history. The trial and tribulations which Pakistani state and society have suffered are huge and are one of a kind in the history of

mankind. Apart from this, Pakistan's strategic location continues to bestow upon it a character that provides a link between the Middle East and South Asia. Pakistan has retained this pivotal importance since Cold War till today.⁶ The crucial geo-political position of Pakistan makes it a state which cannot be avoided by global and regional players.

Topography

Pakistan's topography is a momentous blend of landscape diversifying from plains to deserts, forests, hills and plateaus to coastal areas of the Arabian Sea in the South to the towering mountains of Central Asia in the north. Pakistan is home to Himalayas and Karakoram mountain ranges with Karakoram being the most heavily glaciated part of the world outside the Polar Regions. Pakistan is endowed with the densest consolidation of high peaks in the world with five mountains over 8000 meters, including K₂, the second highest on Earth. In the north, there is another great mountain range of Hindu Kush which is 800 km long and stretches between central Afghanistan and northern Pakistan. The highest peak there is Tirich Mir (7708 meters) situated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province of Pakistan which separates Central Asia from South Asia.

Demography – Past and Present

Pakistan's unique geographical history has given it an immense social and natural diversity. There exist many features, cultures and distinctions peculiar only to Pakistan. Its historical significance is characterized by many celebrated features including the Great Indus Valley Civilization developed with Harappa, Mohenjo Daro and Mehrgarh being the large cities of this civilization.

However, by 1700 BC, this civilization disappeared yet its influence and remains are still found in the subsequent civilizations.⁷ Next thousand years saw the invasions from South West and Central Asia. By 1500 BC, Aryans came to Punjab and settled all over India. Later, Punjab was conquered by Persians during 500 BC who were followed by Alexander the Great. Then, history witnessed establishment of Mauryan Empire that was subsequently conquered by the Greeks who established their capitals in Peshawar and Rawalpindi. A visit through the pages of history suggests that many civilizations including the Indians, the Greeks, the Arab Muslims, and the Turks, followed by the mighty Mughals ruled the present day Pakistan.

This rich civilizational history has great bearing on the culture and sociology of the people of Pakistan who are a fine blend of multi-ethnic and multi-lingual community. Pakistani society and culture comprises numerous ethnic groups ranging from the Punjabis, Kashmiris, Saraikis, Makranis, Baloch, Hazaras, Pashtuns to the Baltis, and Shinkai communities. Pakistan's culture is greatly influenced by neighbouring countries' cultures such as Afghan, Turkish, Iranian and South Asian Indians, Central Asia and Middle East. This diversity of cultural influences finds expression in dress, food, language and religious practices.⁸ However, the truth underlying the demography of a nation is never defined by its boundaries, landscape or

geography but it is the character, steadfastness, unity and perseverance of its men and women that make it stand out tall. This dynamism has found ample expression in Pakistani people who rise from the ashes like a phoenix each time they face calamities and disasters.

Resilience – Enduring Feature

Michael Kugelman of Asia News Network says “Resilience is a trait often used to describe Pakistanis, and rightly so. No matter what is thrown at them Pakistanis persevere”. This is evident from Pakistan’s political history of playing the front line state twice: in the ‘Cold War Era’ and then to win ‘Global War on Terror’ in recent times. This front line status has inflicted huge losses to Pakistan so far. But it is the resilience of Pakistani state and society that keeps it afloat. It is heartening that despite experiencing bouts of violence and instability, of divergence and divisiveness, the country not only has existed but also excelled as a compact and promising state especially with China’s BRI vision elevating its stature further in the emerging multi-polar world.

Burden of History with Difficult Neighborhood

At the time of creation, Pakistan was akin to a hapless newborn. Inequitable distribution of resources at the time of partition, with managing two wings East & West Pakistan, 1000 miles apart with an utterly hostile enemy in between was preordained. Losing her founding father in the second year of her life and fighting a war against arch rival India set the stage for tumultuous times lying ahead for the newly born state. Since independence, Pakistan has been facing socio-economic challenges due to inequitable distribution of assets at the time of partition and political instability throughout. Threats emanating from its eastern neighbor India predominantly because of the unfinished agenda of subcontinent’s division in the form of Jammu & Kashmir have also cost it heavily, denying it socio-economic development by diverting its resources for strengthening security. On Kashmir issue dispute continuously knocking at the door of United Nations and international community as the single biggest example of forsaking the right of self-determination. So far, the resolve of Kashmiris stays immovable and they won't rest till they get independence. This reality is obvious to the Indian policy makers, yet the subversive actions denying Kashmiris their innate right are underway jeopardizing peace in South Asia particularly creating security worries for Pakistan.

Recognizing the changes underway in global and regional geo-political and geo-economic environment, foreign policy of Pakistan is somewhat balanced. However, it needs to focus on the future of Pakistan-India relations which have to be based on respect and peaceful co-existence. There is a need that both nations must try to shed burden of history by resolving long standing disputes especially Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution. To that end, Pakistan by following Quaid-i-Azam’s directive of ‘Peace Within and Peace Without’ may gain maximum benefits from the emerging geo-economic developments underway via China’s BRI vision of connectivity and economic well-being for the people of this region and beyond.

Assailability: Potentials and Pitfalls

The new regional alignments are orienting Pakistan towards diversifying her security, strategic and geopolitical priorities and strategies to address internal and external challenges to safeguard its national interests. These developments also compelled the political and security leadership to apprise its National Security Policy (NSP) and National Internal Security Policy (NISP) to deter internal and external threats. First and foremost prerequisite for Pakistan's security is to secure its borders and territorial integrity at the same time undertaking threat analysis emanating from its immediate neighborhood in the east, west and south. Given China's BRI Vision and specifically CPEC in Pakistan, there emerges a new phenomenon of 'Regional Security'. Furthermore, there is realization in Pakistani security calculus that ensuring connectivity and strong economy are cardinal parts of national security as Pakistan's bright future hinges on this economic corridor.

Analyzing and assessing Pakistani borders' vulnerability to attacks predominantly from eastern, western and southern borders is discussed here. For that purpose, assailability factor needs to be examined at length. Assailability is based on geography and kind of borders/neighborhood a country has. A circle is most suited for defence as all points on the perimeter are equidistant from the centre. A force in the middle can react to a threat emerging at any point on the perimeter.

The shape of a country can be compared to the circle to assess the state of assailability. Pakistan being an elongated country has a hostile neighbor on the East and an unfriendly country to the West. Pakistan's total land borders are 6774 km; India 2240 km, Afghanistan 2430 km, Iran and China 909 km and 595 km respectively. Based on nature of relationship, border with China is the only land border where assailability may be measured as zero. Keeping in view nature of relationship with neighbours and emerging developments following factors will define degree of assailability:

- Prevalence of disputes.
- Degree of animosity/ hostility.
- Propensity to resort to application of military instrument.
- Nature of military potential available.
- Geography of borders.

Thus, borders with the rest of the three countries have a degree of assailability, worst being with India where assailability can be quantified at 7 or 8 on scale of 10. In case of Afghanistan, this figure is 5 and for Iran it is 2, as shown in figure.

Disputes in Neighborhood

Since independence, Pakistan has always faced territorial claims by Afghanistan and lingering issue of Jammu and Kashmir with India.⁹ Keeping assailability factor in mind, Pakistan has been facing continuous threats from these two countries situated on western and eastern borders respectively.

India

In one way or the other, Lord George Nathaniel Curzon influences Indian strategy circles that looked at the world from an indistinguishable geographical point of view as Indian elites do today. Curzon's India comprised of the lands of present day Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma. This India, in Curzon's view, required shadow zones of impact, particularly in the Iranian Plateau, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and in South East Asia as far as to the Gulf of Siam (Gulf of Thailand).¹⁰ It is intriguing how India is stressing on same shadow zones of impact in the region.

This Indian mindset is manifested in the decades old dispute of Jammu & Kashmir. Ever since Pakistan's independence, the issue of Kashmir has been at the base of Indo-Pak rivalries.¹¹ The issues of Siachin, Sir Creek and water keep on impacting Indo-Pak relations besides their conflicts gaining a nuclear dimension too. It is because of these cardinal issues that there is greater concentration of forces and security mechanisms on Pakistan's eastern borders to counter any adventure by India. Furthermore, recent Indian Cold Start and Doval Doctrines are completely Pakistan-centric, presupposing that India can cross the international border, temporarily hold Pakistani territory and launch punitive multi-dimensional strategic and economic targets without triggering a general conflict. Also, repeated violations of the Line of Control renders this border dangerous, perpetuating, threat from India. To tackle these threats, Pakistan has developed a range of nuclear weapons that will present a theoretically insurmountable barrier to any Indian design seeking military aggression against Pakistan, also putting in place requisite border security mechanisms to ensure its territorial integrity.

Afghanistan

The bi-lateral relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan have mostly been unfriendly since 1947. The hostility has developed into complexity due to regional disputes to repeated allegations of cross-border terrorism in the Post – 9/11 scenario. Afghanistan's peaceful future depends on a promising regional cooperative milieu, with Pakistan as an important stakeholder. On the other hand, a shaky Afghanistan destabilizes Pakistan, complicating its capacity to restore her security and economy by suppressing internal militancy. However, Pakistan's geostrategic outlook, military operations like Al-Mizan and Zarb-e-Azb and limitations of its counter terrorism policies due to difficult, shared and mountainous border with Afghanistan have not so far brought any resolute changes for lasting peace in Afghanistan. Afghanistan shares religious, cultural and traditional values, and is dependent on Pakistan for transit and bilateral trade. Nonetheless, the absence of radical change in Pakistan's strategic outlook and behavior towards militant groups caused resentment in Afghanistan, India and United States. The presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan along more than 2000 kilometers of porous border pose serious concerns for Pakistan's security. The Durand Line remains a thorny issue between the two countries whereas India's machinations to create instability inside Pakistan continue through its consulates situated in Afghanistan close to Pakistani border.¹²

Recently, emergence of Daesh on Afghanistan's side of the western border is a great concern for Pakistan. The group has resources, manpower and safe havens in the foothills of the White Mountain (Speen Ghar) on the other side of the Durand Line, where it has virtually established its writ. In this respect, blaming each other's government will not solve the problem as the threat is transnational and could only be addressed through collective response mechanisms. Bajaur and Mohmand agencies' border areas, being high-threat zones, need to have regular surveillance.¹³ Fencing the border is another hard step taken in national interest. Furthermore, proper border management needs seriousness and commitment from both Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, the Afghan Unity Government is influenced by the US and India which do not want stability in Afghanistan so as to keep Pakistan unstable for their vested interests.

Iran

Another porous border of Pakistan is in the southwest with Iran running over almost 900 Kilometers. This border is infested with drug trafficking, illegal border crossings, terror attacks, human trafficking and unlawful transportation into both Iran and Pakistan. Iranian authorities have built a fence to prevent illegal trespassing and trade. This has caused friction between the two countries. The Balochs also claim that the wall was built against the will of the Balochi people who populate both sides of the border. These border tensions between them are creating security implications at the junction.

Over the years, the Pak-Iran relationship has been characterized as cold due to Pakistan's closeness with Saudi Arabia, which has close relationship with the US has further increased the crevices in Pak-Iran relations. Iran views the Islamic Military Alliance (IMA) as a coalition of Sunni Muslim countries against Shia Iran and its other allies in the Middle East. Against this backdrop, Iran's relations with Pakistan have deteriorated while Pakistan's former Chief of Army Staff, General Raheel Shareef has been appointed as Commander-in-Chief of Islamic Military Alliance. Similarly, Pakistan views Indian involvement in Chabahar as threat to its security since India declares her ambitions of isolating Pakistan regionally and internationally. Addressing these issues, calls for elimination of cross border movements in the region promising significant financial incentive, physical links through Iran - Pakistan gas pipeline and instituting effective mechanism of Border Management Commission between Pakistan and Iran. Alongside, propagating Chabahar and Gwadar as compatriots instead of pitching both ports as rivals for ensuring enduring relations between the two neighbours.

China

In its northeast, Pakistan shares border with China which is connected through Karakorum Highway that passes through the Gilgit-Baltistan province. Recently, China has initiated BRI in order to connect with Eurasia, Central Asia, Middle East and Africa through a network of land and sea routes. Under China's BRI vision, Pakistan provides pivotal position through 'Gwadar Port' along with both land and sea routes running through its territory, considered to be of immense importance for China's rise as an economic world power.

North Arabian Sea

Pakistan has a coastline of 960 kms along the Indian Ocean. The maintenance of shipping lanes into the main ports of Karachi and Bin Qasim is vital to Pakistan's economy. Pakistan has significant location in North Arabian Sea in particular and in Indian Ocean in general which could control the world trade by playing effective role in the region.¹⁴

Keeping in view external threats to Pakistan, the foremost is Indian hegemony which is multiplying its influence through close cooperation with the US and other western allies. Threats emanating from Arabian Sea can be divided into war and peace time periods; war time potential threats entail joint Indian Naval, Air and land Forces' strikes. There also exists a probability of attack by Extra Regional Forces predominantly by the US Navy and Air force in tacit understanding with India, in case Pakistan is required to be subdued. Whereas peace time activities detrimental to security include terrorism related acts, piracy, human trafficking and narcotics, clandestine and subversive activities including mining, drone or rocket and suicidal attacks by anti-state actors. Nevertheless, Pakistan's Armed Forces through their modest but intelligent and technologically advanced inventory are fully capable to defend against any aggression on any of its borders by any country. Now, the discussion focuses on critical challenges to internal security of Pakistan.

Economic Security

Any democratic country aspires to have in place sustainable governance with positive economic indicators, good health and education infrastructure, satisfactory internal security guaranteeing all citizens' social security while providing them equal opportunities to progress and prosper. Pakistan despite being a democratic state has been faced with challenges like poor governance, political instability, fragile law and order, lack of social justice, rising national debt and to top it off an internal security threatened by extremism and militancy.

Further, corruption is common and goes unabated. Pakistan is positioned 127th out of 177 on Corruption Index and divide between rich and poor as per GINI Index remains at 29.3%. There is least will and commitment on the part of government towards expediting the tax reforms process and documenting the undocumented economy. It is worrisome to note that Pakistanis feel more confident in investing abroad as compared to the investments in their own country and for that reason there is continuous flight of capital from Pakistan.¹⁵ The current account deficit has shot up by 43% to US \$ 15.96 billion in the first eleven months of the fiscal year 2017-2018 which is 5.5% of the GDP. This deficit stands very close to the full year's estimate of US \$ 16 billion, and is expected to reach around US \$ 17.5 billion by end of June 2018. Analysts say that high import bill and foreign repayments have weakened the external sector's position.¹⁶ Heavy borrowing has piled up to a US \$ 75.7 billion external debt, which is not sustainable for long term growth. Foreign exchange reserves have fallen and the descending slide continues.

The circular debt which is reported at Rs.507 billion on 31 May, 2018 has increased by Rs.40 billion to Rs. 547 billion by June, 2018. At the same time, consistent decline in investment rates and savings have put the policy makers in a tight spot. In April 2018, Pakistan's GDP was projected at 5.28%, highest in 10 years. However, with the swearing in of the new government faced with huge economic challenges including alarmingly high debt re-payment, growing trade deficit, swelling circular debt and plummeting Pakistani currency, the target seems unlikely to be achieved.

How the country will avoid default like situation when it has to pay US \$ 45 billion of debt by December 2018 as well as to make interest payments, in addition to depleting foreign currency reserves.¹⁷ The economy has shown signs of development when it registered a potential growth from 5.1% in 2015 to 5.85% for the FY 2017-18. There is room for a boost in the economic momentum by instituting strict measures such as austerity drive, broadening tax base, limiting tax evasion and privatizing loss-making public service enterprises in order to put fast-depleting precious resources on halt. It is mandatory to ensure provision of uninterrupted power supply to domestic and commercial consumers to increase industrial output and restore the trust of private sector which is presently suffering hard due to power outages and shortages. CPEC related projects when combined with growth- centered policies have the potential to take growth rate to encouraging numbers in short to medium term.

Pakistan being the zipper state, with developments in energy, communication and road infrastructure under CPEC, promises great prospects for increase in bilateral trade with Iran and Central Asian states. Hence, Pakistan- Iran gas pipeline and CASA 1000 should help in bridging the gap in energy shortfall. A timely culmination of these projects is critical to a stable economic security. For reinvigorating Pakistan's sick economy, there exists an immediate need to overhaul our economic policy through a consensus of all stakeholders, committed to stand for economic stability and get rid of IMF bailout packages in favor of homegrown, self-reliant, austere and resilient economic remedies. If nuclear weapons' acquisition in 1980s ensured Pakistan's security against existential threat, the future security of the country lies in economic security. This purpose can best be served by timely implementation of CPEC development plan provided its potential is optimally exploited and ensuring it doesn't become a debt trap.

Political Instability and Disarray

If we analyze the success stories of Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, China and India, political stability, good governance and continuity of policies emerge as pre-requisite for economic development. The smooth political progression of 2013 from one political government to the next has fairly fortified the political and democratic set-up in Pakistan. In this milieu, political parties and state organs are collaborating and conflicting simultaneously, as democracy is evolving into a more participatory form of government. It is contended that politics centered around development projects only may win votes and prolong the life span of political regimes. However foundations of a result-oriented political disposition can only be laid by those leaders who not only respect democratic institutions but also derive strength from them as well as exercise their instrumental power through them.

The existing political framework needs to experience progress towards a deepened participatory democratic system to include grass root levels so as to make democracy appealing and to deliver results to the common man. Making strides in the quality of democratic governance, administrative and institutional reforms are imperative also for political stability. All arrangements and measures are, therefore, needed to be pooled in to address the issues of a common man. Along these lines, Pakistan can experience political security and long-term stability ensured by a more participatory democratic system delivering dividends. The national consensus on national security, established through the National Action Plan (NAP), will ensure prolonged periods of political and economic stability. For internal stability, the government with consensus of all the political parties should fortify the democratic system, while integrating democratic institutions and upholding rule of law. The consideration of a three-tiered arrangements of administration; district, provincial and national, provides essential forums for resolution of disputes and result-oriented governance. In federalism, the part of interprovincial coordination is of vast importance. Thus, Interprovincial Coordination Ministry (ICM) ought to be enabled to assume accountability. Recurrent meetings of Council of Common Interest (CCI) can empower dispute resolution mechanism and should be facilitated for encouraging a thriving society in a politically stable country.

Governance Woes

Social equity and economic growth are essential for supplementing each other to build-up a good and just society. Development prompts social fairness; the disadvantaged are helped, their essential needs are met, and access to monetary benefits are improved. Pakistan has been in the eye of the storm because of terrorism, violent extremism and acute intolerance, a ticking demographic bomb and the immense youth bulge of 64% which remains untapped thereby impacting the socio-economic development of the country.

The ground reality on socio-economic front is grim; 22.6 million Pakistani boys and girls are out of school, 43% of government run schools lack basic infrastructure and meager spending of hardly 3% of GDP on education has resulted in a literacy rate of 55% after 70 years of independence. As per estimates, there are 145,797 doctors, 10,693 dentists and 55,165 nurses, who are registered to take care of a population of over 200 million. The population growth has been looming large over Pakistan for decades and no government has given serious thought to this problem. Resultantly, today Pakistan is the fifth most populous nation only behind India, China, USA and Indonesia.¹⁸ Hence, good governance upholding the principle of minimum government control, practicing the policies of privatization, shedding bureaucratic weight and becoming cost-effective could address governance woes. Good governance, improved internal security conditions via speedy and effective social justice and service delivery to masses, could let the government focus on national security through the prism of socio-economic development. In this context, systematic de-politicization and sustainable reforms agenda on the principle of "Either Reform or Perish"¹⁹ be applied to the bureaucracy,

judiciary & police, infrastructure & industrial development institutions and education & health sectors on priority basis.

In the spirit of reform, a national commission may be constituted with the mandate of suggesting reforms to government. Its mandate should be to make governance cost – effective, savvy, reviewing institutional performance, setting objectives, deciding indicators, as well as schedule assessment evaluation and intermittent review.

Internal Security Challenges

Internal peace and harmony is another prerequisite for branding Pakistan as a safe country enjoying respect in the comity of nations. Pakistan has been victim of terrorism and foreign – funded militancy which has adversely affected country's society and economy for decades. In the Global War on Terror (GWOT), Pakistan has suffered 70,000 casualties and US \$ 123 billion.²⁰ The terrorist outfits like Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other militant organizations have not only targeted political leadership but also the religious minorities, members of rival groups and other ethnic groups as well. The terrorists' attacks took a heavy toll on Pakistan's economy, as foreign investment dried up, businesses moved abroad, human capital emigrated, and the cost of doing business in Pakistan has increased overall.

Though the country has recently completed ten years of rule by political governments yet still political indecisiveness, leadership deficit and poor governance undermine its ability to execute and monitor internal security policy. The strategy of 'Peace Within' can be accomplished by following the goal of 'zero tolerance to any form of violence'. This approach encompasses short and long term measures – the short term includes launching operations like Operation Radd-ul-Fasad for expelling criminal elements from urban communities, and in the long run, police and judicial system should be strengthened in order to have them performed their responsibilities proactively through swift reforms and capacity building.

Addressing security threats from militants and sectarian outfits is deemed vital. In this connection, the first National Internal Security Policy (NISP) 2013 initially provided policy guidelines which are later included in the National Action Plan (NAP) as well. Taking lead from this, FATA reforms have successfully seen its merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) which would help the region bringing it at par with the rest of the country. Madrasah reforms are also deemed vital to not add to radicalism and extremism rather progress towards becoming harbingers of peace in society.

In this vein, the National Internal Security Policy 2018-2023 takes forward internal security paradigms by not only dealing with measures to curb extremism in society but also taking into account emergence of Daesh in Afghanistan by restraining its influence from spreading in Pakistan. This policy underlines measures to solidify internal security through administrative, ideational and socio-economic measures as security and economy go hand in hand. National Security Management System (NSMS) has also been incorporated in the political system which is ensuring civil-military

consensus on matters of national security and foreign policy. It would, likewise, address problems that emerge from intermittent change of power between civilian and military governments which also hindered a joint approach on issues of national security.

Conclusion

Pakistan's innate strength, its resilient society and effervescent populace are struggling and surviving through the tests of time. The country is cognizant of the contemporary internal and external security challenges, evolving its policies and institutional capabilities to cope with the changing geopolitical environment of the world. At the same time, opportunities offered through vibrancy of geo-economics of the region in the form of CPEC further enhances Pakistan's economic and connectivity vivacity in the emerging multi-polar world. On the external security front, Pakistan's defence is impregnable by means of readiness of its armed forces. However, internal security is directly proportional to the quality of democracy, positive socio-economic indicators and a selfless leadership. In conclusion, democratic continuity, socio-economic security, and a visionary political leadership with its ability to manage good governance will be the game changer.

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IS THE AFGHAN SITUATION RIPE FOR NEGOTIATIONS?

Rehan Mushtaq*

Abstract

This article posits the Ripeness Theory to discuss different failed attempts to negotiate the on-going Afghan conflict. Initial part explains the Zartman's theory, developing a framework centred around two variables – mutually hurting stalemate and perception of way out – to investigate when a conflict is ready for negotiations. Further the paper examines different Afghan peace efforts till February 2018, listing out the limitations of the theory.

Keywords: Afghanistan, Conflict, Negotiations, Defence.

Introduction

Different studies have substantially established that most conflicts end with negotiations. Yet what baffles practitioners, is how would they come to know that the parties involved are ready for any settlement. William Zartman's *Ripeness Theory* provides evolving framework to investigate when does a conflict become ready to negotiate.

The *theory* posits two prime drivers for a successful conflict resolution – *substance of proposal* and *timing of efforts for resolution*.¹ Peaceful settlements of disputes see the substance of the proposal as most important aspect impacting closure of ongoing conflict. The basic logic is, “disputants manage their conflict by exploring an agreeable arrangement – mostly a point where their positions have convergences.”² Whereas, the second significant aspect is the timings of the efforts to resolve disagreement. Here the underlining logic is, “disputants come to an agreement only when most show a desire for an accord; alternatively, when all avenues of any unilateralism are either blocked or disputants find themselves in an unfavorable and costly situation.”³

Zartman having identified these two key variables, puts conditions to reaching the ripeness state: “*Ripeness* is necessary but not sufficient element in beginning negotiations. It is only a condition, which is not self-fulfilling or self-implementing.”⁴ So having simplified his theoretical framework, Zartman accepts that war termination is a complex phenomenon with many antecedents.

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It would not be wrong to state, “ripe moment is necessarily a perceptual event”,⁵ which could be at any instant in the conflict, early or deferred. Zartman further refined his theory and came up with two essential components of *ripeness*:

- The concept of ripe moment centers on the disputants’ discernment of Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS). A situation where the disputants perceive themselves booked in a dispute from which they cannot push any further towards triumph and this gridlock is agonizing to all involved.⁶
- The second necessary factor for a ripe moment is further intricate: the perception of a way out. Disputants need to have a sense that a negotiated solution is possible. With the sense of way out, the push associated with the MHS would leave the parties with somewhere to go.⁷

Important caveat here is that, not all negotiations come out to be consequence of ripe moment.⁸ Negotiations could be a pause for rest and rearmament, an appeasement to external influence, without any intent to seek reconciliation. The difficulty to identify and recognize *ripeness* needs due diligence, especially when accomplishment of negotiations is not strictly credited to a precise course of action selected but to urge the disputants to build up confidence building measures, avoid zero-sumness, and make fair and mutual concessions.

Negotiation Efforts till February 2018

As early as, December 2001, Mullah Obaidullah met Karzai and gave him a letter from the Taliban that accepted Karzai’s leadership and acknowledged that “the *Islamic Emirate* had no chance of surviving”. The Taliban sued for peace and were prepared to relinquish all claims to the country. Interestingly, in exchange, Taliban did not seek any position in power structure, but a general pardon, which would enable them to dwell respectfully.⁹ Karzai told Obaidullah that provided Mullah Omer also agreed to these terms, he would be allowed to remain in Kandahar under the supervision of Mullah Naquib.¹⁰ This was an Afghan style deal. Karzai was being pragmatic, the Taliban had surrendered, so why not bring them into your camp?

The Bush Administration however, squandered this chance. After learning of the discussion, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld appeared to reject the idea at a press conference. Letting Mullah Omer “live in dignity” as opposed to in custody was “unfeasible”. Under the rubric of the *War on Terror*, Mullah Omer was the enemy, and making deals with him and his ilk would only embolden other non-state actors.¹¹ Steve Coll now makes public in his new book, *Directorate S*, that, when a few of Taliban leaders tried to join in the peace agreement at Bonn, Vice-President Dick Cheney issued instructions to put them in jail at Guantanamo or Bagram.¹² Karzai was told that such an arrangement with Taliban was not in the US interest.¹³ The first attempt towards peace talks failed because US bent upon dehumanizing the Taliban. Apparently, they had beaten the enemy and perceived the future exclusion of Taliban.

During 2002, US kept flatly refusing the Taliban officials’ offers to negotiate laying down arms and reconcile with the Afghan government. They even wrecked these

efforts by putting the Taliban envoys in detention cells or at times simply killed them.¹⁴ By early March 2003, Mullah Omer was able to gather the Taliban leadership around him. Since they had last met, their views on Afghanistan had been repeatedly upended: from despair after their apparent rejection by the country to a renewed belief in the righteousness of their cause.¹⁵ While on the other side, US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld declared an end to major combat operations and about rebuilding Afghanistan. Around this time, the then US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad again managed to get the Taliban to restart the negotiation process with the government in Kabul. But the US decision makers in Washington refused security assurances sought by Taliban before engaging in any peace process.¹⁶

The US conduct made the Taliban infer that they had little option but to carry on with fighting.¹⁷ The US rejection of talks, made them go back to the battlefield where fighting became a mode of communications. Negotiations appeared a ploy to capture and kill Taliban delegation members or through their whereabouts, the others; therefore, one observes a big gap till any side again, after 2002-03, opted for talks.

Saudi Arabia – Led Peace Efforts

In 2006, the Saudis tried to initiate the peace negotiations.¹⁸ Abdullah Anas, an Algerian, who for 10 years fought Soviet-Afghan War acted as the initial fixer. Whereas, on the Afghan government's side, Qayum Karzai, who is real brother of then President Hamid Karzai acted as the envoy.¹⁹ By 2007, Taliban had regained much of their lost strength and decided to once again engage the US in peace talks. Agha Jan Motasim was made the leader of a political commission by Taliban to initiate negotiations with US in Saudi Arabia.²⁰ During this period as the Afghan Taliban insurgency grew bolder,²¹ they publically declined to negotiate with the Afghan government till presence of a single foreign boot on the ground.

Nevertheless, formal negotiations with the Saudis began in 2008. But when the negotiations reached a critical decision-point, where Saudis put a pre-condition to the Taliban to renounce terrorism and their links with Al Qaeda, they rejected the preconditions and with it the peace dialogue once again.²² In February 2010, Motasim's main protector, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban's chief operational commander, was arrested in Pakistan, while an assassin shot Motasim and left him for dead outside his home in Karachi, though he survived.²³ Both the incidents were construed as Pakistan's resistance to any peace talks without her,²⁴ which appears a frivolous claim as KSA is a very good friend of Pakistan.

Talks Facilitated by Norway, Germany and Qatar

In May 2008, Taliban agreed to meet with Afghan government representatives. However, this shift in position took place when violence had worsened dramatically in Afghanistan.²⁵ The delegations from both parties arrived in Oslo in November and even agreed to stay in the same hotel.²⁶ Unfortunately, hours before the sides were to meet, in a bombshell one of the delegation member's house got blown up, killing the Talib's brother and wounding his wife.²⁷ It unmistakably resulted in finger pointing among all

stakeholders. Around March 2009, it was reported that the Taliban even arranged a meeting between the Norwegian diplomats and their leader, Mullah Omar.²⁸ But while these endeavors were in hand, the US opted to increase 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan. The development damaged the Norwegian peace initiative. Taliban rolled back all negotiation mechanism and resumed fighting with new vigor: "If they are bombing us from above, we will bomb them from below".²⁹

After failure of Norwegian peace initiative, US tried to restart peace talks through German emissaries. In November 2010, Taliban nominated a new representative, Tayyib Agha, who secretly met the Germans in Dubai, and through them with the US officials.³⁰ During these talks, the Taliban representative presented the US officials with a road map for negotiations based on a series of *confidence-building measures*.³¹ The US were asked to lift sanctions and release Taliban detainees from Guantanamo, and in exchange the Taliban had to publicly announce their willingness to disassociate themselves from terrorism and seek a political resolution to end war. In the second stage, the Taliban would be allowed to open an office in Qatar, from where they would negotiate with the US and Afghans. Satisfactory progress on these lines was expected to let the two sides declare a limited ceasefire.³²

The US-Taliban peace talks continued through 2011, punctuated by deadlocks, leaks, and assassinations. This time President Karzai, feeling his government being marginalized, lost patience and demanded that talks should continue only if Taliban agreed to include Afghan officials in negotiations.³³ This led to a deadlock. In order to break this logjam and speed up negotiations, Qatar suggested change in the sequence of *confidence-building measures* agreed upon earlier on. It was agreed that Taliban will open up their political office, concurrently making an announcement, distancing itself from terrorism and seeking political resolution of the conflict. This would follow up the *confidence-building measures* with the US. And in the last stage of talks, Taliban would meet with the Afghan representatives. On April 23, 2013,³⁴ the Emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, personally showed the draft of the Taliban statement to President Obama. Obama decided to go ahead. He had assured Karzai that the Taliban office would not infringe on the sovereignty of the Afghan government. But on 13 June 2013, when Taliban inaugurated their office in Qatar, in a televised ceremony, they displayed the flag of the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan". The optics of this event annoyed Afghan Government who saw this as an effort by Taliban to project themselves as alternative government rather than a movement. The flag hoisting by Taliban forced the US to formally close their Qatar office.³⁵ This ended the peace talks, once again.

Murree Talks

In 2015, Pakistan persuaded Afghan Taliban to join peace talks with Afghan government.³⁶ The *Haqqani group* was also represented. Representatives of the US and China participated as observers or guarantors, whereas Pakistan's foreign secretary participated as a facilitator.³⁷ Though these talks had widest representation of all Afghan peace talks held so far, but the timing of talks was not conducive again - Taliban's annual offensive was in full swing. The first sitting of Peace Talks in Murree was held on 7 July 2015. Pakistan foreign office statement explained the context of talks: "It is an

Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace initiative. We are here to facilitate.”³⁸ Participants after the first meet recognized the requirement of instituting trust amongst themselves through suitable confidence-building measures. The Taliban, who by then had developed an upper hand, came up with hawkish preconditions for any negotiations to progress. They stressed talks would only get meaningful when they will have some timeline of the complete departure of foreign troops from Afghan soil. Unable to make any headway, Afghan government and Taliban representatives agreed to meet again for the second round of peace talks scheduled for 31 July, 2015.

The first round of talks was considered a success, both sides expressed their desire to work for war termination and enduring peace in Afghanistan, underlining the need to develop *confidence-building measures* among all stakeholders. The Taliban also agreed to a tentative ceasefire “if Pakistan and China guaranteed that a united national government would be formed in Afghanistan”.³⁹ It was also reported that although the Taliban demanded the inclusion of its first-tier leadership in the government, Afghan government officials agreed to at least include their third-tier leadership.⁴⁰ The talks were welcomed by Afghan authorities, the US, China, and the international community at large. Even Mullah Omar’s purportedly in his annual Eid message endorsed the talks as “legitimate,” if they can help end “US-led foreign occupation of Afghanistan and establish an Islamic system in Afghanistan.”⁴¹

Though the talks ended with immense optimism but, the sudden news of Mullah Omar’s death which was disclosed and confirmed by Afghan authorities, just before the second round of talks, led to the suspension of talks and cast a shadow on the future prospects of peace talks. This was immediately followed by a surge in violence in Kabul in which more than 50 people were killed, further complicating matters between Pakistan and Afghanistan.⁴² Afghanistan government had clearly sabotaged the talks by disclosing the death of Mullah Omar. It was an effort to accentuate internal infighting among Taliban. Afghanistan’s behavior makes a classical case where parties came for talks to assess each other’s resolve, and put conditions only to sabotage them. One can observe a huge gap between perceived future vision of parties involved.

Ashraf Ghani’s Initiative – The Kabul Process

By start of 2017, US had fully realized that there could be no other way to end war and bring peace in Afghanistan than the political settlement among all stakeholders.⁴³ But, Taliban had different plans. On 31 May, 2017 a truck bomb exploded in a crowded intersection in Kabul, killing over 150 and injuring 413, mostly civilians. After the bombing, thousands of protesters demanded the resignation of officials. It was under these conditions that Kabul launched another initiative called “Kabul Process” to reboot peace talks.

Again, the timings were not suitable. Peace talk initiative was launched in the midst of regional diplomatic upheaval. Tensions between arch-rivals India and Pakistan had run high since Pakistan sentenced an Indian spy to death in April. In May, more than a dozen Pakistanis and Afghans were killed in clashes on the two countries’ border. The Taliban called the Kabul Process “futile”. They repeated their old demand that the

peace negotiations would not accrue any meaningful results till they first settle down and develop consensus over the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan.⁴⁴ The withdrawal of western troops from Afghanistan by then was also supported by Russia and several regional powers, which further made any political settlement complex.

