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Disclaimer

The contents of this 'Journal' are writers' personal views. The statements, facts and opinions by the authors in the Margalla Papers do not imply the official policy of the National Defence University and Editors or the publishers.

MESSAGE OF PATRON-IN-CHIEF

In an environment of rapidly transforming geopolitical realities, a constant and timely reckoning of policy substitutes is necessary to evaluate the veracity of present course of action. South Asia has long been a sensitive region, destabilized by the complexities arising out of international power play, bitter internal and mutual conflicts and hindered growth despite its enormous economic potential. Thriving in such an environment poses a huge challenge to Pakistan whose frontline status has often embroiled it in situations detrimental to its core interests.

The demands of desired progress entail a delicate strategic balancing and intricate policy maneuvers. It is incumbent upon the cognoscente to acquaint the decision-makers of the eminent potentialities in order to adjust to the shifting sands of regional and international phenomena. Fortunately, our intelligentsia is alive to this obligation and fully perceptive of the portents of future changes.

I congratulate the Editorial team of "*Margalla Papers*" for providing a platform that affords an uninhibited intellectual discourse aimed at situational and policy assessment. My appreciation is also due towards the contributors for their incisive inquisition into the thorny labyrinth of foreign relations which has made this publication a valuable study into geostrategic evolution. I sincerely hope that in its coming issues, "*Margalla Papers*" will emerge as a dependable source of creditable opinion on matters of national and international significance.

**Lieutenant General
Aamer Riaz, HI(M)
President National Defence University**

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In the background of emerging global challenges, Pakistan is actively playing the role of a responsible nation to maintain peace in the region. Though our country is confronting with both internal and external variegated challenges yet we believe that days are not far ahead when we will achieve the ultimate destination of peace and stability both on the economic and social platforms. Pakistan Army has successfully met the target of defeating terrorism and militancy within the county by virtue of unprecedented professionalism coupled with the sacrifices which have been acknowledged by all nations in the world. The current operation '*Radd-ul-Fasaad*' to eliminate terrorists across Pakistan will prove peacemaker for the society and pacemaker for the economy; with special reference to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. We believe in peaceful coexistence and expect of all our neighbours' to honour our peaceful existence in the region. We strongly condemn all shapes of aggression and extremism and respect the integrity and sovereignty of our neighbors'.

Our professionalism and commitment which we have displayed during our war on terror has been acknowledged by the international power-players. This capability and performance of Pakistan Army remains unprecedentedly unique in the world. No doubt our achievements would not have been possible without the support of our nation.

The latest edition of *Margalla Papers*, offers a panorama of defence and security related strategic issues with the solution oriented objective judgments and views of various scholars in the relevant fields. The objectivity and impartiality is commendable. The peer reviewers and editorial boards deserve appreciation.

**Major General
Asif Ali, HI (M)
Director General
Institute for Strategic Studies Research and Analysis**

AN INSIGHT INTO ROHINGYA THE UNWANTED PEOPLE

*Dr. Asma Shakir Khawaja, Ms. Asma Hussain Khan and Adnan Jamil**

Abstract

Rohingya conflict, a term widely in use since 1950s, is a multidimensional crisis generally interpreted as a religious clash between the Buddhists and Muslims of Myanmar's western Rakhine state. The world, and especially the Muslim nation, is incensed at what is portrayed as genocide against Muslims in Myanmar. Nevertheless, the ground realities leading to this identity-centric hybrid war are a lot more complex. The issue has many aspects, including far deeper internal factors. Myanmar has undergone significant changes since the new state and region structures were created under the 2008 Constitution. The country is still going through further reforms to align its new political structures with broader governance, peace and decentralization processes. Rohingya crisis is one such national reform that Myanmar government sees critically to the future endeavours. This paper gives an insight into the real status of Rohingya crisis.

Keywords: Rohingya, Crisis, Constitution, Reforms, Ethno-Religious.

Introduction

Burma renamed as Myanmar, in 1989, by military Junta, is the largest country in mainland Southeast Asia. Situated at the cross-roads between India and China, Myanmar was once a province of India, divided into Lower Burma and Upper Burma, each with further divisions and districts.¹ The then province detached from India as a separate crown colony in 1937 (April, 1st). However, during WWII it went under Japan occupation (1942-1945) and it was then that the Rohingya and Burmese Muslims were recruited to force back the Japanese invasion.² The country eventually came under British colonial rule.

Myanmar gained independence in 1948 (January, 4th) as a democratic nation. Since the day, there had been a constant unrest between the country's ethnic minorities and the central authority, which kept the region into a state of emergency. The country was divided into 7 divisions to bring stability, which eventually led to the implementation of martial law in 1962 that lasted till 2010.

*Dr. Asma Shakir Khawaja is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Government and Public Policy, Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad, Ms. Asma Hussain Khan is the first practicing Psychologist of Religion in Pakistan and Adnan Jamil is lecturer at the Department of Leadership and Management Studies, Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad.

Under the constitution of 2008, the divisions were converted into seven regions and semi-autonomous states, each allocated to a particular ethnic group.³ Constitutionally equivalent, regions are the areas largely inhabited by the Burmans (or Bamar) who form about 2/3 of the total population. Burman is the major ethnic group of Myanmar, who have the control over the military and the government. States, on other hand, include the areas inhabited by ethnic minorities, that make the remaining 1/3 of the total population located along resource-rich border areas and hills of Myanmar.

Despite the changes and amendments in administrative divisions over time, Myanmar has suffered from the decades of mismanagement, which has led to political isolation and economic sanctions in the country. Myanmar is ranked as one of the poorest and least developed country by the UN.⁴ GDP growth rate has slowed down to 6.4% in 2016 compared to 7.3% in the 2015. Inflation eased, but the current account deficit has worsened.⁵ Ministry of Commerce data shows Myanmar's trade deficit in 2016-17 "at around US \$ 5.5 billion, with exports lagging behind imports at US \$ 11.6 billion and US \$ 17.2 billion, respectively".⁶ "Poorly enforced employment standards, rampant child labor, land-grabbing concerns, and an economy dominated by cronies of the former military regime and companies under the control of the Ministry of Defence" are few further barriers to development and foreign investment in the country, says Wong Kyin Pyu in his interview with The Myanmar Times.⁷ Adding to it, there is Myanmar's narcotic trade that makes a significant place on the list of major concerns, with serious implications for the economy and public health.⁸ This together deepens the tension in people that has often erupted into communal conflicts.

In the predicament, Myanmar has become the second largest and fastest growing aid recipient (after Philippines) in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, with her low population densities in the region (about 52 million), a prime strategic location at the crossroads of Asia, abundant natural resources, fertile land with significant agricultural potential,⁹ and a long coastline, Myanmar has favourable circumstances to lure foreign investors with her wide-ranging investment opportunities.¹⁰ If availed, the country has the potential to re-establish her economy in the region. Although Myanmar is situated at a strategic location with effective regulatory and adequate infrastructure,¹¹ Rohingya crisis remains a crucial challenge to her success. Hence, Myanmar is going through reforms to align its new policies with broader governance, peace and decentralization processes. If managed well, the estimation of Asian Development Bank says "it could quadruple the size of its economy, to more than \$200 billion in 2030".¹² Rohingya crisis is one such national reform that Myanmar government sees critical to the future of Myanmar. Let us have a deeper look into Rakhine State and its inhabitants, Rohingya.

Rakhine State

The Rakhine state (formerly Arakan) is situated in the West coastal region, surrounded by the mountain range in her east, and in the Bay of Bengal in the southwest. The state shares her border with Bangladesh from the northwest. It has 5 districts and 17 townships,¹³ with similar administrative structures in townships.

However, the main troublesome areas are chiefly in northern Rakhine townships namely Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung- which have more restrictive administrative procedures.¹⁴

Despite being rich in natural resources, “Rakhine State is Myanmar’s least developed state with the poverty rate of 78% against the national average of 37.5%”, as estimated by the World Bank.¹⁵ According to the last data released in 2014 by the Department of Population, the estimated population of Myanmar was 3,188,963,¹⁶ characterized by widespread poverty, absence of an infrastructure including lack of education and employment opportunities, and its impact on income generation. One in three women are victim of domestic violence, while, one in five women are susceptible victims of rape or attempted rape over the course of lifetime.¹⁷ Besides, the weakest infrastructure, Rakhine State is vulnerable to natural disasters.¹⁸ Additionally, it faces prolonged internal displacement mainly because of the communal violence there, which is a huge barrier to investment too.

Communal Violence

Many diverse ethnic groups live in Rakhine State, with Buddhist being recognized as the most dominant ethnic group. After Buddhist, Rohingyas form the second largest ethnic community of Rakhine State. Rohingya people, historically also termed as Arakanese Indians,¹⁹ are Muslims in majority, while the minority include Animist and Hindu as well.²⁰ There were an estimated 1.1 to 1.3 million (85–90% of total population) Rohingya who lived in Myanmar before the 2016-17 crisis,²¹ chiefly in the northern Rakhine townships; a troublesome areas.²² However, under citizenship law of 1982, the Rohingyas are denied country’s citizenship,²³ and under 1985 law they are not recognised as one of the country’s 135 ethnic groups (national races).²⁴ The issue is not limited to the discrimination but worst, government of Myanmar even refuses to acknowledge their existence by name.²⁵ In 2014 census they were forced to identify themselves as “Bangali”.²⁶ Despite the clear traces of Rohingya history to the 8th century,²⁷ Myanmar Buddhists claim the inherited legacy of the long-standing Kingdom of Mrauk U, and view Rohingyas as colonial settlers. According to the UN special investigator on Myanmar Yanghee Lee, Rohingya identity crisis as a deliberate action: “the country wants to expel its entire Rohingya population”.²⁸

This denial of identity actually means the denial of basic rights; from education to civil service jobs Rohingyas are deprived of their basic civil rights.²⁹ The unemployment rate of the state is 10.4% excluding the Muslim population, which according to the IOM Report is more than three times the national average.³⁰ Unemployment crisis has forced IDPs and other vulnerable people to migrate to the neighbouring states and regions for work as day labourers, or to flee to neighbouring countries. Seasonal migration to other villages or towns is also common.³¹ Although it is not just Rohingya Muslims, Rakhine people in general is afflicted by the low socioeconomic circumstances which force them to struggle for very basic services. However, Rohingyas are at its verge.³² Subsequent Myanmar governments have exercised discriminatory practices against the Rohingya. This culture of poor

infrastructure, widespread poverty, and a lack of employment opportunities are worth noticing factors that intensify the tension between Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims of Rakhine State, leading to conflicts over decades.

The conflicts hit its first peak in 2012 that forced thousands of Muslim families to either seek asylum in the refugee camps on Myanmar's territory, or flee to Bangladesh.³³ The state went under a state of emergency back then for four years. Scores of people were reported to have been killed and tens of thousands displaced, mostly Rohingya.³⁴ Yet another series of riots ebbed in 2016 on military response of the country's authorities in Rakhine resulting into between 2,000 and 3,000 deaths, Denmark-based European Rohingya Council (ERC) reported.³⁵

Since late August, "nearly 40 percent of Rohingya villages had been targeted by the army in so-called *clearance operations*, with 176 out of 471 villages emptied of people, and an additional 34 villages partially abandoned," government spokesperson Zaw Htay stated.³⁶ According to International Organization for Migration (IOM) report, about 515,000 Rohingyas have fled to Bangladesh, and UNHCR estimated them over 900,000 in total who have fled en mass to neighbouring countries.³⁷

The majority of migrants from Rakhine State travel rather illegally. In 2007, Rakhine had a low rate of out-migration (31 per 1,000) and the lowest gross migration rate (36 per 1,000), mostly to other countries such as Thailand, Malaysia and China. Following the Cyclone Giri³⁸ in 2010 and communal violence of 2012, this mass departure of Rakhine people accelerated which increased their vulnerability to human trafficking and exploitation as well.³⁹ Due to the lack of legal channels for migration and unavailability of authorised documentation, many choose to travel through Bay of Bengal with assistant of migrant smugglers. Consequently, human trafficking has become an acute regional issue in Rakhine State. There remains a high risk for these migrants to drown at sea or become the victims of trafficking networks.⁴⁰ Andaman Sea/Bay of Bengal crisis is one such example that highlights the scale of the human rights abuses, migrants are routinely subjected to.⁴¹ Besides, the risks of irregular cross-border migration at stake, people still prefer it as they are left with no choice.

Aung San Suu Kyi Stance

Myanmar has a long history of oppression against a voice of freedom, even if it is a simple demonstration for education reforms or land confiscations.⁴² It is because "the authorities rely on a range of draconian laws to silence and lock up 'critics,'" Patel says, "as long as these laws remain on the books, arbitrary arrests and detentions are likely to continue."⁴³ Nobel Peace Laureates Suu Kyi (1991) herself is a former prisoner of conscience. She led her party NLD to a win in 2015 election, first openly contested election in 25 years. Appointed as state counsellor at a crucial stage in Rakhine history, there are concerns over how Suu Kyi's NLD-led government be able to break the ice.⁴⁴

There is a lot of confusion about the whole issue in Rakhine State. On one hand there are numerous allegations of abuses by the armed forces, based on the videos viral on social media showing soldiers beating civilians they suspect of being linked to

an ethnic armed group. On the other hand, Suu Kyi declined any claims of ethnic operation,⁴⁵ and reaffirmed her political stance “there is no ethnic or religious war taking place in the Rakhine state”.⁴⁶ She addressed it as a Muslim catastrophe (Muslims killing Muslims) resulting into exodus, which her government is trying to find “why”, to amend at priority.⁴⁷ In response to the international pressure, her stance remained, “What exactly is it that they are condemning?”⁴⁸ Not to forget when she said, “Let me be clear that I would like to be seen as a politician, not some human rights icon,” shortly after her release from house arrest in 2010. She is thus a politician who instead believes is doing best to take forward the peace process.⁴⁹ She self-claimed “peace process” is leading to peace for whom, is a pitfall in the pursuit of real peace. Many high-profile influencers have also publicly criticised Aung San Suu Kyi for her stance throughout the course but her response has remained clear and constant: she appealed for international understanding but said her country did not fear international scrutiny.⁵⁰

In her speech on September 19, 2017 to the international community, she commented for the first time on Rohingya situation after the August 2017 crisis, emphasizing upon the complex situation the country is in due to decades of neglect, which her nascent democratic government is working hard to rectify systemically and strategically.⁵¹ Nevertheless, we observe that she is not only challenged by foreign observers and rights’ advocates on remaining ignorant of the issue at stake,⁵² she has been criticised by her country’s Buddhist nationalist movement as well for her leniency towards Muslims.⁵³

Nevertheless, Aung San Suu Kyi has won support from some world leaders, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi included. President Modi has offered his full support to her, which is viewed by the experts as New Delhi’s strategic position to protect its ties with Myanmar. Though India has extended assistance for Rakhine, it has taken a strong stand on the influx of about 40,000 Rohingya over the years, vowing last month to deport them all.

An Insight

Research shows that the country is going through a lot of simultaneous transition, most importantly in her governing system that has taken a shift from an authoritarian military system to democratic governance, and redirecting her economy to a market-oriented economy. In addition to the new democratic government is straining to bring the century old conflict in its ethnic group of border areas to peace.⁵⁴ Western countries and China see Myanmar as a gateway for east and west, and Myanmar has signaled their willingness to strengthen their ties with China.⁵⁵ This new advancement in China-Myanmar relationship is seen by experts as the reasons Rohingya crisis is fanned by external global players.⁵⁶ However, the focus of this paper remains to restore situation of Rohingya in Rakhine State and, of course, control the outflow of refugees from that region.

Although the Rohingya Muslims’ conflict has been cast in religious terms,⁵⁷ there is no obvious semblance against government on Rohingya’s part as a religious community. The government, however, has often expressed a definite ethnic semblance

against Rohingya which appear unresolvable either by force or separation. Hence, it should be remembered that Rohingya crisis is not a religious conflict between Rohingya Muslims and the central government, but the weak policy which discriminates between inhabitants and exasperates conflict and differences in all aspects, including religion.

The discrimination against ethnic minorities is not a new phenomenon. They have difficulty accessing basic civilian rights around the world, which is mainly because of the minority rights are not adequately protected under constitution. Moreover, it is worth noticing here that none in the world are stateless or identity-less like Rohingya. "The Muslims in Rakhine constitute the single biggest stateless community in the world" stated Kofi Annan, Chair Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, on the very first page of his report.⁵⁸ Under its term, the Rohingya identity cause is just and legal. So far, unfortunately, Rohingyas are maintained to be Bangladeshi nationals. Although the term 'Rohingya' gained political connotation only after 1950s, their existence and strong influence has been present in Rakhine since the 8th century. They are as much rightful to be the native to Myanmar as any other ethnic group residing there.

Recent democratic reforms, after decades of military rule, have altered little for the Rohingya. Even as Junta frees hundreds of political prisoners, opens the economy and prepares to share power through elections, Rohingyas are still prevented under 1982 law from basic human rights.

Clear Policy by Bangladesh

Rohingya Muslims migration en mass to Bangladesh started back in 1978 with the launch of crackdown named "Operation King Gragon". The then Major General Zia-ur-Rahman, founder of the main opposition party BNP, ordered for issuing passports to these immigrants. In 1982, soon after Bangladesh's proposed policy, Myanmar government of the time revoked Rohingya Muslims nationality by law and made them officially stateless. Upon request from the Saudi government of the time,⁵⁹ Major General Zia-ur-Rahman and Pakistan president General Zia-ul-Haq, promised the Saudi King that they would give passports to the Rohingyas.⁶⁰

In an interview with Dhaka Tribune, Bangladesh Foreign Minister Dipu Moni reflected on a historical event which she sees as a mistake by the then government. She stated: "Pakistan gave them passports with a BM [Burmese Muslims] code without having recognised them as Pakistan nationals, whereas, Bangladesh issued them passports with Bangladeshi nationality. That was not only a historic mistake, but an offence too". She said that her government is trying to amend it.⁶¹ Saudi foreign minister had also requested Bangladesh to issue a document that may strip the Rohingyas of Bangladeshi nationality. Clarifying her government's stance on this sensitive issue, Dipu Moni implied, "We do not want the Rohingya Muslims to suffer, but they must forego Bangladeshi nationality,"⁶² Rohingya immigrants are a huge burden to Bangladesh's economy. With the population of 1,252 people per sq. km of land (2016),⁶³ Bangladesh hardly has enough land and resources to accommodate the migrants.⁶⁴ Although Bangladesh has set refugee camps close to Myanmar border but it is no less than a death chamber against habitation because of the extreme weather and

topographical conditions.⁶⁵ Keeping the circumstances upfront, Bangladesh will have to come up with a clear policy that may amend their previous mistakes and weak stance towards the sensitivity of the real cause.

Call for Restraint

Peace-building begins with enhancing the moral-political climate which necessitates empowering the weak, and providing necessary aid to hapless people. Myanmar government shall take necessary steps to stop the illegal flow and mass emigration of Rohingyas to neighbouring countries and reconsider their policy on peace and stability sooner rather than later. It would require to mobilise and excerpt enough international public pressure to influence Myanmar's government policies, especially to change position on its Citizenship Act 1982.⁶⁶

To meet the desired, the identity crisis should be addressed first and foremost, that is, to accept Rohingyas as nationals of Myanmar. Second, their urgent humanitarian needs must be satisfied, who deserve homes and not ghettos or camps they are confined to. The way Rohingyas are marginalized politically, economically and socially is totally inhumane. Either the crisis is planned (as blamed by media) or Rohingya Muslims' extremism turning uncontrollable (as claimed by the Myanmar government), killing of people and pushing them out the borders by dissociating any possible identity -sympathy far apart- with them is clearly not a solution. It is wrong, and everyone is justified for feeling outraged when they believe this is happening, as it plainly is in some Rohingya case. It is rather a strategic immaturity and policy failure on government's part. No doubt it is equally important for the regional countries to have a clear policy towards Rohingya immigrants, specially Bangladesh, and urge Myanmar government to carry out the remedial measures.

NOTES

- ¹ Gwillim law, "Administrative Subdivisions of Countries", (NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1995), pp. 253-54. For map, see: http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs6/MIMU001_A3_SD%20&%20Township%20Overview.pdf
- ² Expressing his insight on the early recruitment of Rohingya, Army Commander Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing quoted to media on September 2, 2017 saying: *It (army) won't ease off its campaign, describing it as 'unfinished business' dating back to World War II. Army was pursuing its patriotic duty to preserve Myanmar's borders and prevent Rohingya insurgents carving out their own territory in northern Rakhine State. We will never let such a terrible occurrence happen again.* "Myanmar Says Clearing of Rohingya Is Unfinished Business From WWII", CETUS News. Available at: <http://www.cetusnews.com/news/Myanmar-Says-Clearing-of-Rohingya-Is-Unfinished-Business-From-WWII-.Bkg5ATeYYb.html>
- ³ Namely: Chin, Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Mon, Shan and Rakhine. Each State is named after the seven largest minority ethnic nationalities in the region. The states are further subdivided into districts and townships.
- ⁴ According to UN, Myanmar stands at 150th out of 195 on the Human Development Index. Available at <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14-report-en-1.pdf>
- ⁵ Asian Development Bank, "Myanmar, unlocking the potential, country diagnostic study", August 2014. Available at <https://www.adb.org/countries/myanmar/economy>
- ⁶ King Wan Chern, "Why the Myanmar economy is slowing, and how it could bounce back", 25 July 2017. <https://www.mmtimes.com/business/26948-why-the-myanmar-economy-is-slowing-and-how-it-could-bounce-back.html>
- ⁷ King Wan Chern, 25 July 2017. Wong Kyin Pyu is executive vice president of Maritime Silk Road Society.
- ⁸ Domestic drug use and drug trafficking in Golden Trangle -bordering Thailand, China and Laos- is a rising problem. Myanmar remains second largest producers of the world's opium, which feeds demand for heroin in China. Myanmar is also a production hub for methamphetamine and ecstasy. Steve Finch & Mong La, *Burma's 'Wild East' Is a Debauched Land of Drugs and Vice That Reforms Forgot*, Mar 09 2014. Available at <http://time.com/17651/burmas-wild-east-is-a-debauched-land-of-drugs-and-vice-that-reforms-forgot/>
- ⁹ Suez Canal opening in 1869 uncovered large tracts of land for cultivation, increasing the demand of Myanmar rice. However, farmers were forced to borrow money from Indian moneylenders to prepare the new land for cultivation. Indian moneylenders gave money at such a high interest rates people often ended up losing their land and livestock. While the country prospered with flourishing economy, the power and wealth remained in few rich hands and the deserving largely failed to reap the rewards. George Orwell's novel "Burmese days" is a fictional account of this time.
- ¹⁰ Myanmar has the economic potential. She is rich in natural resources; she has reserves not only of gemstones (including gold, silver, and platinum), but coal, tin, tungsten, zinc, and copper as well; water is abundant and climatic conditions are favourable. Everything that can make a region ideal for great agricultural growth and economic enhancement. <https://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/setting-pace-country-leading-regional-pack-growth-rates>
- ¹¹ Madani, D.H. and N. Mas-Guix. 2011. The Impact of Export Tax Incentives on Export Performance: Evidence from the Automotive Sector in South Africa. *Policy Research Working Paper* 5585. Washinton, DC. World Bank. p.94
- ¹² McKinsey Global Institute, "Myanmar's moment: Unique opportunities, major challenges", 2013. Also see: <https://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/setting-pace-country-leading-regional-pack-growth-rates>
- ¹³ UNICEF Report on Rakhine State, 2012. Available at: https://www.unicef.org/myanmar/Rakhine_State_Profile_Final.pdf
- ¹⁴ For map, see: http://themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/State_Map_TS_Rakhine_State_MIMU1264v02_02Nov2016_Topo_A1.pdf
- ¹⁵ World Bank staff estimates from 2009-2010 IHLCA survey.
- ¹⁶ "Population and Housing Census of Myanmar, 2014" Census Report vol. 1, p. 6.
- ¹⁷ For details, <http://www.un.org/en/women/endviolence/pdf/VAW.pdf>
- ¹⁸ Natural disasters is another challenge that play its part in migration of people from Rakhine State. In October 2010, Rakhine State was hit by severe cyclonic storm Giri that destroyed about 14,000 homes and displaced more than 71,000 people. 2015 flood is another example, when their harvest was devastated and transportation impeded due to intense rainfall and landslides. Inflation is also a persistent problem and their structural issues keep it high. For details, visit <https://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/setting-pace-country-leading-regional-pack-growth-rates>.
- ¹⁹ Colin Clarke; Ceri Peach; Steven Vertovec (26 October 1990). *South Asians Overseas: Migration and Ethnicity*. Cambridge University Press. p. 46. ISBN 978-0-521-37543-6.
- ²⁰ Andrew Simpson (2007). *Language and National Identity in Asia*. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. p. 267.
- ²¹ "There were at least a million of the Rohingya ethnic group living in Myanmar, most of them Muslim, though some are Hindu." <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41260767>
- ²² Mahmood; Wroe; Fuller; Leaning (2016). "The ROhingya people of Myanmar: health, human rights, and identity". *Lancet*: 1-10. Available at [http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736\(16\)00646-2/fulltext](http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(16)00646-2/fulltext)
- ²³ Leider, Jacques P. "Rohingya: Rakhine and recent Outbreak of Violence: A Note" (PDF), Network Myanmar.
- ²⁴ 1982 Citizenship Law designates three categories of citizens: (1) full citizens, who provide evidence to prove the birthplace and Burmese nationality of ancestors prior to the first British annexation in 1823. This includes nationals from Rakhine State. Failing this, one is classified as an (2) associate citizen if only one (or more) post-1823 ancestors was a citizen of another country. (3) naturalized citizen, who has a parent who was a full citizen and one who was an

associate citizen. According to the terms of the law, only full and naturalized citizens are “entitled to enjoy the rights of a citizen under the law, with the exception from time to time of the rights stipulated by the State.” All forms of citizenship, “except a citizen by birth,” may be revoked by the State. “Burma Citizenship Law”. *Government of Burma*. UNHCR. 15 October 1982. For the Rohingya Muslims from Rakhine State, becoming a registered citizen is almost impossible.

²⁴ <http://www.embassyofmyanmar.be/ABOUT/ethnicgroups.htm>

To add here, Myanmar government does not officially recognise several ethnic groups in the list of 135, including Burmese Indians (2%), Burmese Gurkha, Anglo-Burmese (52,000), Burmese Chinese and Panthay (together 3%).

²⁵ Adam Taylor. “The battle over the word ‘Rohingya’”. Washington Post.

²⁶ “Why Burma Is Trying to Stop People From Using the Name of Its Persecuted Muslim Minority”. Time (magazine). 9th May, 2016.

²⁷ “Discrimination in Arakan”, Vol. 12 (3), Human Rights Watch., May 2000. Also: “Muslim influence in the kingdom of Arakan”, Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO) Arakan, Burma 13 January 2012.

Francis Buchanan-Hamilton historically documented the usage of the term Rohingya in 1799, in an article called “A Comparative Vocabulary of Some of the Languages Spoken in the Burma Empire”, *Asiatic Researches*. The Asiatic Society. 5: 219–240. Among the native groups of Arakan, he wrote are the “Muhammedans” who have long settled in Arakan, and who call themselves *Rooinga*, or natives of Arakan.”

Though the etymological root of the word is disputed, the most widely accepted theory is that *Rohang* derives from the word “Arakan” in the Rohingya dialect and *ga* or *gya* means “from.” By identifying as Rohingya, the ethnic Muslim group asserts its ties to land that was once under the control of the Arakan Kingdom, according to Chris Lewa, director of the Arakan Project, a Thailand-based advocacy group. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-migrant-crisis>

²⁸ “Burmese government accused of trying to ‘expel’ all Rohingya Muslims”. *The Independent*. 14 March 2017.

²⁹ According to IOM Appeal for Rakhine State, “Rakhine State has the lowest percentage of households with access to improved sanitation in the country (48% compared to a national average of 84%), as well as the lowest primary school enrolment rate (71.4% compared to a national average of 87.7%).” IOM Appeal for Rakhine State. Available at: https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/country_appeal/file/IOM-Myanmar-Appeal-April-2016-April-2018.pdf

³⁰ For details, see: Ibid

³¹ For further details, see: Ibid.

³² For further details, see: Ibid.

³³ “The development of the Sino-Myanmar energy project coincided with the intensification of the Rohingya conflict in 2011-2012 when 120,000 asylum seekers left the country escaping the bloodshed.” The situation is even worse for their children born in refugee camps in Bangladesh. As foreigners, they experience discrimination in many ways. For further details, [http://www.ronpaulforums.com/showthread.php?514678-Extremist-Monks-Myanmar-\(Burma\)-faces-anger-from-Muslim-world-over-Rohingya- plight&p=6522031&viewfull=1&styleid=37](http://www.ronpaulforums.com/showthread.php?514678-Extremist-Monks-Myanmar-(Burma)-faces-anger-from-Muslim-world-over-Rohingya- plight&p=6522031&viewfull=1&styleid=37)

³⁴ Thulasi Wigneswaran, “Reconciliation in Rakhine State”, *New Mandala*, 11th Oct, 2016. Available at: <http://www.newmandala.org/reconciliation-rakhine-state/>

³⁵ The Denmark-based European Rohingya Council (ERC) report.

³⁶ Visual explainer of Rohingya 2017 crisis has been documented in maps by Al-Jazeera, available at <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/09/rohingya-crisis-explained-maps-170910140906580.html>. Former President Thein Sein’s spokesperson, Zaw Htay was promoted to deputy director general of the President’s Office under Myanmar’s current National League for Democracy (NLD) government.

³⁷ <http://www.thedailystar.net/world/myanmar-rohingya-refugee-crisis-1%2C000-killed-Myanmar-%20violence-%20un-rapporteur-1459426>. “Over 168,000 Rohingya likely fled Myanmar since 2012”, UNHCR report, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2017/5/59099off4/168000-rohingya-likely-fled-myanmar-since-2012-unhcr-report.html>; “190,000 Myanmar nationals’ get residency relief in Saudi Arabia”, *Al Arabiya English*, available at <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2017/01/25/Over-190-000-Myanmar-nationals-granted-Saudi-residency.html>; Zia Ur Rehman, in his article “Identity issue haunts Karachi’s Rohingya population” states: “Their large-scale migration had made Karachi one of the largest Rohingya population centres outside Myanmar but afterwards the situation started turning against them.” *Dawn*, available at <https://www.dawn.com/news/1165299>.

³⁸ In October 2010, Rakhine State was hit by Cyclone Giri, displacing more than 71,000 people and destroying at least 14,000 homes.

³⁹ https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/country_appeal/file/IOM-Myanmar-Appeal-April-2016-April-2018.pdf

⁴⁰ IOM appeal (Myanmar / Rakhine State) April 2016- April 2018. p.3. Available at: www.iom.int

⁴¹ <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/15/world/asia/burmese-rohingya-bangladeshi-migrants-andaman-sea.html>

⁴² Available at <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa16/3430/2016/en/>

⁴³ Simon Lewis, *TIME | World*, Mar 31, 2016. Available at <http://time.com/4275928/burma-myanmar-civilian-government-challenges/>

⁴⁴ Champa Patel, Amnesty International’s director for Southeast Asia, told TIME.

⁴⁵ “There is no possibility of crimes against humanity, no evidence of ethnic cleansing [of Rohingya],” Vice-President Myint Swe (former military regime’s Chief of Military Security Affairs) stated to reporters on 6 August 2017. Interview available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39507350>.

⁴⁶ Again on September 19 Aung San Suu Kyi speech on “National Reconciliation and Peace”. Full speech available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NJkg2_7zuUo

⁴⁷ Ibid

- ⁴⁸ Suu Kyi interview to BBC's Fergal Keane. BBC News 6 April 2017. Available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39507350>
- ⁴⁹ Full speech available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NJkg2_7zuUo
- ⁵⁰ She said so in her first address to the U.N. General Assembly on 22 September 2016 as national leader. For details see: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-assembly-myanmar-suukyi/in-first-u-n-address-as-leader-suu-kyi-defends-efforts-on-rohingyas-idUSKCN1R2P8?il=0>. And again in her nation televised speech on September 19, 2017.
- ⁵¹ Aung San Suu Kyi speech on "National Reconciliation and Peace" September 19, 2017.
- ⁵² Testimony of Daniel P. Sullivan, "Burma's Brutal Campaign Against the Rohingya", 27 September 2017, pp. 6-8. Available at <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA05/20170927/106434/HHRG-115-FA05-Wstate-SullivanD-20170927.pdf>. Daniel P. Sullivan is Senior Advocate for Human Rights Refugees International. Also see: "Rohingya crisis: Suu Kyi speech criticised by global leaders", 20 September 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41329662>, "The Rakhine State Danger to Myanmar's Transition", 8 September 2017, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/rakhine-state-danger-myanmars-transition>. Bob Geldof handed back his "Freedom of the City of Dublin" award on 13 November 2017, as a gesture in protest over Suu Kyi handling of Rohingya crisis.
- ⁵³ <http://time.com/4275928/burma-myanmar-civilian-government-challenges/>
- ⁵⁴ World Bank, "Myanmar Overview". Available at <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/myanmar/overview>.
- ⁵⁵ "China has very large investments in Rakhine", Mosyakov said. "After the massive Rakhine energy reserves were discovered in 2004 they attracted China's attention. By 2013 China completed oil and natural gas pipelines, which connect Myanmar's port of Kyaukphyu with the Chinese city of Kunming in Yunnan province. The oil pipeline allows Beijing to deliver Middle Eastern and African crude by passing the Malacca Straits, while the gas pipeline is transporting hydrocarbons from Myanmar's offshore fields to China." For details, see: <https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201709051057098493-myanmar-rohingya-energy-china-soros/>
- ⁵⁶ According to deputy director of the Institute for Strategic Studies and Prognosis at the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia Dmitry Mosyakov, it appears that some established global economies are seeking to contain the rapid economic development of ASEA nations, by instigating inner strife within the bloc. <https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201709051057098493-myanmar-rohingya-energy-china-soros/>
- ⁵⁷ Some experts see the crisis as setting with religious dimension staged with a multilateral "humanitarian intervention" following the Kosovo model. As a matter of fact, the conflicts couched in religious terms are more likely to become transformed in value conflicts that often result into mutually conclusive or zero-sum issues lacking a common ground to resolve their differences.
- ⁵⁸ "Towards the Peaceful, Fair and Prosperous Future for the People of Rakhine", *Final Report of the Commission on Rakhine State*, August 2017. Available at: http://www.rakhinecommission.org/app/uploads/2017/08/FinalReport_Eng.pdf
- ⁵⁹ KSA has the largest (2 million) Bangladeshi community among all foreign nationals Around 500,000 Rohingyas are living in Saudi Arabia with Bangladeshi passports, says Expatriates' Welfare Minister Mosharraf Hossain. <http://www.arabnews.com/news/458697>
- ⁶⁰ However, no official record is available regarding the number of Rohingya Muslims who got Bangladeshi passports during that time.
- ⁶¹ See: <http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2013/07/20/rohingyas-in-ksa-must-forgo-bangladeshi-passports/>
- ⁶² <http://www.arabnews.com/news/458697>
- ⁶³ See: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.DNST>
- ⁶⁴ A top Bangladesh government source said. <https://newsin.asia/sushma-swaraj-tells-sheikh-hasina-india-bangladesh-rohingyas/>
- ⁶⁵ "Bangladesh to build one of world's largest refugee camps for 800,000 Rohingya", <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/06/bangladesh-build-worlds-largest-refugee-camps-800000-rohingya>
- ⁶⁶ We second Ambassador Khalid Mahmood's insight on the proposed solution to the issue at skate, that he highlighted in a Round Table Discussion on "The Dilemma of Myanmar's Stateless Rohingyas" organized by MUSLIM Institute on 02 June, 2015 at National Library of Pakistan, Islamabad. <http://www.muslim-institute.org/images/articles/newsletter-speech-khalid-mehmood-rohingyas283.pdf>

COUNTERING INDIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE & STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA

*Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal**

Abstract

India's conventional and nuclear arsenal calibrates the nuclear weapons capability of Pakistan. The Indian Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) program intensifies destabilizing arms race in South Asia. Its deployment certainly increases the reciprocal fear of surprise attack. The logical choice for Pakistan is to build nuclear weapons only that needed for deterrence, instead of entangling in the arms race. Simultaneously, it continues encouraging India to do the same. Hence, Pakistan continues its efforts for constituting Nuclear Restraint Regime in South Asia. Realistically, cataloguing the required strength of the forces to deter the adversary's aggression in the absence of arms control arrangement between the New Delhi and Islamabad is impossible. The continued modernization of both ballistic and cruise missiles is imperative for the credibility of Pakistan's nuclear deterrence that ensures the continuity of strategic stability in South Asia.

Keywords: BMD, Missiles, MIRVs, Arms Race, Stability.

Introduction

The Indian strategic pundits' acclaimed ballistic missile defense systems a central shielding weapon for the cities and forward-deployed forces. Since four decades, therefore, the Indian scientific establishment has been working on its Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program. The stated objective of the Indian BMD policy is to defend against missile strikes from Pakistan and China. The Pakistani defense policy-makers, however, seem convinced that the Indian BMD would only affect the strategic equilibrium between nuclear-armed South Asian states. It would be having little efficacy against Chinese missiles.

India's conventional and nuclear arsenal calibrates the nuclear stockpile of Pakistan. Islamabad immensely relies on ballistic missiles because they provide accuracy and confidence that is not achievable by bombers or submarine-launched missiles.¹ The missiles need a short time to reach the target. In the case of India and Pakistan, either side is capable of striking the adversary's cities within 5 to 10 minutes. The Pakistani strategic analysts opine that ballistic missiles provide an insurance policy

¹Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal is Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

in case of Pakistan's nuclear bomber force would be incapacitated. Therefore, Indian BMD operationalization could undermine Pakistanis confidence in the effectiveness of their ballistic missiles.

The reliability of the BMD system is debatable. "There is no effective defense against these missiles, even though the United States has spent more than 30 years and \$ 500 billion trying to build radars that can track them and interceptor missiles that will shoot them down."² Despite the probability of malfunctioning, Indian military planners are determined to develop and field BMD system. The operationalization of the BMD system would be destabilizer. It would increase the likelihood of deadly miscalculations. Hypothetically speaking, the confidence in missile shield raises the temptation to attempt for a splendid first strike based on the assumption that BMD interceptors can successfully intercept any leftover offensive missiles the adversary could then fire in retaliation.

It was reported Indians are planning to deploy BMD in the next 4-5 years.³ The aim is to defeat Pakistan's nuclear deterrent. Therefore, the modernization and deployment of Indian BMD oblige Pakistan to adopt countermeasures. The latter would embrace new nuclear weapons and delivery system using Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology. Precisely, Indian BMD program progress incites the proliferation of offensive and defensive missile capabilities in the region.

India's BMD program steady modernization germinates three interlinked questions. Where does India's BMD program currently stand? How does Pakistan endure the credibility of its nuclear deterrence capability? What are the ramifications of India's BMD program on the strategic stability in South Asia? The following discussion is an attempt to answer these questions. It proceeds in three substantive parts. The first section spells out the prowess of Indian BMD program. This is followed by practical and normative Pakistan's countermeasures to endure the strategic stability in South Asia. The third section summarizes the debate on Indian BMD program ramifications for the Strategic Stability in South Asia.

India's BMD Program

India's Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) contemplated to develop indigenous BMD program in 1983, but the substantial development on the project started in the mid-1990s.⁴ Currently, "India is pursuing a two-tiered missile defense shield. To that end, it is constructing the Prithvi Air Defense to address high-altitude threats and the Ashwin Advanced Air Defense interceptor program for low-altitude threats."⁵ It has planned to develop lower- and upper-tier systems for air and missile defense applications that enable to track and destroy incoming hostile missiles both inside (endo) and outside (exo) of the earth's

atmosphere. It is also aspiring for longer-range exo-atmospheric interception capability.⁶ “With the successful testing of the Prithvi Air Defense missile in 2007, India became only the fourth country to have developed a functioning ballistic missile defense system, ahead even of China.”⁷ India’s prominent scientist Dr. V K Saraswat is of the view, “within three years major cities such as Delhi and Mumbai would be under a protective shield. A country, which has a small arsenal, will think twice before it ventures.”⁸

The current DRDO's BMD project is aimed to produce a two-tiered BMD system. The two-layer ballistic missile defense shield comprises the Prithvi Air Defense (PAD) system and Advanced Air Defense. The former provides long-range high-altitude ballistic missile interception during an incoming missile's midcourse phase, and the latter offers short-range, low-altitude defense against missiles in the terminal phase of their trajectory.⁹ The DRDO conducted a successful test of an Advanced Area Defense (AAD); endo-atmospheric missile capable of intercepting incoming target missile at an altitude of 15 to 25 km range on March 1, 2017. It had tested the exo-atmospheric interceptor missile in January 2017.¹⁰ The DRDO is “currently testing a successor to the PAD—the Prithvi Vehicular Defense—with greater range and speed, and a maximum interception altitude approaching that of US THAAD system.”¹¹ The missile interceptors “are cued onto their targets by giant Swordfish Long-Range Tracking Radars, an indigenously built derivative of the Israeli Green Pine radar.”¹² It was reported in August 2017 that New Delhi had decided to install its BMD system at two villages—Alwar and Pali—in the western state of Rajasthan.¹³ The deployment of the BMD system in Rajasthan very close to Pakistani border alarms Pakistani defense policymakers about the operationalization of Cold Start Doctrine.¹⁴ Thus, BMD could provide India a space below Pakistan’s nuclear threshold to launch a limited war or a low-scale conventional strike.

The Indian scientific bureaucracy claims that its missiles program is “the result of indigenous scientific research and consistent endeavor and resolve in the field of ballistic missile defense.”¹⁵ However, many analysts objected Indians claim and concluded that the Indian missile program is beneficiary of direct and indirect assistance of many nations. Ashok Sharma pointed out “India is seeking international collaboration with countries like Israel, Russia, the United States and different nations in Europe to get the best support in missile defense technology.”¹⁶ Zafar Khan is of the view that, “The post-9/11 India—the US growing strategic partnership has further supported India's BMD program by seeking support from countries such as Russia, France, and Israel that have also contributed to India's missile defense system.”¹⁷ It is an open secret that India’s indigenous military equipment programs especially missile defense program are encountering technological problems. The Indian armed forces expressed their severe reservations over the Defense and Research Development Organization (DRDO) manufactured weapons reliability. An office of Controller and

Auditor General of India, in July 28, 2017, compiled a report which revealed certain degree of deficiencies are present in Indian indigenous program.¹⁸ Further, the author was of the view that India still needs advancements in its air defence system on development of missile shield.¹⁹

New Delhi is determined to continue work on ballistic missile program on better foundation coupled with advanced technology. Indigenously, however, India is incapable of resolving its technological and material deficiency problems. For instance, the speed is in the advantage of both offensive and defensive weapons. India needs to develop a higher speed interceptors. "The ultimate weapon in terms of speed is a Directed Energy Weapon (DEW). DEWs, such as a high-power laser or a high-power microwave beam, travel at the speed of light."²⁰ The problem with DEWs is that their effectiveness is compromised in adverse weather conditions such as fog or rain. Moreover, PAD is a two-stage rocket, and it uses liquid fuel in its second phase. "As liquid rocket fuel corrodes fuel tanks when stored for longtime, the PAD could not be on standby 24/7. Instead, it would need to be gassed up during a period of crisis in anticipation of trouble. This is less than ideal for a weapon intended to defend against an attack which might come at any moment." Presently, DRDO is scientifically incapable of producing DEWs and replacing liquid fuel propellant of PAD with solid fuel propellant.²¹ Therefore, it has to procure advanced components of missiles systems from foreign contractors to perfect its defensive missiles as well as offensive missiles, such as Agni series and BMD system. India's full membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and above all India's cementing partnership with the United States provides New Delhi an opportunity to purchase dual use space material and import sophisticated technologies to modernize and perfect its BMD program.

Realizing the DRDO deficiencies in manufacturing BMD high-tech components, India's Cabinet Committee on Security; a government body responsible for military procurements, headed by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi approved 17,000-crore (\$ 2.5 billion) for purchasing medium-range surface-to-air missile system from Israel on February 22, 2017.²² The Indian armed forces already armed with Israel's Green Pine radars, which used in BMD system in both Israel and South Korea. According to Ashok Sharma "India wanted to buy the Israeli Arrow-2 system from Israel, a deal which required US endorsement. However, America expressed its helplessness in selling the Arrow, citing Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) commitments."²³ Notably, many analysts including Charles D. Ferguson and Bruce W. MacDonald pointed out: "Nonetheless, the George W. Bush administration did assist India by approving the sale of the Arrow-2, which is very similar to PAC-2. Besides, the Israeli Green Pine radar system came with this deal. India has further enhanced its surveillance capabilities with the acquisition of the Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control System."²⁴

India was granted the full membership of MTCR in June 2016. Even, if one agrees with Mr. Sharma that Americans were reluctant to sell BMD technology or material due to MTCR prohibitions. After Indian's joining MTCR it would be able to purchase Israeli Arrow-2, the US PAC-3, the Russian S-300V, etc. "The June 26, 2017 summit between President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi covered an extensive discussion on defense cooperation and arms deals with India elevated the position of "major defense partner."²⁵

The US still is leading exporters of arms in the world. It exports its hardware to its allies to create a sphere of influence couple with promotion of its national interests. It is also making an effort for military hardware exports because of the reason of the cost spent on Research and Development and to save its own military industrial complex. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century the Indian defense market has been desirable for American defense contractors. For instance, on February 5, 2003, the US had eased its rules on the export of dual-use technology to India. The sales of US dual-use technology or hi-tech products have military applications.²⁶ Rajesh Basrur pointed out: "Simple pragmatism backs the Indian position. Since the United States will go ahead with missile defense regardless of what others say, why not hop aboard the bandwagon and try to extract the maximum advantage?"²⁷ Nevertheless, during the last decade, India has become one of the largest importers of American military hardware.

The Indo-US strategic partnership has been contributing constructively in the Indian BMD buildup. A high-level American delegation visited New Delhi for the negotiation on the transfer of technology related to BMD in June 2004. Ashok Sharma envisaged, "In the coming years, missile defense will emerge as one of the more important components of the Indo-US bilateral relationship."²⁸ New Delhi has been soliciting Washington for "the cooperation in the area of BMD as part of an emerging strategic partnership with the United States. These discussions subsequently even included the possible sale of the US Patriot-3 BMD system to India."²⁹ More precisely, being a member of MTCR, New Delhi can purchase the Arrow-2 type of technologies for perfecting its BMD programme.

Pakistan's Countermeasures

The introduction of the Indian BMD system in the South Asian strategic environment, indeed, intensifies Pakistan's security dilemma puzzle. "It does not take much imagination to anticipate Pakistan's response. There will be legitimate pressure for Islamabad to attempt to redress this perceived Indian defense by producing more missiles and nuclear weapons."³⁰ Nevertheless, Islamabad needs to respond intelligently to counter Indian BMD shield. Therefore, Islamabad revamps its military doctrine, especially nuclear posture, to acquire reliable means to deter India's military threat and for the sake of effective responses, if deterrence fails. The challenge for the makers of Islamabad's current strategy is to chalk out a strategy, which is neither risky

economically nor undermines the deterrence credibility. What can Pakistan do? Perhaps, in the prevailing situation, the arms race with India is not in the advantage of Pakistan. Therefore, avoiding an arms race with India is imperative. "There is only one way to win an arms race: Refuse to run."³¹ Equally, the makers of Pakistan's defense policy cannot ignore the Indian BMD program. Many Pakistanis are debating whether they need their own BMD program to balance the Indian BMD shield.

Islamabad, certainly, has chalked out and is executing its counterbalancing strategy. It cannot ignore India's BMD program. It commenced modernization and increase of the size of its offensive ballistic missile force in response to its assessment of India's BMD program. Pakistani missile designers modernize their offensive missiles to improve the offensive techniques to collapse the battle-space. "One of the most effective defense penetration techniques is to collapse the battle-space by minimizing the engagement time available. The primary techniques available to collapse the battle-space for the offensive missile designer to exploit speed, altitude, and radar cross-section."³² It seems possible. Pakistani missile designers could increase the speed of the offensive ballistic missiles (Shaheen-I, Shaheen-II, and Shaheen-III) and also increase their effectiveness in penetrating missile defenses by equipping them with technologies to defy the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), detection and tracking systems of Indian BMD system.

The offensive missile tactics and raids can be used to reduce probability-of-kill or probability-of-raid annihilation. "Tactics can include jamming and maneuvers either in combination or separately. Jamming is employed to delay detection by the radar and missile seeker and to deny the radar and missile seeker accurate range and angle estimates."³³ Second, "evasive maneuvers are one of the most, if not the most, effective tactics used to evade defensive weapons such as missile and radar-directed gun weapon systems and bring down probability-of-kill."³⁴ Third, offensive missile "raids are used to saturate and confuse the defensive systems and can be a stream or simultaneous."³⁵ Fourth, the offensive missiles use radar-absorbing material to reduce BMD radar cross-section.

Today, the 'Full Spectrum Deterrence' nuclear posture of Pakistan, prevents the country from both India's nuclear blackmailing coercion and conventional military invasion. Therefore, responding this way, by adding the BMD system in Pakistani military arsenal seems a costly option. As Jeffrey Lewis has pointed out, "An enemy who can be deterred will be deterred by the prospect of a counterattack, even if it consists of only a few nuclear weapons. Beyond that minimum threshold, nuclear weapons provide little additional deterrent benefit."³⁶ Therefore, Islamabad increases the protection of its ballistic and cruise missiles from pre-launch attack, and also increase their effectiveness in penetrating missile defenses.

Theoretically, three options are available to penetrate and defy the adversary's BMD shield. The Indian BMD shield can be overwhelmed by a flurry of ballistic missiles utilizing the multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) technology to deliver multiple conventional and nuclear warheads. With MIRV "the weapons can be launched towards different targets, they can also be directed towards one target in an attempt to overcome a missile defense system."³⁷ MIRVs enables Pakistani strategic forces to engage multiple targets with a high level of precision by a few missiles. It simultaneously disrupts or destroys the radars of India. Strategists have consensus that MIRV is very effective against the adversary, which deploys ballistic missile defense system. It was rightly opined that: "If a state is worried about the survivability of its limited missile force and anticipates significant attrition of that force by the adversary, MIRVs provide multiple warheads with which to retaliate for every missile that does survive."³⁸ On January 24, 2017, Pakistan conducted successfully the test of a medium-range, surface-to-surface, ballistic missile Ababeel, which uses the MIRV to deliver multiple conventional and nuclear warheads.³⁹ The Ababeel range is 2,200 kilometers — three times the distance between Islamabad and New Delhi — having the capacity to engage multiple targets and thereby it would be very lethal for the Indian BMD shield. Michael Krepon and Travis Wheeler rightly pointed out that: "If New Delhi decides to absorb the costs of ballistic missile defenses for high-value targets, along with the radars to accompany BMD deployments, these expenses will be in vain."⁴⁰ Ankit Panda concurred Krepon's conclusion. He wrote: "a MIRVed Pakistani strategic capability may stand as a powerful deterrent to India's retaliatory capabilities, freeing Pakistan up to use battlefield nuclear weapons as a war-terminating strategy without concerning itself with escalation to the strategic level."⁴¹ Precisely, Ababeel seems a cost-effective, dependable ballistic missile to neutralize India's BMD shield.

Second, using a deep penetration strike aircraft, a nuclear attack could be launched. The BMD shield technologically offers no resistance to it. Third, Pakistan could employ its supersonic cruise missiles to evade enemy radars by flying at low altitudes while striking the target. On December 14, 2016, Pakistan conducted the successful test of an improved version of the medium-range and subsonic cruise missile—Babur Weapon System Version-2.⁴²

Pakistan can further improve the efficacy of its missiles by developing and employing decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding, evasive trajectories, warheads with very low infrared signature and Multiple Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) to shower warheads over several targets. "The balance of nuclear technology strongly favors the offensive, which has cheaper, far superior technology that can quickly be deployed to defeat India's nascent BMD."⁴³ Thus, Pakistan's qualitative and quantitative improvement in its nuclear and missile forces and its strategy pose a formidable challenge to the Indian BMD shield.

Implications for Strategic Stability

Theoretically, India's BMD program has a defensive projection, but it is an integral measure of offensive planning to conduct pre-emptive or preventive nuclear strikes with impunity of Pakistan's retaliatory nuclear strikes. It is an attempt to dent the balance of terror, which is causing deterrence stability between India and Pakistan. Indeed, deterrence stability between the belligerent neighbors is a prerequisite for sustaining the strategic stability in South Asia. Though the stated focus of India's BMD program is to defend against missile strikes from Pakistan, the BMD assets (advanced radar systems) also strengthen the Indian air defense system. After successful development and deployment of PAD and AAD, India would plan for an "enhanced air defense capability" covering a wider part of India's territory, its population centers, and strategic assets."⁴⁴ Consequently, India would be invulnerable from Pakistan's air force bombings, cruise, and ballistic missile strikes. Hence, the BMD deployment undermines the balance of strategic nuclear deterrence between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. The implication is that BMD program may give the Indians a sense of greater security; emboldening the Indian hawks to ignore the Pakistani ballistic and cruise missile threat and actively resist confidence-building measures or efforts to endure strategic stability in South Asia. India's BMD program could have the following destabilizing consequences:

- The defensive weapons, particularly BMD, could undermine the viability and effectiveness of ballistic missiles. The compromise of the offensive strikes dents the credibility of the retaliatory strikes, which deter the adversary from aggression. The probability of absorbing an opponent's retaliatory strike in a crisis undermines the deterrent capability of a state desiring to deter the adversary with its ballistic missile capability. Sumit Ganguly pointed out: "After such a strike, which would disable much of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, the ragged retaliation that would follow could be significantly denuded through the use of India's BMD."⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the BMD destabilizes the deterrence stability. The deterrence instability subverts strategic stability between the strategic competitors by reducing the vulnerability of the BMD's holders.
- Second, the BMD deployment is a threat to nuclear deterrent stability entailing strategic instability. It is destabilizing because it intensifies a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan. Many analysts are convinced that BMD changes the nuclear order and alter strategic stability, and can encourage Indian leadership to engage in offensive actions or first strike, on the premise that they are invulnerable to Pakistani strategic forces retaliation.⁴⁶ Indeed, "deployment of BMD could boost the Indian confidence in its ability to strike first with the belief that it could protect itself afterward against what strategists have called 'ragged retaliation.'"⁴⁷ That is why; the Indian ruling elite threatened to conduct surgical strikes to devastate Pakistan's nuclear weapons

capability. On October 5, 2017, the Indian Air Force Chief Marshal, B. S. Dhanoa, had claimed that the Indian Air Force (IAF) could target Pakistan's nuclear sites and could carry out surgical operations.⁴⁸ The gravest danger now is that India and Pakistan will stumble into a catastrophic war that is neither in the interest of New Delhi nor Islamabad.

- Third, India's 2003 "nuclear policy draft is based on a counterforce strategy in India."⁴⁹ The BMD deployment increases the Indian hawkish leadership temptation for counterforce surgical conventional attacks on Pakistan storage facilities to end the nuclear threat. Proponents of this course believe that the Indian missile shield and threat of further escalation by India (massive retaliation) would deter Pakistan from responding militarily to a limited first strike. On September 29, 2016, Indian DGMO Lt Gen Ranbir Singh announced in a joint press conference of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of Defence: "some terrorist teams had positioned themselves at launch-pads along the Line of Control. The Indian army conducted surgical strikes last night at these launch-pads. Significant casualties have caused to these terrorists and those who are trying to support them."⁵⁰ Pakistani armed forces spokesperson while rubbishing Lt Gen Ranbir claim stated: "The notion of surgical strike linked to alleged terrorist bases is an illusion being deliberately generated by Indians to create false effects."⁵¹ Perhaps, increasing confidence in the operational reliability of the Indian BMD system can encourage Indian hawks to execute his frequently articulated strategy "jaw for a tooth" to punish Pakistani armed forces.⁵² Positively, Islamabad will react with its so-called tit-for-tat strategy, if there is a surgical strike on Pakistani soil. "As per rules of engagement, same was strongly and befittingly responded by Pakistani troops."⁵³
- Fourth, the BMD deployment will gear up India and Pakistan nuclear plans toward pre-emption. Both sides will opt a built-in option to launch nuclear weapons if officials believe that an enemy attack is imminent and unavoidable. This produced a danger that the strategist Thomas Schelling called "the reciprocal fear of surprise attack."⁵⁴ Thus, India's BMD impressive progress and its collaboration with the United States and other countries such as Israel create uneasiness in Pakistan. It obliges Pakistan to modernize its offensive ballistic and cruise missiles to evade the Indian BMD shield before striking the target. In simple words, Pakistan develops technology to thwart the BMD system. The advancement of the offensive forces of Pakistan causes India's BMD shield ineffective. While debating the Indian BMD operational perfection, many analysts concluded that even after spending tens of billions of dollars over 30 years, United States still not be able to shoot down a couple of North Korea missiles.⁵⁵ Glenn Kessler pointed out: "The interceptor system has

been tested 18 times since 1999, with a success rate of about 56 percent. The most recent test, on May 30, 2017, was a success, but the three of four before that failed. It is worth noting that the tests are done under ideal conditions — during the day, not at night, and without having to deal with an adversary's countermeasures, such as decoy warheads or technology that confuses the interceptors."⁵⁶ Scott D Sagan expressed similar apprehensions about the BMD. He wrote: "But military leaders should be candid about the limits of US ballistic missile defenses. Most such systems have failed numerous tests, and even the most effective ones, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, could be overwhelmed if North Korea fired multiple missiles—even dummy missiles—in a salvo at one target."⁵⁷ Thus, India's BMD only increases risk and fuels colossal defense spending between India and Pakistan, and it might not even protect the former against a nuclear attack by the latter.