The second round of talks, materialized on 28 February 2018, when Afghanistan's battlefield losses were mounting and Taliban had regained control of most parts of the country. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani started talks with "no conditions" attached. He invited Taliban to open an office in Kabul for that purpose. Ghani agreed to recognize the Taliban as a political group, if they chose to declare ceasefire.⁴⁵ Afghan government also expressed its willingness to take *confidence building measures* and guarantee security for Taliban representatives if they agree to come to Kabul. He also called on government-to-government talks with Pakistan.⁴⁶

In response to Ghani's proposal, the Taliban however, reiterated that they would engage in direct talks only with the US, blaming the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan for a continuation of the war.⁴⁷ The third round of talks is planned in Islamabad, which is expected to draw up a road map for further negotiations between Kabul and the Taliban. With no ceasefire on the cards from both sides, the Taliban are likely to keep up the fight even if peace talks get off the ground in order to secure territory and leverage in the negotiations.

Eid Ceasefire and Offer for Direct Talks

A few days before Eid ul Fitr, in June 2018, the Afghan President Ashraf Ghani announced a unilateral ceasefire against Taliban until five day of Eid. He, however, said that their fighting against IS and other militant groups would go on.⁴⁸ Taliban reciprocated. But, immediately after the eid, Taliban resumed fighting, declining President Ghani's request to extend the ceasefire.⁴⁹ It is believed that the ceasefire had positive impact and definitely pointed towards an urge by the three major stakeholders – Taliban, US and the Afghan Government – to seek some kind of a conflict resolution mechanism.

Later on, Wall Street Journal also disclosed in last days of July 2018 that US is in some kind of negotiations with Taliban, in Qatar.⁵⁰ It is important to note that between ceasefire and these meets, the State Department did made a statement indicating that US has agreed to Taliban demand to directly talk to them. Though immediately after announcing her willingness to directly talk to the Taliban, US did issue a clarification that talk would be just to support the Taliban negotiations with the present Afghan Government.⁵¹

Limitations of Ripeness Theory Dependence on Violence

Notion of MHS is dependent on conflict: "to ripen a conflict one must raise the level of conflict until a stalemate is reached and it begins to hurt."⁵² Efforts to reach MHS could push antagonists towards more violence and bitterness. Normatively, what the theory is suggesting is, "hurt him, till he realizes, his efforts are futile". Such as

strategy is likely to turn conflict wounds into permanent scars. Afghanistan negotiation efforts are witnessing similar dynamics. US plan for Afghanistan is to increase violence in order to end it. She has escalated violence against Taliban to force them to the negotiation table. In recent Afghan strategic review, Trump Administration has decided to increase the tempo and intensity of military operations to bring change in Taliban attitude. They are seeking a situation wherein Taliban start questioning their future.

USA Today, in “Trump’s Afghanistan War Strategy: Use Military to Force Peace Talks with Taliban”, quotes Rex Tillersons, “The entire effort is intended to put pressure on Taliban to have them understand they will not win a battlefield victory.”⁵³ White House hopes overwhelming force will exacerbate divisions in the Taliban ranks and help lure more members to the negotiating table. In response, Taliban have increased their presence and strength in the country. By escalating their attacks, Taliban want to lead Trump’s policy to a failure. Despite deaths of their leadership, Taliban have been able to lift their momentum, when required. Violence also makes it harder for moderates to influence. Thus, the whole notion of *ripeness* provides a negative prelude to negotiations. War termination should come about with the pull of attractive outcome, and not through the push of MHS, a negative prelude. With coercion, one can start the process of negotiations but cannot lead up to reconciliation. Push factor acts as a spoiler.

Dependence on Actors

Soon after release of President Trump’s new Afghanistan strategy, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was quoted saying, “the strategy was to make the Taliban negotiate with the understanding that they would not “win a battlefield victory,...We may not win one, but neither will you.”⁵⁴ This is clearly an effort to trigger feeling of MHS. Not understanding that for a particular type of adversaries, like Taliban, MHS may not work. Taliban think themselves as “true believers”, thus an increased pain is unlikely to lead towards a compromise; instead, to them the pain may justify renewed struggle. Commenting on Taliban attacks, after US increased tempo of air operations against them, Michael Kugelman opines that through these attacks Taliban are delivering a strong message: we prefer to fight rather talk, and we have the capacity to succeed,⁵⁵ reinforcing the assumption that hurting stalemate in such cultures is meaningless.

On the US side, weight of effort, especially human sacrifices, besides geopolitics – keeps her committed to Afghanistan. Trump statement, explains this reality: “Our nation must seek an honorable and enduring outcome worthy of the tremendous sacrifices that have been made, especially the sacrifices of the lives”.⁵⁶ Consequently, following four attacks in Kabul in January 2018, Trump rejected idea of negotiating with Taliban - “There’s no talking to Taliban”.⁵⁷ Yet, the Trump’s strategy of increased military pressure and removing any deadline for the US troops failed to present an opportunity for new diplomatic initiative. Not only this, according to a NBC report, the Taliban have gained more strength and territory in Afghanistan. In 2014 strength of Taliban was 20,000, and now its over 60,000.⁵⁸

Nevertheless, the latest effort, where the US has agreed to directly talk to the Taliban, is a promising development. This may expand the political space between disputants for a meaningful dialogue. Besides this, since 9/11 US had demonized Taliban so much that their adverse image has now become a functional feature of relationship, reducing any chance of reconciliation. Hence, there are circumstances, where MHS becomes its own undoing.

Negotiations – the Earlier the Better

It is relatively easy to begin problem solving at an early stage of conflict, before it becomes a protracted conflict. During protracted conflicts, it is difficult to reach a point where opponents are ready and willing to repay concessions with concessions. This is opposite to MHS conditions, which happen towards the other end of violence spectrum. Conventional wisdom holds that making the first offer is a mistake in negotiations. But this cannot be taken as good for all situations. Early offer in negotiations may set up a powerful, unconscious psychological anchor that acts as a gravitational force. Stated simply, there is strong co-relationship between first offer and the final outcome. Unfortunately, US flatly refused the initial negotiation efforts of the Taliban. They only got serious in 2008-09 but then it was too late for them to trust each other easily. Besides, Taliban had gathered momentum in the battlefield and the space for concessions had reduced.

Ripeness Ends at Negotiation's Doorsteps

Ripeness Theory may help in predicting the possibility, wherein belligerents come on the negotiation table but, it cannot guarantee results in negotiations. For this to happen, perception of ripeness must continue during negotiations. The theory takes the belligerents to the opening of negotiation but successful conclusion of talks requires a different explanatory logic. Once both sides have agreed upon to start talks, significance of the two prime drivers – MHS and acceptable future discourse – changes, the later gains more importance. Encouraging way out will keep the negotiations going. Series of CBMs will maintain the perception of ripeness, redressing old mistrusts.

Conclusion

MHS carries germs of prolonging the conflict and is counterproductive to conflict resolution. It accentuates mistrust and push as belligerents towards more violence. In protracted conflicts, like Afghanistan, spoiling capacity of the weaker power must not be underestimated. The discussion in this article highlights four reasons, which has led to frequent break ups in negotiations process: tough demands, multiple actors' conflicting stakes, selection of bad timings, and efforts to inflict more pain. Consequently, instead of ripening, the conflict gets putrid. Better mechanism would be to focus on institutionalizing *confidence building measures* to bridge mistrust and shape the environment where belligerents could talk about concessions.

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SINO-US TRADE WAR

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Abstract

This research provides historical background and an in depth analysis of China and United States' commercial relations including historical evidences, major trends and tensions with reference to all these factors it establishes reasons to look at the likelihood of Sino-US trade War. The paper highlights the recent change in government in the US and its policies toward China. It also looks at the potential impact of any such trade war.

Keywords: China, United States, Trade War, Commercial Ties.

Introduction

Economic and trade reforms between China and the United States began in 1979. Ever since both the countries have helped each other and China has elevated its status on as one of the fastest-growing economies. China's policy for trade liberalization along with massive economic growth is the leading cause of sharp improvement in economic ties between both the states. Apart from growing trade relations: there is a rising trade tension between United States and China. There are number of factors behind these strained trade relations China's slacked attitude towards the obligations of World Trade Organization (WTO), breach of US intellectual property rights (cyber violations of trade secrets and forced technological reforms on firms), China's promotion and protection of its own industrial policies, extra focus on foreign and trade investment, absence of transparent rules and policies, overburdened industries and its surplus of merchandise with United States. China's economic rules, regulations, policies and trade experiments have a greater impact on US economy and some sectors are highly concerned about it. This paper presents an overview of contemporary US and China trade relations, pinpoints major areas of conflict, analyzes Trump administration trade posture towards China, and predicts possible future behavior of both states.

During his election campaign, the US President Donald Trump made some alarming statements. One of them was about threatening China against a 35% to 45% tariff on all imported goods from the country, which he also said would not be "willy-nilly."¹ Trade sanctions against China were a cornerstone of his election campaign. He went on to accuse China of being the biggest currency manipulator, which is ripping the US economy apart. Mr. Trump's unexpected policy moves have already unnerved the

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global structure, and Sino-America trade war will present a very significant turning point in the global economic facade. Economies of both the states are directly dependent upon each other. The sum of US products and services trade with China is roughly estimated at \$ 659.4 billion in 2015 and exports were worth as \$ 161.6 billion, on the other hand imports were amounted as \$ 497.8 billion. According to officials the US products and services trade deficit with China was \$ 336.2 billion in 2015. It is interesting to see that China is the biggest commodity trading partner of the US with a \$ 598 billion in total goods trade during 2015.² This shows that US and China are bound in economic co-dependence. They have both become increasingly reliant on each other for sustainable economic growth and anything that happens between the two countries would send shockwaves across the globe as the countries have increasingly become dependent on each other for trade benefits.

The words of Mr. Donald Trump need to be taken with caution. He has already lived up to some of his promises like quitting from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), banning the entry of Muslims from specific countries mentioned in a list, and issuing an executive order for erecting a wall along the US-Mexico border.

Peter Navarro was made the head of White House National Trade Council on December 21, 2016,³ He is the champion of the protectionist agenda and is much known for attacking China in his previous statements. He is a zero-sum economist, who, like Trump, believes that every item not made in the US symbolizes the theft of job from an American.⁴

It is expected that Mr. Navarro will play an integral role in shaping Trump's economic policies. Therefore, the threat of Sino-American trade war is not just rhetoric, but also real and is most likely going to change the economic landscape of the world. It is expected that Mr. Navarro will play an integral role in shaping Trump's economic policies. Therefore, the threat of Sino-American trade war is not just rhetoric, but also real and is most likely going to change the economic landscape of the world. The most immediate effects will be felt by the Trump's voters as companies like Wal-Mart import cheap goods worth billions of dollars from many countries like China and the owners of these companies are those who supported Trump to win his new office. The prices of all these manufacturing goods and products would increase mainly because of tariffs and it will become out of reach of the population of lower economic back ground.⁵

Furthermore, China has frequently pointed out that it is responsible for 2.6 million jobs in the US through their trade relations. Hence, America might lose more from this looming trade war. China will not permit itself to be taken lightly. It will not merely sit down and watch; rather it will follow a 'tit for tat' policy towards the US.

Chinese trade experts with ties with their government have given a notion to retaliate by switching some aircraft contracts from Boeing to Airbus, food trade with rival states like Brazil, and creating difficulties in potential sales areas of Apple Manufactured iPhone in China.⁶

However, at the venue of international conference of the World Economic Forum at Davos in January 2017, the Chinese President argued, “No one will rise as winner in a trade war.”

A trade war will harm both countries and send a wave of uncertainty among other countries in the world too. It would be like lose-lose situation for both economic giants. There is no place for protectionist orientation in this increasingly interconnected global world. However, one cannot ignore. Mr. Trump’s rhetoric and the world might see a shift in China-US economic relations, which would trigger a trade war. These are still early days of the Trump administration, and one will have to wait and see how the future unfolds in the coming days.

The US following a path towards protectionism not only entails trade war with China, but also repercussions for other countries, especially those of the Asia Pacific region that are traditional US allies, including Japan.

Left without a choice, these hitherto trading partners would have to look towards an increasingly willing China for trade, and inevitably increase their dependence on it, which would be a major step allowing China to dominate the region not only economically, but also politically, at the cost of American dominance. However, the trajectory that the US economy will ultimately take is yet to be seen.

Most Contemporary Developments

Sino-US trade ties are always complex but in the most recent times it has become highly contentious as can be observed in below mentioned points. According to the United States Trade Representative (USTR), there were particular concerns in National trade estimate report of March 2018 over technological practices of China and its industrial policy (such as 2025 initiative named as made in China) and restriction on cyber security.⁷

President Trump had announced a presidential memorandum calling for an inquiry into China’s industrial policies as related to section 301.⁸ The memorandum said that United States is planning to impose certain restrictions on China’s investment in sensitive US departments, and increase tariff by 25% on some Chinese products and open a WTO case on China based on intellectual property rights licensing regulations. (Policy made by China on 23 March).⁹

Both the states have ad valorem tariff on each other, for example, USTR has suggested 25% on \$ 50 billion worth amount of Chinese commodities that includes color television, electrical and mechanical parts of motor and vehicles. In reaction China on very next day, April 4, targeted multiple US products in case ad valorem tariffs would be implemented. The same day observed some interesting events, China started a dispute settlement case through WTO against the US and Trump responded by proposing tariffs of \$ 100 billion amount on Chinese commodities.

On March 8, 2018 there came a proclamation US imposing additional tariffs 10% aluminum and 25% steel. This additional tax is based on the 1962 trade act, section 232 justified by national security.

China responded that it increased duties of estimated \$ 3 billion in 2017 on 128 tariff charges on various products from the United States. This includes aluminum products and scrap, pork, nuts and some pack fruits.

On April 09, 2018 China initiated a dispute handling case at WTO against the implementation of tariffs section 232 by US. The Chinese stance was that since the US has clarified its tariffs under the national security umbrella, hence it created some safeguard measures.

President Trump claimed that he would use United States safeguard measures and apply tariff quotas on certain items that include large size housing laundry machines and solar Photo Voltaic (PV) cells and it will be implemented on February 7, 2018.¹⁰

China retaliated on April 5 that it proposed to cancel tariff concessions comparable to the trade that is cut by the US safe guard steps on washing machines and PVs.

The USTR announced the statement in its annual report on China's agreement with WTO on January 18, 2018. The research report argues that "the United States erred in supporting China's entry into the WTO on terms that have proven to be ineffective in securing China's embrace of an open, market oriented trade regime."¹¹

In an important joint statement at WTO by the trade representatives of United States, European Union and East Asian giant Japan apparently referred to China as "severe excess capacity in key sectors exacerbated by government-financed and supported capacity expansion, unfair competitive conditions caused by large market-distorting subsidies and state owned enterprises, forced technology transfer, and local content requirements and preferences;" and they additionally argued that occurrence of such policies "are serious concerns for the proper functioning of international trade, the creation of innovative technologies and the sustainable growth of the global economy."

The three states assured to improve collaboration and complete removal of such practices. During the November 8 and 10, 2017 State visit of president Trump to China, he stated that firms of both states have signed more than \$ 250 billion commercial deals. In an official press release of White House President Trump assured President Xi Jinping fair and reciprocal commercial ties with China. Trump stressed to sort out the trade deficit issue with China. He said both sides need to "immediately address the unfair trade practices that drive this deficit, along with barriers to market success." He blamed past US administrations as responsible for unbalanced and unfair bilateral commercial relations.¹²

- On 18 August, 2017, the USTR declared it had started a Section 301 in depth inquiry of China's practices on transfer of technology, IPR, and prospects on

terms and its economic effects upon US. The USTR's act was declared three days later when President Mr. Trump announced an Executive Memorandum inquiring the USTR to define if this type of inquiry was justified.

- On 19 July 2017, there was improvement when the two sides had the first session of dialogue i.e. the Comprehensive Economic Dialogue (CED) between US and China, but no positive developments were seen after the discussion.
- During the initial discussion as head of states on April 6-7, 2017, Presidents Xi and President Trump proclaimed to establish a “100-day plan on trade” and complimentary opening up of new upper-level forum discussion termed as the “US-China Comprehensive Dialogue.”

On 11 May, 2017, both states came with a conclusion that in reaction to 100- day plan of trade agreement, China will expand and further open up its markets to US beef products, biotechnology goods, credit rating facilities, electronic type payment offers, and bond guaranteeing settlements. The US will open up its markets on Chinese cooked dairy and poultry products and Chinese procurements of US liquefied gas.

US and China Trade War

After the establishment of Sino-US bi-lateral relations in the year 1979 the trade relations rose rapidly and they mutually signed a trade act in July 1979. The Most Favorite Nation (MFN) status was mutually given in 1980.¹³ When China began economic reforms the same year net trade between both states was around \$ 4 billion.

China occupies significant place as the United States' 24th highest trading partner in the world, 16th biggest export market for U.S products, and 36th important country of imports. In last year i.e. 2017, entire US trade with China was worth \$ 636 billion, showing China and the United States' as the biggest trading partner. Many trade experts are of the view that China could be more noteworthy market for US goods in the future. China is one of the biggest growing economies of the world and if it implements economic reforms in a comprehensive measure it will grow faster. China's policies of opening up its markets and infrastructure modernization, up gradation in technology, improving service sector and enhancing the social safety measures will increase the demand of foreign products. Along the east coast of China that is considered as urban part of China, purchasing power has considerably increased. Along with these developments its large reserves of foreign exchange (\$ 3.1 trillion as of December 2017) and the massive population (1.39 billion) establish it as an important trade market.

- A study of January 2017 developed by Oxford group of Economics for the US and China Business Council assessed that in 2015 alone U.S exports of goods and service facilities to China, and both sides direct and indirect FDI \$ 216 billion to US GDP. The study also claimed that US goods for export and service facilities to China would increase from \$ 165 billion in 2015 to over \$ 520 billion by 2030.
- In 2016, 3.0 million Chinese visitors (up 15.4% more than the last year), went to US it made China as 5th largest foreign population of visitors in US.

- In 2016, Chinese people (visitors & tourists) paid \$ 33 billion in the United States that is the largest visitor expenditure in the United States.
- According to the prediction of the US Commerce Department, by 2021, Chinese visitors to the United States will increase and it might reach up to 5.7 million. According to a study published in 2017, China occupies the world's largest mobile phone network with 1.36 billion mobile phone users and the highest number of internet using population of 751 million,
- Online sales of China in 2016 were \$ 752 billion (double than the US online level at \$ 369 billion).
- Corporation of Boeing has transported 202 planes to China in 2017 (keeping it on the rank of 26% of total global distributions), and occupying the place of largest Boeing purchaser outside the US.

Boeing claims that in the upcoming 20 years (2017-2036), China's requirement will reach up to 7,240 new air planes worth nearly \$ 1.1 trillion and will hold the position of largest commercial airplane customer of Boeing apart from the United States.¹⁴

General Motors (GM) sales of cars and trucks to China is higher when compared to United States during the period from 2010 to 2017.¹⁵ GM's sale to United States in the year 2017 was 3.0 million and was 3.9 million to China. GM's joint ventures in China during the year 2016 were worth equity income of \$ 2.0 Billion. GM vehicles unit sale to China was worth 38.7% of its world total. GM presumes vehicle market of China would increase by 5 million per unit or more by 2020. Adding to it, during the period of 2016, US exports of motor vans to China were worth \$ 8.3 billion and thus China occupies the second-largest place as US motor vehicle export country after Canada.

According to predictions by a global financial service Credit Suisse, China overtook the United States in 2015 and become the largest country with middle class at 109 million young population (with net amount between \$ 50,000 and \$ 500,000); the US level was assessed at 92 million. A research study by the Brookings Institute claims that it has estimated that spending of China's middle class will increase from \$ 4.2 trillion in 2015 to \$ 14.3 trillion after 15 years (2030). It is estimated that China's middle class purchasing power will be more than three times than United States. During the period of 2007 to 2016, in comparison with 1.6% growth in the US, China's domestic expenditure increased at 8.9% per annum.

There is an inverse relationship between trade with China and Jobs in the US. One of the hotly discussed topics among US economists and policy makers is assessing the cost and benefits of Sino-US trade ties, especially its effect on different production sectors and employees. The major bone of contention is the effect on US employment that results from Chinese imports particularly after 2001 when it joined WTO. Some policy writers blame imbalance of trade between China and US as one of the main cause of less jobs in US. The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) studied that trade deficit of US and China between the period of 2001 and 2013 completely removed 3.2 million jobs in US (mostly manufacturing jobs). The writer further claims that they used economic

statistics input and out model that calculated total number of jobs , labor value for export production and the number of displaced labor at import substitution time for private output. The dissimilarity of two values is the empirically assumed eliminated job vacancies due to trade deficit. There are number of economists who reject the idea due to flaws in methodological process.

For example, total imports of China cannot compete directly with the production of US. There are many other items that are made by other states and they may enhance the Chinese items and it is not complimentary that only Chinese items will displace US jobs and private producers. There are also some items from China with parts made by US, for example, semiconductors.

Multiple products from China are finally gathered merchandises (such as Apple iPhones) with a comparatively little amount of value added from China, and the jobs opportunities created or reinforced by changing the production items are not considered for in the data of trade. Finally, other issues than trade, such as innovation in technology, can have an impact employment sectors in some important levels.

As China is one of the biggest source of US goods imports, the total effect on the economy of US is comparatively little. In the year 2010, a Bank of Federal Reserve in the state San-Francisco has studied US customer expenditure and calculated that, the US private usage expense of privately sourced items and services is 88.5% of total US sum of importations are of 11.5%. Chinese Imports are 2.7% of US PCE, but it is less than the half of total volume. The remaining amount goes to US business groups and transportation workers, sellers, and the people from marketing the Chinese-based commodities, and the study further estimated, that it would reduce share of China of US PCE to 1.9%.¹⁶

Various experts of economy believe that trade has an overall good effect on the economic activity of the state. Imports with less cost improve the buyer well-being, enhance customer options, and assist in reducing prices. However, there are a large number of economists who argue that the trade benefits are not uniformly distributed. Some areas may have bad impact and it will effect employment and earnings, and these types of negative impacts can be more focused in some areas or companies, and balancing to these effects would be more challenging. Another study of 2014 by the Economic Research of National Bureau of Federal Reserve (NBER) found out that enhanced import dissemination from China during the period 1999 to 2011 whether, directly or indirectly, caused total loss of jobs in US ranging from 2.0 million to 2.4 million and resulted in 10% decrease in US industrial jobs during the mentioned period.¹⁷

Another study by NBER declared that the rise of China as an economic giant has “persuaded the major shift in shapes of dynamics of world trade” by this it had “ put a challenge on much of the approved scientific wisdom about the working of labor markets adjustment to trade shocks.” The study argued that for workers in competing firms of imports, “adjustment in local labor markets is remarkably slow, with wages and labor-force participation rates remaining depressed and unemployment rates remaining

elevated for at least a full decade after the China trade shock commences. Exposed workers experience greater job churning and reduced lifetime income,” in some aspects because the phenomenon of job loss due to high imports will be from the exposed industrial regions and it will increase the trade shocks.¹⁸

The report also argues that there is a small visible proof for significant off setting of job opportunities in private companies and it is not exposed to trade off set trade capabilities. Multiple critics of both NBER studies claim that trade has and will have an impact on job composition in US economic activity but it will not have major impact on US jobs opportunities in long terms. The critics justify their stance that from 2010-2015 the total opportunities in manufacturing increase by 6.8% although imports of China increased up to 32.4%. Along with this total manufacturing out return from US also increased by 15.3%. There are also many economists who argue that US production capacity is the major reason of job loss in manufacturing sectors.

Conclusion – At the Edge of the Cliff

The year 2016 brought some major changes with cross border stocks and investment between both the states at \$ 90 billion and trade flow increase at \$ 600 billion annual rate. At this time when the president of US is less incline to understand the value of cooperation and willing to change the economic relations with China, many Washington based propagators of pro-trade are silent. The contrary stance of economists and president may spark another public debate and generally it is not a good omen for business activity. It is quite evident from the tweets of president trump that he is obvious for a trade war with China as precisely summed up in a recent conference that he has an persona of “to blow things up”. President Trump has openly claimed that he will implement 45% tariff on Chinese exports based on manipulation from Chinese firms.

Indeed China is involve in currency manipulation and want to prop up the value of Yuan in international market although it avoid international stock markets for a decade or so. There are many other justifications for increasing issues between China and US on trade, that includes U.S Discriminatory policies against China, biasness for its own owned enterprises, large benefits for private industries, American intellectual property theft, conflicts on cyber-crimes, strict inspection of Chinese commodities are some of the most pertinent trade issues between both the states.

President Mr. Trump with coordination with his economic advisors gives China’s trade surplus as one of the major reason of uneven trade distribution and recommend China to take immediate actions to resolve it. On the other hand China threatened to change import of Boeing Aircraft to Airbus and agricultural commodities from US to Australian and Canadian markets.

It is quite evident that China is also considering other platforms of retaliation such as investing in companies and industries that can assert political pressure on Congress. On domestic grounds Chinese premier is more likely to have a trade war with America to distract the attention from environmental destruction, surveillance on

media and restricted internet access. In this situation when US measures for stagnating Chinese economy, people and institutions of China will side by the Chinese premier. As China bears a heavy crown of nationalism it will maximum utilize its capabilities to brunt the trade war with Mr. Trump's government and its allies.

Ironically, association between Asia-pacific, Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) countries which are labeled as hostile towards China can be a potential beneficiary to achieve its dream of worldwide trade at the expense of US association between Asia-pacific is open to all member states, many states apart from original 12 members are willing to join it with the promise of deliveries. All of aspiring members are eager to transform their economy on domestic grounds, and motivated to join investment and supply chain development. China is eager to join TTP but demands to change its name as "Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific."

In contemporary era the international trade market is against the protectionist agenda and unilateral withdrawal from International trade agreements. As long as WTO's struggle for peaceful settlement of trade disputes and a "legal protectionist measures" there are less chances of eruption of a major trade war. But the President who has the potential to turn all the odds and who is firm to win such wars and the other side Chinese premier will not sit back idle, the inevitable seems to be a happening of near future.

We can predict and foresee the future of trade between both the states but there is no concrete method to stop it. Facts don't matter now. There appears no urge for cautious negotiation. We cannot assume cautious heads will take decisions and govern the states. The guiderails and emergency measures that have the capability to stop both the states from running off the tracks in the past have failed miserably.

NOTES

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PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM: CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN

*Talat Abbas and Sidra Jamil**

Abstract

Consequent to joining hands with international community in war against terrorism, Pakistan is bearing the brunt of terrorism since the upheaval of September Eleven. Parallel to physical harms, terrorism has modelled intense psychological disorders in Pakistani citizens. Numerous researchers have identified the psychological disorders predominant in the country as a result of terrorism, whereas categories and metamorphosis of these disorders are discussed very rarely. The present study emphasises on the psychological consequences of terrorism on mental health of Pakistani masses. The study unfolds the use of fear as an instrument to paint the horrification of terrorism in the minds of masses. In addition to that the study also gives the policy recommendations to manage the psychological disorders prevailing in Pakistan.

Keywords: Terrorism, Psychological Disorders, Pakistan.

Introduction

Catastrophe of 9/11 is considered as a potential game changer in the history of contemporary global politics. Within ten days of the attacks on twin towers, George W. Bush, the president of America announced war on terrorism.¹ Almost ten decades prior to the attacks of September 11, President on United States, William McKinley was assassinated by an anarchist in 1901. After the event, Theodore Roosevelt, the new president announced global crusade against terrorism.²

The terrorist attack on World Trade Centre propelled United States to intercede in Afghanistan, with core directive to rip Al-Qaida into shreds. Al-Qaida was involved in various high-profile terrorist ventures including Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon.³

In October 2001, the Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A) was launched. Mullah Omer, the leader of Afghan Taliban and de facto head of state of Afghanistan, knew that he could not resist United States effectively in conventional war, therefore decided to fight guerrilla warfare against America and its allies. The majority of Afghan Taliban fighters and bigwigs recoiled in their communities in Afghanistan and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan. Pakistan shares 2640 km long porous border with Afghanistan that makes cross border movement easy.

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Before proceeding Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan, United States requested to:

- Shut off the Pak-Afghan border and to stop all the activities and transportation of Al-Qaida group within and outside the Pakistan;
- Freeze the assets of Afghan Taliban leadership in Pakistan;
- Break the fuel supply to the Afghan Taliban.
- Share intelligence information gathered by Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) regarding Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaida;
- Grant permission to use airspace for carrying out robust military operations in Afghanistan;
- Allow the American forces to station in Pakistan to imprison Osama bin Laden.⁴

Pakistan opted to join United States in Afghanistan for the sake of international peace and security. Subsequently, the Afghan Taliban declared war against Pakistani government, and another wing Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was formed under the headship of Bait Ullah Masood to operate from Pakistan against Pakistani government.⁵ Peter J. Philips claims that terrorist organizations upsurge the spiralling of attacks when stances counter-insurgency.⁶ Likewise happened in the case of Taliban. With the execution of operation by United States in Afghanistan, a high frequency wave of terrorism took Afghanistan and Pakistan in its way. Tehrik-e-Taliban planned and execute deadly attacks in Pakistan that only resulted into the killings of masses but also caused monetary loss of billions of US dollars. One hundred and sixty-four people were killed in 2003 in terrorist attacks, whereas the death toll reached to three thousand, three hundred and eighteen in 2009.⁷ Till early 2018, 61213 people were killed.⁸ Enduring terrorist attacks and escalation in homicide caused the adverse effects on the mental health of individuals. Coming below is the precise picture on psychological disorders prevailing in Pakistan consequent to terrorism.

Impacts of Terrorism on Mental Health in Pakistan

Terrorism is a psychological warfare that not only brings human and economic forfeiture but carries psychological harms too. The terrorists escalate their actions to cast terror in the minds of masses. Fear is a prime instrument of terrorist organizations, utilized to capitalize their objectives. Modern terrorism may look like ordinary criminal actions, however in terrorism, criminal acts such as homicide, sabotage and blackmailing are just means to reach desired ends. The strategies and gears utilize by the terrorist organization goes through various short-term aims and objectives, such as inculcation of paralyzing fear in the target population. Therefore, modern terrorism creates insecurity in each and every individual of target population that following attack may take his life away. The entire kit and caboodle of terrorism is developed to perform the task of identification of sagaciousness of security, and to dismay the target society to function efficiently. The concealed objective of terrorist group behind terror propagation strategy is to initiate public opinion to compel the governments to up their hands before the demands of the terrorist organization. Hence, as a result of perceived

threat and fear, target populations are played in the hands of terrorists, and assist them to proceed with their goals. The physical and economic loss caused by terrorism might be limited in scope, but limited loss is very well affected to build psychological impact on fairly broader degree. Terrorist organizations focus on three types of audience:-

- The first target audience is the membership of the terrorist group and its popular support. Through terrorist attacks, terrorist organizations convey message that we are successfully leading towards our goal, and strength of enemy can be counterbalanced if we hit its most sensitive point i.e. masses.⁹ This tactic helps the terrorists to regenerate solidarity and uplift morale among themselves and their supporters.
- The second target audience of the message of terrorist organizations is the victim population and message bore to them is contrary to mentioned above audience. The government of victim is told that despite all your measures to prevent terrorism, you are not yonder to our access. Once masses begin to recognize themselves insecure in their residences, offices and schools, the next message is delivered that you are not safe until you surrender before our demands.¹⁰ This is done to shatter the national morale and create hustle bustle among the victim population.
- The third target audience population is international community residing outside the victim country. The aim is to draw attention of global community towards the conflict, and to recognize the fortitude of terrorists to achieve their goal without considering the nature of means and costs. In this way global community put pressure on host country to consider the demands of terrorist group, and to bargain with them to bring about peace.¹¹

Understanding of Psychological Disorders

The terminology “psychological disorder” is frequently used to refer the mental and psychiatric disorders. Psychological disorders are defined through behavioural and mental warning signs that produce impacts on multiple domains of life. The psychological disorders produce distress in the person enduring the behavioural and mental warning signs. The DSM-5, the latest edition of the American Psychiatric Association's diagnostic manual describes psychological disorder as:

“...a disorder categorized by a clinically substantial commotion in an individual's mental, sentimental directive, or action that portrays a dysfunction in a psychological, biological, or developmental course fundamental to mental working and performance. Mental disorders are commonly related with significant suffering and distress in social, professional, and other significant activities.”¹²

Though umpteen psychological disorders are extant yet mentioned below are only few of them that occur as an upshot of terrorism:

Anxiety Disorders

Anxiety disorders are commonly characterized by life-threatening and persistent worry, fear, anxiety and further behavioural disorders of similar types.¹³ Fear involves an emotional response to a menace. The menace can be a reality or a perception. Anxiety also comprises of expecting the ascendance of future threat. The anxiety disorder can be sub-categorized into following types:

- **Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAP):** It involves the lop-sided concern about the day to day events. Worries and concerns are considered normal sometimes, yet GAP are those concerns and worries that may have tendency to affect the proper mental functioning of a person.¹⁴
- **Agoraphobia:** In this psychological disorder, a person fears of public places and hesitate to visit those places where chances of having panic attack are high. In certain cases, an individual develops hesitant attitude that he becomes inept to face public, and leave home.¹⁵
- **Social Anxiety Disorder:** A person suffering from this disorder feels as if he is watched or judged by someone. Sufferer of this disorder avoids visiting social settings such as school, office, market etc.¹⁶
- **Specific Phobias:** This psychological disorder is categorized by deadly fear of a certain person, thing or an event. Sometimes people are found having phobias of reptiles and bugs, fear of highlands or deep waters. These mentioned phobias are called specific phobias of natural events. The specific phobias also include the unnatural events such as war, terrorism, homicide etc. The encountering of an individual with man-made events results into shivering, nausea, heart excruciating, and fright of death in some cases.¹⁷
- **Panic Disorder:** This type of psychiatric disorder involves panic attacks that may happen without any particular reason. Anxiety and worry are the common signs of this disorder. Sufferers of this disorder avoid to visit the places where last panic attack happened, avoiding attitude develops as a consequent of previous panic attack. This affects the routine activities.¹⁸
- **Separation Anxiety Disorder:** It is a sub-type of anxiety disorder that is characterised by life-threatening fear and anxiety regarding being separated from attachment figures. For example, fear in children to get detached from their parents or parents' fear to lose their kids. The person having warning signs of separation anxiety disorder avoids leaving house, attending college and workplace.¹⁹

Trauma and Stress Related Disorders

This category of psychological disorders occurs as a result of stressful and traumatic events. Previously trauma and stress-related disorders were placed in under the scope of anxiety disorders, but presently they are replaced into new category.²⁰ Given below are the types of trauma and stress-related disorders:-

- **Acute Stress Disorder:** The warning symptoms of this disorder occurs within one month of the encounter with traumatic event. The event can be

natural or man-made. The symptoms include extreme anxiety and fear, and person's inability to develop positive emotions.²¹

- **Adjustment Disorders:** This category is characterized by sudden change for example, death, divorce, monetary damage, migration and other impairments of similar kind. The symptoms of this disorder are extreme anxiety, sense of isolation, annoyance, bleakness, depressed mood, fear and irritability.²²
- **Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD):** Exposure to a life-threatening and traumatic incidence results in the development of this disorder. The sufferers of PTSD develop habit of recollecting and re-experiencing the incidence persistently, and stepping aside from those figures that make the sufferer to recollect the traumatic event. In addition to that a sufferer finds himself down in negative thinking, nightmares, annoyance, and incapable of reminiscing aspects of the event.²³

Psychological Disorders viz-a-viz Terrorism in Pakistan

Terrorism has brought about adverse psychological disorders among Pakistani masses. Every second individual residing in Pakistan is a sufferer of psychiatric disorder and strain consequent of terrorism.²⁴ The survey published in Dawn revealed that forty percent of the total Pakistani population is sufferer of psychological disorders. According to the survey 57.5 percent of women and 42.5 percent of men are facing depressive disorders.²⁵ Intense traces of trauma, depression, phobias and anxiety found in the air of Pakistan are the poisoned chalice of Pakistan's counter-terrorism efforts for global peace and security. People sitting in every nook and corner of the country got affected by the psychological consequences of terrorism. Secretary General of Pakistan Medical Association (PMA), Dr. Qaiser Sajjad said that 35.7 percent residents of Karachi, 43 percent inhabitants of Quetta and 53.4 percent people are sufferers of psychological illness.²⁶ According to Pakistan Medical Association, worldwide, twenty percent people are victim of psychological disorders, whereas in Pakistan the estimated depression in country's population is thirty-four percent.²⁷ Beside genetic factor, environmental elements also contribute primarily in the pathogenesis of psychological disorders.²⁸ Researches revealed that people who witness terrorist attacks directly have most adverse psychological impacts. In Pakistan, survivors of terrorist attacks and people from security agencies who had encountered the attacks have most adverse psychological disorders.²⁹ Terror, insecurity, fear and threat propagating in the social environment of Pakistan has put the mental health of masses at risk. The study conducted by students of Rawalpindi Medical College (RMC) tells that 68.2 percent of the families of students enrolled in RMC fear to send their children to college, and 34.4 percent families do not allow the students to attend the college on any day consequent to security threats. The mentioned critical situation is troublesome for the streamline education of the students.³⁰ Students enrolled in Pakistani institutions also contemplate that media overstate the situation and create flimflam by extra exaggerating the news and role of media is gobbledygook and distressing.³¹ In Pakistan, most of the people are exposed to terrorism over television.³² Besides curricular activities, terrorism also hinders the extracurricular activities, therefore has a negative impact on students' life. Mostly activities are cancelled or postponed due to security concerns.³³ People want to

migrate from Pakistan, and desire to settle abroad due to prevailing insecurity in the country.³⁴ Fifty physicians lost their lives from the years 2001 to 2016.³⁵ Consequent to assassinations of medical doctors, many of them left Pakistan to limit the risk of life.³⁶

Recommendations

Terrorism is a psychological warfare too. Through limited physical harm, terrorists try to maximize psychological damage to the victim population. Usually, social assets of a nation- social unity, traditions and capability to function properly is beset. Therefore, it is crucial for a state to have counter-terrorism units with an effective ability to manage psychological and behavioural damages and social mal-functioning consequent to terrorism. Coming down below is the comprehensive sketch to counter terrorism in Pakistan.