Conclusion

The BMD program of India, the countermeasures of Pakistan, and above all the rational strategic calculations manifest that New Delhi's operational missile shield cannot create a deterrence gap that needs to be filled, immediately. It is because there (during the war) is always a reasonable probability that one or more nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles penetrate in the Indian missile defense system. Since a single nuclear missile hit inflict, unacceptable damage on India, therefore its BMD program does not change the strategic equilibrium between the strategic peers in South Asia.

The action-reaction theory, however, indicates that despite the absence of deterrence gap, Islamabad does not only modernize its nuclear-capable delivery vehicles but also multiply their numbers. The Indian BMD program embarks Pakistan on the process of modernizing almost every component of its armed forces. Thus, the region experiences a lethal devastating arms race between India and Pakistan. The arms race between the belligerent neighbors, obviously, undermines the prevalent strategic stability in South Asia.

The practical choice for Islamabad is that it builds nuclear weapons only that needed for deterrence, instead of entangling in an arms race. Simultaneously, it continues encouraging India to do the same. Hence, Islamabad continues its efforts for constituting Nuclear Restraint Regime in South Asia. Even, if it does not, Islamabad's level of nuclear forces should be determined by what it requires for credible deterrence instead of a misguided desire to match New Delhi's missile for missile. Realistically, cataloguing the required strength of the forces to deter the adversary's aggression in the

absence of arms control arrangement between the New Delhi and Islamabad is impossible.

To conclude, today Pakistan's indigenous BMD program is neither affordable nor executable, and thereby not advisable. The declassified information about Pakistan's missile program reveals that its ballistic and cruise missiles are becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate. Though Presently, Pakistan can only rely on offensive ballistic and cruise missiles instead of developing ballistic missile shield, yet the continued modernization ballistic and cruise missiles is imperative for credibility of Pakistan's nuclear deterrence that ensures the continued strategic stability in South Asia.

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NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP (NSG) MEMBERSHIP: A CASE OF NON-NPT NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES

*Dr. Zulfiqar Khan and Rubina Waseem**

Abstract

The argument of paper revolves around the significance to set a principle for the inclusion of the non-NPT Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The global security requires a balanced approach and cooperation so as to achieve the mutual objectives of the international community. The requirement of global security is to adopt mutually negotiated rules that could assist in attaining the goals of global non-proliferation. Moreover, rules based on a criterion would stabilize the system and norms to secure the support of the majority of the countries. We can argue that NPT is not a universal treaty because India, Pakistan, and Israel had never signed it; therefore, they are not liable to follow the norms or rules of the non-proliferation. Nonetheless, leaving these states out of the arrangements of non-proliferation would also not be a right approach because rules that are not mutually negotiated or that do not provide a stable social order, are not durable or authoritative.

Keywords: NPT, NSG, Technologies, Materials, Nuclear Weapons, India, Pakistan, Israel, NWS, Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS).

Introduction

This paper will explore the possibility of taking on-board the non-NPT NWS in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Although most states have their national export control mechanisms to regulate the trade of nuclear-related materials/ technologies, there is only one formal treaty, available in this context - that is the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Unfortunately, the three non-NPT states - India, Pakistan, and Israel (North Korea left the treaty in 2003) are not members of the treaty. Nonetheless, some informal arrangements are in place and these states are participating in these forums as observers, but they are not under any formal legal commitment except the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 of 2004, which obliges the states to establish domestic measures to prevent access to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons (and their means of use) to the non-state actors. The UNSCR 1540 discusses and outlines some mandated steps to be taken by states domestically; however, an international framework where these states are legally bound to adhere the export of nuclear materials, is *missing*. For many years, the supporters of non-

*Dr. Zulfiqar Khan is a Professor and Head of the Department of Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Islamabad, Pakistan. E-mail: hodsns@ndu.edu.pk & zulfqarkhan8@gmail.com. Rubina Waseem is a Research Scholar in George Washington University, Washington DC, and Lecturer of the Department of Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Islamabad, rubiwaseem@ymail.com & rubinawaseem@ndu.edu.pk.

proliferation have been suspended between the *unrealistic* hope that these countries will reverse their nuclear status; but the result does not progress from either side.¹ India and Pakistan are now declared NWS and Israel is a nuclear state by assumption, as Tel Aviv has adopted a policy of opacity and officially has not conducted any nuclear test, yet all the secondary data indicates that Israel is an NWS (North Korea is the only declared nuclear state that conducted a series of nuclear test after withdrawing from the NPT).² Therefore, legally these states (except North Korea) are not in violation of any the NPT norms/rules, as they were/are not part of the treaty. In fact, they had acquired nuclear weapons due to their national security compulsions. Nonetheless, these states should share the responsibility of not to proliferate this critical technology. This makes the case of their inclusion in the mainstream non-proliferation regimes, primarily the NPT, more logical and compelling so as to plug the loopholes of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In this context, their inclusion in NSG can be a step toward this journey.

The NSG is part of the Multilateral Export Control Regimes (MECRs), the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), the Australia Group (AG), and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). All these export control measures are placed as key fences against the proliferation of critical dual-use and military-related technologies. Albeit, these arrangements share the different history and members, the paper will focus on the NSG. Its main goal is to exclusively combat the proliferation of WMD, and the membership criteria for the states having the potential to export critical dual-use technologies, equipment or materials. The 'Trigger List' under the Zangger Committee (ZAC) is a detailed list of the dual-use items, and it provides a comprehensive guideline relating to materials and equipment (Zangger Committee, 2017).³ The NSG cartel sets the norms and principles under the guidelines that are adopted by states through a consensus-based approach. NSG supports relevant international treaties such as the NPT, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard regimes, and it was established by the like-minded supplier states, particularly the United States (US) and its partners.⁴ Now, 48 states, including Russia and China, are its members and all adhere to the objectives of the non-proliferation norms, yet, the states under study are still out of these arrangements. The paper observes that the preeminent way to monitor all the states; having the nuclear weapons-related technology, in the ring to prevent further proliferation of nuclear technology and at the same time, without hampering or overlooking their basic peaceful civil nuclear needs. The role of international institutions is very crucial as these institutions can provide information to the states that could assist them to realize the common interests and gains.⁵

Why the international community should be concerned to take them on board? It's due to a variety of factors such as the threat of export of nuclear weapons-related technologies falling into the wrong hands, the rogue states with ambitions to further proliferate; and the improvement of the nuclear safety and security measures and tackling other relevant issues. Global terrorism and the fear of nuclear accidents such as the March 2011 meltdown of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, and the revelation of AQ Khan nuclear network raised pertinent questions relating to

nuclear safety and security. The vision of the nuclear weapons-free world, or 'Global Zero,' was overshadowed due to an emphasis on nuclear safety and security issues. Thus, the debate about bringing nuclear *outliers* under the umbrella of NPT commenced. There is a closer relationship between the nuclear regulatory authorities and technical assistance to maintain a foolproof safety and security, to keep the command, and to control structures on vibrant trajectories. This is significant to ensure international peace and stability. These requirements turned the debate to consider more policy options to monitor the role of the states and to look for how to bring them into the mainstream apparatus where they are bound to adopt the required mechanisms to deal with the nuclear safety and security threats, and to join hands with the international community against proliferation trends. Historical institutionalists argue that the policymakers evaluate the possible gains and cost of new strategies related to the certainty of the existing institutional landscape. The decision to reform institutions is a reaction to a particular constellation of beliefs about how and why institutions should structure, monitor and enforce interactions within that issue area.⁶

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

The IAEA was established in 1957, but, the additional informal safeguards were introduced by NSG along with technologically advanced countries with likeminded approach/perspectives on these issues. This debate was triggered in the aftermath of India's nuclear test in 1974, and in 1975, NSG cartel was formalized to plug the non-proliferation gaps and to ensure that other states do not follow on India's footsteps. The NSG evolved its guidelines to regulate nuclear transfers and to ensure its non-diversion or unsafeguarded nuclear weapons-related technologies and materials to other states. In 1978, IAEA published (Information Circular) INFCIRC/254 outlining comprehensive guidelines relating to the export of nuclear materials, equipment and technologies, which, in 1992, was amended and appended Guidelines in the shape of Part-2 to the INFCIRC/254. It introduced stringent checks on the dual-use-related exports and denial mechanisms for future transfers to Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). This had truly transformed the NSG. In true sense, stringent measures were introduced between 1975 to 1992, and for the first time, it was made effective with the inclusion of almost all technologically advanced countries. Thus, all the countries that acquired nuclear weapons technology prior to India's nuclear test could *evade* the curbs that NSG had now introduced. A brief account of the mechanism that constitutes global security architecture to enforce NPT clauses and to monitor implementation is explained below. It evolved a methodology to regulate trade-related to nuclear and other sensitive dual-use technologies by introducing comprehensive guidelines for countries possessing such technologies. The decisions to share such technologies with countries outside the NSG are to be taken by consensus. However, it shares technology between the member states.⁷

The NPT and NSG have a goal of preventing nuclear proliferation by regulating the transfers of nuclear-related technologies. Yet, relations tips these two arrangements have different legal characters, rules, coverage, and memberships. This diversity has hampered the effectiveness of efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Many

NPT members that do not participate in the NSG have criticized the arrangement as being at odds with the basic quid pro quo of the NPT (figure-1). The NPT promises unrestricted access to nuclear technology and cooperation for peaceful employment in return for acceptance of controls to ensure that such technology is not misused or diverted toward military objectives. Critics hold that NSG, which constrains nuclear trade, is an attempt by the nuclear technology holding states to preserve their economic advantages. They point out that decisions taken by NSG members and discussions on export control guidelines are not transparent, and that there is no recourse against technology denials. In essence, they see NSG and other export control arrangements as cartels of technology holders. On the other hand, some analysts are of the view that there is a margin of improvement, as more members will join, the procedures and Guidelines will become more comprehensive. The members can play a more constructive role by mainstreaming all the states having nuclear weapons in the fold of NSG (figure-1). For this purpose, the participating governments should set-up revised criteria for the NSG membership.

Figure-1: Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

Basic Principles of NPT	Basic Principles of NSG
Formal International Treaty	Supportive of NPT, CTBT, IAEA
Counter nuclear proliferation threat	Counter nuclear proliferation threat
Monitor exports related to WMD Proliferation under Article II-III (Supportive to NSG)	Monitor fissile material, nuclear technology, dual-use materials and technologies, nuclear power plant equipment (relates Article II-III of NPT)
Avoid hindrance in legal civilian trade	Grant of export licenses to qualified end-users/under certain conditions

The NPT and its Impact on NSG

The NPT is considered to be a cornerstone of international agreements aimed at achieving complete nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It consists of a preamble and eleven articles. It is sometimes interpreted as a *three-pillar system*, with an implicit balance between them: non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to peaceful use of nuclear technology. In essence, NPT is an unequal treaty as it perpetually divides 190 states into NWS and NNWS categories. An NWS is defined a category which had 'manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or another nuclear device prior to January 1, 1967. Thus, as per NPT definition, only five nations: US, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom (UK) are called P-5 and recognized as *de jure* NWS while remaining all are NNWS. In Article I of the treaty, P-5 have given a commitment not to transfer any nuclear weapons-related technologies and to maintain control over such weapons or explosive devices they have, directly, or indirectly; and not to assist them in any way, encourage, or induce any NNWS to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. Under Article II, an NNWS party to the treaty accepts the

fundamental obligation 'not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.' Fulfillment of this obligation must be verified through state's commitment to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be concluded by states with IAEA to prevent diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons or for other banned nuclear activities or manufacturing of explosive devices.⁸

As per Article III of the treaty, each NNWS party undertakes to conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the application of safeguards over all its nuclear activities/materials and to prevent diversion of such materials, technologies to manufacture nuclear weapons, or for any other nuclear explosive devices. However, this view - if limited to textual analysis, does not fully deal with the problem as safeguards under the article are applicable only to nuclear materials and equipment provided 'for peaceful purposes'⁹. Therefore, under the treaty, as it stands, there seems to be *no legal obstacle* for the non-NPT NWS to commence a nuclear weapons program.

The Article IV-V of the treaty encourages the member states to cooperate and share the potential benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear explosion under appropriate international observation or other international procedures/agreements. It grants inalienable rights to all the parties to the treaty to undertake research and production with the right to participate in the maximum possible exchange of equipment, materials, scientific and technological information; and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination; but it has to be in conformity with Articles I and II.

The Article VI of the NPT provides an essential foundation for the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons. This article as a whole has a symbolic significance and neither has it established specific nor concrete legal rights nor obligations.¹⁰ Other states perceive it as 'a disproportionate prioritization of non-proliferation principles and an unwarranted under-prioritization of non-proliferation principles and an unwarranted under-prioritization of peaceful use'¹¹. In this context, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1996 stated that Article VI:

...goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct; the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result - nuclear disarmament in all its aspects - by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith.¹²

Since the inception of the treaty to its unconditional and indefinite extension in 1995, the NWS has failed to honor their undertaking given to the NNWS to take steps and to realize the goal of nuclear disarmament. This was also later on re-emphasized by the ICJ in its rulings.

Arthur Goldberg, the former US Ambassador to the General Assembly, writes that the Article VI contained three goals, which he said constituted provisions to cease nuclear arms race at the earliest; realize the goal of nuclear disarmament; and finally to achieve general and complete nuclear disarmament under an effective international

control as the ultimate goal.¹³ The NPT provides a right to each state-party under Article X to withdraw from the treaty by exercising its national security and sovereignty compulsions. After every five years interval, a Review Conference of the states-party to the NPT is held in order to review the operation of the treaty and to assure that its purpose and provisions are being realized. This leads to a twofold conclusion: 1) the non-proliferation obligations under the NPT are far from watertight and; 2) the Article I and Article II of the treaty establishes a vivid discrimination between the NWS and NNWS, which in the perspective of Jaswant Singh; the former Senior Adviser of Defense and Foreign Affairs the Indian Prime Minister, a 'nuclear apartheid' that instituted to 'ratify the nuclear status quo,' which is 'an international currency of force and power'.¹⁴ This distinction between the two categories of states parties' is problematic and unfair due to a variety of factors.¹⁵

However, it is contrary to the preservation of sovereign equality of states under the principles of Public International Law¹⁶ and Article II of the UN Charter. Sovereign equality does not rule out the acceptance of agreements distinguishing different groups of states; 'sovereignty is not infringed if (a state) freely agrees to unfavorable terms'.¹⁷

Indeed, within the NPT differential treatment of NWS and the NNWS is compensated by two sets of treaty provisions and political arrangements attached to the regime as a whole.¹⁸ It is a discriminatory treaty that perpetually created two blocs of states. But three states (India, Pakistan, and Israel) under discussion had not signed the treaty - that institutionalized a 'nuclear apartheid.' New Zealand pointed out that the NPT is a club used by the powerful states, especially the US, to keep down the weak states. The non-NPT NWS due to their distinct security concerns had decided to stay away from the treaty, and later on developed nuclear capabilities. This would provide impetus and a rationale to other NNWS states to follow suit. However, the contention on the alleged involvement of Iran in building a nuclear weapons-related program has created a new dilemma for the volatile geopolitics of Middle East. Albeit, Obama administration, and other P5+1 countries had reached a nuclear deal with Iran, but its future under President Donald Trump administration appears to be quite bleak, as during the election campaign, he had termed it the worst deal. Incidentally, on January 27, 2018, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated that working groups comprised of its European signatory to the deal, are studying ways and means to fix the alleged 'flaws' in the deal. However, in the case of North Korea, its multiple nuclear and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) tests have firmly led to the institution of an ambitious nuclear weapons/missiles program, which is posing a grave challenge to the non-proliferation regimes/norms.¹⁹

In effect, non-implementation of Article VI of the NPT by the NWS - to realize the goal of a world without nuclear weapons is a source of serious concern for the international community, primarily for the NNWS. This Article is the hallmark of the treaty and focuses on all previous NPT Review Conferences. NNWS persistently criticized the NWS for not taking adequate steps to achieve the goal of total nuclear disarmament as they had committed and re-committed, especially during the NPT Review Conference in 2000. Furthermore, the P-5 countries also did not implement the

proposed 'thirteen steps' of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.²⁰ Incidentally, in 2010 NPT Review Conference, many NNWS bemoaned the granting of India-specific NSG waiver that later on led to the lifting of nuclear trade sanctions, and they demanded full-scope safeguards agreements in this context. However, many states, including France and the US, opposed granting a similar concession to Pakistan or Israel. On the contrary, the conference referred to 1995 document that urges NPT states 'to make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls' and 'to consider whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making nuclear export decisions.' Rather, 'the selective lifting of nuclear trade restrictions on India,' writes Meier, has 'not helped to find a solution to the important problem of bringing' non-NPT NWS effectively under the non-proliferation regime.²¹

The NPT suffers from inherent institutional 'deficit' and anomalies that permits country like North Korea to withdraw from the treaty. Now it keeps the international community guessing as to when Iran may decide to exercise its option available under the NPT's Article X, to withdraw, if it is stretched beyond certain limits. Incidentally, after P5+ 1 agreement (in 2015) with Iran, the issue was considered to be addressed, but its future is not certain under Trump administration. Although both states are not the focus of this study, yet, this debate has raised questions about the global non-proliferation efforts. The case of North Korea is also becoming more complex with the passage of time because of its continuous missile and nuclear tests and defiant attitude toward the international non-proliferation norms and regimes. Some analysts are of the view that Pyongyang had not withdrawn with proper procedure. The case of N. Korean withdrawal is not the focus of this study. However, in the case of India, Pakistan and Israel are considered responsible nuclear states that adhere to the non-proliferation norms. Nevertheless, in the case of India, right from the day one it had rejected the treaty on various rationales and maintained that NWS status is not by virtue of 'conferment' rather it's 'an objective reality' that India had exercised in 1998.²² In fact, India's non-NPT diplomacy since 1968 has been guided by its 'nationalist interest;' and the 1998 tests, writes Singh, had 'resulted from earlier decisions and were possible only because those decisions had been taken correctly'.²³ In the perspective of another independent writer, even during 1967 negotiations on NPT, India's then representative at the Geneva Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee argued that the: 'civil nuclear Powers can tolerate a nuclear weapons apartheid, but not an atomic apartheid in their economic and peaceful development'.²⁴

IAEA Additional Protocol

In 1993, IAEA commenced efforts to effectively constrain the ability of the NPT states to use nuclear technology under strict safeguard architecture including for peaceful purposes.²⁵ After the North Korean nuclear test and Iran's apparent breaches of the NPT, it invigorated IAEA's efforts to impose more stringent safeguard procedures and regimes, including the imposition of the Additional Protocol (AP). The AP allows the IAEA to visit the NPT states' nuclear facilities for inspection on short notices. However, the AP is not completely implemented, particularly in the case of P-5 states,²⁶

as they have accepted AP conditionally and these exceptions are challenging its *credibility* and raising questions about its universal approach. It is a legal document that grants increased inspection authority to the IAEA, to enforce safeguards.²⁷ India ratified AP in 2006, that with certain exceptions too.²⁸ Like other states, it had picked and chosen certain provisions of the AP. The model chosen by India resembled with the model of China and Russia. India after signing the AP was considered for the NSG waiver, and eventually, it paved way for the Indo-US nuclear deal.²⁹ In the aftermath of the US-India deal, New Delhi was exempted from nuclear trade guidelines. In addition to the IAEA Board of Governors approved India-specific safeguard architecture to undertake separation of its civil and military nuclear facilities. Articles 25, 95 and 96 of this plan, enable India to utilize 'safeguarded and unsafeguarded materials' simultaneously, which would contribute to its 'unsafeguarded program,' and facilitate its 'strategic' nuclear program.³⁰ US amended its export control legislation to grant India the benefits of the deal. The Indian policymakers consider this as an implicit recognition of its nuclear status.³¹ In essence, such a selective approach undermines the legitimacy and credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Furthermore, India still did not subscribe to the NPT; rather it considered treaty a discriminatory despite receiving an India-specific waiver from the NSG in 2008. Ostensibly, US seems to be moving toward according India 'same benefits and advantages as the US'³², for instance, to trade in nuclear technology. IAEA Director General ElBaradei remarked that engagement with all the non-NPT states of India, Pakistan, and Israel should be based on the principles of 'nuclear partners rather than pariahs.' This enunciation still needs to be critically explored to recognize the reality of non-NPT NWS status into the larger non-proliferation regimes.

The India-specific waiver by the NSG is in vivid contravention of the non-proliferation norms and regimes that had eventually enabled India to sign fifteen civil nuclear cooperation agreements with eleven countries.³³ China and Pakistan contemplate the deal as detrimental to their security interests. No doubt, the Indo-US deal will have a far-reaching impact on the regional and global security as well.³⁴ In strategic and military fields, it would facilitate India to weave in with the regional countries in a variety of ways together with an extensive series of military exercises.³⁵ Basically, all the NPT states and some non-NPT NWS, especially India, are entombed in a 'complex economic interdependency' in parallel to pursuing their economic and industrial interests.³⁶ It is believed that despite differences on various accounts, states are cooperating with one another, not by their own choice, but slightly due to their commercial interests and strategic compulsions, even at the cost of cooperating and giving concessions to each other on certain security issues; for example, US and India. As India is economically and geopolitically rising and is assuming a key role in the US strategic calculus in its 'active denial' strategy to sustain status quo and to raise the military cost for any Chinese military adventure or aggression in the Asia Pacific.³⁷ Presently, the contours of international politics are being intertwined by imperatives of geo-economics – that is, 'GDP now matters more than force'.³⁸ The US and India are intrinsically linked with China in trade and commerce cycle despite being adversaries for attaining primacy in critical Asia-Pacific region, which is expected to largely

determine the future course of history. India has pursued a sophisticated foreign security by projecting its image as a forward-looking country with a cooperative security outlook. Through the US-India nuclear deal, which has included the NSG waiver, the MTCR and the WA memberships, and also discussions for its inclusion in the AG are underway? This perspective entails a sharing of each other's security concerns through social interaction within the international institutions, resulting in a willingness to approach security problems in a cooperative spirit. At the domestic level, states tend to regulate the safety and security architecture of their nuclear and critical dual use technologies in harmony with standardized good practices.

UNSCR 1540 and NSG

In April 2004, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 was adopted in the aftermath of A Q Khan incident. It is considered to be a milestone that addresses and mitigates the prospects of WMD proliferation. The Resolution obligates the member countries to strengthen their existing treaties by evolving comprehensive domestic legislation through extending the obligations and penalties to individuals and companies - thereby addressing the threat of NSAs' or 'rogue states' involvement in nuclear proliferation activities.³⁹

The UNSCR 1540 made it mandatory for all the states to introduce 'appropriate, effective national export and trans-shipment controls' i.e. necessary to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery' (Meier, 2006). Initially, it was considered to be controversial partly because the Security Council was seen to be legislating on behalf of the entire international community to implement UNSCR 1540, and in many cases, incorporating implementation into their own program of work.⁴⁰ This to some extent addressed the future threat of emergence of A Q Khan-type network and other issues at domestic levels. Yet, the need to address the WMD proliferation threat was required to be evolved through mainstreaming all the nuclear-capable states under one umbrella. The NSG membership could be one such step to secure international security. Furthermore, NSG membership of these states: India, Pakistan, and Israel can complement the principles of UNSCR 1540 and the international community may ask (these states) to adopt more stringent measures to regulate their export controls to mitigate horizontal proliferation risks.

The Non-NPT NWS

Realism emphasizes that all states act within the anarchic international system on the basis of power.⁴¹ Hedley Bull assumes that states exist in an anarchical environment and must be self-reliant in order to survive.⁴² In essence, states require power to protect themselves from other states. The absence of central government or authority is the basis of 'enduring and continuing propensity for conflict between states'.⁴³ The anarchic system is characterized by the belief in the threat of force to compel certain actions of states.⁴⁴ The states acquire nuclear weapons due to security considerations, or for other domestic and prestige-related motivations. Every state interprets threat in the way which suits its national interests. Charles Glaser's concept of security seeking state is quite relevant in this regard, which argues that:

Cooperation is less risky when a state believes its adversary is more likely to be a security seeker, which reduces the severity of the security dilemma and makes cooperative policies designed to reduce military vulnerabilities and signal its benign motives more desirable.⁴⁵

NSG membership for the non-NPT NWS - through a criteria-based approach, would play a constructive part in minimizing the prospects of nuclear proliferation and universalizing the nuclear ECRS. It would enhance the credibility of NSG in a broader perspective as an effective and realistic cooperation approach based on a regularized criterion which could yield constructive outcomes. There is a requirement to bring the nuclear-capable states like India, Pakistan, and Israel under some collaborative mechanism with a view to streamline the monitoring system and to broaden the scope of cooperation. Nonetheless, cooperation and commitments require guarantees as well. The corporation needs to be addressed on the basis that all states with nuclear technology, especially three non-NPT NWS, should be taken on board to counter the nuclear proliferation challenges. All the state parties need to have strong commitments and mutual trust to confront these challenges. Cooperation principles need to be evolved and to conform to 'rules and procedures which reduce the fear of the states of being cheated by their partners and consenting to focus on the benefits'.⁴⁶ For instance, if one state is involved in cheating it will trigger a domino effect, especially in the absence of universal enforcement body.

Conclusion

The non-proliferation issues are very complex and require considerable cooperation and engagement from the international community to craft standardized procedures and to evolve common grounds to prevent the spread of nuclear and other dual-use sensitive technologies. In spite of enormous economic growth and technological innovation, the significance of geo-economics and international trade has enhanced globally. This notion has furthermore complicated the risks of transferring military technology, equipment, and knowledge, which could enlarge the proliferation hazards, especially by criminal organizations and the transnational terrorist activities. In order to counter these threats, NPT states should join hands with the non-NPT NWS, as this will add strength to their efforts. On the other hand, the non-NPT NWS so as to contribute for smoothing their image as responsible nuclear-capable states and with intention to gain legal access to civilian technology, would tend to adhere to the norms and rules of nuclear ECRs, which would essentially enhance non-proliferation rules, procedures, norms, and improve the security architectures of nuclear ECRs.

NOTES

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EMERGING SPACE WEAPONS PROBABILITY AND INDIAN QUEST FOR GREAT POWER STATUS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIAN DETERRENCE STABILITY

*Dr. Ahmed Saeed Minhas and Dr. Ghulam Qumber**

Abstract

Debate about inevitability of space is getting weaponized and a focal issue. Introduction of 3rd and 4th generation of warfare concepts have blurred the conventional warfare a bit further. Destruction associated with lethal weapons on earth have made the great powers' policy makers to think differently and find out the means to enhance their strategic ends by exploiting the technological edge they have over rest. Outer space weapons are expected to be the mean for seeking and maintaining great power status and maintaining it too. The US President; Trump has already shown his willingness to exploit outer space as a domain to ensure safety and security of the US mainland. The US approach under Trump Administration has rung the bells among the US strategic competitors like, Russia and China who view the development against the normative status of outer space i.e. common heritage. Similarly, in the South Asian context, India has been looking for its great power status since its inception in 1947. India, under the leadership of nationalist government, has shown its resolve to exploit its outer space edge in the South Asian region to meet its long awaited end of becoming a great power. However, it is, easier to than to do, Indian major power status through use of space control would be counter-productive for its neighbor – Pakistan, who feels existential threat from it. Thus introduction of space weapons in South Asian security calculus would negatively impact upon strategic and deterrence stability of the region.

Keywords: Space Weapons, Space Control, Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons, Strategic and Deterrence Stability, Destructive and Non-Destructive Counter Space Capabilities, Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

Introduction

Future wars would be the wars of technologies.¹ More a state is technologically advanced more would be its chances of survival in anarchic international political system. Techno-nationalism, a term coined in post-Cold War era, projects that the technological/technical advancement will supersede the military to win the major power status in the international system. Geo-technological advantages vis-à-vis geo-

*Dr. Ahmed Saeed Minhas is PhD in Nuclear Studies from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. Dr. Ghulam Qumber is faculty member at Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA), National Defence University, Islamabad.

political competition's comparative advantages are being debated in favor of technology.²

Albeit, the debate about space weapons has been on the lower side of actuality graph, yet it was never out of vision. The US under Trump administration has yet again revived the debate about having space based weapons as it was once initiated by the Regan administration under its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of 1983. The SDI had vision of war on the concept of star wars. SDI manifested that the one who controls the space controls the earth.³ However, SDI could not be materialized due to huge exchequer involved in its operationalization, besides, it increased stakes in outer space. The US policy makers feared that placement of weapons in outer space could give an incentive to others such as China and Russia to opt for tit-for-tat options. The US having maximum numbers of outer based assets could not afford to let others a free hand for developing counter outer space capability.

Global political power order is being transformed. The US, had gained the sole super power status at the end of Cold War, is being challenged by the rising Russia and China. The US itself has to be blamed for the decline, which overstretched itself throughout the world and launched many campaigns since 1989 onward. Gulf Wars, Global War on Terror (GWOT), Operation Iraqi Freedom and increased collaborative activities in South China Sea have drained the US economically. However, the US has apparently learnt from its strategic mistakes. The US 2017 Afghanistan Policy indicates the transformation in US policies towards Pakistan vis-à-vis India. India has been granted more active role in regional affairs as compared to Pakistan which is almost treated as an enemy.⁴ Apparently, the US has relegated the option of launching wars in favor of buck-passing and off-shore balancing.

In order to maintain its global power stature, the US has best choice in form of India to take baton of checkmating Chinese rising power. Consequently, India has discriminately been provided with all possible opportunities to modernize its armed forces including access to the dual use technologies through membership of export control regimes. The US and its allies are also providing support to India at multiple diplomatic and political fora for raising its stature. In this context, space weapons (ASAT) and BMD technologies are two important means that could provide India an opportunity to exert itself in winning its highly desired status of a being great power.

Notwithstanding the above, the realists' desire component intersects with how the Indian state identity is being constructed. In other words, though competition at the international level. Certain elements of India's power might have been encouraging the country to pursue great power status, which somehow or the other is a matter of its identity, i.e. matter of understanding of "self" and "other", through interpreting its past by using the obsessed lenses of "chosen glories" and "chosen traumas". However, the subject angle of analysis is not going to be elaborated being beyond the scope of research.

The paper is an attempt to explore answers to the queries, first, how the IR theories view military modernization as a tool for seeking great power status, second, is

the probability of space getting weaponized has increased or still it is a distant mission among the space faring nations third, why India likes to have space weapons; and how it could impact on South Asian strategic and deterrence stability, and finally the way forward to mitigate the threat emanating from Indian efforts to have space dominance in South Asian context.

IR Theoretical Perspective of Military Modernization to Become a Great Power

The contemporary international political system is anarchical in nature where state on the basis of resource distribution, are questing hard to win the status of major/great power in the hierarchy of international power structure. The anarchy prone international political system thus pushes states to invest exponentially in modernization of its military industrial complex. Armed forces modernization is directly proportional to the survival rate in the system besides leverage in decision making process in global affairs. However, the out of this proportion armed forces modernization has paradoxes attached to it. In fact, military might provide tangible advantages to its possessor, yet it creates a kind of security dilemma puzzle as for as bilateral or multi-lateral inter-state relationships are concerned. India is no different, which with immense power potential is aspiring for becoming great power.

Although there are multiple criteria for achieving great power status; inter-alia, diplomatic strength, strong economy, established democracy, and the most important one is the military might. Military or hard power is purely realist paradigm centric. To be more précised, realist proponents profess that in the contemporary realpolitik domain, states pursue their national interests through effective exploitation of power politics.⁵ Realists also view the hard power as an important and dynamic variable to access the states' behaviors.⁶ Zero-sum competition remains the hall mark of power gaining exercise in the form of conventional and unconventional weapons development i.e. a capability attained by one actor is completely denied to its competitor for exploitation through monopolization.⁷

Sequentially in order to survive, weaker states commit themselves into acts of Balance of Power (BoP). As per Headley Bull, BoP is nothing but 'a state of affair, where no one power is dominant and can lay down laws for other'.⁸ Besides, the BoP approach, there is yet another approach which is termed as Balance of Terror (BoT) approach within the realist paradigm that speaks about quantitative and qualitative balancing between the nuclear powers in terms of nuclear warheads and delivery means on their inventories. BoT depends on deterrence.⁹ As per the deterrence theory, as argued by Zagare, it is the use of a threat (explicit or not) by one party in an attempt to convince another party to maintain the status quo - is a general phenomenon that is not limited to any particular time or space.¹⁰

While looking pondering over the realist paradigm, arguments given by John. J. Mearsheimer in his book '*The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*', explicitly reflects the study's basic idea about Indian quest for becoming a great power through modernizing its armed forces.¹¹ Mearsheimer argues that becoming a great power, regional hegemony

is the best suited route by modernizing its military industrial complex through Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).¹² Any new technology that directly impinges upon BoP between the two rivals is taken as exponentially destabilizing.¹³

In the above context, India is striving hard for its global status through building its military might. The same is evident from a recent report published by the SIPRI that indicates India being the largest arms importing country from 2011-15.¹⁴ Indian space program is matured and is on course of using it for increasing its global reach. Outer space is expected to be the great powers' strategic competition turf. In technologically advanced era, outer space is likely to be exploited for balancing or outbalancing the equation of deterrence and stability. Ballistic missile defense and Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons could thus be used as technological means for having regional hegemony. Both kinds of weapons demand 'space control'¹⁵ i.e. liberty of action without any considerable challenge in outer space.

However, it is not that simple. Pakistan in the South Asian security calculus is maintaining a *full spectrum India centric deterrence*. Any unbalancing act might put into play the normative action-reaction syndrome influenced by the reification (image building) of the strategic environment, thus could severely impact upon already fragile South Asian strategic stability. Realists also warn in this perspective that prescription for protracted peace is glued to sovereign autonomy by deterring adversary through 'military preparedness' and alliances' formations. Indian growing strategic relationship with the US and its other allies has already tilted Pakistan towards Asian powers including China and Russia. Any asymmetry borne discriminatory acts could pitch the great powers against each other in pursuit of their vested interests which put South Asian stability at exponential risk of instability.

Political Debate Increasing Probability of Space Weaponization

Debate about securitizing outer space dates back to 1957, when the Soviet Union launched first ever satellite Sputnik in outer space. The US did not take long to launch its own satellite to show its technology muscles and thereafter the race for gaining and strengthening control of outer space was initiated, being followed till to-date. For the last sixty years, the outer space applications have increased exponentially and domestically day to day life has extensively been made dependent on it. Whether it is communication, banking, traveling, disaster warning or weather update, everything is space applications dependent. However, like any other technology, the outer space applications have dual use and could alternatively be used in supporting military operations. For instance, outer space was used pivotally by US and allied forces during the Gulf and Iraqi wars besides the GWOT.

It is widely believed that the outer space was militarized right from day one of its inception; however, it has yet to be titled as weaponized. For instance, the remote sensing satellites which are primarily to be used for the purpose of remote sensing the impending disasters or locate minerals and other natural resources under the earth surface; could alternatively be used as spying satellites to monitor the adversary's movements and disposition of its troops and logistics. In South Asian stability context,

India recently culminated a military exercise along Pakistani border in Rajasthan where Indian offensive formations validated their plans of striking Pakistan under nuclear, chemical and biological environment duly assisted by the real time battle field situational awareness by using their outer space based surveillance satellites.¹⁶ Similarly, the navigation satellites that guide the commercial aircraft could also alternatively be used for guiding long range ballistic missile etc. to their intended targets with an efficient error free accuracy.

Although, renowned arms control experts including Michael Krepon do not buy the idea that outer space would ever be physically weaponized due to multiple unaffordable political, economic and technological repercussions, yet there are indicators in prevalent anarchic international political system which do point towards option of physically weaponizing the outer space is not completely dead and is still breathing.

In a published 'US 2018 National Defense Strategy', titled, "Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge", where it was declared that the US has to prepare itself to help retaining outer space dominance by following the indicators that Russia and China are close to challenge American autonomy in outer space. Following the strategy paper, the US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis also indicated the preparations for conducting a space war over space-crafts as the US can't fight and win a war of tomorrow with yesterday's old technology weapons. He also said that for the US, outer space is just like any other domain of war like land, air and sea. While warning the rival countries in outer space capabilities, Jim Mattis said, "Don't try it.....In space we [US] will do our best to deter". Mattis; however, clarified that it does not mean that guns would be shooting in space but the war for outer space control would be fought on the Earth instead of outer space.¹⁷

Besides, in 2018 US Intelligence Report prepared by the US Director of Intelligence revealed that the Russians and Chinese militaries are all set to use destructive (ASAT) and non-destructive (lasers etc.) weapons in any next potential war against US to "reduce US and allied military effectiveness [and] to offset any perceived US military advantage derived from military, civil, or commercial space systems."¹⁸

On the other hand, Russian space program has mostly remained shrouded under ambiguity canvas. Russia is resurging at global power stage after its dismemberment in 1989. Its outer space program has again paced up under dynamic leadership of President Putin. The US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002 was the main catalyst behind Russian development of its own BMD systems as well as space denial technologies.

Although Russian Federation does not accept it, yet US military command believes that Russian Federation has developed Japanese famed *Kamikaze* kinds of satellites (Kosmos 2499) which are covertly orbiting in the Earth Orbits as sleeping satellites which would be used on suicidal missions against important satellites of the US during crises.¹⁹

Russian President Putin during his one of the 2012 address in special meeting on the state weapon program reminded space and other weapons' designers that sufficient funds have been allocated for the State Armament Program till 2020 to develop state of the art weapon systems and stressed:

".....to keep the weapons constantly ready and to consider the potential enemy's plans for development of offensive weapons... We [Russian Federation] are not going to enter the arms race, but no one should have any doubts in the reliability and effectiveness of our nuclear potential, as well as the means of air and space defense."²⁰

The assertions made by the Russian President considerably cement the fact that space weapons are being developed if not space based at-least terrestrial based surely.

On the Chinese part, despite being subjected to technological restraints with regard to space technology, it is pursuing its outer space program by following 'buy, copy, or steal' approach in order to seek a continued role at global helm of affairs.²¹ China's space program is not differentiated as civil or military facilities and hence is strategic in nature since its inception.²² Chinese space control capabilities are diverse in nature i.e. both destructive and non-destructive. It is being maintained and controlled by the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) which is reified by its peer competitors as purely military oriented space program.²³ Chinese test of its ASAT test in 2007 against its of the non-functioning satellites substantiates Chinese ASAT capabilities.

With regard to Indian space program, it is apparently peaceful in nature; however, there have been certain numbers of indicators that its space weapons program is still in latent stage.²⁴ India has also yet to declare its formal 'Space Policy Document'.²⁵ It feels that ambiguity serves the purpose more as compared to a declared policy. However, there have been a number of official statements from persons at helm of affairs in space arena which indicate that outer space weapons are being developed. For instance, VK Saraswat, Scientific Advisor to the Indian Defense Minister, stated in 2010 that if the Indian Government desires the DRDO can produce desired capability of fighting space war.²⁶ Later in April 2012, when India tested its Agni-V test, VK Saraswat had again asserted that India has developed ASAT capability – an offensive terrestrial based ASAT.²⁷ Indian capacities of developing space launch vehicles (SLVs), Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and BMD systems could alternatively be used as ASAT weapon systems.

In December 2017, Pakistan's National Command Authority resolved to pursue its space vision 2047 objectives. Although details of the subject space vision has yet to be made public, it could be inferred that it includes plans of developing considerable numbers of satellites for remote sensing, navigation, weather warnings and communications. Pakistan's Space Vision- 2047 vis-à-vis Indian matured space program has an element of subjugation and supremacy from India. Although Pakistan does not have any plan to develop ASAT weapons being too nascent program, yet India would

likely take all measures to deter Pakistan from fiddling with its space assets on solo basis or in cooperation with China.²⁸

From above debate, it could be inferred that although there is no apparent visibility of space getting physically weaponized; however, terrestrial based offensive space capabilities do exist and are being improved for deterring, if not fighting, a space war. Guards can't be lowered and states would do all possible deterrent based efforts to mitigate infringement with their outer space based assets.

Legal Debate –Increasing Probability of Space Weaponization

There is not a single piece of legal paper that prohibits an orbital [space] war.²⁹ There are loop holes even within the text of mother space treaty i.e. Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967. For instance, the OST does not explicitly cover the definition of space weapon and terms like 'peaceful purposes' etc. Ambiguity of term 'peaceful purposes' gave leverage to the advanced space faring nations to develop space weapons to deter the aggressor for maintaining peace in the outer space.³⁰

To prevent weapons in the outer space, treaties like Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) and Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) have been blocked by the US at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as it apparently desires to keep the initiative of developing space weapons whenever needed.³¹ In order to compensate for the legal valued treaties, there are informal initiatives and codes to set the norms for outer space activities. For instance, European Union's International Code of Conduct (ICoC) and McGill Center for Research on Air and Space Law's project of developing 'Manual on International Law Applicable to Military Uses of Outer Space (MILAMOS)' with a purpose of:

"...objectively articulating and clarifying existing international law applicable to military uses of outer space, including the conduct of hostilities in outer space and military activities in periods of tension."³²

The US on the other hand, states that Russia and China promote and are champion of 'no first placement of weapons in outer space' and the champion of treaties like PAROS or PPWT do not cover all kinds of weapons which could be placed in outer space, thus they seek to have leverage in developing those weapons while hedging behind their public positions of keeping space as a heritage. For instance, the proposed treaties do not specify those silent docking satellites which apparently have the missions like re-fueling, inspections or repairs and could alternatively be docked against enemy satellites and then put them in self-destructive mode for destroying the victim satellite of the opponent.³³

The legalistic debate over space weaponization reveals that the major space faring nations do not have an appetite for the legal valued space related treaties but the non-binding and non-legal valued initiatives like the ICoC etc. They want to keep the initiative in their own hand as the space technology; strategic interests and the threat are dynamic and remain evolving.

Global Technology Control Cartels and their Role in Curbing Space Technology Proliferation Trends

Technology is uncontrollable and is meant to flourish being dynamic. Continued Research and Development (R&D) projects have introduced new weapons suiting the interests of their beholders. The Russian initiative of launching first ever satellite *Sputnik* in 1957, did not let the space technology restricted to the Soviet scientists only, but soon it was spread like a fragrance. Technology has no bounds and doesn't care for a particular creed. Based on the assumption and proliferation trend of technologies especially the dual use technologies i.e. those could contribute towards development of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), world's technologically advanced countries formed technology control cartels to prohibit these technologies from falling into the wrong hands. Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Australia Group (AG) and Wassenaar Group (WA) are the export control cartels meant to exercise stringent controls over the technology transfers related to nuclear, missiles, chem-bio and conventional weapons respectively.

All export control cartels have their own specific control lists which are supposed to be strictly adhered before transferring dual use technologies to a recipient state. The receiving state has to abide by certain rules and regulations including end user certificate, non-transfer of the said technology i.e. proliferation in terms of vertical and horizontal proliferation and most importantly, the verification mechanism as an assurance for supplier to check the judicious use of the transferred technology as per the end user certification.

Entry into these cartels, which have varying numbers of participating or member states, demand a merit based qualification. Any aspiring member state for any of the export control cartel has to have the expertise in related technology, clear proliferation record, commitment to adhere to the respective export control regime's guidelines and strong will to contribute global non-proliferation efforts. The four export control regimes have noble causes, which are committed to control the proliferation of specific lethal and dual use technologies. The cartels performed well and were able to control the proliferation of destructive technologies. The success story could be substantiated by the fact that the US President Kennedy who predicted that by mid 1970s. The world would have 15-20 nuclear weapons states,³⁴ could not materialize due to strong export control checks by the cartels. However, over a period of time the said cartels have been subjected to the political, diplomatic and economic pressures, thus alleged for being discriminatory in nature. For instance, discriminatory granting of memberships to India is a case in point.

An Analytical Discourse of Indian Quest for Enhanced Global Power Status and Implications

As admitted by an Indian former foreign secretary Lalit Mansingh, India becomes the right choice for US to check mate China in changed global political power framework.³⁵ India, which is the world's largest populous democracy, the second most populated country, the largest country in South Asia, area wise seventh largest state of

the world and almost the fastest growing economy having around 8% Growth Rate, became logical US choice for the purpose of off shore balancing and buck-passing. India being a revisionist state has been gained of status conscious state. The change of heart by the US who once graded Pakistan as the major non-NATO ally in GWOT relegated it in favor of India for its vested interests. India played its cards well and opted to side with US for meeting its ultimate end of becoming a great power. An analytical discourse of the prevalent strategic environment in which India is being supported un-proportionally by US, has considerable benefits for India however with strings. Benefits which India has acquired from US are stipulated below:

- India found a strong ally in shape of US against an aggression from China. Although, Russia was the long term India's friend; however, Russian and Chinese common ground of communism orientation did not merit it ahead vis-à-vis the US in the eyes of Indian policy makers.
- Indian military industrial complex was strengthened by having western sophisticated technologies instead of crude Russian technologies. It may also be recalled that the Indian military modernization especially the Indian Air Force was already on cards having obsolete aircrafts. With change in hearts the Indian military would have an opportunity to induct advanced western technology and equipment.
- Indian entry into the export control cartels have been smoothened and is being smoothened. Out of four, India has the full membership of three export control cartels with the US support i.e. MTCR (June 2016),³⁶ AG (January 2018)³⁷ and WA (February 2018)³⁸. Politically, by getting into the export control cartels, India has almost gained status of *De-facto* nuclear weapons state without any obligation of NPT restrictions in legal terms. Membership of MTCR and WA has given India a technological edge over its competitors. MTCR membership would prove to be a catalyst in further maturing Indian space program, thereby, flexing its muscles for exercising space control.
- Recently, Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) head revealed that ISRO is indigenously developing state of the art propulsion systems including electric, hybrid, cryogenic and nuclear power propulsion system at one of its subsidiary facility 'Liquid Propulsion Systems Centre (LPSC)' for the space launches.³⁹ Development of said propulsion systems for SLVs could alternatively be used for perfecting its long range missile program including the BMD and ASAT initiatives, which could be destabilizing for the region. Hence, discriminatory assured technology accesses to India of dual use technologies through MTCR forum is alarming for peace in the region.
- India by developing state of the art BMD systems might pull or drag Pakistan into an action-reaction syndrome scenario, which is like creating a bloodletting kind of situation for Pakistan. If Pakistan, opts for tit-for-tat response, it will get involved in building more number of weapons including its own BMD system, it subsequently will be putting a drain on already struggling economy. A weaker or dependent Pakistan suits Indian ambition of becoming the regional hegemon.

- Indian economy is getting further flourished by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as almost all the major powers want to invest in India in various socio, economic and strategic projects so as to have a much bigger share of Indian rising economy pie.
- Finally, all these steps are acting as stepping stones towards Indian getting permanent seat in United Nations Security Council (UNSC). A permanent seat in UNSC coupled with a status of de-jure nuclear weapons state mean rising of India to the status of great power.

Although, India would have many of the above narrated advantages in future, however, an analytical discourse reveals that these advantages to India carry destabilizing strings attached to them for peace of the region:

- Indian entry into export control cartels especially in the NSG would be a political blow to the global non-proliferation regime. It may be recalled that the NSG was formed after the Indian test of its first nuclear device back in 1974 titled, 'Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE)'. International community in general and nuclear weapons aspirant states in particular, would thus get a wrong message of proliferating first and then coercing international community for seeking anticipated power stature. Moreover, the US also set a wrong precedence in the backdrop of Indian 1998 nuclear tests when instead of maintaining sanctions on India, the US President Clinton started rapprochement with it, being a rising economy. The same approach was later carried forward by the Bush Junior and finally culminated into Indo-US nuclear deal of 2008 thereby reversing three decades long sanctions against India.⁴⁰ Evidently, India has adopted the same approach in building of its image to get an access to the advanced space technology. It first matured its space program despite ISRO was put to sanctions after PNE in 1974⁴¹ (smells diversion of dual use technologies).
- Deterrence stability in South Asian region would be put to test, in case of *one*, Indian acquisition of BMD technology indigenously or through international cooperation and *secondly*, if India opts for seeking viable outer space weapons.
- Sequentially, Indian quest for BMD which has a direct nexus with the Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons⁴² could exponentially increase probability of initiation of an unprecedented arms race in outer space.
- India, with great power status could further harden its dismissive attitude towards Pakistan, which subsequently is reducing the chances of peace substantially in the region.
- Indian rise to the status of great power would put Pakistan under perpetual existential threat. Pakistan is not an ordinary state but equipped with nuclear weapons. When put to scenario of existential threat by its neighboring *great power* India, it might feel that threshold has been crossed for which it developed nuclear weapons. Use of nuclear weapons whether at tactical or strategic levels i.e. used against counter-force or counter-value targets, would

be catastrophic not only for the region but beyond. Thus, a known element associated with the South Asia i.e. *nuclear flash point* might get activated.

- Last but not the least; the South Asian regional security complex could become volatile. Although, China and the US are not part of the South Asian region; however, the clash of interests in the region of the two super powers might shape-up environment for initiation of World War III.⁴³ The World War III, in case initiated, wouldn't be a simple conventional war, but it will be a nuclear war to the limit of using thermo-nuclear weapons.

Way Forward

Development of outer space weapons is alarming and has to be addressed at all tiers. Space weapons, if used, could initiate a dangerous war involving even nuclear weapons. Attribution is also difficult in space, hence a chance of misperception has a higher acceptancy. Moreover, resultant debris in outer space due to destruction of space crafts including satellites would be detrimental to life on Earth. Hence, a viable way forward is necessary at international community as well as Pakistan policy levels so that it mitigates the chances of a space war.

Responsibilities of International Community

- **Granting Technology Controls' Membership to Pakistan:** International community has to be impartial with regard to granting access to the dual use technologies. Pakistan being a responsible nuclear weapons state has to be given same status as that of India. South Asian strategic and deterrence stabilities rest on removal of asymmetries and a potent BoP. Being a sovereign state with firm technology base, Pakistan would attempt all measures to defeat the asymmetric scenarios including counter space capabilities. It is better to keep Pakistan in main stream and criteria based approach be practiced with its dual use technologies' requirements as the responsibility and authority are directly proportional to each other.
- **Preventing India from Developing Counter Deterrence Weapons:** International community should play their role in restraining India from developing destabilizing weapon systems including BMD and ASAT weapon systems. The two technologies have been mastered by ISRO after getting an access to the dual use space technologies through MTCR membership.
- **Expedite Negotiating Legal Space Arms Control Treaty:** From arms control perspective, there is a need to initiate negotiation on PAROS treaty. The treaty may include exhaustive definition of space weapons besides other terminologies which have previously been exploited by the advanced space faring nations to extend their zone of military influence to outer space. However, while negotiating, there shouldn't be any discrimination with regard to space 'haves' and 'have-nots', thereby obstructing the nascent space faring nations from acquiring space technology.

Pakistan's Deterrence Based Response Options

Pakistan being at the losing end due to Indian development of counter deterrence weapons including BMD and ASAT weapons has to have viable responsive measures, in case, international community fails to restrain India from destabilizing the stability of the region. A few of the immediate response options to balance the unbalanced deterrence and power equations are as under:

- **Seek International Cooperation in Meeting Space Objectives:** Pakistan may seek international cooperation in seeking its space objectives vide its space vision 2047, besides entering into defense cooperation with regard to defend its space assets. The cooperation may include building destructive and non-destructive counter-space capabilities for maintaining 'full spectrum outer space deterrence'. Destructive space capabilities may not go well with space sensitive experts who are worried about debris; however, non-destructive counter-space capabilities like lasers may be tested for outer space deterrence credibility. Destructive counter-space capability may be simulated for desired results.
- **Development of Micro Satellites/Achieve Redundancy:** Pakistan may make an effort to develop low cost smaller satellites for redundancy. In case its outer space assets (being developed under space vision 2047) are targeted. In technical terms, it is achieving status of 'responsive space'. Responsive space, in simpler terms means replacing a destroyed or out of action satellite with reserve satellites. Easier said than done, it is an expensive option for Pakistan.
- **Development of Hypersonic Missiles:** Hypersonic missiles fly with tremendous speed which is difficult for a normal BMD missile to follow or catch up. Pakistan has an advanced ballistic missile program and over a period of time has demonstrated its capacities to develop advanced versions of ballistic missiles whenever needed to maintain the strategic and deterrence stabilities. For instance, Pakistan had tested its MIRVed ballistic missile 'Ababeel' for balancing Indian destabilizing act of developing BMD systems against Pakistani ballistic missiles. Along the same pattern, Pakistan could aim for developing hypersonic or glide missiles to avert Indian BMD engagement.⁴⁴ Although, it is just hypothetical assertion amid Pakistan's strong commitment towards missiles' non-proliferation, yet, once survivability is put to stakes, states have to acquire whatever counter-measures to bring back the stability. In a recent address by the US under-secretary of defense Michael Griffin at Washington based think tank 'Hudson Institute' showed his concern about hypersonic missiles' detection from outer space and revealed that even the US is not sure of countering Russian or Chinese hypersonic missiles by its matured BMD infrastructure.⁴⁵

Conclusion

Outer space weaponization is yet to be actualized. However, advanced space faring nations have developed their respective destructive and non-destructive technologies to deter an attack on their outer space based assets. Indian space program

is in matured state while Pakistan space program has yet to take off in true sense. Indian perusal of space dominance is natural but would be challenging for the Pakistan's space vision 2047. Pakistan has to be vigilant and exercise all possible options from cooperation to self-sufficiency for addressing the potential space coercive efforts by the Indian side.

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- ⁴⁵ "Chinese Missiles Are Transforming the Balance of Power in the Skies," *Bloomberg*, May 8, 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-07/chinese-missiles-are-transforming-balance-of-power-in-the-skies>.

THE EMERGING STRATEGIC SECURITY ALIGNMENT: A CASE OF GOLDEN RING OF SECURITY IN EURASIAN REGION

*Muhammad Samrez Salik and Ms. Khurshid Fatima**

Abstract

The international political system is gradually drifting from unipolar to bipolar world. This transformation is posing a severe challenge to small and medium size states. Apart from challenges the likely future global order will create more opportunities as compare to the cold war era and unipolarity. In this context the writer in its article has made appraisal for the Eurasian Region countries. China has invested its huge capital in the development of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Central Asian states and in Pakistan. Further, the countries of Eurasian Region are in search of new security structure already in place after the demise of Soviet Union has been abolished. It is worth analyzing its role for BRI, China Pakistan Economic Corridor and overall regional security. The article analyzes the emerging security arrangements to address the security and stability of the region through the prism of theory of Regional Security Complex (RSC).

Keywords: Indian Ocean Region (IOR), Pakistan, Iran, China, Turkey and Russia (PICTR), BRI, Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICS).

Introduction

Following the cataclysmic events of 9/11, the world has been propelled in to radical changes in the global security agenda ranging from Westernization to liberalization and regionalism. The US response to 9/11 and ever since then her endeavors to maintain her hegemony on a global scale have been redefining the security paradigms. The declining reference to time and geographical distance and motivation for hyper-terrorism are facilitating the political identities and activities of non-state actors, creating an environment for the global reach of counter terrorism movements, proliferation of security actors and the varied ability of sovereign states to respond to the challenge of trans-sovereign security problems and transnational threats.¹

The Southwest Asia has remained plagued with conflict and violence for a prolonged period of four decades. Afghanistan has remained the epicenter of this prolonged conflict. In the midst of the transiting world, the order of power is shifting from West to East as well as unipolarity is shifting to multipolarity. In this prism, Belt

*Muhammad Samrez Salik is a PhD scholar at the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad and Ms. Khurshid Fatima is Research Associate at Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA), National Defence University, Islamabad.

and Road Initiative (BRI) forms a counterstrategy to the US strategy of Pivot to Asia.² Indian Ocean Region is also seen as center stage of rivalry and its manifestations are already visible. In the given geopolitical environment, it may be required to analyze future security demands and possible security paradigms to move the conflict prone region to much needed growth and development. In this regard, Barry Buzan's Theory of Regional Security Complex gave logical insights which need to be reviewed in the context of changing global order.

Figure-1: 21st Century Maritime Silk Road




Owing to these regional security developments, the great powers are also on the verge of strategic power play for their invested interests in the **Eurasian Region**. In that realm, the US is contesting to retain her hegemony and is the only country as 'overall security provider'³ of the region whereas economically rising China and resurgent Russia are also introducing new security paradigms to safeguard common interests. The geopolitics of new world order have emerged as a complex in the post 9/11 scenario such as the US, China, Russia and other countries of the Eurasian region are greatly involved into global politics.

The concept of '*Golden Ring of Security*' was first introduced by a Russian Scholar; Andrew Koryobkov in his article: 'From Bandwagoning against Eurasia to Circling the Wagons in the Centre of it'. There are visible signs that the War on Terror is soon bound to slow down and play a considerably less conspicuous role in world politics. The US has already transited the efforts from War on Terror to strategic competitors. However, the New Cold War is looming that is entirely about convergence of strategic interests and resources as well as the zero-sum mindset with its most prominent rivals such as United States, Russia and China.⁴ The US supremacy is being challenged by new emerging inter-connected power blocs against it in the Eurasian region. The logic stipulated behind that the 'weaker states tend to align against stronger adversary as the

later by instinct can take control of anything by force while capturing the essence of bandwagoning'. Thus, the bandwagoning considered as act of preventing an aggressor state from disrupting that balance of power. In this regard, the China and Russia have commenced the balance of the power conception with further growing alliances in the region. Moreover, in the contest of West and East, the natural gravitation of certain countries towards Eastern bloc is interesting in Iran, Turkey and Pakistan forming a super-complex of 'Golden Ring of Security' to oppose much stronger threat i.e. the US in the Eurasian Region.⁵

Figure-2: Belt Road Initiative with Six Economic Corridors



Enclosing New Security Alignment: A 'Golden Ring of Security'

The Golden Ring of Security enclosed the newly emerging security arrangements encircling the distinct and interconnected power alliances (Koryobkov, 2018). In true essence, the new security arrangement is making a growing bilateral strategic partnership between China and Moscow as 'waxing powers' against the US as a 'waning power'. The multi-polar trilateral relations between Beijing, Russia and Pakistan have started as a response effort (2016) towards US failure in countering terrorism in Afghanistan. A multilateral cooperation of the Mid-East major powers between Iran, Turkey and Russia emerged in the late 2016 that also formalized into manifolds bilateral alliances later in 2018. Moreover, these alliances have incorporated the world most troubled spot i.e. Afghanistan and energy rich areas of Central Asian states as well as the heartland of Eurasia and to some extent Middle East. Moreover, these two transnational institutions that occupy the most important place in security alliances are Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Pakistan, however, can function as the bridge in connecting them together as the 'Zipper

of Eurasia⁶ notion via the Chinese-built infrastructure of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as part of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This coinage refers to the New Eurasian Land Transport Initiative (NELTI) and Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) coupled with expansions of the CPEC.