- **Role of State:** The continuing episodes of terrorism underscored the importance of effective and efficient counter-terrorism unit. National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) adopted the comprehensive National Action Plan (NAP) to curb terrorism, but unfortunately no observable measures have been taken to address the adverse psychological damage occurred as a result of terrorist attacks. Anxiety, fear, annoyance and depression are the key emotional setbacks of terrorism faced by Pakistani society. State and provincial governments must allocate funds to aid the educational and instructional campaigns in victim communities.
- **Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Strategy:** Pakistan must have comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy that would be equally effective for dealing with physical and psychological damage. Pakistan is carrying a successful robust operation against terrorists, yet sometime government officials may have found engaged in exposing incredible terrorist threat that spread fear and terror in the environment. State government has the responsibility to educate and train Pakistani masses to deal effectively with physical and psychological consequences of terrorism. To get the task done, counter-terrorism text must be introduced at post-elementary level.
- **Responsibility to Respond:** State has the responsibility to respond to those who are victim of terrorism, physical and mental both. Psychological first aid is the right of every direct and secondary victim. American Red Cross Disaster Mental Training Program was introduced in United States to give training to respond to any terrorist event. Likewise training programs must be launched under the banner of Pakistan Red Cross. Efforts should also be made to restrict people from exposing to place of terrorist attack. Informal care-providers and social workers must come forward to provide support to victim population. School teachers can be helpful for people dealing with psychological disorders.³⁷ Similarly, work places and religious institutions can also be good platforms for providing psychological aid.³⁸
- **Strategies for Preparedness and Response:** There is a dire need of research on preparedness and response at advance level, the studies which are carried out till date have concluded that community-oriented responses are

instrumental in managing the psychological impacts of terrorism. The overall policies for formulating the public and accurate resources to respond at large-scale traumatic incidences must be organized in accordance to specificity of the population (direct victims, responders, and vulnerable factions) and phases of the incidence (pre-attack, acute, post-attack, long-term post-attack). These policies can be sub-categorized into two groups which although are different yet have overlapping objectives.

- To deliver instant psychological management to permit for efficient public health and response policies, for example, mitigation and prevention of psychological distress and fear, and lessen the potential and redundant strains on the system of health care.
- To condense short-term and long-term psychological morbidity.
- **Function of Media:** It is important that media should not be played in the hands of terrorist organizations. Media facilitates the terrorist organizations by amplifying the horrification of incidence of terrorism. In modern democratic world, citizens have right to have correct facts, but media must be cautious in broadcasting the terrorist activities, and avoid casting fear and trauma.

Conclusion

Since the time when the foundation stone of Pakistan was laid, the country has been resiliently fighting against the social economic and political upheavals. Terrorism is one of the key challenges Pakistan has come across. Pakistan has faced high intensity wave of terrorism after the cataclysm of 9/11. Pakistan joined US led coalition forces in Afghanistan to fight against terrorism, consequently Taliban declared war against Pakistani government and started carrying out lethal terrorist attacks in the country. Physically weak terrorist groups chose to use psychological tools to reach its desired goals. Pakistani government may have taken effective steps to eliminate terrorism, but psychological impacts of terrorism never came under consideration, therefore neither managed nor resolved. Haziness and absence of knowledge on specific or sole impact of terrorism on mental health of the masses is may confound the task of the state officials i.e. who should perform the task of planning and strategizing on psychological health as a part of overall development of disaster preparedness model, and terrorism preparedness model in particular. The efficient implementation of effective strategy may help in alleviation of fear, anxiety and depression in Pakistani masses. Clear understanding about managing the mental health issues viz-a-viz terrorism is prime to plan and execute accurate and operative strategies. The emergency response system and public health system must be capable of dealing with and unexpected terrorist attack, along with concrete and effective model to minimize the psychological impacts of the attack. Various national security departments must collaborate and coordinate with each other for early preparedness. Emergency responding units, medical centers and hospitals and public health offices must be capable of dealing with any physical and psychological harms occur as a result of terrorist attack. In addition to that an efficient communication system is essential to contrivance approbations for responding and eliminating traces of horror and depression prevailing among the masses. Federal and provincial governments should contemplate three-prong style together with education,

preparedness and action. In a nutshell, well-researched policies and strategies related to anti-terrorism preparedness system, and efficient implementation of established model are equally important.

NOTES

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WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN PAKISTAN

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Abstract

Water, is one of the most significant natural resource available at the disposal of mankind. However, increasing global demands and a considerable decline in its availability due to mismanagement/misuse has culminated in an intricate scenario, in terms of water availability. The situation is considered to have serious implications for global peace being a glaring politico-economic issue of the current century. Consequent to an “irrational” partition of the sub-continent executed by the British, Pakistan has been “destined” to struggle for availability of requisite water from an upper riparian i.e. India. Similar issues exist in our Water related dealings with Afghanistan, to the West. Notwithstanding these facts, Pakistan’s internal political decision making in terms of distribution, preservation and management of water resources has been wanting. The overall scenario has led to a situation where Pakistan is heading towards “dire scenario”. This paper endeavors to analyse our existing water resources, its linkages with security, our issues related to water resource management both within the country and with our immediate neighbours. Viable recommendations on various fronts have also been proffered.

Keywords: Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Security, Indus River System Authority (IRSA), Indus Water Treaty (IWT), Water Apportionment Accord (WAA).

Introduction

Importance of water, the most significant asset for existence of life, needs no further elucidation. With ever increasing world population, Global water demand has escalated to 6 times due to the population increase since the last century.¹ This increasing demand, once viewed in the context of dwindling natural resources and excessive wastage due to mismanagement, has caused an overall strain on availability of water. The situation is viewed by experts to have serious implications for global peace being a glaring politico-economic issue of the current century.

Pakistan, owing to a biased partition across the Indus Basin, inherited ingredients for potential water based conflicts. This unjustified distribution of water resources has, consequently, become major source of contention between India and Pakistan. Persistent inter provincial discord over water distribution, coupled with strained relations with Afghanistan on Kabul river waters are further aggravating the water resource management challenges for Pakistan. All these issues have direct bearing on the national coherence and, in turn, security of Pakistan.

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Sources of Water in Pakistan

Sources of water in Pakistan are distributed in two categories, i.e. Primary and Secondary. A brief account of each source is discussed below:-

Primary Sources

- **Rainfall**
 - Rainfall is an important primary source of water in Pakistan. However, quantum of rainfall for different regions is not symmetric which affects the water availability in that region.
 - “Monsoon” and “Western Disturbances” are two major contributors of rainfall in Pakistan. Monsoon spell is experienced in Summers whereas, Western Disturbances are responsible for rainfall in Winter.²
- **Glaciers:** Glaciers are another significant natural source of water for Pakistan. Mountain ranges like Himalayas, Karakoram and Hindukush, containing few of the largest pockets of ice on earth immensely contribute towards availability of water for Pakistan.

Secondary Sources

- **Surface Water:** In terms of surface water resources, Pakistan comprises of three hydrological regions i.e. Indus basin, Kharan closed basin and the Makran Coastal basin³ which jointly contribute 146 MAF of surface water to Pakistan. Pakistan has 143 large and small water storage reservoirs. Mangla, Tarbela and Chashma are super reservoirs with a joint storage capacity of 18.92 MAF, however, due to silting their storage capacity has been reduced by 22%.⁴ Certain new dams like Diamer Bhasha, Dasu dams and a number of small dams are at various stages of completion.⁵
- **Ground Water:** Indus Basin's ground water aquifer in the sweet zone of the Indus Basin is a considerably large rechargeable secondary source of water for Pakistan. It has been catering for irrigation and domestic needs of this region for centuries.⁶

Existing Water Resources of Pakistan – An Analysis

- **Drastic Decline in Water Availability Vis a Vis Demands:** Availability of water for Pakistan has gone down drastically. From a water availability position of 5300 m³ at the time of independence in 1947, we have become a water scare country with current water availability at around 1000 m³. Similarly, rapidly growing population has also exerted pressure on available water resources. The data on water availability in Pakistan for 75 years.⁷
- **Decreasing Annual Rainfall:** Rainfall is one of the significant primary sources of water for Pakistan. However, in the last few years, the intensity of rainfall, especially in southern part (agriculture zone) of country has declined.⁸
- **Declining Storage Capacity of Existing Water Reservoirs:** These reservoirs store water, which is lifeline of the country's agriculture. As per statistics provided by WAPDA, these reservoirs have lost more than 22% of storage space

due to siltation and deforestation. If these causes are not controlled capacity of the dams is likely to be further reduced to 32% by the year 2025.

- **Climate Change Effects on Glaciers:** Studies on climate change indicate a rapid melting of glaciers. Pakistan, during last 40 years, has witnessed 0.76°C rise in overall temperature, which is quite high.⁹ This ongoing gradual rise in temperature can trigger rapid loss of our glaciers, which is harmful for our water requirements.
- **Limited Storage Facility:** Pakistan's existing water storage capacity (10% of inflows) and per capita storage (below 100 m³) is far lesser than other arid countries in the world.
- **Tube Well Irrigation – A Serious Exploitation of Ground Water:** Severe water shortages have led to exponential growth of tube-well irrigation during last 50 years. More than 1.2 million tube-wells have been installed in Punjab alone.¹⁰ This excessive usage of tube wells without any checks and balances from the government is causing excessive reduction in ground water availability.

Pakistan's Inter Provincial Water Management Challenges

Issues of water distribution amongst regions in Subcontinent have been arising long before partition. A number of committees were constituted by different Governments to resolve the issue; however, no permanent solution could be accrued. Significant ones are mentioned below:-

- **Tripartite Agreement & Indus Discharge Committee (1921):** The agreements were executed for settling claims for more waters between Punjab, Bahawalpur and Bikaner State.¹¹
- **Rao Commission (1945):** Constituted to settle renewed water claims between Punjab and Sindh in the backdrop of Government of India Act, 1935.¹²
- Akhtar Hussain Committee (1968)
- Fazle-e-Akbar Committee (1970)
- Chief Justices Commission (1977)
- Haleem Commission (1983)

The Water Apportionment Accord (WAA), 1991

Water disputes between provinces started getting worsened after the commencement of the Tarbela Dam Project in 1977. However, an inter-provincial agreement took place on 16 March 1991.¹³ This agreement has two important features:-

- Existing usage of Canal Water by each province was protected.
- Balance of river supplies (including flood surpluses) was apportioned.

Establishment of Indus River System Authority (IRSA)

In the backdrop of Water Accord of 1991, IRSA was established in 1993 for regulating and monitoring distribution of water sources of provinces in accordance with the accord.¹⁴ It has representation of all provinces. IRSA is responsible for inter

provincial distribution of water whereas, distribution of water within the provinces is a provincial subject.

Causes of Inter Provincial Disputes after the Water Accord

Salient causes of concern amongst provinces even after signing of 1991 accord are appended below:-

- **Punjab and Sindh:** Most dominant inter provincial water issue lies between upper riparian Punjab and lower riparian Sindh.
 - **Less Allocation of Water:** Sindh accuses Punjab of gaining an additional 7.61 MAF water against established international norms and historical Sindh-Punjab Agreement of 1945.¹⁵
 - **Construction of New Storage Sites:** The biggest disagreement between Punjab, Sindh (including Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) lies in the clause pertaining to construction of new storage dams. Punjab interprets this clause in favor of constructing Kala Bagh Dam, however, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are against its construction.¹⁶
 - **Damage to Sindh's Mangrove Forests:** As per the agreement some fresh water should be allowed to go to the sea for maintaining ecological balance of Sindh's mangroves forests. However, Punjab is not adhering to this clause resulting in damage to these forests.¹⁷
 - **Distribution of Water during Shortage Periods:** Sindh and Punjab have differences over sharing of water during shortage periods. Punjab claims that it has already forgone 2.7% of its share based on a package deal wherein Punjab was to be allowed new construction. As construction of Kalabagh dam has not materialized, hence, no further reduction is acceptable to it.¹⁸
- **Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.** As a lower riparian of Sindh, Balochistan accused Sindh of using its share of allocated water. Similarly KPK insists that a considerable proportion of its water share is consumed by Punjab due to unauthorized irrigation of Kaccha areas.

Non Existence for a National Water Policy (NWP)

In a country like Pakistan, where availability of water is on a rapid decline whereas its demand is rising with each passing day, a National Water Policy is critical. The National Water Policy (NWP) draft was initially prepared in 2005 after a World Bank comprehensive policy study. A number of drafts have been prepared since then (2010, 12 and 15). However, in Apr 2018, Council of Common Interests has approved the National Water Charter that was signed by the four chief ministers. The first ever National Water Policy, which had faced delays for more than a decade, was finally approved after removal of provincial reservations over its language. The Centre and the provinces agreed under the policy that selection of water reservoirs would be made with consensus in line with the 1991 water apportionment accord and after thorough

examination of their impact on sea intrusion, environmental protection and provincial water rights to secure surplus water in the system.

The policy acknowledges the need to adopt the NWP with an initial target of increasing storage capacity from existing 14 Million Acre Feet (MAF) by immediately starting the construction of 6.4 MAF Diامر-Bhasha dam which had already been cleared by the CCI back in 2009.

Pakistan's International Water Related Issues

Context and Current Status of the Issues with India

- Pakistan and India have been embroiled in disputes over possession and utilization of water resources courtesy owing to a highly unjustified boundary demarcation process.
- The famous Indus Water Treaty enacted in 1960, lays down privileges and obligations of water resources for both the countries.
- Accordingly, 3 western rivers Indus, Jhelum and Chenab were given to Pakistan, while 3 Eastern Rivers i.e. Ravi, Beas and Sutlej were allocated to India.¹⁹

Implications of Indian Hydro-Misadventures on Security of Pakistan

Implications of Indian hydro projects for security of Pakistan are highlighted as under:-

- **Agricultural Implications**
 - Pakistan's agro based economy is entirely dependent upon our irrigation system, by building a large number of dams, India retains the initiative to control our waters as per its will.
 - Water requirement in agriculture is time sensitive. Hence, any move to stop or delay water once it is needed the most or releasing it once it is not required can inflict serious damage to our agriculture production.
- **Economic Repercussions**
 - Agriculture is backbone of our economy, any loss in our agriculture production will have direct impact on our economy.
 - By reducing inflows of Chenab River (Baghliar Dam), Jhelum River (Kishan Ganaga and Wullar Barrage) a considerable decline in water availability has been observed. This has direct linkages with reduction of cultivated area which, in turn, has serious economic implications.²⁰
- **Defence Related Implications**
 - Indian water projects have serious implications for our defence and security. First line of our defenses is threatened by the Indian ability to control waters of Jhelum and Chenab rivers.
 - Blockade of water bodies emanating from these rivers can seriously threaten the viability of our defence.

- Similarly, in case of deliberate or unintentional malfunction / collapse of any hydraulic structure can result in massive disaster for our localities thereby threatening our very existence.

Water Issues with Afghanistan

The Kabul river basin covers areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. It has been divided into 5 main regions. It originates from the Konar hydrologic region on the Pakistan side, it subsequently enters Afghanistan part of the Konar hydrological region and then again enters into Pakistan at Attock.²¹ This arrangement provides Pakistan with a unique status i.e. both upper as well as lower riparian.

Pakistan's Concerns

- Owing to the peculiar security situation, issues over Durand Line and political instability of Afghanistan, the process of sharing waters from Kabul river has never been formalized. Non-availability of any such treaty is against national interest of Pakistan.
- A rapid decline in the availability of water from Kabul River has been witnessed in last few years. This has serious implications for agricultural and economic activities of the dependent regions. This has direct impact on Pakistan's economy.
- **Indian Involvement in Afghanistan's Water Resources:** The Afghan government, with the support of India is constructing 12 water projects (with max capacity 4.7 MAF) on Kabul river. This situation is likely to have adverse impact on Pakistan being a lower riparian. Traditional lack of interest on the part of Afghan government towards signing a treaty, once seen in the backdrop of current developments, can have disastrous effects on Pakistan's security.

Linkages of Water with Security

Owing to ever increasing global water scarcity, a fierce competition for control over sources of water has been in its full swing. Following points may provide some critical insight into the issue in Pakistan's context:-

- Fresh water forms only 2.8% of global water resources. This dwindling resource is getting scarce due to an ongoing rise in global population. Since water security directly impacts human security, it is a potential source of conflict.
- Researchers like Peter H. Gleick, have carried out analysis of water related disputes dating back to 3000 BC²² and state that water issues can result in conflict between the states even if they have entered into formal agreements on the subject (Indo Pak Scenario).
- Categories of conflict arising due to (or involving) water resources are discussed below:-²³
 - **Control of Water Resources (State and Non-State Actors):** These occur once access to water is root cause of the problem.
 - **Political Tool (State and Non-State Actors):** These occur where water resources are used by a country for political goals.

- **Development Disputes:** These occur where development of new reservoirs is a source of internal / external disputes.
- **Military Tool (State Actors):** These occur where water resources are used (likely to be used) by a country, as a weapon.

The types of conflicts mentioned above, once seen in the context of Pakistan's water issues with its neighbors and provinces are fully relevant and have the potential of transforming into armed conflicts.

Way Forward – National Level Actions

Need for Immediate Implementation of National Water Policy

All stake holders in Pakistan i.e. Provinces as well as Federal Government, needs to implement newly approved National Water Policy. Recent measures like decision by the Federal Government and Honorable Supreme of Pakistan to undertake fundraising for much- needed construction of Diamer – Bhasha and Mohmand Dam, has witnessed support from all segments of the society, both in the country and abroad. Similarly, proposals like establishing a mechanism to seek investments for construction of these dams through Public – Private Partnership basis may also be given due consideration to expedite the long awaited process.

Promoting Inter-Provincial Water Cooperation

In view of numerous challenges posed to our national cohesion, Inter provincial harmony on the distribution of water resources is extremely important at point in time. Few of the recommended steps are appended below:-

- **Establishment of an Effective Conflict Resolution Mechanism:** An effective, independent and empowered “**Conflict Resolution Framework**” over the water disputes be established at “IRSA” level with equal representation of all provinces. It should have another organ “**Technical Council**” comprising of top national experts in the field to resolve conflicting issues.
- **Consensus on Development of New Water Storage Reservoirs:** Construction of new water reservoirs and expedition of ongoing projects be undertaken at top priority. However, all this be done while taking all provinces into confidence. An effort be made to restart an “objective” debate over construction of Kalabagh dam at national level involving legislative assemblies, intelligentsia, media and all stakeholders to find out the solution to the problem. The option of hiring an international team of specialists for carrying out an impartial analysis of the process may also be considered.
- **Strengthening and Empowering of IRSA:** Although IRSA has effectively played the role of a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) in distribution and management of water resources amongst the provinces, however, its role in terms of conflict resolution has been below par. The reason behind it lies with dominance of bigger provinces in Council of Common Interest (CCI) which is the sole authority for deciding such issues. It is suggested that a Third Party (preferably International) be hired for a comprehensive analysis of IRSA's role.

- **Establishment of a Well Defined Legal Framework:** Legal cover to most of the water rights, allocation of resources, distribution, pricing and conservation at provincial level is inadequate. There is a need to integrate more than 24 different kinds of provincial legislations into a comprehensive document. This effort will help in clearly defining water rights of each province duly supported by adequate legal cover based on the ground realities.
- **Monitoring and Evaluation of Water Usage:** Use of technology like GIS and Telemetry system can help identify the areas where water is being used excessively or being misused. Similarly, quantum of water in/outflows, if monitored by a third party can reduce the trust deficit amongst the provinces.
- **Allowing Provinces to Market Excess Water:** A provision be added in Water Accord of 1991, wherein the provinces may be allowed to sell their extra water. This initiative is likely to have a double advantage i.e. on one side it will encourage provinces to conserve water and on the other hand they will earn extra revenue as a result of this conservation.

Population Management as a Means of Managing Water

As discussed earlier, per capita water availability in Pakistan is decreasing with ever increasing population. As per Official statistics of Census 2017, Pakistan's population has jumped to 207million.²⁴ Efforts to control the population growth rate should be enhanced in order to manage the availability of water resources for the current and future generations of Pakistan.

Efficient Supply Side Water Management

The concept of supply side water management deals with the processes involved with creation of new and restoration/upkeep of existing water projects. Suggested actions in this regards are appended below:-

- **Rainwater Harvesting:** Pakistan utilizes only 20% of the rainwater which is its primary water source. Advanced countries use up to 98% of the rainwater for different purposes. Efforts should be made Government level to invest in this great venture for ensuring availability of requisite amount of water.
- **Re-Use of Waste Water:** As of now, Pakistan is reusing only 1% of sewage/industrial waste water after treatment. Strict enforcement mechanisms on the industries should be put in place by the governments to ensure installation of treatment plants can contribute in both ways i.e. recycling of water thus increasing its availability for usage.
- **Mechanism to Manage Number of Tube Wells:** Installation of massive number of tube wells, especially in Punjab, has adversely affected the groundwater availability. The government needs to strictly regulate the installation of tube wells by analyzing the user requirements as well as groundwater availability in that area.

Regulating the Demand Side Water Management

This concept entails mostly regulating actions are user end. These actions are far more economical and less time consuming than the “Supply Side” options. Few of the examples are appended below:-

- **Linking Research and Development in Technology with Water Management:** Steps in this regards are appended below:-
 - A department be added under IRSA which should be equipped with requisite technology to share important data pertaining to weather forecasting, appropriate cropping patterns, and other related information.
 - Crops requiring lesser water may replace high water consuming crops.
 - Mobile applications should be developed by local universities to deliver information to agriculturalists regarding what to plant, timings, quantities and suitable markets for its sale.
- **A System of Financial Incentives / Penalties:** A framework be evolved at the Federal level (under IRSA) entailing systematic pattern of financial incentives as well as penalties for water usage. Details are appended below:-
 - **Incentives**
 - Agriculture sector can get subsidies on LASER land levelling, installation of drip irrigation and improving field/farm infrastructure aimed at water conservation.
 - Domestic users may get subsidies on using new water efficient fittings in household usage like washrooms, kitchens and replacing leaking pipes etc.
 - Industrial sector can be given payback options in case a substantial reduction in water usage is observed. Incentives may increase if their treatment plants are working efficiently.
 - Education institutes be given specific areas for running awareness campaigns about water conservation. They may be given special incentives / grants in case of reduction in water usage in their respective area.
 - **Penalties**
 - Agriculture sector may receive financial penalties for excessive / misuse or wastage of water of canals or tube wells.
 - Domestic users can be imposed penalties on wasting water in the form of leakages excessive usage for floor washing, gardening.
 - Industrial sectors be imposed penalties for wastage / excessive usage of water and non-treatment of wasted water.

Recommendations on Regional Issues Constructive Multi-Track Water Diplomacy

Aggressive and extensive diplomatic moves need to be executed to inform international community about the severity of the water challenges confronted by

Pakistan and their impact on our survival. This region may not be considered as nuclear flash point but a potential conflict on Water cannot be ruled out. If successful, this step will be very beneficial in bringing India on negotiating terms.

Revisiting the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) with India

Time has come for revisiting IWT due to the frequent rise of queries for which treaty has no explanation. Negotiations on IWT should be delinked from all other bilateral disputes where both sides show a sign of statesmanship. Few of the anomalies in IWT which need revisiting are as under:-

- IWT was based on the flows of 1960's where water availability and demand was not that critical issue as it has become nowadays.
- Global warming is likely to accelerate glacier melt and the treaty does not cater for the disposal of this additional water.
- Due to low electricity tariffs, extensive installation of Tube wells in Indian Punjab is draining Pakistan's underwater aquifer.
- As per International River laws, a specific amount of water to maintain environmental flows is mandatory, which is not being followed by India.

Initiation of Bilateral Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)

There are a number of steps which both countries can take to improve the overall water situation in the region. Few of these CBMs are given below:-

- **Real Time Data Sharing:** A real time monitoring system based on Satellite Imaging and Geographical Imaging System (GIS) be installed at requisite locations. Installation and Monitoring by third party can also be considered.
- **Timely and Accurate Information Regarding Indian Projects:** Delayed and often inaccurate information on the construction of Indian hydropower projects on western rivers is one of the biggest source of mistrust between both the countries. In order to address the issue India may resort to sharing timely and accurate information about the proposed projects to address Pakistan's apprehensions.
- **Protection of Glaciers:** Effects of Climate Change aggravated by human activities are rapid melting in these great sources of ice. Any significant damage to these glaciers will result in an existential threat for both the neighbours. It is, therefore, important for both the neighbours to declare all glaciers (especially Siachin) as demilitarized zones to prevent them from further damage.

Water Treaty with Afghanistan

Pakistan does not have any water sharing agreement with Afghanistan. It is recommended that the government should ink a Water Agreement with Afghanistan. Any delay in the process will deprive Pakistan with its precious water due to ongoing power projects in Afghanistan with the help of India.

Conclusion

Linkages of water with security are historically and empirically established. Pakistan being a lower riparian state of Indus River Basin, has been a sufferer of riparian exploitation by India. With each passing day, water requirements of Pakistan are increasing due to huge dependence on agriculture, rapidly growing population and rising urbanization. The situation with Afghanistan has also been strained due to gradual decline in River Kabul's water to Pakistan. A holistic approach entailing measures at domestic as well as regional level is necessary to ensure economic viability and security of Pakistan.

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TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND REGIONAL SECURITY IN EAST ASIA

*Asif Ali, Dr. Muhammad Tehsin and Irfan Ali**

Abstract

This paper seeks to study the maritime disputes amongst China and various nations of the East Asian region. The paper explores the drivers, which compel the states astride the East China Sea to establish control over the maritime and island territories. This is followed by a discussion on the dangers associated with these disputes e.g. costs of the political and military escalation, and the competition for maritime resources. There is a risk of escalation and conflict at sea. China's interests and objectives in the region are analyzed with a view to the Chinese aspiration to be the global super power by acquiring and controlling the territories around the East China Sea. While sovereignty claims in the East China Sea are not new, China's rising diplomatic, economic, as well as military influence is increasing China's capacity to pursue its interests.

Keywords: East Asia, US, China, Maritime Security, Economy.

Introduction

East China Sea carries significance as a hub of natural resources containing hundreds of islands, shoals and reefs. China is the regional power in East Asia and as a super power-aspirant employs different kinds of tactics and strategies to maximize its benefits from available opportunities. The maritime territorial disputes of China in East China Sea could also be described as part of the grand strategy of China to become a super power through control of maritime territory. Further, these maritime territorial claims escalate tensions between different stakeholders i.e. China, the US, Japan, and other regional claimant countries, which envisage the role of proxies as well. Because of its importance, the East China Sea has become a flashpoint of regional and international politics.¹

The disputes have gained momentum due to certain factors e.g. disparate interpretations of history, different understandings of international regimes like United Nations Convention on Law of Sea (UNCLOS), inordinate reluctance of concerned states which are involved in different maritime disputes, non-serious attitudes towards resolution of disputes of the claimants of different islands and territories, and inability to negotiate peace among themselves. Rising tensions over South-East Asian maritime

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disputes have become the centre of gravity not only for Asia-Pacific countries but also for the US and its allies.² These maritime territorial disputes, which have generated rift among the regional states, are decades old, and incidents and skirmishes between claimants have been a constant for several years. However, various incidents got amplified for different reasons, including the desire of the countries around the Asia-Pacific maritime territory to show their might and strength to smaller and less developed nations. Another important factor is the exploitation of the natural resources in the East and South China Seas.³

This study was prompted by the following research questions:

- Due to the territorial disputes in the East Asian Sea region, is there a threat to regional security posed by a conflict at sea?
- What are China's aims and objectives in the region in view of its aspirations to become a global super power?

The hypothesis of the study is that China's rising diplomatic, economic and military influence is increasing its capacity to pursue its ancient sovereignty claims.

Each country in the East Asian region tries to control its islands and other territories to exploit the region's natural resources including oil, gas, hydrocarbons, and fishery.⁴ As for the involvement of the US, Washington does not have competing claims over any waters but it is involved in disputes in one form or another. The US seldom takes a clear position in the miscellaneous territorial disputes. However, the US has treaty obligation with different countries like Philippines and Japan. It is clearly defined in the treaties that if Japan or the Philippines are attacked by any of the claimant parties than the US will help them.⁵ The US being a super power has certain region-wide strategic and economic interests; as a result former Obama administration announced the "Pivot to Asia Policy" which denotes the focus of US towards Asia.⁶ These maritime disputes are reshaping the relations between the US and different countries like Japan, China, Southeast Asian states, and especially Vietnam and the Philippines. The persistent regional disputes have forced the US to adopt a policy of engagement with Southeast Asian nations.⁷

The rebalancing or pivot as announced by the former US president Barack Obama was a reflection of Chinese assertiveness in the region, and of Washington's growing stakes in regional peace and stability.⁸ The treaty obligations of the US with Japan and the Philippines have provided bigger clout to both countries. Consequently, Japan and the Philippines are eye to eye with China to secure their maritime territorial rights. China seeks to resolve the maritime disputes bilaterally, and resists any attempt to internationalize the issue by involving the US in the region. Regional and international organisations have been trying to resolve the disputes, but they still have not made any progress. In this regard, China and ASEAN started discussions in early 1990s for the code of conduct for disputed islands in the Pacific region, but could not reach any suitable solution.⁹ Practically, these maritime disputes have the capacity to further deteriorate the relations among the states and can disturb the stability and peace, not only throughout the region but also beyond region as well, which can be

disastrous for international security and economy.¹⁰ The East Asian region retains importance because of crucial factors for instance it contains six of the largest militaries in the world including considerable US military presence.¹¹ This region houses the world's second largest economy i.e. China, and critical shipping lanes in a region that produces over one third of the world's exports. An increase in tensions over territorial claims could consequently disturb international shipping and deteriorate the regional security and international economy.¹²

Maritime Disputes: Chinese View

The Chinese view some decades ago and now has experienced a change due to the changing global environment. China's path towards the super power role as well as becoming a dominant power of Asia is the underlying reason behind this change. China is endeavoring to create a status quo, which mostly favors it when it comes to maritime disputes.¹³ Since 2012, China is clearly defining to the neighboring and claimant countries that either they want to solve the problem peacefully in favor of China, or become ready to bear the consequences of actions taken by them. China also, time and again, reminds its neighboring countries that it is developing very fast in economic and military terms so it will be beneficial for other claimants to have good relations to benefit from the rise of China. On the other hand, China also cautions them about the results of enmity with a rising giant.¹⁴

Different Kinds of Claims in East China Sea

There are a couple of outstanding disputes in the East China Sea. The first dispute is over Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands that are under Japanese control but also claimed by Taiwan and China. The regional history is evident that all claims and disputes have their own worth but territorial sovereignty dispute involving Senkaku/Diaoyutai has remained acrimonious among the host of disputes.¹⁵ However, claims of Japan, China and Taiwan are based on historical facts over the islets centered on two essential elements; the first element is about the amalgamation of the islets with Sino-Japanese War or independent from this.¹⁶ The second component is the issue of the concerns of islets to become the part of an area, which China relinquished to Japan in 1895 Treaty. The treaty is remembered as Shimonoseki, which ended the war between China and Japan.¹⁷

China claims that during the period of Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) these islets were part of Chinese territory. It was also included in the map of China during those days and Beijing also had the documents of territories protected and cared by the dynasty's coastal defence. So, China has the view and it proclaims that during the Ming dynasty, China retained these islands under supervision of Taiwan.¹⁸ Adding to this, Beijing urges that it was upon surrender of powerful and Imperialist Japan in 1945, which resulted in return of Taiwan to China. Japan should also have handed over the Senkaku Islands to China.¹⁹

China holds the view that the islands and territories between Beijing and Tokyo are clear and defined for example China proclaims that Okinawa Trough in the ocean

floor split up Senkaku and Beijing's Continental Shelf from Japan's Ryuku Islands. On the other hand, Japan holds that the Japanese Emperor promulgated an Imperial ordinance, and joined the Senkaku/ Diaoyutai Islands to Japan in January 1895.²⁰ Japan proclaims that there was no evidence earlier, which proved that the islands were inhabited. Japan considers these islands were uninhabited, and there was no trace that China controlled these islands. Further, Japan also demands that the integration of Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands had nothing to do with the Second World War. On the other hand, China and Taiwan have been proclaiming that Japan seized these islands in the war. In the Second World War, the purpose of the Allied Declarations of Cairo and Potsdam was to return the islands to China, which had been taken by an Imperialist wartime Japan.

At the end of Second World War with the defeat of Japan the authority over Senkaku/Diaoyutai was surrendered by Japan to Taiwan. But it did not solve the issue of Senkaku/Diaoyutai during that time. After the Second World War, China affirmed that it had regained Taiwan after the surrender of Japan, but added that Beijing should also have recovered Diaoyutai Island. The Foreign Minister of Taiwan affirmed that Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands seem to have been in Chinese historical records during the Ming Dynasty. Taiwan held the view that Senkaku/Diaoyutai were the group of islands, which were part of Taiwan before the Second World War. Therefore, it should have been returned to China along with Taiwan.²¹

Taiwan was a colony of Japan from 1895 to 1945. The Republic of China came into existence in 1911. There was a peace treaty of the US with Japan in 1951, according to the terms and conditions of the treaty the US controlled the islands from 1950s to 1972. Another treaty was signed between the US and Japan in 1972 termed as the US-Japan Okinawa Reversion Treaty by which the US returned these islands to Japan (Zhong, 2012). After the signing of this treaty between Japan and US, China pronounced the treaty regarding the islands as "backroom deals", which are illegal thus null and void. In 1970s, the sovereignty question over Senkaku/Diaoyutai was debated but not resolved. However, Beijing and Tokyo had softened their relations and they were on the path toward stabilization, and concluded a peace treaty in 1978. China upheld that they arrived at an understanding to leave the issue for "future generation" to resolve. Since 1990, both countries have suspected and blamed each other that they were trying to violate the terms of the treaty.²²

The Maritime Dominion Conflict

There has always been conflict over oceans, and rights and control of the states over these and their natural resources. Following this tradition, China also claims rights farther than the 200 Nautical Miles (NM) of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to the centre of the Okinawa Trough and the Median Line. In addition, China asserts that there is a huge quantity of natural resources in the seas, and there are many Chinese projects in the Continental Shelf, which are still in process so it is possible to discuss the region's collective progress in at least some areas. After much conflict, finally Japan and

China reached bilateral agreements over exploration of undersea hydrocarbon reserves in 2000.²³

Maritime Resources in East China Sea

The East China Sea is replete with natural resources especially some areas have abundance of resources like Xihu/Okinawa Trough, which contained large amounts of natural gas that can be estimated to fulfil the domestic energy demands of China and Japan. According to EIA (Energy Information Administration - US), China's growing economy could need much oil and natural gas in future, which would put pressure on the Chinese government for the search of new supplies to fulfil the local demands.²⁴

Oil Reserves

It is difficult to measure the quantity of the oil resources that exist in East China Sea. Due to the ongoing conflicts among various players, this area has yet not developed further in regard to discovery or utilization of oil resources. There are estimated numbers provided by EIA of 200 billion barrels of oil reserves.²⁵ The Chinese sources have their own view, according to which there are different estimates about the undiscovered reserves. The Chinese claim that undiscovered reserves could range from 70 to 160 billion barrels of oil in East China Sea and this area largely lies in the Xihu/Okinawa Trough.²⁶ China started to exploit the resources nearly three decades ago, in 1980s, when it first found the Pinghu oil and gas field. Additionally, China and Japan are moving towards the normalization of relations. Having considered the quantity of oil produced from South China Sea, most of the observers are not likely to believe that it can become an important supplier of oil for the Asia-Pacific region.²⁷

Natural Gas

According to the reports and figures of EIA, East China Sea contains 1 to 2 Trillion cubic feet (Tcf) discovered and proven natural gas. Chinese sources' claims provide another version that there are 250 Tcf in East China Sea, which are yet undiscovered mostly in Xihu/Okinawa Trough. The Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) estimates that proven gas reserves were at 300 Tcf in 2011, according to an annual report. The undisputed Pinghu field started its production in 1998, reached its maximum level of 40 to 60 million Tcf daily in the mid-2000s. China worked hard to explore these resources so many Chinese companies initiated work in this huge gas and oil field in 1995 in Xihu/Okinawa Trough. There are some large gas fields and others are lesser in quantity. The Chinese companies discovered a huge gas field in the area. To contest with others China, in 2006, began its production in competition with other countries and groups like Tianwaitian/Kashi field. China states that the Kashi field is an inseparable part of its EEZ.²⁸

United Nations Commission on Laws of Sea

The United Nations Commission on Laws of Sea (UNCLOS) requires that every state had right up to 200 NM of seawater as EEZ. In any sea, areas of maritime jurisdiction will overlap, if is less than 400 NM across. The total distance across the East

China Sea is 360 NM. The UNCLOS is unable to solve the claims of Exclusive Economic Zone.²⁹ On the other side, China insists that its Continental Shelf stretches to the Okinawa Trough. If UNCLOS calls for Sino-Japanese maritime boundaries to be defined according to their claims and after reviewing their claims then the Trough and Median lines are the immediate choices. The Geneva Convention on Continental Shelf 1958, the predecessor of UNCLOS, provided a better solution for the East China Sea disputes. According to its plan, in the absence of any agreement, the boundary was to be defined by employment of equidistance.

Nonetheless, geography is the most important factor in solving the maritime boundary delimitation. Further, control over Senkaku/Diaoyutai Island is a significant issue between Japan and China in the East China Sea. Therefore, it relates to the demarcation of maritime border between two countries. The best solution is that the maritime boundaries between Japan and China should be solved on equality basis and equal distance from both the concerned countries.

Laws about Territorial Acquisition

There is no international convention yet designed about the destinies of nations on the issue of authority over undecided territories. The Customary International Law lays down “at least five modes of territorial acquisition” that came to surface through the verdicts of international bodies and arbitration panels. These five modes of territorial acquisitions are: discovery, occupation, accretion, conquest and prescription.³⁰ According to Customary International Law it means that discovery alone is not sufficient to claim sovereignty. For exercise of sovereignty, the occupation must be effective. The international courts describe effective occupation when a state possesses the intention to exercise its sovereign authority.

Importance of Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia

There are numerous issues such as fishing rights, underwater oil and gas deposits, different understandings of maritime law, and conflicting principles for claims. The objective is to redress previous territorial losses, and protect national interest amidst uncertain geopolitical situation. Therefore, these conflicts are the result of the shrinking of the world and competition over natural resources to fulfil the increasing requirements of future because of the growing demand and supply imbalances.³¹

Impediments for Regional Maritime Security

The impediments which act as a stumbling block in maritime peace and cooperation in the Far East include: impact of domestic factors in the region, Sino-American maritime rivalry, deficient policy guidelines and operational protocols, third party intervention and involvement, blurring the operational role of navy and coastguards, advanced missile technology and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in the seas, lack of new maritime security initiatives, and reluctance to resort to legal solutions.³²

Sino-American Maritime Rivalry

The rivalry between Washington and Beijing started when the US realized that China could be its only competitor at the global level. Therefore, both countries are trying to dominate the seas of Asia Pacific. Their interests and intentions pose an increasing challenge for the disputants of East China Sea. All the other nations in the region are caught in a dilemma which makes it problematic to solve their issues when both China and US are projecting power in the region.³³ The Sino-American rivalry proved to be a zero-sum-game for the nations of East Asia. China is becoming possessive in the region since it considers the region as its home ground, which is geographically correct. The US being a super power and guardian of world peace and prosperity has changed its former policy toward Asia-Pacific with the introduction of “Pivot to Asia” policy. With introduction of the Asia pivot policy of the US, and China’s increasing naval and military power have made these two states the real competitors in the region.³⁴

The rivalry between these two countries has given rise to the security issues and concerns of regional nations and stakeholders in Asia-Pacific. Strategic autonomy of East Asian nations is imperative for their strategies and improving relations between China and the US calls for strategic thinking.³⁵ Even though the US retains land forces in a number of states in this region like South Korea, Japan, and Australia, the economic dependence of East Asian nations upon China continues to grow because of the fast-paced development of China. These countries are of the view that China could be a better friend of neighbouring states than the US, which is at a distance geographically. In South China Sea, the Chinese claim of nine dash lines is renounced by nations, which are the part of the dispute and also by the US. Likewise, Japan rejects the Chinese claims over the East China Sea. Yet the US has refrained itself from taking any position on East China Sea, about which Japan protested by maintaining that the US had to take position in accordance with the US-Japan treaty obligations.³⁶

China has become confident in the region to stake its historic claims over East Asian Sea. As much as China has been regionally projecting its naval power, the US has turned towards the East Asian region.³⁷ Increasingly, the US is aligning itself with smaller countries in order to pursue their maritime claims. The interests of the two super powers in East China Sea are intimidating to others in the region, and they suffer because of this attitude of these big powers.

China considers maritime security and autonomy as a “core interest”, while the US regards the issue of freedom of East Asia Sea as a “Critical National Interest”. The US is improving its relations through naval exercises with partners in accordance with the policy of “Pivot to Asia”.³⁸ China’s military modernisation has created many doubts in the neighbouring countries. China is also projecting its military strength by means of gunboat diplomacy in East China Sea. Consequently, the regional nations are caught in a security dilemma. If they choose one they would have to face the wrath of the other. China is making efforts to be a naval power in the Far Eastern and Asia-Pacific region by projecting its military might while the US seeks to maintain its status as hegemonic power in Asia-Pacific. This power game between the two mighty rivals is still ongoing,

at the cost of the indecisiveness of other stakeholders in deciding to choose one or the other.³⁹

Conclusion

The concept of power in the global system has always been relative and fluctuating. The rise and fall of a state is mainly due to its pace of economic progress, conducive environment and prevalence/absence of war. Some states develop quicker than others, which is the outcome of domestic politics and technological innovation, good institutions and political leadership's capability to make use of state resources. Over the previous three decades, Beijing has acquired remarkable skill to plan and assemble its power in terms of national resources to execute actions, which are most beneficial to it in economic, diplomatic and military spheres. Due to its potential economic development for a quarter of a century, China has been placed at the top of the list of countries, which have substantially increased their military budget. China's military expenses have increased in the double-digits, which also provide motivation to fresh alliances. The Chinese pursuit of "comprehensive national power" assures that no country should challenge what China claims to be its "core national interests". The event of gaining and maximizing power has widened the gap between China and its neighbours. The issue of security dilemma persists in East Asia despite the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) after the Cold War. In East Asia, there are two main conflicts, which are responsible for triggering security concerns and having an effect on the regional stability. One is the issue of peace and security, which has always been sought by regional states, and other is the South and East China Seas disputes which remains matter of concern not only for China and the US but also for the other countries of the region. China has been behaving proactively and assertively since a long time that has given momentum to maritime disputes in the East China Sea. Further, the declaration by China to exercise jurisdiction in these disputes has given rise to the security dilemma of several states in East Asia. It is widely believed that security dilemma has remained the problem, which is the cause behind the existing tense environment in the East China Sea. The military modernization of China can be regarded as the major source of regional security dilemma. China has been moving towards becoming a naval power from an economic power that can transform the military balance in the East Asian region. China is concerned with maritime security due to unsettled territorial disputes in both the seas. The region of both the seas has turned into a source of interstate conflict since the disputes have turned out to be closely associated with interrelated issues of food, energy and maritime security. These issues have given boost to the maritime security dilemma not only among the regional states but also affecting other stakeholders. The intensity of maritime disputes could be reduced by the disputant states through trust and understanding. The influence of domestic political factors on regional maritime security could be handled by regional states in the best interest of collective economic gains and mutual maritime defense. In addition to this, it is also crucial for the regional countries to distinguish between the role of navies and the national coast guard. The US being involved in the East China Sea as well as on humanitarian grounds must play its role in East Asia as a neutral umpire. The disputants should agree to jointly work on policy guidelines and operational

protocols. The arms race for cutting edge missile technology and WMDs in regional seas should be regulated and restrained to eschew any misadventure. The regional states must cultivate new maritime security initiatives to accomplish regional maritime peace and cooperation.

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FEDERALISM IN A POST 18TH AMENDMENT – PAKISTAN

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Abstract

This article seeks to understand the political landscape of Pakistan as it exists today and explains its structure. The study utilizes a textual analysis approach to analyze parts of 1973 constitution, and the 18th amendment as a whole. Interviews of those accountable for the 18th amendment have been conducted to gain insight into its success in establishing a democratic federation. Analysis of the interviews was done in order to determine the general theme of responses and generate a discussion with respect to the specific research questions. Subsequently the final data was subjected to an ontological and epistemological study. The analysis of the 18th amendment reveals that the document itself is highly conducive to the model of federalism.

Keywords: Eighteenth Amendment, Pakistan Politics, Federalism in Pakistan, Democracy.

Introduction

The foundation for any nation in the modern world, regardless of the form of government, is its constitution. The constitution essentially paves the way for the creation of a nation and its future existence. It is the constitution that sets out the method of governance for a nation, however, theory and practice are entirely different in nature. All forms of government can be understood to lie on a continuum, with respect to the number of people involved in the electoral or decision-making process. However, the common denominator among all forms of government is a constitution. From a purely theoretical standpoint the constitution is simply a set of rules outlining a nation's administrative governance system. It may or may not be a legal written document.

While scholars have varied opinions on the subject the first ever known, written piece of legislature that is said to qualify as a constitution is attributed to Sumerian King Ur-Nammu of the city of Ur, located along the river Euphrates in modern day Iraq.¹ Around the time of 350 B.C Aristotle is said to have been the first to make an actual distinction between common and constitutional laws. Of these distinctions the simplest and perhaps most important was that constitutional law

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revolved around the arrangement of “offices (positions of power, ministers etc) within a state”.

On the other hand, it is argued that the Islamic Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) was actually the first to set up a constitution. This refers to the charter of Medina setup by the Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) after his migration to Medina in the year 622 CE and instrumental in its establishment as a nation state.²

Similar to the Muslim world, the Western world has its own notions about the world’s first constitution. The *Magna Carta* or the Great Charter of the early 13th century is the earliest example of a constitution in Europe.³ This charter however went on to have a significant impact on the development of future charters, peace agreements and even constitutions across the Western world.

The constitution is the foundation of the political and administrative governance system of a state and, therefore, it is considered as the most important and sacred document for it. All powers are used and drawn from the principles set in it. It describes the extent to which this power can be exercised. It defines the structure of the legislature, the powers of executive and judiciary that how the government and its different institutions will be formulated with a clear mechanism of their functioning with a system of limitations. A written constitution is the first and foremost requirement of the federal form of government.

Even before its inception, Pakistan has been envisioned, under the objective’s resolution, as a nation under the federal form of governance. After its inception however its political direction has drifted under different presidencies. Considering the political history of Pakistan, this paper studies federalism in Pakistan through the 18th amendment to the constitution of Pakistan, heralded by many as step towards democracy and strengthening of federal system of governance in Pakistan’s history. While there is no doubt about the efficacy of the 18th amendment itself, this paper studies the implementation of the 18th amendment to determine if and to what extent it has been successful in reviving and implementing federalism in Pakistan.

Defining Federalism

For the purpose of this study Pakistan is referred to as a federation, in accordance with the 18th amendment. A federation is defined as “group of states, with a central government, independent in internal affairs.”⁴

Focus of the Study

This study is centered around the 18th Amendment with respect to its financial, legislative, administrative, and political concerns. This study looks towards the implications of the 18th amendment as they have come to be and compare it to proposed outcome i.e. the issue of its implementation and success. This study investigates all major concerns and implications of the 18th Amendment and the role of democratic and bureaucratic forces with reference to the constitution of Pakistan.

Theoretical Framework

The data gathered from the interviews and produced from textual analysis, was subject to the various theories of public policy, in order to understand the rationale behind policy making in Pakistan. As the currently prevalent system of governance in Pakistan seems to follow the lines of federalism, the data has been subjected to K. C. Wheare's theories on federalism due to his widely accepted authority on the matter. Principally a form of federal governance is defined as "the method of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each within a sphere co- ordinate and independent."⁵

Under Wheare's system of federal governance the sphere of power is divided into regional governments having the autonomy to exercise their rights to governance upon their people independently and autonomously of each other. These governments, whilst functioning independently are however bound together by the central government, which has the ability to exercise power directly over the citizens but not indirectly via the states or provinces. Where is also of the opinion that, if the central government lacks the means by which to regulate its citizens directly, a confederation form of governance is more desirable than the federal form.⁶ Note that a confederation can perhaps be characterized as the polar opposite of a federation, in which the power rests largely with the central government.⁷

Research Methodology

For the purpose of this paper a combination of both primary and secondary research will be used. The primary research will utilize a textual analysis approach to analyze the 1973 constitution and the 18th amendment. Interviews of those responsible for the 18th amendment i.e. legislators, bureaucrats, law makers, learned clergymen etc as well as those impacted by the amendment i.e. ministers and general public will be conducted. The interviews allow for a gathering of insight into how effective the 18th amendment has been. Interviews are conducted by the researchers themselves ensuring the interviewees privacy, while also adhering strictly to a set of structured interview questions.

For secondary research the work of lawmakers and bureaucrats, which deal with the 18th amendment as well as the constitutional identity of Pakistan has been utilized. Furthermore, broader works of literature revolving around democracy and its implementation has been considered as well.

Interview data was transcribed and translated into English using the double-blind translation method in order to ensure consistency. The interviews were conducted by the researcher themselves according to a set of predetermined structured questions, in order to avoid leading questions or the introduction of the researchers own prepossessed biases to the data.

Theatrical analysis of the interview was done in order to determine the general theme of responses and generate a discussion with respect to the specific research

questions. Subsequently the final data was subjected to an ontological and epistemological study.

Literature Review

There are a large number of articles which deal with problems and prospects of federalism in Pakistan and major issues of democratic Parliamentary system Majeed (2015), Waseem (2010), Bukhari (2013), Akbar (2002), Khalid I. (2013), Nazir (2012), Jahagir (2010), Shah A. (2013), Nazar (2013), Hussain M., (2012), and Khalid I, (2012)⁸ explain problems and issues of federalism after the 18th Amendment, and struggle of power assessment with the idea to hold political democracy that deals with the federal supremacy and is not province- oriented politics. Also, it upholds the idea of justice and rule of law. Meanwhile, in Pakistan the federal system did not flourish in real terms and has extreme flaws due to which there is a challenging situation for future development in economic and social field.

There are many articles that deal with different aspects of the 18th Amendment and Pakistan's political transitions after the 2010 parliamentary settlement by President Asif Zardari to strengthen parliamentary government. The aim was to continue the democratic set up in coming decades for de-centralization of power under the 18th Amendment. It gives provincial autonomy under the legal framework. This amendment consists of a hundred changes in which the most significant change is removal of 58-2(b) clause which relates to dissolution of parliament by the president which resulted in adverse consequences for the democratic state. This amendment aimed at better balance of power through a stronger connection between the state governing body and the people.

Under the 18th amendment, the parliament with mutual consensus changed the name of NWFP province to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) but there remained some unresolved questions which could not be handled by PPP government i.e. security, education, economic and foreign policy measures (Cookman, 2010). Likewise, Siddiqui, (2010), Nabi, (2013) and Butt A.M., (2013) have also criticized the 18th amendment for not addressing issues related to education system in the provinces such as budget allocation.

The 18th amendment was also criticized for not providing proper resources to provinces and local body governance system for socio-economic development of society. Similarly, Hassan M.H., (2013) and Sial (2010) have raised concerns that even after the 18th amendment, the provinces have feelings of deprivation and it is claimed that Punjab still monopolizes the resources. These authors further argue that the 18th amendment has become a stumbling block between centre and provinces as it has engaged them in a struggle for securing more resources and this will lead to the development of harsh feelings between developed and less developed provinces. It results in province-oriented patriotism and weakening of centre. Hence, it is argued that the 18th amendment created misconception between Center and provinces and has further widened the gulf.

The Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC), Evacuee Trust Property Board (ETPB), Employees' Old-Age Benefits Institution (EOBI), Workers Welfare Fund (WWF), Aerial Survey and Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services Corporation (PASSCO), these departments are still waiting for the fulfillment of federal promises from their implementation which clearly shows difference between theory and practice in the implementation of 18th Amendment.

With reference of 18th Amendment, people of Pakistan are more concerned with the power sharing formula in which each province wants its due share from parliamentary government, which was elected on the basis of democratic reforms in 2013. Its main duty was to provide single set of resource to the people of all the provinces. Nevertheless, in economic and administrative sector, the government has also failed to provide equal level of facilities to all regions. Current government of KPK also raised up its voice in provincial assembly against the federal government with reference to their province's share in CPEC, which is not practically done by government.⁹

Asma Faiz explains in her book about the power of federalism and authority upon provinces after 18th Amendment and transition to democracy after 2008 and major constitutional amendment of 2010 and the relation between the center and provinces. PPP's contribution towards parliamentary democracy enhanced fundamentalist approach of parliamentarians towards people to flourish civilian government in future, hence 18th Amendment in 2010 is major milestone in Pakistani federalism. While historical events provoke more enhancement towards power sharing between the center and the provinces, re-structuring the federation and devolution of power is necessary for provinces otherwise negative relationship between the provincial revenue and federal revenue will provoke inequality within Pakistan and will provide mixed finding in terms of Indian and Pakistani federation. In short, Pakistani system is still suffering from constitutional ups and downs like Indian system.¹⁰

Kundi (1980) elaborates problems and adjustment of their issues in Pakistan constitution that affects mostly on working of civilians and internal issues promoting external threat because the unstable constitutional adjustments promote basic agenda of power division, since as federal type of system it is the duty of the center to divide power and resources. Further, the linguistic groups, instead of practicing political harmony, added fuel to fire and it resulted in the separation of Bengal and so, is the area of the settlement of disputes and conflicts of the center and provinces, the federalism of Pakistan has been ineffective.¹¹

Shriram Maheshwari attributes the ethnic groups as major problem within Pakistan, which did not permit the strengthening of the federal system in Pakistan, due to administration setup, which includes all the political and economic affairs of Pakistan directly. Quota system in election set up of Pakistan made fundamental difference between the distributions of resources, which majorly influenced the federal setup in terms of economical process.¹²

The 18th Amendment

Passed by the senate on 18th April 2010. Under this amendment the president is a figurative head of state, his power to declare a state of emergency has been removed and a total of 15 ministries have removed from federal jurisdiction and allowed to be establishment under provincial jurisdictions.

While this amendment may have been made in 2010, the groundwork for this development dates back to 2002 when local bodies system was introduced. Practically however it was the central government that had jurisdiction over the aforementioned ministries, which resulted in extremely skewed human development among provinces, particularly Baluchistan.

The 18th amendment was heralded as a revival of 1973 constitution in its true spirit and was welcomed by the nation.¹³ At the time claimed that much of Pakistan's issues with respect to development as a nation and development of its people would be resolved, there would be a balance of power between provinces and development would largely be more equitable. The issue of federalism in Pakistan is not a new one, throughout its history the nation has struggled with the division of powers under the bicameral legislature proposed by 1973 constitution.

Under this amendment the key concern is of the dissolution of evolution of power mechanisms within the principle of the supremacy of democracy, which is proposed to be achieved under an effective local government system. Amendment XVIII or the 18th Amendment of the Constitution of Pakistan, was passed by the National Assembly of Pakistan on the 8th of April 2010. It was approved by the senate on the 15th of April 2010 and became a part of the constitution when President Asif Ali Zardari countersigned it on the 19th of April 2010. Thus, marking a significant first in the political history of Pakistan where a president willingly relinquished their own powers passing the down to the parliament and the station of the prime minister. Aimed at eliminating the Presidential powers to dissolve the Parliament unilaterally. Aiming to turn change the form of governance in Pakistan from semi-presidential to a parliamentary republic. It also renamed the North-West Frontier Province to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in recognition of the major ethnic group of the region. These reforms were meant to ease political tensions between provinces and disseminate the powers of the Presidency. Major changes to the Constitution:

- Amendment to Article 6 in an attempt to deter future military coups.
- Article 58(2b) was repealed and substituted with the Dissolution of National Assembly
- The President retained the power to dissolve the National Assembly only in the event a vote of no confidence was passed against the prime minister
- The total strength of the cabinet was fixed at 11% of the total membership of the parliament
- All governors were required to be both residents and registered voters of their respective provinces and were to be appointed by the president under the discretion of the prime minister

- Provinces were now legally required to establish local government systems, devolve the political electoral process, administrative and financial responsibility and the authority to elect representatives
- Prime minister was to be chairperson of the Council of Common Interests, members of which are to include Chief Ministers and three members of the federal government
- An amendment to Article 157 requiring the federal government to seek provincial government approval before installing hydroelectric power stations in provinces
- The Prime Minister was granted the power to provide names of three candidates of the Council of Common Interests in consultation with the leader of the opposition, to a parliamentary committee for confirmation
- Insertion of Article 175(a) governing the appointment of judges of Supreme, High and Federal Shariah Courts
- With the substitution of Article 243 the control and command of the armed forces of Pakistan shall rest with the federal government and ultimately the President
- The President was granted the authority to appoint chairman to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the chief of army, naval and air staff
- North West Frontier Province was renamed to “Khyber Pakhtunkhwa”
- As a constitutional duty the State is to provide free and compulsory education to all citizens of Pakistan from the ages of 5 and 16 years
- Under amendment to clause 1 names of provinces “Baluchistan” and “Sind” were substituted with “Balochistan” and “Sindh” respectively
- Barring of person(s) having acquired foreign citizenship from contesting in national elections for parliament
- The electoral process for all elections in Pakistan, excluding those of the Prime Minister and Chief Minister, are to be held by secret ballot
- The concurrent legislative list in the 4th Schedule was removed in its entirety and various ministries and powers divided clearly amongst the provincial and federal governments, ensuring a clear division of power and authority

Elimination of the Concurrent Legislative List

By abolishing the concurrent list in its entirety the 18th amendment has created an unprecedented change. It is aimed at providing greater autonomy to the people of Pakistan and to the provinces of Pakistan with respect to their rights to governance.

The concurrent list of the 4th schedule of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, was a comprehensive list of 47 subjects upon which both the Parliament and Provincial Assembly could jointly legislate. Under the 18th amendment with the abolishment of the concurrent list one item namely; Boilers, which appeared at serial number 29 has been shifted to part 1 of the federal legislative lists. While two items namely; Electricity, and Legal, Medical and other professions, have been shifted to part 2 of the federal legislative list.

With the omission provisions have been made to provide the provincial assemblies with powers to legislate any matter not appearing on the federal legislative list including but not limited to the remaining 44 subjects. The Parliament has been essentially restricted to legislate only the subject appearing on the federal legislative list and nothing else. As a result, a number of subjects and activities being previously legislated by the parliament have now been shifted to the authority of the provincial assembly.

With the elimination changes have also been made to both parts of the federal legislative list. Under provision of Article 154(1) the council of common interests has been granted authority to formulate and regulate policies with deal with legislation and governance of subjects appearing in part 2 of the federal legislative list. The following subjects have been sifted from part 1 of the federal legislative list to part 2:

- Major ports, that is to say, the declaration and delimitation of such ports, and the constitution and powers of port authorities therein
- Census
- Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging to any province to any area in another province, but not so as to enable the police of one province to exercise powers and jurisdiction in another province without the consent of the government of that province; extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging to any province to railway areas outside that province, and
- National Planning and National Economic Coordination including Planning and Coordination of Scientific and Technological Research.

New Subjects added to part 1 of the federal legislative list vis a vi the 18th amendment:

- All regulatory authorities established under a Federal law
- Supervision and management of public debt
- Standards in institutions for higher education and research, scientific and technical institutions, and
- Inter-Provincial Matters and Coordination

The issue of Sharing of Ownership in Oil, Gas and Territorial Waters has also been discussed and provided for under the 18th amendment by Article 172(c) and Article 172(3). Providing for joint ownership but limiting powers with respect to development.

Implementation of the Eighteenth Amendment

Under Article 270 AA clause 9 the 18th amendment has provided for the creation of an implementation commission, formulated by the federal government as they see fit. Under this the implementation a commission was created which was headed by Senator Mian Raza Rabbani.

Devolution Process

The implementation commission decided to carry of the process of devolution in three distinct stages. The Commission recommended devolution of functions of devolved organizations in the following manner:

- Employees working in various field organizations under the aforesaid devolved Ministries/Divisions will be transferred to the respective administrations of the provinces and federal areas (Islamabad Capital territory, Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Gilgit-Baltistan) under Section 10 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, pending formulation of a new enabling law on the subject
- Employees working in any Ministry being abolished and not taken by the provinces/federal areas will be adjusted in other Ministries/ Divisions. None of the employee will be retrenched/laid-off
- Funds for transferred activities and manpower of devolved ministries budgeted in the year 2010-11 will be transferred to the provinces/federal territories on pro rata basis
- Development projects of these Ministries/Divisions will also be transferred to the provinces/federal territories along with project employees and unreleased part of revised allocation of funds for these projects in the year 2010-11
- Office buildings, furniture, fixture, equipment, and transport in use of these offices will be handed over to the provinces. Final determination of issues relating to assets and liabilities shall be decided with the approval of the Federal Cabinet

Interview Analysis

In order to discover the grassroots impact of the 18th amendment and provide an answer to how successful it has been in strengthening federalism and democracy, in depth interviews of key individual were conducted. These ranged from ministers of devolved ministers, political party leaders, judiciary, academics as well as the implementation commission was conducted.

The general consensus amongst all participants was that the 18th amendment was indeed instrumental in restoring democracy and providing structure to the system of governance in Pakistan. Instrumentally the amendment was considered as providing clear guidelines on conduct of government business, government structure and making efforts to any conceivable avenue for disruption of the government. The interviewees also concurred that the amendment provides for complete, absolute, and clear division of powers between the federal and provincial governments. In particular the omission of the concurrent legislative list was often quoted as being key towards clarity in division of power. It was also agreed that the 18th amendment provided grassroots level democracy with in inclusion of many democratic freedoms previously not included in the constitution.

However, the opinion on its success of the 18th amendment was mixed amongst the interviewees. The general consensus here was the 18th amendment indeed supports and makes provision for a federal system of governance. The opinion however was split

on how successfully the proposed process of the 18th amendment was implemented and where the faults lay.

In particular it was found that those who were serving in the ministries themselves, were of the opinion that both the implementation commission and provincial governments were at fault for a lack of grassroot level federal system. This set of interviewees was of the opinion that the implementation was conducted hastily and without proper consideration of the provincial governments ability to manage the ministry. Often at the time of devolution, provinces were lacking in necessary infrastructure to run these ministries effectively. They also voiced the opinion that the highest echelons of the political parties themselves were largely uninterested in making a grassroot level federal system as they sought to consolidate their own power and place those closest to them in powerful positions.

Political leaders and significant persons of political parties were largely content with the aspect of federalism under the 18th amendment and were of the opinion that it has been implemented in true letter and spirit. They however show concern over the devolution process and held the implementation committee responsible for mismanagement of the devolution process.

Those heralding from the judicial diaspora were for the most part against the change proposed by the amendment with respect to the appointment of judges. In their opinion the process provided for appointment of judges made it highly subjective to the personal preferences of the highest echelons of federal and provincial government, increasing the likelihood for practices of corruption and putting the government above the law.

The academics interviewed were of the opinion that the 18th amendment was only partially successful in establishing a federal system of governance. They considered the division and devolution of powers to be adequate, however voicing concerns over political parties themselves not wanting a grassroot level federal system of governance. They also pointed out a major flaw of the 18th amendment which made the provinces and federal government responsible for their own resources, revenue generation and expenditure. However, the federal government lacked the resources of the provinces and could only collect revenues from limited taxation of the provinces. The federal government was still solely responsible for the expenditure on military, defense, and servicing of foreign debt. This has created a situation where the provinces get to access the security and stability, created by the presence of an armed forces but do not actively pay for this security. Similarly, the provinces benefit from projects financed by foreign debt but are liable to service this debt. Thus, the federal government has to an extent been put in a position where their expenditure offsets their revenues. Academics have also pointed out that while the amendment deals with the macro level issue of federalism very well, it does not provide for guidelines to implement a grassroot level federal government, leaving that entirely up to the provincial government.

Findings

The research provides concrete evidence for the 18th amendment being a document that favors, provides for, and attempts to produce a democratic federal system of governance in Pakistan. With respect to providing a democratic system it has been highly successful in undoing a large part of the damage done by various rulers. It divides powers and provides mechanisms for governance that ensure that the democratic process be following in all business conducted by the government.

With respect to question of the success of the 18th amendment in establishing a federal system of governance, it has been found that the amendment has only been partially successful. Its success lies in providing for the means, rules and divisions of power required to establish a federal system of governance. A federal system has indeed been established at the macro level, however the amendment has lacked any clear framework for a grassroots level federal system, thus being unable to fulfill its intended purpose.

Significance

The study is instrumental as it represents the first research of its kind on the subject. The insight it has provided into the political landscape of Pakistan adds to the gap in knowledge overall that has been present to a lack of in-depth research on the subject. This research looks at the 18th amendment as a whole alongside the actors responsible for its execution and implementation. In doing so it is able to provide concrete reasoning which explains the political structure of Pakistan as it is today.

Conclusion

The analysis of the 18th amendment reveals that the document itself is highly conducive to existence of a theoretically perfect model of federalism. The problem lies in the fact that the amendment has to undo decades of damage to the political landscape of Pakistan under the various rulers. Some of this damage is highly intangible in nature, which can only be erased with time. The major hurdles in establishing a grassroots level democratic government, seems to be the political parties in power within the various provinces. Years of autocratic and dictatorial rule has rendered those in charge of these parties unwilling to provide an environment truly conducive to the perfect model of federalism.

NOTES

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MANAGING INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS TO PREVENT RADICALIZATION: LESSONS FROM PAKISTANI TRIBAL AREAS

*Ghulam Muhammad Awan and Dr. Khuram Iqbal**

Abstract

The research investigates the factors affecting Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), and effect of their delayed repatriation in promoting radicalization. The sample frame comprised of 385 IDPs North Waziristan for the period from June 2014 to December 2016, in the camps located at five different places. 375 questionnaires, duly filled, were retrieved out of the 385 self-administered questionnaires. Results found that social deprivation, push factors, pull factors, delay in repatriation and social deprivation have significant positive effect on radicalization. The research recommends provision of quality living meeting vital requirements of life such as; provision of clean drinking water, rehabilitation of water supply schemes and tube wells etc, provision of reliable and regulated electricity, improvement and up gradation of health facilities, availability of medicines and doctors, reconstruction and improvement of educational institutions and establishment of cottage industries in the area..

Keywords: Internally Displaced Persons, Radicalization, War on Terror, Social Deprivation, Repatriation and Rehabilitation.

Introduction

Pakistani was a tolerant society with regard to discrimination on religion, caste, color and creed.¹ The US War on Terror (WoT) resulted in dislodging Taliban from power, pushing them and their sympathizers, for shelter, to far flung mountains in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The porous border between the two countries played a vital role in uninterrupted cross-border movement of Taliban and their allies. Soon these Taliban's regrouped in to resistant groups and started retaliation against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Afghanistan and Pakistani forces.