Conceptualizing ‘Common Threat’ and Formation of ‘New Security Alignment’

At the first stance, the growing Sino-Russian Alliance seems as cardinal feature to be a logical counter to their common adversary (US) in the emerging global order.⁷ China and Russia have persistently aligned their stances on critical issues against the US and including, North Korea, casting double vetoes in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on the US interventions in Middle East⁸, pursuing greater power in international financial institutions, resisting US perspective on cyber governance and missile defense. China had also refrained from criticizing Russian intervention in Ukraine⁹ while Moscow demonstrated implicit support for China in its maritime disputes that further strengthened strategic alliance against west.¹⁰ Moreover, both have drawn increasingly closer together because of a confluence of geostrategic, political, and economic interests. This conflict has a common theme of diminishing, subverting, or dislodging American influence. On other hand, US power is also receding in its military and diplomatic power in its political leverage, in its economic might, and, perhaps most perilously, in the power and appeal of its leadership and ideas¹¹.

On the strategic level, this leads towards a ‘*New Cold War*’¹² confrontation that is already underway¹³ for long term strategic conflicts. It had become institutionalized since the US proposed its National Security Strategy (NSS, 2017) and termed both Russia and China as her ‘Strategic Competitors’.¹⁴ Besides, the American hostility towards Beijing and Moscow can be viewed in the US strategies such as upgrading the space wars as a branch of defense, possibility of missile crisis in Europe and allegation on Russia for interference in American elections for influencing outcome and followed by the structural conflictual tendencies.¹⁵ In the economic domain, the US has also imposed heavy sanctions on Russia in terms of economic and technological constraints. US has gone more hostile in containment of China and has started trade war against China.¹⁶

However, Moscow and Beijing have seen their influence increasing in the region. The growing strategic rapprochement between both is viewed as ‘a shallow partnership of connivance’ due to convergence of national interests such as military cooperation and leveling of allegations against them to form a new security alignment against the West.¹⁷ Recently, both attended the ECO meetings which can be viewed in this context. In addition, the US’ growing tensions with Iran pushed Moscow and China closer in opposing economic sanctions against Tehran. Russia and Beijing coalition with EU to isolate US also seems to be on the cards. The strategic partnerships are improving manifolds between Pakistan- China, Pakistan- Russia, with Central Asian States and Turkey to offset the growing effect of Indo-US-Israel nexus in the region. Moreover, the Sino-Russian embrace will continue to deepen in the economic security sphere in the foreseeable future.

The research paper is divided into three sections. The first section deals with the theoretical underpinnings applied on the concept of Golden Ring of Security through the framework of Regional Security Complex (RSC) and Comprehensive Security Framework by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. The second section highlights the major implications at global, regional, inter-state and domestic levels. The third section comprises of the major findings of the paper as well as conclusions and recommendations.

Theoretical Underpinnings

'Security' in its traditional conception remained synonyms with the neo-realist's assumption of state as 'derivative of power'¹⁸ such as states constantly struggling for power during World Wars. The Barry Buzan, for the first time, in his book; "*People, State and Fear*" argued that the concept of security was too narrowly founded and evolved as more complex and multifaceted in Post-Cold War Era.¹⁹ So, he focused was to offer a broader security framework encompassing all dimensions of security.²⁰ Buzan's approach is an interesting exercise to analyze security from all angles, from micro to macro levels and to address the social aspects of security and to how find people or societies construct or 'securitize' threats. According to Buzan, in the international relations 'regions' are usually considered as subsystem or part of international system that have a particular geographical boundaries and common patterns of interactions such as religion, language, political integration, cooperation among states and history etc. The regional security complex 'is a group of states whose primary security concerns are so intrinsically interlinked and interdependent with one another and their national security interests cannot be realistically apart'²¹. Security is a relational phenomenon because one cannot understand the national security of any given state without understanding the international pattern of security interdependence in which it is embedded.²² In his analysis of regional security and how it affects the concept of security as a whole, Buzan offers several interesting and important concepts. First comes 'amity and enmity among states', in other words relationships between states that can represent a spectrum of being a friend and foe or alliances to those marked by fear. According to Buzan, the concepts of amity and enmity cannot be attributed solely to the balance of power. The issues that can affect these feelings range from things such as ideology, territory, ethnic lines, and historical precedent.²³ This is important to understand as the concept of amity/enmity leads to the idea of what Buzan refers to as 'Regional security complex' whose processes of securitization and desecuritization cannot be resolved apart from one another.²⁴ Buzan veers towards a broader understanding of security-based levels and sectors. The three levels that are referenced and addressed in detail in his work are individuals, states and international systems. The sectors, which he also addressed in the article '*New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century*', are Political, Military, Economic, Societal, and Environmental, together forming the concept of 'Comprehensive Security'.²⁵ These concepts cannot adequately address the issue of security separately, each one is intricately and complexly linked with the next, forming a web of information that consequently affect each other. This micro/macro methodology is something, of the utmost importance in order to be able to get a better idea how to deal with what Buzan calls the 'National Security Problem'.²⁶

Barry Buzan discussed briefly in his book with co-authors Old Waever and Jaap de Wilde; 'Security: A New Framework for Analysis', the dimensions and levels of security problem in term of ordering priorities that are interwoven together as complex web;²⁷ Barry Buzan's major findings are:

- **Military Security** is the most important threat and most pressing concern, which affects all components of the state. It can put into question the very basic duty of a state to be able to protect its citizens as well as have an adverse effect on the layers of social and individual interests.²⁸
- **Political Security** represents a constant concern for a state. It can be more ambiguous and difficult to identify in relation to military threats. As the state, itself is a political entity, a political threat with the purpose of weakening that entity can be considered to be on par with a military threat. They can take the form of competition amongst ideologies, or an attack to the nation itself. However it is important to distinguish between intentional political threats and those that arise structurally from the impact of foreign alternatives on the legitimacy of states.²⁹
- **Economic Security** is difficult to determine due to the nature of economics itself. The economic sector is also a clear example of how the different sectors interact with one another. Buzan addresses the important linkage between economic security and military security. It is easy to see that military security is dependent on economic security due do budget constraints and limits. Furthermore, economic security can be considered a key indicator as to the general security of a state. If developed and developing countries are compared, it is clear that with economic security other levels of security become easier to establish.
- **Societal Security** threats are about identity and the balance that can be found within any given state. Weak states are often ill-equipped to deal with differences in identity and culture that have spill-over effect over other neighbouring states which share same ethnicities and identities. However, it is also important to stress that the notion of societal security is difficult to apply since it deals with identities and cultures, essentially subjective and contextual constructions, it can easily lead to politics of discrimination and exclusion.
- **Environmental Security** is not easier to define and is considered the most controversial of the five sectors. When thinking of possible ecological threats, one often thinks about the "struggle humans have with nature" such as earthquakes and hurricanes. It is impossible to control these natural disasters. Possible initiatives to address these issues dependent on economic security and political security, as these issues are considered not only a threat to an individual state, but also global threats that will have a widespread after effects.

After analyzing the framework of "Regional Security Complex and the Concept of Comprehensive Security" with its derivatives, which is directly relevant to the subject matter under discussion. It is necessary to apply and evaluate theory, while keeping in view the "emerging geopolitics" in Eurasia and its implication for the region. The strategic relations among the US, Russia and China can be understood by taking into

consideration the basic assumptions of Neo-Realism theory. Eastern Bloc's ambitions to become revisionist powers in Eurasia against the US are truly the depiction of the traditional conception of security to pursue power for influence and resources in the region. Since America's national interest are driven in her policies of becoming 'sole security provider' of the region. The resurgent Russia and economically rising Beijing feel insecure as natural instinct of 'fear' between states to be controlled by hegemony as already discussed by Barry Buzan (2009). States foster alliances in the pattern of 'amity and enmity' to securitize threats from foreign interference whereby intrinsically stressing the national security issues altogether. In that context; the emerging security alignments between PICTR countries forming a 'Golden Ring of Security' can be viewed as new 'security complex' with reference to the interdependence and interlinkages between these countries on the following parameters or the levels such as; the golden ring of security emerges as countering way to the US growing Quad alliance and the emerging Indo-US-Israel nexus in the Eurasian region thereby addressing the military threats in context. The PICTR countries also have leverage to bring security and stability in the most volatile region i.e. Afghanistan, because the US is constantly failing the purpose by putting military muscles rather than huge investments in development and growth. This development will lead towards bloc politics in the realm of new cold confrontation between eastern and western bloc on ideological basis. The eastern bloc led by PICTR countries supporting communism and socialist's political ideologies as compared to US led capitalist's ideology. The area is also containing immense natural resources that may become source of concern for great powers. Moreover, the regional memberships and transnational cooperation at regional institutions such as SCO and ECO are underpinning the economic security of these states in foreseeable future. Additionally, the instability in Kabul is bound to affect the development of these projects due to its ill effects radiating to neighboring countries compounding security aspects. Since the US withdrawal from Paris Agreement; the PICTR countries are likely to bring in more cooperation in environmental security. In the holistic view, the newly formed security arrangements in the shape of Golden Ring of Security have altogether prospects of forming regional security complex that will foster effective security mechanism thereby constructing enhanced cooperative security framework in foreseeable future.

Critique

Although, the concept of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSC) is applicable well on the emerging geopolitics of Eurasian region. Under the consideration of all the derivatives of the theory, the newly multi-pronged alliances between PICTR countries at regional level may be suited best to form a Regional Security Complex. All sectors are considered while analyzing national and international security both separately and together. But, the idea of Regional Security Complexes that was offered by Barry Buzan in his book: "Regions and Power: The Structure of International Security" through which multiple regions such as Middle East, South Asia and East Asian complexes, have not been adequately addressed in the security domain due to overburdening of relational interdependence between states in the regions. Moreover, within the context of emerging security alliances between PICTR, the RSC theory should be reviewed again in term of newly dynamics forming regional complexes owing to global geopolitical and

geo economic developments. Therefore, the concept of “Comprehensive Security” is also applied to incorporate security in all domains and analyzed briefly.

Implications

- **Impact on Overall Security:** The emerging security arrangements i.e. the Golden Ring of Security between PICTR countries will impact Eurasian Region positively³⁰. Although, the US is becoming waning power and her hedging policies such as from ‘Pivot to Asia’ to ‘Rebalancing’ and Quad alliances in Indo-Pacific are not much favored in the interests of the regional countries³¹ in Eurasia. Due to the regional history of turmoil, there are likely chances of crackdown between countries out of game played for divergent interest by the great powers.³² Moreover, in case of China, Russia and India there is also the possibility of regional integration (trade), but the conflicts will remain intact with regards to security imperatives³³. India will also prefer to be part of a regional alliance while being domineer of the US hedging policy while acknowledging her ambitious regional power status³⁴. Besides, Australia is security partner of the US and economic partner of China. However, the states seem to favor more the option which lies at optimal interest according to the need-based interdependence. Moreover, the intertwined nature of interests between great powers will create conflicting situations that lead towards sense of deprivation among states. There is a need to define regional cooperation for overall security such as led by PICTR countries. It is established fact that anarchy and sense of deprivation can only bring dissatisfaction. That’s why, all the powers have co-opted the policies of ‘vested interests’ in the region, therefore, the geo-economic convergences between great powers may reduce tensions by avoiding any conflicts in the Eurasian Region³⁵.
- **Regional Impact:** In the regional context, the Golden Ring of Security is going to be an enhanced security mechanism in terms of institutional commitments, it is also considered a more optimal and preferred security mechanism. The Golden Ring of Security as ‘security complex’ can be viewed in terms of ‘collective security’ in Eurasia through the lens of SCO, ECO and BRI. Although, it might have some negative implications, such as states might have natural competition for power and influence between them. However, the Golden Ring of Security will encompass more insider powers in the security complex than outside powers in the region. The security impact in Afghanistan, India, Central Asian Republics, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan is as under:
 - **Impact on Afghanistan:** Afghanistan holds a central position vis-à-vis BRI and CPEC. Instability in Afghanistan can adversely affect main prong of BRI passing through Kazakhstan in the north and CPEC in the south. One of the main threats to CPEC lie in instability if Afghanistan. Keeping in view criticality of CPEC for overall success of BRI, stability in Afghanistan becomes a *sine qua non*. It may even be in the interest of the US to keep Afghanistan unstable. Afghanistan lies at the heart of Eurasia and therefore instability in Afghanistan radiates ill effects to all the countries in Eurasian region. Afghanistan, as a most troubled spot,

is facing issues, one of them is, US' interests of using Afghanistan as battleground to manipulate and serve her interests in the region. Afghanistan provides an opportunity to the US to keep an eye on Pakistan, China, Iran and Russia. It also enhances liberty of action of the US vis-à-vis China's rise and BRI. Since US is visibly failing to bring stability, but China and Russia are involved in peace process for stability out of their own strategic interests. Chinese ambitions to secure access through CPEC and CAREC initiatives can be secured through stability if Afghanistan for which India has already made serious objections³⁶. Moreover, through Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline will make Afghanistan an energy transit hub which might also facilitate Russian ambitions to secure easy access to the warm waters. Afghanistan is also facing issues of terrorism, militancy, drug trafficking and human smuggling at border areas with Turkey and Iran. Pakistan and Afghanistan can also play role as connector hub to the region. However, there are likely chances that the collective security arrangements such as The Golden Ring of Security can play more effective role in bringing stability in the region. There is a need for collective response mechanism against common security threat in the conception of emerging security complex.

- **Impact on India:** India is serving as '*net security provider*' of the region on behest of the US. In this context, India will be on more disadvantages while being the puppet of US in the region³⁷. As a major implication, India might get sidelined in the region and thereby face isolationist tendencies by the PICTR countries in foreseeable future. Indian upgrading of her defense and naval posture will form a great source of concern in the region specially for Pakistan³⁸. India ambitions to become dominant regional power are being challenged by both the revisionist powers such as China and Russia in the region.³⁹ Indian isolation in the region will contribute positively to Pakistan. CPEC as geostrategic alternative will make redundant great powers' dependency over *Strait of Malacca* and provide more room for their strategic interests in Indian Ocean region as well.
- **Impact on Central Asian Republics:** Energy rich areas are likely to come under effective control for more economic development through cooperation between PICTR countries. CARs will remain at advantage for having their own leverages in terms of capacity and resources.
- **Impact on Turkey and Iran:** Iran and Turkey are aspiring their own roles in the region⁴⁰. Both Iran and Turkey are against US influence and want to become regional dominant powers in Eurasia. Golden Ring of Security will provide them alternate options.
- **Impact on Pakistan:** Pakistan has remained bulwark first for USSR and secondly for US in the region. The presence of the US in Afghanistan has enhanced liberty of action of India which directly impinges upon security of Pakistan. India has negatively contributed

towards creating instability in the region. The leverages provided to India by the US in Afghanistan cause serious implications for Pakistan and India continues to label Pakistan as a state sponsoring terrorism⁴¹. US cutting of financial aid to Pakistan and internationally maligning of Pakistan is favoring India. However, US recent tilt towards Pakistan in terms of playing more role in Afghanistan can be viewed in consideration of its geostrategic importance in the region. India has declared two front war against China and Pakistan which is another concern for security of Pakistan⁴². In this scenario, the possible options for Pakistan lie in playing integral role in the newly emerging security alignment such as Golden Ring of Security. Pakistan has leverages to play primary role in security terms as well as potential economic connector through CPEC in the Eurasian region. In this regard, Pakistan National Internal Security Policy (2018-2030) should be reviewed to strengthen the capacity building at both regional and national levels for optimal results in foreseeable future.

Findings/Analysis

- First, US influence seems to be reducing due her leadership failure in the region and secondly, it is being challenged by revisionist powers like China and Russia as “Axis of Resistance”.
- New Cold War confrontation will bring sense of deprivation among states as it is based on ideologies of the great powers led by making eastern and western blocs.
- Effective Security mechanisms such as emerging Golden Ring of Security through PICTR countries will bring more stability in terms of institutional commitments for collective security and development as a ‘Security Complex’.
- Regional Security Complex theory by Barry Buzan needs to be reviewed in terms of new geopolitical developments and emerging regional alliances.
- However, smaller states are affected when bigger states play games; therefore, there is a lot of apprehension among the countries in the region. The need of the hour is to focus on capacity building of those states in every possible aspect.
- ‘Accommodating and Cooperative Strategic Framework/ Policy’ such as the Golden Ring of Security Framework is needed at regional level to ensure stability and prosperity in the region.
- Stability in Afghanistan will be better ensured.
- Energy security of energy rich regions will be ensured.
- Greater role of regional powers will be ensured as against self-serving interests of the extra regional powers.

Conclusion

“The world is witnessing titanic transitions. The old rivalries are transforming into future friendships and age-old strategic partnerships are now being transformed into suspicious relationships”. China and Russia were considered to be enemies but now

they are best friends. India and Russia, thought to be inseparable because of India's dependence on Russia are now weaning away due to Indian tilt towards the US. Consequently, Russia has begun to have doubts about how their relationship would be in the future. The global powers are at the verge of receiving 'change of choices' and patterns of 'trust and mistrust' hauling the world towards anarchy and sense of deprivation. In the gigantic view, 'regions' are needed to be identified in focusing submerged developments through regional alliances. The need of new leadership is important for combating ideological differences among emerging blocs whereby contributing greatly in new world order for continuous harmony and peace in the world.

Recommendations

- Resurgence of the US Global Leadership can only combat the emerging threat of China-Russia Axis impacting the peace and security of the world.
- The growing China-Russian alliance should be considered more accurately and translucently in terms of their revisionist aspirations to become as dominant global powers.
- There is a need to reintegrate Iran and Turkey in terms of their regional power status in making security arrangements of Golden Ring of Security.
- Indian and Russian alliance should also be reconsidered.
- There is an opportunity to isolate India because of her outside approach e.g. India's defense up-gradation with the support of the US and India's role as net security provider of the whole region on behest of the US.
- There is a need to differentiate the global leader and the new leaders i.e. already existing revival of the US and Western ideologies and new leader in terms of new principals led by Eastern bloc.
- The 'demilitarized-region' would be in common interest of all; regional as well as extra- regional stakeholders. In this regard, diplomacy should be focused as an optimal principle between great powers.
- All efforts should be put in to bring stability in Afghanistan which is a *sia-quanon* for success of future initiatives as well as growth and development is the region.

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CHINA PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR: GEOPOLITICAL IMPORTANCE FOR CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS

*Dr. Sarwat Rauf, Dr. Umer Iftikhar and Dr. Farhat Konain Shujahi**

Abstract

The process of regional integration becomes indispensable for peace at state, regional and international level. This paper aims to highlight Pakistan and China's cooperation in achieving regional integration and their steps towards a new phase of geo-economic relations. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will have considerable implications not only for China and Pakistan but also for Central Asia Republics (CARs). CPEC is part of China's advancement planning of One Belt One Road (OBOR,) which intends to link it with South Asia, Central Asia, Middle East, Europe and Africa via land and sea. CPEC is prone to steer a large economic activity in Pakistan and at the same time, its spill-over effects will have positive impact on CARs. CPEC comes in high times when Pakistan gets membership of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and signs energy projects such as Central Asia-South Asia (CASA-1000) and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan Pakistan India gas Pipeline (TAPI). Hence the paper raises the questions; why CARs are taking interests in ongoing regional integration projects of China and Pakistan? How will Pakistan act as a bridge in connecting CARs with other regions? The paper endeavors to prove that CPEC is an important project for CARs, eventually it will steer regional peace and harmony.

Keywords: Integration, CPEC, TAPI, CASA-1000, Connectivity Projects, CARs.

Introduction

International politics is witnessing a new era of interdependence and regional connectivity. With this a strong competition amongst states has begun and unprecedented interdependence has impelled unique alliance formations and regional integration for developing regional economies and maintaining regional peace. Regional security and economic activities have become two sides of same coin in Asian states. Activities to enhance regional economic cooperation and formation of political and economic blocs are increasing in Asia due to newly launched projects of China. New vistas of economic integration are appearing due to China's OBOR initiative.

CPEC, being an important component of OBOR, accentuated Pakistan's regional importance because it enjoys special geographical advantages in the region of

*Dr. Sarwat Rauf is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad. Dr. Umer Iftikhar is lecturer at the Department of Leadership and Management Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad and Dr. Farhat Konain Shujahi is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad.

Central Asia and South Asia. Being at the juncture of South Asia, Central Asia, China, and Persian Gulf, Pakistan holds a unique position for all adjacent regions. "Pakistan's geo-economic importance stems from its location at the crossroads of three Asia: West, Central and South".¹ Surmounting problems such as energy crisis, terrorism and lack of proper transport system, are curtailing economic activities of Pakistan. Despite all hiccups, role of Pakistan as a regional connector has convinced China that Pakistan's close cooperation with Central Asia is a strategic compulsion as CPEC offers platforms for CARs to integrate Chinese geopolitical and economic objectives.²

This paper aims to examine geopolitical importance of CPEC for Pakistan and CARs. The details of partnership, its optimistic side and fears of some states related to this project are discussed in detail. Moreover, the geo-economic benefits of CPEC for China and Pakistan and its positive effects on CARs are being rationalized. At the first place, theoretical features are underscored followed by the application part. At the end some useful suggestions are also given.

CPEC: An Instrument of Regional Stability

CPEC is being anticipated as a regional game-changer which will be beneficial for the regional countries due to its spillover effects. CPEC purposes to connect other adjacent countries for industrial development, commerce, and trade thereby it leads to collective socioeconomic development and growth. Pakistan aspires to increase its trade activity, connect its industry through energy infrastructure and communication and above all building industrial zones and Gwadar Port.³

Furthermore, CPEC is of great advantage for Pakistan with regards to economic investment intended at invigorating its economy; more than that it will be an asset that might provide much desired symmetry against bolstering India's strategic and economic ingress in South Asia. India is relatively facing an unfavorable situation as the Karakoram Highway (China Pakistan Friendship highway) is connecting China with Pakistan but naturally barring India's access to Central Asia. Sarah Watson, an expert on Indian affairs said that Pak-China cooperation would not only pose military challenge to India but also would affect its access to lucrative trade routes.⁴ CPEC serves as shortest trade route for China to Arabian Sea and then connecting it to West Asia and Europe bypassing Strait of Malacca. Therefore, regional connectivity is producing new avenues of cooperation for landlocked states including Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. This phenomenon is well explained in the theoretical pattern of neo-functionalism.⁵ Neo-Functionalism places emphasis on the role of state and non-state actors in regional integration, it also pictures the possibility of further integration between the states. The spillover will assimilate CARs in economic realm and trade opportunities will lead to integration in other sectors such as social and cultural domains. Furthermore, regions of Central Asia, Middle East and South Asia are expected to reap huge economic dividends from the Corridor.

South Asian region is considered as highly fractured region because of increasing population, struggling economies, energy shortage, extremism, militancy, terrorism and water scarcity. South Asian region is also bracketed in the least

economically integrated areas in the world, while other regions of the world have higher intra-regional trade. South Asian intra-regional trade is merely 3-5 percent of the total trade of the region, demonstrating just over 1 percent of regional GDP, while it is 7% in East Asia. Merely, India is trading with its neighbors in less than 3% of its total trade.⁶ Similarly, Central Asia is also facing severe economic, political and security challenges,⁷ although different from South Asia, but resulting predicaments are common. CARs are land locked due to which economic development has become impassive, and their security problems are highly individualized.⁸ Although Central Asia is possessing rich natural resources such as oil, gas, uranium and other minerals but due to inaccessibility of open seas, the pursuit of collaborators to link to world markets follow on. In this situation, Gwadar portents prosperity for CARs and casts positive effects on regional integration projects. Furthermore, China as second largest economy in the world,⁹ effectively practices its influence in the region to lessen strains, it believes that collective trade, industrial development and infrastructure can bring prosperity for all. China is worried about the security of its periphery and hopes to build friendly relations with CARs.¹⁰ The CPEC is a unique plan of China to build infrastructure, bilateral trade, and socio economic development in Pakistan to boost regional integration.¹¹

The theory of neo-functionalism envisions the positive effects of regional integration and upholding of cordial relations. "Regional integration is an intrinsically sporadic process, under conditions of democracy and pluralistic representation, national governments will find themselves increasingly entangled in regional pressures and devolving more authority to the regional organizations they have created. Eventually, their citizens will begin shifting more of their expectations to the region and satisfying them will increase the likelihood that economic-social integration will "spill-over" into political integration".¹² China and Pakistan, in similar manner, set the terms of the CPEC which would consequentially determine the direction and extent of subsequent positive change.

Pakistan's geostrategic location makes it a pivotal state and it serves as a natural link of the members of TAPI, CPEC, CASA-1000 and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Its strategic location is making it crucial, for South Asia, Central Asia and West Asia. Pakistan and China share border, and this geographical proximity between two states make their bond stronger. China also have geographical links and strong bonds with CARs in terms of trade and security, which is creditable to yield wealth. Nonetheless, landlocked CARs are exposed to serious economic snags and seeking a partner, beyond Russia, to provide them viable routes.¹³ A strident factor, leads CARs near to China and Pakistan is a viable option for CARs.¹⁴ Equally, Central Asia's enormous oil and gas resources can be utilized in fulfilling energy demands of Pakistan. Whereas CARs can utilize Gwadar port (the epicenter of CPEC) to export their goods to international market. Once this route becomes available to CARs for trade, other markets which are attached to this route will also be accessible and economic partnership will grow. Moreover, Pakistan will be able to improve its strategic importance to act as a bridge between the Asian and African zones by the implementation of CPEC which connects South Asia and Central Asia. Therefore, CPEC is a life-time development opportunity for Pakistan. The Gwadar Port, while gaining

importance as Pakistan's economic center, will be one of the most important ports in the Arabian Sea. The economic and energy cooperation with other regions will have a spillover effect and it will guarantee win-win situation for everyone.¹⁵

Certainly, Pakistan fully relies on Chinese assistance during peace and war due to historical records of its support to Pakistan.¹⁶ Both countries are linked through Karakoram Highway (KKH), passing through the Khunjrab pass, further extended to the CARs.¹⁷ Pakistan forestalls to link Gwadar Port with CARs for trade and transportation of energy. Once the way is open to Central Asia for bilateral trade, the other markets will be approached widely and economic relations will grow. This will certainly transform Pakistan and other stakeholders which will be equally benefitted. In short, material comfort will be helpful in solving regional issues and transformation will affect positively on the economies of partners.

Pakistan and Central Asia

Pakistan's prompt response towards CARs, on their independence, and recognition of all CARs had proved friendly feelings for brotherly nations. Islamabad continued political and economic support of CARs and increased association by signing the charter of Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) with CARs in 1992.¹⁸ This was the bold step as it was remarkable to get the ten Muslim countries of Central, South and West Asia on one platform and defining common goals. Although 13th summit of ECO held in March 2017¹⁹ but its members do not assemble frequently whereas regional, political and strategic issues are discussed usually in bilateral meetings. To make ECO better and to renew the commitment to its basic goals were assured in 13th summit, held in Islamabad.²⁰

However, cultural, historical, and religious bonds between Pakistan and CARs substantiate strong base of political and diplomatic relations. It appears that CARs wanted to reduce dependence on its traditional patron to conduct open trade with outer world, and they also trying to decrease relying solely on Russia for exporting energy.²¹ However, it is not to discount that threadbare leadership is not ended completely; the deep-rooted communist influential are still governing there, sometimes hampering the strong bonds with Muslim neighbors and tilt more to the West. However, it is inferred that somehow CARs are diversifying their policies towards Southern states (Pakistan, Afghanistan), the West and their traditional ruler.

Pakistan's efforts to promote cooperation with CARs are exemplary; several visits have been paid by leaders of Pakistan to CARs. The promotion of bilateral relations and economic cooperation with these republics have remained priority for both sides. The ex-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif paid several visits to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan which enhanced collaboration in many areas. President Karimov of Uzbekistan, in his visit to Pakistan, praised Pakistan in these words "Pakistan is playing a key role for peace and stability in the region".²² In November, 2015, President of Tajikistan has also visited Pakistan and both leaders emphasized to be economic cohorts and underscored the need of regional teamwork to for the settlement of common issues.²³

Besides, Pakistan and Central Asia, CPEC will benefit other countries of Middle East, and Africa. Currently China depends on Strait of Malacca to conduct trade which takes almost forty-five days to reach international market and appears expensive. Therefore, China will use the Kashgar-Gwadar route, which reduces expenditures and takes less time in approaching international market. Time reduction is approximately two weeks (from China to Persian gulf) whereas the trade distance between South China Sea and Persian Gulf would be reduced from 16,000 to 2500 km.²⁴ Chinese envisioned the value of this route in 1960s, and they know that Gwadar has potential to connect China's Western areas to Arabian sea.²⁵ Moreover, this project has the capability to transform regional trade routes and will be a boon (to me its boon) for South and Central Asian's economies. In addition to Chinese investment on Gwadar port (Baluchistan), incredible trade potential is available for energy rich CARs, as its oil and gas can be supplied through Gwadar. If all goes as planned, Gwadar would be the garage of multibillion dollar gas pipelines.²⁶

Geographical proximity, religious commonality and cultural affinity have been the contributing factors in strengthening affable relations between Pakistan and CARs. This has led to the establishment of Joint Economic Commissions with each CAR and concluded about 160 bilateral agreements till 2004.²⁷ Besides, Pakistan wanted to act as a hub of trade in the region and ready to provide overland access to the landlocked CARs to the entire world. In October 2016, 15th meeting of Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) held in Pakistan. CAREC works for collective regional benefits and promotes economic collaboration.²⁸ Hence, it is assumed that CPEC is not merely an instrument of connectivity but it will shape a new Central Asia as CARs will be able to access world markets.

Under the corridor, a long-term strategy is adopted in which Beijing plans to lay gas and oil pipelines from Iran to meet its energy needs. Ex-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has made several visits of CARs and sought support for signing agreement of free trade with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).²⁹ Pakistan aims to enhance trade with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan by signing this agreement. The exporters will be paying the duty only one time at the border of the three countries and products can be shipped to member countries of the Customs Union.³⁰

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

The practice of multilateral diplomacy helps mitigating regional tensions and augmenting collaboration. The SCO is becoming an influential organization in Central Asia; it has been labeled by some Western scholars as a security organization, and a regional anti-terrorism coalition.³¹ Now with the promotion of OBOR and CPEC, SCO has been reinvigorated with larger chances of cooperation and cohesion.³² Worth mentioning aspect is SCO membership of Pakistan and India in June 2017 which posits gradually moving of states towards economic cooperation. "SCO has also evolved towards security collaboration although it primarily remains an economic organization".³³ For this reason, it had been widely perceived by the Western analysts as an anti-Western alliance.

Whatever features SCO embraces but worth noting aspect, so far, is its bonding powers as it brought two hostile nations together on one platform to deal regional issues. Despite differences, from mild to severe, Russia and China have been able to maintain their relations since 1996 when SCO was Shanghai Five. The two governments have realized to stabilizing their relations and boosting the spirit of collaboration within region due to the increasing multiple cooperation channels and considerable achievements in the world politics. CARs have also learnt that presence of a patron state in any regional organization guarantees its success. Hence, China and CARs had settled issues left from military skirmishes on the Sino-Soviet border during Cold war era.³⁴

In 2001, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), with increased members, succeeded Shanghai Five and after few months US had initiated its war against terrorism while launching its air strikes on Afghanistan. US economic aid was offered to CARs, reciprocally permission was granted to NATO forces to use soil of CARs to establish military bases to attack on Afghanistan.³⁵ This situation was weird for neighboring China and Russia, as SCO was formed to solve border conflicts, anti-terrorism and counter militancy. This gave hype to the notion that SCO is counter NATO or anti-Western bloc. With the commencement of SCO, a coordinated policy against terrorism could not develop. However, with the passage of time, SCO has successfully launched its security and economic rubric. Gradually its expansion transpired, as SCO has offered observer status to various states and several states are in line to be full members. Pakistan and India, two observer states, with steady pace became full members of SCO in June 2017.³⁶ Presently, SCO is making considerable progress in trade, transport and energy sectors in the whole region. New equilibriums are being shaped, new geopolitical realities are being outspread and it is unleashed that Pakistan is a natural link for the SCO member states.

Factoring Central Asia in Connectivity Projects

Apparently, separate from CPEC, two projects of connectivity, Central Asia-South Asia 1000 (CASA-1000) and Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India Pipeline (TAPI) portray the common interests of CARs and Pakistan. Although these projects were well before the announcement of CPEC project but recent efforts of revamping and congenial response of Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan's instant reply is sign of spillovers of OBOR and CPEC. The CASA-1000 aims to launch Central Asia-South Asia Regional Electricity Market (CASAREM), to assuage South Asia's energy deficiency.

“This would include a 750km high voltage direct current (DC) transmission system between Tajikistan and Pakistan via Afghanistan, together with associated converter stations at Sangtuda (1,300MW), Kabul (300MW) and Peshawar (1,300MW).³⁷ Interestingly, mechanism of *open access*³⁸ is main source of attraction to others exporters such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Russia. Besides, conflict ridden areas, such as Afghanistan can boost its economy which will be a contributing factor in reducing violent mindset. “Afghanistan will earn an annual amount of \$50 million USD from transit rights, which is a major amount for reconstruction in Afghanistan”.³⁹ Hence it is envisaged that CASA-1000 and other projects of connectivity

can augment economic interdependence and helpful in peace building in the region. Peaceful Afghanistan can only provide viable transit route leading to stability prospects. However, security is the common concerns of stakeholders, "all governments (member countries of agreement) have decided to provide adequate security to contractor's workers and belongings".⁴⁰ Regional electricity trade is inviting investment for trade infrastructure which will be alleviating poverty and potential of energy trade which will also be helpful in confidence building.

TAPI is another important project of regional connectivity, enabling energy deficit countries of South Asia to access natural gas. This project had the support of the US as it would supply Central Asian Gas to South Asia without Russia. Besides, TAPI would bypass Iran and will carry gas directly through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India. Presently, CPEC and TAPI are under-construction (stages are different) and security issues are common which are looming mostly because of instability in Afghanistan. The route of TAPI provides its geographical features and importance, starting from Dauletabad (Turkmenistan) gas field, TAPI will go by the way of Herat-Kandahar and then arrive in Pakistan going through the Bolan Pass (Baluchistan). Afterwards, it will transpire at Fazilka (India) border with Pakistan.⁴¹ In the wake of NATO troop's departure, security of these projects has become the main concern of all stakeholders.

Peace in Afghanistan

All connectivity projects between Pakistan and CARs are hooked on peace in Afghanistan, where the security situation has been indeterminate for years. Hence, pacific environs in Afghanistan are required to launch development projects, economic betterment and geographical connections between South and Central Asia. Setting up peace and security is the foremost desire of Pakistan, China and CARs. Projects of connectivity would have positive effects for the whole region, in terms of cooperation but security situation in Afghanistan is main hurdle.⁴² Another bitter fact that Pakistan did not have an easy ride in its relations with Afghanistan in past few years as Afghanistan is curbing all roads lead to CARs rather it is offering route to India via Iran to connect Central Asia. Tensions were fueled between Islamabad and Kabul and the stressful situation is still prevailing. In these circumstances, a positive development took place in which Pakistan came close to Russia. Nowadays, Moscow, Beijing and Islamabad are working to bring peace in Afghanistan. It is very clear that only secure territory and maintenance of law and order in this area can make connectivity projects possible and will boost security of CPEC.

Terrorist Activities

CPEC may face major challenge of extremism and terrorism and so do other connectivity projects. However, to cope up with such challenges, SCO had already been active in CARs. Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATs) was formed in 2004 to curb terrorism in region. Although, CPEC has a separate force to deal with such threats but integrated actions are direly needed to combat terrorism.⁴³ All stakeholders have signed agreements, such as four nation mechanism to fight terrorism which includes China,

Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. The agreement, Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QCCM), intends to cooperate for peace and security.⁴⁴

However, Pakistan was prepared to rise against terrorism, the shift in Pakistan's foreign policy came after 9/11 incident and it became a frontline state in Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). "Pakistan returned to a general regional approach in the war against extremism and occupied an honoured position".⁴⁵ CARs had also provided their lands, for the establishment of US military bases, to attack on Afghanistan. In Pakistan, a decline occurred in violence linked to terrorist activities in 2015.⁴⁶ However, terrorist found soft targets to dismantle security operations. Pakistan along with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan had to provide their territories to NATO forces which steered wave of terrorist attacks in all areas of Pakistan. This also endangers Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as they are also facing issues of extremism and terrorism.

Pakistan's province of Baluchistan is particularly crucial in CPEC due to its strategic importance, however, externally accentuated separatism and extremism is a direct security threat and causes economic blow. To deal with ordeal, all level efforts are being made. Pakistan's PM has said during his foreign visits several times that Pakistan is engaged in war against terrorism to eradicate the menace of terrorism and getting positive results in operation *Zarb-e-Azab*.⁴⁷

India's Policy to Connect Central Asia

It is obvious that not every state is happy about the development of the CPEC, particularly the West is apprehensive and India is insecure. India is suspiciously looking at the China's OBOR initiative, as it feels insecure in China's increased sway in South Asia. Similarly, New Delhi does not like CPEC as the formation of another ole of influence in South Asia which will be a threatening to its economy and hegemony at large. However, despite all of India's negative propaganda, CPEC's early harvest projects are underway. Delhi has overtly voiced its discontent over the CPEC, which is bringing a huge investment in Pakistan for infrastructure building and energy projects. India is therefore trying to bypass Pakistan by constructing Chahbhar port to connect CARs.⁴⁸

Pakistan's Gwadar port is just 72 kilometers away from Chabahar, it holds strategic importance and poses intense commercial, economic, and strategic challenges to Chabahar.⁴⁹ India's worth million-dollar agreement (Chabahar) with Iran is a strategic partnership which is first venture of India. However, this extraordinary agreement is not an exception to face impediments and reaction. Some important points highlight weaknesses of this project. First, Chabahar is not in Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and it is geographical out of Indian reach.⁵⁰ Second, India is going to serve as a guest state in Chabahar, whose territorial waters and borders are at a noticeable distance.⁵¹ Third, all carriers of goods for Chabahar will come under severe monitoring of the Pakistan's Navy. Fourth, Gwadar's management is prearranged and in China's control, as it has enormous experience in launching of developmental projects and infrastructural building successfully.⁵² Fifth, it appears that Tehran will not provide the management of their Chabahar port to India directly because India is

not going to bring huge investment in Iran as China did in case of Pakistan. Hence, Chabahar and Gwadar cannot be gauged with same angle, Chabahar port has potentials and pitfalls, however it is said if Chabahar once materialized, would serve as a gateway for India towards CARs. Nevertheless, the dynamics of Iran-India partnership are different.⁵³

After rapprochement with the US, Iran striving to become part of mainstream regional actors and accelerates its ties with the regional stakeholders by becoming part of regional connectivity and integration. Iran is likely to keep its interests supreme by preventing itself not to become part of regional rivalries.⁵⁴ Iran's situation is unclear so far as Iran US rapprochement, seemingly, is deteriorated after Trump has taken president office. There are chances of sanctions on Tehran by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in purview of nuclear capable missile testing and this can isolate Iran again at international level and could prevent it to continue developing Chabahar. However, Gwadar is free of any kind of such problem; China is ready to invest in Pakistan without having any fear of sanctions from UNSC. Additionally, being permanent member of UNSC, Beijing has veto power, provides the right to curb any resolution that can wane its investment in Pakistan especially Gwadar port.⁵⁵

China and Pakistan are burning mid night oil to complete CPEC project, and both would never want to be victim of any perilous situation. The foresightedness of two partners appears sound as they are struggling to acquire confidence of other regional stakeholders such as Afghanistan. Pakistan could sense India-Iran furtive friendship aims at dysfunction of Gwadar, however, Tehran must realize that after long diplomatic isolation, it would not be in its favor to destabilize relations with its neighboring countries and to subverting its relations with Islamabad could imperil the Eastern border of Tehran. Hence, Gwadar is an important strategic port for Pakistan, China and CARs, also changing fate of South and Central Asia. Gwadar, less controversial and deep sea port, can prove to be more lucrative as compare to Chabahar. Indeed, South Asia which is least integrated region in the world will tend to be well integrated through projects like CPEC, CASA-1000 and TAPI; this will foster cooperation, enough to mitigate tension amongst the states. The tenants of neo-functionalism are also indicating the forthcoming cooperation.

US Concerns on CPEC

The US has always been an important extra regional power in South Asia, which impact the relations of India and Pakistan. However, Central Asia is another region of the US interest, US, since the disintegration of USSR is trying to control CARs and termed these states *Distant Neighbors*.⁵⁶ Undoubtedly, Central Asian region has been used as a "hunting ground" for energy resources and geopolitical influence by regional and global players.⁵⁷ As far as US policy towards South Asia is concerned, it is taking new turn in the light of new alignments and realignments of states. "US is trying to revive its New Silk Road Plan and initiating the so-called Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor (IPEC)".⁵⁸ The US and China, therefore, have appeared as competitors in the region. Apparently, US's revised policy does not impact CPEC

however; it may bring some challenges in the future. Chinese involvement into South Asia and in Central Asian region is likely to reduce the influence of US.

“China’s rise has changed the regional balance making it even more imperative for the US to sustain its role here. However, given their different historical experiences and world views, both countries have diverging conceptions of security and security practices. Their security interests in this region converge (counter-terrorism, regional peace and stability, economic cooperation) and diverge (counter-terrorism goals, geo-political competition, future direction of economic cooperation) and if the US continues to view China as a latent adversary, such divergence will become even more conspicuous”.⁵⁹

The nature of relationship between China and US has always been complex because of intricate interdependence. Hence, CPEC has raised serious US concerns as US dominance is directly challenged by China. India and Pakistan’s inclusion into SCO as members, CARs interests in Gwadar port and reduced presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan sends vibes, of China’s dominance in the region, to the West. Pakistan also views carefully the US grievances over growing Chinese investment in the region because it believes on cooperative relations with US too. However, Pakistan will help China to balance Indo-US partnership in the region due to India’s bad intents for CPEC. The regional puzzle will be solved with the successful application of CPEC and China will be the center of global trade. Precisely, it can be anticipated that CPEC will be a game changer in the region and can turn Pakistan into a hub of regional trade. Thus, the significance of this project may not be denied, and it will prove to be a bridge to integrate the regions.⁶⁰

Conclusion

With China’s OBOR initiative, regional integration has become once again very interesting site in Asia and restaged theoretical underpinnings of neo-functionalism. China develops conflict ridden areas and building infrastructure for the transformation and regional stability. China believes that economic development is the appropriate tool to sooth miserable conditions and assurance of peace and security. Its intention to connect South Asia with other regions is introducing road to prosperity. Old and new projects of connectivity are, either signed or revamped, envisioning prospects of affluence. The CPEC was initially intended to promote mutual development of China and Pakistan, but gradually it appears that CPEC aims to promote cooperation in multiple areas and integrating important regions of world.

It is evident that CPEC is a project of economic interdependence and regional connectivity. Moreover, recent inclusion of Pakistan and India in SCO has debunked that spillover effects, as neo-functionalists highlighted, are purposeful and benefitting regional actors. The anti CPEC rhetoric based on fictitious information, is losing its intensity. Other connectivity projects such as TAPI and CASA-1000 will be profit generating for CARs, and investment on these ventures will bring CARs close to Pakistan. Reciprocally, Pakistan will become a secure transit route and in this regard SCO will provide opportunities of trade.

Although SCO appears as a separate project, it is helpful in connecting regional actors. Currently, Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and India are far from harmonious relations however, regional integration will remove existing irritants. Pakistan and India's inclusion in SCO is an omen of changing landscape of economic activities between South Asia and Central Asia. Pakistan will remain prominent due to its central position between South and Central Asia. To encourage mutual trade, direct, cheap and regular cargo service between CARs and Pakistan is the dire need of hour because fast communication will make implementation of projects easier. The government and the people must support the smooth enactment and sustainable operation of CPEC along with other projects of connectivity.

NOTES

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STRATEGIC RESTRAINT REGIME IN SOUTH ASIA

*Dr. Muhammad Khan, Ahmed Khan and Dr. Syed Turab Hyder**

Abstract

The post-independence Indo-Pak rivalry and the hostile nature of Pak-India relations have caused instability in the region, which continues to this day. While strategic stability has helped in avoiding a major war, stable and durable peace is still a distant reality. The Pakistani proposal for strategic restraint regime in South Asia aims at achieving a holistic peace in the region with the ultimate aim of peaceful settlement of all disputes, reducing arms race, and preventing a nuclear disaster. The initiation of the idea of strategic restraint regime by Pakistan was indeed a step towards peace through resolution of issues rather through stockpiling of arms and increasing the threat.

Keywords: Strategic Stability, Strategic Restraint Regime, Arms Race, South Asia.

Introduction

The distinct geo-political and security developments of South Asia have been receiving a lot of regional and international attention over the decades. Although South Asia comprises of eight countries; its political, security and economic destiny however, is largely shaped by bilateral relationship between Pakistan and India.

Since independence from the Colonial British rule, Indo-Pak relationships have had either a direct or an indirect impact on political cohesion, economic progress and stability in South Asia. As a resultant, intermittent conflicts, bilateral disputes, arms buildup and mutual distrust between the two countries have prevented cooperation for economic progress, peace and stability in the region.

Deterrence instability, offensive military doctrines, the presence of non-state actors, ongoing arms race and recurrent low- to- medium level-armed conflicts between Pakistan and India speak a lot about the precarious security environment of the region. Above all, Indo-Pak geographical proximity and the technological advancements in conventional, nuclear and tactical weapons manifest multifaceted threats for entire region.

*Dr. Muhammad Khan is Professor of Politics and International Relations at International Islamic University, Islamabad. Ahmed Khan is working as a Research Fellow at International Center for Refugee and Migration Studies at Balochistan University of Information Technology Engineering and Management Sciences, Quetta. Dr. Syed Turab Hyder has vast experience in operative research.

As peace has always remained elusive between Pakistan and India relationship, the need for it has never been greater than today. If there can be one great lesson drawn from history, it will be that no country on the face of the earth can afford the dangers of protracted conflicts and arms buildup in a nuclear environment. Therefore, the article aims to show the rationale and utility of implementing a strategic restraint regime in South Asia to ensure durable peace in the region.

The core context of this article is to argue on dual realities of nuclear weapons. On one hand they have a recognized utility of keeping peace, on other hand there are some destabilizing factors that will keep on threatening peace if a comprehensive Strategic Restraint Regime is not implemented. Moreover, this paper also argues that breaking down the issues with strategic stability and deterrence in south Asia can allow us to better understand the need for a strategic restraint regime in the region.

Besides, the article highlights some of the significant area. They are Pakistan's lasting commitment towards regional peace; the development of Pak-India relations in the post-nuclear era; the current and emerging dynamics of regional peace and security; the need for mutual cooperation between India and Pakistan in the areas of politics and security. It also looks into the interaction of global powers with South Asian region and its impact on security.

Pakistan's Quest for Regional Peace

In October 1998, four months after becoming nuclear power, Pakistan offered India a strategic restraint regime that aimed at a) ensuring a nuclear restraint b) establishing a conventional balance, and c) resolution of all disputes between the two countries. In 2006, then Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz while speaking at The Heritage Foundation, once again, reiterated Pakistan's desire for regional peace and security in order to normalizing of its relations with India. Prime Minister Aziz stated that:

"The progress we have been making within Pakistan has required an enabling external environment. To ensure such an environment, it has been necessary to create an architecture for peace, stability, and progress to facilitate regional cooperation and development".¹

This architecture is based on four pillars: a) Dialogues for peaceful settlement of existing disputes and mechanisms to resolve issues on a bilateral and multilateral basis. b) Strategic restraint and avoidance of an arms race in the region. c) Strengthening of regional cooperation, especially trade, investment, and people-to-people contacts. d) Enhancing cooperation between the different sub-regions of Asia, which will enhance security and mutually beneficial cooperation.²

The pursuit of our external relations in accordance with this architecture has already paid some rich dividends. However, this is still work in progress, and much remains to be done. We are confident that this policy

*will enhance Pakistan's capacity to be an anchor for peace and security in the region.*³

Apart from this, in the 22nd meeting of the National Command Authority (NCA) that took place in February 2016, Pakistan's top political and military leadership also expressed the desire of "establishing the Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia and the inescapable need of a meaningful and sustained comprehensive dialogue process for resolution of all outstanding disputes."⁴

These remarks, coming from top civilian and military leadership of Pakistan, reaffirm Pakistan's commitment to durable peace in South Asia. In fact, the desire of preventing arms race and finding ways that can lead towards the resolution of all the disputes and that can reduce the danger of crisis escalation and nuclear exchange find great resonance at all levels within Pakistan.

In this respect, Pakistan's proposal of implementing a Strategic Restraint Regime can be considered a highly significant top-down approach to implement reciprocal restraint that can ultimately take South Asia towards durable peace.⁵

Moreover, Pakistan views the Strategic Restraint Regime as a significant initiative in its pursuit of lasting peace in South Asia. Apart from this, Pakistan's proposal of a Strategic Restraint Regime also underscores Islamabad's desire of not wanting itself sucked into an unsustainable arms race in the region.

Pakistan, as a responsible nuclear power and an important country of the region, desires to bring the arms race under control and to find peaceful solutions to all issues between the two countries without leaving them for future generations to deal with.

A Critical View of Strategic Stability in South Asia

Paul Stockton defines strategic stability as a "situation between adversaries, in which they are unlikely to fight a strategic war, involving attacks against industry, population, or strategic military forces."⁶ Strategic Stability is also viewed as "a robust strategic nuclear balance that is maintained over a long period of time despite the impact of destabilizing factors."⁷

Thomas Schelling and Morten Halperin have defined strategic stability as a situation where the probability of war is minimal because neither side sees any advantage in striking first and their respective calculations are insulated from upsets, fears and trepidations.⁸ That is why a large body of literature suggests that a nuclear state pursues strategic stability as the first choice approach to defend itself against a nuclear adversary.

The Cold War era, and during that period, the strategic competition between the United States and Soviet Union is vastly studied by scholars to draw conclusions about the utility of nuclear weapons in preventing war between nuclear adversaries. For example, the long peace between United States and Soviet Union, particularly, the

Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 is cited as the most prominent example by the protagonists of nuclear weapons.

After the end of the Cold War, the absence of a large-scale war between Pakistan and India is also attributed to the possession of nuclear capability by the two nuclear rivals. These examples gave much credence to the utility of nuclear weapons which has led to the famous hypothesis: the more the nuclear weapons, the better it is. Other scholars have argued that given the strong deterrent capability, why should states give up such a strong source of security.⁹

The protagonists of nuclear weapons claim that the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons is the most important element which can dissuade a nuclear state from starting a war or launching a nuclear attack against another nuclear state. However, the path nuclear states, after acquiring nuclear capability, have travelled along has led to a bitter, dangerous and unsustainable arms buildup with lesser focus on conflict resolution and more interest in getting strategic advantage over one another.

Furthermore, nuclear rivals such as Pakistan and India, in order to hedge against an uncertain security environment, have resorted to invest an heavy amount of economic and political capital trying to increase their security through different methods. These methods include conventional and nonconventional arms buildup; modifying their nuclear postures; revising their respective military doctrines; and a constant evaluation and re-evaluation of their respective deterrent capabilities.

In the presence of long-time disputes and historical animosity between Pakistan and India, any kind of offensive measures taken through any of the methods as stated above result in destabilizing forces that can turn strategic stability into a dangerous vulnerability. The Cold War as well as Pakistan-India relations present sufficient evidence regarding how vulnerable strategic stability might become and that how nuclear powers can reach to the brink of a major nuclear catastrophe.

Moreover, the US-Soviet strategic rivalry during the Cold War period as well as the history of Pak-India relations in the post-nuclear era suggest that security can at times become extremely fragile if its contributing economic and political variables get disturbed. The fragility of peace in South Asia can also be looked at in terms of how nuclear weapons and conventional imbalance, although having prevented major wars between India and Pakistan, has failed to prevent nuclear adversaries from adopting risky behavior.

A brief study of the past two decades of Pak-India relations shows that as compared to the pre-nuclear era, the frequency of crises between Pakistan and India have increased in the post-nuclear era. Thomas F. Lynch states that More incidents of military conflicts and larger conflicts occurred between India and Pakistan during the period of nuclear weapons development and testing (1990–2002) than in any other time since their independence from Britain in 1947.¹⁰

One explanation of the higher frequency of crises between Pakistan and India in the post-nuclear era points a correlation among the presence of disputes, arms

buildup and crises. In other words, the existence of disputes between Pakistan and India and the growing asymmetry of conventional weapons have created sufficient conditions for conflicts between the two countries.

In addition, Lynch's observation provides root causes of the frequency of crises which lies in security dilemma. The major dilemma is the acquisition of sophisticated naval, ground, air and, recently ABM systems by India adds to the security issues for Pakistan. As Lynch states that even if their military capabilities are aimed only at their self-protection, they potentially or actually threaten harm to other states that will respond in kind; which results in a spiral of fear and mistrust and make both states less secure.¹¹

Susan G. Sample also shares the idea that arms race and war are linked by security dilemma.¹² Therefore, the acquisition of sophisticated weapon systems creates an imbalance between the two countries, which leaves no choice for either Pakistan or India other than to follow suit and keep nuclear weapons as the central element of their security policy.

Furthermore, Douglas M. Gibler, Toby J. Rider, and Marc L. Hutchison note that a world with fewer nuclear, but more conventional forces is likely to bring forth new dynamics for arms races, which increase the likelihood of disputes and wars. The growing reliance on nuclear weapons, which is already happening, will make the crisis-prone system of South Asia increasingly unstable. Arms buildup in a crisis-unstable system might trigger war.¹³

Apart from the systemic instability, arms buildup negatively influences the behavior of Pakistan and India to engage in serious and comprehensive diplomacy to find the resolution of their long-standing disputes like Kashmir, water and Sir Creek. An analysis of Pak-India relations in the post-nuclear era leads us to hypothesize that in the presence of nuclear cover, conventional arms buildup has opened up to the space for crises and risky behavior between Pakistan and India.

Strategic Restraint Regime, Stable Peace and Cooperation in South Asia

The presence of disputes, the danger of crisis escalation, conventional and non-conventional arms build and deterrence instability in South Asia replicates many features of the Cold War strategic rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union. On a deeper level, Pakistan and India's rivalry can said to be even more dangerous than that of the United States and Soviet Union in at least two ways.

The first way is the geographical proximity of the two countries that can have severe consequences of unimaginable proportions for both countries in an event of crisis escalation or war. This factor, only, is enough to disrupt war-time strategic calculations on both sides. Apart from this, the geographical proximity also bears substantial influence on devising strategies to crises situation or war. The second factor pertains to major technological developments and advancements that have taken place in the 21st century, particularly in the area of cyber space. Technological advances that

make existing weapons obsolete can require the state that enjoyed a lead in deployment of the earlier technology to engage in an arms race that leaves it less secure.¹⁴ Cyber warfare can prove to be a menace to strategic stability because it poses a serious threat to the nuclear command and control systems, cause decapitation without using any nuclear or conventional weapons and cause confusion.¹⁵

The threats that geographical proximity and technological developments present necessitate the implementation of Pakistan's proposed Strategic Restraint Regime. As Pakistan and India have both been living under the nuclear shadow for two decades now, it is now an appropriate time for both countries to consider a strategic restraint regime to prevent strategic vulnerabilities and improve level of trust among each other for larger regional and global peace.

While the need for Strategic Restraint Regime might on the surface be considered normative or aimed at strengthening the moral side of Pakistan's argument on regional peace and security. On a deeper level, the need for a strategic restraint is deeply rooted in economics, politics and in security, because, the general understanding is that leaders have to consider at least five dimensions, military, diplomacy, economics, domestic institutions and ethical dimensions to build a nuclear arsenal.¹⁶

As Brian Rose notes that stability only makes sense with some kind of equilibrium or some kind of mutual restraint.¹⁷ Therefore, Strategic Restraint and conventional balance should receive more attention and be accepted as the most important and primary principle of dialogue and peace by Pakistan and India in the future.

Apart from that, implementing a Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia will be a symbol of political vision, rationality and a recognition of necessity as well as a major leap towards a stability and peace.

Stable peace emerges through a sequential process that cuts across longstanding theoretical divides. Realism adequately explains the outset. Strategic necessity induces a state faced with an unmanageable array of threats to seek to befriend an existing adversary; resource constraints make accommodation and cooptation preferable to balancing and confrontation. The process next moves into the realm of liberalism. Domestic attributes regime type, coalitional alignments, and sub state interest groups come into play, with societal integration facilitating and deepening the process of reconciliation. A constructivist perspective best explains the final stage of the process. Changes in political discourse and identity erode the self/other distinctions that are at the foundation of geopolitical competition.¹⁸

Another benefit of implementing a Strategic Restraint Regime lies in its potential of providing peace dividends. Pakistan and India have gone through a learning process in the post-tests crises with nuclear overtones.¹⁹ It is very clear to them that failure to resolve disputes and adding more weapons to their arsenals is not the answer either to their security problems or to bringing about stable peace in the region.

Moreover, stable and durable peace in South Asia requires a major transformation of the present security environment from a conflictual to a cooperative one. This transformation is only possible when the disputes between Pakistan and India are resolved and the threats of nuclear exchange or a conventional war are eliminated. For this to happen, Pakistan and India need serious diplomatic engagement, cooperation and political will which is rooted in the belief that achieving peace is not an impossible endeavor.

Cooperation on political, security and economic matters will remain a necessary element of regional peace building. Pakistan and India understand that the security challenges they are facing are multi-faceted and not only restricted to physical security only. As the comprehensive concept of security suggest, human and economic security are as important as the physical security of a state. Therefore, non-traditional threats that arise due to economic lag and underdevelopment cannot be overlooked.

Another reason why economic and human security should receive attention in security policy is that the economic, political and security systems do not act or operate in isolation from one another. In fact, economics, politics and security have a dialectic influence on one another. Therefore, investing too much in acquiring weapons might not be a good idea if it comes at the cost of the economic well-being of the people.

In addition to all these, the major security transformation that Strategic Restraint Regime envisages need cooperation from both sides. Cooperation will bestow significant benefits on the strategic environment of the region. Nuclear Restraint also has significant potential to contribute in confidence building among the nuclear-armed states.²⁰

Although previous initiatives of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between Pakistan and India have been considered as a major attempt to improve relations, prevent crisis escalation and promote trust between the two nuclear rivals. However, CBMS have not borne much fruit as behavior on both sides have largely remained unchanged. Subsequently, with the passage of time, interest has fallen in strengthening Confidence Building Measures.

Discontinuity in the implementation of CBMs and NRRMs has been the major obstacle in building of sustained trust between India and Pakistan.²¹ Veteran Pakistani diplomat and Pakistan's current representative to the United Nations, Maleeha Lodhi provides clues about why CBMs could not work to achieve a major change. She states:

.....CBMs cannot stand alone and can only work in a broader context. The presumption of priority for CBMs is that underlying problems are not resolvable, and therefore, by freezing the status quo, CBMs can somehow reduce tension and avert the danger of war.....Meant to be a step towards conflict resolution they can often be used as a substitute. They have frequently been pursued in South Asia under external prodding or pressure and at the expense of problem solving.²²

Moreover, as military capabilities and doctrine have far outpaced nuclear risk reduction diplomacy in the 15 years, the few CBMs and NRRMs that have been reached since 1998 have not begun to serve as a stabilizing offset to technological and doctrinal developments.²³ The largely ineffectiveness of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures (NRRMs) indicate that peace in South Asia cannot be half-done.

Moreover, the history of CBMs also indicate that bringing durable peace in South Asia will require political vision and comprehensive solutions as envisaged by Pakistan's proposed Strategic Restraint Regime. Repeating cycles of crises between Pakistan and India have unraveled the challenges to peace in the presence of long-time disputes between the two countries. The Kargil war, border standoff in 2002, the Mumbai attacks, and the recent incidents of Uri and Pathankot suggest that the region will remain prone to crises until the main variable – territorial disputes – is not taken out of the equation.

Parag Khanna, an Indian author, acknowledges the importance of Kashmir in Pak-India relations. He states that the unresolved status of the princely state of Kashmir at the time of the partition of South Asia into independent India and Pakistan in 1947 has been the direct or proximate cause of three major wars and a near nuclear standoff in 2001 between the two states.²⁴

The resolution of disputes, for example, Kashmir, is very important because most of Pakistan and India's security policies are formulated in the shadow of long-time disputes between the two countries. This dispute has played as a key variable in Pakistan's relationship with India as well as in the larger security architecture of South Asia.

Regional Security and Arms Buildup in South Asia

Throughout the past seventy years of their history, India and Pakistan have remained dependent on major powers for the acquisition of weapons and conflict resolution. In fact, the acquisition of arms has been an important factor which influenced the direction of foreign policy of Pakistan and India.

These alignments have had greater impact on security thinking, strategic stability and the overall security environment of South Asia. In the past, both countries have strongly objected to the sale of weapons by a major power to its regional rival. This indicates that the interaction of the major powers of the world have had a considerable influence on regional security.

The US tilt toward India soon after May 1998 nuclear tests and the subsequent US-India strategic alliance as embodied in the 2008 Indo-US Nuclear Deal alienated Pakistan and contributed to Pakistan's fast-paced nuclear weapons and missiles build up, to counter what was perceived as an increasing Indian threat, now supported by the United States.²⁵

Pakistan and India have also remained suspicious about each other's alignments with foreign powers. Islamabad and New Delhi view such alignments as a potential security threat for the other. Pakistan has long ago expressed its reservations on Indo-US strategic partnership and the special and discriminatory waiver to India in the nuclear suppliers group, while India has also shown concerns regarding Pakistan's growing relations with China, specially, Chinese development of Pakistan's deep-sea port of Gwadar and the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

With the absence of a regional approach, Pakistan and India induced dependence on global powers that forced both countries to play great powers games, particularly, at the expense of their national interests or the interests of the South Asian Region.

The Strategic Restraint Regime offers a pathway for reducing their dependence on external powers and removing the great power factor out of the security thinking. Moreover, Pak- India strategic rivalry also provide important lessons when seen in the context of US-Soviet strategic rivalry of the Cold War era. During the Cold War, the United States of America and Soviet Union got involved in a bitter arms race that ultimately led them towards developing a vast structure of strategic triad.

With the development of Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), which was one of the most sophisticated and the most expensive defense programs ever, the two countries reached the climax of their rivalry in the late 1980s. This unsustainable arms race was one of the factors that ultimately brought the Soviet Union to its knees. To some extent, Pakistan and India also seem to be moving in the same direction.

During the past twenty years, the two South Asian rivals have brought significant qualitative and quantitative improvements in their nuclear capabilities by making their nuclear capability more effective, and of course, much more lethal. New Delhi and Islamabad have added a wide spectrum of ballistic and cruise missiles into their respective arsenals. The march is on now for defense systems and India has already decided to purchase the latest defense systems from United States that will cost more than a billion dollars.

Presently, both countries have much more lethal capability of carrying either a first or a second strike against each other. In fact, after achieving missile capability, both countries are now trying to establish an effective triad while at the same time working on the development of ABM systems. The most probable future course, they take, might lead to space becoming the new pivot of arms race.

New developments have also taken in the area of tactical weapons. Pakistan has successfully developed tactical nuclear weapons that can totally annihilate Indian field formations in the event of a war. The introduction of tactical nuclear weapons drastically affect the nuclear equation between Pakistan and India. This development show that, in the event of a conventional imbalance, reliance on nuclear weapons in South Asia will be gradually increasing.

The development of tactical weapons is the result of the widening asymmetry between the two countries in the area of conventional weapons. Christine Leah and Adam B. Lowther observe that if the India-Pakistan strategic situation offers any lesson; it is that weaker states (such as Pakistan) may desire to develop a “great equalizer” to achieve the security that they cannot find through traditional (conventional) means.²⁶

Christine Leah and Adam B. Lowther further add that conventional imbalance becomes a key driver of nuclear proliferation and geostrategic instability. These developments specially the attention that has turned towards acquiring Anti-Ballistic Missile systems by Pakistan and India significantly threaten strategic stability in South Asia in many ways. Therefore, if a restraint regime is not implemented soon, the region will drift further into instability and preventing the region from on the edge of a nuclear disaster will become even more difficult.

The massive arms buildup and India’s refrain from responding positively to Pakistan’s proposed Strategic Restraint Regime define India’s political and security behavior in the region. India’s behavior has created major obstacles, which promotes diverging outlooks on regional security. Mostly scholars agree upon that Pak-India relations of the Past two decades indicate that Pakistan and India assess regional stability and strategic stability differently from each other.

During the Cold War, offsetting nuclear capabilities possessed by United States and Soviet Union generated security concerns resulting in diminished security by fostering risky behavior under the nuclear threshold and by intensifying crises.²⁷ The importance of a Strategic Restraint Regime is, therefore, important for crisis management which is a recurrent feature of Pak-India relations. As Zafar Khan observes that future crisis management strategies should create a strategic restraint regime (such as an arms control regime) to strengthen the credibility of crisis management and minimize the danger of war in South Asia.²⁸

Minimizing the danger of war in South Asia will serve as an important step for making forward movement in other areas such as trust building, arms control and resolution of disputes. Despite spending billions of dollars on the development and acquisition of nuclear and conventional weapons, neither India nor Pakistan, has been able to achieve a decisive strategic advantage over the other.

Mooed Yousuf notes that the development and acquisition of sophisticated weapons systems by India, coupled with development of offensive doctrine such as the Cold Start will receive identical response from Pakistan. Through arms buildup and Cold Start doctrine, India in effect was looking for exploring the possibility of a limited war in a nuclearized environment.²⁹ He further states that by adopting this new proactive strategy India had hoped to create a situation wherein with advantage of its greater conventional forces, it will be in a position to force a result in its favor.³⁰ So far, India’s offensive posture and the development of its Cold Start Doctrine has only resulted in reinforcing the security dilemma between the two countries.

After two decades, now the need arises for creating space for promoting cooperative relationship that can bring both countries closer to the realization to take a greater account of each other's regional interests and sensitivities. Both countries need to kick-start dialogue to solve regional security problems as envisaged by the strategic restraint regime.

It is also important to state that the massive arms buildup and India's refrain from responding positively to Pakistan-proposed Strategic Restraint Regime define India's political behavior with regional countries. This behavior in itself creates obstacles and causes diverging outlooks on regional security.

Conclusion

Although Pakistan and India have made some improvement in different areas, the security-centric approach has prevented any type of normalization of Pak-India relationship so far. Therefore, for achieving durable peace and normalization of Pak-India relations, both countries need to move away from the security first approach.

Peace and security in South Asia require trust, political vision, cooperative behavior and a reordering of priorities on both sides. However, more important than these, peace will require a settlement of all disputes and the elimination of nuclear threat. Reducing the nuclear threat is extremely important because until and unless this threat remains there, South Asia's strategic stability challenge will always be there to deal with.

Finally, the Strategic Restraint Regime symbolizes Pakistan's vision for peace. It also symbolizes Pakistan's understanding of the possible ways to achieve this end. The proposed Strategic Restraint Regime provides a path towards a holistic peace in South Asian region.

NOTES

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THE CASE OF LIBYA'S WMD: ANALYSIS OF KEY FACTORS FOR NUCLEAR TURNAROUND

Muhammad Usman Asghar, Dr. Muhammad Bashir Khan and Dr. Shahzad Hussain*

Abstract

Libya has pursued its quest for the acquisition and development of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in general and nuclear weapons in specific since the regime change in 1969. This wish was shattered when Libya renounced to give up its pursuits of WMD, especially nuclear bomb aspiration. This paper examines the puzzle of Libya's nuclear rollback and the factors, which compelled Libya to give up its nuclear arms ambition. Libya's decision to renounce its nuclear program, in 2003, was not less than a shock for the world. There exist different views regarding Libyan nuclear turnaround, justifying the factors behind this move. This paper argues that the decision by Libyan leadership to give up the WMD ambition was not merely due to the US invasion in Iraq in 2003 rather it was the consequence of the unfolding of variables like security, economy and political concerns of Libya over the decades, ultimately forcing Libyan leadership to surrender its WMD dreams.

Keywords: Libya, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Disarmament.

Introduction

Libya renounced to give up its WMD program at the end of 2003. Libya (The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) made it public by issuing state policy on December 19, 2003 showing its willingness to dismantle its WMD program.¹ This announcement was very shocking for the world community who had been witnessing the desperate efforts of Libya, either to acquire or develop indigenously the WMD at any cost, since 1969's regime change in Libya. The Libyan aspiration for the WMD included the chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

In this backdrop, different views and conspiracy theories surfaced about the factors which induced Libya and its leadership to abandon its WMD programs. It is learnt that there exist two major perspectives about the Libya's case of WMD and its subsequent policy decision for wrap-up of WMD. According to one popular perspective in West, many analysts emphasize that the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, besides the interdiction of a Libya bound ship in October 2003, loaded with accessories and components allegedly used in nuclear facilities, became the key factor in Tripoli's decision. The other major perspective refers towards the evolving dynamics of the

*Muhammad Usman Asghar, Dr. Muhammad Bashir Khan and Dr. Shahzad Hussain are faculty members at the Department of Government and Public Policy, Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad.

regional security, depleting economy as a consequence of years long economic sanctions and isolation on diplomatic fronts as the key factors in Libya's decision of a turnaround regarding the WMD.

The article examines and analyses these underlying factors, which compelled Libya to give up its WMD aspiration. The article is based on the main argument that Libya's renouncement was not merely due to US invasion of Iraq; rather it was the result of diplomatic efforts of the international community, evolving security situation of the region and indigenous economic and political layout of Libya over the decades. This paper will briefly outline the history of WMD in Libya and its struggle to achieve WMD and analysis of key factors which changed the ideology of the Libyan leadership regarding the WMD.

Historical Background

Libya's long-time leader Colonel Muammar Qadhafi has utilized all of his country resources to get the WMD technology since 1970. Colonel Qadhafi sought to obtain and develop nuclear weapons besides chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction as well. There could be certainly strong and compelling logics with the Libyan leader but the reality unfolds that the world super powers were not happy with the Libya's intentions for the acquisition of WMD. Libya's WMD aspirations date decades ago in the history.

Libya got its independence on 24 December 1951 as United Kingdom of Libya under the monarchy of King Idrees who was the only monarch of Libya. Under the King Idrees's regime, Libya enjoyed very cordially relations with Western countries, especially USA. Libya signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in July 1968 under King Idrees.² The monarchy was toppled by a coup that changed the regime and Colonel Qadhafi took control of Libya.

Muammar Qadhafi started materializing his dream to acquire the nuclear weapons in the very first year of his reign. Qadhafi was so desperate for nukes that he sent his trusted aide (Lieutenant Major Abdelsalam Jallud) to Peoples Republic of China repeatedly with the hope of getting success to purchase the of nuclear weapons. On same lines, Qadhafi took his chance to convince India as well under a deal that offered India repayment of all its foreign debts (estimated at \$ 15 billion) in exchange of nuclear weapons but both attempts could not reap the desired results for Libyan leader.³

It was year 1971, under the new regime when Libya opted to be part of the 1925 Geneva Protocol that bans both chemical and biological weapons and their use in wars.⁴ Libya had not shown any serious intentions to opt for the possession or development of WMD. Libya institutionalized its nuclear energy aspirations under a commission in 1973.⁵

Libya's agreement with international treaties posed no serious threat to the world peace. Libya ratified the NPT on May 26, 1975.⁶ It is worth mentioning here that

NPT was signed by the pro-Western monarch; King Idrees whereas, it was ratified after seven years by an anti-Western military dictator; Colonel Qadhafi.

Libya also cooperated with Pakistan in 1974. Libya helped financially to Pakistan besides providing the vital ingredient for nuclear energy (Uranium, “yellow cake”) from Niger. It remains uncertain that, what was Libya’s demand in reward from Pakistan either some nuclear technology transfer or share in nuclear weapons.⁷

Libya and USA relations saw first confrontation, when the US embassy was attacked and set on fire by a mob in Tripoli on December 2, 1979.⁸ This incident gave birth to a new era of tension between the Libya and USA. America has always disliked Libya under Qadafi rule.⁹ In the backdrop of this incident, the U.S. government labeled Libya as the terrorist country. US government also imposed sanctions on Libya for the first time, after this incident. As a matter of fact, the bilateral relations between the USA and Libya have remained hostile since mid 1970’s.

In pursuit of its covert and classified WMD program, Libya has reportedly procured almost 2 kilo-tons of Uranium (that was lightly processed for further use) from Niger for its 10 megawatt nuclear research reactor at Tajoura which was completed by the Soviet Union during 1978-1981.¹⁰ Despite being the signatory to NPT, Libya continued its clandestine nuclear program and tried to make the nuclear bomb as soon as possible.

Libya was playing on both the fronts in 70’s and 80’s. On one hand, it was continuously making agreement with the international world community against the proliferation of WMD whereas on other hand, it was pursuing its WMD program desperately. In 1982, Libya signed the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) that prohibits the states from developing, producing, and stockpiling offensive biological agents.¹¹

Another wave of sanctions shocked Tripoli on January 7, 1986 when US President Ronald Reagan imposed additional economic sanctions in the milieu of two attacks at airports in Rome and Vienna in 1985.¹² This reinforcement of sanctions added the burden on Libyan economy. The West was blaming Libya for its support towards terrorism. The tense bilateral relations become more aggressive and hostile when an American airplane carrying 259 passengers exploded en route from London to New York over Lockerbie, Scotland. It is reported that this fatal accident caused a death toll of 270 lives on December 21, 1988. Two Libyan officers were identified as chief suspects of the bombing incident by the investigators.¹³ After a year, in 1989, another similar act of terrorism shocked the world when a French airliner bound for Paris exploded killing all 171 people. Once again, the traces of miscreants who were allegedly involved in this heinous act were two Libyans and this was also evident from the subsequent reports of investigating authorities in 1991.¹⁴

These two heinous acts of terrorism paved the way for Western powers to make their Alliance against Libya. As a result, United Nations Security Council adopted

Resolution 748 in 1992 and Resolution 883 in 1993 sanctioning Libya (arms embargo, international travel restrictions, limited freeze of Libyan assets and ban on oil exports).¹⁵

Libya joined the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in April 1996, by signing the Treaty of Pelindaba.¹⁶ This treaty was aimed to bar its member states from developing, acquiring, and possessing nuclear weapons. By signing the Pelindaba Treaty, Libya's policy on WMD experienced paradigm shift and its WMD surge was expected to be reverted in near future. Libya brought a major shift in its WMD stance. As a consequence, Libyan officials approached to US for secret talk regarding the elimination of their chemical weapons in May 1999.¹⁷ Eventually, Libya also signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 2001.¹⁸

It is reported that Libyan regime through its intelligence officials approached British intelligence counterparts to initiate covert dialogue regarding the termination of Libya's WMD programs in early 2003.¹⁹ These subsequent negotiations also included U.S. officials. The meetings took place prior to US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003.²⁰

In an allegedly intelligence based operation, officials from Germany and Italy successfully managed to intercept a ship bound for Libya with centrifuge components on October 4, 2003.²¹ This revelation proved to be the last nail in the coffin of Libyan nuclear program and proved to be a big blow to Libyan covert aspirations for the nuclear program.

As a preemptive prudent gesture, Libya's Foreign Ministry publicly renounced its WMD programs with a promise to terminate such programs, adhering to its obligations under the NPT and BTWC, as well as acceding to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).²² Libya also ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on October 4, 2003.²³

Libya's Quest for WMD

Libya pursued its agenda of achieving the WMD, which could raise the Libya's strategic power and importance to the optimum level. Libya's adrenal rush for WMD in general and for nuclear weapons in specific, are believed to be in response to Israel's nuclear weapons program. Libya envisaged itself to be the sole and first nuclear Islamic state. This was aimed to give boost to its military might regionally and globally. Israel was always perceived as a major external threat to its security, whereas, Israel enjoyed the full support by the Western states, especially United States of America. Libya's quest for WMD was based on the assumption that the WMDs are inevitable for Libya and its security both regionally and globally. Nuclear weapons as the symbol of modern statehood were the big fascinating indoctrination of Libyan leadership in pursuit of its nuclear program. During the Cold War Era, nuclear weapons were deemed as the excellence of scientific and technological supremacy over archrivals. This capability and capacity was also perceived as a ticket to an exclusive and elite international club of nuclear states.²⁴

Chemical Weapons

Libya has been involved in the chemical weapons (CW) and its production programs. The aspiration for the CW was the part of its major aim to achieve capabilities of WMD. Libya has developed indigenous production capabilities for CW and their storage facilities as well. Libya had developed more than one facility for the CW as the same is evident and shown in the Figure 1.

Pharma 150 (Rabta)

The first CW production facility, known as Pharma 150, was a large industrial complex at Rabta, a sparsely populated and mountainous desert area about 75 miles southwest of Tripoli.²⁵

Pharma 200 (Sebha)

Libya was keenly pursuing its chemical weapons program. A second Libyan CW plant, called Pharma 200, was reportedly almost identical to the Rabta plant and was located underground in a remote desert location, approximately 650 miles south of Tripoli in the Sebha Oasis, which is a military base, located about 95 kilometres north of the Chadian-Libyan border.²⁶

Tarhunah

Tarhunah was an underground CW production complex near the town of Tarhunah, 50 miles southeast of Tripoli, intended to supplant the Rabta plant.²⁷




Figure-1: Map of Libyan CW Facilities²⁸

Biological Weapons

There was no evidence of Libyan biological weapons program or any facility in Libya. This could have been an agenda for future pursuits of Libyan leadership but was not initiated on ground.

Nuclear Weapons

Libyan nuclear program was not at advance stage as compared to that of Iran, because it lacked the basic infrastructure and technical capacity to lead its rudimentary nuclear program into a complete nuclear facility. Libya's nuclear capabilities were of basic research and development nature. Libya's only declared nuclear facility was a 10-megawatt research reactor at Tajura known as Tajura Nuclear Research Center (TNRC), which was being purchased from the former Soviet Union.²⁹ This reactor was subject to IAEA safeguards. Libya intended to build a 440-megawatt power reactor near the Gulf of Sidra, which it had initially sought from the Soviet Union in 1977 but could not materialize. Due to sanctions, Libya mostly attempted to acquire weapons-grade fissile material and technological assistance from the black market for its nuclear program. Figure 2 illustrates the location of Libyan nuclear facility.³⁰




Figure-2: Map of Selected Nuclear and Chemical Facilities in Iran

The TNRC consisted of numerous laboratories and facilities. One such facility is the 10-megawatt (MW), pool-type Tajura Research Reactor (IRT-I), which was constructed in 1980 along with a TM4-A Tokamak fusion reactor.³¹

From the years 1983 to 1989, Libya had conducted various small-scale uranium conversion experiments and again after 1994 had some experiments to limited extent, at Tajura Nuclear Research Center.³² Such kind of experiments, leave the traces for experts, regarding the Libyan efforts to enrich the uranium through isotope separation. Enriched uranium can be used for both civil and military nuclear weapons. Libya had exerted its maximum capacity and resources for the development of nuclear bomb but could not succeed due to various reasons.

Challenges to Libyan WMD Program

The major challenge to Libyan WMD program was the technical capacity and availability of nuclear related apparatus. Libya's nuclear program was dependent on the supplies from the foreign suppliers. In this backdrop, Libya relied on both legal and illegal ways to acquire the nuclear related material, equipment, and expertise. Despite the availability of the Libyan resources for the nuclear program, international sanctions played vital role in barring Libya from acquiring required nuclear support from abroad. It is already discussed that US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in collaboration with its British, German and Italian counterparts successfully seized over 1,000 assembled gas centrifuges and components from German flagged Libya-bound ship.³³ This interception was a big blow to the Libyan nuclear program, authenticating its covert efforts to acquire nuclear supplies from the black market. Libya did not surrender till 2002 and kept working on its WMD program under the strict vigilance and restrictions of international sanctions and arms control initiatives by super-powers.

Key Factors for Libyan Turnaround on WMD

Libya concluded that it should give up its WMD program in greater national interest on the basis of a variety of the following factors:

Security

- Right from the advent of Qadhafi Regime in 1969, Libya opted aggressive policies and postures against Israel, challenging its growing hegemony and influence in the region. Qadhafi wanted to lead the Arab against the Israel based on its military strategy. Qadhafi had an influence of Arab defeat in the 1967 war against Israel, which was a 'searing blow to Qadhafi's nationalist and pan-Arab pride'.³⁴ In order to achieve strategic edge over other Arab countries, Libya pursued WMD program with all its resources. The Arab-Israeli conflict lied at the centre of Qadhafi's ideology and Libya's policy.
- Libya never faced serious threats to its national sovereignty. Libyan neighbours were not a strategic risk to its national security. The entire logic and motivation behind the acquisition of WMD was to portray Libya as a regional power. Over the decades, Libya realized that the security narrative has yielded nothing to it, except economic deprivation and isolation among the international community. This became the strong argument for the Libyan leadership to revisit its aggressive policy, towards self-perceived threats and west.

Leadership and Ideology

- In a bloodless military takeover, Muammar al-Qadhafi overthrew the monarchy on September 01, 1969 and established a new authoritarian political system.³⁵ Since its conception, the new regime under Qadhafi's rule, developed hostile relations with USA unlike the previous regime of King Idris was a pro-Western regime in its nature. Qadhafi and his fellows inherited the same ideological background which was centric to anti-US and Israeli sentiments. In the later years, Qadhafi regime got even more rigid, in its ideology of hostility which was evident from serious incidents, ranging from clashes with neighbouring states to the promotion of fascist ideology, in its international affairs.

Arab Unity and Pan-Africanism

- Qadhafi was strong advocate of Arab Unity. This motivation was derived from the defeat of Arab countries by Israel, which was due to lack of unity among the Arab states. For this purpose, Qadhafi exerted his best efforts to bring all Arab countries on single page but he could not succeed. This shattered him and became a factor of Libyan turnaround on its pursuits of WMD. Qadhafi's Universal Theory which he proposed in 1978 seemed no more realistic.³⁶
- Desperate Qadhafi did not restrict Libya's role as a regional power and leader among Arab countries. Instead, Qadhafi portrayed Libyan state as an integral part of sub-Saharan Africa by involving Tripoli in African affairs. The reduction of Western and Israeli influence in the middle east was the main driver of Libya's policy and to achieve this goal, Qadhafi offered financial and military aid to several 'liberation movements' across Africa and played a mediatory role in various conflicts between African countries.³⁷

Domestic Economic and Political Changes

- At the time of independence, Libya was among the world's poorest countries. Pro-Western monarchy of Libya was dependent on foreign aid. In mid 1950s, Libya discovered oil reserves and extracted it with the help of West. This exploration of oil made Libya one of the highest grossing countries in Africa. At the time of Libyan Coup, it was ranked among the wealthy countries. Libya adopted the socialist policies in Qadhafi regime.
- In a very short span of time, Libyan economy showed the signs of recession caused by numerous factors such as command economy, bad governance, lack of institutional capacity, stagnate oil prices, lack of new economic reforms to attract foreign investments, costly military expenditures, and most important of all were the international sanctions. All these factors accompanied by Soviet Union collapse, dragged Libya towards the status of a 'rogue state'.³⁸ It seemed that Libyan leadership was madly involved in the WMD pursuits, ignoring rest of the state responsibilities. These policies were not sustaining the growing problems of the Libyan economy. New generation was no more interested in the old rhetoric of the Libyan leadership regarding the WMD.

- Qadhafi had been ruling Libya since 1969. With the passage of time, he felt to prepare the next generation as a replacement to him in the future. This unfolds another major factor regarding the succession planning by Qadhafi. In this context, most suitable candidate for the regime was his own son 'Saif ul Islam'. Qadhafi wanted to hand off a stable, successful government to his son, realizing that the reforms would be difficult for his son to implement after Qadhafi's death.³⁹

Libya in Turmoil

- Given all the resources, Libya was not growing and developing, both economically and socially. This was an alarming situation for the leadership. In this backdrop, Libyan leadership started pondering on the contemporary geo-strategic and political situation of the world politics in mid 90s. As a matter of fact, Libya was producing 1.488 million b/d in the year 2003, which accounted for less than half of its production in 1970.⁴⁰
- These factors compelled Libya and Qadhafi, to revisit his policies and vision, regarding Libya, so that further harm to its identity and economy could be avoided.
- In April 1999 (the same month he agreed to release the Lockerbie suspects for trial, and one month before he offered to give up his WMD to the United States), Qadhafi declared: "The world has changed radically and drastically. The methods and ideas should change, and being a revolutionary and a progressive man, I have to follow this movement."⁴¹
- Sanctions had severely depleted the Libyan economy and its resources over the years. Qadhafi regime was desperate to get rid of these sanctions in 90s, which had become inevitable for a prosperous and developing Libya. It is estimated that lifting of sanctions would mean "a several billion dollar infusion into the Libyan economy and new jobs for thousands of Libyans."⁴²

Libyan Nuclear Turnaround

- Ultimately in 2003, Libya renounced the WMD program. The breakthrough was shocking for the international community. Certain arguments surfaced in the backdrop of this announcement by Libya. A clear divide was witnessed among the experts and political figures regarding the Libyan decision to abandon its WMD program. A new debate overcame the world political analysts, pondering on the exact reasons for Libya's give up.
- US Vice-President Dick Cheney said, 'Five days after we captured Saddam Hussein, Qadhafi came forward and announced that he was going to surrender all of his nuclear materials to the United States', whereas the British Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon stated, 'We showed after Saddam failed to cooperate with the UN that we meant business and Libya will draw that lesson.'⁴³
- In fact, Libya's decision to abandon its WMD program was not reached upon overnight. It was the result of a range of factors (security, ideology, economy and diplomatic isolation) being spread over years since 1970s.

Analysis of Libyan WMD Disarmament

Being the unique case, Libya is the only example in the history of WMD, where the same leader made the decision to acquire the WMD and after 30 years of struggle, renounced to forgo the WMD. Qadhafi regime had to surrender its pursuit of WMD on the basis of evolving security paradigms on the regional and global level, depreciate economy, long standing diplomatic isolation, evolving political scenarios and tight sanctions. US invasion in Iraq was not a major driver for Libya's renouncement. It is evident from the fact that Qadhafi had been trying to negotiate with the United States for WMD since the early 1990s.⁴⁴ Libya wanted to remove the tag of 'rogue state' from its identity in the world which was labelled to it as per the 'rogue states' doctrine of Clinton era.

*It was General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint-Chiefs of Staff, who developed the strategy, given the imminent collapse of the USSR in 1989-90, Powell proposed a set of guidelines upon which US military strategy would be based. Thus, 'the anti-rogue strategy has become the defining paradigm for American security policy.'*⁴⁵

Except for Cuba and North Korea, most of the 'rogue states' were in the Middle East and were Muslim states namely Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan and Syria.⁴⁶ Libyan economy and public suffered massively, due to the international sanctions and isolation and have to revert from its year's long struggle of WMD. This argument is not true that Libya gave up its WMD program due to the fear of US invasion, similar to that of Iraq in 2003. There are numerous evidences that Libya had shown its interest to roll back its WMD program in 90s.

Bush government was in serious and tough situation when it could not ascertain the WMD allegations, despite invading Iraq. In this backdrop, Libyan confession provided them with a breath of credibility among the international community. The US administration was embarrassed by its subsequent failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. President Bush and other administration spokespersons were quick to portray Libya's December 2003 decision to abandon unconventional weapons as the direct result of the US invasion of Iraq.⁴⁷ In fact, reality is altogether opposite and the Libya's decision was the result of years of repercussions.

Libya's decision was warmly welcomed by the international community. It was a big leap towards securing the world from WMD.

*Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker stated May 2, 2005 during the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference that Libya's choice "to demonstrate that, in a world of strong non-proliferation norms, it is never too late to make the decision to become a fully compliant NPT state," noting that Tripoli's decision has been "amply rewarded."*⁴⁸

USA and British were not the only stakeholders in Libya's surrender for WMD. It is worth mentioning here that Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the IAEA have played their vital role in helping the proponents of non-

proliferation of WMD by assessing Libya's efforts and providing technical assistance.⁴⁹ The efforts of these organizations, interest groups, advocacy groups and other international institutions are commendable.

There are certain additional factors which should not be ignored while analysing the Libyan WMD program. First of all, Libya was not the only state in Middle East and African region who pursued WMD. Iraq, Israel, Egypt, Syria and Iran have also sought different varieties of WMD.

Libya has proved its willingness to disarm its stockpiles of nuclear weapons and to roll back its nuclear program through transparency and dedication via cooperation with the international community and institutions. This unearths the fundamental change in Libya's policy from a 'pariah state' to a responsible member state in the international community. Libyan leadership realized over the years that WMD were no more useful in world politics. Qadhafi had been vocal against Israel since the advent of its regime in defence to Palestine's rights whereas no significant success was achieved due to this hostility, rather race for WMD proved to be a futile struggle.

Saiful Islam was quoted as, "We have seen that the armed struggle of the Palestinians, which lasted 50 years, did not produce results such as those obtained by means of negotiations that lasted five years. They told the commander [his father] that they had given up the rifle and taken the path of negotiations, and obtained what they had not obtained in 50 years."⁵⁰

Conclusion

The undertaken study concludes that US led Invasion in Iraq had no major role in compelling Qadhafi's regime to give up WMD. A deeper analysis of Libya's case study reveals that security dynamics and repercussions, ideological change, International isolation, economic downfall with stringent sanctions, and international pressure were key drivers behind Libyan decision to roll back from WMD route. Another noteworthy factor that proved to be a prudent step in this case was international dialogue and engagement effort, in order to bring the desired outcome. Thereby, Libya's renouncement of WMD has proved to be a success for the policy of engagement through dialogue accompanied by non-coercive efforts in the shape of economic and diplomatic sanctions. This event in particular has also foiled the notion of pre-emptive strike as a strategy to force the opponent in international security environment.

Qadhafi's decision to disarm its country from WMD and abandoning the nuclear weapons program was a success for the arms control and disarmament regimes. Eventually Libyan leadership was compelled to give up its WMD program and surrender to non-proliferation regimes. This was marked as an accomplishment by the advocates of WMD free world. Libya's policy decision to windup its WMD program was warmly welcomed by the international community.

However, this episode does not end here. It was witnessed that the same Western powers that first played their role in disarming Libya, later played their vicious role in toppling the Qadhafi regime, in the name of introducing democracy to Libya. All the guarantees and sureties to Qadhafi for abandoning WMD program proved mere tactics to weaken his strength. After Qadhafi regime, Libya still looks for peace and development as promised by the Western actors. Libya's current socio-political and economic situation depicts a very grey picture of the affairs as compared to that of Qadhafi's era. This raises serious questions regarding the credibility of international mediation and engagement efforts, and, highlights a critical flash point of trust anxiety for non-nuclear NPT signatories. Another scenario also concludes that the Libya's decision to give up its WMD was a respite for the Qadhafi regime which added few years to its reign otherwise this coercive action could have been initiated decades ago.

This study seeks subsequent research in the matter where the nexus between WMD and its significance as a tool of national power was compromised with claims of peace and development in exchange by the West to Libya. It is anticipated that this episode has shattered the trust of non-proliferation regime among the nuclear states specially those who are non-signatory to the NPT.

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PEACEBUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN: SHIFTING US STRATEGIES SINCE 2001

*Amanullah Khan and Dr. Noman Sattar**

Abstract

Foreign policy tends to undergo review with the changes in foreign policy objectives. Terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 not only altered the course of history for America but also impacted dynamics of world politics in general and South Asian politics in particular. During the last seventeen years, despite having different strategies by the three US administrations, the United States' main foreign policy goals in Afghanistan—to eliminate terrorists, bring peace in the country and transform Afghan state and society into a modern state have not been accomplished. Instability and bloodshed continue, making the country the center of attention for the international community. It is important to evaluate strategies of different US administrations toward Afghanistan since 2001. This paper, written from a Neorealist perspective, attempts to explore different dimensions of the US strategies, i.e., their strengths and shortcomings, achievements and the role of regional stakeholders. The paper argues that US policies have not worked mainly because of complexities of the internal dynamics of Afghanistan. These complexities are caused by the conflicting goals of neighboring and regional states that the US policies need to take into account.

Keywords: Afghanistan, Peacebuilding, US Strategies, Regional Politics, Smart Power, Hard Power, War on Terrorism, ISIS, India, Pakistan.

Introduction

Hard power approach had underlined US foreign policy for most of its history. The same trend is reflected in US foreign policy today. While Washington also pursues soft approach, however, predominantly, use of force, threat of use of force and sanctions have been used as instruments to achieve foreign policy goals.¹ There are obvious reasons for its reliance on hard power. Having the biggest economy of the world, advanced military industrial complex, a leader in technology and a huge geographical size make it the sole superpower of the world. In other words, we are living in an American world order, commonly understood as unipolar world order.

The US hard power approach has had consequences for peace and stability in the world. The superpower could not achieve substantial gains out of large scale military campaigns in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Intervention in Afghanistan, after terrorist attacks in the US, was justified as mandated by the UN Security Council, while the international peacekeeping body was bypassed in case of military invasion of

*Amanullah Khan is PhD scholar in Peace and Conflict Studies department, Center for International Peace and Stability (CIPS), at National University of Sciences and Technology, Islamabad. Dr. Noman Sattar is an expert in nuclear studies.

Iraq.² In both the cases, little has been achieved; rather repercussions exceed achievements. Al-Qaeda, the main set target in Afghanistan, was eliminated from Afghanistan but not the Taliban. Likewise, in Iraq, Saddam Hussein's government was successfully toppled, however it could not stabilize the country. Consequently, a new terrorist organization, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), emerged as an outcome of the anarchy³ that destabilizes many countries today.⁴ The group which is far more aggressive in its terrorist activities than Al-Qaeda is now a reality in Afghanistan.

Keeping in view the above mentioned realities, this paper studies the US strategies toward Afghanistan. It is designed to answer key questions like, what have been the US approaches toward Afghanistan since 2001? Which of the US administration's policy worked, which one could not work and for what reasons? What are the major challenges to the US in Afghanistan's peacebuilding? How Pakistan and India factor come into play in the US strategy in Afghanistan.

A Glimpse of US Engagement in Afghanistan

Primary goal for America in Afghanistan remained to destroy terrorist safe havens and to transform the country's political, economic and social structures into a modern state in line with liberal ideology of democracy, free market economy, rule of law and human rights. Unfortunately, none of the goals has been accomplished completely. Afghanistan houses hundreds of thousands of militants yet, belonging to different groups, mainly the Taliban, Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and ISIS. Similarly, Afghan political government stays in a fragile condition without having effective writ outside the capital, Kabul.⁵

Ostensibly, the US regional objectives restrict its earnest drives for peacebuilding in Afghanistan. Resistance from the regional countries toward the prolonged presence of the US troops in Afghanistan is also a hurdle toward peacebuilding in the country. Huge economic and human cost tied with the Afghanistan mission is yet another moral and public pressure on the US government to conclude its mission in Afghanistan.⁶ In addition, the US relations with some NATO allies in Europe are at odds, especially after the Trump administration imposition of tariffs on import of steel from Europe.⁷ The following figure demonstrates the scenario, discussed above.



Figure-1: Challenges to US objectives in Afghanistan
Source: Authors

The Bush Era: Hard Power Approach

George Bush had a harder posture on international issues of American interests. Intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, were direct military adventurisms. His administration also kept military option on the table against Iran.⁸ Roots of the current unrest in the Middle East could be traced back to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by his administration on mere false intelligence reports about possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by Saddam Hussein's regime.⁹ His policies, thus, had the dominant element of hard power approach.

Regarding Afghanistan, his strategy¹⁰ of sharp and powerful reaction to the 9/11 terrorist attacks were based on over optimism on his part. Diplomacy was not given due consideration to address the issue of terrorism. A global war on terrorism campaign begun that met with partial success because of conflicting perspectives on the definition of a terrorist.¹¹

Challenges are part and parcel of every military campaign especially if it is taken against a state actor. However, due to the massive killings in the terrorist attack on the soil of the world superpower, a supportive international environment helped the US to overcome the challenges. By and large, the initial years of intervention could not witness much resistance. Taliban government was easily dissolved, interim Afghan government was formed, and international donors funded Afghan government for building its own security forces. Yet, a few challenges could be listed that emerged in the subsequent years.

- After 2004. Taliban re-organized and their insurgency got momentum, many attacks on the US and NATO troops were reported.

- Mistrust between Pakistan and US grew. Pakistan officially protested against drone attacks inside Pakistan's FATA region that were seen against the sovereignty of Pakistan.¹²
- Pakistan got alarmed by the growing Indian influence in Afghanistan.
- Iran and China got alerted over the growing insecurity in Afghanistan.
- Domestic pressure in the final years of Bush administration due to the deteriorated economic condition of the US. Moreover, increase in the killings of the US forces in combat operations in Afghanistan also put pressure on the US government to wind up its military mission in Afghanistan.

Invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the Bush administration along with Britain was the first major turn in the US policy toward Afghanistan. Bush shifted focus from an unfinished mission in Afghanistan to Iraq that multiplied challenges for the US internationally and negatively affected its Afghanistan mission. Commentators opine that had Iraq war been avoided, situation could have been different in Afghanistan.¹³ At large, Bush approach reversed some of the major gains against Taliban in initial years of intervention. Afghanistan remained unstable with more violence and anarchy by 2008.

The Obama Era: Smart Power Approach

Barack Obama was more a smart statesman than his predecessor, Bush. His international approach reflected the idea of rapprochement, peace and dialogue. Withdrawing troops from Iraq, rebuilding relations with Cuba,¹⁴ and a nuclear agreement with Iran and world powers¹⁵—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—are some examples in this regard. His policies had comparatively a softer posture than Bush. At the same time, he used and threatened to use military force in some cases, i.e., Libya and Syria.

Obama was of the view that reckless use of force is counterproductive and creates more terrorists.¹⁶ The following were some of the turning points in the US policy regarding Afghanistan during Obama's era.

- Announced ending Iraq mission in order to focus on Afghanistan;
- Also pushed for more troops in Afghanistan, ordered for deployment of 30,000 more troops in Afghanistan;
- Gradually started withdrawing of troops in 2014 and announced complete drawdown by 2016;
- Extended the scope of his policy and included Pakistan too with his policy announced in 2009, named Af-Pak policy.

Challenges continued for his administration too. Public pressure mounted against his government to withdraw forces from fighting useless wars abroad in the face of growing number of casualties of the US troops in these missions. The decision to add more troops to Afghanistan mission during the economic crisis, at home, was definitely a bold decision from Obama. Hence, his first term approach carried on with the legacy of Bush except that he announced gradual withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan.

Overall, violence continued along with some efforts for reconciliation with the Taliban. A few additional challenges that faced Obama were as following:

- Obama administration repeatedly expressed concerns over the presence of Haqqani network and Quetta Shura in Pakistan whom it considers targeting US and allied NATO troops in Afghanistan.¹⁷
- The blame game further undermined trust in the bilateral relationship between US and Pakistan, especially after killing of Osama Bin Laden. While attack on a Pakistan Army check post (Salala)¹⁸ and Raymond Davis issue¹⁹ fueled tensions between the two allies.

The Trump Era: More of a Hard Power Strategy

Donald Trump pursued aggressive diplomacy as is evident from US engagement with the world during his first two years in office. United States' relations with the world in general appeared to be in decline. Inclusively, his administration's approach toward global politics could be summarized as following:

- Withdrawal from JCPOA;
- Trade war with China, its European allies, Canada;
- Building controversial wall on border with Mexico;
- Banning immigrants from several Muslims countries;²⁰
- Withdrawal from UN Human Rights Council;
- Controversial move to shift US embassy to Jerusalem and recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.
- An important positive move by his administration, so far, could be mentioned as the development of denuclearizing North Korea and reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula.²¹

On Afghanistan, Trump, during his election campaign, was of the view to completely abandon Afghanistan mission and not to waste American taxpayers' money on fighting fruitless wars, rather use the valuable resources on building America again. In a tweet on January 11, 2013, he writes, "Let's get out of Afghanistan. Our troops are being killed by the Afghanis we train and we waste billions there. Nonsense! Rebuild the USA."²² However, after becoming president, he reviewed his decision of withdrawal on the pretext that hasty drawdown would lead to increase in insurgency in Afghanistan.²³

Below is a glimpse of his approach toward Afghanistan:

- Sending more troops to Afghanistan;
- A policy having elements of ambiguity and unpredictability, more focused on military use of force against Taliban;
- Threatening International Criminal Court (ICC) with sanctions in case the court proceeds with alleged war crimes by the US troops in Afghanistan.²⁴

The Trump Administration faces multiple challenges regarding its mission in Afghanistan. The prevailing complex scenario reduces any optimism for the prospects

of peace in the country; neighboring countries of Afghanistan remain concerned at developments there.

Current challenges to the Trump strategy in Afghanistan could be mentioned as:

- Presence of ISIS;
- Distrusted relationship with Pakistan, suspension of Coalition Support Fund and economic aid to Pakistan;²⁵
- Hostile relations with Iran and its alleged support to Taliban;
- Alleged Russian support to Taliban;
- Tensions with Turkey, a NATO member that supported US mission in Afghanistan;²⁶
- Low domestic and international support for Afghanistan mission;
- Human rights violations, large scale civilian casualties in air operations;
- Weak Afghan government that faces a number of domestic challenges ranging from security to economy and political instability.

Shifting US Strategies

Bush administration's policy after 9/11 attacks in the United States remained confined to Afghanistan only. It primarily aimed at eliminating Al-Qaeda and removing Taliban from power. The scope of destroying terrorists' safe havens was later extended to the FATA areas of Pakistan in the middle of 2004 with the initiation of drone attacks. However, the official policy of Bush administration, on paper, did not include Pakistan. Broadly, Bush's approach focused on military victory against the militants in Afghanistan.

In 2009, the new administration of Barack Obama, announced its Af-Pak policy. Pakistan's role was officially linked to the success or failure of the US mission in Afghanistan. The US administration realized the critical role of Pakistan for peace and stability in Afghanistan. While more troops were added to the existing number of the US forces in Afghanistan, drone attacks in Pakistan's tribal areas also continued. Positive about Obama's administration approach to Afghanistan was that dialogue process with Taliban was initiated. Taliban were recognized as a legitimate actor in Afghan politics, in other words.²⁷ They set up their office in Qatar and actively participated in many bilateral and multilateral talks. Obama's approach could, therefore, be termed as a smart power approach.

The current administration of Donald Trump has sent 3000 additional troops to Afghanistan. Trump's policy further expanded the scope of its approach to India and named it as Afghanistan and South Asia strategy. He avoided giving any fixed timeline for exit and conditioned withdrawal of the US troops on the ground situation in Afghanistan. While Pakistan was asked to do more against Haqqani network, India was offered to play a greater role in Afghanistan.²⁸ Largely, his policy emphasized on achieving victory against insurgents through military operations.

Outcome of the Administrations' Strategies

The three US administrations' policies differently impacted the situation in Afghanistan, especially in Pakistan. Bush administration's hard power approach resulted in the immediate overthrowing of the Taliban regime in Kabul. It paved the way for installing an interim government through the Bonn Conference. President Bush pursued a policy of inflexibility toward Afghan Taliban.²⁹ Conversely, Barack Obama tried to achieve some visible successes for a respectful and timely exit from Afghanistan. His opened ended policy worked to some extent in terms of relative peace in Afghanistan by recognizing Taliban as a legitimate political entity. During 2006-2013, Pakistan faced grave internal security challenges.³⁰ The table below reflects major achievements of the three US administrations in Afghanistan mission since 2001.

Administration	Approach	Major Gains in Afghanistan
George Bush	Hard Power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ overthrowing of the Taliban regime ▪ installing Afghan democratic government; ▪ building Afghan army and police force.
Barack Obama	Smart Power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ killing of OBL; ▪ dismantling of Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan; ▪ closure of detention centers in Afghanistan; ▪ recognizing Taliban as a legitimate force and gaining Taliban confidence to start dialogue with; ▪ Strengthening capacity and capabilities of Afghan security forces to lead in combat operations; ▪ ending combat mission of US troops in 2014 and drawdown by the timeline, 2016.
Donald Trump	Hard power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Yet to be seen

Table-1: US Strategies and Major Gains

Source: Authors

It is imperative to underscore that despite some achievements by the Bush and Obama administrations, violence in Afghanistan remained on the rise according to the available data. The positive impact of the achievements by the first two administrations of Bush and Obama is not yet visible. Excessive reliance on use of force, especially aerial bombings, resulted counterproductive with increase in civilian casualties over the years.




Figure-2: Civilian casualties in Afghanistan

Source: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)

Additionally, the emergence of ISIS has adversely added to the already violent situation in the country. It gave a new dimension to violence, i.e., sectarian violence. The group claimed responsibility of multiple suicide attacks on Shia community in Afghanistan.³¹ According to the latest report of United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), in the first six months of 2018, civilian casualties hit record high despite some occasional ceasefire between Taliban and Afghan government.³² Worth mentioning is that domestic support in the US for Afghanistan mission which remained overwhelming during the Bush era, steadily started decreasing. The decline began during the second term of Bush and continues.




Figure-3: Public Opinion in the US

Source: Pew Research Center

Although the three administrations applied different approaches to handle the Afghanistan situation, however, mission Afghanistan is not yet completed. The partial success in Afghanistan could not be termed as durable.³³ Some commentators even reject the notion that US has accomplished its main objective in Afghanistan. They claim that US is failing in Afghanistan.³⁴

Afghanistan amidst the Politics of the Triangle

Every state and region has its own political, social, economic and strategic dynamics. Security situation in Afghanistan and success or failure of the US mission greatly depend on the local politics of Afghanistan and its linkage with the regional politics. While politics of South Asia is already complex, especially between Pakistan and India, the US policies toward the two nuclear states of South Asia also impact their bilateral relations and their role in the region including Afghanistan.

The complexity of issues and objectives of the three most influential states (Pakistan, India and US) contribute to the diminishing prospects for peace in Afghanistan. The bigger picture shows that India and the US maintain commonality of interests in Afghanistan. This is why US welcomes proactive Indian role in Afghanistan. On the contrary, there is a big factor of mistrust between Islamabad and Washington. Relations between Pakistan and the US have further deteriorated during Donald Trump's presidency.

By the end of Barack Obama's second term in office, the number of US drone attacks inside Pakistan's territory gradually decreased. The last major attack was the killing of Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, the leader of Afghan Taliban, in Balochistan province.³⁵ Notwithstanding, the continuing US concerns about the presence of Haqqani network in Pakistan's tribal areas, the current US administration of Donald Trump also refrained from conducting drone strikes inside Pakistan.³⁶

The figure below demonstrates that India enjoys support from the United States for its role in Afghanistan. While both the US and India are on the same page, Pakistan and United States play in a field of mistrust. Neither Pakistan is fully supportive of the US mission in Afghanistan nor does US address Pakistan's concerns seriously. Pakistan and India, on the other hand, also counter each other in Afghanistan.



Figure-4: Role of main stakeholders in Afghanistan politics

Source: Authors

Conclusion

US intervened in Afghanistan to respond to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Shifts in United States strategy reflect that it is stuck in Afghanistan and the mission has become more confounding with the complex security situation. The rise of ISIS has added to the US and regional countries' concerns³⁷ about the future of Afghanistan and peace in the region. Trump's new policy seems lacking a clear direction. The situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating and apprehensions of regional countries are also growing.

In the current complex scenario in Afghanistan, a rosy picture may not be painted. Trump's strategy of defeating Taliban through offensive means seems failing. Recent Taliban attacks on Afghan security forces in major cities³⁸ signal an urgent need for change in the strategy. The deteriorating security situation may also affect the upcoming presidential elections in Afghanistan. Ironically, challenges are too grave in the face of limited options with the Trump administration. Privatizing security to private security companies, reportedly, is being discussed in US policymaking circles as an option; however, this might be a risky move. A viable option remains to engage Afghan Taliban in a constructive dialogue process.³⁹ Taliban too would be willing to find a win-win solution of the conflict through talks with the US.

United States need to accept that cooperation with regional stakeholders is essential for any strategy to succeed in Afghanistan. Reconciliation with Taliban also requires help from the neighboring countries. The defeat of ISIS through effective use of force could provide a common ground for cooperation. While Pakistan's role remains crucial, none of the three US administrations gained full confidence of Pakistan. It ought to be understood that peace in Afghanistan needs a comprehensive plan of action with positive contribution from all major stakeholders, both within Afghanistan and

external actors. Unilateral approaches of the US administrations have worked with partial success, and have failed to bring peace.

Now when a new government is in power in Islamabad, there lies a hope that Trump administration would seriously engage Islamabad to find a viable solution of the Afghanistan imbroglio. Imran Khan's government has also shown interest to play positive role for resuming dialogue process with the Taliban.⁴⁰ Pakistan Army also supports US and NATO mission in Afghanistan. Army Chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, reiterated Pakistan's support for the US mission by saying, "We will encourage actions by America and NATO that will bring peace to Afghanistan specifically and the region at large. But we also wish our security concerns should also be resolved."⁴¹ Opportunities for peace through dialogue should be availed to resolve the Afghan issue. This would shun security competition among the regional states, particularly between Pakistan and India in Afghanistan, and help the US wind down its military presence there.

End Notes

- ¹ American policy makers believe that it is the country's hard power that ensures that America remains indispensable for the world economic and political stability. Ian Bremmer, "Obama or not, U.S. still needs hard power," *Foreign Policy*, February 9, 2009, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/02/09/obama-or-not-u-s-still-needs-hard-power/>
- ² Brendon O'Connor and Martin Griffiths, "Making sense of anti-Americanism," in *The Rise of Anti-Americanism*, ed. Brendon O'Connor and Martin Griffiths, (London: Routledge, 2006), 2.
- ³ *The Rise and Fall of ISIS: From Evitability to Inevitability*, Report 2016-2017, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, available at: <https://hcsc.nl/report/rise-and-fall-isis>
- ⁴ It has, so far, engulfed Syria, Yemen, Libya and Egypt in the Middle East. Nonetheless, areas under ISIS have been recaptured by the Iraqi and Syrian government forces in their respective countries; however, the organization still operates in pockets in the two countries. Egypt also battles ISIS militants in its Sinai region.
- ⁵ Afghan people are unsatisfied with the performance of the Afghan government. Their basic demand stands to protect their lives and properties which the government has so far been failed. At times, people protested in the Afghan capital and demanded resignation from Afghan President Ashraf Ghani. "Kabul anti-government protest turns deadly" *France 24*, June 2, 2017. Also refer to, Nematullah Bizhan, "Building legitimacy and state capacity in protracted fragility: The case of Afghanistan," The LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, April 2018, 4. <https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/afghanistan-report-v3.pdf>
- ⁶ Rod Nordland, Ash NGU and Fahim Abed, "How the U.S. government misleads the public on Afghanistan," *The New York Times*, September 8, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/08/world/asia/us-misleads-on-afghanistan.html>, to avoid public pressure, the U.S. government releases untrue statistics that contradicts with those of its friendly government in Kabul.
- ⁷ Larry Elliott and Richard Partington, "Trade war" What you need to know about US steel tariffs," *The Guardian*, May 31, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/may/31/trade-war-what-you-need-to-know-about-us-steel-tariffs>
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- ⁹ Phil Shiner, Andrew Williams, ed. *The Iraq War and International Law*, (Portland, Hart Publishing, 2008), 64.
- ¹⁰ The term 'strategy' has been used interchangeably with 'approach' at different places in the paper.
- ¹¹ The US and regional countries have different orientations and approaches to deal with 'terrorists'. The US, for example, blames Haqqani network and Afghan Taliban for violence in Afghanistan. Pakistan, on the other hand, does not consider Afghan Taliban as a terrorist group as they do not hurt Pakistan's national interests. Pakistan's former advisor to Prime Minister on foreign affairs, Sartaj Aziz, admitted that Pakistan has some influence over the Afghan Taliban but not control. *The Express Tribune*, October 28, 2015, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/980666/pakistan-has-some-influence-on-taliban-but-no-control-over-them-aziz/>.
- ¹² Though, status of drone attacks is controversial before international law, however, to some sources such attacks were carried out with the consent of Pakistani authorities. In other words, there was a tacit support for the drone attacks if not a written agreement. See, Amnesty International report (2013, p.53.) titled "Will I Be Next? US Drone Strikes in Pakistan," <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/12000/asa330132013en.pdf>
- ¹³ David Rohde and David E. Sanger, "How a "Good War" in Afghanistan went Bad," *The New York Times*, August 12, 2007, <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/12/world/asia/12afghan.html>
- ¹⁴ His administration opened US embassy in Cuba and Obama visited the country as the first US president in nearly a century.
- ¹⁵ The five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany.
- ¹⁶ Remarks by former President Obama on the Administration's Approach to Counterterrorism, at MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida, on December 06, 2016. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/06/remarks-president-administrations-approach-counterterrorism>
- ¹⁷ Pakistan denies any such presence of the network and asked US to share information of the group activities and safe havens. Pakistan Army also assured that US that its fight against terrorism is indiscriminate. "Indiscriminate action taken against terrorists," *Aaj TV* webpage, January 8, 2018, <https://aaj.tv/2018/01/indiscriminate-action-taken-against-terrorists-ispr/>
- ¹⁸ As a result, Pakistan closed its borders for US supply to its troops in Afghanistan for six months.
- ¹⁹ The American killed two Pakistani s in Lahore. For detail refer to, Raymond Davis, *The Contractor: How I Landed in a Pakistani Prison and Ignited a Diplomatic Crisis*, (Dallas: Benbella Books, 2017)
- ²⁰ Jennifer Lee Barrow, "Trump Travel Ban: Lawful But Ill-Advised," *Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy*, Vol.41, Issue 2, 692.
- ²¹ It depends on level of trust between the two countries; also an effective mechanism to move smoothly according to the mutually agreed terms and conditions. North Korea would like to see practical actions from the US to ease sanctions on North Korea while US may not do so unless it sees pragmatic steps from the North regarding denuclearization.
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- ²³ David Jackson and Jim Michaels, "Cautioning against 'hasty' pullout from Afghanistan, Trump clears path for more U.S. troops," *USA Today*, August 21, 2017 <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/08/21/donald-trump-send-4-000-more-troops-afghanistan/585488001/>

- ²⁴ Owen Bowcott, Oliver Holmes and Erin Durkin, "John Bolton threatens war crimes court with sanction," *The Guardian*, September 10, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/sep/10/john-bolton-castigate-icc-washington-speech>
- ²⁵ "US suspends \$300 million in military aid to Pakistan," *Asia Times*, September 2, 2018, <http://www.atimes.com/article/us-suspends-300-million-in-aid-to-pakistan/>
- ²⁶ The contradicting role of the US and Turkey in Syria, controversy over the Fethullah Gulen after the failed military coup in Turkey, Ankara's deal with Russia for buying S-400 advanced missile defense system, and the issue of the detained American pastor, Andrew Brunson, are the main sources of the current tensions between US and Turkey.
- ²⁷ As a group, Taliban have not been put in the US State department list of terrorist organizations.
- ²⁸ Santosh Chaubey, "Why US policy change on Afghanistan matters for India," *India Today*, August 22, 2017, <https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/india-afghanistan-pakistan-china-us-president-donald-trump-1030749-2017-08-22>
- ²⁹ Taliban were not invited in the Bonn conference as a legitimate actor of Afghan politics which is considered a big mistake on the part of the western coalition.
- ³⁰ The insurgency of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was at full force during this period of time. Pakistani authorities believed TTP to have links and support from Afghanistan.
- ³¹ Casey Garret Johnson, "The Rise and Stall of Islamic State in Afghanistan," USIP Special Report 395, November 2016, 13.
- ³² "Civilian deaths in Afghanistan hit record high," *UN News*, July 15, 2018, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/07/1014762>
- ³³ Two points are essential here regarding the end result of the US approaches since 2001: First, the US partially achieved the objective of eliminating the Al-Qaeda threat. Although, Al-Qaeda has lost its power to conduct any such big attack like the September 9, however, the ideology of the terrorist group remains alive yet. Effectively dealing with the ideology of the group needs joint comprehensive actions at a large scale in multiple ways. Secondly, another group, ISIS, poses a bigger threat to world peace now.
- ³⁴ Seth G. Jones, "Managing the Long War: US Policy toward Afghanistan and the Region," Testimony published by RAND Corporation in April 2017, 2. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT472/RAND_CT472.pdf. Another latest report (May 2018) by Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) concludes with similar findings, "between 2001 and 2017, U.S. government efforts to stabilize insecure and contested areas in Afghanistan mostly failed." <https://www.sigar.mil/interactive-reports/stabilization/index.html>
- ³⁵ Adam Entous and Jessica Donati, "How the U.S. Tracked and Killed the Leader of the Taliban," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 25, 2016, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-tracked-taliban-leader-before-drone-strike-1464109562>
- ³⁶ There could be mentioned multiple reasons for this: one, that Pakistan has somehow developed its own drones capable of missile attacks on the militant targets; second, the US might have believed that Haqqani network is no more a potential threat to the US mission in Afghanistan; third, Pakistan has taken a firm stance against drone strikes inside Pakistan, calling it a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Pakistan Air Force Chief had even warned that Pakistan's fighter jets would shoot out any drone entering into the Pakistani air space. See, "US Drone in Pak airspace to be shot down: Air Chief," *The News*, December 8, 2017, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/253528-us-drone-in-pak-airspace-to-be-shot-down-air-chief>
- ³⁷ Massoumeh Torfeh, "ISIL in Afghanistan: A Growing Threat," *Al Jazeera*, August 20, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/08/isil-afghanistan-growing-threat-1708131322968.html>
- ³⁸ Taliban are seizing more areas and killing Afghan security forces in record numbers. Reportedly, Taliban killed 22 Afghan soldiers and policemen a day in 2016. Since then death toll is kept secret by the Afghan government. "The Death Toll for Afghan Forces is Secret. Here's why?," *The New York Times*, September 21, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/21/world/asia/afghanistan-security-casualties-taliban.html?emc=edit_th_180922&nl=todaysheadlines&lid=138881810922
- ³⁹ It is generally believed that Taliban may not be defeated militarily. The best option is to integrate them into the mainstream Afghan politics and recognize them as a potential political force. They could prove an asset for the Afghan government in its fights against ISIS.
- ⁴⁰ Iqbal Khan, "Turns, twists of Afghan Peace Process," *Pakistan Observer*, September 19, 2018, <https://pakobserver.net/turns-twists-of-afghan-peace-process/> "The world must do more against terrorism," *Dawn*, September 6, 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1356002>.
- ⁴¹ "The world must do more against terrorism," *Dawn*, September 6, 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1356002>

2018 NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON GLOBAL SECURITY

*Tauqeer Hussain Sargana, Mujahid Hussain and Hafeez Ullah Khan**

Abstract

The 2018 nuclear review of the United States would enhance arms race and provide greater leverage to battlefield of nuclear warheads while giving boost to application of tactical nuclear weapons, which historically NATO had inducted during the Cold War period against the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, American political and military leadership in its 2018 NPR has considered the dynamics of 'lowered nuclear threshold' which earlier in the 2010 Obama NPR revolved around 'increased nuclear threshold'. This happened due to undeclared Russian induction of tactical nuclear warheads in any possible war theatre with NATO at the European battlefield. Also, US acceptance of the lowered threshold would ignite a new wave of political orchestration around the globe particularly imposing political maneuvers against China and Russia including nations imposing strict protocols against US non-kinetic interventions. This research makes the point that possibility of war is possible under the new nuclear posture, which would be limited in scope and controlled in actions. Serious nations around the globe had already started non-kinetic war-gaming to evaluate the US doctrine and how it helps Washington to politically craft the environment in the regions such as South East Asia, South Asia, Middle East, and states compiling pro-Russian Eastern Europe. The findings of this study are based on deductive approach with hypothetical premises mentioned above.