The frequent incidents of terrorism and pursuing response from Pakistan's military influenced displacement of local people to safer areas. Besides military actions; persistent poverty, degrading livelihood, and frequent natural disasters added further in to IDPs flow out. The continued military operations against militants in various parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Bajour, Mohmand of erstwhile Federally Administered

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Tribal Areas (FATA), and Swat, Dir, falling under Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) resulted in to near 3 million IDPs.² Some of the locals supported them for politico-religious reasons and some of them opposed due to their difference in philosophy. However, almost all of them left their respective places of residences for fear of becoming the possible victims of the war between the government forces and terrorists.³

It is assumed that there was a broad spectrum of factors that impacted on the IDPs and their households' due to actions against the terrorists, by the terrorists and analyses the scenario developed by fluidity of WoT. The article identifies and analyses these pull and push factors to find out their linkages to the radicalization of IDPs. Primary data, based on the perceptions of the IDPs, obtained from the five major concentrations of IDPs in various districts of KP through self-administered questionnaires, focused group discussion and various interviews with major stake holders.

Operation Terms and Definition Radicalization

Radicalization is defined as an extreme social, administrative, religious or political standards that rejects or undermines the status quo or undermines the existing philosophies of the nation.⁴ In other words, the process of digressing away from equilibrium (which could be legal, political, social and/religious) may be defined as radicalization. Radicalization and extremism are often used interchangeably with little or no difference.

Terrorism

Terrorism, according to the US official definition, is *“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents or the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims”*.⁵

War against Terrorism

The term "War on Terror" (WoT) refers to the military campaign from 2001 onwards led by the U.S., UK and its allies against Al-Qaeda and its allies (state and non-state) identified by them as terrorists. Interestingly, the WoT placed disproportionate focus on the above-mentioned groups, ignoring militant movements, which did not threaten the West.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Simone defines an IDP as *“someone who is forced to flee his or her home but who remains within his or her country's borders”*.⁶ IDPs at times are put in same category as of refugees, however, both terms fall in different legal frameworks.⁷ By end of 2015, numbers of IDPs were assessed as 38.2 million in the world with Pakistan hosting

approximately 1.4 million.⁸ The surge in IDP population was subscribed to post 9/11-armed conflict in Afghanistan and erstwhile FATA.

Push and Pull Factors

A condition that pushes one to leave his/her home, especially in one's country, region, organization, religion, etc. This may include, but not limited to, armed conflicts, natural calamities, threats of genocide etc. In migration studies the term pull factor is considered in contrast to push factor that includes hostile circumstances that motivates an individual to leave their native areas. Connotatively, pull factors are conditions that turn a place attractive for individuals migrating from another region.

Application of Relevant Theories

Two theories are considered most relevant to the IDPs situation and possibilities of radicalization. These theories explain the phenomenon where individuals, due to feelings of deprivation, opt for choices to use other means to achieve their perceived or real legitimate requirements. Firstly, Relative Deprivation Theory, which was established by sociologist Samuel A. Stouffer (1900 -1960).⁹ Based on data collected after World War II, Stouffer theorized in his study "The American Soldier" that discontentment and feelings of deprivation are related to legitimate expectations. A justifiable need once turned into an expectation not fulfilled either by the society or the government can turn into relative deprivation. Most of the social movements came from the collective feelings of deprivation.¹⁰

Through the prism of a Marxist, societal class and disparity are the outcomes of social make-up, which is built on clash of interests (scarce resources) and conflicts (of interest). As per social conflict theory, such contradictions and conflicts amongst human groups lie at the core of social diversification and undercurrents.¹¹ The upper or governing class always attempts to preserve their position of advantage and dominance, influence, eminence and societal place by undermining or utilizing all available resources, systems, policies for protection of their overall privileges while ensuring limited access to resources for rest of the community. However, the under privileged class has very different interests and faces difficult choices for survival. Since this category is not in possession of definite systems of wealth which is required to be protected, their primary focus and attention remains in acquisition of enough capitals and wealth controlled by higher class. To this end, the under privileged class may instrumentalize education, seek democratization, decentralization of power and resources.

Causal Factors of Radicalization

The commonly declared roots of radicalization (in broad) are; geo-politics, relative deprivation¹², oppressive regimes¹³, identity politics¹⁴, poor socio-economic and political cohesion¹⁵, feelings of embarrassment, and other psychological apparatuses.¹⁶ In Pakistan, it was identified that there are four vital factors interplay to breed radicalization as its significant predictors. These include:

- Conflict in Afghanistan,

- Relative deprivation,
- Sense of vengeance,
- Subversion of religious teachings and effectiveness of terrorism as a tactic.¹⁷

The intensive literature review exercised led to the summing up of following list of pull and push factors that counted in to the frequency of ID IDPs movement and their relative deprivation and greater degree of radicalization:

Push Factors			
Ser	Factors	Ser	Factors
1.	Terrorism and civil unrest condition	8.	Lack of safety
2.	No job or poorly paid jobs	9.	Lack of services
3.	War and conflict	10.	Poverty and isolation
4.	Political persecution	11.	Lack of humanitarian aid
5.	Food and water shortages	12.	Congestion
6.	Poor education and medical care	13.	Pollution (air noise and visual)
7.	Crime, unstable law and order situation and hazards	14.	Lack of livelihood

Pull Factors			
Ser	Factors	Ser	Factors
1.	Peace and harmony	8.	Less risk of natural hazards
2.	Better health care and availability of services	9.	Better service provisions
3.	Varied employment opportunities	10.	Better education facilities
4.	Better future prospects	11.	Peaceful environment
5.	No social compulsions	12.	Better humanitarian support is available
6.	Better standards of living	13.	Better recreational facilities are available
7.	Safer atmosphere	14.	Less population and cleaner environment

Deprivation			
Ser	Factors	Ser	Factors
1.	Homeless people	6.	Street noise
2.	Vandalism and deliberate damage with property	7.	Pollution, grime or other environmental problems
3.	Poor socio-economic condition	8.	Lack of open public spaces
4.	Racism and religious comfortability	9.	Terrorism risk and poor mitigation facilities
5.	Poor street lighting	10.	Racial harassment

Repatriation
1. Home Lifestyle
2. Home Culture
3. Training program
4. Support

Research Techniques Applied

The population frame for the study includes 10000 IDP's living in 5 areas of KPK, as per following details:

S #	Cities	Population
1	Bannu	2295
2	Bazen Khel	2313
3	Karak	1764
4	Lakki Marwat	1679
5	Sperka Waziran	1949
	Total	10000
	Source (IDP's)	

The sample size “N” having 95% confidence interval was determined as follow:

Population	Total
$n = N/1+N*(e)^2$ $n=10000/1+10000*(.05)^2$	$n = 385$
Sample	385

Total of 385 Questionnaires were administered to the DPs of each locations for collection of data. All measurements were done through 5 point Likert Scale measurement scale where 1 is taken as strongly disagree and 5 as strongly agree. The scale was adapted from the study of Abidkadir¹⁸ for the measurement of social deprivation; Push factors; Pull factors; delay in repatriation and radicalization.

Data Analyses

Table-1: Demographic Detail of the Sample

Gender	Frequency	Percent
Male	297	79.20
Female	78	20.80
Total.	375	100.00
Age	Frequency	Percent
20-35 years	162	43.20
36-50 years	180	48.00
51 and above	33	8.80
Total.	375	100.00
Program	Frequency	Percent
Under Graduate	235	62.70
Graduate	140	37.30
Total.	375	100.00

Table-1 represents that 297 males responded symbolize 79.2% and 78 females represent 20.8% of the complete sample.

Summary - Exploratory Factor Analysis and Test of Assumptions

Table-2: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett's Coefficients

Push Factors (The reason of my migration is)	KMO	Bartlett's Test		
		<i>Chi</i> ²	<i>Df</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
1. Terrorism and civil unrest condition				
2. No job or poorly paid jobs				
2. War and conflict				
3. Political persecution				
4. Food and water shortages				
5. Poor education and medical care				
6. Crime, unstable law and order situation				
7. Lack of safety	.526	131.67	6	.000
8. Lack of services				
9. Poverty and isolation				
10. Lack of humanitarian aid				
11. Congestion				
12. Pollution (air noise and visual)				
13. Lack of livelihood				
14. Lack of green spaces				
Pull Factors (The reason of my migration is)	KMO	Bartlett's Test		
		<i>Chi</i> ²	<i>Df</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
1. Peace and harmony				
2. Better healthcare and availability of services				
3. Varied employment opportunities				
4. Better future prospects				
5. No social compulsion				
6. Better standard of living				
7. Safer atmosphere	.510	143.23	3	.000
8. Less risk of natural hazards				
9. Better service provision				
10. Better education services				
11. Fear of being victim of terrorism				
12. Better humanitarian aid				
13. Green house and better recreational facilities				
14. Less pollution and cleaner air				
Deprivation (The place from where I migrated was surrounded with)	KMO	Bartlett's Test		
		<i>Chi</i> ²	<i>Df</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
1. Homeless people				
2. Vandalism and deliberate damage with property				
3. Poor socio-economic condition				
4. Racism and religious comfortability				
5. Poor street lighting				
6. Street noise	.514	19.78	3	.000
7. Pollution, grime or other environmental problems				

8. Lack of open public space					
9. Terrorism and risk					
10. Racially harassment					
11. Poor terrorism risk mitigation facilities					
Radicalization (is largely influenced by)	KMO	Bartlett's Test			
1. Terrorism, Extremism, poverty and unemployment		<i>Chi²</i>	<i>Df</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	
2. Economic crises, political instability					
3. Social and economic injustice	.526	131.67	6	.000	
4. Ignorance of people					
5. Selfishness of rulers					
6. Frustration, tension, foreign invasion, lawlessness, suppression					
Repatriation	KMO	Bartlett's Test			
1. I feel stressed to readapt to my home		<i>Chi²</i>	<i>Df</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	
2. I feel accepted by the local people in the culture					
3. I wish to escape again from my home					
4. I feel chaotic regarding my identification when I returned	.655	303.59	6	.000	
5. I have received support from government agencies					
6. I have attended relocation training program					

The outcomes denote that the $0.50 \leq KMO \leq 0.60$ and $0.61 \leq KMO \leq 0.72$ in 4 and 1 factors indicating sampling suitability methods as mediocre and middling correspondingly. Above-mentioned table also illustrates that the likelihood of the Bartlett's statistic for complete factors is $p < 0.01$ i.e. less than or equivalent to the level of significance of 0.05. Outcomes disclose that the supposition of sphericity is fulfilled and entire data sets are appropriate for factor examination.

Communalities

Table-3: Rotated Component Matrix and Communalities

Push Factors	Factor Loading					Com	Variance
	1	2	3	4	5		
1. Terrorism and civil unrest condition	.81					.83	31.48
2. No job or poorly paid jobs	.79					.66	89.10
2. War and conflict	.91					.87	8.80
3. Political persecution	.66					.64	1.90
4. Food and water shortages	.87					.82	42.77
5. Poor education and medical care	.70					.53	25.95
6. Crime, unstable law and order situation and hazards	.58					.83	22.24
7. Lack of safety	.74					.84	9.02
8. Lack of services	.62					.62	25.23

9. Poverty and isolation	.65	.65	26.23
10. Lack of humanitarian aid	.67	.68	25.25
11. Congestion	.61	.65	25.23
12. Pollution (air noise and visual)	.76	.68	23.30
13. Lack of livelihood	.62	.60	63.92
14. Lack of green spaces	.90	.85	22.78
<i>Rotation has converged in 5 Iteration</i>			

Pull Factors	Factor Loading					Com	Variance
	1	2	3	4	5		
1. Peace and harmony		.81				.83	31.48
2. Better healthcare and availability of services		.85				.82	44.17
3. Varied employment opportunities		.67				.59	32.77
4. Better future prospects		.76				.76	23.05
5. No social compulsion		.81				.83	31.48
6. Better standard of living		.82				.71	48.93
7. Safer atmosphere		.83				.67	31.65
8. Less risk of natural hazards		.70				.51	19.41
9. Better service provision		.70				.70	56.59
10. Better education services		.85				.85	32.48
11. Fear of being victim of terrorism		.63				.68	10.92
12. Better humanitarian aid		.68				.69	39.09
13. Green house and better recreational facilities		.88				.88	31.80
14. Less pollution and cleaner air		.68				.59	17.54
<i>Rotation has converged in 3 Iteration</i>							

Deprivation (from where I migrated)	Factor Loading					Com	Variance
	1	2	3	4	5		
1. Homeless people			.54			.88	54.63
2. Vandalism and deliberate damage of property			.63			.66	43.54
3. Poor socio-economic condition			.54			.88	32.07
4. Racism and religious comfortability			.69			.59	24.37
5. Poor street lighting			.54			.88	56.63
6. Street noise			.69			.59	24.37
7. Pollution, grime or other			.72			.84	13.03

environmental problems			
8. Lack of open public space	.54	.88	5.95
9. Terrorism and risk	.64	.69	25.37
10. Racially harassment	.52	.74	40.58
11. Poor terrorism risk mitigation facilities	.71	.56	33.53
<i>Rotation has converged in 3 Iteration</i>			

Radicalization (is largely influenced by)	Factor Loading					Com	Variance
	1	2	3	4	5		
1. Terrorism, Extremism, poverty and unemployment				.65		.65	26.23
2. Economic crises, political instability				.67		.68	25.25
3. Social and economic injustice				.61		.65	25.23
4. Ignorance of people				.76		.68	23.30
5. Selfishness of rulers				.62		.60	63.92
6. Frustration, tension, foreign invasion, lawlessness				.90		.85	22.78
<i>Rotation has converged in 4 Iteration</i>							

Repatriation	Factor Loading					Com	Variance
	1	2	3	4	5		
1. I feel stressed to readapt to my home					.66	.64	1.9
2. I feel stressed to readapt to my home					.87	.82	42.77
3. I feel normally acknowledged by the native people					.70	.53	25.95
4. I wish to escape again from my home					.58	.83	22.24
5. I feel chaotic about my identification when I am returned					.74	.84	9.02
6. I have received support from government agencies					.62	.62	25.23
7. I have attended relocation training program					.66	.64	1.90

Rotation has converged in 4 Iteration.


Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factor Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Abovementioned table shows a summary of modules for every variable along with number of iterations executed on communalities and rotated component matrix. Thus, for 52 items of 5 variables, a total of 19 iterations were executed for communalities and rotated components matrix (5, 3, 3, 4 and 4 respectively). Due to this, none of the item is excluded because all the computed values of communalities are larger than .50 and statistical outcome of rotated component matrix also indicates that maximum of the elements had solid loading from 2 and 3 factors.

Structure Equation Modeling and Confirmatory Factor Analysis

4.2.1.5 CFA for Model 4.


Result of 4 factor model.



Chi-Square=15.23, df=6, P-value=.018, RMSEA=0.074

Structural Analysis for Deprivation, Push/Pull Factors and Repatriation 4.2.2.6 CFA for Model 8.


Result of 4 factor model.



Chi-Square=12.23, df=5, P-value=.000, RMSEA=0.071

4.2.2.6 CFA for Model 9.

Result of 5 factor model.



Chi-Square=14.23, df=5, P-value=.000, RMSEA=0.071

Table-4: Goodness of Fit for Overall Models

Models	NFI	AGFI	RMSEA	GFI	RMR	CFI	X ² /df
Standard Value (Usluel et al., 2008)	>.9	>.8	<.08	>.9	<.1	>.9	<.3
Model 1	.98	.96	.07	1.0	.04	.99	2.4
Model 2	1.0	1.0	.06	1.0	.01	1.0	2.1
Model 3	1.0	1.0	.07	1.0	.01	.99	2.8
Model 4	.91	.97	.07	.91	.03	.93	2.9
Model 5	.93	.87	.06	1.0	.03	.96	2.3
Model 6	.97	.92	.07	.99	.01	.99	2.2
Model 7	.95	.90	.06	.93	.03	.94	2.8
Model 8	.93	.88	.06	.96	.01	.93	2.3
Model 9	.92	.84	.07	.98	.02	.95	2.8

X² = chi-sqr, df = degree of freedom, GFI = goodness of fit index, AGFI = RMR = root mean error of residuals, RMSEA = root means sqr error of approximation, CFI = comparative fit index, NFI = normed fit index

Seven fit abovementioned indices i.e. (X²/d.f, GFI, AGFI, NNFI, CFI, RMSR, RMSEA) were utilized for measuring the goodness of fit for entire substitute models. The outcomes of CFA's evaluation display the exclusivity of variables. The outcomes of all the substitute models illustrated that entire values indicate its own meaningful loadings and all substitute models are good fit.

Discussions and Recommendations

The data was organized, examined and understood by using a suitable statistical instrument through the up-to-date type of Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) and Liseral software. Regression Model was used to find out

relationship between dependent and independent variables. The regression helps to know the change in dependent variable brought by the one unit change in the independent variable. The research also used paired sample T-test for comparing the mean scores of various camps¹⁹

The result of Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) built on Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) coefficients indicates that the $0.50 \leq KMO \leq 0.60$ and $0.61 \leq KMO \leq 0.72$ in 4 and 1 factors indicating sampling suitability measures as mediocre and middling respectively. Abovementioned table also indicates that the likelihood of the Bartlett's statistic for all the factors is $p < 0.01$ i.e. less than or equal to the level of importance of 0.05. Outcomes indicate that the assumption of sphericity is satisfied and all data sets are suitable for factor evaluation. Statistical examination further indicates entire items with higher factor loadings. Seven fit abovementioned indices i.e. ($X^2/d.f.$, GFI, AGFI, NNFI, CFI, RMSR, RMSEA) were used for ascertaining the goodness of fit for all substitute models. The outcomes of CFA's analysis display the exclusivity of variables. The outcomes of all the substitute models showed that all values have own meaningful loadings and all substitute models are good fit. Outcomes of the study established that social deprivation has meaningful positive consequence on radicalization. The outcome of the research was constant with the earlier studies of Alan H. et al.²⁰ Push factor has meaningful positive outcome on radicalization. The outcome of the study was constant with the earlier study of Ali.²¹ Pull factor has meaningful positive outcome on radicalization. The outcome of the research was steady with the earlier findings of Amnesty International.²² Delay in repatriation has noteworthy positive outcome on radicalization. The outcome of the research was reliable with the prior studies of Archick, Kristen et al.²³

Social deprivation has noteworthy positive result on delay in radicalization. The outcome of the study was constant with the previous studies of Archick, Kristen et al.²⁴ Push factor has unimportant positive outcome on delay in repatriation. The outcome of the research was steady with the earlier studies of Archick, Kristen et al.²⁵ Pull factor has noteworthy positive outcome on delay in repatriation. The outcome of the research was steady with the prior studies of Alan H. et al.²⁶

Findings of Study:

Following are the findings of the study: -

- Social deprivation was found as a significant predictor of radicalization.
- Push factor was found as a significant predictor of radicalization.
- Pull factor was found as a significant predictor of radicalization.
- Delay in repatriation was found as a significant predictor of radicalization.
- Social deprivation was found as a significant predictor of delay in repatriation.
- Push factor was found as a significant predictor of delay in repatriation.
- Pull factor was found as a significant predictor of delay in repatriation.

Recommendations

- Since integration of erstwhile FATA has been done, there is need of a long term sustainable development programs to bring these areas into mainstream.

- De-weaponisation of the area including control on personal weapons.
- Registration of all non-custom paid vehicles as most of these vehicles have been used for suicide attacks against law enforcement agencies and other gatherings.
- All resident must have their national Identity card prepared and verified from NADRA.
- Presence of foreigners must be strongly resisted and regulated. All those local ladies who have married foreigners should be registered with Deputy Commissioner Tribal district office and verification of their spouse must be done at later stage.
- Removal of individual transformers from the houses and arrangements be made to put in a system in place on usage of electricity.

Conclusion

The statistical result of the study reveals that amid social deprivation, push, pull factors, delay in repatriation and radicalization there exists significant positive relationship with IDP movement, their radicalization and delay in repatriation. To ensure that IDPs are rehabilitated in their own areas, some economic and social measures are required to be undertaken in the target areas. The research recommends to be extended for comprehensive analysis of more IDPs cases all over the country. The future research may also review the existing hypotheses on longitudinal basis through a large sample size with some relevant moderation and mediation.

NOTES

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ADOPTION OF NURSI MODEL: THE PANACEA FOR DE-RADICALIZATION IN PAKISTAN

*Dr. Hassan Jalil Shah, Adil Rana and Nadia Khan**

Abstract

Radicalization has become an insurmountable problem for the comity of nations across the globe. Resultantly, every society has become infested with extremist and radicalized elements. These radicalized segments of the society create confrontational environment by motivating the masses through speeches, distribution of controversial religious and other literature and by controlling the minds of the people by using many other psychological tools. The main factor behind every incident; whether it is a terrorist activity or an act of radicalism is the lack of appropriate knowledge. Created on religio-ideological grounds, the menace of radicalization continues to haunt Pakistan since decades. A plethora of factors have been identified having caused fragmentation in our society and skewed the education system. Whereas, Madrasah system of education is blamed as the nursery of radicalization in our society, the total monopoly over decision making process of the country of the graduates of the elite schooling system is causing disfranchisement of the vast majority of the youth from the governance structure. A complete revamping of the education system of the country by adoption of uniform education system with fusion of Islamic and contemporary knowledge can bring a positive change. The adoption of Turkish Islamic scholar, Badiuzzaman Said Nursi's (1877-1960) educational model offers a solution to the existing imbalances in our educational system which will not only mainstream the vast majority of Madrasah graduates, but also enlighten the graduates of elite schooling system with the Islamic tenants of governance and thus ensure the direly needed national integration. Being a descriptive research, the paper makes an endeavor to answer the questions about whether the existing education system is the root cause of radicalization and a fragmented society.

Keywords: Radicalization, De-radicalization, Education System, Nursi model, Madrasah Education, Reforms.

Introduction

Pakistan continues to face a multitude of challenges that go beyond terrorism, political instability, and other security related problems which continue to attract attention¹. The insuperable challenges that continue to haunt Pakistan even after 70 years of independence include: public health dilemmas, energy woes, water shortages, and high levels of food insecurity, to name just a few. However, the epitome of all the problems that Pakistan has yet to surmount is the "Crisis of Education". Unfortunately,

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the crisis of education exacerbates many of the problems that Pakistan continues to face. The uneducated masses complicate efforts to groom future leaders to effectively address Pakistan's many public policy challenges. The un-educated or semi educated youth bulge of the country, with no voice in policy making, unable to get a decent job, are prone to be easily radicalized and thus an easy prey for militant groups.

Since independence the faulty policies of successive governments have resulted in a huge disparity among various regions of the country resulting into developmental dis-equilibrium causing dissatisfaction amongst the masses of the less developed regions. The ill planned developmental policies have led to creation of islands of excellences on one hand in the developed areas, but also seas of deprivations in the remote areas of the country like FATA, Baluchistan, and southern Punjab etc. The disgruntled youth of these areas have thus become prone to be radicalized. The disparity in the development between various regions of the country needs no elaboration. The prolonged lack of attention to development in general, and education in particular, has resulted in a plethora of problems for the dwellers of these areas, the foremost being radicalization of the youth. Education in general and higher education in particular has remained a neglected area for less developed regions, resulting in disfranchised youth, lack of empowerment, and limited job opportunities. Whereas the rampant corruption in the basic health and education sectors has hugely impacted the developmental trajectory, it has also led to youth of these areas being on the brink of being radicalized.²

The large segment of the society in less developed areas of the country, with no access to basic education for a host of reasons including economic factors, non-availability of conventional educational institutions and skewed policies of the government has led to mushroom growth of Madrasah stream of education, which focuses exclusively on imparting religious education. This has created an alienated group of youth totally dis-franchised from mainstream activities of the society.³ This youth bulge has become the easiest prey and the fodder for launch of militancy in Pakistan. The situation can only be redressed by taking revolutionary steps in the realm of education aimed at empowering the youth, maximizing job opportunities close to home and making them part of the decision making loop of the area. This can only be done by introducing a system of education in Pakistan, the beneficiary of which owns the true tenants of Islam, remain committed to the ideology of Pakistan and should focus on brain storming by integrating religious or western (scientific) education vis-à-vis western or modern spheres of academia.

Notional Aspects

The intellectual discourse on terrorism, violent extremism, radicalization and de-radicalization gained preeminence after 9/11.⁴ Social scientists have thereafter been offering various definitions of the phenomena, with no consensus and unanimity of opinion thus far.⁵ Notional aspects and a unified definition of radicalization remains an arena of intellectual discourse till this day, thus causing more ambiguity rather than clarity.⁶

Radicalization De-radicalization: Process and System Dynamics

Academically, radicalization can be defined as “a process which involves the individual adaptation of various extreme political, social, and/or religious ideals and aspirations, and to attain particular objectives the tactics of indiscriminate violence can be nurtured.” “Most importantly, it is a process which involves the mental and emotional preparedness already been directed by any religious or ideological leader to pursue violent behavior for the accomplishment of a specific defined goal.” The UK Cabinet Office has defined radicalization as the process through which a person ‘comes to support terrorism and forms extremism leading to terrorism’. Radicalization has also been defined as the act or process of making a person more radical or favoring of extreme or fundamental changes in political, economic or social conditions, institutions or habits of the mind.

De-radicalization is explained as “a process typically social/psychological in nature aiming at reducing the risk of an individual’s engrossment in, and commitment to, any violent act which is taken in the context of radicalization or extremism.” Disengagement is solely “a programme designed for bringing a change in the radical thinking of an extremist only to reduce individual’s violent participation”.

De-Radicalization Case Studies of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Singapore

After 9/11, the increase in intensity of the terrorist attacks made many Muslim countries to devise counter radicalization strategies. Different de-radicalization programmes were launched to control the menace of radicalization. Some of the programmes are discussed below.

Saudi Arabia launched a successful de-radicalization programme which helped the state to counter the increasing influence of radicalization in different factions of the society. The country’s de-radicalization programme was one of the most successful programmes. Many other countries adopted various features of the Saudi de-radicalization programme and obtained desired objectives.⁷ The Saudi programme was funded and monitored directly by the Interior Ministry. The main approach which was adopted during the programme was the prison-based approach at the individual level. This programme further took a broad shape in which the families of the de-radicalized persons were also fed and provided economic and social assistance. The de-radicalization programme was initiated in 2004 under the Saudi government’s special strategy named PRAC (Prevention, Rehabilitation and Aftercare). The Prevention strategy was based on education and broadcasting of such TV programmes in which the negative consequences of the involvement of any individual in violent acts were highlighted. The Rehabilitation process was meant for the prisoners to re-educate and re-instruct them according to the teachings of Islam and to teach them that Islam renounces every type of violence.⁸ Aftercare was for the families of the detained prisoners so as to make them more neutral and assist them to re-integrate themselves into the mainstream of their social worlds. According to statistics, almost 2000

prisoners were taken into custody for de-radicalization programme in 2004 out of which around 700 were released in 2007.

In Yemen, after the expansion of Al-Qaeda the state was facing numerous challenges including the radicalization of the Yemeni youth. The de-radicalization programme which was launched in Yemen is another example of a Muslim majority country trying to counter the threats posed by radicalization. The de-radicalization programme was initiated in early 2002 and was abandoned in 2006 due to the political unrest in the country.⁹ The main element of the Yemeni de-radicalization programme was the debate process in which Quran and Sunnah was used by the Muslim clerics to convince the participants of the programme. More or less, the programme had some positive impacts on the Yemeni society and various groups who were once associated with terrorist organizations believed to be dismantled by the state through this programme.


Singapore ran a de-radicalization programme in 2003 when a South East Asian militant organization named Jemaah Islamiyah started its terrorist activities and was also found guilty for the 2002 bombings in Bali, 2002. The programme which was given the name of Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) was aimed at the counseling of the radicalized persons. Islamic teachings were debated with the arrested militants and Muslim clerics were successful in convincing them that violence is prohibited in the religion of Islam.

Analysis

Education Streams in Pakistan

Pakistan inherited different streams of education and is continuing to grapple with the same phenomenon. The government run school system has seen a persistent decay over a period of time and is now the least preferred mode of modern education stream. In the aftermath of 1857 war of independence when Sir Syed Ahmed Khan became the proponent of modern education system, the Madrasahs completely disassociated themselves from modern education to the extent that modern education system was declared to be against Islam. Resultantly, private schooling in Pakistan has become a real phenomena.

Student's Enrollment Statistics



Students Enrollment in different sectors of Pakistan

Source: Pakistan Education Statistics 2016 -17

Types of Madrasah Systems in Pakistan

Most madrasahs are affiliated with one of the five educational boards or 'wafaq'. One of the boards represents the 'Shia' group while the rest represent the 'Sunni' groups namely 'Deobandi', 'Ahl-e-Hadith', 'Barelvi' and 'Jamaat-e-Islami.'

A large number of religious schools work independently of the state backing. They choose to affiliate with 'wafaq.', similar to an educational board. Every such educational board is representative of an Islamic faction. The biggest such board in the state is 'Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Arabia.' It has ten thousand madrasahs under its registration. The latest board that has been formed in the country is called 'Rabata-ul-Madaris Al-Islamia.' It has more than one thousand madrasahs under its umbrella.

Schools of Thought	Seminary Boards	Umbrella Organization
Deobandi	Wafaq al-Madaris al-Arabiya	Ittehad-e-Tanzeemat-e-Madaris-e-Deeniya Pakistan (ITMD)
Barelvi	Tanzeem al-Madaris al-Arabiya	
Ahl-e-Hadith	Wafaq al-Madaris al-Salafiya	
Shia	Wafaq al-Madaris al-Shia	
Jamaat-e-Islami	Rabita al-Madaris al-Arabiya	

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Madrasah Reforms: Means to Curb Chaos

Madrasah is the core organ in the conservation and creation of information along with the establishment of spiritual leadership. As per the significance of the madrasah in the upkeep and creation of religious information along with the establishment of the faith-based leadership, the madrasahs are central in the development of expertise in religion. The government intends to modify the syllabi of the religious institutions. Ultimately, the heart of the matter is the kind of instruction and tutoring the religious institutions have been disseminating. Although it was believed that various religious schools in the state kept on supplying workforce to radical outfits. This attempt was made to avert any step by the government to implement reforms of the religious schools and destruction of unlawfully built mosques in the federal capital. The religious leaders showed resistance to the government attempts. The religious elite considered madrasahs as their personal area of influence thereby repelling efforts towards change by the government.

Nursi Model

After the demise of Ottoman Empire, Kamal Ataturk abrogated the Islamic laws and announced the launch of a secular system in Turkey.¹⁰ The traditional Islamic values, the culture, lifestyle all were declared outdated and a new modern approach took over the minds of people. Ataturk's cultivation of western thought brought about major changes in the Turkish society. Secularism was promoted among sections of the elite which then converted to adopt the western approach as the sole survival kit for progress and development.¹¹ The new patterns of modern education turned the minds of the youth towards secularism and their Muslim identity started to wane. Moreover, the division between the social classes emerged because of the un-equal distribution of resources and the promotion of the secular (un-ethical) code of living. At that time Said Nursi realized the need for reformation of the Turkish society through curriculum which could be helpful in sorting out the economic, societal, religious, cultural as well as political issues of that era.¹² Said Nursi came up with a balanced approach.

Nursi Model of education comprised amalgamation of Islamic and Western education to understand and implement a reformist agenda based on true principles of knowledge. Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (1873-1960) was a renowned saint scholar of great prestige who was born in Turkey.¹³ He was a living inspiration for his readers, students and followers because of his philosophical intellect and spiritual glory. His proficiency in writing can be understood by his prolific work in the form of a treatise, 'Risal-e-Nur'.¹⁴ Said Nursi was known for his contributions in interpreting the Islamic knowledge of both 'Al-Quran' and 'Sunnah' of the Holy Prophet Mohammad (P.B.U.H).¹⁵ He was also acknowledged for his deep insight into the western thought and education. At the start of the nineteenth century, when the Muslim world was facing fierce moral and material degradation, Said Nursi came up with his ideational model of education for the reconstruction and development of the Muslim society. He was a proponent of integration of religious and modern scientific knowledge into the mainstream education system. Nursi believed that for a civilization to re-emerge, it should be imbued with the basic forms of education, knowledge and faith. He continuously propagated a system of

education for the society in which faith and knowledge would be the basic components. He insisted upon the fact that natural or material existence is nothing without faith. He asserted that for the progress of education system the integration of scientific and religious knowledge is the prime requirement. In the contemporary era, the education system comprises only western thought at elite level and traditional (religious) ways of conveying knowledge at the lower level of masses. The newly developed concepts of acquiring skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled education has created an environment where everything has become a commodity and even humanity has become valueless.¹⁶ Many educationists have observed and analyzed the current trends in the education system and categorically declared these as a materialistic approach. Any education system that entitles to promote only scientific and materialist sense, can only provide tools and ways for only a mechanical outcome. The ongoing education criteria are steps towards the alienation of man from the beauties of nature, the concepts of theology and philosophy. The absence of intellect can lead to the loss of wisdom.

A scheme of knowledge based on Islamic values with a comprehensive background of faith, is the most desirable structure of education but unfortunately the adherents of Islamic culture and traditions failed to make it happen in the recent past and in the current century as well. Said Nursi always argued that Islam is the Holy religion with a specific defined structure of knowledge for the guidance of all mankind.¹⁷ He composed this thought that Islam has provided a concrete ground for all true knowledge, and exists as a master guide of all natural and other sciences. His actual objective was to integrate all the existing knowledge with the knowledge of Islam. For this purpose, he established an Institute which he named 'Madrasah al-Zehra' and proclaimed it as a 'sister university' of Al-Azhar university, Cairo. The scheme of study mainly focused on the education reforms including curriculum reforms and integration of both religious and secular ways of education. He was of the view that by incorporating religious and western education in the education institutions, the gap between the secular and traditional minds could be bridged. Nursi's Madrasah al-Zehra was an initiative at the higher education level. He continuously insisted for the implementation of the scheme at lower levels of education so that the secular institutions could be kept in touch with the Islamic education, and Madrasahs could include Western thought.

In modern Turkey, under the leadership of Tayyip Erdogan, the reformed education system has developed strategies to compete with the growing influence of the western education system. In one of his speeches delivered at the Fifth Religious Council in December 2014, Erdogan pointed out the need for 'curriculum amendments' by criticizing the secular thinking of Kamal Ataturk. He was of the view that there should be a balance between the Islamic and Western education. He stressed that religion must be included in the curriculum along with the scientific form of knowledge. Since 2012 text books of major schools of Turkey have been re-designed by adding Islamic history as a symbol of dignity and pride of the Muslims. Tayyip Erdogan's policies of education are more likely a practice of Nursi model.¹⁸

Application of Nursi Model in Pakistan

The educational policy devised by Said Nursi is as relevant in the 21st century as it was in the late 20th century. In case of Pakistan, the implementation of Nursi model can bring more prosperous changes in different circles of the society and bridge the gulf between the haves and have nots.¹⁹ The main focus of Said Nursi was to investigate and identify various reasons behind marginalization of different segments of the society on the basis of differences in the education system. In various parts of Pakistan, the education system of private and elite schools comprises divergent syllabi in contrast to the traditional and religious seminaries.²⁰ This creates segregation between the societal class systems.²¹ Although sometimes it becomes difficult to incorporate the ideas of different scholars and educationists, but currently the need of the hour is an adequate change in the curriculum of different schools and madrasahs in Pakistan.²² In the modern times, the proposed education policy of Said Nursi is an important step for the betterment of the society but its implementation does not seem desirable for many education institutes in Pakistan.