Keywords: Nuclear Strategy, Nuclear Posture Review, United States, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Non-Kinetic Interventions, Limited War, Europe, South East Asia, Middle East, South Asia.

Introduction

The 2018 nuclear posture review (NPR) of the United States, in continuation to the previously crafted 2010 Obama, NPR is a renewed effort to modernize the US military.¹ Moreover, Washington had envisioned enhancing reliance on battlefield utilization of 'non-strategic nuclear forces' in contradiction to the 2010 Obama NPR which focused more on strategic deterrence with induction of strategic weapons in the battlefield. Though, it is important to understand the context of 'non-strategic nuclear forces' in 2018 NPR. In fact, this refers to the idea around induction of nuclear weapons in the battlefield with lowered-yield such as tactical nuclear weapons. Interestingly, the

¹Mr. Tauqeer Hussain Sargana is PhD scholar at Department of Politics and International Relations at International Islamic University Islamabad (IIUI), Pakistan, Mujahid Hussain is Senior Lecturer, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences (International Relations), Bahria University Islamabad and Hafeez Ullah Khan is a lecturer, Department of Political Science, Abdul Wali Khan University, Mardan.

lowered-yield of 'non-strategic nuclear forces' is that of the 'Little Boy' and 'Fat Man' nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The yield could be adjusted keeping in view the strategic opponents of United States who have also clustered their non-strategic nuclear weapons with the same yield. So, the yield could be a problem for Pakistan or India but it would somehow get adjusted in the nuclear phenomenon of both United States and Russia. Today, under the February 2018 NPR United States is determined to acquire new modes of lowered-yield ballistic and cruise weapons for its sea based assets.²

Trump's NPR rationalizes adoption of the lowered-yield weapons with that of Russian undeclared induction of battlefield of nuclear warheads to successfully wage a war against the United States, while creating a limited war theater. This in fact, recalls Pakistan's response to Indian Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) that envisions a similar limited war theatre under the nuclear shadow. Induction of battlefield weapons by Pakistan such as Nasr has jeopardized the dreams of Indian stalwarts. Though, Nasr does not maintain nuclear yield that of United States or Russian 'non-strategic nuclear weapons'. Without going into dilemma of South Asian nuclear environment, this research highlights the reemerging of limited war phenomenon between the United States and Russia. The stated rationale of the United States 2018 NPR is to address and correct an imaginary invented fantasy of the Russian misperception that "greater capacity in this area could give Moscow the possibility of successfully waging a limited nuclear war".³ For modernization of non-strategic nuclear weapons, it has been crafted in the 2018 NPR draft that:

*These supplements will enhance deterrence by denying potential adversaries any mistaken confidence that limited nuclear employment can provide a useful advantage over the United States and its allies. For example, Russia's belief that limited nuclear first use, potentially including low-yield weapons, can provide such an advantage is based, in part, on Moscow's perception that its greater number and variety of non-strategic nuclear systems provide a coercive advantage in crises and at lower levels of conflict. Correcting this mistaken Russian perception is a strategic imperative (NPR Draft 364-370).*⁴

The military buildup, under 2018 NPR, will give President Donald Trump "nuclear weapons that are theoretically more usable in a regional conflict".⁵ The application of NPR in real scenario would have drastic impacts with ability to trigger the brinkmanship anxiety towards misjudgment of the threshold. For example, the forward deployment of tactical nuclear warheads during crises time could catastrophically create a blockade inevitably originating food crisis that could potentially cause more deaths in Europe than real war. Moreover, forward deployment of such weapons itself create environment of limited war which consequently lowers the nuclear threshold and increases the possibility of ambiguity in conflict escalation leading the crisis into total war conflict.

The review reaffirms the willingness of the United States, which now seems prepared to adopt 'first use policy' during scenarios which are alarming and manifold at the same time. The traditional nuclear policy of the United States maintained an

ambiguous posturing vested in its response mechanism while remaining silent on explaining the exact circumstances that could demand a clear-cut nuclear response. Whereas, 2018 nuclear posture review specifically chart out the possible scenarios where it could unleash its weapons. For example, it calls the situation as “extreme circumstances” particularly to defend its interests which it refers as “vital interests of United States, its allies, and partners”. On this point the 2018 NPR draft specifically writes that:

The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners. Extreme circumstances could include significant non-nuclear strategic attacks. Significant non-nuclear strategic attacks include, but are not limited to, attacks on the U.S., allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control or warning and attack assessment capabilities (NPR Draft 915-920).⁶

The US right to use nuclear weapons also includes possibility when its friends are under attack which it refers as “allies and partners”. The document includes almost 30 states spread over “European, Asian, and Pacific” (NPR Draft 945-946) as US allies and partners which will be defended through the ‘use of nuclear weapons’ at times of crises.⁷ The definition of the “extreme circumstances” includes most probable Russian attack with non-strategic nuclear weapons or strategic conventional weapons on “allied or partner civilian population or its infrastructure”.⁸

The language and tone of the NPR also indicates that the connotation of “Russian attack” somehow includes allies and partners of Moscow into the context as well. For example, if Syria or Iran as ally or partner of Moscow launches some kind of attack against US or its “allies and partners”, it could also invoke the US nuclear response. Moreover, for deterrence stability the “United States also maintains a portion of its nuclear forces on daily alert, with the option of launching those forces promptly”.⁹ China, Russia, Iran, Syria and North Korea will be the direct victims of Trump NPR, whereas Pakistan must uphold its anxiety on the regional fronts that might have fallouts on its national security under the domain of non-kinetic mingling.

Challenges Erupting out of US NPR

The United States 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is compiled after eight years and surfaced with few changes into it as compared to the previous 2010 Obama NPR. The recent Trump NPR seems more aggressive based on the following reasons:

Negation of the CTBT

The review weakens the ongoing arms control treaties and disarmament commitments as the US retain the right to resume nuclear testing. Washington says that from now on the US doesn’t feel obliged to ratify Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The NPR draft specifically mentions that “the United States does not support ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty” (NPR Draft 529-530).¹⁰ This aptitude reflects dangerous trend because it’s the backward step and rolling back the

consensus of the global world. What signal United States wants to send to the world? By signaling such a drastic tilt in its nuclear posture, Washington has re-invoked the use of nuclear weapons.

United States investment to modernize its existing stockpile and raise inventory of non-strategic nuclear warheads will jeopardize the strategic stability with greater impact. Moreover, it's changing stance over CTBT along with building more sophisticated delivery means is a clear indication for possible real conflict. With all this in view, the 2018 NPR commitment to deploy the weapons on forward bases with ready to launch status under 'first use policy' to protect its so-called 30 allies is alarming. The increased political, economic and diplomatic tensions with contemporary Russia and China along with their allies like North Korea, Syria and Iran; make the United States nuclear posture review explosive. The silent orchestration of world order is feeding the momentum of limited war scenarios, which in turn had been the primary point of address in the 2018 US NPR.

Arms Race with New Means of Delivery

The United States wants to develop new means of delivery and more sophisticated nuclear devices compatible to its weapons. The NPR draft says that:

The United States will modify a small number of existing Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) warheads to provide a low-yield option, and in the longer term, pursue a modern nuclear-armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) (NPR Draft 383-385)."

This indicates massive arms race in the domain of tactical nuclear warheads allowing induction of sophisticated technology usable to dictate the future battlefield. One needs to stay clear regarding trends of arms race. It's the US political will that had played decisive role to curtail or increase arms race among big powers particularly between itself and Russia. Washington had positively allowed mature responses to initiate global agreements ensuring arms control and disarmament. Today, Trump regime has invoked mistrust that has ignited the arms race and massive weaponization. Therefore, in absence of US commitment towards arms control and disarmament, the world is likely to witness proliferation of the battlefield weapons concept.

Fragile Parity

More worrisome is the possibility of limited war in regions like South Asia where warmongering Indian military could seek strength from such evolving international environment.¹² The so-called modernization of the delivery means would destabilize the fragile parity not only between the Cold War rivals but regional competitors like India vs. China, India vs. Pakistan, North Korea vs. South Korea, North Korea vs. Japan and Iran vs. Israel. This trend is possibly a dangerous step towards instability at global and regional fronts.

Gambling on 'Allies vs. Partners'

Since early 1950s the United States maintains the pretext of nuclear umbrella to help protect its allies from nuclear attack. Today, the context involved the concept that if one of its partners gets hit by one of the weapons consisting chemical, biological or nuclear payloads/ agents, the United States could use nuclear weapons. In 2010 NPR, the United States used the term "allies" but interestingly the 2018 NPR propagates the term "partners". So, the question arises, which are those countries that come in the new area of partnership? The 2018 US NPR writes that:

The United States has formal extended deterrence commitments that assure European, Asian, and Pacific allies. Assurance is a common goal based on collaboration with allies and partners to deter or defeat the threats we face. No country should doubt the strength of our assurance commitments or the strength of U.S. and allied capabilities to deter, and if necessary defeat, any potential adversary's nuclear or non-nuclear aggression. In many cases, effectively assuring allies and partners depends on their confidence in the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, which enables most to eschew possession of nuclear weapons, thereby contributing to U.S. non-proliferation goals" (NPR Draft 260-267).¹³

It seems that the United States can now add any country into its partnership that potentially brings valuable benefits for its global strategic objectives. The countries that can help her achieve interests against Russia, Iran and most probably North Korea could be of great status to qualify under "partners" category. In South Asian perspective India had already qualified for the special status against China and Pakistan. The pace of strategic relations, military modernization, defense pacts, and international projection of the Indian potential is adamant to the portfolio that New Delhi would soon resume under 'partners' cluster.

Lowered Nuclear Threshold

The threshold of using nuclear weapons in the 2018 NPR is significantly lowered. From now on the US believes to use nuclear weapons in the wake of chemical and biological attack. Amazingly in the wake of cyber-attack as well.¹⁴ Now a days, it's really difficult to locate the real source of cyber-attack and all these factors (chemical, biological and cyber) provides brilliant excuse and opportunity to manipulate facts and the reality surrounding the complexity of the issue. For example, Syrian President Bashar-ul-Asad is a bad guy and he has used chemical weapons against his people. Regardless of fact finding, 'let's use nuclear weapons against him' could be the mantra used to facilitate execution of 2018 NPR 'first use policy'. Not going too far into history, we remember how Iraq was bombed on the phenomenon of 'weapons of mass destruction'. Did the world found WMDs in Iraq? While looking for an answer of that question, this research also highlights few more scenarios that international community should be interested to find relevance that is taking birth out of 2018 NPR. For example, the NPR draft specifically writes that:

There now exist an unprecedented range and mix of threats, including major conventional, chemical, biological, nuclear, space, and cyber threats,

and violent non-state actors. International relations are volatile. Russia and China are contesting the international norms and order we have worked with our allies, partners, and members of the international community to build and sustain. Some regions are marked by persistent disorder that appears likely to continue and possibly intensify. These developments have produced increased uncertainty and risk (NPR Draft 579-584).¹⁵

The dilemma of mixed range of threats is volatile under the lowered nuclear threshold. This in fact is not a new phenomenon neither had been envisioned for the first time. At Cold War climax, tactical nuclear warheads were the reality to bring battlefield maneuvers though it faced issues of command and control system. The 2018 acceptance of the tactical nuclear weapons is different to Cold War as recent US NPR formally accepts the role of non-strategic nuclear weapons under the prevailing strategic command and control system and allows deployment of them at forward bases.

Implications of the United States Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) on Global and Regional Stability

Due to urgency in the United States nuclear posture review that undermines not only stability of the strategic deterrence but also lowers down the nuclear threshold by inducting tactical nuclear warheads into its forward bases; it is important to highlight contexts of limited war that most probably would define the future battlefield. Below are mentioned few of the important regions that come under the radar of the US nuclear posture review. The regions enlisted below include Europe, Middle East, South East Asia, and South Asia.

Affects of the US NPR on Europe?

The official acceptance of the US to develop new delivery means compatible to tactical nuclear warheads is somehow legitimizing the scenario of limited war at local level. Though, the war is less likely to erupt between great powers such as between US and Russia but projection and likeliness of the limited conflict at the regional level will most likely convert the overall theatre into strategic level. The 2018 NPR categorically sets its pace in context to nuclear developments in Russia. It says:

While Russia initially followed America's lead and made similarly sharp reductions in its strategic nuclear forces, it retained large numbers of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Today, Russia is modernizing these weapons as well as its strategic systems. Even more troubling has been Russia's adoption of military strategies and capabilities that rely on nuclear escalation for their success. These developments, coupled with Russia's invasion of Crimea and nuclear threats against our allies, mark Moscow's unabashed return to Great Power competition (NPR Draft lines 77 to 82).¹⁶

The presumption of the US NPR believing that Russia plans to induct tactical nuclear warheads during its most likely conflict with NATO in Europe is somehow out of order. Further, ambiguity around induction of non-strategic tactical nuclear weapons by Russians somehow demands a credible acceptance from Moscow, which is still a

missing link. The trajectory of recent missile tests by the Russians suggests the other way around. For example, March 2018 test of 'Sarmat' that NATO refers as 'Satan 2' is an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile meant to address the global anti-missile defense shield of the USA.¹⁷ As a matter of fact, it's the United States that wants a limited war scenario to squeeze Russian influence in Eastern Europe. Due to 2018 NPR, it's the Europe that must feel the heat and birth of new Cold War rivalry on its territory. Acceptance of the limited war context by the United States would not hesitate to orchestrate possible application of it.

Eastern Europe will be the next battlefield replacing Cold War's Vietnam and Afghanistan. The unpredictable Trump is going to receive political benefits for the second term from the mantra of limited war just like Narendra Modi of India. The limited war scenario in Europe would have great potential to directly engage nuclear powers which most likely trigger the issues of threshold. War thereafter will be very expensive and Europe's unwillingness to accept lower threshold would create issues of brinkmanship. Any such scenario would ultimately qualify the limited war into total war which is why disqualifies the European theater as an immediate battlefield between U.S. and Russia. It is therefore, the mantra of war may be shifted to another region and most probably into Middle East which both rival can easily manipulate.

Implications of the US NPR on Middle East

As postured above, the region of Middle East is one of the biggest battlefields for the American strategic objectives. Whether legitimate or incorrectly postured, American policy makers have visualized all necessary means to achieve their objectives. Moreover, the so-called US politics is endorsed and even extended through tangible support by the dominant regional nations like Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Israel to mention few. As a result, Iran and Syria emerge as a rival block to the US political orchestration. Henceforth, overall situation somehow paves the way for global gambling. Russian placement in internal affairs of Middle East becomes inimitable which executes its plan, with the help of Iranian and Syrian political posturing, against US objective. Russian approach is more reactive in regional affairs of the Middle East. In fact, it jumps into the whole context as an ally to the anti-US nexus and provides tangible support to its allies and partners. As a conclusive posture, the Middle Eastern politics is hostile to global politics that fuel and support ideological fault lines among the regional nations.

Taking the context in relevance to the recent NPR, the Middle East holds some of the US "allies and partners" that are in bad shape such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. Both the states face tangible threats due to Iranian ideological and political positioning. The so-called *Daesh* or ISIS is again a non-state element that has camouflaged identity in the region. Many experts believe that *Daesh* is orchestrated and sponsored by the US and Israeli intelligence agencies to destabilize part of the Middle East which is favorable for both; Washington and Tel Aviv.¹⁸ Further, the depth of the so-called *Daesh* is only active in Iraq and Syria. These two nations had always faced isolation and hostility from the US and Israeli politic-o-military leadership. This tendency of *Daesh* in fact declassify

US-Israeli nexus to manipulate the security politics of the region, where non-state actors play decisive role to ensure the instability.

The other ally or partner that fits into NPR context is Saudi Arabia. Due to the double dealing nature of US global politics, the Saudi security establishment would be victim of NPR. The contemporary political landscape of the region particularly Yemen, Iraq, Libya and Syria pose great challenges for the Middle East stability. It is most probably a challenging situation for Israel and Saudi Arabia too. Both the states along with US are looking forward to bring necessary arrangements that shall curtail any opportunity for anti-Saudi, anti-Israel and anti-US forces operating in the region.

The so-called anti-forces operating in the region are none other than Iran, Syria and their strategic partner the Russian Federation. Syria and Iran had also formed quite an impressive bond with Russia that has showed political, military and diplomatic support at times of dire need. Since the eruption of so-called instability in Syria, Moscow had been actively supporting the Bashar-ul-Asad regime with all means available in its basket. As a result, the regime has successfully reestablished its political writ and projected itself resilient to international propaganda orchestrated by the United States. The situation in Syria is neither ideal nor it could be called a state where life of its citizens is protected. Whatsoever is the situation but the conclusive hypothesis is somewhat not in favor of the US and its allies in the Middle East who wanted regime change in Syria. Out of tragedy, the situation evidently frustrates the United States. Politics around Syria is now stretching out its instability towards Saudi Arabia. Yemen is about to explode anti-Saudi militancy, which does have its ideological connections with Iran, Syria and so-called US-Israeli sponsored non-state actors.

It is also important to bring forefront the most important rival of the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia; which is Iran. The 2018 NPR draft highlights Iran with specific context which is:

Iran, too, poses proliferation threats. Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has most recently stated that, "America is the number one enemy of our nation." While Iran has agreed to constraints on its nuclear program in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), many of the agreement's restrictions on Iran's nuclear program will end by 2031. In addition, Iran retains the technological capability and much of the capacity necessary to develop a nuclear weapon within one year of a decision to do so. Iran's development of increasingly long-range ballistic missile capabilities, and its aggressive strategy and activities to destabilize neighboring governments, raises questions about its long-term commitment to foregoing nuclear weapons capability. Were Iran to pursue nuclear weapons after JCPOA restrictions end, pressures on other countries in the region to acquire their own nuclear weapons would increase" (NPR Draft 775-785).¹⁹

The current political circumstances of the Middle East evidently reject the so-called US led orchestration in the region. United States failure to isolate Syria has now shifted to resist Tehran's political space granted earlier through nuclear agreement. Tehran has categorically announced to increase nuclear enrichment in case the

agreement is cancelled.²⁰ The major stakeholders including France, UK, China, Russia and Germany has been striving hard to stay with the agreement but due to American unilateral withdrawal, the so-called international commitment has entered into a black hole. The situation is now vindicating a new security environment in the region that brings them all into politics of vengeance.

2018 NPR is evidently addressing the so-called politics of vengeance. Today, if someone has to define the Middle East, following narratives dominate the environment such as; Middle East is hub of Daesh/ISSI, Bashar-ul-Asad is committing war crimes and killing innocent civilians with chemical weapons, Iran is sponsoring terrorism in the region particularly against Israel and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, developments around Iranian nuclear agreement would isolate Tehran that in turn could end up in a political frustration. All this provides breeding ground for mistrust and political tussles among the competing blocks. Initiation of any reaction on ground would demand protection and safety of “allies and partners” that United States would ensure under 2018 NPR with forward deployment of tactical nuclear warheads. The possible response against US military posture would trigger Russian reaction, hence making the situation closer to ‘zero hour’.

South East Asia as a Pivot to 2018 US NPR

China is under enormous pressure when it comes to the issue of North Korea in general and South China Sea in particular. Beijing’s political problems over the issue of Taiwan, Tibet and Hong Kong make it more vulnerable to proactively engage in any military adventure orchestrated by its immediate neighbor India or global rival USA. Moreover, NPR connotation of ‘allies and partners’ is somehow very suitable for the United States to twist the situation to put military pressure over China. The dilemma of disconnectivity between Chinese people and its leadership is somehow fruitful variable for the orchestration of political mingling under the non-kinetic or hybrid warfare. The NPR draft amalgamates Russia, China and North Korea as a common threat and highlights their developments with unique context as under:

While United States has continued to reduce the number and salience of nuclear weapons, others, including Russia and China have moved in the opposite direction. Russia has expanded and improved its strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. China’s military modernization has resulted in an expanded nuclear force, with little to no transparency into its intentions. North Korea continues its illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities in direct violation of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. Russia and North Korea have increased the salience of nuclear forces in their strategies and plans and have engaged in increasingly explicit nuclear threats. Along with China, they have also engaged in increasingly aggressive behavior in outer space and cyber space (NPR Draft 585-593).²¹

What America needs is a military instrument to impose blockade that could potentially create timely brinkmanship crises in China. Billions of people can prevail under poverty but not under fear of being alienated. After Russia, China becomes the greatest victim of US acceptance of limited war and deployment of tactical nuclear

warheads at forward bases. In real perspective, it is the American capacity in the area of non-strategic tactical nuclear warheads that could give her the possibility of successfully waging a limited war in Europe, Middle East and South East Asia.

2018 NPR's Relevance for South Asia

South Asia is no different to Europe, Middle East and South East Asia when it comes to strategic gambling orchestrated under the new 2018 NPR. Indo-US strategic partnership is clear example of bilateral manifestation between New Delhi and Washington. Interestingly, 2018 US NPR and Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine both have similar ambiguities when it comes to the use of nuclear weapons. For example, the Indian Nuclear Doctrine states that:

*In the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons.*²²

The United States 2018 NPR states that:

*The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners. Extreme circumstances could include significant non-nuclear strategic attacks. Significant non-nuclear strategic attacks include, but are not limited to, attacks on U.S., allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control or warning and attack assessment capabilities (NPR Draft 915-920).*²³

Moreover, the Indian Nuclear Doctrine calls upon non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and specifically states that:

*India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers.*²⁴

On this second point the U.S. NPR states that:

*The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their non-nuclear proliferation obligations (NPR Draft 921-923).*²⁵

Not going into the details of expression coincidence in the Indian and American nuclear language, still there is quite a good nexus between both the states. In fact, South Asia is the only region in the world that provides Washington a unique opportunity to squeeze both China and Pakistan while keeping an eye on Iran and Russia by using India and Afghanistan. It can jeopardize the Chinese network of land routes while using Afghanistan and blockade the sea route while using India in the Indian Ocean. Both OBOR and CPEC get intense pressure from Indo-US nexus. Moreover, their joint exercises in the South China Sea are also evident to disallow free mobilization of Chinese trade. The language of 2018 NPR is quite evident and apprehensively classifies China as a threatening actor to US interests or interests of its

“allies and partners”. Tangible response mechanism adopted by China and Pakistan altogether, or in individual capacity, will face Indo-US military adventurism. Engaging China on sea and land routes along with political turmoil on its neighboring territories would have dire consequences for Beijing. That is why either South China Sea or CPEC-cum-OBOR could be the triggering element to initiate China vs. US tug of war.

Squeezing Pakistan is somewhat gloomy for Indo-US strategic nexus. Afghanistan also is unable to push Pakistan towards instability though it had done all efforts to do so. The reason is robust and rigid due to security setup that Pakistan Army along with civil law enforcement agencies has installed in the country. It is today quite impossible to breach Pakistani intelligence and security apparatus for extra regional forces. Nor India and U.S. are successful to weaken Pakistani commitment to execute CPEC plan of action. Therefore, out of frustration the application of the limited war context would require a nexus between regional and extra-regional forces. It is thereby estimated that political, diplomatic and military instruments applied against Chinese influence in South China Sea and Indian Ocean along with land routes such as CPEC and OBOR is the most visible and viable area where Indo-US strategic nexus would like to trigger limited war. Pakistan being close ally and partner of Chinese CPEC and OBOR projects would inevitably play decisive role to secure Indian Ocean and land routes. Failure to negate the pace of positive stability, India might execute its ‘Cold Start Doctrine’ against Pakistan. The dual politico-military blockade by the US against China and India against Pakistan altogether would isolate both Beijing and Islamabad.

The situation would somehow require tangible response from China and Pakistan that as a result could trigger issues of brinkmanship. It is again important to note that Pakistan does not accept lowered nuclear threshold and that is why it had inducted tactical nuclear warheads to deter Indian Cold Start Doctrine. The situation will be worsening if India in alliance with United States executes its limited war strategy. In that scenario Pakistan would certainly uphold its ‘first use option’ against Indian adventure. Moreover, Chinese nuclear doctrine is silent on a scenario such as limited war. The 2018 NPR have definite implications and challenges for Chinese territorial sovereignty along with her ambitious economic plans spread around continents. The balanced evaluation of the Chinese nuclear response would not allow lowering the nuclear threshold, henceforth; making any such move of the United States and India to isolate Beijing could be catastrophic. Chinese response will be critical to US “allies and partners” in the region.

India and Afghanistan on the other hand find themselves in NPR list of “allies and partners”. The condition is an unconditional acceptance of Washington’s global ambitions. India is an ideal partner for the US and coincidentally follows the same brutal politics in the region against peaceful nations. India is an occupant nation so do the United States.

India had spread terrorism in South Asia and used its serving military officers like Col Purohit²⁶ and Commander Kalboshan Yadav to perpetrate violence within and outside India. Moreover, more than a million standing army of India is killing innocent Kashmiris.²⁷ Rap, torture and use of pellet guns are a common tool of the Indian army to

suppress freedom struggle of Kashmiris. Not only Kashmiris but in India, there are millions striving hard to achieve their freedom out of 'Hindutva' ideology.²⁸ Sikhs, Tamils and Nexalites are few of the examples. Kashmir is exception because under 1947 Partition Plan of British India, it was supposed to be part of Pakistan.²⁹

Indian forces occupied the territory in 1948 and since then it had been suppressing the freedom struggle of Kashmiris. Kashmir is also exceptional due to its very international acceptance as a disputed territory. For example, the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru agreed the United Nation Resolutions to grant the Kashmiris a right of self-determination through a plebiscite in 1948.³⁰ The world is silent not only on human rights violations in Kashmir but it had also paid no attention to United Nations resolutions. It seems what matters in international politics is only 'politics of self-interest' not 'politics of self-above'. Due to nature of international politics India is playing politics of instability in the region and Pakistan is one of the biggest victims. Moreover, New Delhi's hegemonic ambitions had poisoned its military thought which had evolved mantra of madness in form of limited war, the Cold Start Doctrine.

United States NPR seems an associated concept of Indian Cold Start Doctrine that also accommodates limited war concept along with induction of non-strategic nuclear weapons at the forward bases. Washington's track record of occupying foreign nations is so rich that one cannot simply ignore. For example, use of force against Iraq that ruined the lives of millions of people is not an ideal episode of its foreign adventures. Also American global war on terror had contributed more towards terrorism rather mitigated the very threat. Nations are today instable and struggling with best available means against turmoil erupted out of American concept of war. Afghanistan has provided an ideal launching pad both for India and United States to maneuver instability in region. It is dangerously being used against Pakistan, China, Iran and Russian interest in Central Asian Republics (CARs). In South Asia, India and Afghanistan are the key "allies and partners" of the United States. Therefore, in case of any political orchestration by the Washington both New Delhi and Kabul will fall in the events of limited war against Pakistan and China.

Conclusion

This paper has reviewed possible changes that happened in the new Nuclear Posture Review of the United States in 2018. Moreover, different hypothetical situations are created to understand the possible application of NPR that has adopted the concept of limited war. In this respect, four regions including Europe, Middle East, South East Asia and South Asia were highlighted along with their potential to host United States new concept of limited war. All these scenarios have different complexities and security anxieties that make them separately ideal for the implementation of limited war concept. It now depends on the US policy makers when and how they want to destabilize the regions mentioned above. Some are already paddling between stability and instability. What is necessary to understand is how the victim nations are going to respond to such American understanding of future battlefield? How Russia and China; as great powers and regional nations like Iran and Pakistan would respond to 2018 NPR?

The fundamental take out from this paper is the American acceptance of lowered nuclear threshold with possibility of limited war and deployment of tactical nuclear warheads at the forward bases. This in fact, creates possibility of conflict under the nuclear overhang while undermining the strategic deterrence. The increased nuclear threshold had been playing decisive role to maintain peace and security in the world. Earlier, only India wished to lower the nuclear threshold to destabilize Pakistan that Islamabad timely responded with induction of tactical nuclear warheads. Moreover, Islamabad had never neutralized its 'first use option' against Indian possible adventurism but the context of limited war under extra-regional forces somehow increases the security anxiety of Pakistan. Whether it's 'Cold Start or Hot Start', Pakistan should remain fully ready to respond to any Indian ambitions vested in its limited war strategy.³¹How China, Russia, North Korea and Iran are going to respond to US nuclear twisting is a question that needs an answer.

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CONCEPTUALISING NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY IN 2ND NUCLEAR AGE

*Nasir Hafeez and Professor Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema**

Abstract

Nuclear diplomacy has been at the centre stage of international relations ever since the inception of nuclear weapons. Despite so much of international activity and engagement in the field of nuclear diplomacy, little if it has been added to academic perspective, especially on its conceptual framework. Recent work of Gregoire Mallard is a profound framework that attempts to explain the concept of nuclear diplomacy and the process through which it contributed in universalisation of NPR. His trinity of transparency, ambiguity, and opacity is found to be a useful framework to study nuclear diplomacy. This frame work not only covers the conception of nuclear diplomacy in the first nuclear age but also is relevant in the second nuclear age. In this paper an attempt has been made to look into the concept of nuclear diplomacy, its practice and contribution in developing international non-proliferation regime. It will look into Indian exceptionalism which according to some opinion is a threat to NPR while others view it as a positive discrimination. In light of this discussion, the paper will also shed some light on challenges to Pakistan and suggest a possible course of action.

Keywords: Nuclear, Diplomacy, Non-Proliferation Regime (NPR), Pakistan.

Introduction

At the core of the concept of diplomacy is the idea of communication, interaction, contact and negotiation among states and non-state actors¹. The main subject of diplomacy has been war and peace ever since its inception; it still remains relevant but the levels and fields of interactions have increased manifolds. Many related functions like economy, technology, scientific developments, education, art, law and much more have come within the realm of diplomacy².

Diplomats and representatives who represent policy have limited role in its formulation but a major role in its execution. Therefore people engaged in diplomacy should be able to bridge differences, such as: cultural, geopolitical and ideological alongwith the conflicting state interests³.

Nuclear Diplomacy

Nuclear diplomacy is the expression of nuclear policy, how a nation views the acquisition of nuclear technology both for military and peaceful purposes, and its role

¹Nasir Hafeez is a PhD Scholar at the Department of International Relations and Professor. Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema is Dean at Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad.

in national security and national development.⁴ Study of nuclear diplomacy invariably includes policy research wherein it is necessary to first understand policy itself.⁵ Those who conduct nuclear diplomacy do not challenge this basic logic. They rather build their arguments on the basis of this predetermined logic. Nuclear policy of a nation, therefore, must clearly layout this logic of why nuclear technology and then instil confidence in its representatives about the truth of this logic.

Everyone has attributed and contributed differently about nuclear weapons but with very limited information about the weapon itself, as the exact information about the nuclear weapons remains shrouded in cloak of secrecy and confidentiality. Despite this dearth of relevant details the extensive exercise in expression of knowledge is fascinating and is likely to continue for some time. This art of describing and ascribing is nothing but nuclear diplomacy, which is the topic of this paper.

There is a lot of nuclear diplomacy in practice and many scholars have focused on various policy positions declared by different countries. There has been a commendable on-going effort to record nuclear diplomacy but little has been written on its theoretical conception. How nuclear diplomacy is conducted and how it produces agreements despite disagreements. How private and public sphere is managed? How contradictory positions are harmonized to arrive at consensus? This paper will make an attempt to look into the evolution of nuclear diplomacy and its transformation in second nuclear age. In light of this framework a brief overview of recent Indian exceptionalism and the challenges to Pakistan's nuclear capability will be discussed in this paper.

Nuclear Diplomacy in Practice

Nuclear diplomacy started at the time when the first atomic bomb was being developed in United States of America. President Truman hinted to Russian leader Stalin at the Potsdam conference in 1945 about the big bomb that America had developed without describing it. Stalin showed no interest or distress⁶ as Soviet spies had already penetrated in US highly guarded Manhattan project and were passing secret information back home. Failing to conduct successful test would have resulted in greater embarrassment and a loss of face⁷. Consequently and quite ironically, in order to display the destructive potentials of atom bomb it was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since then nuclear weapons have been developed, deployed but not used and the main focus of nuclear strategy in the subsequent years has been diplomatic in nature including the coercive diplomacy, using threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Theory of nuclear deterrence plays central role in formulation of nuclear strategy. The main focus, therefore, is on the threat which essentially is a function of human communication. Thus deterrence will remain effective and stable as long as the communication of the threat is effective. Therefore, the nuclear strategy based on deterrence requires effective diplomacy to remain credible. They have diplomatic utility to add unacceptable and devastating consequence of an undesirable action which forces the opponent to respect diplomacy. Countries develop nuclear weapons because they want to avoid nuclear black mail of powerful countries as the best answer to nuclear

weapons is a nuclear weapon as it creates deterrence and mutual destruction, which stops war among the rivals.

In the nuclear age, military strategy has transformed to a great extent. Transparency and communication have been replaced surprise and deception, and nuclear deterrence is assumed a central position in national security policy of all nuclear powers in the increased reliance on nuclear diplomacy. It would not be wrong to say that nuclear diplomacy is the essence of nuclear deterrence. If nuclear diplomacy fails, the nuclear deterrence fails and if the deterrence fails, then there will be a total destruction. One cannot afford the nuclear diplomacy to fail now as there is no option of going to war with nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Discourse

Human race has been in search of destructive power to dominate others but suddenly found itself in control of excessive power that could destroy it. The question of war and peace, that has been the object of international diplomacy since long, is transformed beyond comprehension. Nuclear weapons are though, considered necessary but at the same time not useable. The technology was unleashed without conceptualizing its potential implications on international affairs. The challenge of nuclear age was not only enormous but inescapable⁸.

If we look at the nuclear discourse we find two prominent schools of thoughts which explained and understood nuclear weapons in their own peculiar way. Nuclear optimists thought that nuclear weapons are good for the international peace and stability and “*more may be better*”⁹. While the other group; nuclear pessimists believed that nuclear weapons in the hands of more nations will lead to their use and dangerous for world peace “*more may be worse*”¹⁰. There has been a continuous debate between the two, supported by national and International agencies, in public and private sectors.

With the changing trends in international strategic environment the number of scholars subscribing to each of these two schools of thought kept changing. The numbers of nuclear optimists have always been less and are continuously decreasing and their arguments are gradually fading away due to the policy preferences of institutions and organisations working on nuclear issues. On the other hand the nuclear pessimists are increasing in number since they support the cause of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation which is currently the main stream of the nuclear debate. The nuclear pessimist got further boost with the declaration of nuclear zero policy by Obama administration in 2009.

Both positions are tenable and cannot be ignored by any state which possesses or is trying to acquire nuclear weapons. This presumed role of nuclear weapon though contested, yet forms the basis of many nuclear engagements within the governments and outside.

Nuclear Non Proliferation

The utility of nuclear weapons was seen in its deterrent value to avert the chances of large scale wars. This justified the developments of new weapon designs with increased range and accuracy. Large stocks of nuclear weapons guaranteed peace but at the same time sparked a nuclear arms race which is highly destabilizing and threatening to international peace and security. US proposed an international framework in the form of Baruch Plan¹¹, which was rejected by Soviet Union. In response Soviets presented their own Gromyko plan¹² which was not acceptable for Americans. Moreover, the conflicting dynamics of cold war have further been aggravated the situation. Even the sincere efforts from one side were seen suspiciously by the other.

While total elimination is desired, but practically still not possible¹³. Those who possessed nuclear weapons justified their possession while asked others to refrain from acquiring them. National security concerns the powerful provided them justifications to continue to have nuclear weapon while the dangers of spread of nuclear weapons and their related cost effect motivated others not to have them. UNGA accepted the decision of major powers and created eighteen nations committee on disarmament in Dec 1961. This extensive diplomatic engagement finally succeeded to develop the text of nuclear non-proliferation treaty that established the foundations of international framework to control nuclear technology.

Due to this reason, we see nuclear non-proliferation treaty endorsing the UNSC permanent members' (P5) legitimacy of having nuclear weapons as Nuclear Weapon States (NWS). The treaty text has been debated though at a wider forum of eighteen nations yet the final decision is yet to be made by the leaders of two powerful blocks i.e. US and USSR. Irrespective of the inherent discrimination of NPT it is still the most useful framework to regulate and control the spread of nuclear weapons.

Cold war is over but its nuclear structure continues to exist, without any modification. The changed international security environment demands a review of these structures but so far there is no positive movement. Any slight change, if not well considerate may break the already fragile nuclear order that has to some extent preserved international peace.

2nd Nuclear Age

Paul Braken in his article in Foreign affairs in 2000 noted that the Western military dominance is gradually being challenged by the rise of Asian military powers, i.e. a major shift in the world's balance of power¹⁴. However, now in the second nuclear age Bracken describes "a three-tiered structure" or "MSG framework (for major powers, secondary powers, and groups)." The original five nuclear powers (the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France) are still armed with nuclear weapons. However, over the years, India, Pakistan, North Korea, South Africa, and Israel joined the ranks of nuclear weapons states.

The new nuclear states in south Asia (i.e. India and Pakistan) that joined the nuclear club of the privileged powerful P5 are economically and technologically less independent. The new nuclear powers are softer in their outlook and seek to cooperate in increasingly interdependent world.

In the first stage, when these countries were developing their nuclear weapon programmes covertly, there was a requirement of continuous import of technology and knowledge from other advanced countries. During this period there was pressure from international arms control and disarmament forums to enter into agreements and treaties. Here the diplomacy had to provide justifications for nuclear developments and inability to join international obligations. This phase was very crucial for developing nuclear capability and needed a cover story; both India and Pakistan had already passed through this stage.

In the second phase, now these countries have overtly conducted nuclear tests to display nuclear capability but still without antagonizing the existing international power structure. This is very important to preserve the nascent capability against any decapitating strike and also keep getting international support for further developments and advancements.

The nuclear diplomacy of engaging with the new nuclear nations has different challenges both for the old and new entrants. The international nuclear non-proliferation structures were developed during the first nuclear age, may not be able to absorb new nations but need to engage with them. This needs a clearer understanding of the nuclear diplomacy by all the participants, knowing the process that has so far been successful with all its contradictions.

Conceptual Framework

A comprehensive framework is difficult to develop in social science and more problematic in the field of nuclear diplomacy which is highly secretive. An effort has been made by Gregoire Mallard who has published his research in a book form "*Fallout, Nuclear diplomacy in the age of global fracture*"¹⁵. So far, this is the most profound research work on nuclear diplomacy. Mallard looked into the discussion that went on between the West and the Soviets and resulted into legal obligations that created Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. He claims that the range of obligations found in the global non-proliferation regime should not all be seen as coherent and fixed throughout time, as the multiplicity of legal instruments that define the true interpretation of non-proliferation obligations often leads to tension and contradictions between interpretations. This idea goes against the view developed by most analysts who presented the NPT as constituting a tightly integrated regime, which placed many pre-existing treaties on nuclear trade in a coherent framework.¹⁶ He concludes that NPT legal obligations are coherent with other treaty rules only in some cases but not in general.

Mallard's study exposes the compromise of IAEA-Euratom Safeguards Agreement signed in 1972 which though created enough coherence within the global

nuclear regime, but as the matter of fact, created a fracture between Europe and rest of the world. Mallard argues that the ways in which international law is interpreted in practice is much more complex as generally understood. Sometimes the interpretation of legal instruments can be clear as their meaning is explicitly understood by everyone, such interpretation reflects transparency. In a similar way the interpretation can be ambiguous. Mallard brings an another important perspective of treaty obligations and their interpretations when he mentions discrepancies between how legal obligations are interpreted in public and in private. Here lies the most complex framework of all international treaties which are always secret and managed through agreements outside the treaty text.

Indian Exceptionalism

There can be four categories of countries that have actively contributed in the field of nuclear diplomacy. First the countries which already possess nuclear weapons and are the de-jure nuclear weapon states. Second that have acquired nuclear weapons like Israel, India and Pakistan but so far have not been accepted as legitimate nuclear weapon states. There are some countries that have not yet conducted any tests but are interested to acquire nuclear weapons. Last, the nuclear havenots, those who believe that nuclear weapons are a curse to humanity and must not be acquired even if requisite technological capability exist, and they are of the European countries. India was in the second category that had tested nuclear weapon but so far not been recognized as de jure weapons state.

This however changed with the passage of time. India deliberately planned to conduct nuclear tests and was prepared for the criticism and sanctions by the guardians of existing nuclear order. India took the nuclear non-proliferation regime a head on with full confidence. Its political leadership and diplomats engaged with important stake holders of the Non Proliferation Regime (NPR) and within next ten years, same India that had challenged the NPR and non-testing taboo of the CTBT was accepted as responsible nuclear weapon state, offered unique nuclear deal, granted NSG¹⁷ wavier and privileged international nuclear trade outside NPT framework.

Proponents of Indo US nuclear deal called it a net gain for the non-proliferation regime while opponents described it as a 'non-proliferation disaster'¹⁸. *'For the first time in my experience of international diplomatic negotiations, a consensus decision was followed by complete silence in the room. No clapping, nothing.'*¹⁹ *'NPT RIP (rest in peace)'*²⁰. Despite such a response India became a unique case in the entire world, allowed to retain its nuclear weapons program and also permitted to acquire peaceful nuclear technology in contrast to the existing NPT grand bargain where all countries except the five NWS gave up nuclear weapons program in exchange for access to the peaceful nuclear technology. This paradigm shift in NPR was unprecedented and was initially criticized but gradually accepted as pragmatic policy option to bring India with in NPR, though with some exceptions.

India continued its policy of nuclear ambivalence throughout its nuclear history. On one hand, it criticised existing non-proliferation regime and on the other

hand, it was developing necessary technology to develop nuclear weapons. Indian diplomatic engagement after May 1998, challenged the existing hegemonic nuclear discourse, dominated by the West particularly USA. It not only responded effectively to the international criticism, but also exposing the discriminatory nature of the NPT calling it as “Nuclear apartheid” which gradually moulded it to seek all the favours that India is enjoying today. Indian nuclear capability was not fully recognized as de-jure NWS under NPT, however, sufficiently legitimised to engage in international nuclear trade and develop its nuclear program.

In conceptual framework, Millard’s trinity of nuclear diplomacy in the shape of transparency, ambiguity and opacity played a prominent role in normalising Indian nuclear weapons capability outside NPT frame work. Millard argues that India advocated disarmament efforts to be made before or in conjunction with non-proliferation efforts rather than postponed to a later date.... if exceptions were tolerated, particularly in the West (or in Israel), the non-proliferation plans would be worse than the maintenance of anarchy, as they would reinstitute in the nuclear age that is also the colonial division of the world²¹. This was a powerful Indian nuclear non-proliferation argument that was followed in all its engagement with international community. US understood the challenge and initiated dialogue with India to find a way of absorbing India within the nuclear non-proliferation regime, not by having India become a party to the main treaty of that regime (i.e., the NPT), but by having India adhere to all the other rules derived from the NPT²².

Indian nuclear diplomacy succeeded in getting a special status outside NPT frame work. The new bargain that resulted after signing a nuclear deal with US led to the signing of an India specific IAEA Safe-guards Agreement. Indian foreign secretary stated in late 2005, “Although India is not a member of the NPT, our behaviour is such that we [now] are.”²³ By taking these actions, the United States and other nuclear exporters forced India to abandon its postcolonial rhetoric of ambivalence, which challenged the conceptual categories on which the NPT and its subsequent rules were based. In a sense, India’s nuclear status became an acknowledged exception in the global non-proliferation regime. In the same spirit IAEA agreed to apply some measure of “positive discrimination”²⁴ with regard to India. There is now a very thin line between the present status and the desired status which will allow Indian nuclear capability to be finally recognized as a legitimate nuclear weapon state.

Challenges for Pakistan

Pakistan is facing many challenges in engaging the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. These have been aggravated with the rise of non-state actors and threat of nuclear terrorism. Many concerns have been raised from time to time, these have been aggravated by host of factors. Additionally Pakistan has been the target of sustained international propaganda supported by both regional and international players for variety of reasons. In the process of responding to different accusations, Pakistan has committed to certain terms which are highly sensitive and misunderstood, especially related to the use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s single handed blocking of

FMCT has contributed to its already negative image in the world. Moreover the policy of first use and the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons are all complicating the situation. The recent introduction of full spectrum deterrence is confusing the declaratory policy of minimum deterrence. Resultantly the notion of irresponsible behaviour is being attached to Pakistan without any concrete evidence. Many nuclear experts continue to project dangerous scenarios and present arguments which further complicate already confused perception.

There is no denying that the Pakistani position on all nuclear issues and the recent developments are well thought out and are in the greater national interest. There is also a realization that all the institutions working in formulating nuclear response are working diligently. Yet it is felt that there is some requirement of course correction, internal coordination, greater deliberation and careful articulation of its nuclear policy. Great care is required to formulate national response on nuclear issues to be presented locally and internationally.

Conclusion

Nuclear diplomacy is an interesting field of study especially for those countries that have acquired or are acquiring nuclear weapons capability. The conceptual framework provided by Mallard in the shape of trinity of transparency, ambiguity and opacity to look into nuclear diplomacy is an interesting foundation. This framework explains the universalisation of non-proliferation regime and the process that goes on in public and in private domain. Indian exceptional status is a recent example of such nation where sustained international nuclear diplomacy could be understood within the parameters of this trinity of nuclear diplomacy. Pakistan, currently struggling to get its nuclear weapons capability normalized, can look into this conceptual framework to formulate its engagement strategy. This also needs a re-evaluation of its nuclear diplomacy in light of focused research in this field. Scholars and researchers should be encouraged to work in this important field to increase national awareness and improve Pakistan's nuclear image all over the world. This is vital to overcome current isolation and win greater international integration and cooperation.

NOTES

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BALOCHISTAN TURMOIL CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION APPROACH

*Nazir Ahmed and Dr. Musarrat Jabeen**

Abstract

Since the inception of Pakistan, Balochistan remained a disturb province in different cycles of the history. The nationalists which under the influence of India and West were and are the major instrument of upheaval and chaos. No doubt the province of Balochistan is under developed region as compared to the rest of Pakistan. This sense of deprivation have been mostly exploited by the feudal lords of the province. After the initiation of mega projects, China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Government of Pakistan is pouring huge resources for the development and prosperity of the people of the Balochistan. As the development is in progress and law and order situation is in control, now the people have been emancipated by the negative propaganda of nationalists including India, Afghanistan and the West.

Keywords: Balochistan, Conflict, Strategic, Significance, Gwadar.

Introduction

Almost after seventy years of independence, rather than establishing bondage of nationalism and patriotism, lack of foresight and inapt handling of Balochistan affairs by the successive Federal governments and the exploitative attitude of local leadership (mostly tribal heads/Sardars) has antagonized the Baloch youth. This includes the negative sentiments against other federating units and their inhabitants. As a result, people with vested interests could easily garnish the support of uneducated, frustrated and deprived masses to create internal dissensions which are being exploited in the name of Baloch sub-Nationalism. Obviously, not only the local leadership, but Pakistani government and Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) are to be blamed for their neglect and mishandling the affairs.

Balochistan has very vast potential for development and economic progress. Despite having reservoirs of rich minerals and hydrocarbon resources, it is still the impoverished province of Pakistan. True potentials of the province could never be exploited in the face of conspiracy theories by internal and external forces. The province has therefore, suffered due to ongoing corruption, poor governance, weak law and order situation, tribal rivalry, poverty, deprivation and fragile political structure. Concurrently, violent activities of militants/sub nationalists in the province are

*Nazir Ahmed is a PhD scholar in the Department of International Relations at National Defence University, Islamabad. Dr. Musarrat Jabeen is Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at National Defence University, Islamabad.

continuing at the same scale allegedly supported by the foreign elements / intelligence agencies¹.

Balochistan historically has remained the focal point of the 'Great Game' being played by the major world powers including erstwhile USSR, India² and the US³. Efforts to stir the insurgency through similar actions is still in play and influential self-styled intellectuals, politicians, media-persons, the panelists and their loyalties are used to create upheaval in the province. Dr. Rohrabacher a US congressional member in the year 2012 tabled resolution to support the nationalists of Balochistan and further tried to internationalize the issue.

In this backdrop, one wonders that can the feelings of being deprived or provincial grievances against the Federation be addressed; or how can we overcome internal turmoil, economic disparities or social injustices? Or can we transform the conflict ridden society, may it (conflict) be inter-tribe or intra-tribes, between the province and the federation or with adjoining states (Iran or Afghanistan)? Presence of these real or perceived queries whether stemming from external sources, internal turmoil, economic disparities or social inequalities to certain coveted values of people of Balochistan warrant Transformational Approach, which will help in achieving stability in the Province.

An effort has been made in this paper, to briefly spotlight geo-strategic significance and the conflict spectrum/ dynamics of Balochistan, with a view to suggest a theoretical framework of 'Conflict Transformation' process with its practical application to achieve sustainable peace in Balochistan.

Geo Strategic Significance

Balochistan's critical importance lies in the fact that it is situated at the crossroads of Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean⁴. Significance of the province also enhances due to bordering countries Afghanistan and Iran which share socio-ethnic ties with Balochistan. Balochistan's deep - sea port of Gwadar dominates important international trade and oil supply routes in the Indian Ocean due to its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz.⁵ Signing of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) agreement with an initial \$ 46 billion Chinese investment is a step to explore its potential of becoming a hub of international trade.

Mr. Selig H. Harrison, in his book titled "In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baloch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations"⁶ recognizes that Balochistan is at the center stage of interests of international players not only due to its strategic location but also for its potential of energy resources, reservoirs of uranium, gold and hydro-carbon. In view of its strategic location and an attractive 778 kilometers long coastline, Balochistan is also important to great powers as it occupies the shortest route for world trade, commerce and energy corridors leading to landlocked Afghanistan, resource rich Caspian Region and Central Asian states.⁷ The area lies within a system of mountains and geological structure similar to other oil-bearing areas of the world.⁸ Discovery of large quantity of Gas at Sui and Pirkoh, copper and gold at Saindak and Reko Diq in addition to

extremely promising prospects of energy sources has further enhanced the geo-economic importance of the province⁹.

Besides purely economic and commercial interests, Gwadar port has a far-greater significance for Pakistan and also for China. It offers the shortest routes from Indian Ocean to Central Asian States and to China (i.e. 2500 kms as against 14500 kms through Strait of Malacca). Proposed Rail link from Gwadar upto Kashghar will act as a corridor of opportunity for China, since it will take only 48 hours for a Chinese Oil Tanker as against almost 20 days from Middle East/Gulf to reach Xinjiang through Strait of Malacca.

Hence, significance of the Province on one hand may bring advantage to Pakistan and especially to people of Balochistan, provided, true potentials are gainfully exploited; while at the same time it makes it an area of great interests for global and regional players who continue to meddle and interfere by adding up to our persistent security concerns.

Conflict Situation – A Historical Perspective

Balochistan has witnessed insurgencies and military actions against the insurgents and anti-state elements with regular intervals. Continued disturbances in the Province (i.e. Resistance to 'One Unit Movement' in 1955, 'Dissident Movement' in 1960s and '1973 Insurgency' which continued till 1977), have not only affected the socio economic uplift of its people but have also been creating negative social perception and outlook of the society. Use of exploitative tools and resultant uncertain situation, have denied the Province and the country as a whole, the true benefit of its economic potentials and geo-strategic significance.

Surge in Balochistan crisis was intensified ironically, when the central government in 2004-5 initiated number of large projects like: Gwadar port, Coastal highways, Sabakzai and Merani dams, Kachhi canal, Saindak, Riqodik, Chamalang and Kohlu Development projects and some others¹⁰. The ongoing conflict was initiated once the militants fired rockets on former President General Pervez Musharraf in Kohlu while announcing Kohlu Development Package in December 2004. Thereafter in January 2005, the level of uprising got a sudden fillip on an alleged report of a rape of a lady doctor by an army officer in Sui. Subsequent massive retaliation, firings and large scale damage to government property by militant groups¹¹ resulted into cancellation of inauguration ceremony of first phase of Gwadar Port at the hands of Chinese Premier in March 2005. Commotions got further momentum and already disturbed law and order mosaic of the Province worsened on the killings of Nawab Akbar Bugti in a cave in 2006 during an encounter with LEAs, while the death of Balaach Marri in Afghanistan and assassination of three Baloch leaders in Turbat by unknown militants in April 2009 contributed to set the already simmering Balochistan on fire.

Prevailing Situation

The province of Balochistan remained disturbed from 2005 to 2017 due to militants and banned religious activities. However, since last two year situation is in full

control. Unstable situation in Balochistan is also attributed to the involvement of foreign hands with clear signs and claims of visible proofs¹².

While the troops and resources from Army and FC Balochistan were deployed in support of War on Terror (WOT) along the Western borders, other LEAs with the support of Army and FC were committed to safeguard the National assets, and innocent lives against the militants' actions in 2005-6 who were blowing up the Gas pipelines, blasting the electric pylons/distribution system, targeting Railway lines and even passenger trains and conducting bomb blasts in population centers. FC and Army troops were employed in three districts of Sibi, Barkhan and Kohlu to establish writ of the Government by apprehension of the culprits and removal of Ferrari/ militants' camps in Bugti and Marri tribes' areas. These operations were halted besides withdrawing the Army and other LEAs in 2008 along with announcement for release of all the captive insurgents of military operation and some major positive initiatives of politico-economic and constitutional nature. However, dissident elements continue to unleash reign of terror through attacks on Government installations, target killings of personnel from LEAs & non-Baloch settlers, and frequent bomb blasts thereby killing innocent people. To achieve their objectives, militant leadership (taking refuge/asylum in UK, Afghanistan, Switzerland, India and Karachi)¹³ duly supported by hostile agencies use innocent Baloch youth as cannon fodder to further their heinous agendas.