It is heartening to note that the present government has realized the skewness in the education system and vowed to correct the disequilibrium between the various educational streams by introducing a uniform system of education²³. Some school systems in Pakistan are performing well by integrating Islamic and western education. A few prominent schools e.g. Dar-e-Arqam, Al-Huda, Iqra and Dar-ul-Madina are teaching both religious and modern education to the pupils. The fee structures of these schools are economical as compared to the other elite Westernized schools.

The Nursi model can be applied successfully in Pakistan with its vigilant features demanding the change in old and conservative style of education. The model reflects a wave of reforms in schooling in different regions of the country. The Nursi graduates will form the backbone of the society as thoroughly embedded in the tenants of Islam, while at the same time fully equipped to tackle the challenges of modern life. When mainstreamed, these graduates will form a balanced core of youth whose decision-making cycles would be based on the teachings and rulings of Islam.²⁴ This will redress the grievances and thus be a catalyst in de-radicalization of the society.

Nursi model provides a broader way for the curriculum/syllabi amendments. In Pakistan, most of the times, only madrasah reforms come under discussion. The education reforms at the elite school level should also be discussed at national platforms. The English medium schools working according to the standards of US and UK based institutions must bring changes in their curriculum.²⁵ The scientific approach must accommodate Islamic history and contributions of Muslim scientists should also be included in the text books.²⁶

Research Findings

Based on the literature review, evaluation and survey of various streams of education and analysis, it can be deduced that it is not Madrasah stream of education that has radicalized the society, rather it is the various streams of education that have led to polarization of the society with huge gulf between those in the decision-making

loop and those who are completely detached from the decision making in the country. Unless all the streams of education are moderated, and a uniform system of education is introduced, Pakistan will continue to suffer from radicalization and disfranchisement of a large segment of youth from the mainstream policy making.

Conclusion

To de-radicalize a society or a group of individuals, the education system plays a very important role. In Pakistan, various madrasahs provide sect based and hardcore religious education while totally ignoring the Western and scientific education. In order to address the situation, reforms have been introduced. But they have not been implemented thoroughly given the resistance of some madrasah administrations toward the government's initiative and lapses in political will. There is a need to honestly execute the reforms that have been carefully crafted to cater to the situation. Pakistan has been one of the most adversely affected countries by terrorist and militant activities. The government has contributed towards the effort to combat this menace internationally. As a community, the people of Pakistan are peace loving and tolerant towards followers of diverse beliefs. The masses generally do not believe in marginalizing one another on the basis of their belief systems. However the global narrative in this regard has mostly not been in Pakistan's favor. Therefore, rather than churning out the same outlook that is being doled out toward the country there should be an honest reflection of the situation by the local sources. The educational policy devised by Said Nursi is as relevant in the 21st century as it was in the late 20th century. In case of Pakistan, the implementation of Nursi model can bring prosperity to different circles of the society. The main focus of Said Nursi was to investigate and identify various reasons behind marginalization of different segments of the society on the basis of differences in the education system. In various parts of Pakistan, the education system of private and elite schools comprises divergent syllabi in contrast to the traditional and religious seminaries. This creates segregation between the societal classes. Although sometimes it becomes difficult to incorporate the ideas of different scholars and educationists, but currently the need of the hour to call for an adequate change in the curriculum of different schools and madrasahs in Pakistan.

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EVOLUTION OF NEW INDIAN MILITARY STRATEGY: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

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Abstract

The overt nuclearization in South Asia brought peace and closed the doors for any conventional war between India and Pakistan. But the Indian military doctrinal transformation after 1998 threatened the deterrence stability in South Asia. The idea of limited war under the nuclear umbrella, also known as Cold Start Doctrine (CSD), compelled Pakistan to develop nuclear tipped low yield battlefield nuclear weapons to deter shallow manoeuvres by the Indian Army. Indian Military, later realized that the idea of limited war is risky, and it may escalate into a major war, thus, came up with the idea of sub-conventional warfare, the surgical strikes in its the Joint Armed Forces Doctrine-2017. The Indian military planners perceived that there is a possibility of surgical strikes or limited war in South Asia. However, Pakistani policy makers firmly believe that any attempt to carry out surgical strike will be massively retaliated within shortest possible time. Later, the risk and cost associated with any direct military engagement compelled Indian policy makers to emphasize more on hybrid warfare strategy and indirectly capitalize on the socio-economic, ethno-religious, and political vulnerabilities of Pakistan. The study seeks to analyse the Indian military's doctrinal shift and its implications for the strategic stability of South Asia. It also deals with Pakistan's conventional and nuclear response to the doctrinal transformation by the Indian military. The strategic shift in the Indian military's thinking is continuous because Pakistan came up with adequate answers to their doctrinal manoeuvring.

Keywords: Strategic Stability, Nuclear Deterrence, Indian Military Modernization, Hybrid Warfare, Network Centric and Electronic Warfare, Cold Start Doctrine.

Introduction

India and Pakistan share the most dangerous border in the world. The hazardous nature of this neighborhood is further compounded by unresolved issues like: Kashmir, water disputes, Siachen, Sir Creek, terrorism, conventional asymmetries and threat of a limited war. Nevertheless, Kargil conflict-1999 and the military mobilization 2001/2002 could only be averted owing to overt nuclearization of India and Pakistan in 1998, which brought strategic balance in South Asia. The Indian military strategists however, continued with conventional military modernization and formulating new

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military strategies, primarily to coerce Pakistan. This paper focuses on evolution of new Indian Military Strategy and its implications for Pakistan.

The attack on the Indian parliament had nothing to do with Pakistan but despite that, India mobilized 800,000 troops along Pakistani border apparently to avenge the attack and to coerce Pakistan in the wake of changing global environment.¹ Ultimately, after almost a year of standoff, both states agreed to deescalate the situation at the border because of the nuclear factor and intervention of the international community.² The US played an active role in the de-escalation of the military standoff between India and Pakistan. Frequent visits of the US and European officials, especially US Secretary of State and Defence Secretary played an important role in defusing the tensions. But despite the US diplomatic maneuvering, the most decisive aspect has been nuclear deterrence. The rapid mobilization of Pakistani armed forces and its nuclear capability prevented India from any aggressive manoeuvres. Moreover, the Indian military lost element of surprise, and lack of major conventional superiority vis-à-vis Pakistan made war or even a limited military conflict impossible.

Cold Start Doctrine: From Total War to Shallow Maneuvers

The failure of operation Parakram exposed the Indian military's operational weaknesses to fight a quick war against a nuclear weapon state. The Indian military took almost three weeks in mobilization and deployment of its strike formations, which gave enough time to Pakistan for countermeasures.³ To overcome mobilization time and nuclear threshold of Pakistan, the Indian military initially came up with the idea of 'limited war under the nuclear overhang' which was later reformed into CSD in 2004.⁴ The Indian military's rationale for CSD was to cut short mobilization time and carry out quick, swift operations within 48-96 hours in case of any alleged terrorist attack on the Indian soil. The objectives under CSD would be limited below the nuclear red-lines of Pakistan. Feroz Hassan Khan explained the Indian military's CSD in these words,

After 2001 change in the International mood, India brought shift in its doctrine from Sunderji to Cold Start and carried out military modernization at rapid scale..... So, they realized that Sunderji is not feasible, so they changed it to the shallow maneuvers which means short, aggressive, more firepower, less space, very intense and fast operations.⁵

Therefore, to operationalize CSD, the Indian military has carried out many military exercises close to the border with Pakistan since 2004, in which they practiced joint operations, synergy between air and ground forces, latest aircraft and tanks, Long Range Reconnaissance and Observation System (LORROS), Risaat-II- Spy Satellite, Battle Field Surveillance Radars (BFSR), Weapon Locating Radars (WLR) and advanced Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance and reconnaissance.⁶

Despite all these developments, it is difficult for the Indian military to execute CSD against Pakistan because of many reasons which may include: the Indian military's lack of synergy, coordination and offensive fire power and Pakistan's conventional and nuclear response. Many western analysts doubt the Indian army's ability to operationalize CSD against Pakistan.

According to Mark Fitzpatrick,

..... Cold Start remains an aspiration by the Indian Army. I have heard several times in the past the Indian current and former Chief of Army Staff referred to the CSD, it is always the Indian army that refers to this, not the Indian combined command not the Indian government so yes, the Indian army would like this capability, I do not see this capability as yet operationalized and I also think by the way that Pakistan's response has neutralized this idea already.⁷

Another expert on South Asia, Professor Bharat Karnard argued that...Cold Start'.....“Since that unfortunate doctrine was initiated, is “No start” because it is not an implementable or practicable strategy”.⁸ Pakistan has also taken serious counter measures to counter the Indian military's CSD. First step was the initiation of the Azm-i-Nau large scale military exercises in which Pakistan Army practiced the synergy, integration and offensive-defence concepts to counter any offensive manoeuvres.⁹ Secondly, Pakistan developed Al-Nasr-Hatf-IX nuclear tipped battle field missile to deter rapid thrusts by the Indian army.

Toby Dalton, Co-Director Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace considers that, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) may contribute marginally to deterrence stability in some contexts, but at considerable cost and risk of accident and inadvertent escalation”. Another expert of South Asia, Michael Krepon, of Stimson Center discussed the associated risks with the deployment of TNWs, that, there are the least safe and secure nuclear weapons in any country's arsenal, in large measure because they must be deployed near the battlefield, where they are susceptible to accidents and being overrun, or hit by airpower. Any mushroom cloud is a threat to uncontrolled escalation.

Pakistan considers that TNWs are as safe as other nuclear weapons, since all nuclear weapons have strategic dimension, it is only the usage which makes it otherwise, but the intended impact is always strategic. Pakistani nuclear programme and its command and control are best in the world. The development and deployment of TNWs aimed to avoid any limited or total war with India. According to the Pakistani perspective so far they have been successful in preventing India from any incursions inside Pakistani territory. Former Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General (Retired) Muhammad Mustafa Khan, rationalized the induction of TNWs in these words,

India thinks they can fight a short term/ limited war under the nuclear umbrella. But we say we have developed TNWs and conveyed to the Indians if you impose conventional war on us or cross the border we will use TNWs to deter them. I think TNWs are stabilizing factor in South Asia with the sole purpose to deter a conventional war”.¹⁰

As compared to Pakistan, India possess huge number of conventional arms, has well defined Missiles Defence system, nuclear submarines, space based surveillance assets and spy satellites etc. Furthermore, owing to Indo-US strategic partnership, Indian technological edge in the conventional weapon system will increase with the passage of time. In this regard, Pakistan's indigenous defence industry has made

unprecedented progress in the development of conventional weapon system, but it still lacks behind Indian military might. In this regard, Pakistan's strategic collaboration with China and enhanced professionalism has reduced the gap that had existed between two militaries for decades. Nevertheless, the nuclear capability of Pakistan has proved to be a stabilizing factor in the regional politics of South Asia. Indeed, during the Kargil conflict-1999, the military mobilization-2001/2002 and Mumbai incident-2008 the crisis was averted owing to nuclear deterrence. Former Director General Strategic Plans Division (SPD) Lieutenant General (Retired) Khalid Kidwai said,

.....I believe the time of hot wars even limited war is out, because of the mutual nuclear deterrence, because of all this balance of terror. I said the hot wars as a policy are out; it would be madness to go for hot wars. So, we will define the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) by becoming mad....."

As seen in last three decades, whenever Indian military made doctrinal shift through new strategic thinking, Pakistan came up with adequate and befitting response. The Indian strategic thinkers understand that any misadventure or a miscalculated military operation would plunge the region into further instability and turmoil, since Pakistani response would be uncertain, and threat of escalation would deteriorate the security situation. Since Pakistan has weak economy and it is overwhelmingly engaged in tribal areas against terror groups, the ultimate response would be to rely on tactical or strategic nuclear weapons to counter the Indian military's aggressive moves.

The Joint Indian Armed Forces Doctrine-2017

The Indian military is looking for an opportunity for a short, limited and intense warfare with greater speed, maneuverability and strategic outreach. After learning lessons from the past operational doctrines of Indian Army, Air Force and Navy, Indian Military has announced a Joint Warfare Doctrine in 2017. The most threatening aspect of this new joint warfare doctrine is the possibility of a surgical strike against Pakistan.¹² Initially the idea of surgical strike was coined in the IAF doctrine of 2012. After years of military analysis, Indian military commanders were able to convince their political leadership that, they could carry out surgical strikes against Pakistan in case of any militant attack on the Indian soil.

Whether it was for the public consumption or electoral support, the BJP led Indian Government was convinced by the incumbent Army Chief, General Bipon Rawat and his predecessor that, Indian Army would carry out surgical strikes in Pakistan.¹³ Indian Army even staged such a drama in October 2016, after alleged Uri Attack. Pakistan however, strongly rejected these claims, with physical evidence shown to international and domestic media the following day. Indeed, this Indian claim was meant to divert attention of Indian masses from the internal political crises which the BJP Government was facing at that time. In fact, India cannot afford such an offensive act, which might have invited quid pro quo response from Pakistan.

Indeed, the BJP Government has created war hysteria in India and labeled each and every action of indigenous Kashmiri freedom struggle in Indian Occupied Kashmir

(IOK) with Pakistan. Now, the political forces and masses were demanding an action, which Indian Government fulfilled through fabricated surgical strikes. Indeed, it was a connivance of political and military leadership to satisfy the masses besides labeling the genuine indigenous Kashmiri struggle as militancy. The execution of the sub-conventional operations or surgical strikes would require political will and military capability which is lacking in the incumbent political and military leadership in India. Indian leadership may have a desire to carry out surgical strikes inside Pakistani territory,¹⁴ but, have not calculated its response as yet. Many a time Indian Army Chief, General Rawat has threatened Pakistan with dire consequences and a military response of cross LoC firing with time and place of Indian choosing?¹⁵

Despite clear Pakistani redlines about any incursion, some of the Indian writers and scholars still see the possibility of surgical strikes. Bharat Karnard says, "Indian military may carry out, Deeper surgical strikes in case of egregious terrorist actions against India and Indian targets".¹⁶ Former Brigadier of the Indian Army, Gurmeet Kanwal said that ".....In India we believe there is space for conventional conflict below the nuclear threshold". Professor Harsh V Pant of the Kings College London believes that, "there is a possibility of limited war, CSD or surgical strikes". However, Rajesh Basrur was of the opinion that "Yes, it (surgical strike) is possible; but such strikes will remain very limited in scope."¹⁷ Research Fellow at RUSI, Shashank Joshi says; "I would suggest repeat (surgical) strikes are not only possible, but also quite likely within the next few years. They have proven possible, politically successful, and internationally accepted."¹⁸ The Indian perspective revolves around a thinking that India is a great power and it must go for surgical strikes in future.

However, Pakistani perspective totally shrugs off the idea of surgical strikes. Surgical strike in its true sense, meaning and spirit would entail the use of Air Force, Gunship Helicopters and Special Forces; you go to a certain area, achieve your specified targets and come back unhurt. Keeping in mind the geographical proximity, Pakistan's air defense capabilities, heavily militarized and monitored Line of Control, which is manned round the clock with vigilance, it unlikely that India would ever dare to launch surgical strike inside Pakistani territory. General (Retired) Ehsan Ul Haq believes that slogan of surgical strike is more for their domestic electoral politics;-

.... In my view the Indian military leadership very categorically know this if they were to carry out the surgical strike or any incursion across the LoC or across the international border or the working boundary, Pakistan will retaliate, they are very clear on this.....¹⁹

The Indian military's doctrinal shift entails serious implications for the South Asian security. Indian doctrine is based on the assumption that it can undertake surgical strike owing to strategic alliance with US and global acceptability of its military might. However, it ignores the fact that Pakistan's conventional capabilities will make it costly for India in case of any misadventure. The response to any surgical strike would be massive which may push India to escalate the conflict to avoid embarrassment back home and ultimately limited war may escalate into a major war. It is imperative that

India needs to realize that any sub-conventional operation or surgical strike would invite aggressive response from Pakistan.

India's Hybrid Warfare Strategy against Pakistan

The hybrid warfare strategy is not new to the world. Since ages countries have been employing covert operations against their enemies to create subversion, get intelligence, destroy enemy without actually directly engaging in any war. The classical realist, Chankya Kautilya gave the concept of undeclared war in his book *Arthshastra*, in which he advised the king to use the secret agents, religion or superstition, and even women against the enemies.²⁰ The Indian covert operations against Pakistan are not new. Indian is using hybrid war against Pakistan since the establishment of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in 1968.²¹ The creation of Mukti Bahini, a terrorist organization, was the first operation of RAW, which played crucial role in the dismemberment of Pakistan. Mukti Bahini was trained, funded and nurtured by the Indian army and RAW. They were involved in heinous crimes against Pakistan army, their families, and even the local people of East Pakistan including Biharis.²² India has been actively carrying out subversive activities against Pakistan and many of their high-profile agents were captured in Pakistan since 1970s. Most notable were Surjeet Singh, Sarabjit Singh, and Kashmir Singh, Ravinder Kaushak and recently held Kulbushan Yadav and many others.²³ General (Retired) Ehsan Ul Haq explains the Indian covert operations in Pakistan in these words,

*.....those elements of the hybrid warfare have been at work for a very long time. We saw its manifestation in 1971 in the East Pakistan.....they have accordingly enhanced into all these facets whether it is psychological information, media, cultural, economic, military, diplomatic all these things have been at work against Pakistan and it will continue to be so.*²⁴

The Indian policy makers after the Mumbai attacks in 2008 launched renewed covert operations against Pakistan to curtail its support for Kashmir cause. India's subversive activities against Pakistan have a long history but after 2008 these gained momentum.

The Formation of Technical Service Division (TSD)-2008

The former Indian Army Chief, General (Retired) V.K Singh formed a secret unit in the Indian army called Technical Services Division (TSD), to buy the loyalties of the Kashmiri leaders in the IOK and to carry out terrorist activities inside Pakistan.²⁵ This unit had endorsement of the Indian Director General Military Intelligence, Vice Chief and Army Chief.²⁶

Under TSD, the Indian Army carried out three covert operations in the post 2008 period. *Operation Rehbar I-II-III* was launched in IOK, *Operation Seven Sisters* in Northeast of India and *Operation Deep Strike* was carried out inside Pakistan.²⁷ Since, these operations were highly secretive in nature, therefore no details are available in the open media but reportedly, the TSD Unit carried out eight covert Operations in a

foreign country, and paid money from “secret service funds to enroll the secessionist chief in a province of a neighbouring country”.²⁸

The evidence on ground suggests that TSD unit played its role in creating subversion in Pakistani province of Balochistan. The arrest of Indian Spy Kulbushan Yadav is the evidence of Indian covert operations inside Pakistan. Kulbushan Yadav, in his confession, accepted that he was involved in the subversive activities in Karachi and Baluchistan in which many Pakistanis lost their lives.²⁹ He was tasked to create uncertainty in Pakistan, disrupt CPEC and target Gwadar port.³⁰ According to Lieutenant General (Retired) Naem Khalid Lodhi,

*Kulbushan Yadav and other network which has been caught are a proof that they are actually pursuing this doctrine (hybrid warfare). It is not that they have to wage a war; we are already in the middle of a war. They have already waged hybrid war against us. They will undermine us especially in the field of economy that is the reason that they are so much against CPEC.*³¹

This is the reason that, Pakistan has witnessed many terrorist attacks in Baluchistan, Karachi and other parts of the country in last few years. However, the overall security situation has improved after the successful military operations in tribal areas and intelligence based operations under operation Radd Ul Fasad in urban centers.

Ajit Doval’s Defensive Offense Doctrine

Ajit Doval, the National Security Advisor (NSA), while describing his approach in dealing with threats to the Indian National Security said that, “we deal with enemy at three levels”. First is *defensive mode*, in which he said “we improve our defenses at home and deal with it on our own soil”. Second mode is *defensive-offense*, in which “you have to proactively go to the area from where threat is coming and neutralize it there”. And third is *offensive mode* which implies that “you go for offensive out rightly”.

When it comes to dealing with Pakistan, he was of the view that nuclear weapons prevent India from offensive mode, but it does not cross threshold in *defensive-offense* approach. He emphasized on *defensive-offence* strategy which aimed at “exploiting the vulnerabilities of Pakistan, which could be economic, internal security, political, its isolation internationally, proxy war in Afghanistan and making it difficult for Pakistan to manage its internal security”.³²

The former Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar has also openly declared that India will proactively deal with Pakistan. He said, "We have to neutralize terrorists through terrorists only.....kaante se kaanta nikalta hai (you remove a thorn with the help of a thorn)".³³ It seems that the Indian policy makers have already made up their minds that any alleged terrorist attack in IOK or Indian soil would be orchestrated by Pakistan. Such an approach is threatening to peace and stability in South Asia. The Indian government’s aggressive thinking to use militants and spies to destabilize Pakistan has already been put into practice.

It is worth mentioning that, ever since 9/11, Pakistan suffered economic losses worth \$ 123 billion.³⁴ Besides, it lost over 80,000 human beings which include 5,498 military personnel.³⁵ In addition, Pakistan has deployed 200,000 troops in FATA,³⁶ to curb terrorist networks, supported, funded and nurtured by India from across the border. Their activities were disclosed by ex-TTP commander Latif Mehsud who was nabbed in Afghanistan by the US forces and later handed over to Pakistan. He was in Afghanistan to collect funds and instructions from RAW and Afghan authorities.³⁷

Another major achievement in 2017 was the surrender of ex-TTP spokesman Ehsan Ullah Ehsan. In his confession, he revealed that Afghan soil is being used by the TTP and other militant organizations against Pakistan. His claim was verified by Kulbushan Yadav in his confession, that India is sponsoring militancy in Pakistan from its consulates in Afghanistan.³⁸ Apart from promoting militancy, another Indian policy guideline is to isolate Pakistan globally through diplomatic coercion. India's boycott of SAARC meeting in 2017 and forcing other countries like; Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Bhutan were part of isolating Pakistan diplomatically.³⁹ Indeed, Indian policy aims at regional domination while bullying other regional states.

Implications for Pakistan

The doctrinal change and rapid military modernization drive by India would create security dilemma for Pakistan. The conventional asymmetries would create strategic disparity in South Asia, allowing India to carry out limited operations under the nuclear threshold. Such thinking is aggressive and would plunge the region into further mayhem and turmoil. After the induction of nuclear weapons, though the possibility of a total war has diminished, but Indian Military and RAW are continuing with the planning to fight a sub-conventional war with likely usage of special forces, advanced helicopters, UAVs and highly sophisticated aircraft. It is destabilizing Pakistan through hybrid war and 5th Generation warfare. All these eventualities would lead to a clash between India and Pakistan, which may escalate into a full-fledged conflict.

According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India is world's largest importer of major arms, accounting for 13 per cent of the global total sales. Pakistan's economic conditions do not support arms race with India. It is trying to fill the gaps through its indigenous defense industry and through a better professionalism. India is in the process of purchasing long-range air defense systems (S-400 and Barak-8), Long endurance UAVs, P8I anti-submarine-surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, nuclear submarines, fifth generation aircraft and spy satellites. With all these sophisticated war munitions, Indian military strategies are directly threatening Pakistan's sovereignty.

To counter the massive military built-up of India, Pakistan has to rely on its nuclear assets, especially tactical nuclear weapons with small yield and shorter range to deter any advance of the Indian army's Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs). Though Ashley J. Tellis say that, "*TNWs are unlikely to be effective as nuclear deterrents, except for strategic signaling. Their value operationally is modest, and the risks associated with their deployment are considerable.*"⁴⁰

The Pakistani perspective is different from the Indian and Western perspective. Pakistani policy makers and scholars believe that the sole purpose of the TNW is to deter Indian military's limited conventional war strategy as perceived through CSD. It has no aggressive intent. The command and control, safety and security issues could be addressed and managed effectively. Indeed, Pakistani nuclear programme is safest in the world. In fact, if Pakistan is able to develop TNWs, it also has capability to ensure fool-proof security system for their safety and deployment. The former Director General of the SPD, Lieutenant General (Retired) Khalid Kidwai rationalized development and deployment of TNWs in these words,

As far as Pakistan is concerned it is well within our sovereign right to find an answer to the cold start doctrine, so at the conventional level, at the nuclear level we have tried to find answers to how to neutralizes the CSD, which takes care of the mobilization time, the exercises, cutting down of the reaction time etc etc. It is the kind of a doctrinal game that goes on between any two adversaries. An adversary when develops a new doctrine the other side tries to find answers to that, we have also found the answers to cold start doctrine, because of which I feel confident enough to say that the era of hot wars is over.⁴¹

Owing to repeated doctrinal changes, rapid military modernization and aggressive behavior of the Indian military, the South Asian strategic stability is seriously endangered. The Indian military's doctrinal shift coupled with massive military modernization would seriously create strategic disparity, and force Pakistan into countermeasures which may undermine deterrence stability in South Asia. It is imperative for both nuclear states to show some restraint and work together to resolve their issues in an amicable way as per the internationally laid-down mechanism.

Conclusion

The Indian military's doctrinal transformation would seriously challenge strategic stability in South Asia. The region applauded peace after the nuclearization of South Asia in 1998, but after the Kargil conflict and military standoff in 2001-02, India's strategic thinking vis-à-vis Pakistan transformed. The idea to fight a limited war under nuclear umbrella is not only dangerous but also entails serious implications for regional security, since a limited war may not remain limited after the response of other side.

The development and deployment of TNWs will deter the Indian military from any adventurism under CSD or proactive military operations. However, the Indian military's shift from CSD to 'surgical strike' would further complicate things between India and Pakistan. The Indian strategic thinkers believe that surgical strikes are possible, and acceptable at domestic and global level. Whereas the cost associated with such strikes would outweigh the objectives of the Indian military. What if the Indian aircraft or helicopters carrying out surgical strikes are shot down by Pakistan air defense systems, the Indian Special Forces commandos are nabbed or killed by Pakistani security forces or Pakistan reciprocate with counter surgical strikes and imposes greater damage?

All these scenarios would not only embarrass the Indian military in front of its domestic population, but it will be pressurized to escalate the conflict. In such a situation, things may go out of control and both states may resort to a full scale war which may lead to nuclear exchange.

The Indian policy makers are well aware of the consequences of all these scenarios and arms races. Therefore, instead of directly engaging Pakistan, new Indian strategy aims at promoting militancy in Pakistan through hybrid war. Pakistan has already taken some concrete steps to counter the Indian hybrid warfare in Karachi, former FATA and Balochistan. But still it has to go a long way. The strategic outlook of South Asia looks intense and in near future it may face greater instability and turmoil because of the doctrinal shift in the Indian military along with huge military modernization drive. To counter India at conventional level, Pakistan must improve its indigenous defense industry to reduce dependence on foreign powers especially the US. Already the defense production of Pakistan has risen and except for a few heavy weapons, Pakistan is arming its military through its own defense production complex. Rather, in some cases, Pakistan is exporting small arms.

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UNDERSTANDING NATIONAL SECURITY: A PAKISTANI PERSPECTIVE

*Ahmed Fraz Khan**

Abstract

National Security essentially remains a Western-centric and Western-dominated concept. Not much work has been done in the context of South Asia, which hinders meaningful scholarly advancement in the discipline. In Third World countries national security is misinterpreted as regime security. The era in which Pakistan gained independence was the time of power politics and theory of realism was reigning over international intellectual landscape, however in the meantime United Nations Organization (UNO) was being formed. Formation of UNO reflected emergence of counter thought of realism and termed as liberalism. However Pakistan opted to follow the doctrine of realism. Presumably the existential issues forced the infant state to align herself with the world power centers of the time, i.e. either the United States or the Russia. Pakistani leadership made a convenient choice, and joined the United States. An appropriate decision keeping in mind the international environment, however subsequently country's leadership failed to incorporate changing international political and security trends in state policies. The paper outlines the post war and prevailing international trends in the national security and describes environments wherein country failed to incorporate these intellectual findings in state policies.

Keywords: National Security, Strategic Culture, Comprehensive Security.

Introduction

The word security is taken from the Roman language. The term *secures*, where *se*, means without and *cura* donates worry, care, concern or anxiety.¹ There are two principal avenues to interpret the term, initially it implies the state of being secure or free from hazards. While in the other, It means without unease or without cares or worries. In the context of developing countries, there is no clear concept of security. The concept of disorder is an antonym for security. Indeed many leaders and politicians in the third world countries have been concerned with the issues of stability and unity. Many statesmen have legitimized their actions with the prevention of disorder.

Security is the branch of knowledge which draws its roots from the discipline of International Relation (IR).² However it has a partial overlap with the discipline of Strategic Studies (SS) and Peace Studies. It is believed that security should be the singular term focusing on both the strategic and peace research.³ Security Studies in its current form gained prominence after WWII or to be more precise what today is

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considered Security Studies was developed since mid-1940s. The golden period of security studies is counted from 1955-65.⁴ During this era Security Studies coined theories and developed methodologies that were integrated into the broader field of IR. This period of golden age was followed by a period of stagnation due to reduction in multidisciplinary studies in Strategic Studies (SS), an increase in empirical and technically oriented studies, and the challenge of peace research. This period of stagnation lasted till 1980. However the critical studies of the security became an expanding field since 1980s.⁵ The decade of 1990s saw an increase in the discussion on new security, with the broadening of research agenda beyond the military realm that has been the focus of Strategic Studies for some time. The end of cold war gave a great deal of acceptability to the concept of International security Studies concepts. Peace Research was not only acceptable but also implemented in the developed countries.

Civil wars, ethnic conflicts, terrorism, international crime, and in the context of third world countries issue like health ,education, population, energy, water scarcity and even environment become part of the comprehensive definition of security. The Frankfurt School of Critical Theory emphasizes that the military and state centric, zero sum understanding of security should be replaced by a concept of security that centers on communities and individual emancipation generally termed as comprehensive security. In the developing world the concept of state security is favored by totalitarian regime. In many respects state security is a less ambiguous term than the national security.

The third world countries generally termed as weak states by the western standards have serious concerns about domestic threats to their own authority. Small groups of elite, ruling the country like private entrepreneur treated their citizens like paid servants and own private losses and vulnerabilities are termed as threat to National Security. Although a western concept; however about 90% of domestic conflicts, regional crises and overall international violence that has taken place in the world since World War II is concentrated in the third world. More strikingly, “of the 120 wars recorded since 1945, 119 have taken place in the developing countries”.⁶ The term had been evolving itself over the years. Theories of realism have governed the concept of national security during 19th & 20th centuries.

How Security is perceived in Pakistan?

Pakistan is a multiethnic and heterogeneous society struggling to develop into a modern, progressive and tolerant homogeneous nation state. The country inherited a fear to its existence since it was born in 1947. The threat to Pakistan’s borders emanated from West and the East; especially situation in the East kept the country overly engaged in physically guarding her borders. Disputes over the distribution of military hardware, left the newly formed Army in disparaging state. Kashmir war of 1948 left no ambiguity about what lay ahead between the neighbors. On the Western front, Afghanistan despite being a Muslim country and having long ethnic and commercial ties was the only country to oppose Pakistan’s membership in the United Nations. The country had to decide about the best way to guard its territorial sovereignty. The shortest way to rebuild the military was to align itself with one of the power block existing in the world

at the time. Pakistan became part of unholy alliances like Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). It was done for the purpose of improving the Army despite knowing that country would earn the ire of opposing block and presumably the leadership knew, these pacts bind the participants only against the spread of communism and most likely the alliance would not come to the rescue when chips would be down against India. The desire to build the military is highlighted in the budgets of early years.

Defence Expenditure⁷

Year (April to March)	Expenditure (Millions or Rupees)	Percentage or Total Government Expenditure
1947-8	236.0	65.16 (Aug-Mar)
1948-9	461.5	71.32
1949-50	625.4	73.06
1950-51	649.9	51.33
1951-2	792.4	54.96
1952-3	725.7	56.68
1953-4	633.2	58.70
1954-5	640.5	57.50
1955-6	917.5	64.00
1956-7	800.9	60.10
1957-8	854.2	56.10

This was the formatting of the environment prevailing at the time. Despite the fact that political situation was highly unstable due to demise of Governor General Mr Jinnah, assassination of Prime Minister Mr Liaquat Ali Khan and subsequent political upheavals, that prevented any meaningful development in the country, yet the performance on account of developing the Armed Forces was commendable. This was only possible due to outright support of United States. Although in the long run Pakistan could not achieve self-reliance to maintain the modernization standards acquired through the foreign aid. However theoretically the approach adopted by the country of aligning herself with one of the power block was correct and as per the ground realities. It also coincided with the prevailing international trends. Why Pakistan did not join the opposite block i.e. Russia is a subject of separate debate.

The result of political instability was the military take overs of General Ayub and General Yahya. Military contends that it was dragged into the foray by the political leadership of the country. The space was provided by the polity, which failed to develop themselves into an institution capable of handling the issues of state policies. Ayub Khan in his biography states that he was asked by Governor General Ghulam Mohammad to produce a constitution in three months⁸.

Identification of Pakistan's National Security Culture

Ironically the most stable period of country's history happens to be during the Martial Law regime of President Ayub Khan. This was the time when the world was at

the peak of cold war, however concurrently security studies have also gained popularity among the developed countries. "The national security culture internationally was defined according to four criteria: the world view of the external environment; national identity; instrumental preferences; and interaction preferences".⁹ In Pakistan Generals were ruling at that time, their approach to national security depended on their military experiences on the Bureaucratic Model of decision making rather than being institutional, incorporating all the stake holders. Excerpt from President's book *Friends Not Masters* throw some light on his ideas about the four elements of security culture.

"Nobody gives you freedom you have to fight for it. Nobody fights for you; you have to fight for yourself. About identity his views were; Pakistan must develop/ establish a distinct national identity of its own in moral, social, intellectual, and political terms. Internally, the major problem for us has been to establish political institutions and stable instrument of government. The main cause of our major problem is India's inability to reconcile her to our existence as a sovereign, independent state. From the beginning, India was determined to make things difficult for us. Pakistan's location of being wedged between three mighty neighbours is a weakness; however it can be converted into a source of strength if we could establish normal and mutually acceptable relations with the countries hemming us in."

There was nothing wrong with these ideas; these were based upon realist paradigm which advocated the might is right phenomena in vogue at that time. However being dictator he lacked legitimacy and the policies basing on ideas could not be followed through after his regime ended. During the regime of Mr Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who succeeded Martial Law after the conduct of National Election 1970, security culture underwent paradigm shift. There were two reasons; Separation of East Pakistan and nuclear explosion by the India. Higher Defence Organization was created by establishing Headquarters of Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. It remained a halfhearted attempt.

In response to Indian Nuclear explosion Prime Minister Bhutto made his famous public statement "If India builds the bomb, we (Pakistan) will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one (atom Bomb) of our own. We have no alternative...atom bomb for atom bomb".¹⁰ The result of this policy was denial of development funds to public sector. During this era also our focus as per the international environments matched with the ground realities. However its manifestation was not as per the international trend which prescribed that development of nuclear arsenal should reduce the size and expenditures on conventional forces. Our security culture again experienced changes when in 1979 Russians invaded Afghanistan and Pakistan under General Mohammed Zia UlHaq became the front line state against the threat of Soviet expansion. We did receive some short term gains but in ultimate analysis we suffered a great deal. Refugees, drugs, guns and religious zealots are the gifts of that era. Internationally, Pakistan was instrumental in the breakup of USSR, hence culminating the cold war era in favor of west, however could not cash on the victory. The general died in the air crash and country suffered on account of inconsistent policies.

After the breakup of USSR the concept of security experienced a paradigm physical change advocated by the intellectuals and academics. The contours of new concept resembled that of welfare state and termed as comprehensive security. West or developed countries implemented it earnestly by reducing expenditures on the defence. Pakistan had a major share in bringing about these benefits to the west by playing a decisive role in termination of cold war, however was unable to reap the fruits of its efforts. The whole saga unfortunately turned out to be opposite. Regional environment went bad to worst. Afghanistan was left to the mercy of war lords who played in the hands of international agencies. The spill over came to Pakistan. The unresolved Afghanistan also became sanctuary of international terrorist groups. After 9/11 the international environment drastically changed and Pakistan again had to become an instrument in score settling game of world powers.

Analytical Debate

Since independence the country was faced with serious problems like unjust and partial boundary award, non-implementation of assets distribution, enormous flux of refugees, their rehabilitation and Kashmir dispute. The statements of congress leaders forced Pakistan to deduce that India will be an erstwhile enemy in times to come. These problems coupled with political instability made the country difficult to govern. The regional environment forced Pakistan to make protection of its territorial integrity the priority one. It warranted maintenance of strong Armed Force. The only way to achieve this objective was to align herself with either of the power block to get assistance for modernizing its forces. The alignment was as per the ground realities; however the country started living beyond her means. Basing on the borrowed capability the country instead of resolving its differences with the neighboring countries got involved in the arms race. Pakistan neither had the industrial muscle nor did it try to develop one. It almost acted like a rentier state.

After the cold war, global environment transformed dramatically and Pakistan should have realized that its geo strategic location should be used for economic gains rather than being used as proxy. Unfortunately the opportunity to stand on its own feet was lost in the wake of Global War on Terror (GWOT). The country again willfully assumed the role of rentier state and relied heavily on foreign aid rather developing the industrial infrastructure. Due to intermittent Martial Law regimes and autocratic civilian governments, the reign of power remained with a small elite feudal group. Since it was a very small circle of powerful kitchen cabinet hence the decision making had always been beneficial to an exclusive group of few in the government. These decisions were termed as state centric as masses were not benefitted

Contemporary Debate on the Concept of National Security

National security more often referred to as the process of integration of foreign and defense policy and national intelligence. It is generally applicable to the developed countries. Most of the third world countries have become insecure due to chronic problems of poor governance like extreme poverty, crime, pollution, famine and expanding population. "The social and economic vulnerabilities are directly related to

national security throughout the Third World, and in most cases much more directly related to the national security than in the developed countries. The threat lies in the heart of the understanding and implementation of the concept of security".¹¹

Lately the concept of Human rights modified the concept and it took the shape of comprehensive national security. The problem is commonly understood in terms of the physical protection of the state from the external threats. "External aggressions involving war and border conflicts, espionage, sabotage, subversion, and other threats operationalized by actual or potential adversaries are the immediate concerns of national security".¹² Treating national security as military and political matters reflect the realist interpretation of international relations where anarchy is pervasive and each state looks for its own interests. "An exclusive military strategic approach to the study of national security is not only myopic but also misleading".¹³ It would suffice to say here that our political leadership could not adapt to the changing concepts of national security due to host of reasons and remained glued to the military aspect of the term

Comprehensive Security

The latest scholarly trend in the concept of national security is termed as comprehensive security. It is based on the premise that people should have the right to lead their lives as per their desire without any inhibition. In short if people are happy the security is good and people do not get happy only by territorial protection. Bary Buzan states the concept as under.

"In this view, the military sector is about relationship of forceful coercion; the political sector is about relationship of authority, governing status and recognition; the economic sector is about relationship of trade, production and finance the social sector is about relationship of collective identity; and environmental sector is about relationship between human activity and the planetary biosphere".¹⁴

Third world countries who had been victim of foreign occupation, the theory of colonization fits appropriately. For such countries security is measured by the ability to protect state sovereignty, to preserve territorial integrity, and to maintain autonomy. This demands accumulation of adequate force, which could deter attack by the hostile state. In this back drop military as an institution becomes the ultimate criterion by which overall levels of power potential and national security capability are measured or judged. Construction of a modern military establishment is not an easy task, nor an inexpensive one. In the absence of indigenous capability i-e natural resources, industrial development and infrastructure, the country looks for treaties and alliances. "The dependency of developing countries on foreign support for managing their military threats, and requirement of external aid for their economic survival carries with it strings".¹⁵ They are therefore especially susceptible to heavy pressures to compromise on their national sovereignty in order to maintain that support.

"The minimization of external constraints on policy and behavior is at the heart of national security".¹⁶ Third world countries usually rely on acquisition of arms through external resources or try to develop their own capability, which they do at the cost of

their social sector development. The countries usually fail on both accounts. The foreign acquisitions, as per Ross, erode the national security rather than enhancing it by limiting policy and behavioral autonomy. On the other hand developing country would never succeed in acquiring arms market which would contribute in the economic development. This way the military in the third world becomes a burden on the economy of the country. There is another concept known as state security favored by the totalitarian regimes. "State security puts more emphasis on the state as a centralized governing organization, and less on the individuals and social groups existing in the state".¹⁷

Consequences of Weak National security Culture (Emerging Threats)

Few of the emerging threats or consequences of weak strategic culture are mentioned below:

- Breakdown of Social Contract between the state and the people
- Unhappiness of People
- Elitism (Self Interests of few).
- Ideological Inhibitors (Identity i-e Religion, Ethnicity and Braderi Issues)
- Geostrategic Compulsions
- Mis-Governance (Corruption, Incompetence)

Conclusion

The paper has made an endeavor to provide an overview of the evolution and development of the concept of national security through the prism of academic view point and the ground realities. Irrespective of the regime debate one thing has been established that our national security policy did not afford our people opportunity to live happily since independence, hence there is requirement to take a fresh look at it. It would be unwise to get into the blame game. The international environment prevailing at the time of independence and existential issues faced by the country forced us to associate ourselves with either of the power block. The problem lies in state's understanding of changing international environment and its transition accordingly. The onus to devise a policy rests not only with the state institutions, the politicians but also to the academia, which should be able to come up with the ideas to be implemented by the state.

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INSTITUTIONAL IMBALANCE AS DISRUPTIVE OF DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN: A RECONSIDERATION OF THE ARGUMENT WITH REFERENCE TO THE 1956 CONSTITUTION

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Abstract

After independence from the British rule, Pakistan was established as a parliamentary democracy based on the Westminster model. During the first six decades of its history, the country experienced repeated disruption of democracy through military interventions. The analysts generally attributed these disruptions to the civil-military imbalance; considering the two as institutional entities and describing the institutional imbalance in terms of civil-military relationship. Dispelling this general approach, this article has undertaken analysis of the institutional imbalance in Pakistan as a disruptor of democracy in terms of the constitutional framework – focusing on the circumstances leading to the first Martial Law in 1958 in the backdrop of the 1956 Constitution. The research is pivoted on the concept of Westminster model of parliamentary democracy, which has been adopted in Pakistan's constitutional framework from the very onset. Exploring the circumstances leading to the formulation of the first constitution of Pakistan (the 1956 Constitution), the article explains the importance of constitutional conventions in a Westminster parliamentary model, indicates the inclusion/exclusion of conventions in the 1956 Constitution and analyses effects of these inclusions/exclusions that contributed towards the disruption of democracy and imposition of the first Martial law in 1958.

Keywords: Institutional Imbalance, Democracy, Argument, Constitution.

Introduction

Pakistan, initially a dominion, inherited parliamentary form of government based on the Westminster model, which had its influence on the first constitution, formulated after a haggling of 9 years. Founders of the nation were also visibly supportive of this type of governance, which placed the executive powers to the Prime Minister heading a cabinet of ministers. However, the country has suffered political instability both in terms of changes in governmental heads as well as regime changes i.e. switching from democracy to dictatorship and back to democracy.

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Roots of constitutional governance in Pakistan can be traced to the Government of India Act 1935, which was formulated and promulgated by the United Kingdom Parliament.¹ The Act was envisaged to mature into a constitution on the lines of the British parliamentary system if and when the Princely States acceded to this Act's provisions. This, however, did not materialize and the Act was eventually adapted through the Independence Act 1947 to become the interim constitution for two separate dominions – India and Pakistan – within the framework of the Westminster model.

The interim constitution gave executive powers to the country's Prime Minister and relegated Governor-General's post to a customary role, but it gave transitional power to the Governor-General till 31 March 1948. Also, the first Governor-General of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in practice enjoyed the real control over the reins of government by virtue of the respect he enjoyed as the Quaid-e-Azam and the parallel powers in capacity of the President of the Constituent Assembly and the Legislature. This imbalance in contrast to the Westminster model was resolved after Jinnah's demise on 11 September 1948, when Liaquat Ali Khan chose to remain the Prime Minister; thus strengthening the cabinet form of governance. The new Governor-General, Khawaja Nazimuddin, remained the constitutional figurehead as per conventions of the Westminster model, while the Prime Minister held the executive power along with his cabinet. This harmony was disturbed with sudden death of Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951.

Khawaja Nazimuddin took over as the next prime minister, while Ghulam Muhammad, a bureaucrat and the Finance Minister since 1947, got elevated as Governor-General. Ghulam Muhammad sacked the Prime Minister in April 1953, in disregard of the conventions restraining him to do so, followed by dissolving the Constituent Assembly in 1954. After court verdicts on the dissolution and other constitutional matters and its guidance to elect a Constitutional Assembly anew, the first indigenous constitution of the country was promulgated in March 1956. However, instable political environment led to a fast changing of country's leadership, with six prime ministers coming and going in a row under the Constitution – culminating in its abrogation in 1958.² This has been followed by the checkered history of Martial Laws/military takeovers on the one hand, and return to democratic dispensation on the other.

The subject of regime changes in Pakistan has been extensively studied by various researchers and academia, but the scope of study has been largely confined to civil-military relationship or the politico-military institutions. Political institutions, it is averred, were underdeveloped at the time of independence, while military institutions were overdeveloped in terms of organization and mobilization capacity. Imbalance between the two was, so to say genetic. The debate, so far, has largely focused on such imbalance and resulting extra-constitutional activity, mainly on the part of the military. Not much attention has been given to the structure of the constitution, especially ambiguities in the powers of the President as head of state vis-a-vis the cabinet with Prime Minister as its head to aid and advise the President.

This study attempts to identify major constitutional ambiguities leading to institutional imbalance in Pakistan's political landscape. Such ambiguities in the 1956

Constitution arose out of adoption of a compromise between the presidential and the Westminster model of parliamentary government. The Westminster model is a parliamentary form of governance with executive powers lying with the Prime Minister heading a cabinet of ministers. In absence of a formal constitution, the United Kingdom parliaments have evolved and sustained the Westminster model largely based upon conventions that are generally not enforced by courts. No legal proceedings can be taken for a breach of established conventions, since they are merely a matter of practice and not written into law. In Pakistan's constitutions based on the Westminster model, conventions were either retained with some modifications (as in the 1956 Constitution), or codified into laws (as in the 1973 Constitution).

While the country has experienced repeated disruption of democratic processes both by the military and civil regimes, most of the research undertaken to explore the disruption has emphasized on the perceived imbalance between the civilian and of military institutions. Literary analyses of causes of institutional imbalances in Pakistan by various scholars can be categorized as the heritage, the outcome of civil-military nexus, the deliberate measure by the military for overall supremacy, the anomalies in civil-military relationship, the military being suspicious of civil institutions, the inability of political parties to organize themselves, and the influence of intelligence agencies. In terms of heritage, Jamshed Khan and Asmat Ullah Wazir view the imbalance persisting between the representatives of the people and bureaucratic institutions (both civilian and armed) from the very inception of Pakistan, as a consequence of the legacy inherited from colonial era. They view the military and the bureaucracy almost in harmony with each other in impeding the country's uneven progress to democracy through strength and assertiveness.³ According to Jamil Hussain Junejo, Pakistan already had institutional imbalance upon independence due to well-structured and powerful civil and military bureaucracies while the political institutions were weak and political parties had a non-democratic culture. Consequently, the country did not have stable, vibrant and powerful political institutions that could undertake regular elections on the basis of universal franchise, develop confidence of the people into democracy, safeguard democratic practices from constitutional misdemeanor and attain suitable environment for growth of democracy so that it could respond to the wishes and expectations of the people.⁴ Michael Kugelman does not consider Pakistan to have any semblance of civil-military balance – the old norm becoming the new normal.⁵

As an outcome of civil-military nexus, Hassan Askari Rizvi attributes the imbalance to the overwhelming of the weak civil institutions by relatively strong bureaucratic-military nexus since the very inception of Pakistan.⁶ Safdar Mahmood emphasizes that democratic process in Pakistan has been subverted as a consequence of manipulation of politics and destabilization of elected governments by the military-bureaucratic elites.⁷ In Ayesha Jalal's opinion, the country's political system has been systematically broken down by civil-military personnel.⁸ Mohammad Waseem opines institutional imbalance in Pakistan in the context of civil-military relationship to accentuate the processes of military takeover.⁹

As a deliberate measure, Anthon Bell considers Pakistan's military to be responsible for weak civilian governments.¹⁰ Siegfried Wolf characterises the military to be responsible for non-consolidation of democracy in the country owing to its prominent role in all spheres of socio-economic and political life.¹¹ Akmal Hussain describes the institutional imbalance in terms of legislature, executive and judiciary but attributes its existence in Pakistani political landscape to the military's tendency of dominating the government with little regard for institutional balancing.¹²

Among other reasons for institutional imbalance, Talat Masood recognizes the civil-military balance to make significant in the last few years, but mentions of serious anomalies in civil-military relationship that weaken the national vigor.¹³ Aqil Shah views the Pakistan Army as an institution profoundly suspecting politicians of being incapable to govern the country effectively, intervening repeatedly to weaken the civilian institutions, that has destabilized the development of representative institutions.¹⁴ Ian Talbot considers weak institutionalization of the ruling Pakistan People's Party to be a crucial factor in Bhutto regime's inability to strike a balance with the military and bureaucracy,¹⁵ while not evaluating this dilemma in terms of the constitutional institutions. Ismail Khan expands the canvas of civil-military imbalance by linking the involvement of Pakistani intelligence agencies in the country's important national events, as an extended arm of the one among the two components of the power equation.¹⁶

The study argues that parliamentary institutional imbalance affecting the functioning of democracy in Pakistan emanated largely from the structure of the country's constitution, in that the 1956 Constitution was based on the Westminster model i.e. the British Parliamentary system. The Westminster model has evolved over time wherein political institutions and procedures are largely based on conventions. Following this basic model for Pakistan, the 1956 Constitution retained several conventions, which interested office holders – particularly the President – could breach imperiously; thus disrupting the functioning of democracy in the country.

The following pages are devoted to the explication of conventions-based Westminster model, some major conventions incorporated in Pakistan's 1956 Constitution and the dynamics whereby such conventions became the basis of institutional imbalance, consequent political instability and disruption of democracy.

Constitutional Conventions in the Westminster Model

Constitutionalism is the product of the European political experience, with roots in the theory that governments are derived from the will of people organized into societies that are mindful of their rights as well as obligations.¹⁷ The models of governance based on democratic ideology are fundamentally of two types: Presidential, and Parliamentary. In a presidential system, the power and authority of the head of government and the head of state are merged into single office, while a parliamentary system comprises of the office of the head of state separate from the head of government. Some countries have a hybrid system of government with a combination of the presidential and parliamentary systems.

The parliamentary system has originated from the British democratic principles and in its basic form is referred to as the Westminster model; named so after the location of the UK parliament – the Palace of Westminster. It is essentially a progression of conventions and procedures for legislation.¹⁸ Most procedures within and utilized by the Westminster model evolved with conventions that were in practice and are now precedents of the British parliament; being significant parts of the British Constitution. While the United Kingdom does not have any written and fixed constitution, most countries following the Westminster model have adopted a formally written constitution for their system of governance. But even those countries frequently refer to conventions, practices and precedents because some important aspects of various procedures are not adequately covered in the constitution.

The phrase ‘Constitutional Convention’ was introduced by British legal scholar A. V. Dicey in 1883. He indicated that in Britain two complementary and parallel sets of rules governed the actions of political actors and institutions:¹⁹ The one set of rules are in the strictest sense “laws”, since they are rules which (whether written or unwritten; enacted by statute or derived from the mass of custom, tradition; or judge-made maxims known as the common law) are enforced by the courts. The other set of rules consist of conventions, understandings, habits, or practices that—though they may regulate the conduct of the several members of the sovereign power, the Ministry, or other officials—are not really laws, since they are not enforced by the courts. This portion of constitutional law may, for the sake of distinction, be termed the ‘conventions of the constitution,’ or constitutional morality.

Dicey defined constitutional conventions as the rules to determine the manner in which the monarchy’s discretionary powers should be exercised.²⁰ He further wrote that the conventions had a purpose of watching over and regulating the behavior of the monarchy. A century after him, Marshall argued that Dicey did not take note of other governmental institutions and personnel that are bound by convention.²¹ Canadian scholar Peter Hogg emphasized that some conventions effectively transfer effective power from the legal holder to another official or institution, while other conventions limit a broad power or even advise against its application.²² Hilary Barnett presented a more modern definition by summing up that breaching or violating a convention would have the consequence of encouraging legitimate criticism, which may be in form of alleged ‘unconstitutional conduct’.²³

Constitutional conventions evolve from traditions, tendencies and normal practices, regulating the conduct. Due to their very nature, they readily adapt to changes in the society and are considered the moral backbone of the constitution. While being greatly important in the British legal system, courts do not consider conventions as legal obligations. It is generally accepted that if a constitutional convention is breached, then the ramifications of that will be political, not legal. Despite the fact that the conventions have no real legal standing, they do have informal influence to consecrate and associate the working of the state and its institutions. A few such conventions are Royal Assent, collective responsibility and political impartiality. Despite of no legal ramifications for not following conventions, their adherence is

considered obligatory to avoid 'unconstitutional' practices, or losing political office. In Westminster model, laws and conventions co-exist in a major fusion. Converting conventions into laws can induce several problems within the legal system, due a number of conventions clashing with their legal equivalent.²⁴

The 1956 Constitution and Inclusion/ Exclusion of Conventions Therein

After the dissolution of the First Constituent Assembly in October 1954, introduction of the presidential system in Pakistan was seriously considered, which would have excluded Cabinet responsibility, However, it soon became obvious after the elections to the Second Constituent Assembly in May 1955 that majority of its members favoured the Cabinet form of Government i.e. the parliamentary system.²⁵ The 1956 Constitution was thus a result of the two conflicting views and contained a number of conventions of the Westminster model as a written rule, while disregarding a few. Presence of such conventions in the absence of a political culture whose reflection such conventions were, led to instability in Pakistan's politics. Key aspect in this regard were:

- The 1965 Constitution provided a parliamentary form of government, in which the executive was responsible to and drawn from the legislature. Under Article 37(3), the President had the discretion to appoint any member of the legislature as the prime minister whom he considered to be "most likely to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly". This was a convention in the Westminster model i.e. an unwritten obligation. When transplanted to Pakistan it could, and did, become a great source of instability²⁶.
- Under Article 37(1), the Prime Minister was to be the Head of the Cabinet of the Ministers, which was to advise the President on how and when he was to exercise his functions. Under Article 37(5), the Cabinet was collectively responsible to the legislature. These aspects were also derived from the Westminster model, where the cabinet headed by the prime minister is answerable to the legislature i.e. the parliament.
- Provincial Governments' structure was identical to that of the Federal Government; Cabinet headed by the Chief Minister being drawn from and responsible to the Provincial Legislature under Article 71, and the Governor taking the place of the President as the head of the Provincial Government.²⁷ Hence, the provincial governments were also inherently based on the Westminster model.
- Under Article 37(6), the Prime Minister was liable to dismissal if the President was of the opinion that he had lost the confidence of the majority of the legislature. This clause empowered the President to dismiss the Prime Minister when of the opinion that the Prime Minister no more enjoyed the confidence of a majority of the legislature. Being a convention in the Westminster model, this power of the head of the state has been seldom invoked in the United Kingdom. However, in Pakistan, it acted as the Damocles' sword; always proving lethal in the hands of the President during 1956-58.

- An important aspect of the Westminster model is the collective responsibility of the Cabinet, which mandates resigning of the body as a whole or a Minister thereof in case of an expression of non-confidence by the legislature. The 1956 Constitution did not contain this convention; thereby making it non obligatory for a defeated Ministry to resign and throwing unnecessary burden upon the courts of law to settle such matters.²⁸

While the Constitution of 1956 envisaged a parliamentary government on the Westminster model, it did not run on the form and spirit of that system and, instead, created a conflict between the President and the Prime Minister.²⁹ The framers of the 1956 Constitution reduced some conventions of the British Constitution to the forms of express statutory provisions, which could later confront the judiciary.³⁰ Ambiguities arising out of conventions facilitated intervention of the President in politics.³¹ Notable ambiguities in the Constitution and implications with respect to the Westminster model are discussed below.

While the general tenor of Part IV of the 1956 Constitution (describing the structure and working of the Federation) gave credence to the assumption that the adoption of the presidential system was originally contemplated, Article 37 (the Cabinet) pointed to the contrary.³² According to Article 37(7) of the Constitution, the President, in the exercise of his functions, was to act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or the appropriate Minister or Minister of State, as the case may be, except in cases where he was empowered by the Constitution to act in his discretion, and except as respected the exercise of his powers under Clause 37(6), which stated that, "The Prime Minister was to hold office during the pleasure of the President. The President was not to exercise his powers under this clause unless he was satisfied that the Prime Minister did not command the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly." This binding of ministerial advice on the President's powers was derived from the conventions of the Westminster system, which prescribe that the Crown (in capacity of the head of state) cannot act except upon advice of ministers;³³ for the last 250 years or so the British monarchy having acted only upon the *advice* in taking such important decisions such as the dismissing a government or dissolving a parliament.³⁴ By adhering to the advice of ministers in exercising its prerogative, the monarch has distanced itself from political controversies. Retaining this convention in the 1956 Constitution distanced the President from political controversies that may arise if the advice of a responsible minister was not the basis of a presidential course of action. However, such limitation was more of a matter of convention, rather than legal obligation, in absence of a specific documentary requirement, i.e. the requirement of countersignature of the Prime Minister or the relevant Minister as contained in the French, German, Norwegian and Swedish Constitutions.³⁵ On the other hand, keeping the ministerial advice obligatory in written constitution made any deviation from it illegal; thereby restricting the prerogative of the head of the state to exercise contrary to or in the absence of a ministerial advice. Keeping this aspect as a convention in the Westminster model facilitates the Crown to retain such option as perfectly legal, while the 1956 Constitution made it illegal.

In Westminster model, as a matter of law the power of the Crown to dismiss a Government or to dissolve the House is unlimited. Even though the Crown has disdained to exercise this authority for the last 250 years, the power to do so exists and can be exercised should appropriate situation arise for the Crown to act for the good of the country.³⁶ Due to the non-exercise of this personal power or authority by the Crown, the foundations of constitutional monarchy in the United Kingdom have been strengthened. The framers of 1956 Constitution adopted this convention of the British Constitution in form of an express statutory proposition without indicating measures if the provision was breached. The only sanction which could be presumed to operate upon the President to submit to ministerial advice was the fear that in the event of his violating the Constitution he may be summoned by the Legislature for impeachment. But such fears could not offer effective restraint in power politics pursued by an irresponsible President, because the President could not be called to court for anything done in his official capacity. As such, any disregard of Article 37(7) by the President could only be dealt with outside the judicial forum – presumably, by the legislature through impeachment proceedings.³⁷

A variance in the 1956 Constitution from the British constitutional conventions existed in form of Article 37(4), which stated that: “Other Ministers, Ministers of State and Deputy Ministers shall be appointed and removed from office by the President, but no person shall be appointed a Minister of State or Deputy Minister unless he is a member of the National Assembly.” This implied that the resignation of Ministers, Ministers of State and Deputy Ministers was to be regulated through the President’s office, on the advice of the Prime Minister. However, the practice adopted in the British parliamentary system is that the Prime Minister asks a cabinet colleague to tender his resignation if the Prime Minister is convinced that continuation in office of that colleague is not in the interest of the country.³⁸ In such case, the Minister is bound to resign.

A major departure from the Westminster model conventions resided in Article 50 of the Constitution, which expressly conferred upon the President the power to summon, prorogue or dissolve the Legislature, and to fix the time and place of its meetings. Read in conjunction with Article 37(7), the President would dissolve the National Assembly on the advice of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. These provisions raised query as to what extent the Prime Minister’s advice to dissolve the Parliament was constitutionally binding on the President; such as, when a Prime Minister may be deserted by a majority of National Assembly Members and necessarily desired that the House be dissolved so that he could approach the electors for majority support in the new legislature for the proposed programme or measures. The 1956 Constitution was silent on this important question; presumably on the presumption that conventions of the British Constitution and established practices of parliamentary democracy would be followed in Pakistan too.³⁹ Leaving the matter to convention created opportunities for manipulation by the President. Indeed, President Iskandar Mirza clinched resignations of Prime Ministers, particularly of Sahrawardy and Chandigarh through the power to dissolve the legislature that was presumed to be regulated by convention.⁴⁰

Constitutional Deviations and Exploitation of Conventions

The parliamentary situation envisaged through the 1956 Constitution necessitated a credible party system, but the only party with significant national following at that time (the Muslim League) had lost its appeal and was in advance state of deterioration.⁴¹ With the adoption of new Constitution, Major General (Retired) Iskandar Mirza assumed the office of the President. But on manipulation, the existence of weakly organized parties served him well. The President and the Chief Minister of West Pakistan, Dr Khan Sahib, had been friends since the former's appointment in the 1930s as the Political Agent in the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier Province. Dr. Khan Sahib was a non-Muslim Leaguer, but was appointed the Chief Minister despite the Muslim League having the absolute majority in the West Pakistan provincial legislature and deserving to have the chief ministership. This appeasement of Dr Khan Sahib by the President was at the cost of violating the Constitution and flouting the universally accepted norms of parliamentary democracy.⁴² The 'wrong person,' Dr Khan Saheb, launched his own political party, the Republican Party,⁴³ which grew in strength in the National Assembly at the cost of further weakening the Muslim League. In the process, constitutional conventions were ignored by employing pressure on legislative assembly members and central MPs to change their political and party allegiances.⁴⁴ Prime Minister Chaudhri Mohammad Ali was ultimately replaced by Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, who was later himself ousted by President Mirza through political intrigue.⁴⁵

With diminished political strength partly due East Pakistan background and political association with Awami League (the party ruling then East Pakistan when the 1956 Constitution was adopted), Suhrawardy became increasingly subservient to Iskandar Mirza. As such, he lent support to the President's rule in West Pakistan on 20 March 1957 on the pretext of its requirement to ratify the provincial budget, while it was actually imposed on the call of Dr Khan Sahib whose party had lost majority in the Provincial Assembly. The opposition was in a position to form an alternate government; it was hence wrong to say that the government of the province could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.⁴⁶ The President's rule was a subversion of the Constitution, because Article 37(3), on the basis of convention, required the President to invite the Muslim League (then majority part in the Provincial Assembly) to form the next Government. The President's non adherence to conventions became a major source for political instability. Ironically, he criticized the British parliamentary system as unsuitable for Pakistan and asked for adopting the American system. He even recommended suspension of all political parties and presiding of state affairs by a revolutionary council for at least five years.⁴⁷ Such gross deviation of constitutional norms could not be sustained under ordinary circumstances but for the manipulation of conventions being out of courts' jurisdiction.

The Republican Party's return to power in West Pakistan was facilitated by Suhrawardy at the behest of President Iskandar Mirza. But under Mirza's intrigue, the Republicans at the center withdrew coalition support for Suhrawardy. The President asked for the Prime Minister's resignation, not allowing him to get the vote of confidence from the Assembly.⁴⁸ As per Westminster conventions, the Prime Minister

should have been given the opportunity for a vote of confidence. But the President again exploited constitutional ambiguity in matters of his powers vis-à-vis constitutional conventions, which forced Suhrawardy to resign.

Chundrigar was succeeded by Feroz Khan Noon, with support of 5-party coalition, who remained embroiled in political instability inherited by his predecessor. Developments in West Pakistan gave President Mirza opportunities to dismiss any ideas of forthcoming elections.⁴⁹ In the midst of deep political and financial crisis, the central government was in dire straits by the summer of 1958. The matters were no different in East Pakistan. On 31 March 1958, Chief Minister Aatur Rahman Khan requested the Governor Fazlul Haq to prorogue the National Assembly because the cabinet had obtained a majority of only fifteen votes in a debate on the Budget estimates. This request had a merit in terms of constitutional provisions but was denied by the Governor which was contrary to the Westminster model conventions embedded within the adopted British parliamentary system. Haq instead, dismissed the Ministry of Aatur Rahman and placed Sarkar on the post. To make the matters worse, President Mirza adopted the same tactic, doing away with constitutional conventions, by replacing Fazlul Haq with the then Chief Secretary West Pakistan as the Governor, who promptly sacked Sarkar and brought Aatur Rahman back. There were brawls in the provincial legislature, including the one on September 23, in which Deputy Speaker Shahid Ali was injured and died two days later.⁵⁰

Meanwhile, in West Pakistan Qayyum Khan demanded early elections in capacity of the President of the Muslim League. He threatened to launch 'direct action' if the government refused to announce a firm date for elections. The central government placed a ban on all paramilitary organizations, which led to resistance by Muslim League workers in Karachi and clashes with police. Subsequent to ensuing political turmoil, the military staged a successful coup; declaring Martial Law in the country on 7 October 1958, while abrogating the 1956 Constitution.

Conclusion

Democracy in Pakistan has been gravely affected by the institutional imbalance induced by the constitutional provisions and conventions adopted by various stakeholders. The country inherited the Westminster system of democracy essentially through the 1935 Act, then the 1947 Act and the Interim Constitution. However, colonial experience of constitutional governance left a mark of the authority that the head of the state enjoyed in capacity of the Governor-General over the elected legislature, which was displayed in the formulation and subsequent implementation of the 1956 Constitution.

In a typical Westminster model, the prime minister and the cabinet evolve from the legislature and remain responsible to it; the head of the state, President, being a mere symbolic figurehead. Accordingly, executive powers in matters of governance were to lie with a cabinet of ministers, headed by the prime minister or the first minister in some instances. The prime minister is chosen to head the government from and by the legislature comprising of elected representatives of the people, while the

ministers are chosen by the prime minister from the legislature, so that the people have their participation in governance through their elected representatives. The prime minister and his cabinet are answerable only to the legislature for the lawful execution of their powers, according to the wishes of the people, which is manifested through the legislature. In the whole process of governance, head of the state does not have any power over the executive and gives consent for specific milestone activities of a democratically elected government, such as inviting a member of the legislature to form government, confirming the ministers' appointment, dissolving the legislature, etc. It, however, can interfere under certain circumstances through constitutional conventions, which are rarely applied in respect of the wishes of the people that are reflected through the legislature and the executive.

The concept of head of the state in the Westminster model has evolved from the British parliamentary system, where the monarchy has been kept politically alive as the sovereign, with occasional exertion of power over the executive through conventions – not laws. In absence of a monarchy, adoption of the Westminster model mandates the head of the state to remain apolitical, and adhere to constitutional laws as well as conventions. In doing so, constitutional conventions are a key element, which provide great flexibility to the application of the constitutional provisions.

The period 1953-58 in Pakistan's political history was characterized by an unending process of political manipulation by the head of the state (represented first by the Governor-General and later the President), which contributed in disruption of political system and eventually leading to the establishment of military regime.⁵¹ The President reportedly ignored the limitations placed on his powers and duties as a constitutional head of state and indulged in partisan political activity.⁵² Submission of the constitutional institutions to this excessive use of power by the head of the state encouraged the Governor-General further. It was because of this enhanced confidence that he countered the next Prime Minister's move to take away his discretionary powers by dissolving the legislature (the Constituent Assembly) and declaring a state of emergency throughout Pakistan in October 1954, without adequate constitutional provisions. The cabinet subsequently formed was at variance with the Westminster model due to the absence of the legislature. In fact, the very nature of the powers the Governor-General exerted was more akin to the presidential form of governance, which was actually neither adopted nor practiced in the country's adopted constitution.

The effects of the heads of state's persistent interference into the executive's working and disregard for the legislature were evident in the application of the country's first constitution – the 1956 Constitution. While the Constitution itself was based on the Westminster model, President Iskandar Mirza's style of governance was similar to the presidential form, and his frequent interference inside the working of the executive resulted in dismissal of four prime ministers within two years from September 1956 to October 1958, without any elections and ending with a military coup.

However unfortunate and unceremonious the closure of the first chapter of Pakistan's democratic period may have been, it was indeed facilitated by the loopholes in the Constitution in the form of conventional dictates which were exploited by the

President to serve this cause. Furthermore, the disorganized political leadership and its continuous struggle for power shifted the real political power from the legislature to the head of the state; establishing a trend to violate the norms of parliamentary democracy.⁵³ The President repeatedly manipulated things to take advantage of the absence of fixed rules. Indeed, constitutional provisions contained in the Constitution of 1956 were adequate to have stable governance in the country, provided conventions contained therein were followed in spirit. But that was not to be, and the country had to learn its lessons in parliamentary democracy the hard way.

It can hence be concluded that institutional imbalance in Pakistan as an aftermath of the 1956 Constitution was primarily due to variances from the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy and non-adherence of stated as well as implied constitutional conventions.

NOTES

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ENERGY SECURITY AND THE IPI PEACE PIPELINE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

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Abstract

The Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) peace pipeline is considered a win-win proposition for the three countries which may lead to enhanced economic interdependence and promote durable confidence building measures. This project can be integrated into the Chinese led economic integration initiatives called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is expected to help Pakistan become an economic hub and energy corridor for the major rising economic states in the region like China and India. Massive industrialization in the South and South-East Asian region has exponentially increased the energy demand to cater to the global market needs. This paper investigates why notwithstanding the consistently growing energy demands in the region the IPI has as yet not materialized despite being an opportunity for both economic development and conflict resolution. Following a retrospective analysis of the developments since the project was announced, the paper concludes that political disputes among neighboring countries of South Asia and US sanctions on Iran are the core challenges that have hampered this and other development initiatives. Sanctions, however, have generally remained ineffective in international relations due to the rise of complex interdependence. Iran and Pakistan, as participant countries in the peace pipeline, are determined to continue the project for viable peace and development in the region.