With continuous exploitative strategy being pursued by the sub-nationalists coupled with illicit foreign patronage, the situation is likely to remain tense and unstable in future as well. There does not appear to be any signs of an imminent halt in the insurgency like situation in Balochistan, thereby warranting a credible, sincere and implacable process to resolve the lingering crisis.

Conflict Analysis – Major Causes Fueling the Conflict Situation

There is a lot of writing available indicating inadequacies in the political structure, administrative inefficiencies, socio-economic disparities, cultural sensitivities and mismanagement/mis-governance issues. However, certain important factors which provide lead to understand the basic problems in Balochistan are either given a cursory treatment due to an oversight or even not touched upon deliberately, by most of the writers. The motive could be, not to underscore the vested interests of the political elite, the tribal chiefs and the regional as well as international players. There are many factors/ causes which are counted towards instable situation in Balochistan. These are being exploited by the militants or their supporters on one pretext or the other. Seeing from a Realist's perspective, positive initiatives from the government (from 2009-2011) which included some political and budgetary concessions, measures for the socio-economic uplift and benefits for the Baloch people (like Aghaz-e-Haqqq-e-Balochistan (A-HQ-BLN) Package and revision of NFC Award,)¹⁴ besides the issue of Provincial autonomy through 18th Constitutional Amendment (2010) and their implementation (though with certain limitations from the State) should have been hailed by the masses in Balochistan.¹⁵ But in fact there are no such positive signs. Rather, the propaganda

unleashed by dissidents continues to occupy larger space thereby having negative impact.

Notwithstanding, poor governance, mismanagement and political manipulation at the federal and provincial government levels, instability in Balochistan is characterized by exploitative tools and machinations of tribal chiefs (Nawabs, Sardars & Waderas) in subjugating the rights of common people, inter and intra-tribe disputes and unexplored/untapped rich mineral resources precluding a possibility for its utilization to alleviate peoples' sufferings/deprivations and poverty¹⁶. This indicates that there are certain pressing/core reasons, which need to be identified from a different angle and addressed, to overcome the crisis situation in Balochistan.

Fragile Political and Administrative Construct

Balochistan is just 5% of total population of Pakistan with 7.9 million people from multiethnic, multicultural and multi-lingual groups/society (comprising Baloch, Brahvis, Pashtoons, Hazaras and others). The political and administrative systems of this largest province of the country (43.5% of Pakistan)¹⁷ are marred by inefficiencies, incompetence and corruption. Balochistan remained out of mainstream functions as compared to other provinces of Pakistan; and was left as a sort of un-governed federally administered area for about 22 years¹⁸. Before acquiring status of a full-fledged Province on July 1st, 1970, bulk of the province was governed by the tribal Chiefs who traditionally enjoyed both executive and judicial powers in their respective areas. This concept of governance continued to exist even thereafter, in the form of 'B Areas'¹⁹ of the Province. So, whenever status of these areas or authority of these Sardars was challenged, they imposed stiff resistance and promoted hype of insecurity threatening the writ of Government.

Uncertain Internal Security Situation

With a persistent past record of political instability, armed resurrections, growing sense of frustration amongst the people, vested interests of the tribal heads, sectarian violence and target killings of innocents in the Province have contributed to uncertain internal security situation. Failure to control such acts of militancy and provide security to human lives is clear reflection of poor governance, inefficiency and indifferent approach of the Provincial Government and the LEAs.

Fear of becoming Minority

In view of influx of people from across the country, Balochs living in Gwadar are afraid of becoming a minority; and similar anxiety prevails in the minds of other people of the Province as well. Hence, it is because of this reason and also feeling of distress for being marginalized, that they consider other development projects and mineral explorations detrimental to the interest of people of Balochistan²⁰.

Blame Game and Sense of Deprivation

Sardars and tribal chiefs who have always been part of political dispensation process as members of Provincial Assembly, Provincial and Federal Cabinet members, besides holding the offices of Governor and Chief Minister, were not sincere in their efforts towards overall development of the province, or to boost its economy. They blame the Federal Government and Punjabis for the socio-economic inequalities and miseries of the common people. Moreso, Baloch sub-nationalism remains a favourite cry of the exploiters to garner strength from the Baloch people and black-mail the Federal government to fulfil their vested interests and that of their foreign masters. Their malicious propaganda has gradually started polluting the mindset of young Baloch and uneducated masses besides creating misperceptions at the National and International levels.

Lack of Capacity and Resolve

About Rupees 134 billion were allocated to Balochistan in 2005²¹ and approximately 140 billion rupees in 2006 for Mega Projects and development,²² followed by substantial allocations in the subsequent years. Correspondingly, share of the Province in total Federal transfers in Budget 2010-11 and onwards has increased to 9.5%.²³ Since Balochistan suffers from the capacity problems due to lack of infrastructure, absence of skilled manpower, availability of experts, requisite industry/machinery and technical education, hence failure to alleviate the sufferings of masses further disillusioned the Baloch populace thereby lending credence to sub-nationalists' agenda.

Role of Political Parties and LEAs

Majority of Political elements, parties and the tribes (especially Pashtoons) are pro-federation. Unfortunately, political parties in the province neither have resolve nor the ability to play a crucial role towards the conflict in Balochistan. Similarly, the roles, mandate and jurisdiction of different security agencies and LEAs are neither clearly defined nor communicated to all. Hence, their positive initiatives and sacrifices for improvement of law and order situation and safety of citizens are also portrayed negatively. Pro-active response by intelligence agencies and LEAs including FC, well within their constitutional bounds, curtails liberty of action of the militants/dissidents and therefore is not acceptable to so-called sub-nationalists and Baloch insurgents.

Core Issues

Fundamental problems confronting Balochistan pertain to nationalists' grievances over fiscal and political autonomy, lack of representation at the national services/institutions and Baloch identity perspective supported by foreign media and articles highlighting negative perceptions which have brought Balochistan to the present level of conflict²⁴. Therefore, primarily, the *fear of expropriation, marginalization, and dispossession* (substantiated by the continuous neglect, inapt handling and non-serious approach by the Federal and Provincial Governments), become the basis of exploitation for the dissident elements²⁵ and also for Baloch

nationalists, to demand Provincial autonomy, if not for total independence. Taking advantage of the prevalent circumstances in Balochistan, the regional and extra regional forces are fuelling/ supporting the anti-government elements to fulfil their ulterior motives by exploiting the internal fault lines of Baloch nationalists,. They are providing moral and material support to the sub nationalists, both for political and militant activities.

Conflict Transformation and Peace Process in Balochistan Conceptual Argument

According to Penguin Dictionary of International Relations “Conflict” is a social condition that arises when two or more actors pursue mutually exclusive or mutually incompatible goals.²⁶ In international relations conflict is assumed to be originated, facilitated and replicated by specific social structures, and institutions in differing set of environment.²⁷ Primary objective of “Conflict Transformation” approach is to end protracted and inflexible conflicts through a process of dialogue and active participation that ultimately transforms the relationships and alters the interests of the disputant parties²⁸. It is about transforming the relationships, structures and very systems which increases injustice and violence²⁹. This approach is quite distinct from “Conflict Management” and ‘Conflict Resolution” since both suggest short term solution of “constructive management of differences”³⁰ and “addressing only the indicators of the conflict with limited involvements without addressing the underlying causes of the conflict” respectively. The Conflict Transformation process simultaneously addresses surface issues and change underlying social structures and relationship patterns. Conflict transformation theorists therefore, agree that present-day conflicts not only require more than changing the positions but also finding the win-win situations.³¹

Fighting Terrorism/Militants through Education

Another very important aspect of Indirect Approach/Strategy which contributes directly towards transformation of a society is promoting the education for lasting peace and prosperity. Addressing the root cause of militancy through education is considered as the scarlet thread. **Greg Mortenson** (a Mountaineer) came to one of the remote village (Korphe) in Northern Areas of Pakistan, had ‘three cups of tea³²’ with the villagers (a symbol for hospitality - they nursed him back to health after a mountain climbing injury - and later it became the title of his best-selling book); and in order to repay for their kindness to this isolated community in far-flung area, he built schools for their children, particularly girls. It was a one man show, and now in dozens of these formerly extremist-controlled villages, the people are rejecting extremism and embracing modernity. Similarly, in Kohlu District, the same theme “fighting terrorism through education” was manifested. Earlier, people of Kohlu were averse to education due to fear of their tribal heads or non-availability of such an opportunity. Chamalang Beneficiary Education Program had now transformed the public who were found eager to achieve a vacancy for the education of their children. So much so that even the anti-state elements/ militants started laying their arms joining those efforts and conveying their desire to induct their children in the education program.

A Theoretical Framework for Conflict Transformation in Balochistan

John Paul Lederach considered to be the promoter of Conflict Transformation theory, looks at peace building as a long term transformation of a conflict / war system into a peace system. The key dimensions of his suggested process are changes brought about over short, medium and long term in the *structural, cultural personal and relational* aspects of conflict. Thus peace building is seen as a structure process.³³ In thinking about structure, he contributes the idea of 'Pyramid' with elite leaders and decision makers at the top, respected leaders of social organizations, religion and academician in the mid-level and grass root community leaders at the base of pyramid. According to him, a comprehensive peace process simultaneously engaging and addressing complementary changes at all these levels is required for developing sustainable peace.³⁴ According to Vayrynen:

*“The bulk of conflict theory regards the issues, actors and interests as given and on that basis makes effort to find a solution to mitigate or eliminate their contradictions. As a consequence of the politico-economic and social dynamics of societies, there is likely change in interests, issues and the actors.”*³⁵

Vayrynen's approach is mainly abstract and analytical which suggests that peace builders should consider five types of transformations (or transformers) relating to different phases of conflicts and the timings of interventions. First, the **“Context Transformation”**, which implies changing the context or environment of the conflict that may alter each party or groups' perception of conflict besides their objectives. **“Structural Transformations”** entail altering the fundamental edifice of the conflict, their relationship, economy and power distribution and their issues (causes of violence) prevailing in the society to transform the conflict. **“Actor Transformations”** refer to change in their goals, approaches or even their leaders, to seek peace or to initiate a peace process. **“Issue Transformation”** means redefining or reframing positions on the contested/key issues or de-linking/re-linking issues to reach a constructive compromise/solution. **“Personal Transformation”** implies changes in the perspective or heart and mind of individual leaders or small groups who have the decisions making power. It could be very vital, that interventions from outside bring about the personal changes by directly trying to reach or contact these leaders/ groups³⁶.

Conflict management is a very complex and brain storming job. The all actors which are practically participating in the conflict are better equipped to develop the methods and techniques to continue the war. The conflict/crisis management particularly in the theoretical framework is not likely or possible by them because they are prisoner of their own perceptions. Furthermore, the warring parties/groups are always locked in the conflict, thinking about possible alternative models for conflict resolution is sometimes beyond their mental horizon/capacity. Keeping in view, table 1 on the next page explains/relates these **five types of transformations blended with Lederach's Pyramid approach** with regards to Balochistan crises/conflict and suggests

application/ measures to be adopted for Conflict Transformation (CT):-

Table – 1: Transformers of Conflict and Their Application in Balochistan

<u>Type</u>	<u>Transformers</u>	<u>Application</u>
1. Context Transformations (Regional / Global level)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Change in overall environment and confidence building ▪ Changing the context in view of positive initiatives (18th amendment, 7th NFC Award, Provincial Autonomy, Aghaze-Haqooq-e Balochistan Package) & its implementation 	<p>Federal Government level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Foreign policy initiatives with Afghanistan, India, US, Russia and UN. (pro-active diplomatic moves to stop foreign interference) ▪ Protest against illicit refuge of militant leadership and request for their arrest/ deportation (Afghanistan and UK) ▪ Request closure of Indian Consulates in Afghanistan, (close to Pakistani border)
2. Structural Transformation (State/Society Level)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Political and fiscal autonomy of the province as a consequence of initiatives stated above ▪ Improving Province – Federation relationship ▪ Addressing grievances of the masses to remove misperceptions ▪ Redefine role of LEAs, FC and intelligence agencies 	<p>Federal / Provincial Govt Level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Composition of various bodies/committees for CT ▪ Visible Socio-Political Transformation (especially in Education, Health, provision of services, water & employment) ▪ Ensuring good Governance ▪ Capacity enhancement of LEAs to establish writ of the Govt ▪ Capacity enhancement in provision of services/ structures
3. Actor Transformation (Conflict Party or leadership levels)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Engaging leadership of all the types:- <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Politicians • Sardars/ Tribal chiefs • Sub tribal heads • Community leadership • Youth • Dissident elements ▪ Redefine narratives and counter narratives 	<p>Federal / Provincial Govt Level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Progressive dialogue process with Politicians, Sardars, tribal chieftains, sub tribal heads, Youth, dissident elements and groups of common people ▪ Acceptance of previous neglect and assurance to address the genuine concerns ▪ Develop new narrative & remove negative perceptions ▪ Effective use of electronic and print media including Radio

Type	Transformers	Application
4. Issue Transformation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Engaging leadership at all the levels i.e Politicians, Sardars, tribal chieftains, sub tribal heads, youth and lower level of leadership who are in direct contact with the tribes/common people on all the contentious issues ▪ Building new Narratives or redefining/ improving issues based narratives in view of recent developments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Dialogue & win confidence on:- <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Financial autonomy % or share on mineral resources (excluding rights) • Role of intelligence, LEAs/FC • Gwadar Port issue • Target Killings • Local participation in Development projects including Gwadar • Devolution plan / system • Induction of Balochis / Locals in Armed Forces • Bring sectarian harmony • Control militancy/ Terrorism • Misplaced persons' issue
5. Personal Transformation (Individual leaders/Small groups)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Direct contact with the tribes / common people ▪ Engaging individual leadership of all i.e Political parties, Tribes, sub tribal heads and lower level of leadership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Initiate dialogue and debates ▪ Debate & Inculcate sense of belongings / ownership ▪ Remove negative perceptions through newly developed narratives ▪ Effective use of electronic and print media including Radio

Proposed Concept for Peaceful Balochistan

The Concept

Failure of the Federal Government to acknowledge the severity of the Balochistan problem and launch a determined socio-economic development drive in far flung areas in the face of resistance by local leadership contributed to aggravate the problem out of proportion which was thus exploited by the external and internal players to suite their vested interests. The Concept thus proposes “to systematically identify and focus on the root causes of the problem, undertake transformation/ reconciliation through participatory political processes ensuring social and economic justice inter-laced with economically sustainable society-driven structural reforms/relationships thereby achieving the ultimate goal of sustainable peace”.

Implementation of the Proposed Concept

Under the auspices of Federal Government, ‘Conflict Transformation’ through participatory political processes at provincial level (in Balochistan), can at best be achieved by a ‘**Council of Elites**’ comprising of some leading professionals, credible

Baloch elders, renowned leadership of undisputed repute both from Federal and Provincial stature and influential individuals from communities in conflict (Balochs, Pashtuns, settlers and representatives of Governments) to work together to bring out the underlying causes of ongoing as well as potential conflict suggesting a framework to overcome the violence/ Conflict through a collaborative system of transformation ensuring sustainable peace and development at different tiers of society. For this purpose, the proposed 'Council of Elites' within Pakistan's Federal Framework, will have to conduct number of workshops, conferences, Seminars and meetings engaging different groups of local people, think-tanks and students/ youth from all over Balochistan. This activity could be spread over weeks and even few months to ascertain the true input and gain the confidence/ trust of these people while facilitating to construct a framework. The 'Council of Elites' will identify core issues, areas of neglect, grievances and shortcomings at the hands of both provincial as well as the Federal government and carve out a comprehensive policy and plans to tackle them one by one or a few simultaneously (Few of the suggested subjects of transformation include 'Socio-Political Transformation', 'Constitutional/Legal Transformation', 'Socio-Economic Transformation' and 'Psycho-Social/Media Transformation' Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively). Socio economic service delivery system and transparent development measures to win the hearts and minds of the common citizens will have to be promptly initiated under the control of provincial/ local managers. The areas of focus include education, health, sanitation, drinking water and infrastructure development/ improvement. Employment opportunities for local youth should also be given priority to provide direct and immediate relief to the affected community. A 'Monitoring Mechanism' and a 'Development Review Board' at Federal/Provincial and District levels including representatives from the Army (if approved by the 'Council of Elites') and technical representatives should assess the effectiveness of all development agencies and their projects according to qualitative and quantitative criteria and provide regular feedback with recommendations to scrap, strengthen or modify concerned agencies and projects etcetera. It would be fruitful to coordinate and evaluate development at District level to reach the widest population base. Sequel to the policy / plans formulated as a result of above cited 'Concept' the 'Council of Elites' will select appropriate people at the Zone/District level to form various 'Reconciliation/ Reconstruction and Implementation committees. These Committees/ teams will be given a clear mandate by the 'Council of Elites' in accordance with the circumstances and the requirement of respective areas besides supervising/ monitoring the development activities undertaken through the assistance of District, Provincial and the Federal Governments.

Conclusion

The recent political overtures with regards to selection of Chairman Senate and formulation of new political party are positive developments. However, the undulating relationship between Centre and Balochistan shows a history of political inaptitude, economic exploitation and unfulfilled promises. State, in its successive policies and measures has continuously overlooked the dynamics and peculiarities of Balochistan and harsh socio-economic and political realities due to

which people of Balochistan are suffering since last over seventy long years. Negligence of development needs, deprivation and economic disparities has made the masses more vulnerable to the nationalists' misinformation campaign.

Federal government despite its claim remains unable to formulate a systematic and practicable strategy/ mechanism to address the underlying issues of Balochistan. There remains a need to first acknowledge their problems and then adopt a holistic approach of Conflict Transformation. Initiation of Conflict Transformation process with sincerity of purpose, dedication and resolve (in accordance with application mechanism as suggested above), the desired socio-economic and political transformation of Balochistan would be an ultimate outcome. Initially, it will be a slow process requiring unwavering but constant efforts, and patronage of the successive Central as well as Provincial governments. These endeavors will have to be supplemented by positive and pro-active use of media to project the positive outcome and remove misperceptions/ negative propaganda to win over the people of Balochistan.

NOTES

- ¹ Dr Haq Noor ul, "Balochistan disturbances: Causes and Response", IPRI Journal, (Summer 2006), p71. The News (Islamabad), 22 February 2005.
- ² Confession statement of Indian RAW leader Commander IN, Kalbhoshan Yadav during the meeting with his mother and wife on 27 December, 2017, and public announcement by sitting US Secretary of State General James Mattis in September 2017 about the links between TTP and Indian agency RAW.
- ³ Muhammad Jamil, "Get out of Stupor!", Pakistan Observer, September 8, 2012; <http://pakobserver.Net/detailnews.asp?>
- ⁴ Lt Col Syed Iqbal Ahmed, 'Balochistan, Its Strategic Importance', P248.
- ⁵ Fazle – Haider Syed, "Balochistan: Challenges and Opportunities", www.syedfazlehaider.com/books/economic-development-of-Balochistan/.
- ⁶ Selig H. Harrison, "In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baloch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 1, 1982.
- ⁷ Lt Col Syed Iqbal Ahmed, 'Balochistan, Its Strategic Importance', PP248-249.
- ⁸ Syed Abdul Quddus, The Tribal Balochistan, pp-161-163
- ⁹ Ammad Hassan, 'Pakistan's Gwadar Port – Prospects of Economic Revival'.
- ¹⁰ Idrees Bakhtiar, "Mega Projects are Conspiracy to turn the Balochis into a minority in their Homeland", an interview with Sardar Attaullah Mengal, The Herald, August 2004, p51. According to Attaullah Mengal, "We would lose our identity, our language, everything. That's why we are not willing to accept these mega projects".
- ¹¹ Syed Irfan Raza and Arshad Sharif, "Troops to Protect Sui Plant: Sherpao, - Operation in the Offing – ISPR", The Dawn, Karachi, January 13, 2005.
- ¹² Zahid Gishkori, "Kabul Helped Dismantle Brahamdagh Camps: Malik", Express Tribune, March 5, 2012. Available at: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/345631/baloch---insurgency---kabal---helped---dismantle---brahamdagh---camps---malik/>
- ¹³ Amir Mateen, "Is it more anarchy, than an insurgency," *The News*, July 26, 2010, states that this insurgency can not be equated with previous ones since Nawab Akbar Bugti's grandson Brahamdagh Bugti is hiding in Afghanistan while Baloch nationalist leader Khair Bux Marri's son Harbiyar Marri is based in London.
- ¹⁴ A-HQ-BLN package was adopted by parliament on 23 November, 2009 that included increasing subjects on concurrent list, provincial autonomy, share of development for Balochistan, utilization of oil and gas resources, shared decision-making and 5,000 jobs for educated youth. Arrears of gas revenue and share of province in divisible tax pool have been addressed through 7th NFC Award and 18th Constitutional Amendment.
- ¹⁵ IPRI, Aghaz-e-Huqooq-Balochistan. IPRI Fact File. Vol. XII No.1, 2010, p.1; Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies' (PIPS) annual security Report 2010.
- ¹⁶ Dr Haq Noor ul, "Balochistan disturbances: Causes and Response", IPRI Journal, (Summer 2006), pp 65-66.
- ¹⁷ Ibid, p56.
- ¹⁸ Interview with Dostain Khan Jamaldini, Secretary Finance Balochistan, Shahzada Zulfiqar, Quetta, September 2010.
- ¹⁹ Since British rule and till recently, except for Quetta and few other districts, the rest of Balochistan was governed according to their established Riway/customs under the overall control of respective Sardars. In 2003 as per a five years plan all the areas were to be converted to "A" areas under the direct control of government. But the decision was reversed by the Government in 2009-10.
- ²⁰ Dr Haq Noor ul, "Balochistan disturbances: Causes and Response", IPRI Journal, (Summer 2006), p66.
- ²¹ Source: Development Statistics of Balochistan (2005) by Bureau of Statistics, Planning and Development Department, Government of Balochistan, Quetta_Details attached as Annex A at the end of Paper.
- ²² Editor's note, Balochistan Today, Quetta, February 2006.
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CLIMATE PROOFING INDUS WATER TREATY: SYNERGISTIC INTEGRATION OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATERS' CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION PRACTICES

*Fiaz Hussain Shah**

Abstract

Understanding potential impacts of climate change on trans-boundary water resources is of paramount significance for devising adaptation strategies. Climate change adaptation strategies devised after due deliberations, promise dividends in socio-political, economic and environmental domains. Indus Water Treaty (IWT) signed in 1960 is internationally considered a successful mechanism for regulating water resources between Pakistan and India. At that time, climate change due to its late realization was not incorporated in it. As the climate change phenomenon became known globally, the scarcity of water also started getting pronounced thus leading both the countries towards a conflicting situation. While the long conflict between India and Pakistan has attracted extensive interest amongst the scholars, approaches related to climate proofing IWT have largely remained ignored in the academic literature.

Keywords: Climate Proofing, Indus Water Treaty, Trans-boundary Water Resource, Climate Change Adaptation, Segmented Practices.

Introduction

Increasing Green House Gases (GHG) emission is causing rise in global temperature and is the major source of climate change. In 20th century, as reported by the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) - 2007, the rise in global temperature was 0.76°C whereas in first decade of 21st century, a rise of 0.6°C has been observed.¹ Studies have revealed that the rise in temperature has disturbed weather systems.² Resultantly, the water has been the most affected element on earth as both of its main sources i.e., rainfall and glaciers have been adversely impacted.³ Uncertain conditions for the availability of water in different parts of the world, with regards to water quantity particularly variations in terms of magnitude, timings and duration have further accentuated the impact of water scarcity.⁴ More importantly, in the countries where water resource is shared by two or more states or countries, the implications of the temperature rise are more evident.⁵

*Fiaz Hussain Shah is faculty member at Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS), National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad.

Climate change is a global phenomenon and its impacts also go beyond borders. As the precursors like weather systems, glaciers etc. to climate change have trans-boundary roots similarly are its impacts which by its unique nature involve more than one state. Involvement of more than one state has a potential of turning such an issue into a conflicting situation. Pakistan mainly dependent on Indus River Basin (IRB) for its fresh water is no exception in suffering from the implications of climate change.⁶ To rationalize the use of water between both the countries, an international protocol known as Indus Water Treaty (IWT) was signed on 19 September 1960 under the auspices of World Bank.⁷ Indeed, the treaty has proved itself as a longstanding symbol of cooperation between India and Pakistan.⁸ However, while the treaty was being framed, the phenomenon of climate change was not incorporated.⁹ Absence of this reality from the Treaty has negatively affected IRB and has constrained Pakistan as it has only one river basin to draw waters from. Contrarily India has over a dozen river basins to be accessed.¹⁰ The water quantity with different variables like volume of water, timings and duration of its flow and frequency with varying intensity has immensely changed in last fifty years.¹¹ As a result, with variation in quantity of water, the quality of water has also been negatively impacted.¹²

In the face of water variability, incorporating mechanisms to bring flexibility and introducing climate change related clauses and provisions to deal with water quantity and quality issues is the way to retain stability in a treaty. To incorporate climate change related clauses and provisions with a view to ensure sustainability of a water agreement, termed as its *Climate Proofing*,¹³ provides the flexibility to an agreement with which it can adjust to the consequences of climate change.¹⁴ The dominant climate change related factors like equitable and sustainable utilization of water resource and avoiding damage and loss to other riparian states are the most important factors to be incorporated in a treaty. Consideration of such factors can ensure socio-economic, environmental and political dividends and will also help to manage and respond to extreme events like drought and floods, maintaining ecological balance in the basin and management of basin aquifer and ground water. In addition, the effectiveness of a treaty relies on a comprehensive mechanism that offers: monitoring and data archiving, data and information sharing, joint institutions for basin water management, amendment and review procedures, dispute resolution, and conflict management. Such mechanisms in the context of trans-boundary agreement create culture which facilitates the process of cooperation.¹⁵

This paper aims to introduce the concept of *climate proofing* in the context of IWT. In doing so, the paper first provides the global context of trans-boundary water treaties citing pertinent climate change adaptation examples which can be emulated in case of IWT. Thereto, IWT is peeped through with an aim to identify the conceptual contours of *climate proofing* while illuminating its geographical, legal and institutional dimensions. The applicability environment which poses challenges and provides opportunities in Indo-Pak context is broadly considered. The implementation milieu is then deliberated upon which leads the discussion precipitating into synergized effects of integrating climate change adaptation practices in IWT before the paper is finally concluded.

Trans-boundary Water Treaties - Global Context

Like oil is one of the major sources of disputes and conflicts amongst the states, similarly as a natural resource issue, hydro-politics also has a long history of conflicts on world arena. All trans-boundary river basins which have led to inking of over 300 mutual water agreements across the globe are testimony to the fact that timely management of future supply and demand matrix are necessary for peace and stability in the region in general and within the riparian states in particular.¹⁶ Review of trans-boundary agreements amongst riparian states for Nile, Rhine, Mekong, Jordon, Danube, Tigris, Euphrates, Brahmaputra and Colorado Rivers etc., show an effective cooperation and coordination at play which have been suitably applied to create an environment of cooperation. The studies by Wolf¹⁷ and Daoudy¹⁸ reveal that with the help of trans-boundary agreements acting as institutional mechanisms, the conflicting situations between the riparian states have been amicably avoided. Water, the foundation of human life, is a finite and shared resource which is divided based on the availability.¹⁹ Indus River System (IRS) is the lifeline for regional economies of Pakistan and Western India. Any threat to its availability is considered challenging for both the countries.²⁰

Conflicting Pressures

According to theory of liberalism which advocates foreign relations between liberal states based on democratic principles and institutions,²¹ the conflicts are resolved through non-traditional ways like establishment of institutional mechanisms in form of agreements and treaties outlining rules of the game with no ambiguities. If the agreed rules are established with an inbuilt mechanism to monitor and implement the distribution of scarce resource, however, when the governance of such mechanism is weak to be effective then the dominant party takes advantage of the void whereas relatively weaker party develops discontent and frustration.²² In a particular conflict situation, actions and counter actions lead to attempts for control of outcome of interventions. Since aspirations of all stakeholders cannot be met simultaneously therefore the goals and activities become incompatible when one's own interests are threatened by action of another.²³ Stakeholders in a competitive environment with opposing interests, endeavor to deny each other the achievement of desired objectives. This leads to disagreement on the means to attain the same end which in turn results into tensions. Perceived goal incompatibilities and efforts to control each other choices result into conflicting situations. If the causes and sources of discontent are left unresolved and unaddressed then the conflict has latent potential to negatively affect interdependent bilateral relationships and peace equations.²⁴

Climate Proofing Concept and its Efficacy

Climate proofing trans-boundary water agreement or treaty is a comprehensive concept in itself. It can reduce the climate change-based risks and impacts to minimum possible level. At first instance, it shall keep away from a conflicting situation between the riparian states and shall lead to conflict resolution institutionally if at all a difference in interpretation or implementation of the concept shall arise. The climate proofing concept may not be an end in itself rather it is an effective mean to bring

flexibility in the treaties and agreements. The concept when appropriately applied can suitably absorb the negative impacts of climate change by applying technological, institutional, social and legal innovations rather than waiting for the existing treaties to succumb to the burgeoning future pressures. The concept besides addressing the water quantity and quality issues, has promising potential to address low probability but high magnitude climate events like floods and droughts as well which shall provide a long-term sustainable solution to the stresses being caused by climate change on political, economic, and social planes.²⁵

Climate proofing being a wholesome concept shall integrate isolated or fragmented climate change adaptation practices which are applied by different countries to their respective trans-boundary water agreement to multiply its dividends and creating synergy in efforts and results. After establishing its feasibility and practicability, climate proofing concept is applied on trans-boundary agreements in a customized manner. Through a comprehensive monitoring mechanism, the concept is allowed to endure which gives it sustainability to meet intended future needs and dictates. The whole concept thereby results into synergy of effort and outcome.²⁶ It will be in line with national road map of economic growth, social inclusion and sustainable development as given in Pakistan's Vision – 2025.²⁷ More significantly, climate proofing of IWT will reflect Pakistan's resolve to implement its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) in compliance to the decision taken at the 20th session of Conference of Parties (COP) UNFCCC. At global level, climate proofing of IWT will have profound effect in the realm of conflict management through the incorporation of climate change phenomenon in trans-boundary watercourse treaty. It will be the manifestation of the resolve shown by world leaders at 21st session of COP at Paris from 30 November to 11 December 2015.²⁸ Climate proofed IWT will mean that concerns expressed in Paris Agreement about acknowledging climate change as a common concern of human kind has been practically applied and IWT has been configured to become sustainable instrument particularly under climate change scenario inspired by its guiding principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national circumstances.

At conceptual plane, the outcome of synergy is visualized by integrating segmented climate change adaptation practices through climate proofing of an institutional mechanism like treaty or an agreement. Traditionally, Pakistan and India are embroiled in host of disputes. Kashmir dispute dominates the conflict matrix. Others major traditional disputes include Siachen Glacier and Sir Creek issues. Subsequently nuclearization of both the countries has more serious dimension to the conflict matrix. Politicking on Indus Water Treaty can usher an era of non-traditional conflict matrix which can exacerbate the existing stress level. Conceptually strengthening of existing institutional mechanism like Indus water treaty by its climate proofing and subsequent application of integrated globally segmented climate change adaptation practices on ground has the promise of building peace between two nuclear states.

Global Climate Change Adaptation Practices – Rich Source for Emulation.

There are numerous examples on international arena where climate change adaptations have been practiced by riparian states for trans-boundary water bodies thereby drawing immense benefits from their outcomes. Some of the examples are cited here for inspiration and emulation.²⁹

- International Commission for the Protection of Rhine (ICPR) started a study on “Impacts of Climate Change on the Rhine River Basin” in January 2013 by multi-disciplinary working group comprising hydrologists, chemists, ecologists, engineers, flood experts and NGOs which was concluded in end 2014 and published at the beginning of 2015 is being implemented now.³⁰
- Danube River is shared by 19 countries and is the most shared international basin in the world. To raise the awareness and draw conclusions about the impact of climate change on Danube Basin, the International Commission for the Protection of Danube River (ICPDR) started work in December 2007 with an international conference and in a period of about five years prepared a strategy in December 2012 to be incorporated in existing legal and institutional mechanisms and structures for complete basin which provides guidance for how to address climate adaptation in the Danube basin particularly flood risk management.³¹
- Zambezi River Basin is shared by seven countries. Basin experienced increasing number of disasters like floods, droughts and hailstorms often resulting into outbreak of infectious diseases. It was in 2009 that International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and National Red Cross Societies of all riparian states established Zambezi River Basin Initiative, initially for helping in flood relief operations but later it developed into an effective body forging an integrated and comprehensive long-term strategy to reduce vulnerability to flooding and other risks brought about by climate change particularly the disaster preparedness measures.³²
- Mekong River Basin is shared by four countries. In 1995, Mekong River Commission (MRC) signed an agreement for cooperation on the sustainable use of Mekong River. MRC also developed five procedures which provide detailed implementation guidance for the basins. In 2009, MRC created Climate Change Adaptation Initiative which supports member countries to integrate climate change in development planning aspects and design frameworks which guide adaption and monitoring of implemented measures and mechanisms.³³
- There are host of adaptation practices which have been implemented on various trans-boundary waters like Dniester River for environment planning,³⁴ Great Lakes by US and Canada for joint integrated assessment and ecosystem adaptation strategy,³⁵ the Sava River Basin flood protocol.³⁶
- Bugesera Initiative by Burundi and Rwanda for climate change adaptation and water resource management.³⁷

- Agreement between China and Kazakhstan for protection of trans-boundary waters particularly the water quality etc.³⁸

These practices are implemented for the challenging concerns of a particular trans-boundary basin but if the same segmented practices are integrated through a comprehensive plan it can climate proof a trans-boundary water body creating synergistic effects of their collective outcome. That's what is expected from climate proofing of Indus Water Treaty which resultantly will benefit both Indus River Basin riparian states.

Indus Water Treaty: Geographical, Legal, Institutional and Historical Profile

Indus River Basin (IRB) comprises six major rivers (the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab commonly known as western rivers and Ravi, Beas and Sutlej as eastern rivers). Indus River is the only tributary which cuts across Himalayan – Karakorum – Hindukash (HKH)³⁹ ranges having its major portion in Pakistan.⁴⁰ (Husain 2010). IRB covers an area of about 1.12 square kilometers. With varying proportions, the Basin is shared by China (8%), Afghanistan (6%), India (39%) and Pakistan (47%). The total water from IRB amounts to 171 Million Acre Feet (MAF) and is shared between Pakistan and India. 20% of it amounting to 34 MAF flows in eastern rivers whereas 80% amounting to an average of 138 MAF flows in western rivers.⁴¹

IWT outlines principles to share water of IRB between Pakistan and India. The treaty specifies the jurisdictions of both the countries on different sets of rivers in the western and eastern halves. Treaty also defines the rights and obligations of both the countries for sharing the water. In addition, the treaty imposes various provisions regarding unrestricted use of waters of eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) except for domestic and non-consumptive use by Pakistan of the water which flows down into its territory.⁴² Similarly, waters of western rivers are earmarked for Pakistan except some non-consumptive and agricultural use by India as outlined in the provisions.⁴³ It is repeatedly highlighted in the Treaty that both the countries should exchange information, share data and not to create any damage or harm to other party in the process of applying its right on its respective waters.⁴⁴ For implementation of the treaty, monitoring and dispute resolution, a 'Permanent Indus Commission' serves as a functional instrument to avoid localized conflicts.⁴⁵

Since the activation of the treaty, Pakistan and India are sharing waters of IRB. As an amicable resolution of trans-boundary conflict between newly born two states, IWT has been considered as a successful undertaking by the World Bank.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, there have been instances where India as an upper riparian state has exercised its right over non-consumptive utilization of water resource of western rivers, without due regard to the damage or harm to Pakistan in the process. In addition, the treaty has an inbuilt mechanism of information and data sharing, monitoring and implementation through 'Permanent Indus Water Commission' (PIWC). Although PCIW endeavors to resolve the issues mutually, however, the Commission has been criticized for not resolving various disputes bilaterally. Consequently, Pakistan as a

lower riparian state has been forced to approach international platforms of justice or arbitration for third party dispute resolution.

In commenting on trans-boundary water resources and geographical advantages and disadvantages of upper and lower riparian states, Salik argues that, lower riparian states are usually at disadvantage.⁴⁷ This is mainly because of the 'natural' geographical access and control that upper riparian has over lower riparian. Although technical, legal and institutional arrangements of IWT are keeping it functional yet its inadequacies do create conflicting situations between both the states. At times it becomes pronounced particularly when the internal mechanisms of IWT fail to resolve the issues mutually and the doors of international mediators are knocked for the solution. Climate change phenomenon has further accentuated the existing inadequacies of IWT. The issue is especially crucial to recognizing the impact of climate change on water quantity, water quality and ecological systems. For instance, the fifth assessment report of IPCC-2014 notes that the extreme meteorological events like floods and droughts have increased in frequency and intensity. According to Roic and Garrick et al, the frequency of violations of water utilization on western rivers has also increased.⁴⁸ Another approach led by different scholars begs the consideration of geographical and environmental factors contributing towards climate change: significant increase in energy and food demand resulted by the unprecedented population growth,⁴⁹ increasing urbanization,⁵⁰ intensive ground water extraction, and aquifer depletion.⁵¹ Furthermore, Petersen-Perlman and Veilleux et al make a strong case against the prevalent weaknesses in the treaty and highlights issues related to lack of information and data sharing, weak monitoring and implementation mechanism.⁵² While considering these arguments, one is bound to see that Pakistan stress over water resources is exorbitantly increasing.⁵³ Therefore, this paper aims to highlight the necessity of *climate proofing* IWT in order to make it sustainable under climate change scenarios.

Pakistan and India have a peculiar historical background⁵⁴ which has defined both the countries as 'rivals.' This 'historical' view is important because it significantly influences and shapes the contemporary relationship between the neighboring countries. Since independence during 1947, both the countries have fought four wars. First and second wars were fought in 1948 and 1965 respectively and both were related to Kashmir Dispute. In 1971, once again war broke out for the third time between India and Pakistan on East Pakistan issue which resultantly led to breaking of the country and creation of Bangladesh. This never-ending animosity created a deadly scenario which eventually led both the countries toward their nuclearization⁵⁵. The last standoff between the nuclear rivals took place in 1999 which was once again linked to Kashmir Dispute and is commonly known as 'Kargil War'. Iconic international event like the 9/11 with its consequent fallout like NATO invasion of Afghanistan further complicated regional security balance and created triangular rivals comprising India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The spill-over of extremism from Afghanistan into Pakistan have also significantly contributed to create never-ending tension between Pakistan and India. More significantly, 'The War on Terror' stepped over the boundaries of Afghanistan and did expose divergence of interests of Pakistan and India. Destradi and Sandra in their

work on "*India: A Reluctant Partner for Afghanistan*." state quite categorically that India leveraged Afghanistan against Pakistan thereby complicating their bilateral relations.⁵⁶ Recent spate of hydro politics between India and Pakistan is also a great challenge and more serious is the denial syndrome by the upper riparian which has further exacerbated the situation.⁵⁷ No doubt the environment prevailing between Pakistan and India is extremely challenging but there exist 'peace' opportunities as well which need to be explored and capitalized.

The Applicability Environment for Climate proofing IWT – Challenges and Opportunities

Water and national security are inextricably linked and perhaps this relationship can be considered as the most significant nexus which can be threatened due to the impact of climate change, particularly in the context of trans-boundary shared water resource. Thus, within this inextricability of 'water and security', trans-boundary water resources have always remained a potential source of international conflict.⁵⁸ Expanding on this point, various studies have pointed out that, any effort to control the shared trans-boundary water resources (geographical/territorial exercise of power) and its consequent impacts on the fair distribution and management create a competition and escalate conflict between riparian states. Such kind of scenario between the riparian states, indeed necessitates either conflict or cooperation in order to utilize the shared water resources.⁵⁹ Usually, disputes over trans-boundary water resources are managed through cooperation and the role of various institutions such as World Bank (WB) and International Court of Justice (ICJ) etc. have been instrumental to this end.

Also, the United Nations well realizes the situational gravity of trans-boundary water issues and has been therefore highlighting the vulnerability of freshwater resource in relations to the climate change at different global forums. For instance, following the creation of the World Water Council, the meeting of the first World Water Forum was held at Morocco on 21 – 23 March 1997 which laid foundation for the development of a long term 'Vision for Water, Life and Environment for 21st Century'⁶⁰. The Forum reaffirmed that the incompatible water demand and its availability will significantly impact the socio-economic development. Moreover, the limited or reduced water availability will directly impact the agriculture productivity, public health, migration, human well-being and livelihood.⁶¹ Global warming and climate change are indeed key features of understanding the increasingly widespread natural disasters around the world. In this vein, various assessments and reports particularly IPCC 2014 have also led to the realization that intense rains and more water flows in rivers will cause catastrophic floods that would adversely affect human lives, physical assets/capital and the livelihood etc.⁶²

There are several and obvious reasons which insist to consider the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) as a 'success story'. Akhtar,⁶³ Jamir⁶⁴ and Mehra⁶⁵ in their works on IWT are appreciative of its strengths and find dividends in capitalizing those. The treaty has endured the tests of time since it's signing in 1960; survived three major wars, continued

border tensions, hydro controversies and political rhetoric as well. Though, recently Indian Prime Minister Modi threatened to revoke IWT,⁶⁶ yet the treaty has proved itself as a successful instrument for regulating shared waters of IRB between Pakistan and India. In general, the waters of the western and eastern rivers as per the treaty are being utilized by Pakistan and India respectively and demonstrate the effectiveness of means other than confrontation. Between India and Pakistan, some of the major hydraulic controversies like Baglihar HPP,⁶⁷ Wullar Barrage⁶⁸ and Ratle HPP⁶⁹ may show proneness to contradiction of aforementioned claims. However, various scholars have considered these arguments as sophisticated because of the strong and mature institutional mechanism of IWT. Following this argument, Petersen-Perlman and Veilleux call for the exploration of opportunities that can be capitalized to make IWT a source of strong cooperation and dependence through its climate proofing i.e. formation of one of the principle 'turn' within the studies of natural resource management, disaster risk management and conflict resolution can help establish the required framework.⁷⁰ Here, a greater engagement with some of the climate change adaptation practices applied to trans-boundary water resources between riparian states would be highly worthwhile⁷¹. Recognition of such climate change adaptation practices would become both imaginable and promising to move towards 'climate proofing' of trans-boundary shared waters across the globe.

Climate Change Adaptation: Trans-boundary Waters' Cooperation Possibilities

Climate change has direct bearing on water demand. With increased population growth, urbanization, industrialization and improved quality of life, in warmer temperatures water demand will increase. It has been observed that most of the treaties and international agreements do not incorporate economic, social and political impacts which climate change has on trans-boundary water resources.⁷² Particularly in those treaties which were framed during the time period when knowledge about climate change was either nonexistent or rudimentary. The absence of climate change related factors make those treaties fall short of the perceived sustainability standards as set out in international water law documents like the Helsinki Rules,⁷³ the UN Watercourses Convention⁷⁴ and the Berlin Rules⁷⁵ Significance of the impacts of climate change is so glaring that its incorporation in trans-boundary water treaties is unavoidable.⁷⁶ According to Fischhendler, legal and institutional adaptation to climate change uncertainties in trans-boundary watercourse treaties is essentially required to make it sustainable.⁷⁷

Water Resource and Trans-boundary Dependence

Around 60% of global freshwater flow across politically divided borders.⁷⁸ Cooperation framework in management of trans-boundary waters is essentially required to prevent or reduce the negative impacts of unilateral interventions by the riparian states and to facilitate the application of structural as well as non-structural climate change adaptation and mitigation measures at basin level. Trans-boundary waters cooperation framework can enable integrated development of intervention as a

cost-effective solution. It can help synergize the hydrological effects of interventions applied by riparian states in their respective areas. Economically also, the cooperation framework can lead to shared costs and benefits of adaptations, will broaden the knowledge base, enlarge the range of adaptation measures and reduce social inequalities. Resultantly the process shall promote sustainable development.⁷⁹

Collaboration Leading to Cooperation

Water is a cross cutting element for civic amenities and merits multi-sectoral and multi discipline attention by all stakeholders at all levels. Water issues involve conflicting and competing needs. These requirements transcend physical, political, institutional, disciplinary and jurisdictional boundaries. The cooperation at trans-boundary level shall therefore remain always necessary to address core issues. These issues shall invariably include water allocation and distribution, pollution sources, water abstraction, infrastructural development, over exploitation of scarce water resource and bearing the financial burden of water management. Trans-boundary waters cooperation framework as a consequence contributes in reducing the poverty and inequities. It accrues economic benefits through efficient and sustainable use of water resource. As a consequence, it facilitates exchange of data and information and promotes sustainable natural resources management of water and the ecosystem and the species dependent on that water body. In nutshell, the trans-boundary waters cooperation framework can prove catalyst in reducing geo-political pressures and build needed trust amongst the riparian states.⁸⁰

Climate Proofing – The Envisaged Implementation Context

Climate change adaptation phenomenon is a recent experience and its application on trans-boundary water resources is an even newer field.⁸¹ For many of the climate change adaptation practices, the foundational knowledge of existing Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) concept is being used for policies and interventions. One such example is the European Union Water Framework Directive (EU WFD)-2000 which has been essentially used to draw climate change adaptation responses particularly for extreme events like floods and droughts.⁸² Climate Change adaptation and IWRM due to their conceptual similarities are complementary to each other. One of the key elements of IWRM is the integration of water management decisions across sectors which can be instrumental in identifying the potential climate change vulnerabilities and synergies. Similarly, approach followed in IWRM for hydrological analysis to establish the patterns of extreme events for their frequency and severity can also help in identification of trans-boundary manifested or potential patterns of climate change. Although IWRM as a concept is generally accepted framework for natural resources of water yet there exists a possibility that different countries may interpret, define and implement the concept differently which may cause hindrance in building desired cooperation amongst the riparian states. It would, therefore, be more practical to outline a contextual frame work for climate proofing within the context of IWRM so as to apply climate change adaptation strategies and practices in trans-boundary context.⁸³ For this purpose, the exhaustive work by the

United Nations and documented in the form of lessons learned and good practices for water and climate change adaptation in trans-boundary basins in March 2015 alluded to in preceding paragraphs can help customize climate proofing strategies and its projected application context⁸⁴.

Implementation Strategy – A Preferred Model

The formulation of climate proofing strategies will essentially comprise two functional planes, one at policy level and the second one at intervention level. At policy level, the functions shall comprise four major activities. These activities include umbrella dialogue between the riparian states, effective communication through different political, diplomatic and technical means, application of policy frameworks and capacity building at all levels. At intervention level, the functions essentially shall comprise five cardinal activities. Firstly, the collection of information about climate impacts will set the stage for further activities. Secondly the assessment of vulnerability to climate change and the need for adaptation for capacity building will help in formulating the scope of work. Thirdly the development of climate proofing strategies will outline the conceptual contours of intervention. These contours shall include adaptation measures and the mechanism for their implementation, prioritization for interventions, the development of institutional arrangement, creating policy synergies and ensuring financial support. Fourthly implementation of adaptation intervention will be the major activity which shall need consensus and cooperation to produce optimum results. Lastly the process of monitoring and evaluation will ensue which shall suggest the adjustments on the basis of the effectiveness of implemented climate proofing interventions.

Contextual Framework – How Will It Be Done?

The climate proofing of a particular trans-boundary water treaty will be done by integrating all those climate change adaptation practices which are applied by different countries on trans-boundary rivers, lakes or aquifers basins. There will be four dominant pillars of climate proofing contextual framework. These shall include feasibility, applicability, monitoring and sustainability. For feasibility, principles of basin adaptation, legal and institutional frameworks and institutionalized approach for climate proofing strategy development shall be considered. The basin principles shall include basin wide approach to climate change adaptation, reconciling uncertainty and retaining flexibility in implementation of interventions, establishing linkages between various levels and sectors and using climate as an added pressure for formulating strategies. For legal and institutional frameworks, these should be adaptive to existing trans-boundary protocols with implementation flexibility. The institutions for trans-boundary basin adaptation should be individual context sensitive and functional. To adopt institutionalized approach for climate proofing strategy development, the process shall be systematically organized through collaborative, integrative, transparent and participative measures. The capacity for that purpose should be developed through deliberate planning, data and knowledge sharing, collaboration between technical specialists and decision makers and clear communication amongst all stakeholders.

Implementation Methodology

Applicability of the climate proofing concept will revolve around vulnerability and impact assessment in trans-boundary river basins. The vulnerability and impact assessment will be done by gathering, compiling and exchanging information. Only set of data and information from complete basin and across water cycle will prove helpful. Based on thematic, spatial and temporal areas of data coverage, a common repository of the information needs to be developed, communicated and used for vulnerability and impact assessment. Under applicability regime, after completing vulnerability assessment at basin and sub basin levels, the opportunities and synergies need to be identified for formulating climate proofing strategies. Similarly, to integrate and harmonize the use of climate, environmental and socio-economic models and scenarios, all stakeholders should form part of the vulnerability assessment process. Furthermore, in applicability scenarios, the adaptation measures in the trans-boundary context need to be identified which shall be a mix of structural and non-structural measures. These measures should also include the basin wide monitoring and observatory system which shall be an important component to be subsequently used for evolution purposes. The economic, environmental and social costs and benefits of adaptation interventions and their impact on mitigation need to be established at basin level. Prioritization of the interventions is the most important component which shall form part of final plan for implementation. Sharing the costs and benefits of interventions on the basis of economic analysis shall lead to crystallize climate proofing options for adaptation at basin level.

Monitoring Mechanism

Monitoring and evaluation is a progressive measure to keep the intervention alive and updated. It shall be a basin wide, comprehensive monitoring mechanism preferably by integral as well as impartial monitors. Monitoring shall be done for a theory of change, shedding away the status quo and following the assessment when it is dictating a change from original intervention. The effectiveness of intervention shall be regularly re-assessed and the space for flexibility should be maximized by applying correction and adjustments where needed. For making the climate proofing interventions sustainable, its implementation mechanism and financing arrangements need to be well organized and structured. For financing the implementation of adaptation measures, mix of public and private funding sources need to be explored. Basin adaptation for development policies and programmes if properly mainstreamed will help in sustaining the intervention otherwise in absence of regular funding the complete climate proofing process may stall.

Climate Proofing IWT: Adaptations' Integration Leading to Synergy

IWT regulates water of Indus Basin. IWT negotiated in 1950s was signed in 1960. According to that time, it was probably one of the best solutions to resolve an acute water dispute between newly born states. From hindsight, one can say with certainty that the best available knowledge of that time was applied in framing IWT. In

second half of last century, there has been immense educational and technological advancements in the field of hydrology, water resource management, trans-boundary watercourse management, conflict resolution, environment, monitoring techniques, data acquisition, storage, sharing and archiving techniques and above all new paradigm of climate change has emerged which was not exhaustively researched by that time. Moreover, the water demand has also increased due to more population, economic development and improved living standards whereas contrarily due to climate change phenomenon, the availability of freshwater has become uncertain, unpredictable and reduced. Consequently, freshwater a finite commodity has become a source of tension and conflict between the riparian states. The extreme meteorological events have added yet another dimension to the adversity, whereby water resource management inadequacies have started revealing more strongly than before. Besides other solutions at users' end for efficient water resource management, the basic solution lies in reviewing IWT to incorporate current knowledge particularly of climate change which is missing from the document and is a major source of rendering IWT incompatible to latest knowledge. This places the treaty serious risk of creating tension between India and Pakistan which can naturally be impregnated with the latent potential of turning it into a conflict of grave character if existing gaps in IWT are not timely addressed.

Advantages and Disadvantages of IWT in the Context of Climate Change

While framing IWT, only the quantity attribute of the shared water was mainly focused and that too without incorporating the impact of climate change. Even the ground water and aquifer which are integral part of a basin and now have attained a relevant position in water utilization were not included in the Treaty. Provisions regarding water quality, pollution, environment, aquatic life, ecological systems and extreme events which have immense political, economic, social and environmental implications are all together missing from the original Treaty. When IWT was formulated, it was a standalone effort. There were no internationally established and accepted trans-boundary watercourse rules under international water law. Whereas now an effective framework under international law is available in the form of Helsinki Rules-1966, UN International Watercourse Convention - 1997 and Berlin Rules - 2004 which need to be applied on IWT as well for making it more efficient and effective. Climate change has impacted every facet of human life which needs to be accurately measured for precise and timely response. For that purpose, water mapping, data acquisition and monitoring through GIS and Remote Sensing for accurate water analysis and response is an essential component of response strategy which needs to be incorporated in IWT for effective management by both the countries. Moreover, for complex trans-boundary water management where bilateral monitoring and implementation mechanisms are not very effective, for making the process more transparent and responsive, there is a need to constitute mutually consented external body for monitoring, data acquisition and subsequently information and data sharing to all stakeholder with a view to make the response strategy more efficient particularly for extreme events like floods and droughts. In this way, IWT will be climate proofed and become sustainable under climate change scenarios. The current climate change

knowledge application on IWT can become recourse to future trans-boundary water conflict management and peace building between India and Pakistan.

Climate Proofing – An Instrument of Capacity Building

Building multi-level governance capacity an instrumental facet of climate proofing is achieved by coordination and cooperation at inter-institutional and inter-sectoral levels normally referred to as horizontal integration and vertical integration which is done by establishing linkages and empowering multi-level actors for evolving strategies and finding solutions to climate change problems. For climate proofing IWT, the framework for the development of climate change adaptation strategy for IRB would have to be evolved. This framework shall comprise the universal components like data or information collection, impact, vulnerability and capacity assessment, development of legal and institutional frameworks, adaptation measures, implementation, monitoring and financial support mechanisms, instituting mechanisms and implementation of measures and evaluation of implemented measures and mechanisms for adjustment in strategy. This strategy development shall define the realized and expected climate change impacts, anticipated vulnerabilities and general principles for adaptation at Indus River Basin level. Consequently, it shall be minimizing the possibility of unilateral adaptation measures while maximizing adaptation interventions beneficial for trans-boundary perspective. As a conclusion this paper crystallizes that there are five fields for climate proofing of Indus River for which customized climate change adaptation interventions would have to be instituted. These fields shall include the water (quantity and quality), the ecology (ecosystems and species), the data acquisition and sharing (thematic, spatial and temporal), impartial monitoring and evaluation system and finally the sustainability of interventions through shared financial responsibilities⁸⁵.

Conclusion

The paper has revealed that both Pakistan and India are water stressed countries so there is no scope of wasting water in any way. Climate change phenomenon will further aggravate water scarcity. Climate change adaptation measures need to be undertaken by both the countries to conserve water. Shared water across the globe has latent potential of creating conflictual situations in water resource management. Pakistan and India have a history of wars and conflicts, but shared IRB water has been more of a source of cooperation rather than dispute. The concept of climate proofing IWT will foster the level of cooperation when it shall be applied with consensus and collaboration. Climate proofed IWT where on one hand will lay down the rights of riparian states for equitable and reasonable water utilization with more specificity, on the other hand it will outline the obligations as well to conserve water through adaptation measures. The formulation of climate proofing strategies will essentially be done at policy level and the secondly at intervention level. The climate proofing IWT will be done by integrating all those climate change adaptation practices which are applied by different countries on trans-boundary rivers, lakes or aquifer basins. For making the climate proofing interventions sustainable, its implementation

mechanism and financing arrangements need to be well organized, structured and monitored.

Climate proofing will also help in reducing GHG emissions which are contributing to global warming and subsequently the climate change. The current climate change knowledge application on IWT will become recourse to future trans-boundary water conflict management and instrument of peace building between Pakistan and India. Numerous practices on international arena where climate change adaptations by the riparian states for trans-boundary water bodies have delivered immense benefits can also be a source of emulation in IWT context. These practices when integrated, a comprehensive climate proof concept can create synergistic effects of their collective outcome. Therefore, the climate proofing concept shall be minimizing the possibility of unilateral adaptation measures while maximizing adaptation interventions beneficial from trans-boundary perspective. Long term outcome envisaged from the climate proofing of IWT will render credence to the process which if emulated globally will create enviable inspiration for trans-boundary water course riparian states.

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- ⁸⁵ These shall indeed be five pillars of climate proofing implementation strategy.

REFUGEES AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING: A CASE STUDY OF SYRIAN REFUGEES

*Asma Sana Bilal and Zoha Khalid**

Abstract

Human trafficking has been a great concern with respect to the human rights violation and refugee exploitation for ages. There is a surge in recent year because of many factors associated with global conflict. Unfortunately, it has evolved to be an influential industry in the global economy. Human trafficking generates about \$ 150 billions of illegal profits per year and has been designated as an illegal activity internationally. Refugees are vulnerable to fall victim due to the lack of policies and practices to handle their situation in time. Moreover, not providing basic rights and not safeguarding basic needs of the people particularly of the refugees accelerate the subjugation of people to human trafficking and eventually to violence, which consequently enhances crime. This study would discuss the vulnerability of Syrian refugees as case study that how they have been victimized through migrant smuggling, exploitation on job, illegal employment and abuse of children soldiers, sexual exploitation, forced child marriages and gender-based violence.

Keywords: Human Trafficking, Exploitation, International Law, Migration, Violence, Conflict, Syrian Refugees.

Introduction

Human trafficking, in recent years, has emerged as a multibillion dollar industry. The conflict in Middle East has provided enough space to traffickers to operate and carry out their illicit trade. The growth of such criminal activities has also been referred as ‘the dark side of globalization’ where humans are treated as a commodity for purchase and sale. This form of ‘modern slavery’ has also been characterized as transnational organized crime by many countries who have also adapted strict laws on cases of human trafficking.

This paper tends to highlight how refugees become an easy prey to human traffickers and been exploited by them in number of ways. Human trafficking has emerged as a global business and recently Syrian refugees are most vulnerable class available for exploitation by the human traffickers. The study is divided into three sections: section one will discuss the status of refugees under international law, second section will discuss human trafficking and build a relationship between refugees and

*Asma Sana Bilal is lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad and Zoha Khalid is M.Phil scholar at the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad.

human trafficking, and the last section plight of Syrian refugees will be discussed as a case study.

Status of Refugees

The 1951 UN Convention on status of refugees (Geneva Convention) and the 1967 protocol related to status of refugees provide a legal framework for the protection of refugees as one of a human right. Refugees are regarded as a special class of migrants who left their country under specific conditions and under international law, they deserve specific protection by their host state. According to Article 1 of the 1951 UN Convention, as modified by 1967 Protocol:

“A refugee is defined as a person who ‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.’”

A refugee is not the same as an asylum-seeker. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

*“an asylum-seeker is someone who says he or she is a refugee, but whose claim has not yet been definitively evaluated.”*²

There is a provision in article 31 to safeguard the right of those who refuge to escape vulnerable situation in their country, such asylum-seekers may enter into the country of refuge unlawfully. These ‘Refugees unlawfully in the country of refuge’ are not punishable because they come from a country where their life and security was endangered and secondly, if they also report immediately to the host country and provide adequate reason for their refuge, the host country may put restrictions on their mobilization in the host country until their status is regularized according to the law of that country.

On the movement of refugees, article 26 of the Convention grants the right to ‘refugees lawfully in the territory’ to move freely in the country and freely exercise their right to residence anywhere in the country. In certain countries, which normally become host of large influx of refugees, the right to choose residence to refugee camps and their movement is also restricted. In other countries, including developed countries, there is a common practice of detention of irregular migrants until their status of refugees is not determined by law of that country.

Human Trafficking

Much of the existing literature on human trafficking by academia and policy makers’ emphases on descriptive question, and for bringing scientific objectivity concerned with numbers.³ Just like the case of defining terrorism, there is no one internationally accepted definition of trafficking and/or smuggling. Different definitions were offered on ‘white slave traffic’, ‘traffic in women and children’, ‘slavery’ and ‘forced labour’ between 1904 to 1933 in international conventions, however, in 1949 the

'trafficking in person' was defined for the very first time in United Nations. Over the last few decades, the relation between trafficking and refugees become more evident and has been reflecting in various definitions.

Finally, in 2000, United Nations promulgated protocol to end trafficking in the world. The protocol came into force in December 2003 and called for world-wide suppression, punishment and prevention of human trafficking particularly women and children. At the same time, the United Nation for the first time defined human trafficking as "the recruitment, transport, transfer, harbouring, or receipt of persons by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion of abduction, of fraud of deception of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having a control over another person for the purposes of exploitation. Exploitation shall include at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth (above) shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth (above) have been used."⁴

United Nations Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur Ms Sigma Huda in 2004 to define Human Trafficking with respect to human rights with focus on women and children. She categorizes human trafficking in four sets: "act, mean, end result and victim status".⁵

It is pertinent to mention that not all trafficked persons would fall within the definition of refugees thus the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in its Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Trafficking recommends States to take appropriate measures to consider asylum applications by trafficked persons. In April 2006, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) issued Guidelines on International Protection of Trafficked person.⁶

At the regional level, efforts to curb human trafficking have also been made. The Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in human being was signed in June 2005. Afterwards, it launched a campaign in 2006 to "Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, aiming to raise awareness and solicit signatures and ratification of the Convention".⁷ Today, trafficking in person is a form of modern-day slavery and violation against fundamental human rights. It violates the basic human right of liberty and security of person the right not to be held in slavery, the right to free from torture and cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment. Furthermore, enslavement, forced prostitution and rape experienced by trafficked person falls into crime against humanity and a war crime if it is occurred in a country victim of armed conflict.

There is no accurate statistic available on human trafficking as it is a clandestine activity and illegal in nature. Some reports by UNHCR gave an estimate of 800,000 to 2.5 million per year.⁸ Moreover, human trafficking is considered more about transnational trafficking (across international borders) and the domestic trafficking (within the national border) is ignored whereas, the magnitude of domestic trafficking

is far more than transnational trafficking. In addition, it is difficult to measure domestic trafficking.

According to International Labor Organization (ILO) report, there are about 21 million victims of modern-day slavery. Among them, “55% of trafficking victims around the world are women and girls and 45% are men and boys. Almost 15.4 million victims (74%) are aged 18 or older, with the number of children under the age of 18 estimated at 5.5 million (26%)”.⁹

Industry	Number	Percentage	Profits
Labour	14.2 million	68 %	
Construction, Manufacturing, Mining and utilities	7.1 million	50%	\$34 billion
Domestic Workers	3.4 million	24%	\$8 billion
Agriculture	3.5 million	25%	\$9 billion
Sexually exploited	4.5 million	22%	\$99 billion
State-Imposed Forced Labour	2.2 million	10%	

The reason for growing number of human trafficking cases is the maximum profit attached with it with minimum risks. It has emerged as an extremely lucrative business, with “estimated profit ranging from US \$ 9.5 billion to US \$ 30 billion a year.”¹⁰

The case of domestic trafficking is different from transnational trafficking. Though, both are primarily motivated by economic reasons, but the drivers of transnational trafficking are mostly organized criminal group and their activities fall into organized crime activity whereas in domestic trafficking, individual are more likely involved with forced labour, bondage or sexual exploitation.

Human Trafficking Business

The statistics of International Labour Organization estimated that human trafficking, in the informal economy, generates \$ 150 billions in illegal profits per year. Human trafficking is an international crime and it is illegal activity, majority of states have legislation in place to prosecute traffickers for their heinous crime. However, in practice majority of traffickers are operating freely even according to one statistic from UN in Europe alone, just 1 in 100,000 traffickers is convicted. Thus, it makes human trafficking business for traffickers extremely profitable.

The causes of human trafficking are complex and can be understood from the business point of view. Trafficking in person as a business operates in global market, supply and demand is a basic principle through which market operates, likewise, trafficking in person occurred because trafficked person constitutes supply side, and abusive employers, sex buyers or exploiters represent demand side.

Human trafficking involved men, women and even children, these victims are trapped by the traffickers who act as an agent and lured them with dreams of land of better opportunities where they can become rich within couple of years. Many of them,

travelled without any documentation or through fake documents. In both cases, the victims are unaware of the consequences such as arrest, deportation or even death.

Money is the basic driving force behind human trafficking that keeps the criminal activity running. As there is always risk of being caught, these criminal groups constantly move their victims from one place to another. The socio-economic factors that are associated with human trafficking also play an important role. The socio-economic condition, demographic factor, demand of cheap labour and human capital in developed countries all act as a pull and push factors for the human traffickers.

Factors of Human Trafficking

Within the liberal international order, the illicit market has benefited from the privatization and deregulation of industries and economy. The humans are being easily traded from one country to another. The demand of cheap labour is increasing in many countries and, on the other side, there is no efficient visa policy to meet the demand of cheap labour. In some instances, companies are not allowed to hire cheap labour from outside. Thus, it opened a way for illicit market traders to provide them with cheap labour.

Poverty is also one of the major factors as to escape poverty people migrate from one place to another. The demand side of human trafficking exists because the agents of human trafficking promise better job opportunities abroad. Many young people particularly girls left their homes to fulfil their dream or to earn well for their families. Even parents agreed to send their children abroad willingly to escape poverty. After arrival to distant country, their travelling and identity documents are confiscated by the buyers and they are abused into submission. Global warming and natural disasters are also contributing factors to human trafficking. The disaster hit homeless people become an easy prey for traffickers. They are considered as a lucrative commodity as cheap labour for the companies with loose regulations.

The risk and feasibility factor also played an important role in increasing of human trafficking. Countries with long distances involve much paper work and lot of travelling which also increases the chance of being caught. On the other hand, trafficking within country or neighbouring countries is easy and feasible.

Humans are exploited in two ways by the traffickers. Either they end up as forced labourer or sex workers. According to ILO report, about 4.5 million humans are exploited as sex workers which account for 22 percent of total incidents of human trafficking and generate profit of about \$ 99 billion.¹¹ In twenty-first century, slavery is illegal, but prostitution is allowed in certain areas which is also considered as multi-billion-dollar industry with is low-cost and low-risk investment.¹² The demand and supply rules also exist in the sex industry.¹³

The availability of internet and revolution in communication technology has provided enough space to sex industry in which they operate without any legal

restriction. Today, due to this industry, the Asian women and children are trafficked in a large number across the world.

Syrian Refugees as a Victim of Human Trafficking

Around the world today, an estimated twenty-one million people have fallen prey to the criminal enterprise of human trafficking. Though victim demographics run the gamut, there is one factor common to all: vulnerability to exploitation. Such vulnerability emerged in Syria with a non-violent uprising that began in Syria in March 2011 rapidly descended into a complex civil conflict. Syrians are now considered as largest refugee population in the world. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees described the crisis as the “biggest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time.”¹⁴ Since the start of Syrian civil war in 2011, about 386,000 people have been killed which also includes 14,000 children.

Forced Marriages, Child Brides and Gendered Specific Violence

Children and adult women have been at most risk of being affected by any conflict, let alone being trafficked. For example, the traffickers may find several benefits for their actions of exploitation in terms of selling them for forced marriages, mainly for the purpose of prostitution to men of the neighboring countries. There was one instance when the government of Jordan investigated the case of forced marriage of a seventeen-year-old girl from Syria, for the purpose of prostitution. It was also reported that the Arab men used to visit the refugee camps set up in Jordan for the Syrian refugees in order to look for young brides.

It is also reported that Islamic State used to force their local young Syrian girls and adult women, who were within the areas under their control to get married with its fighters. Not only that, but ISIL has also abducted thousands of women from Yezidi and Iraqi origin and forced them to Syria in order to sell them. The end result of this cycle remained forced marriages, domestic violence, organized rape and sexual assault.

Sexual Exploitation

It is a common practice that the young girls and woman in every part of the world are the most victims of crimes like gender based and sexual assaults, especially in the emergency humanitarian situations.

Another type of victimization that the Syrian women fell prey to is the ‘survival sex’. This is done in order to earn money for them and to support their families in distress situation. These women may earn anywhere between \$ 13 to \$ 450 per case. All of that comes down to be reported as the financial crises the families are facing due to migration to a new place and lack of settlement opportunities and assistance.¹⁵

Illegal Employment and abuse of Child Soldiers

The act of hiring and preparing child soldiers is one of the forms of human trafficking, either by coercion or fraud or force. With reference to the Syrian refugees, ISIL continued to forcibly recruit and use the Syrian child soldiers and human shields. These children were used as a part of the coordinated military operations to locate the

enemy's positions. These children served the duties of the informants also. ISIL actively recruited and assigned child soldiers in hostilities. It also utilized and targeted the children for training and used them for military purposes, endangering children and preventing their access to education. The training camp established by the ISIL call these children as the "Cubs of the Caliphate",¹⁶ and trainings included on how to operate the weapons and how to act as a suicide bomber where required.

Exploitation on Job

There is a big problem of forced labour where the Syrian refugees were compelled to work either for very little or no money in return, but for just shelter or food. The accommodations were usually tents and thus in the nearby areas the people were forced to work otherwise they were expelled from that area. In this way, the refugees have no choice but to fall victim on the forced labour choices. The refugees living in the apartments faced these forced conditions from their landlords.

Conclusion

With the advent of globalization and easy transfer of goods and capital from one place to another number of issues emerged related to human security. One such concerned issue area is 'illicit market' that not only deals with drugs and guns but human beings as well as a commodity. Human trafficking has emerged as a serious issue for the world. The reason for the surge in the 'illicit market' is the profit it generates and low-risk of being caught.

People in Syria flee, leaving their homes, for well-earned jobs, schools and good living but as refugees they are in desperate need to have new homes and stability in their new areas of settlement in order to provide for themselves and their families. Dismantling the modern-day slavery now demands for increasing the risks and decreasing the profits for the perpetrators. It also requires for ample resources to combat the criminal enterprise and also to initiate advocacy to garner maximum supports to the future policies regarding this menace. There have been prosecutions and victims identified and charged for, but these actions need to be consistent and more proactive. It is only possible if collective efforts and policies are made at international level and to create awareness about the devastating issue of the human trafficking, only then this illegal act of "Modern Slavery" will wind up from the international market.

NOTES

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LINKAGE OF EDUCATION AND LEARNING ENVIRONMENT WITH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF PAKISTAN

*Shahid Yaqub Abbasi, Fatima Saleem and Zobia Noreen**

Abstract

Empirical analysis of economies around the world shows that there is a strong correlation between education, learning environment and income/productivity levels. It is often argued that indicators of economic growth and development lie in a country's national income and for this the human development index is of extreme importance. Education and learning environment are one of the various dimensions of Human Capital which when viewed through the lens of human capital theory, describes individuals as economic firms contributing to the Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Thus, for any economy to thrive, it is important that its physical and human capital complement each other and for this, education is the connecting dot. Education raises the marginal productivity of workers, that's why it positively impact on a country's national income. The immensely polarized education system of Pakistan takes form of three distinct learning environments impacting the services, agriculture and the industrial sector.

Keywords: Education, Learning Environment, Personality Development, Human Capital, Marginal Productivity, Total Factor of Productivity, Foreign Direct Investment.

Introduction

Economists and sociologists around the world, time and again have argued about the importance of education for the economic development of a nation. The idea of education as an indicator of economic returns and development is premised on the belief of a more developed human capital invested in the labor market. Education, is crucial in achieving the status of large economy and its significance, is illustrated in the following quote by British economist Alfred Marshall,

“While nature shows a tendency to diminishing return, man shows a tendency to increasing return. Knowledge is our most powerful engine of production; it enables us to subdue nature and satisfy our wants.”

Thus, the correlation between of education as well as learning environment with economic development of a nation is positive.

*Shahid Yaqub Abbasi is PhD scholar in the Department of Education at Islamia University Bahawalpur, Fatima Saleem is a Research Associate at Institute for Strategic Studies Research and Analysis, National Defence University, Islamabad and Zobia Noreen is PhD scholar in the Department of Education at Islamia University Bahawalpur.

"If anything, recognition of the importance of knowledge has gained momentum, and there is a renewed impetus to integrate knowledge into countries' development strategies."²

Irrespective of the components of a country's GDP, the relation is premised on the basic idea that skillful labor force would produce more output in the same given working hours than unskilled or under-skilled labor force. Education raises the marginal productivity of workers hence positively impacts a country's national income.³ This illustrates the significance of primary, secondary and tertiary levels of education on the human capital of a country.

Pakistan is a developing country and it spends 2.2% of its GDP on the education sector. Its literacy rate stands at 58% for its population from 10 years of age and above.⁴ The literacy rate of urban areas is 74% and rural areas 49%.⁵

Overall, Pakistan's economy has often remained unstable due to more than one contributing factors, such as mismanagement of resources, low GDP-Tax ratio, rampant corruption, overburdening of the economy with loans and fast depleting foreign reserves. The situation has further been aggravated due to the menace of terrorism that engulfed the country. Unfortunately, Pakistan was labeled as an epicenter of terrorism by the international community which had negative effect on direct foreign investment. Despite the uncertainty surrounded Pakistan's economic conditions, the country attained a Real GDP growth rate of 5.28 percent in 2016-17, the highest in 10 years.⁶ According to a report published by Price Water House Coopers in 2017, Pakistan is expected to acquire the status of the world's 20th largest economy by 2030 and 16th largest by 2050.⁷

Since the human capital theory suggests that the number of productive working hours are more important than the total number of working hours, it is therefore evident that in the same given working hours, the average output of an organization will increase manifold when its workforce is well equipped with modern knowledge as compared to an organization whose workforce is unskilled. It can be inferred that the existing dire state of Pakistan's diminishing economy can be attributed to non-congenial and inflexible learning environment and a divergent class-based school system that has not been able to equip individuals with skills compatible with the changing job demands. In developing countries, education plays a crucial role for the creation of human capital and unfortunately, the education sector of Pakistan faces multiple and complex natured challenges. This paper will focus on education and learning environment that impede the human capital to become a productive part of Pakistan's economy by establishing a linkage between Education and Economic Development. Primarily, Human capital theory will be used to assert that knowledge, skills, assets, and experiences achieved through good quality education will make country's working class more compatible with world standards and thus add to the economy via industrial growth and remittances. In addition, the participatory state model of governance will be used to highlight how poor governance and lack of participation by the stakeholders in the country's education process has hampered the

system from improving. Since no country's economy can take off unless the government invests in its education, these theories will help establish and identify how an educated labor increases the overall productivity and output.

Pakistan's Education System

Quacquarelli Symonds (QS), a British ranking agency has dubbed Pakistan's education system as one of the world's weakest. The system is marred by bad policies, teaching methods more focused on rote learning instead of analytical skills, low primary enrolment rates, untrained teachers, outdated curriculum, poor planning and mismanagement of resources.

Overview of the Education System and Learning Environment

Factors congenial to students' learning consist of an optimum balance of curriculum, physical environment, social atmosphere, institutional characteristics and diversity while giving equal weightage to counselling sessions and family background. Unfortunately, in Pakistan, the school system embodies the highly polarized class stratification where 4 out of 10 individuals live in poverty.⁸

In any academic institution, learning environment plays an important role as "*classroom environment is one of the key factors of a student's accomplishments*". According to experts, the best learning environment consists of a setup which effectively pursues the set learning objectives. However, in Pakistan, the significance of learning environment is quite often overlooked by the policy makers, administrators and faculty members.⁹ A good learning environment should focus on both teaching and learning facilities. Few aspects such as temperature, walls decoration, lighting arrangements, ventilation and acoustics also play a pivotal role in students' learning.¹⁰ A study was conducted in 2013 on elementary and middle school by Barrett, Zhang, Moffat and Kobbacy, they examined that the learning environment of 751 students in 34 classrooms across seven schools of UK to observe if environmental conditions impact learning or not.¹¹ While controlling other factors, they found that conditions such as light sound, temperature, ventilation and quality furniture accounted for 25% (either positive or negative) of the students' performance.¹²

Henceforth, a good quality education encompasses various elements such as motivated learner, safe, healthy and conducive learning environment, relevant and student-centered curriculum, textbooks and learning materials, trained teachers, student centered teaching approaches, and learning outcomes. It encompasses knowledge, skills and attitudes that foster positive participation in society.¹³ A good education system should thus be a combination of the following factors:

- Updated Curriculum
- High standard Textbooks & relevant learning material
- Trained and qualified teachers
- Assessment focused on developing cognitive abilities of individuals
- A conducive learning environment

In any educational system, curriculum is central and instrumental key to decide and follow some particular teaching practices and knowledge products. Indications of learning skills at each level is non-existent and often fail to answer questions like How, What and Why, which are vital for the development of an individual's critical and analytical skills. Unfortunately, in Pakistan, the curriculum is not regularly updated and lagging in visual stimulation which ultimately impedes in learning. Being the principal learning tool, text books are outdated and sometimes lack reliability. Teaching methods emphasize on rote learning and the classroom environment lacks a healthy teacher-student and student-student interaction. The prevailing assessment techniques at almost all levels fail to advance cognitive ability of individuals.

Components of Economic Progress

It is often argued that the GDP is not the real reflection of a country's growth. The real indicators of economic growth and development lie in a country's national income and for this the human development index is of extreme importance. The index consists of following factors:

- Life expectancy
- Education and welfare
- Wealth

As discussed, the education system of Pakistan is in dire state; whereas the economy despite all the potential is unstable and flailing. Hence, economic growth of a nation is combination of both; the physical capital and the human capital. Both forms of capital combined exponentially to increase the quality and the quantity of the products. The, components of economic progress broadly consist of:

- Infrastructural development and investment
- Technological advancement
- Labour productivity

The relationship between each component is directly linked to the quality of education and learning environment. As the quality of education improves, labour productivity, technological advancement and infrastructural development happen at a faster rate. Due to this, the knowledge-based structure of globalized world compels nations to strive for a good educational structure with focus on a highly conducive learning environment. The demands of the information age have put developing countries like Pakistan under stress due to the widening income and knowledge gaps.¹⁴

Pakistan is a land of diverse cultures, languages and beliefs that vary across the country. Located in South Asia and home to 207, 774, 520 people, Pakistan's population consists of 106, 449, 332 males and 101,314, 780 females.¹⁵ Its location provides it with immense economic potential due to its geostrategic significance; known as the gateway to Central Asia, its location provides China the key link to Central Asian States, Middle East and Europe. Its strategic significance and its role as conduit to world economies have allowed the country to be categorized as a transit economy.

The country's agriculture sector contributes to 19.8% to the country's GDP whereas the industrial sector contributed a 21.02% in the fiscal year 2015-2016.¹⁶ Like most developing countries, agriculture is the main contributor of Pakistan's GDP. The sector accounts for half of employed labor force and is the largest source of foreign exchange earnings.¹⁷ The diversification across Pakistan has a direct impact on the education sector. The UNESCO Institute for Statistics estimated in 2016 that around 25 percent of the Pakistani youth is illiterate whereas 8.2 percent is unemployed with no vocational and technical skills.¹⁸ Majority of Pakistan's population have less access to education and the completion rate for primary education is one of the lowest in the world.¹⁹ Many analysts have attributed the current dire status of the country's education system to the absence of defined national education goals or standards.

Country	Scientific and Technical Journal Articles (2009, World Bank Data) ²⁰	GDP Ranking (based on 2011, World Bank Data)	Human Development Index (HDI, based on 2012 UNDP Data) ²¹ Category
United States	208,601	1	Very High
China	74,019	2	Medium
Japan	49,627	3	Very High
United Kingdom	45,649	7	Very High
Germany	45,003	4	Very High
France	31,748	5	Very High
Canada	29,017	10	Very High
Italy	26,755	7	Very High
South Korea	22,271	14	Very High
Spain	21,543	11	Very High
India	19,917	8	Medium
Australia	18,923	12	Very High
Netherlands	14,866	16	Very High
Russia	14,016	9	High
Brazil	12,306	6	High
Sweden	9,478	20	Very High
Switzerland	9,469	18	Very High
Turkey	8,301	17	High
Poland	7,355	21	Very High
Belgium	7,218	22	Very High
Pakistan	1,043	45	Low

Table-1²²: Country Wise Comparison

A comparative analysis of regional economies of China, India and Pakistan shows vast differences in economic growth due to differences in human development stemming from divergent educational policies and literacy rates. As seen in the table,

the human development index of Pakistan in the year 2011 was low when compared to China and India which as a result was reflected in the country's GDP ranking.

Impact of Education Learning on Pakistan's Economy

Foreign Direct Investment, Domestic Investment and Trade openness have great significance on the economic growth of Pakistan.²³ Today's most technologically advanced economies are truly knowledge based²⁴ and this rule holds no exception for Pakistan. Simply, to tap on the potential of the natural resources, the country will require educating its nationals in order to transform resources into useful commodities. As discussed earlier, the education system of Pakistan is weak, and the quality of education is not at par to meet the requirements of knowledge based economies. The substandard education system of the country has been unable to curtail the knowledge gaps between the developed industrial nations due to which the income gap between Pakistan and the developed nations has been widening. The services, industrial and agriculture sectors of the economy are linked with education as follows:

Services Sector

Globally, Services sector is the fastest growing component of the global economy and it accounts to almost 69 percent of global output, 35 percent of global employment and nearly 20 percent of global trade.²⁵ The value of services in world exports has increased by 41.7 percent whereas the value of goods has increased just by 35.5 percent during 1975 to 2005.²⁶ The services sector has been replacing the agriculture and industrial base of developed countries. Services provide under developed countries with low resources to progress economically by investing in technical knowledge and good education. This is because it overlaps with all segments of economy, especially the technological advancement in human capital which is reflected in the expansion of services sector which has taken a tremendous turnabout in the growth trajectory of many developing economies.²⁷

The service sector of Pakistan consists of Finance and Insurance, Transport and Storage, Wholesale and Retail Trade, Public Administration and Defense.²⁸ The service sector has been replacing the agriculture and industrial base globally, and the same trend can be seen in Pakistan, as we see an employment shift from agriculture to services. At present, it contributes 53.8 % to Pakistan's GDP.²⁹ It is a major contributor of the country's gross fixed capital formation (GFCF). Service sector is a major contributor of the country's revenues as almost 26 % of the total revenues are received from taxes compared with 1 % from agriculture sector.³⁰ This sector of the economy is a directly related to the human development index, since a better educated and technologically aware nation would be more compatible with global job demands.

Industrial Sector

Pakistan's industrial sector comprises both the consumer markets and the manufacturing industries. The industrial sector is the second largest contributor of the country's GDP. Its growth rate however, has substantially slowed down from a 25% in

2000 to a 20% in the year 2016. Its wellbeing is the utmost important to the country's economic development since it provides the agriculture sector with export markets in the form of cotton yarn and cotton cloth.

1579 industries had to be shut down in the period of 2006-2011 due to lack of both human and physical capital. Poor quality education and learning environment unfortunately have an adverse impact on the sector due to underutilization of the human capital.

Lack of technical knowledge in the educational curriculum of the country has added to the scarcity of technically qualified workforce to the industrial sector of the country. Recent studies show that investment in the field of Research and Development (R&D) is essential for transformation of technology, ultimately improving both; yield quantity and quality.³¹ Continuous replacements and evolution in the field of technology requires that industries remain abreast with the latest knowledge. Pakistan suffers in the field of industry since the landscape of education in the country is not research centric and there exists no collaboration between the industrial sector and the educational institutes.

Agriculture Sector

Like all developing nations, agriculture is the primary source of income and employment in Pakistan. Both types of farming practices exist in the country, namely the arable farming and pastoral farming. Arable farming is the practice of growing crops whereas pastoral farming involves rearing livestock. Pakistan's agricultural exports consist of cotton, rice, horticulture and livestock with intermittent exports of sugar and wheat.³² The major crops of the country are cotton, rice, wheat and sugarcane which are not globally competitive and mostly cater to the needs of the domestic market.³³

The agriculture sector not only provides Pakistan with its largest share of foreign exchange earnings (forex) but also is a source of raw material for various industries. Today, it is no longer limited to subsistence farming, meeting only the consumption demands of the domestic market. It has now taken shape of an industry which requires innovative technology to meet the food demands of the world. Providing farmers with the basic education related to their means that they have the capacity and the ability to use newer technology and better farming practices to improve yields. However, the poor state of education in the country coupled with a non-conducive learning environment has made the agriculture sector suffer. The farmers fundamentally lack cognitive and analytical skills that would allow them to be receptive to changing trends and grasp the shift in resources in response to the changing chain of supply and demand. Poor quality education and learning environment have hampered the farmers to transform the outputs from low-value staple food commodities to higher-value commodities.³⁴

Since agriculture employs a major portion of the country's labor force, a strong education and good learning environment will help individual's to gain better understanding of the environment. Yields will increase when practices of extensive and

intensive farming are employed. An understanding of the environment will allow the farmers to understand the economy-environment relationship and adopt sustainable farming practices as a result. Sustainable practices will provide the labor force with a better understanding of soil degradation and other soil cropping factors such as soil salinity, alkalinity, erosion and fertility. Efficient usage of water resources, management of irrigation systems, geography, climate and cropping demands will also be better understood, and crop yields will increase as a result. The dire state of education in the country has not only impeded research in the agriculture sector of the country but also hindered the flow of information to the farmers which would have otherwise helped in increasing crop yields by providing an insight to the farmers of practices such as:

- Selection of pure Seed of Superior quality
- Maintenance and Integrated Soil Fertility
- Conservation of moisture
- Efficient use of water Irrigation
- Integrated Weed Management
- Crop Rotation for Integrated Soil Fertility Management
- Integrated Insect Pest Management System (IPNMS)
- Integrated Plant Nutrition Management system (IPNMS)
- Organic matter in Crop Production
- Waste Management Practices
- Compost Farming
- Mulch Technology
- Effective Microorganism Technology
- Use of Modern Machinery
- Use of Genetically Modified Crop (Gm Crops)
- Livestock Management
- Mixed Cropping/Intercropping
- Fish Farming

A study conducted in Sindh showed that the farmers were not privy to sustainable agriculture practices such as genetically modified Crop, Fish farming, Mulch Technology, EM Technology and IPNMS.³⁵ Unawareness surrounding sustainable farming practices will directly impact the agriculture sector in the longer run since the misuse of resources will lead to degradation of the environment and the land will become un-arable for cultivation, thus impact the economy adversely in the longer run.

Conclusion

The nations are judged by the quality of its human resources, and the quality of human resources is maximized through educational excellence. Education by and large provides the basic knowledge, acumen and skills which are required to steer the developmental wheels of a country to its destination of prosperity and success by improving the lives of individuals and enriching the wider society. From the above discussion, it can be inferred that production levels are directly related to good quality education and learning environment coupled with acquisition of technical skills. A well-

developed human capital is a technological tool that ensures economic progress over the longer run. In Pakistan, there exists a major difference in quality of education which becomes more pronounced as we move from one stream to another and from urban to rural areas with the employment of unskilled or semi-skilled labour. This is also creating balance of payment difficulties for the country as the exports level remains below optimum.

Currently, the dire state of education and learning environment has resulted in low productivity which translates into lack of competitiveness in the international market. This shows that the education and learning environment has a direct relation with country's economy since it impacts the balance of payments.

While CPEC projects are in the pipeline, Pakistan because of its strategic location, has a potential to benefit from the emerging opportunities. Improved education system with a learner friendly environment is now needed more in the country than ever before. Education that focuses on the development of cognitive and analytical skills in the field of agriculture and industry will prove to have multiplier effects for increased productivity. The interaction between educational institutes and industries should be enhanced for greater economic output. It is therefore; recommended to ensure coherence in all three streams, shift towards a policy of STEM education (Science, Technology, Engineering and Math) to ensure sustained economic growth. In addition, the quality of primary education should be enhanced since much evidence links primary education to higher economic growths. For this, education in the country should be made free for all, dropout school rates should be minimized, the curriculum should be updated, text books should be revised, and the teachers should be better qualified and trained. The assessment methods in schools should focus on skills development of individuals so that Pakistan can use its labor force to achieve higher growth rates.

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INDIA-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: A STUDY FROM THE LENS OF REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX

Dr. Muhammad Khurshid Khan*

Abstract

In the post-cold war period, the balance of power had shifted from the Atlantic to Pacific region. This distinct region has thus, emerged as centre of international politics due to its economic and strategic significance. South Asia which continued to maintain its identity as a separate Security Complex, has virtually merged with Asia Pacific region due to global connectivity hence, making the two regions as Asian super-complex. The key variables that would shape the security structure of Asian super-complex would depend largely upon the attitude and behaviour of the US and China and to a lesser extent India. From realistic perspective, China and the US are involved in strategic competition to exercise maximum influence in Asian super-complex which could turn into confrontation if it is not managed rationally. Yet, an in-depth study of the Joseph Nye's Theory of Complex Economic Interdependence and its relevance to this contested region indicates that the possibility of a conflict between the two great powers is less likely in near future. But, isolated studies in South Asian context alarms that there is a real possibility of war between India and Pakistan. The world community should therefore, focus on the causes leading towards the emerging security scenario and take steps to help this part of the region to avoid catastrophic that is possibly waiting if not contained well before time.

Keywords: Strategic Partnership, Catastrophic, Variables, Global Connectivity, Contained, Virtually, Conflict Formation, Security Regime and Structural Realism.

Introduction

After two hundred years of British rule, India emerged as one of the great country on the world map. Being located in the heart of Asia, the leading countries of the world decided to engage India with a view to bring it in their respective fold. From the very beginning, India played its cards smartly and decided to join Nonaligned Movement (NAM)¹ so that it should be able to observe the realist world from a distance. Nehru upheld balanced relations with both blocs.² The secret of Nehru's foreign policy was that it was neither permanently pro-west nor with the east, said Mamta Aggarwal.³ On the contrary, Pakistan, a fractured country had fewer options at the time of independence thus, it decided to join the United States (US) bloc⁴ by confining its future foreign policy options.

*Dr. Muhammad Khurshid Khan is a Research Fellow of Stimson Center Washington D.C. Has done PhD in International Relations from National Defence University, Islamabad.

On May 7, 1949, Nehru was invited by the US president but he avoided the US call and decided to formally join the Soviet bloc.⁵ Despite its clear position, the US did not overlook India and demonstrated its inclination towards New Delhi during Indo-China limited war of 1962. Three years later, during 1965 War with India, the US upset Pakistan by asking its authorities that the weapons provided by it should not be used against India.⁶ Gradually, Indo-American strategic thinking continued to converge to promote their common interests yet, the fall of Soviet Union helped them in speeding up the process. The talks for a strong strategic partnership between the two continued through 1990s-2000s which led towards signing of the historical accords including the Indo-US nuclear deal of 2008.

In the post- cold war era, the balance of power had been transferred from Atlantic to Pacific region. Thus, the Pacific region emerged as a distinct security complex which occupies a significant strategic position at the crossroads of a number of major sea and air routes. To protect its security and economic interests in the region, the US needed a strong partner and other than India, there was no better option for it.⁷ The author believes that Indians are too smart. They are drawing all benefits from the US but are unlikely to accommodate its wish list.

US Indian unusual collaboration in defence sector would make India a great military power in near future, capable of challenging China thus, creating a sense of insecurity in the entire region. The current discourse of the two partners clearly demonstrates that the future peace of South and Southeast Asian region is at stake. It is believed that these two distinctive regions which have been termed as Regional Security Complexes (RSCs) by Barry Buzan have virtually merged to become Asian Super Complex (ASC) because of the global connectivity and the strategic interests of the great powers.

It must be understood that besides the US, the six permanent states of this region including China, Japan, India, North Korea, Pakistan and South Korea are not the ordinary states. Four of them possess nuclear weapons while the remaining two have the potential to develop it. Thus, the US and India led initiatives and their future designs if spiral out of control could bring serious consequences for the entire region. Yet, a detailed study of Nye's theory of complex economic interdependence duly proves that due to compelling economic reasons, the possibility of war between China and the US is less likely in near future. Yet, isolated studies of South Asia reveals that there is a risk of war, between India and Pakistan that must be contained if a nuclear catastrophic is to be avoided in the region.

In this backdrop, this brief research paper aims to highlight the strategic and security implications of the India-US strategic partnership for ASC. The study has been carried out from the prism of the theory of RSC. The arguments have been framed in following sequence:

- Background of the Indo-US strategic partnership.
- Contemporary history of convergences and divergences.

- The growing partnership from 2000 and beyond.
- The cost of the partnership for China and Pakistan.
- An in-depth analysis of Indo-US partnership from the lens of the theory of RSC.
- Suggestions and conclusions.

Indo-US Strategic Partnership: A Brief Background

Since 1947, the two sides continued to maintain closed links, despite the fact that India remained a close Soviet ally.⁸ Nehru also managed to enjoy good relations with China but later severed in the backdrop of the clash between China and the Soviet Union over the contested areas. Their relations further deteriorated because of their dispute over the areas along Tibet border.⁹ As explained earlier, right from the outset, India started to play its diplomatic cards smartly. By joining NAM, it could buy time to understand the changing nature of the world politics that has helped India in taking rational decisions about its foreign policy matters. In international theory, this is called structural realism.¹⁰ In the decade of 1950s, the US offered its assistance to help India in acquiring a permanent seat at the UN Security Council (UNSC). During 1955, the Soviet Union also extended similar offer to India.¹¹

Despite its cold response, India was still able to get the US support during the Sino-Indian war of 1962.¹² In 1970s, India followed the Soviet policies. As a result, its relations with the US remained cool.¹³ Despite being close Soviet ally, India still managed to stay away from the game of militarized development.¹⁴ Yet, during late 1980s and in early 1990s, it was the Soviet fiasco which enabled the two sides to get closer.¹⁵ During 1991, Narasimha Rao, the then Indian Prime Minister got a chance to review India's foreign policy.¹⁶ In an era of first Gulf War, India helped the US by providing refuelling facilities to its aircrafts en-route from Pacific to Middle East.¹⁸ Rao's visit to the US during May 1994 initiated a new phase of their relationship.¹⁹

Contemporary History of the India-US Strategic Partnership

Throughout the cold war period, the US tacitly accepted India as one of the central powers in the region²⁰ yet, the Soviet downfall proved to be a watershed in their renewed relationship. At the turn of new century, "the US started to classify India alongside its core friends, South Korea and Japan as an indispensable partner", said Ahmad Ejaz.²¹ The US tilt towards India from a fissured partnership to a solid bilateral relationship is based on commercial and strategic regional interests.²²

To begin with, militaries of the two countries started to expand their cooperation.²³ The formal talks for strategic cooperation started off during 1993 but the progress remained slow. During 1998, nuclear weapons tests conducted by India and Pakistan further spoiled their working environments.²⁴ India continued to play its diplomatic cards intelligently and managed to take away the US support for Pakistan especially in the backdrop of the Kargil crisis, a major security gain for India.²⁵

Strategic Partnership, the Possible Wish List of the Objectives

The US pivot to India has grown to a solid bilateral relationship based on strategic and commercial reciprocal interests. Furthermore, it has fostered specific multilateral eco-strategic commitments, and an enhanced Act East policy.²⁶ The possible security and economic interests that two sides have decided to protect as strategic partners may include:²⁷

Shared Security & Economic Interests

- The US wishes to accord India a great power status to balance out China.
- Joint strategy to fight against terrorism.
- Promote and protect democracy across the globe.
- Work together to protect their economic interests by protecting the SLOC, especially passing through India Ocean.
- To work together to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
- India and the US intend jointly protecting the critical infrastructures from cyber-attack.
- And finally, to cooperate on global issues such as climate change and fighting infectious diseases.

India Specific Security & Commercial Interests

- India wishes to achieve the status of a major global power thus, striving to become member of the UNSC and the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), the US support is crucial in this respect.
- India would look for a partner to ward-off the upcoming Chinese security threats in Indian Ocean.
- India would like to isolate Pakistan on the long pending issue of Kashmir. In this regard, the US diplomatic support is vital.
- In South Asian context, India wishes to be dealt separately and does not want to be clipped with Pakistan. The US could play key role in elevating India's role and its 'exceptionalism' in the region.
- India would wish to have multiple options to acquire state of the art military technology, the US plays key role in meeting its objectives.

The US Specific Security & Commercial Interests

- The US looks for strategic partner to contain China in Asia Pacific region as well as the Indian Ocean. It is an individual as well as the collective interests of the two countries.
- China is an emerging global power. Directly/ indirectly, India could serve the US interests in gaining more time to be seen and believed as a sole superpower.
- The US is looking towards India for its greater role in maintaining peace and stability in Afghanistan.

- A strong bilateral partnership with India has a commercial angle as well. The US military industrial complex as well as its nuclear industry would benefit from India being one of the biggest markets.

The Growing Partnership from 2000 and Beyond

To promote the above mentioned interests, continuity in their ongoing policies was very crucial. During March 2000, Bill Clinton visited India and set a new pace in their friendship by signing a historical document, "India-U.S. Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century".²⁸ "After more than 50 years of missed opportunities, we are taking steps necessary to elevate, improve and regularize the relationship between the world's two largest democracies", said Albright. Vajpayee's visit to the US in September 2000 helped to reaffirm the broader vision of their relations.²⁹

India has been lucky because Bush junior (2001-2008) was even more curious to build on the progress made by the previous regimes.³⁰ In this regard, Dr Ravi Tomar is of the view that while India-US relations floundered for nearly half a century, the recent pace of development of these ties have taken many observers by surprise.³¹ The incident of 9/11 and later, an attack on Indian Parliament (which is believed to be a well thought out plan by RAW), further galvanised the growing closeness of the two sides. During this timeframe, the US needed Pakistani support for its operation in Afghanistan but instead, it decided to appease India and put pressure on Pakistan to stop cross border terrorism.³² The author believes that India remains the sole beneficiary of the incident of 9/11.

US India relations continue to grow. Within five years starting from 2003, the two sides made tremendous progress in defense as well as nuclear sector.³³ The 'nuclear deal' of 10th October 2008 has been one of the most significant developments that ended India's nuclear isolation and let it do nuclear business with the world leading countries. In process, the US caused serious damage to its own strong nuclear non-proliferation scheme pursued since the early 1950s.³⁴ The transformation process of their relationship continued during Obama's period as well.³⁵ During his visit to India from 7-9 November, 2010, he called the US-India alliance as one of the "defining and dispensable partnerships of the 21st century". In a joint statement, Obama "welcomed India's emergence as a major regional and global power".³⁶

India's strategic thinking since the beginning of 21st century is more aggressive and ambitious. It is involved in investing huge money in building its defence sector. It has already emerged as the largest arms importer during the past five calendar years (2013-2017).³⁷ The US defence sector is ready to work with India from a buyer-seller relationship to a partnership of co-development that would lead to self-sufficiency.³⁸ With the change of the administration in the US, Modi-Trump nexus seems even more proactive.³⁹ Finally, Indo-Israeli strategic network is yet another factor which favours Washington. This nexus might be willing to participate in an informal 'coalition of the willing' that would help US in protecting its long term strategic interests across the globe.⁴⁰

The Cost of the Partnership for China and Pakistan

A detailed analysis of the subject will be made in theoretical framework under the next heading yet, a brief scrutiny of the case proved that the US has chosen India as a potential partner in the Asian security affairs. The study also reveals that America is counting on India's rise as a leading power alongside Japan and Australia to play key role in Asia-Pacific affairs as a counter weight to China. Thus, the position taken by the US about India's role in Asia Pacific and elsewhere has been seriously contested by China. In South Asian backdrop, the US believes that it would be stable under the leadership of India.⁴¹

Internationally, a lot has already been said about the Indo-American nuclear deal. For others, it may have commercial angle but for Pakistan and possibly China, it has strategic implications. It is sufficed to mention that the deal has given India everything that it needed for which it struggled since 1974. Moreover, America's wish to bring India in the NSG without setting a criterion would also add on the problems for Pakistan.

India-US Strategic Partnership: A Study from the Lens of RSC

In order to make this study more practicable, the subject has been analysed from theoretical prism. When I say 'theoretical prism', I mean dealing the issue from the perspective of 'Structural Realism' with more focus on the theory of RSC. For easy understanding of the readers, the theory and its applications in ASC have been briefly explained below.

The background to contemporary research on RSC can be traced to the late 1940s when scholars got special interest in the notion of regional integration/ regional security institutions.⁴² Though, there are scholars like Katzenstein, Solingen and Achyarya who have written on this concept but Barry Gordon Buzan, the 20th century scholar got fame by introducing the concept in his work *People, States and Fear* (1983).⁴³ Buzan and Ole Waever define RSC as, "set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another".⁴⁴

The concept was revised during 2003 which concludes as "a set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed/resolved apart from one another".⁴⁵ This concept covers how security matters are clustered and played within the limits of geographical bounds.⁴⁶ As narrated by Wayne McLean, RSCs themselves are formed through strong patterns of amity and enmity as a consequence of securitisation/de-securitisation processes.⁴⁷

As explained by Buzan, the central idea in RSC theory is that "since most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters". He was of the view that there is often intense security interdependence within a region because the security of each actor in a region interacts with the security of the other actors. To

validate Buzan's argument, Friedberg viewed that historically, security concerns of most of the states have primarily been linked with the capabilities and intentions of their neighbours.⁴⁸

The Copenhagen School brings in another factor to separate the RSCs by introducing the concept of 'insulation'. In the present context, the concept relates to outlier states or 'buffer states' which separate one RSC from other.⁴⁹ With regards to buffers, Michael Partem asserts that geography is the only precise variable in a state occupying such a role. Yet, the author believes that there is a difference between the two. While the insulator states are likely to be more stable and powerful but the buffer states may or may not be strong enough to sustain the pressure of either side. Historically, some states like Afghanistan and Tibet have played this role in the past.⁵⁰ Buzan argues that there is a distinct and longstanding regional structure in Asia Pacific. With the end of the cold war, regional level structure got more importance as compared to the global level approach.⁵¹ Furthermore, Buzan and Waeuver's RSC theory summarizes that the RSC comprises of a group of states united by common security problems.⁵² Buzan opines that the overall architecture of RSC theory involves examination of security dynamics at four levels: domestic, regional, interregional and global.⁵³

The normal expectation is that the inter-regional level will be relatively weak except either where the boundaries of RSCs are breaking down (external transformation), or where a global-level power links two or more complexes together (leading to a looser super-complex). The theory distinguishes between globally operating *superpowers and great powers* whose sphere transcends two or more regions, and *regional powers* whose sphere is largely contained within a single RSC. Its central focus is security interdependence whether negative (conflict formation) or positive (security regime-security community).⁵⁴

Currently, both China and US have the capacity to influence the three RSCs namely South Asia, Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Historically, as a result of internal/external transformation, the security dynamics of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia have effectively merged together to form a single East Asian RSC. With regards to South Asian, it has retained its status as an independent RSC though there have been lots of events impacting its security structure.⁵⁵ Yet, a general view is that South and East Asia, the two distinct RCSs are gradually merging in a wider ASC.

The definition of RSCs given by Buzan seems losing its value. In author's view, argument given by Buzan would have been valid, provided the region under debate was marginally influenced by the outside actors. It is believed that due to global connectivity, there is hardly a region that operates in isolation. The hard and soft powers of the global leading actors have improved, having direct influence across the globe. The interplay between global/the regional security structures has thus, become more intensive.⁵⁶

It is viewed that the great powers like US and Russia and the emerging great powers including China and to an extend India would wish to remain relevant to every

region with a view to promote their respective national interests. Thus, one can safely assume that distinction between various regional security structures is going to vanish quickly. Hence, it is opined that in South and East Asian context, instead of thinking in terms of RSCs, we might think and make strategic plans to protect and preserve the peace in terms of ASC.

The issues related to the architecture of South Asia and Pacific regions could be analysed in the light of RSC theory involving examination of security dynamics at four different levels namely domestic constraints, state to state relations, region's interaction with neighbouring regions and the role of global powers in the regions.⁵⁷ The author opines that the idea of 'Insulator States' would not work in South Asia and Pacific region. It is believed that in the presence of China and the US in the region, there are no 'Insulator States' which would effectively separate the two regions.

Despite being members of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the South Asian countries stand in different camps due to their serious domestic constraints. Social construction especially between India and Pakistan is based on historical enmity.⁵⁸ Thus, despite sharing the common boundaries, there is a little possibility that South Asia would move away from conflict formation. The US support to India, has made the security problem of this region more complex. Moreover, it is believed that the key variables that would shape the security structure of South Asia depend largely on triangular relationship between China, India and the US. Pakistani response in the region would be tailored accordingly.

As far as India is concerned, social divisions persist that can threaten its political stability. Besides local insurgences, the Hindu-Muslim question also remains unresolved. Modi's BJP has created a new trend of projecting Hindus as a dominant class thus, an underlying potential for deep social division, and violence, remains in India.⁵⁹ Based on sectarian divide, similar social order also persists in Pakistan.

With regards to security structure of East Asia, Buzan argued that the key "variables that would shape the security structure of this region would depend largely within US and China and the relationship between them". He goes on to say that the nature of bond between China and US would also depend on pattern of Chinese behaviour and its ties with its neighbours.⁶⁰ The author fully endorses Buzan who opined that there is a little possibility that "either East Asia, or Asia as a whole, will be able to form a security community in the foreseeable future".

While social construction of Southeast Asia is not based on enmity, still they are unable to remain united because of the outside influence. The US has willingly taken over the role of balancing China in this region. Though, most of the members of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) would wish to remain neutral in the upcoming 'Great Game', but being weak, they are unable to take independent decisions on security matters. Chinese decision to maintain its sole claim over the resource rich South China Sea further complicates the security situation around the region.⁶¹ Indo-US partnership would make the problems of the individual states of this region more complex.

One can approach the problem from another angle. In geographical sense, the security of Southern Asia is better thought of as a series of concentric but overlapping circles. What happens in Asia Pacific/West Asia, directly affects the security of southern Asia and given the open geography of the Indian Ocean maritime domain, what happens in southern Asia affects the rest of Asia as well.⁶² The author believes these two RSCs have already merged as ASC therefore, cannot be dealt separately in any future conflict due to the direct influence of a superpower, a great power and an emerging great power.

Many scholars consider India as a key component of the US grand strategy to balance out China. Paul Staniland says, "India is a ray of optimism about America's ability to sustain its position in Asia".⁶³ This argument besides, how India would response to the American call is yet to be seen. It is believed that India would stand by US as long as its national interests are well protected. But it would avoid direct clash with its next door neighbour China because one has the option to change friends and not the boundaries.

Though, the nature of Indo-US strategic relationship is presumed to be unyielding; in reality, there seem many differences. According to Sourabh Gupta, while India is looking towards a "broad-based and loosely-defined strategic partnership with Washington as envisioned in its 'Act East' policy yet, the US by contrast, has emphasized a narrower and focused maritime defense alignment in the Indo-Asia-Pacific".⁶⁴ From a functional standpoint, "a comprehensive defense cooperation remains off-the-table", said Gupta.

Harshita Kohli opined that India is conscious about being seen by Beijing as US proxy. It therefore, continues to maintain bilateral actions on separate tracks.⁶⁵ During February 2016, India and China inaugurated, and institutionalized a mid-level official Maritime Affairs Dialogue that will allow both sides to broach these and related issues of common interest.⁶⁶ Yet, as stated by Nitika Srivastava, "increasing Chinese activity, especially its ambitious One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative through the Indian Ocean Region and Russia's interest in joining the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) may have threatened India's interests".⁶⁷

From economic perspective, Asia Pacific remains an emerging centre of gravity. The findings of Goldman Sachs report clearly indicate that the economic activities will be shifted decisively to the Asia Pacific by 2050.⁶⁸ Thus, any kind of confrontation in this region would not be a preferred option by the stakeholders. Hence, to find whether or not the ASC has the prospect of moving from conflict formation to security community, it needs to be analysed from Joseph Nye's theory of 'complex economic interdependence'.

The future discourse of the great powers is also linked with their respective economic goals and stability which depends on trade balance among the actors directly influencing the region. India, being the fastest-growing economy in the world, is ranked as the 18th largest export market for the US good.⁶⁹ The US remains the largest trading partner of India.⁷⁰ With regards to Pakistan, the US has been a major

destination for its exports.⁷¹ With regards to China, it has become the largest trading partner of 16 Asian countries including Pakistan.⁷² The data shared by Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation of China reflects that the countries like Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea and Vietnam are among China's top ten trading partners.⁷³

Though, Japan remains a close US ally, still by January 2017, China had been Japan's second export destination and largest source of imports.⁷⁴ With respect to China and the US, their trade balance is around \$636 billion, heavily tilted in China's favour. Donald Trump has blamed his predecessors for bad trade deals with China.⁷⁵ As for as Indo-China trade is concerned, despite their differences, India's export to China has surged by 39 percent. The trade balance is tilted in China's favour.⁷⁶

A detailed analysis of trade/business among the states of ASC region reveals that there is a complex economic interdependency. None of the states of this region could claim to have capacity to survive alone. Hence, it is less likely that the two great powers would cross the 'redlines'. In author's views, except Japan, South Korea and to a lesser extent Vietnam, US might not succeed in getting close cooperation from ASEAN countries in case of serious tension between China and the US. Thus, one could safely draw the conclusion that due to complex economic interdependency, the possibility of a conflict between the two Great Powers in near future is quite negligible.

Besides, US would like to preserve its sole superpower status by exploring all options peacefully, and if needed so it would also achieve its economic objectives through power projection, coercion as well as threat of use of military might. By using multiple approaches, US would like to maintain a new set of priorities towards China to contain it military and political powers to engage it economically through 'Engaged-Containment Policy' by applying both 'soft and hard' power.⁷⁷

In the ASC region, all is not good. There is less likely that the security situation in South Asian part of the region would remain well within the manageable level. As indicated earlier, since the beginning of 21st century, India is spending billions of dollars on defence sector. It is already involved in coercive diplomacy against Pakistan.⁷⁸ The author believes that the infringement and coercion could be accepted by Islamabad to a certain extent but any pressure beyond limits would not be tolerated by Pakistan. Thus, in South Asia, a catastrophic that is possibly waiting, if not checked at the lower level.

Possible Suggestions and Conclusion

If US wish to maintain a stable security and economic order in ASC region, it would need to keep its wish list and expectations from its allies limited and realistic. Likewise, US allies especially that of India should also be watchful of what US can deliver in case there is a crises situation between China and India.

The US policymakers and its Pentagon must analyse India's power sensibly and resist the temptation to view India as more capable and committed than it actually is. An over reliance on India's military capabilities could lead to disastrous consequences

in actual crises because the correlation of forces in Asia would fail to balance out coalition against China. Though, India is an important player in Asia, but it would take considerable time to emerge as an equalizer to challenge China. Therefore, the US needs to maintain a clear-eyed understanding of India's likely trajectory in medium to long term.

Despite its tall claims and the US unconditional backing, India has been unable to seal off the domestic politics of the Kashmir conflict and its co-relation with Pakistan. For their freedom, Kashmiri youth has emerged as a new force with more vigour and enthusiasm to fight back the occupation forces. Though, for a brief period, Indian occupied Kashmir (IoK) remained isolated but the issue has come back on the world screen. Even the pro-India Kashmiri leadership including Dr Farooq Abdulla continues to emphasize the need to engage with Pakistan on the question of Kashmir.

The sheer footprint of force structure that India is compelled to devote inside the IoK and along the Pakistan border, shows the limits of de-hyphenation. It is therefore, suggested that for the long term peace and economic prosperity of the region, both India and Pakistan along with all other stakeholders should sit across the table under the UN sponsorship. China and US must encourage them to resolve the long pending issue of Kashmir.

Although, the old security concept based on 'zero sum game' still enjoys considerable value while dealing with the global issues but as pointed out in the detailed analysis, this approach in changed geo-economic scenario would not lead towards win-lose situation. It would rather lead only towards 'lose-lose' situation, both at the regional as well as the global level. The author sincerely opines that Nye's complex economic interdependence theory has become extremely important in the global arena that would lead towards win-win situation, a factor which is vital for survival of over 6 billion people.

As per Chinese assessment, "to solve new problems new visions are required". Thus, as suggested by the Chinese Foreign Office, in the new circumstances, "all countries should keep up with the times, strengthen solidarity and cooperation with openness and inclusiveness, make security vision innovative, work to improve regional security systems and explore a new path for Asian security including its economic security".⁷⁹

Finally, it is also vital that the hotspots and sensitive issues pertaining to Asia Pacific region should be handled carefully by the regional countries, following the "tradition of mutual respect, seeking common ground while reserving differences, and peaceful coexistence, and preventing conflicts from escalation, so as to jointly safeguard peace and stability in the region. Lastly, India and China should also resolve their border disputes and jointly promote OBOR initiative through the Indian Ocean region which is important for the collective economic prosperity of ASC region as a whole."⁸⁰

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GEOSTRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF WAKHAN CORRIDOR FOR AFGHANISTAN, CHINA AND PAKISTAN

*Dr. Muhammad Munir and Dr. Muhammad Shafiq**

Abstract

The Wakhan Corridor, a narrow strip of territory in the Badakhshan Province of Afghanistan, is situated at the crossroads of four countries: China, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan. The corridor has great historic value being part of ancient Silk Road. Even today it has great potential for regional connectivity and tourism. The Wakhan territory is considered very peaceful having no law and order problem. If a road is built across Wakhan, it will enhance trade and business activities in the region, especially for Pakistan, Central Asia and Afghanistan. It could offer a shortest trade route for Pakistan to reach Central Asia and for China to reach Afghanistan. In this backdrop the paper examines the possibilities of reviving Wakhan corridor by building roads infrastructure. The study highlights the geostrategic significance of Wakhan Corridor in the context of changing regional situation. It also discusses various challenges in undertaking this proposal.

Keywords: Wakhan Corridor, CPEC, Wakhjir Pass, Central Asia.

Introduction

China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is providing great opportunities and avenues for regional connectivity and economic cooperation. As a flagship project of BRI, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has entered in the second phase of implementation. Meanwhile China, Nepal and India are exploring the possibilities of cooperation in building Trans-Himalayan corridor and jointly benefiting from mountains' resources such as water, energy and tourism. Like Trans-Himalayan cooperation, Trans Wakhan corridor cooperation is another opportunity that requires a debate on the prospects and challenges in the operationalisation of this corridor.

Geographically the Wakhan Corridor is unique as it is situated at the crossroads of four countries: China, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan. The corridor is a narrow strip of territory in the Badakhshan Province of Afghanistan. In south it shares a 300 km with Pakistan, on its northeast and west direction it has over 260 km boarder with Tajikistan, and 74 km with China. The Wakhan Corridor appeared as a bridge among the nations with great mountains ranges on the Silk Route. During the

*Dr. Muhammad Munir, Assistant Professor, Department of Strategic Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad and Dr. Muhammad Shafiq, Assistant Professor, Humanities Department, COMSATS University, Islamabad (Vehari Campus).

19th century, Wakhan corridor was built with the purpose of a buffer zone between Britain and Russia as a result of great geopolitical games. It remained a part of Afghanistan since the colonial times.¹

The Wakhan Corridor is about 350 km long with 16 to 64 km wide, connects China with Afghanistan and separate Tajikistan from Pakistan. The western side having Panj River Valley called Lower Wakhan, whereas in east Pamir river and valleys of Wakhan with their tributaries called Upper Wakhan. Move along the east in Upper Wakhan, there are the wonderful sight of three enormous mountain ranges joining at the Pamir Knot usually named as Bam-e-Duniya (Roof of the World).

Mir Ali Mardan Shah was the ruler of Wakhan who wanted the merger of his khanate in Chitral but the British discouraged him. The Great Britain and Russia formed the 'Pamir Boundary Commission' to define their sphere of influence in Wakhan in March 1895. According to the agreement the commission identified a territory, as a buffer zone, which was thereafter lied within the domain of Abdur Rahman, emir of Afghanistan. As per the agreement: "Her Britannic Majesty's and the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia engage to abstain from exercising any political influence or control-the former to the north, the latter to the south-of the above line of demarcation."² However, then the British Government was not interested to share a border with Russia. The purpose was to create a buffer zone so it was decided that: "the territory lying within the British sphere of influence between the Hindu Kush and the line running from the east end of Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier shall form part of the territory of the Amir of Afghanistan; that it shall not be annexed to Great Britain; and that no military posts or forts shall be established in it."³

Wakhan is the shortest trade route for Pakistan to reach Central Asia and for China to enter Afghanistan. The famous Broghal Pass (Chitral) is serving as the most important gateway for Pakistan to Wakhan Corridor. Historically there had been no law and order issue in Wakhan and "no highway robbery or theft is committed in the Wakhan territory."⁴ Even during recent decades this area has experienced a relative peace as compared to other areas of Afghanistan. "These peaceful, but environmentally challenging surroundings are home to around 12,000 people living in small settlements and encampments, isolated from the rest of the country by the Hindu Kush."⁵ The local population of Wakhan is nomads whose source of income is keeping cattle.