Keywords: IPI-Peace Pipeline, Economic Interdependence, Energy Security, Development.

Introduction

Energy security is the primary issue area for countries in pursuing economic growth and essential for the smooth functioning of industrialized economies.¹ The fast growing technological advancements and rising interdependence are features of an increasingly globalized world. Yet, a population of almost two billion in developing parts of the world lack energy resources required to meet their basic needs. Despite this lack of access to energy and security, some regions in the developing world have performed remarkably well, owing to their fast economic and technological growth rate. But the majority of the developing countries are still grappling with issues of energy security that has significantly affected their industrial growth. Among these developing societies, the South Asian region alone encompasses 22% of the world's total

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population, while nearly half of the population (40%) lives below the poverty line. A large portion of the population lives without appropriate access to energy.²

Since the Cold war, oil has become an indispensable strategic resource.³ The Middle East has the world's largest oil reserves supplying to most of the regions in the world.⁴ The Arab Oil Embargo in the 1970s, demonstrated the power of oil in shaping the political behaviour of the global powers and their subsequent efforts to monopolize strategic oil assets.⁵ During the last few decades, the global economy has witnessed soaring prices in the world oil market particularly due to the political turmoil in the Middle East. This has had a deep impact on Asian countries in general and the South Asian region in particular. China, India and Pakistan are rapidly growing economies with a huge appetite for energy which if not properly ensured might lead to a great economic crisis.⁶

Energy security is becoming a critical issue for these three countries which they need to ensure, by putting aside their differences for peace and viable economic growth. India and Pakistan both have deeper stakes for their future survival, hence in the longer run, both require collaborating with each other particularly in energy matters.

Geo-strategically, Pakistan's position as an economic and energy corridor can serve as a linchpin for peace and economic integration in the region. It is the shortest route for the supply of Iranian, Turkmen and Persian Gulf oil and gas to India and China.⁷ This new configuration of economic and energy route through China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) enhances the geo-political significance of Pakistan in global politics, i.e. historically like the construction of the Suez and Panama Canals enhanced the geopolitical importance of their respective regions.⁸

The IPI is a significantly important neo-functional cooperative project that would enhance economic interdependence amongst the members involved. Puri posits that the project might precipitate a domino effect leading to peaceful relations between India and Pakistan.⁹ It is, therefore, imperative that the viability of the project may be explored. The paper primarily relies on journal articles and news articles to determine whether the project will help improve the prospects of peace and development in South Asia. Although, this project has the potential to reshape the power structure in the region by creating new alliances and changing old rivalries into new friendships, its implementation has been delayed indefinitely. The governments in Pakistan and Iran have shown interest in reviving the deal. This paper examines the events leading to the renewal of the interest by analyzing the details of the project since its initiation.

Evolution of the IPI Project

Pakistan, in addition to taking advantage of the pipeline for its domestic consumption, is in the pivotal position to provide a conduit for energy transportation to other states in the region.¹⁰ The IPI pipeline or the peace pipeline project planned to transport gas through 2600 km distance from Iran's South Pars gas field to India via Pakistan. Initially the IPI was conceived in 1989 by Mr. Ali Shams, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran, and Mr. Rajendra Pachauri the then Director-General of the Tata

Energy Research Institute in Delhi. Initially the official Indian response was obscure due to poor relations with Pakistan, however, after further analysis, India agreed to the consortium. In 1993, India finally signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Iran.¹¹ There are three route options, through land, deep sea and shallow sea. India has been more concerned about the security rather than the economic costs and technical issues of the project.

Initially, internally Pakistan could not develop a complete consensus supporting the pipeline transit, due to the strained relations with India. As such, Pakistan refused to let the pipeline go through its territory. Furthermore, Pakistan Navy also had security concerns, as allowing the Indo-Iran pipeline to pass through Pakistan's Economic Exclusive Zone, will give the Indian navy an excuse to enter Pakistani waters. In addition, Pakistan seemed more interested in the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) pipeline project which would be 40% cheaper than the Indo-Iran project.

In response to Pakistan's failure to provide a transit route or a political decision in favor of joining the project, Iran and India began discussions over a deep waters route, in order to avoid the Pakistan territory altogether. However, the deep-sea pipeline option, in addition to being costlier than the land option, is prone to security risks. Due to increasing energy demands, India had to speed up the land route option. Keeping the geopolitical complexity in mind, India used these conditions as incentives to pressurize the US to hasten its civil nuclear deal. There was also a growing realization within Pakistan that by staying out of the pipeline project it might also lose the option to earn a transit fee, which initially at a minimum was to be US \$ 500 million per annum. After due deliberation, in 2001-2002 then President Musharraf considered it as a transit gas pipeline with monetary benefits until realizing energy need in Pakistan and engaging India into this project till 2005-2006, eventually Pakistan desired to be part of project and the pipeline will be allowed through its territory.¹²

Finally, it was assumed that the Indo-Iranian pipeline, now dubbed the IPI or the 'peace pipeline,' would play a pivotal role in mitigating political rifts between India and Pakistan and begin a new chapter of cordial relations leading towards economic integration. Originally, the IPI was worth US \$ 7.5 billion covering a distance of 2600 km stretching from the south of Iran to India, with an approximately 400 miles of line planned through Pakistan's resource rich province of Balochistan. Iran has the second largest gas reserves in the world after Russia, estimated at 812 trillion cubic feet.¹³ Through the IPI, Pakistan would not only address its growing energy needs but also earn a hefty transit fee.¹⁴

The initial phase of the project was to provide 110 million standard cubic meter per day, of which nearly 25% was to cater to domestic demands, 25% was to be transported to Pakistan, while 50% was to be transported to India. To meet future demands, a parallel pipeline was also proposed to be constructed. Pakistan further requested for higher gas off-take, and proposed another dedicated Iran-Pakistan pipeline. India objected to this move,¹⁵ however, recent developments indicate an interest by both Iran and Pakistan to renew work on the Iran Pakistan pipeline.¹⁶

According to Pakistan's Ministry of Oil & Gas, the construction of pipeline at Pakistan's site was to start by late 2009 and finish by 2011, but this dream is yet come to fruition. The cost of the entire pipeline inside Pakistan was estimated around US \$ 2.6 billion. Iran had in 2007 already embarked on the construction of the nearly 1100 km (690 miles) long project with an estimated cost of about US \$ 4 billion. India planned to spend US \$ 0.6 billion to construct the 344 km (215 miles) long pipeline within its territory. Due to various geo-political reasons and US sanctions on Iran, Pakistan so far has not been able to begin the construction of the pipeline, where as in March 2010, the state Television of Iran stated that it had completed almost 907 km of pipeline construction, and was waiting for India and Pakistan. The project was expected to function completely during 2014.¹⁷ Although in 2009, India withdrew from the project but in March, 2010, India again showed interest in the project. However, Pakistan continued it with Iran and renamed it as IP Gas or Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. India's civil-nuclear deal, political turmoil in Pakistan and new sanctions on Iran pushed India out of signing the final deal. Pakistan wants to go ahead with the bilateral agreement with Iran as it is facing a huge energy crisis and mounting public pressure on the government to meet the energy deficit. Both Iran and Pakistan seem hopeful that India may join the consortium; otherwise, the option of China replacing India is also on the cards. In 2004, China and Iran signed a contract worth US \$ 100 billion for a period of 25 years. Iran is to supply China with gas, and in return, China will help Iran build energy related infrastructure.¹⁸ But, these development commitments are hampered by the on and off US sanctions on Iran and regional political disputes.

In early 2010, officially both Iran and Pakistan agreed to sign a US \$ 7.5 billion pipeline deal, as India was staying out of peace pipeline project. The deal was finalized from both sides, by the Inter State Gas System (ISGS) a semi-autonomous company from Pakistan, and from the Iranian side by the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).¹⁹ In March 2010, officially both Iran and Pakistan signed the Heads of Agreement (HoA) and Operational Agreement in Istanbul. The 'sovereign guarantee' was signed by S.R. Kasaezadeh, Managing Director of the NIOC, and Irshad Kaleemi, Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources.²⁰

During a tripartite summit on Afghanistan's security in 2010, presidents of both Pakistan and Afghanistan endorsed the peace pipeline with Iran for 30 years.²¹ India also asked Iran for a joint meeting of the India-Iran Joint Working Group the same year in New Delhi. In this regard, Indian External Affairs Minister S M Krishna visited Tehran to embark on pipeline gas issue in fear that it will remain out of deal as Iran and Pakistan signed the final deal in March 2010.²² Despite having reservations that it expected to be addressed, the Indian side was optimistic about the finalization of the deal (UPI, March 2010). The willingness of both India and Pakistan to embark on project comes to halt with another round of subsequent US pressure on both countries to isolate Iran during early years of President Obama, and Trump repealing US-Iran deal. The US fears that any kind of deal will help Iran to finance its nuclear program. These international political developments have almost forced Indian side to stay out of the deal. Moreover, India has not only been given relaxation to continue to import oil from Iran but also a reiterating commitment towards its civil nuclear deal by the US. This

one-sided offer has put Pakistan into a zero-sum game, reinforcing its decision to go for the energy project.

Energy Consumption, Strategy and Options for India and Pakistan

The rapid industrial growth and growing population in both India and Pakistan has raised the demand for high energy. Both countries consume more energy than produced. The IPI project is one of the core options for both countries to deal with their increasing energy immediately.²³

India's huge growing economy primarily relies on oil and coal-based fuels.²⁴ It generates almost 50% of its electricity from coal, 32% from oil and rest from natural gas, hydro and nuclear resources. The energy production from coal and oil has stagnated in the last few years and the demand for its economic growth is increasing. India's core strategies are focused on nuclear power projects. Currently, India has 14 nuclear reactors operating commercially while nine are under construction. Existing reactors supply only 3% of India's electricity need, whereas by 2050, all projects will provide nearly 25% of the total electricity.²⁵ Indian owned oil and gas reserves are not enough, while its domestic demand is increasing rapidly. In addition, the capacity of thermal, hydroelectric and nuclear generation is lower than the demand, which has prompted the policy makers to seriously rethink the use of natural gas fuel for the future as the optimal choice to produce electricity.

During 2006, the total domestic demand in India for natural gas was 43 billion cubic meters which rose to 110 billion cubic meters in 2010.²⁶ India was also seriously considering constructing a gas pipeline from Oman, as an agreement was signed in 1994, but the high cost has hampered the project. Furthermore, two other projects went on the shelves as well. The Myanmar project via Bangladesh was dropped due to economic reasons, as well as the Afghan project, which is unlikely due to political instability in Afghanistan. Therefore the IPI is more economical and viable for India to sign the deal.

Despite ongoing energy projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CEPC), Pakistan is currently facing an acute energy short fall. Through the IPI project, Pakistan can not only reduce its natural gas short fall, but can also use this gas pipeline to generate 5,000 megawatt electric power which can potentially address its energy requirements.

Why the Delay in IPI Gas or Peace Pipeline?

The study shows that there have been a myriad of reasons and factors involved in the delay of the project since its inception. Despite all parties realizing that it is politically, economically and environmentally the most feasible project, there are multiple domestic and regional/international issues, which have kept the IPI project from being implemented. These have been discussed below in detail while some issue areas have been touched upon earlier.

Regional/Domestic Hurdles for IPI-Peace Pipeline

The hurdles to the pipeline are varied and related to issues within all three members of the consortium. Firstly, the main reason for the delay is the rivalry between India and Pakistan and the trust deficit between the two. Pakistan initially was not in favor of the IPI gas pipeline as it was considered as a challenge to the status quo in the region.

Secondly, India has also been reluctant as it is skeptical of the security of the pipeline in Balochistan. India considers Balochistan as the home of many terrorist outfits while Baloch grievances and their opposition may also put the pipeline in jeopardy.²⁷ India fears that in case of any crisis with Pakistan, the pipeline may be cutoff, which will worsen the economy and energy condition and escalate more tension in the region. The situation worsened in 2016 when Pakistani security agencies arrested an Indian spy Kulbhushan Yadav in Balochistan. He has been charged for spying for India and conducting other terrorist related activities in the provinces. Pakistan took this issue to multiple regional and international forums including UN General Assembly. Pakistan has consistently blamed India for causing the persistent security threats and chaos in Balochistan by financing and providing support to Baloch militants, who have been attacking Pakistan's domestic gas pipeline, electric grids, transformers, and other public or private properties, the kidnapping and killing of Chinese engineers. Since 2003 almost 100 attacks have been made by Baloch militants and out of 100 some 15 attacks targeted gas installations.²⁸

Thirdly, the issues related to the price of the gas and transit fees has also slowed down the pace of the project. By 2008, Iran was willing to invest and start the project, whereas, the India and Pakistan negotiation process was quite slow.²⁹

International Factor

In addition to the regional and local factors, international considerations have also had an impact on the commencement of the project. Iran's relations with the US is also a hurdle in the implementation of the IPI peace pipeline. The US has concerns about Iran's nuclear program and behavior and has its doubts about the IPI pipeline. The US is concerned at the prospect of Iran gaining political leverage with the construction of the IPI pipeline.³⁰ The US has repeatedly tried to dissuade the Indians and Pakistanis from going ahead with the deal, which seems to be the main reason it has not been implemented.³¹

Since the inception of the program, the US has been trying to lobby for extension of TAP into the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) by including India in the project, so that Iran may be excluded from energy security or energy politics of this region. Indian cabinet also approved TAPI gas pipeline, but the security situation in Afghanistan has become more volatile.³² The US also offered to bring electricity from Tajikistan via Wakhan Corridor in Afghanistan to Pakistan, but again the project is dependent on the security situation in Afghanistan.

Both India and Pakistan understand that the IPI project is a *win-win* situation for both sides but at the same time, both countries also know that it may jeopardize their friendship with the US. It may result in severe economic crisis and penalties for being supportive to Iran. It is also not clear how much pressure Washington is willing to exert on both countries,³³ as the US also needs their support in the region for its own political and economic interests. Iran, however, has also looked into the possibility of China joining the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project.³⁴

Future Prospects

The Asian Development Bank's feasibility report recommended IPI project over the TAPI gas pipeline. There are multi-faceted prospects of the projects. If India and Pakistan collaborate with each other only on single point agenda of energy needs, that includes gas pipeline transit issue and domestic power generation through hydro-projects with amicable solutions of disputes will begin a new prosperous chapter for the entire region and its development. Indian withdrawal from IPI was mainly because of bilateral disputes between India and Pakistan. If disputes are settled between India and Pakistan, the building of this inter-state gas pipeline or energy corridors will strengthen the regional integration and bring down conflict.

Political Impact

The IPI project could help in overcoming the trust deficit between India and Pakistan, and help these countries to move positively towards CBMs. This project could soften the hostility between both countries, and both can take jointly take a step towards stability of region by fighting against terrorism, poverty, economic crisis and emerging environmental challenges. In addition, the IP project can help overcome the differences within Iran and Pakistan over sectarian issues. Pakistan may also assure Iran to curb against terrorist groups like Jundullah, which Iran believes to be operating from Pakistan's Balochistan.

Economic Impact

The IPI project can be an economically feasible project for all the member countries. The population and economic growth requires India and Pakistan a high input of energy supply in the next few decades. India studied all the options to import gas, trading gas through deep waters directly either from Iran or Oman (agreements signed in 1993 & 1994 with both countries), India even proposed to ship LNG in tankers into India, but all options were economically not feasible. Finally, the cost assessment prompted India to drop all other options and accept the land route via Pakistan. Moreover, the companies involved are mostly internal, so employment opportunities will be provided to the local people.³⁵

In addition, Pakistan will earn US \$ 500-600 million per year through transit fees, which will help Pakistan to accrue US \$ 14 billion in 30 years, including US \$ 8 billion in transit fees, US \$ 1 billion in taxes and US \$ 5 billion in savings from IPI gas pipeline project. Pakistan should not lose any opportunity to exploit its geo-strategic

location, regardless of whether the pipeline emanates from the Middle East or from Central Asia or ends in India or China.

Environmental Impact

In recent years, there has been a strong link between energy and environment. The gas pipeline project more importantly carries environmental benefits. The usage of coal is common in South Asia, but it has great environmental repercussions, in contrast, the use of natural gas will lessen the pollution in the atmosphere and produce fewer greenhouse gases. The gas pipeline project is environmentally feasible too, as it will reduce carbon gas emission in big industrial cities like Karachi and Lahore (Pakistan) reducing the impact on global warming.³⁶

Apart from clean air and fuel, another reason for the increasing demand for natural gas, is owing to its efficiency, abundance and existence as clean fuel for burning purpose. Presently, the largest consumer of natural gas is the power sector in global market, as well as in South Asia. More importantly its utility lies in it being more economical and efficient than other non-renewable sources. Table 1 provides a clear picture of the benefits of a natural gas plant in terms of its cost effectiveness, efficiency and the time in which it may be built when compared to either coal or oil fired plants.

Table-1: Comparison of Fuel, Oil, or Coal, Natural Gas: Economic and Utility Benefits

	Capital Cost/Unit Power Generation Capacity	Thermal Efficiency in Terms of %	Construction Period in Terms of Years
Natural Gas Plant	\$ 650/kW	45 - 50	2 - 3
Coal-Fired Plant	\$ 1,300/kW	30 - 35	5
Fuel-oil Fired Plant	\$ 1,000/kW	30 - 35	4

Source: World Bank, 2000

The gas pipeline project will be as beneficial to Pakistan. Nearly 49% of Pakistan's energy consumption is allocated for residential purpose while only 33% is for the industrial sector. Oil is the most used for energy at 43.5 %, whereas natural gas accounts for only 38.3%. Hydro-electric also generates almost 40%, since all water streams are located in the high altitude region in the north of Pakistan it is more expensive to transport energy to the population down south.

Conclusion

The energy security and debates related to this theme have sped up the race between the haves and have-nots. Here haves mean those countries, which have sufficient energy resources and supply, and vice versa. Many developed countries are looking towards alternative energy resources, in order to reduce dependency over oil. The new energy resources would be more economically feasible and more environmental friendly. The case of Pakistan is not different as it is struggling to achieve better energy solutions so that it may fulfill domestic demands as well as boost their

economic activity. For instance, most of Pakistan's textile industry is shutting down due to the short fall of power supply.

The IP project will support Pakistan to produce 5,000 megawatt power. It is the greatest advantage for South Asian countries that they share borders with the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, considered as world's major natural and oil reserve regions. If India would be party of IP, this could help bring India and Pakistan closer to each other, thus the pipeline project could turn into a real source of peace in the region.

In the long run, the entire region can boom its economic growth as Asian Tigers set the examples in the last quarter of 20th Century. If India will join hands in IP, they should go for both IPI and TAPI project.³⁷ Pakistan will import only 20% of its energy requirement via the IP gas pipeline while in the times ahead the need is expected to be doubled. These rising energy demands are catalysts that prompt the member countries to seriously address issues of mutual interest and tackle international pressures of sanctions. This requires the effective role of leadership, political will and commitment to address these issues.

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EARNINGS MANIPULATION AS A DETERMINANT OF COST OF CAPITAL: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF NON-FINANCIAL LISTED COMPANIES IN PAKISTAN

Muhammad Ilyas, Ihtesham Khan and Muhammad Tahir Khan*

Abstract

Management acts to maximize the wealth of shareholder and in addition, concentrated to minimize the cost of capital. However, sometimes management indulges in the manipulation practices of earnings information and such practices reduce the confidence of investors. Moreover, the cost of capital of firms is increasing. Hence, seeking this study investigated to empirically demonstrate that can earnings manipulation act as the determinant of cost of capital in capital market of Pakistan. For this purpose, the study selected 144 sample firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange during 2007-2017. Along with performance matched model for measurement of earnings manipulation, costs of capital is calculated through weighted average cost of capital and also control variables. Moreover, the empirical findings are supported through agency, signaling and bankruptcy cost theories of capital structure. The empirical results demonstrate that when firms engage in earnings manipulation practices then their cost of capital will be high. Thus, the study found that earnings manipulation practices reduce the confidence of investors and they demand higher rate on their investment. Therefore, it is recommended to prepare the financial information according to the corporate governance code of Pakistan to control earnings manipulation practices of management, and get financing at lowest possible cost to increase the wealth of shareholders.

Keywords: Earnings Manipulation, Cost of Capital, Wealth Maximization, Performance Matched Model.

Introduction

Businesses such as Enron, Global Crossing Limited, Parmalat and Health International Holdings collapsed. The failure of these and such other businesses are considered the largest scandals of business world. In the similar vein, Gul and Tsui reported that these scandals declined the level of investors' confidence on the quality of financial reported information.¹ Further, added that earnings manipulation or Earnings Management (EM) masked the true picture of firm financial position. Similarly, Khan reported that businesses failure shattered investors' confidence on reported information.² Moreover, businesses collapses affected developed and developing economies. Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman reported that if management cannot disclose accounting information then information asymmetry is increasing, therefore

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this shatter the confidence of investors'.³ In addition, Habbash demonstrated that such practices of manipulation encourage the business failure.⁴ In addition, Strobl reported that previous literature shows that publically listed companies are highly indulged in these practices.⁵

Moreover, literature report that if the governance system of a country is strong and efficient then management avoids practices of EM. On the other hand, reveals that if management engage in such practices and shatter the confidence of investors then the expected Cost of Capital (CoC) of these firms are increasing. In the similar vein, Patro and Kanagaraj revealed that to make informed decisions accuracy and authenticity of financial information is utmost important.⁶ However, firms' management are involved in EM activities. Hence, literature reveals that on the basis of information asymmetry and manipulation practices of management investors demand higher return. Moreover, previous literature reports that a number of factors motivated management to indulge in EM practices such as Fudenberg and Tirole⁷ concluded that firms make earnings smoothening and Barghathi⁸ demonstrated that management of those companies whose financial position are weak become involved in such practices. Furthermore, Hadani, Goranova and Khan demonstrated that EM adversely affects earnings quality and in addition, information asymmetry increases.⁹ Similarly, the study demonstrated that these practices even negatively affect future performance of firms.¹⁰ On the other hand, studies reported that quality of earnings acts as an important attribute because equity and credit investors take it into consideration before making their decisions.¹¹

Healy and Wahlen define EM as:

"Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers".¹²

In addition, Lambert reported that due to noisy earnings of firms outside investors demand higher return on their investment. Therefore, Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) revealed that disclosed financial information should be accurate and reliable for decision purpose.¹³ Pham, Suchard and Zein (2012) demonstrated if the external monitoring practices are low, then management borrows unnecessary funds and such funds reduced their firms market risk.¹⁴ Therefore, the CoC is also increasing for such firms. Moreover, a small number of studies investigated EM and CoC in developing and developed countries. Therefore, in this study is included sample of publically listed firms on Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) to investigate EM effect on the level of CoC. The CoC plays its important role in the firm decisions such as it helps to choose the hurdle or cutoff rate of the project and alternatively it affect the capital structure of the firms. Moreover, the study observed that CoC presents the efficiency of management that how they utilize firm resources. The CoC is an important factor to investigate because as reported in study of Tran (2014) that it affects the value of firm.

Therefore, in the current study this is asserted that the EM practices affect positively the CoC of Pakistani listed firms.

Literature Review

Modigliani and Miller reported that the capital structure does not affect value of firm and CoC. However, in their subsequent study, Modigliani and Miller reported that corporate tax affects the firm value and cost of capital.¹⁵ In addition, Markopoulou and Papadopoulos concluded that more debts in the capital structure generate advantages for firms in term of tax deduction and maximized value of firms.¹⁶ This current study is based on the cost based theories such as the agency costs, bankruptcy and signaling cost theories. Agency cost theory demonstrates that it reduces conflict of interests. Moreover, capital encourages management to utilize the firm resources in an efficient way. Furthermore, literature reveals that creditors having the power to monitor management activities, hence they avoid manipulation of accounting information and ultimately increases quality of such information. In addition, reported that if information is truly presented then it conveys positive signal into the market participants and they used authentic information in their decisions. Therefore, investors demand lower rate of return on their investments and firms pay lowest CoC. In the similar vein, reported that Heinkel reported that more debts in capital structure increase chances of bankruptcy.¹⁷ However, if information reported is true and accurate then the level of CoC is low because the chances of bankruptcy are lower in this situations and investors demand low rate of returns.

Earnings Management and Cost of Capital

Kim and Sohn studied EM and CoC in US listed firms and conclude that EM positively affect the CoC due to the management involvement in opportunistic EM practices.¹⁸ Hence, such unrealistic information added in the record of firms financial reports and ultimately, chances of losses increase. Therefore, investors increase their required rate of return and firms CoC are increased. In addition, Strobl reported that EM and CoC are significantly associated.¹⁹ However, others find that EM and CoC are inversely and significantly related. Thus, concluded that association of EM and CoC is still controversial. Furthermore, positive relationship of CoC and EM shows that uncertainty increases due to manipulation activities of management and therefore, investors confidence on reported information is reduced. However, negative association of EM CoC shows that debts act as a tool of monitoring mechanism, hence to increase investors' confidence management is involved to produce quality information. Moreover, it is reported that the quality information reduces the level of CoC. Therefore, it is concluded that there is still required further investigation to demonstrate an accurate causal relationship between EM and CoC in developed and developing capital markets listed companies. Hence, current study investigates this role of EM as a determinant of CoC in capital market of Pakistan in a developing economy perspective.


Others investigated cost of equity and debts with EM instead of CoC. Such as relationship of EM and cost of equity is examined in Indonesian listed companies and

revealed that EM positively and significantly affects the cost of equity.²⁰ Similarly, concluded that EM and CoC are positively related.²¹ Furthermore, Ben-Nasr and Al-Dakheel investigated the earnings quality impact on cost of equity in a sample of privatized firms of industrialized and developing economies.²² The results revealed that firms of lower earnings quality have the higher cost of equity. Similarly, Bhattacharya et al. investigated EM and cost of equity in cross countries.²³ For this purpose, selected sample of 34 countries and the results demonstrated that increase in EM practices increases firms cost of equity. This positive association shows that the fake information deceives the investors and they demand high returns. However, other studies reported negative association of EM and cost of equity.²⁴ Finally, concluded that EM and cost of equity still require research to clearly determine their association in a developing country such as Pakistan.

In addition, earnings manipulation and cost of debt is investigated, such as EM and cost of debts in a sample of banking industry of 85 countries are examined and revealed that EM and cost of debts are positively associated.²⁵ Finally, the literature review demonstrates that area of earnings manipulations and CoC needs attention to explore in developing countries like Pakistan.

Conceptual Framework

In current study developed the conceptual framework after review of previous literature and empirical investigations in this area. This framework shows the impact of EM and other control variables on CoC of non-financial firms listed on PSX. Moreover, EM is proxied through performance matched model, CoC is measured through Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC). In addition, shows control variables like firm size, capital structure, performance, market risk, capital expenditures and the ratio of operating cash flows to total assets.



Control Variables of the Study

Characteristics of a firm affect EM practices such as capital structure and firm size and performance.²⁶ In addition, capital expenditures, market risk and Cash Flows from Operation (CFO) activities are used as control variables. Previous studies used total assets logged value as proxy of firms' size. In addition, they concluded that management of large size firms faces more pressure. Therefore, they reported more predictable earnings.²⁷ Moreover, they reported that performance of firms indicates management ability of efficiently utilizing resources of firms. Return of Assets (ROA) is used as proxy of firm performance.²⁸

Results and Discussions

Descriptive Statistics

Table-1: Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Mean	Median	St. Dev	Minimum	Maximum
EM	-0.018	-0.012	0.841	-1.799	1.893
CoC	1.560	1.11	3.123	-5.037	9.742
CS	0.551	0.559	0.222	0.007	0.999
Size	6.842	6.786	0.629	5.336	8.392
CE	0.708	0.716	0.335	0.000	0.932
ROA	0.063	0.057	0.112	-0.539	0.297
CFO	0.088	0.066	0.133	-0.193	0.39
Beta	0.741	0.744	0.614	0.976	1.997

Table-1 reports the descriptive statistics of dependent, independent and control variables. It explains the nature of data PMM minimum value is -1.799 and its maximum value is 1.893. Moreover, its mean and median values are -0.018 and -0.012 respectively, its standard deviation is low and therefore, variation in the series from its mean value is low. These results show that listed firms on PSX follow same procedures of accounting information reporting practices and manipulation practices of management are not high in these firms. Similarly, the descriptive statistics report the minimum and maximum level of series. Range of maximum and minimum values of CoC is low, hence the investors' trust on financial market is high and they demand low rate of return on their investment. Its mean and median values are closely associated. In addition, the study finds that the capital structures show that Pakistani listed companies to a high level rely on debt instead of equity financing. Furthermore, size of sample firms show that these firms are not too much different. Similarly, CE results of descriptive reveals that sample firms of the study have the opportunity to expand their businesses because of favorable business environment. Moreover, performance descriptive statistics reveals that on average all firms show positive performance. CFO results show that sample firms of PSX generate more cash. It conveys positive signal to the capital market about industries and economy performance of Pakistan. Moreover, find that market risk of sample firms is less than the market risk.

Correlation Analysis

Table-2: Correlation Results

	EM	CoC	LEV	ROA	Size	Beta	CFO	CE
EM								
CoC	0.038							
CS	0.065	-0.217						
ROA	-0.071	-0.106	-0.482					
Size	0.218	-0.285	0.036	0.048				
Beta	0.081	0.768	0.179	-0.182	-0.2875			
CFO	-0.033	-0.023	-0.239	0.534	0.0303	-0.071		
CE	-0.174	-0.058	0.265	0.213	0.2169	0.057	0.0367	

Table-2 presents correlation results such as EM is negatively related with CE, CFO and firm performance. This negative association between CE and EM shows that if firms having the opportunities to expand their business then they cannot manipulate information of earnings. This negative association is same as reported in the study of Conyon & He.²⁹ Moreover, ROA is negatively associated with EM and it shows that if firms perform highly then their management indulges less in EM practices. Furthermore, negative relationship of CFO and EM shows that if firms generate more CFO then manipulation practices are low in such firms. These findings are consistent with the research study of Jiang as mentioned above. However, association of capital structure and size with EM is positive. Positive association of capital structure and earnings management is same as reported other studies. Moreover, results show that if size of firms is large then they involve to a great extent in EM because such the reported information is more complicated as compared to small size companies. These findings are same as other studies.³⁰ Further, it reports that EM is positively related to CoC. These findings show that firms whose management are involved in EM then CoC are expected to be high because investors' cannot have trusted on reported information. Hence, they demand a higher rate of return.

In the similar vein, capital structure, ROA and size are inversely related with CoC. Association of capital structure and CoC is same as reported by Claessens.³¹ The negative relationship of CoC and ROA reports that if profit of sample companies is high then chances of bankruptcy are low and ultimately, the CoC becomes low. Moreover, it reveals that large firms finance their businesses at lowest possible CoC as compared to small firms.

Empirical Results

Table-3: Diagnostic Test Results

Tests	test values	
	p-values	
F-test		
F-value	1122.11	0.000 **
Hausman test		
	12.48	0.126
Breusch and Pagan test		
	30.30	0.000 **

Note: diagnostic test results of panel data techniques recommend that the appropriate model is random effect for analysis. ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.1$.

Table-3 reports appropriate model selection of panel data. The results report that the suitable model is the random effect model.

Table-4: Random Effect Model Results

Dependent Variable (CoC)			
Variables	Coefficient	z-statistic	p-value
Constant	9.300	9.11	0.000
EM	0.140	2.24	0.025*
Beta	3.740	39.04	0.000**
LEV	-1.840	-4.85	0.000**
CE	-0.130	-0.67	0.502
ROA	-1.734	-2.78	0.005**
CFO	-0.663	-1.25	0.213
Size	-0.534	-3.84	0.000**
Adjusted R-Square	60.43%		
F-Statistic		261.34 (p-value 0.000***)	

Table-4 presents that EM significantly and positively affects the CoC of companies listed on PSX. Hence, these findings demonstrate that when management is involved in earnings manipulation then perception of investors is high about risk level. Therefore, they demand a higher return from management on their investment. Similar results are found in the other studies.³² Similarly, when management indulge in activities of EM then it reduces the level of investor protection. Therefore, CoC of such companies are increased. Moreover, market risk and CoC of sample firms are positively related. Previous literature supports these findings that as the level of market risk are positively associated with the required rate of return, and alternatively the positive association between risks and return act as an accelerator between risk and CoC.

Capital structure of Pakistani sample firms is negatively and significantly associated with the CoC. Moreover, the findings reveal that CE of sample firms negatively and insignificantly affects the level of CoC. It shows that when firms make more investment in CE then investors expect that businesses are expanded and they generate more funds to pay their obligations. Thus, they are willing to get low rate of return on their investment. Furthermore, it demonstrates that when management makes investment in such projects which have a positive NPV, then in such firms' investors place soft conditions and CE reduces the level of CoC of firms. Further, it reveals in the current study that ROA and CoC are significantly associated but their relationship is negative. These findings show that if the firms favorably perform and generate more returns on their assets then risk level is reduced and confidence of investors increases. Therefore, they cannot demand for a higher return on their investment. Furthermore, it reported that CFO negatively but insignificantly affects the level of CoC. Moreover, it concludes that CFO controls the differences in terms of performance of firms because this study selected sample firms from different sectors. The negative association of these variables demonstrates that firms that generate more cash flow from their operating activities can attract more investors to investment and in such situation they can make investment at lowest possible CoC. Further, concluded that the high level of cash flow from operations demonstrated that the expected profit of firms will increase. Therefore, firms whose performance is high face lesser uncertainty and in turn, shareholders demand a lower return on equity investment and cost of equity becomes reduced. Moreover, the bankruptcy theory supports these findings that creditors trust is high in these sample firms. In addition, it concluded that firms that need new loans, these loans convey signal to market that expected cash flows are high because from future cash flows management fulfills debt obligations. Hence, the findings of this study are supported by the signaling theory of CoC. Similarly, the results of current study are further supported by agency theory of CoC. Habbash (2010) reveals that when firms generate more cash flow from operations then their management's involvement in practices of earnings manipulation is reduced. Therefore, level of CoC is declines. Further, it finds that the size of firms significantly and negatively affects the CoC of sample firms listed on PSX. In addition, concludes that large size firms finance their investment from external financing at low cost as compared to small firms. Finally, it demonstrates that the value of adjusted R-square report that independent variables of this study explained variation in CoC up to 60.43% and F-statistic shows that the model is significant and valid therefore used for analysis.

Conclusion

The current examined to empirically determine that EM act as the determinant of CoC in the context of Pakistan as a developing country. For this purpose, it used a sample of 144 listed companies on PSX during 2007-2017. For EM, the study used the performance matched model of Kothari, Leone and Wasley.³³ and used WACC as proxy of CoC. Moreover, control variables were used in this study that can affect the level of CoC. For analyses, the study used the panel data approaches and the diagnostics tests results recommended that the appropriate model is random effect for this study. The final results recommended that firms that are engaged in EM practices find that their

CoC are high. Therefore, the study recommends to management of firms to not indulge such activities to get external financing at lower possible cost and to increase the value of their firms. Moreover, it recommended to management of Pakistani listed companies to adopt and implement the corporate governance code in true spirit and to encourage investors to invest at lowest possible CoC.

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