The history bears witness to the fact that the strategic importance of this area has kept the surrounding countries hot on its trail. These countries include Afghanistan, Turkey, Iran and recently India, Pakistan, Russia and China. Chitral district in Pakistan is connected to Wakhan through several passages in the Hindukush making it a gateway to central Asia for the country.⁶ This corridor is getting much renewed attention in the context of CPEC even though it was neglected by the authorities in the past. Furthermore, Pakistan is accelerating its efforts to curb cross border terrorism through border management and by creating an economic interdependence with Afghanistan. The economic interdependence between Pakistan and Afghanistan may lead in ending enmity between the two countries.⁷

Wakhan Corridor as a trade route has long been used by Europeans and Chinese to access Indian Ocean through the Arabian Sea Coasts as a crucial connectivity point of Silk Route. External interventions and other happenings such as the Great Game between Britain and Russia in 1838, Chinese Communist Revolution in 1949, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980s and later invasion the US , NATO and coalition forces in Afghanistan since 2001.⁸ Actually all these developments did not provide a conducive environment for regional connectivity. Another factor was the difficult terrain and lack of road infrastructure and building totally new infrastructure would require huge investment.

Wakhan corridor would acquire a great geostrategic significance for Afghanistan, China and Pakistan due to changing regional alignments. The Wakhjir Pass opening from China will indubitably enhance regional trade and associations; however, India may feel concerned as this outflanking manoeuvre of running up of the Wakhan Corridor will integrate Afghanistan with China and Pakistan that would undermine its efforts of linking Afghanistan to India through Chabahr Port.⁹ Further as per its previous practice of opposing CPEC, it might show its concerns especially in the context of Jammu and Kashmir. Many believe India cannot remain aloof of these regional connectivity openings for a long time. It will ultimately request to join CPEC which is an important project economic growth of South Asia.¹⁰ This way India would be able to get benefit of energy resources of Central Asia for its economic development especially after its membership of SCO that requires all its members to “work together as active partners within the SCO to pursue common objectives of development, peace and security.”¹¹

Geo-Political Significance for Afghanistan

The opening of Wakhan Corridor will enhance political influence of Afghanistan and help in balancing its relations with major powers and the regional countries. It will enhance access of Afghan government to these areas and help it in building infrastructure and uplifting the living standards of the poor people in the area. Although the area has been very peaceful in the past but now some militant groups are establishing their footsteps in the region¹² and may exploit grievances of the poor people. For the long run to make this area to remain politically stable, the opening of the route and building of infrastructure would be useful for Afghanistan’s political future.

Central Asian States can reach out to the Indian Ocean through Afghanistan either via Iran or Pakistan, giving Afghanistan a great geo-political and geo-economic position in the region. Wakhan Corridor was controlled and managed by China in the past as a part of the old Silk route in North Eastern part of the Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the late nineties and the US invasion of Afghanistan in the early 2000 wreaked havoc on the country, and the pending projects of building further trade routes to connect Afghanistan with other countries lay forgotten. Many experts believe the situation is not different even today despite after the drawdown of the US and NATO forces from Afghanistan. They believe, “much desired stability for economic

development is not likely to be achieved due to Afghan culture and strategies of extra regional and regional powers to pursue their interests".¹³

Even though Afghanistan is a land locked country but the history shows it has been an important part of the old Silk trade route via Wakhan Corridor that connected China with Europe. But today Afghanistan has become a victim of proxies of conflicting interests of various regional and extra regional powers. This situation presents a gloomy picture as for as Afghanistan's prosperity and development is concerned. Further to geo-politics, Afghanistan is also facing multifarious internal challenges due to its difficult terrain and socio-cultural problem. "About 80 percent of Afghanistan comprises of tough mountains with poor communication facilities. Besides its landscape, its ethnic tribal culture, peculiar demography, and the concerns of regional and global powers kept the social development a distinct reality".¹⁴

There is no doubt that Afghanistan is showing interests in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and is taking measures to develop domestic projects in line with regional connectivity such as North-South Corridors but practically, there are many issues that need the attention. The Afghan government should enhance its capacity to properly address the internal security challenges such as corruption and terrorism.¹⁵ Hasan Yaser Malik in his research on 'Stability in Afghanistan' has rightly pointed out that the ethnic division in the Afghanistan did not allow any government to implement its policies. He argues that:

*Ethnically divided Afghan warlords have always dominated the weak governments and have continuously struggled to influence each other. Such circumstances never allowed any government to formulate and implement foreign, trade and defence policies. As a result the governments could not concentrate on social development. Therefore, today the social, educational and communication facilities in Afghanistan are weak and its people mostly depend on Pakistan for food, medical and trade facilities.*¹⁶

Many believe that Afghanistan's reliance on China will increase in the post US/NATO drawdown of forces. Afghanistan's inclusion in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) would have a positive impact on its economic development. It will regain its politico-economic significance and emerge as a regional hub by linking North and East Asian countries to South and West Asian countries.¹⁷

The geo-political value of Afghanistan will be enhanced with the opening of Wakhan corridor as it will emerge an additional/ subsidiary route to Indian Ocean in combination with Karakoram Highway through Pakistan.¹⁸ It will further strengthen Afghanistan's strategic and cooperative partnership with China. Afghanistan can use this corridor as bargain chip in its relation with Pakistan and India. It will also enhance Afghanistan's strategic value in regional organisations such as SCO and SAARC.

Economic Significance

Reviving the Wakhan Corridor appears to be progressively suitable keeping in view the right time for intra-regional trade, as Iran, Russia, China and Pakistan have

convergence of interests along with Indian desire to connect with Central Asia, reflects a change in regional thinking i.e. pursuing geo-economics along with geo-politics. China's Belt and Road Initiative coincides with President Ashraf Ghani's proposal of making Afghanistan a regional hub for transit trade and Pakistan's designs of making Gwadar Port a mean to regional connectivity will help Afghanistan's integration in China's Belt and Road Initiative. In 1991, the trade between the Central Asia states was 20 percent of all trade in the region. Today, the intra-regional trade in Central Asia has decreased and reached at 3.5 percent, a consequent of the fragmentation of 'joint production processes'. "Reinvigorating intra-regional trade with access to Chinese inputs would be an efficient strategy to restore productive capacity for value-added manufacturing in a region now characterised by primary exports".¹⁹

Due to its closeness to the Karakoram Highway (KKH) the Wakhan Corridor would be linked with the US \$ 46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a mega infrastructure investment project [US \$ 62 billion] which China developed "to transform the region into a strategic energy nexus through pipelines, power grids and railways." It will not only provide market access to Afghanistan for exporting its oil and energy products but will also help it in getting electricity for its 43 percent population who at present has no access to electricity. Most notably, Wakhan offers an alternative route bypassing troubled areas of Afghanistan. Further, it will reduce Afghanistan's dependency on Pakistan. Afghanistan's one third trade with Pakistan accounts for a trade deficit currently valued at 37.4 percent of GDP.²⁰ China has strategic and economic interests in Afghanistan. In line with these interests China is making efforts to develop and improve infrastructure in areas close to Wakhan Corridor.²¹ These infrastructural developments would also offer economic opportunities for Afghanistan.

The entire corridor is additionally critical for biodiversity preservation and there are no less than three potential ensured ranges that may soon be developed- the Big Pamir, Teggermansu and the Wakhjir Valley. These ranges together guarantee that the Wakhan Corridor is perceived universally as an area of significance for biodiversity.²²

Security Significance

Some insurgent groups such as Harakat Al-Mujahedeen's, Jund-ul-Allah, Tahrir-e-Taliban Pakistan, and Islamic Movement of Turkestan (IMT) have been using Wakhan Corridor. 'Practically an open and porous Tajik border alongside the strip of this corridor may turn it very soon into a serious headache for almost all Central Asian countries'²³ Badakhshan province located in northeast of Afghanistan was one of the most secure provinces. It was the only province, which was controlled fully by anti-Taliban groups when US intervened in the year after the withdrawal of coalition forces, in that province insurgents started growing in strategic places where this province shares border with Pakistan, China and Tajikistan. The presence of the Taliban in that strategic location is not only a threat to the Afghan government, but also can be a big threat to regional countries.²⁴ The militant groups have located themselves in Warduj and Baharak districts of Badakhshan province are economically and strategically

important. There are a variety of claims regarding the motives for their presence in that area. Their presence can be more dangerous with the current concerns created by ISIS in the region.²⁵

Geopolitical Significance for China

Chinese Wakhjir and Tegermansu Passes provide connection between Caspian Region and India. By controlling these passes China can enhance its position in the region in two ways: first it can get economic and strategic benefits; secondly it can reinforce its relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Wakhan Corridor is one of the important options available to China in regional connectivity. The route is surrounded by Pakistan in the south and by Tajikistan in the north. Both Pakistan and Tajikistan have close cooperation with China. Further, it can fill in as an auxiliary to the current route via Jalalabad and Chitral connecting Pakistan and Afghanistan. Normally the route would be used from time to time when in winter the Lawari Top is closed. From the geo-politically perspective, China would like to stabilise Afghanistan by providing economic and security assistance.²⁶

Opening of Afghan-China fringe through the Wakhan Corridor over the remote 47-mile outskirts between the two nations would link China to Central Asia, Europe and Gulf countries. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani visited in October 2014. He recommended President Xi that China and Afghanistan should join hands in setting up a vehicle interface along their border at the easternmost tip of the Wakhan Corridor.²⁷

Clearly it appears that China is getting ready to open Wakhjir Pass as it has begun some infrastructural work in the Wakhjir Pass; where it has built the road up to 10 km short of the border crossing point, leaving the rest to time of its choice and domination. In addition, China has developed a supply terminal for its fringe police. It has improved its communication capacity by setting up cell phone centres and by placing the optical cable line for web/internet based offices. Cell phone centres. India has been propagating that the Chinese were occupied in delving in a passage/tunnel at Wakhjir Pass.²⁸

Economic Significance

The trade between China and Afghanistan gradually enhanced since 2001 onwards and as a result China emerged as major exporter in Afghanistan. China is also contributing positively for economic uplift of Afghanistan especially developing its natural resources and infrastructure.²⁹ Currently, China is engaged in an Aynak Copper mining venture worth US \$ 3.4 billion in the eastern Afghanistan; south of Kabul. This world's biggest copper deal is an eye sour for the US. In recent years China has invested US \$ 4 billion as it has signed a 30 year agreement with Afghanistan.³⁰ According to Afghan officials estimate, Afghanistan has minerals worth of US \$ 1 trillion comprising copper, iron ore, rare earth elements, aluminum, gold, silver, zinc, mercury and lithium. According to some media reports, 'US President Donald Trump is eyeing Afghanistan's mineral wealth to help pay for a 16-year war and reconstruction efforts that have already cost US \$ 117 billion.'³¹

Opening up of Wakhan Corridor will make existing and future energy pipeline and other economic projects more secure. China and Tajikistan are planning to establish a free trade zone in Taxkorgan, Tajikistan close to Uygur autonomous region in Xinjiang. China is Tajikistan's 3rd largest trade partner with bilateral trade volume surpassing \$ 2 billion in 2012, 15 times that of a decade ago. Beijing has agreed to extend \$ 1 billion credit to Dushanbe. US \$ 600 million have been provided to Tajikistan for construction of a cement factory in the south of Tajikistan. And new credit came on top of the \$ 900 million for building new roads, tunnels and electricity lines. Tajikistan has leased out some 600 hectares of agricultural land to a Chinese in its South. Any trade being made through Wakhjir and Tegermansu Passes will add to the economy of China, further improving its status in the region.³²

To be sure, China turned into the principal outside nation in decades to sign an oil exploration agreement with Afghanistan, making it workable for the later to get US \$ 7 billion over coming 25 years. The geo-economic imperatives of Afghanistan and Chinese massive investment in Afghanistan show the desire of both the sides to further consolidate their ties especially in the economic cooperation. Presently, many Chinese companies are involved in various economic and development projects in Afghanistan. It is likely that soon China would be the largest investor in Afghanistan's huge energy and mineral resources.³³

Security Interests

China's engagement in the Wakhan corridor remained limited due to geographical constraints. Further, the reason that China is still considering whether to officially open the Wakhan corridor or not, even though Afghanistan has asked China several times to open Wakhan, because it serves not only as a business route, but the treading pathway of human trafficking and drug flow as well. In fact, China's foremost interest of not opening up to Wakhan is to prevent the spread of terrorism, particularly terrorist movement in Wakhan corridor.

Opening of linkage with neighbouring Kyrgyzs and Wakhis will not only improve their lifestyle, but will also add to a sympathetic tone from the entire population of the Wakhan Corridor in particular and Afghanistan in general. By winning the hearts of all the Muslims of Tajikistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan can ease out Indian projected Chinese concerns of possible terrorism in its neighbouring Muslim.

China will have an exceptional opportunity by connecting Beijing through road networks across the region which in turn will provide it an edge over rivals in its venture for Central Asia's New Great Game. Through a nexus of rich Central Asian States in terms of oil and natural resources besides China's mammoth trade potential will put its competitors in a perturbed situation. Since Afghanistan is one of the important countries in the prevalent regional geo-strategic scenario therefore, China will have the prospect to overwhelm India and carry out uninterrupted trade activities across Central Asia and the Arabian Sea through Gwadar Port of Pakistan. The completion of One Belt-One Road initiative will serve as a benign trade and

transportation route for the landlocked Afghanistan and other Central Asian Republics by having a secure and cost effective trade route. This also will dissuade the emerging influence of extra-regional powers such as Japan and the United States and facilitate China to solely triumph in the New Great Game.³⁴

Geopolitical Significance for Pakistan

Pakistan can greatly benefit from the Wakhan Corridor as its northern highlands along Chitral provide an excellent trade route linking Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asian States through Wakhan Corridor. The 250 kilometres passage starting from Broghal Pass may connect Chitral with Afghanistan via Mastuj and Booni.³⁵ The proposed route can help a great deal to balance the Indian influence in Afghanistan by building/upgrading existing link road from Shandur to Gilgit via Gahkuch and Singul to Karakorum Highway. Further it may serve as an alternate for another route through Wakhjir Pass which due to harsh climatic conditions remained closed for about five months every year.

If the Wakhan Corridor plan gets operational, it will help in countering India's plan to isolate Pakistan in the region. This makes it all the more important for Pakistan to open all passages in the Hindu Kush mountain range that access Wakhan Corridor including Ochhili Pass (5553 meters high), Khan Khun Pass (4985 meters high), Broghal Pass (3801 meters high), Darwaz Pass (3893 meters high) and Karambar Pass (4358 meters high) to suit its geo-political scenario.³⁶

On May 27, 2017, the first meeting of China-Pakistan-Afghanistan Practical Cooperation Dialogue was held in Beijing. During the session, the three countries agreed upon trilateral cooperation and to undertake practical measures for regional security and cooperation.³⁷ In 2016, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China and Tajikistan formed a joint force to counter terrorism named as QCCM (Quadilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism). The alliance was formulated on the understanding that all four countries will provide support to each other in intelligence sharing, capacity building, training/exercises, situation evaluation and counter terrorism. It was also agreed upon that all the decisions at QCCM would be made in consensus with all members.³⁸

A Tripartite meeting of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan was held on July 6, 2017 in Dushanbe where Emomali Rahmon President of the Republic of Tajikistan, Muhammad Ashraf Ghani, the President of the Republic of Afghanistan, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif then Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan discussed the significance of regional connectivity and transit trade potential. Further implementations of development projects including highways, railways and trade routes was also discussed and deemed important during this meeting. It was also agreed that the building of trade routes will attract investment in the region and will help the transport and energy sector as well.³⁹

Economic Significance

The route proposed here will not only elevate Pakistan's economy but will also increase the trade with Central Asian States. This will help Pakistan to repay its foreign debts. Low debt will allow the country to be more variant in its foreign policy that could benefit the national interest rather than limiting it due to poor economic condition. The connectivity of Pakistan to Central Asia will also allow the exploration of natural mineral resources for example, uranium which holds great importance for all stake holders in the region.⁴⁰ For Landlocked countries such as Central Asian States distance coefficient of gravity model is 5.5% (every 1% decrease in distance from port increases the trade by 5.5% and CPEC will decrease this distance by 22%). It is expected that Pakistan's trade with Central Asian countries would increase manifold. The northeastern Badakhshan province of Afghanistan is bordering China, Pakistan and Tajikistan through Wakhan Corridor. The province has large scale natural resources such as Azure, Gold, Ruby and Diamond mines in addition to Copper and Iron.⁴¹ Pakistan and China can help Afghanistan in exploring these natural resources.

Afghanistan has assumed the role of contemporary epicenter for energy producing Central Asia with growing energy markets of India and China that connect through the CPEC project. The construction of supply depots in Wakhan Corridor and establishing border access routes, auxiliary facilitate China to access Afghanistan's natural resources. In addition, with the inclusion of India and Pakistan as permanent members in SCO there is also prospective chance to soon materialize the TAPI project as well. However, the regional prosperity and the economic growth in Central Asia are particularly linked with the question of enduring peace and stability in Afghanistan.⁴²

However, the opening of Wakhan Corridor will provide an alternate route to Central Asian countries and Russia by avoiding troubled region of Afghanistan. China is helping Pakistan to stay away from the last's "circle" by India. With China protecting its "all climate" partner Pakistan, India may seek the United States for help with forming occasions in Afghanistan.

Security Interests

Opening up of the Wakhan Corridor will assist in Pakistan's security and strategic interests by enabling an increase military posture and countermeasures against Indian intrusions in Gilgit-Baltistan from Ladakh region. The areas across Qala Panja, Mintaka and Wakhjir Passes interlink Gilgit-Baltistan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan particularly such an interlinked connection was further reinforced in 1996 with China's construction of concrete-base suspension bridges in the valleys of Darel, Yasin, Gupis, Shigar and Tangir. Moreover, the Darel and Tangir bridges connect with the Indus right-bank road as an interchange for protractible supply line towards the KKH; one of world's highly intercepted air targets. The susceptible strangle points of Indus valley and Gilgit town are also sidestepped besides these bridges connect the districts of Diamer and Ghizer with Swat. Whereas, Pakistan is connected with Tajikistan through the bridges of Gupis and Yasin that also serve as an offsetting factor against prospective Afghan progression through Wakhan Corridor into the Ghizer and Hunza districts.⁴³

Meanwhile, these bridges offer a parallel way in to the Chitral district amidst winter months when it usually gets obstructed and merely becomes reachable through Afghanistan. Similarly, the Shigar Bridge alternately serves as a supply line towards Siachen and Shaksgam sectors of Baltistan. During the Kargil War, the Chorbat, Masherbrum and Salto valleys witnessed intense Indian attacks whereas; the Shigar Bridge assisted Pakistan to maintain its significant military presence in the Nubra-Turtuk sectors.⁴⁴ Wakhan can serve as an important trade corridor. It is in the interest of China, Pakistan and Afghanistan, if a road is developed across Wakhan. This will enhance trade and business activities, especially in Chitral and Afghanistan. While discussing the prospects and geo-strategic importance of operationalising Wakhan Corridor, it is equally importance to discuss the challenges to initiate such plan.

Challenges in Reviving Wakhan Corridor

There are various challenges in undertaking in reviving the Wakhan Corridor. Firstly, the terrain is very difficult in building road infrastructure and would require huge investment. Secondly, China is reluctant in opening/building Wakhan corridor due issue of terrorism. Third, India as per its previous practice of opposing CPEC, may feel concerned as this outflanking manoeuvre of opening up in the Wakhan Corridor will further integrate Afghanistan with China and Pakistan. India is making propaganda to tarnish the image of China among the Afghan population. A former Indian Army Chief Gen. V.K. Singh has termed China's role in the region as an outflanking move, He added that "India risks losing the influence it has in Afghanistan because of a China-Pakistan link that is getting stronger and is seen in evidence here,"⁴⁵ India can hire the services of terrorists like the IS to damage Pakistan and Chinese interest in and around Wakhan. The Indian secret service, RAW is very active in Afghanistan. At least thirteen IS fighters of India were killed when the US dropped the mother of all bombs on the cave complex in the Tora Bora mountain in Nangarhar province.⁴⁶

India realized the importance of Wakhan long before. It renovated Farkhar airbase in Tajikistan at a cost of 350 million rupees in 2007 to keep watch on the moves of China and Pakistan in the region. It extended the runway so that its jet fighters could land at the base. India has also constructed three hangars at Fakhor base. This strategic investment has given India an exceptional watch tower. But India can no longer base its fighters and helicopters there because of Russian pressure.⁴⁷

India wants to further its interests in Central Asia as well as to reach the north-west front of Pakistan in minutes and keep a check on the western front of China. Strategically, it provides major support to the Indian Army operating in Afghanistan and Siachen.⁴⁸ Indian fighter planes flew from Tajikistan and bombed the Taliban positions in northern Afghanistan. The former President Pervez Musharraf objected to the use of Farkhor airbase by India. He said "Farkhor air base of India is a real concern, Indian planes would be able to reach Pakistan within minutes using the air base."⁴⁹ Russia is suspicious of the Indian activities, especially its tilt towards the US and asked

Tajikistan not to allow India to use its bases. Pakistan and China can join Russia to counter the Indian moves in the region.

Recommendations

- Chinese and Afghan officials are discussing the possibility of building modern road and rail connections and even an oil pipeline through Wakhan Corridor. With the Opening of the corridor, Afghanistan's dependency on India will decrease and Indian influence on Central Asian Countries will also be diluted. It will be a serious setback to Indian efforts to isolate Pakistan. It is very important for Pakistan to integrate itself with the Central Asian Countries. Efforts to improve relations with Afghanistan should continue both at bilateral and multilateral levels.
- Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and Tajikistan Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QCCM) to counter terrorism should be strengthened as opening up of Wakhan Corridor would require peaceful environment free of militant groups such as the IS and its affiliated groups.
- One important step in the fight against terrorism is to stop the movement of terrorists between Pakistan and Afghanistan through effective border management. With cooperation already underway with regard to Islamic State, the armies of Pakistan and Afghanistan should now extend this collaboration to counter militant groups in and around Wakhan corridor.
- In case Afghanistan continues providing space to India while ignoring Pakistan's interest, then Pakistan should enhance its influence in Wakhan corridor and use it as a pressure tactic to compel the Afghan government and its security forces to stop cross border terrorist incursions into Pakistan.

Conclusion

The Wakhan Corridor has a great Geo-strategic significance for Afghanistan, China and Pakistan. The opening of this corridor will have serious implications for regional and global players involved in Afghanistan, especially India and the US. Today, most of the countries, including US would support opening of this corridor through Wakhjir Pass. However, India may show its concerns as it did in case of CPEC. Being located on the crossroads between energy rich Central Asian States, and Caspian Region and oil rich Strait of Hurmoz; Pakistan has a few implications over it which it needs to handle very pragmatically in line with the interest of the regional powers. To get maximum benefits Pakistan should continue its pledge in building cooperation with China, Afghanistan and Tajikistan. The paper has discussed the Geo-strategic significance of using Wakhan Corridor for regional connectivity arguing that opening of this route will create a conducive environment for peace, stability and economic development in the region. It will also help Pakistan to improve its diplomatic and economic strength being a part of this corridor.

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PAKISTAN'S ELITE ENGLISH PRESS DEBATES PIONEER WOMEN: HINA RABBANI KHAR AND SHARMEEN OBAID CHINOY

*Shiza Nisar**

Abstract

This study analyses the portrayal of Pakistan's first female Foreign Minister, Hina Rabbani Khar, and Pakistan's only female Oscar-winning filmmaker, Sharmeen Obaid Chinoy, in the newspaper coverage of four Pakistan's four leading English newspapers, The News, Dawn, The Express Tribune and the Nation. It is also investigated if the debate on women has changed in Pakistan's patriarchal social system and they are encouraged for their achievements. The study is theoretically linked with framing theory and conducts a discourse analysis of 94 news articles. The findings depict a different image of these women as media appreciated the achievements of SOC while discouraged a debate on HRK due to the profession of both the women.

Keywords: Hina Rabbani Khar, Sharmeen Obaid Chinoy, Newspaper, Women, Pakistan.

Introduction

Noted filmmaker Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy (SOC) is Pakistan's leading female to have two Oscars to her name, for the best short documentaries in 2012 and 2016, while Hina Rabbani Khar (HRK) was Pakistan's youngest and first female Foreign Minister in 2011. Both the women represented Pakistan on a global setting and came under public scrutiny for their respective roles in the patriarchal Pakistani society. HRK repeatedly faced sexist remarks and was targeted for the inability for the office she held. On the other hand, SOC faced slurs of being a "western agent" or the "mouthpiece of the west" after her success at the Oscars, for her documentary on honor killing. In general masses, the Oscar failed to qualify as a proud moment for Pakistan and was sadly contoured with hesitations and displeasure since it followed a bitter criticism of SOC. SOC was called a pawn in the hands of the West for projecting a rather ugly and traumatic image of Pakistan¹.

This research aims to reveal the opposing discourses of femininities offered by the elite print media in Pakistan by concentrating on changing narratives about women's empowerment and, their social and political positioning. This research project studies how major English-language newspapers in Pakistan have mediated public

*Shiza Nisar is lecturer at Centre for Media Studies, Art and Design, Lahore School of Economics, Lahore.

debates about influential women in Pakistan. The research is based on *The News*, *Dawn*, *The Nation*, and *The Express Tribune* since these four national dailies have the largest circulation, have different news audiences geographically and represent distinctive business interests, and different editorial positions on the political spectrum. It explores how these newspapers have reported these issues and events around these women and the extent to which these media have provided a space for a range of voices, argument, and diversity of opinion².

Since gender is one of the establishing principles of Pakistani society and male-dominated beliefs have placed women in reproductive roles as mothers and wives in the private arena of home; therefore, it is utmost to contemplate the ways news media opens up spaces for opinions and arguments on significant gender issues and generates public debate³.

Pakistan's News Media and English Language Press

Pakistan has a vibrant news media in over ten languages. Paradoxically, the diversification of news has not necessarily led to greater debate and plurality of perspectives in the press. Pakistan's English-language press, which is believed to be "echoing the modern western news leads", enjoys a special status⁴.

English became the de facto official language of Pakistan at the time of partition of British India. All domains of power - government, bureaucracy, military, judiciary, commerce, media and education - use English at the highest level. Since it is empowering to learn English, Pakistanis are ready to invest in it for the future of their children. English and Urdu languages have strengthened the process of nation-building, and both have invested in the national project more than any other vernacular language. However, English enjoys a special status since the lack of materials (corpus planning) has handicapped Urdu as the only official language. Thus, to run the government smoothly, English is maintained as the official language, Urdu is recognized as the national language⁵.

The governments of General Musharraf (1999-2008) and Asif Ali Zardari (2008-2013) greatly valued English and implemented policies to teach English as a result of the country's tilt towards English-medium schools, students learn from textbooks containing discourses originating from Western countries. This student body tends to be more tolerant of the 'Other' (women). They are generally believers in liberal-humanist and democratic values. Thus they are less susceptible to sectarian prejudices or the persecution of minorities in Pakistan⁶.

Consequently, Pakistan's English newspapers are more liberal and open-minded than the Urdu-language and vernacular press and cater to the products of English educational institutions, who are likely to challenge the existing state of affairs⁷. This research will outline the gender debate by the English-language press and its attitude towards Pakistani women and argue: how has the print media dealt with gender issues and overcome gender stereotypes?

Four major Pakistani media groups have thrived in the last decade. The research is based on four popular English newspapers, one from each group: *The News*, *The Nation*, *Dawn*, and *Express Tribune*. These four national newspapers have the largest circulation, have different news audiences geographically, and represent distinctive business interests, and different editorial positions on the political spectrum⁸.

The Independent Media Corporation (IMC) is the oldest and biggest media giant in Pakistan and dates back to 1940. The group enjoys a shared monopoly, both in print and broadcast media, and its profits are higher than the cumulative incomes of all other media groups in Pakistan. IMC's English-language newspaper *The News* often becomes entangled in bitter debates with the Islamist groups. *The News* criticised the murder of Pakistan's social media celebrity, Qandeel Baloch, who was asphyxiated during sleep and referred to her as "a symbol of defiance"⁹ for challenging patriarchy¹⁰.

The Waqt Media Group is the second largest media group. Hameed Nizami launched the group in 1942. The group has regularly attracted criticism from the liberal society due to its sympathies for extremism in Pakistan. Khan and Safder argue that the group intentionally engages itself in religious controversies to gain publicity due to its sensitivity to conservative causes. Kheeshadeh accuses Waqt group of a "remorseless campaign against all liberal trends and progressive forces in national life". Waqt group's editorial policies have promoted the idea of Pakistan as an Islamic state, and repeatedly it has condemned the controversial debates that break stereotypes. It has referred to the rise of internet sensation Qandeel Baloch as an overnight celebrity and her contentious videos "a good publicity stunt"

Century Publications launched its first newspaper in 1998, and it is Pakistan's third-largest newspaper group in terms of circulation. The group publishes an English-language newspaper, *The Express Tribune*, in partnership with *The International Herald Tribune*. Its editorial stance is in line with social liberalism, and enjoys left-wing readership on the political and social spectrum. It has emerged as an advocate for free speech and equality as far as the issue of women rights is concerned. It applauds the laurels of Malala Yousafzai and Nighat Dad who have all been honoured multiple times globally but seldom in Pakistan¹¹.

The Herald Group of Publications (PHP) started its flagship newspaper, the daily *Dawn*, in 1941. *Dawn* is famous amongst Pakistan's diplomatic community (Pakistan's Former Ambassador to the US, Sherry Rehman) and decision-makers in public (Former Federal Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Javed Jabbar) and private sectors. The group enjoys widespread respect as a credible, independent and balanced player. It has a vast influence and has emerged as an autonomous and liberal critic of the society. *Dawn* urged the nation to "own Malala's achievements" as evidence that Pakistanis do not shun bold voices. However, media coverage of Pakistani women with international standing remains a challenge. Thomas and Shukul revealed when Taliban shot Yousafzai; *the Dawn* tried to "achieve delicate balancing act without appearing hostile to a potential enemy". While on the other hand, alternative English

media was strident and unbridled enough to condemn right-wing groups and voiced support for Yousafzai¹².

Women in Press

Illiteracy, prejudice and gender chauvinism and inequality are the most critical and emerging social challenges faced by women in Pakistan from all segment of society. Due to the religious and cultural norms, cruel practices such as honour killing, acid attacks and domestic violence are widespread. It remains a non-issue unless it takes a severe type of murder or attempted murder. As a result, women's participation in social, economic and political spheres has been substantially curtailed. The National Report of Pakistan for the Fourth UN World Conference for Women admitted that women "continue to suffer because of oppressive patriarchal structures, rigid orthodox norms and stifling socio-cultural customs and traditions"¹³

News of violence against women is substantial not only as it stimulates public debate on pressing social problems, but also because it has a direct impact on governmental policymaking. The news media appears to echo hegemonic ideologies, strengthening and legitimising traditional partisan structures by reinforcing and upholding the status quo and government-sanctioned social norms and beliefs explain that in Pakistan as women are considered weaker than men, it is not expected of them to give a reaction in their defence¹⁴. Thus they are suffocated. Furthermore, they argue that their deteriorated representation does not permit them to flourish beyond stereotypes and change the negative image of a woman despite all her efforts. Pakistani media showcase women as either submissive sufferers or objects to entertain. Rasul (2008, p. 74) notes that "This media projection is, in fact, a reproduction of the existing and established image of women in our society". This was observed by Yu (2010) in the media coverage of gang rape victim, Mukhtar Mai, as she appeared as a helpless victim desperately seeking the help of western media and human rights organisations. The author argued that Mai was represented as a nervous and sedate woman who gains poise and self-assurance only from international factions. Mai has been bent as a recluse who is at odds with ethos and society; who lacks family support. However, Mia's father and other male figures were a constant source of comfort and courage throughout her suffering and in her quest for justice. The media coverage of the victim remained meek and passive¹⁵.

Generally, in Pakistan prejudice against women exists in all spheres of life; thus Pakistani newspapers, both English and Urdu, also give biased and prejudiced coverage to women. Discussing the representation of women in the media, Rameez Ul Huda & Ali (2015 p. 15) state "there is a patronising tone in every printed feature, communicating a feeling of inferiority in women". They consider the representation of women in news media as feeble, juvenile and helpless. News stories around professional women are overshadowed and beautified with tales of their marriages, family life and other facets of women's customary roles. Highlighting the example of Benazir Bhutto when she became prime minister of Pakistan; media repeatedly referred to her as "a perfect housewife" "a conscientious mother" that overlooked her role in politics¹⁶.

Similar traits can be untangled in news media depictions of female politicians, as more prone towards costume and physical appearance than on substance and achievement. For example the first woman Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Hina Rabbani Khar was labeled as “the most fashionable”¹⁷, “4th Most Stylish Women in Politics”¹⁸, and “an epitome of grace”¹⁹. She has repeatedly been targeted for her branded wardrobe, from her Cavalli sunglasses to her Birkin bag. Being from a patriarchal society, women have been stereotyped as weak and submissive on the one hand and object of beauty on the other. (Rasul, 2009)

Khan & Anwar (2013) and Ullah, Khan, Khan, & Ibrahim (2016) argue that despite the growth in the social status of women over time, gender stereotyping remains same. News media is not presenting women in diverse roles, and their contributions to society remain unnoticed. Media has been showcasing women as men deem fit- dependent, caregivers, good-looking and homemakers. Khan & Anwar (2013) refer to this representation as “the beauty and the beast”; where the beauty has finite concerns although males are described as the beast who can control this beauty by physical and mental strengths²⁰.

Mojiz (2016) notes that Pakistani females are getting media’s attention but not primarily in an active context. Patriarchal attitudes towards women reflect them at the bottomend of the power-compliance dynamic. Womenfolk are perceived and treated as ‘victims’ as well as ‘objects’ and remain deprived of active power. There are exceptions, but it is too early to celebrate.

This research explores the contribution of these newspapers to public debate and the extent to which the diversity of news sources has led to more diverse viewpoints. This project analyses significant gender debates in the English press and studies the reportage on renowned Pakistani women in specific by including the case study of an Oscar-winning filmmaker Sharmeen Obaid Chinoy and Pakistan’s only female Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar to explore press attitudes towards women. This research project examines the way these English-language media function as an arena for debate and considers the way these newspapers open up spaces for opinions and arguments on gender issues, yet also limit and contain these views, and promote particular voices.

This study analyses the portrayal of candid women in the English newspapers and investigates how news media coverage varies for professional Pakistani women. My broad research questions are the following:

- RQ-1: How has the English-language press articulated debates about women in Pakistan?
- RQ-2: What does news content in the English-language press reveal about Pakistani women of international standing who challenge the social norms?
- RQ-3: Is Pakistan an anti-women society?

The time frame is distributed around the critical media incidents of Hina Rabbani Khar (HRK) and Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy (SOC). For HKR two critical events

were her when she became the First Female Foreign minister of Pakistan closely followed by her visit to India in July 2011 and the second event being her famous interview with Al-Jazeera in December 2015. However, the critical event for SOC includes the first Oscar in October 2013 and the second Oscar in 2016 being the second significant event when she came into limelight.

This study is a content analysis of Pakistan's four English-language newspapers, *The News*, *Dawn*, *The Express Tribune* and *The Nation*. Selection of publications was by their circulation and reputation as the leading and influential English-language newspapers. Another factor for their choice is their archive availability.

The study takes an objective explanation of newspaper content by analyzing newspaper reports, opinion articles, feature stories, editorials and letters-to-editor from four English-language newspapers in Pakistan. Opinion articles and editorials were included because they are more likely to have a bias and stir debate in masses. These not only give the masses the knowledge and information about issues but also the masses get the idea of the amount of worth to place on any issue due to the exposure given by the media to that particular issue. Op-eds are the sections for supporting ideas and supporting debate on essential matters. Currently, Pakistani editorials function in the manner that they are the places where newspapers speak out their viewpoints on the most pertinent issues the nation encounters while performing their functions to influence the public and the government who have the knowledge of the matter and understand the perspective as realistic.

Discourse analysis will enable me to comment on the inherent meaning of newspaper content. Discourse means merely language-in-use (Gee, 2005) (Ullah, 2013). It is a way of talking and thinking (Roberts, 2009). Using discourse analysis as the methodology the research will try to investigate the underlying meaning, gender power relation in newspapers images and texts. It is reiterated that the article used discourse in the Foucauldian fashion. Michel Foucault (1977) argued that discourses that are available in society govern what can be thought and said. Drawing on Foucault, it is argued that discourses are bedrocks of social reality. It is within discourses that we create objects and types of people and social roles. (Ullah, Khan, Khan, & Ibrahim, 2016) News frames will be used to understand the way stories, and issues are identified, perceived, contested, or the subject of debate and arguments in print. News framing refers to the way in which news media organise and present news to convey a specific message. The media framing makes certain aspects of an event or issues more salient than the others. In news writing, frames are manifested by the use of specific words and phrases that reinforce particular ideas at the cost of other ideas. Therefore, it resembles agenda-setting in which media builds public perception. Media frames play a vital role in: stimulating opposition to or support for an event or issue; providing moral judgment; representing a specific ideology, and determining the 'tone' of media coverage of an event or issue.

Frame classification was according to the overall tone of the media reports - positive, negative and neutral. Positive reports support the issue. Negative stories are those critical towards the topic. Neutral stands for a general stance which is merely interpretative without having any 'positive' or 'negative' elements.

For data analysis, articles were primarily coded as 'positive' 'negative' and 'neutral'. Later 'positive' and 'negative frames were further divided to decipher the extent of these frames which helped analyse the trends in the print media.

Findings and Discussion

Further analysis of these frames revealed that Khar referred to as incompetent 61% to hold the office as Foreign Minister who was repeatedly targeted for her feudal background made her unprofessional 22%. The Express Tribune remains the only newspaper that has covered HRK while all others remained mostly mute or ignorant of the female Minister. Khar has been a subject of a lot of criticism since the appointment as the Foreign Minister in 2011, even though she had been actively participating in politics since 2002 while serving the Economic and Finance ministries. The Express Tribune (2011)²¹ stated, "her election was more because of her family's cloud and less because of her own popularity" and called her political career to be "compromised" and "not-taken-seriously". Though it is not uncommon for political families in Pakistan to have their children engaged and serve political offices yet news media has repeatedly taken a turn to overshadow her achievements with her family background. Her visit to India in July 2011 was merely a commentary on her fashion sense rather than her portrayal as an active Foreign Minister on a mission. Dawn (2011) referred to her as "Pakistan bomb" while Express Tribune discussed her age and youthfulness highlighting the fact she was given the office to give a "soft image" of Pakistan. Hussain (2011) used satire in his commentary to HKR's flaunting fashion and brand showcasing. He termed HKR's appointment as "mango diplomacy" while underlying that Pakistan's foreign policy is dictation from the US. While on HRK's visit to India, he wrote "In the days following Bhagat Singh's daring exploits, poet Majaz had advised the beauties of his day to turn the scarf into a flag. These times, however, are different and as the gospels say there is a time to fight and a time to make up. So there is a place for the flag and an occasion for the scarf, and it is best not to mix the two"²².

The Nation only covered HRK's Ajmer Sharif's visit where she was photographed wearing an oversized chaddar and praying, highlighting the manifesto of Waqt group. On the other hand, she was again showed incompetent by The News (2015)²³ during the Al-Jazeera interview with Mehdi Hasan, repeatedly highlighting being a female she cannot deal with Pakistan's politics and more importantly the military.

Sharmeen Obaid Chinoy (SOC)

The mainstream Pakistani English newspapers illustrated multiple frames under three categories of Positive, Negative and Neutral. The findings revealed that a Positive (61%) narrative was built around the achievements of SOC for raising her voice

against the oppression of women in Pakistan, more than Negative (8%) and Neutral (31%). The researcher used multiple frames for each category to further dissect the narratives. For instance, professional, celebrated, work seeking implementations were marked Positive frames. While female objectification, shameful and anti-Pakistan narratives were considered negative. The findings showed that SOC referred to as a celebrity (38%) more than a professional documentary maker who fought for the laments of Pakistani women. Amongst the positive frames print media urged for the implementation (46%) of SOC's work. Dawn published 20 articles on SOC during the selected time frame and applauded SOC more enthusiastically than The News, The Express Tribune and The Nation.

The overall findings showed that she was portrayed positively in the selected newspapers. Due to her commitment to advocate women rights, Premier Nawaz Sharif praised SOC's Oscar win and reiterated, "Women like Ms Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy are not only pride for the Pakistani nation but are also a significant source of contribution towards the march of civilisation in the world"²⁴. Following this statement, English print media of Pakistani articulated much debate on the issue urging the government to take "action against a despicable practice" and translate political condemnation into "the legal and administrative changes necessary for putting an end to the impunity that surrounds honour killings". Chairman of the HRCP, Zohra Yusuf said, "He will have to take some bold steps... Words from the PM are not enough"²⁵.

Even though on February 29, 2016, We Disown Sharmeen was the top social media trend; the conspiracy narratives of 'attempting to defame Pakistan for personal gains', 'the West wants to embarrass Pakistan' and 'it only highlights the negative aspects of our country' were bashed by Siddiqi (2016), Shahid (2016) and Rehman I. (2016) in the mainstream print media. Arshad (2016) writes, "Journalist, activist and filmmaker Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy has made us proud by bringing home two Oscars for Pakistan." SOC was applauded for her commitment to documentary making on controversial topics. SOC was cheered for "unveiled the suffering of the vulnerable" (Shahid 2016) at the global level. Her commitment was respected for breaking the stereotypes as she did not remain silent about the violence against women, and refused to accept the menace in the society. Her struggle reflects the plight of many Pakistani women as she vowed to give voice to the marginalised, proposed a tolerant Pakistan and endeavoured to protect the victims of patriarchy. SOC's win was termed as "a great highlight in the fight against the so-called Honor Killings" (Cautain, 2016) as it is perceived that strong notions are forming against prevailing practices of female oppression and finally Pakistan is engaging in lively debates on feminism²⁶.

However, after being awarded the Oscar for 'Best Documentary — Short Subject' for *A Girl in the River*, critics denounced SOC for tarnishing Pakistan's image in the world because as Garg (2016) puts it, "After all, the West is known to thrive in third world misery" and Academy Awards, Oscars termed as "White supremacy in a new guise" (Rizvi, 2016). Inferences could be made that she had to come up with socially acceptable topics of debate because Pakistan does not wish for a status quo change. Two critiques surfaced; whereby, the first claims SOC's films only highlight Pakistan's

failings, therefore, building a highly negative narrative about Pakistan. Underlying that these films bring shame to Pakistan, as a result, she was labelled as “a traitor, a Western sellout and a conspirator”²⁷

Another argument directed towards SOC is more about the nature of international media's interest in Pakistan. It was repeatedly suggested to overlook the plight of women on social Oscar. SOC's Oscar win was marginalised by outright commentary on her wardrobe selection, which overshadowed the context of debate supporting SOC's achievement. The discussion was slightly shaped to build a perspective that Oscar is a considerable fashion-moment; whereby displaying patriotism through the flaunting of traditional attires. Thus triumphing female objectification and making the Oscar debate a secondary matter. “Sharmeen's entire attire was done by Pakistani designers”. Though it is daunting to connect the glitters to SOC's life with the harsh and crude realities that delineate her work; however, the print media was determined to outline her appearance more important than her work. Rehman (2016) inscribes SOC as “at ease in designer wear on the Oscars red carpet”²⁸.

To cash on the Oscar moment, Dawn applauded her choice of clothing for making “a statement without looking over-the-top” and to make the wardrobe issue more pronounced it describes, “the cape makes a statement while also being comfortable.”²⁹. While The Express Tribune blares, “Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy dazzles in black at the Oscars” and “it was her statement jewellery pieces that stole the spotlight” (Qamar, 2016). Thus apparently marginalising Pakistani women to be known for anything but the dedication to their profession.

Conclusion

This article has presented a comparative analysis of 94 newspaper articles on Pakistan's first female Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar and first Oscar filmmaker Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy. The purpose of this research was to understand the debate Pakistan's leading English Press has articulated around these women of international standing. Through the case studies of these women, this study has also examined the state of Pakistan's attitude towards women. The findings revealed that both these women are targeted for representing Pakistan on two very different forums.

Hina Rabbani Khar has faced criticism on the grounds of incompetence in politics. Negative frames have dominated Hina Rabbani Khar's profile through the print media lens. She is criticised for being inexperienced and young for the position, which is a manifestation of Pakistan's male-dominated political scenario as previously females have not been given the office of Foreign Minister. In a pragmatic sense, the English press has failed to synthesise her incompetence in any other terms rather than her youthfulness. The print media did not spare her after she left the Foreign Ministry and criticised her on a rather eloquent interview with Mehdi Hasan on Al-Jazeera. The tumult that followed the interview is indicative of the fissures in our society regarding women in politics. Pakistani women derive their legitimacy from their relationships with men – as a daughter, mother, wife, sister. An independent woman is seen outside of the paradigm and therefore considered a threat to the ‘normative values’.

On the other hand, the English press has tried not to opt for the conventional approach on Sharmeen Obaid's Oscar win. She is lauded for her achievement, yet the debate around SOC mostly does not revolve around the recognition of her work. Instead, it is an urge seeking the implementation of her work. Despite the Oscar win, SOC has been labelled as a traitor and Western propaganda to defame Pakistan because her work reflects the unfortunate menace of violence against women in Pakistan.

Far from the acceptance of female leadership, Pakistan's English press has consistently targeted HRK for Birkins, Cavalli, her feudal background and print media has developed an obsession with her outlook rather than her respect as a politician representing Pakistan in international forums. The same narrative was revealed for SOC where her achievements are sidelined, but her life is glamorised and staged. The trait of Tabloid journalism can easily be found in Pakistan's Elite English press, where females are targeted and objectified. However, there is a growing debate on 'place of women' in the media, which signifies that the society is becoming more tolerant towards women in all spheres of life.

NOTES

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ARTICULATING EDUCATIONAL VISION FOR PAKISTAN: THE EARLY POST-INDEPENDENCE INDIGENOUS ATTEMPT

*Dr. Rafaqat Islam, Dr. Sarfraz Hussain Ansari and Dr. Qaim Raza Jaffry**

Abstract

Before Pakistan's independence in 1947, a committee of educationists was appointed to deliberate on the nature of education to be imparted to the citizens of the envisaged new country. According to the decision of the committee, it was necessary to "impregnate the various disciplines with the philosophy and ideology of Islam". After independence, a major educational conference in 1947 reaffirmed the ideal and characterized education as development of the 'whole man' i.e. development of spiritual, intellectual and physical aspects of human being. Search for security and economic aid after 1951 led to intervention of American consultants and American trained development planners. Emphasis shifted from education of 'whole man' to human resource for economic development. Intermittent bursts for educational uplift emphasized moral and material aspects of education without much systematic treatment of the subject. This study takes note of post-1951 rhetoric about education but undertakes more elaborate treatment of the pre-1951 educational conferences wherein education of whole man with reference to Iqbal was put forward quite emphatically.

Keywords: Independence, Pakistan, Educational Conferences, Educational Vision, Education of Whole man, Allama Iqbal.

Introduction

The words "post-independence" and "indigenous" in the title are important. They point to the fact that after August 1947, Pakistan was no longer a colony, it was independent and that the people inhabiting the country with the name, Pakistan, possessed a culture different from the one that their British rulers possessed and partly imposed on them¹. During the independence movement, the people re-asserted their culture; indeed, re-assertion of culture provided the basis for independence. They struggled for a separate and independent country on the basis of possessing a different culture, a mark of distinction from other groups living in the Indo-Pak Subcontinent and, therefore, entitled to a separate territory. Cultural distinction also provided a basis to mobilize people, to come together for demanding a separate territory². Culture, therefore, was seen to provide philosophy of education-both to basic education on culture and to promote those aspects of culture which were perceived to have been

*Dr. Rafaqat Islam is Faculty Member at Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis, National Defence University, Islamabad, Dr. Sarfraz Hussain Ansari is Assistant Professor, Department of Government and Public Policy, Dean at Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad and Dr. Qaim Raza Jaffry is a faculty member at Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis, National Defence University, Islamabad.

eroded by living under an alien rule. So, there was an emphasis on preserving and promoting what was perceived as indigenous, along with the desire to acquire and develop useful modern technology, mainly through education.³

Pakistan was born as a result of partition of the subcontinent into two states and inherited injustice of partition, with meager resources. Despite the myriad challenges, hopes were high and aspirations were strong for the new nation. The first education policy conference resolved to break from the colonial history; henceforth, Islamic ideology was to guide a socially just and intellectually vibrant education system, a system that would cater to the physical, material, moral and spiritual life, i.e. education of whole man⁴.

Statement of Problem

Pakistan's history after 1951 changed particularly in the form of assassination of its first prime minister that year. The country's security and economic problems became more acute and the initial attention accorded to education sector began to fade away. The ideal of education of Whole Man could not be pursued in practice. However, the ideal represented the essence of the Pakistan idea in that Pakistan idea/ideal had its intellectual roots in the thought of Allama Iqbal. Any attempt at reform/regeneration of education must refer to the early indigenous efforts. Such efforts were envisaged to lay the foundation of an education system in consonance with the ideal of Allama Iqbal. It is important that policymakers, educational practitioners and public at large are knowledgeable about the early efforts made during 1947-51, which were not seriously taken up later but are relevant to any meaningful reform for national rejuvenation through a vision that insists on education of Whole Man.

Objectives of the Study

- To review the post 1951 period wherein government paid lip service to the educational ideal of Whole Man.
- To discuss the efforts during the 1947-51 period for the educational policy to have Islamic roots.
- To discuss the substantive aspects of the ideal of Whole Man with reference to important European education theorists
- To highlight Allama Iqbal's views on the ideal of Whole Man as projected to be embodied in Pakistan's education system, during 1947-51 efforts.

The Post-1951 Intermittent Lip Service to Education of Whole Man

After the demise of the founder of the nation in September 1948 and assassination of the first Prime Minister in 1951, the country came under the influence of Western capitalist system, particularly the United States of America. This happened because of Pakistan's search for national security and aid for economic development under politicians with less clear vision about the destiny of the nation. This led to foreign advice in planning with economic planners coming to have more say in education policy. Educational policy planning became part of planning for economic development under the guidance of Harvard Advisory Group and western-educated national bureaucracy. Work of the Group in the view of an American author "far

exceeded simply advising as effectively functioning Pakistani staff.”⁵ The ideal of education of whole man suffered erosion. There were several commissions/committees appointed for uplift of education in the country. All such initiatives ignored the ideal of education of whole man.

For example, Ayub Khan’s Commission on National Education exhorted that the concepts of spiritual and moral values, nation building, scientific development, enlightened citizenship, and public service should motivate and guide Pakistan’s educational system. In practice, however, the Commission avoided discussion of what it described as the conflicting philosophic views on the nature of the educational process and the forms it should take, by saying:

*A major difficulty we have had to face lay in combining academic and in a sense theoretical advice to educators for long-term guidance with practical proposals to government for the correction of present weaknesses*⁶.

The question, however, was how to recognize the “present weaknesses” without framing a vision, say, a worldview that would encompass the aspirations of the people of Pakistan. The Commission’s thinking reinforced the economic planners’ emphasis on human resource production needed for economic development, rendering education of whole-man as something superfluous.

Similarly, a decade later the important report of 1969 and the educational policy of 1970 based on the same did not see the light of implementation owing to internal war and consequent dismemberment of the country in 1971 into (new) Pakistan and Bangladesh. After dismemberment Pakistan came under the rule of the Pakistan People’s Party led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Educational policy of 1972-80 was instituted with emphasis on citizenship and science and technology. The policy did not elaborate a philosophy of life beyond the slogan: “Islam is our faith, democracy is our politics, socialism is our economy, all power to the people”. It has been described as “Electic Socialism”⁷.

The next policy enforced in 1979 under General Zia Ul-Haq put emphasis on Islamization of public life and, thereby, education as well. But again, the policy lacked any coherent statement. Selective Muslim laws were introduced in certain aspects of public life, and attempts were made to introduce Islam-related subjects at school and college levels, particularly Islamic Studies and learning to read the Holy Quran. Such attempts proved to be superficial and unproductive, even to those who admired such measures⁸.

Role of the country’s ideological moorings into education further came to lose importance with General Musharraf coming into power. He preached the notion of “enlightened moderation”⁹. The National Education Policy 2009, embodying his views, summed up the government’s educational vision:

“Our education system must provide quality education to our children and youth to enable them to realize their individual potential and contribute to development of society and nation, creating a sense of Pakistani

nationhood, the concepts of tolerance, social justice, democracy, their regional and local culture and history based on the basic ideology enunciated in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.¹⁰

The 2009 policy was an updated version of the earlier document namely, "Education in Pakistan a White Paper".¹¹ In an analysis of the White Paper, two authors focused "on the way the White Paper constructed its political/ideological context and its global/national contexts". The authors note: "The White Paper works with trope of a binary construction of Islam – fundamentalist or moderate – which rearticulates Orientalist Western constructions. The analysis of the construction of the global/national contexts demonstrates the framing of the policy the Millennium Development Goals and the Washington and post-Washington consensus"¹². That is, in the view of the two authors, the contents of the White Paper and, thereby, the educational policy represented "an attempt to enhance the standing of Pakistan in the eyes of the donor agencies and the West." This led to weakening of any capacity for independent policy production. The document demonstrated what the authors describe as the inevitable enigma and dilemma of the colonial past and colonial present."¹³

The draft National Education Policy, 2017, claims to emphasize "balanced and harmonious development of the individual in respect of wisdom, spiritual development, physical as well as social development as goals of education"¹⁴. While such emphasis is commendable, it amounts to name dropping without any attempt to give it systematic exposition. There is no indication whether the stated goals are interrelated, if yes, then how. Further, in continuation of the list of goals, the document lists the constraints being faced in the education sector: "population explosion, resources constraints, low financial allocation, low participation and high dropouts, low literacy, lack of teacher's motivation, lack of political commitment, disparities in respect of gender and regional, weak quality of education and Good Governance, no Societal based Curriculum and Setting of Standards"¹⁵. One wonders whether the government will have any courage to act in the face of such unnerving list of constraints!

To conclude intermittent reports of commissions continued to pay lip service to the vision of whole man, i.e., spiritual, intellectual and material development through education. The momentary bursts of interest never led to any worthwhile changes. Particularly, they did not work to articulate a clear vision. The present study discusses, below, the vision articulated during the 1947-51 conferences on education.

Educational Conferences of 1947-51: Articulation of an Indigenous Vision

A cardinal point of early conferences was that education problem was studied in the context of the country's creation – the process whereby became independent was created. It came into existence on the basis of an ideology adumbrated by a poet-philosopher, Iqbal, and a political struggle waged by a leader of impeccable integrity, Jinnah. The system projected through the educational conferences of 1947-51 was not taken up during the subsequent years. Yet, any serious effort at reform in the present day Pakistan needs to take into account the substantive work done during the early

period as the recent views of a British consultant on education reform has acted as educational do indicate the consultant has worked with Michael Barber, the Federal Government and is currently advising Government of the Punjab province.

In Barber's view, pivotal to education reform is "A Narrative of Reform", a narrative that "raises the question of identity for individuals and for society as a whole." In unfolding the bases of narrative of reform in Pakistan, Barber lists the following:

- The Political entity, Pakistan, created in 1947 with all its accomplishments and challenges;
- The remarkable civilizations which have risen and fallen in the lands now called Pakistan; and
- Islam, a religion that has brought to the world great art, spectacular scientific advancement and remarkable literature and history. To its adherents, it [Islam] has also brought insights into how life should be live¹⁶.

Barber concludes, "It should surely be possible to weave for Pakistan, from these three strands, an inspiring narrative of Pakistan's future and place in the world"¹⁷.

Weaving of an inspiring narrative was undertaken in the educational conferences during 1947 and 1951, through messages/speeches of key leaders, decisions by conferences, and committee work performed in pursuit of decisions taken there.

Quaid-i-Azam's message to the Conference stated the task before the conference and the educational goals of the country, saying:¹⁸

"Under foreign rule for over a century, sufficient attention has not been paid to the education of our people and if we are to make a real, speedy and substantial progress we must earnestly tackle this question and bring our educational policy and programme on the line suited to the genius of the people, consonant with our history and culture and having regard to the modern conditions and vast developments that have taken place all over the world."

For civic education, he reiterated:¹⁹

"At the same time, we have to build up the character of our future generation. We should try, by sound education, to instill into them the highest sense of honour, integrity, responsibility and selfless service to the nation. We have to see that they are fully qualified and equipped to play their part in the various branches of national life in a manner which will do honour to Pakistan."

In weaving a narrative for the proper education the leaders took into account problems being faced by mankind during the late 1940s. Educational leaders in Pakistan viewed the world "sick and exhausted by perpetual sanguinary conflicts"²⁰. In their view, the people world over were "yearning for a new order free from oppression, injustice and inequality in all fields of human relations – political, social, economic, and so on"²¹. In the founding of the United Nations Organization (UNO), the world sought to proclaim new ideals of human rights and embody them in diverse charters. To

Pakistan's Minister of Education, it was a sad comment on human intelligence; according to him the ideals of universal brotherhood, of democracy, of social justice, of tolerance envisaged in the UNO charters lay embodied in the theory and practice of Islam. Indeed, Fazlur Rahman regarded Islam to be a challenge to the status quo as things prevailed in the late 1940s, particularly the fight between capitalism and communism. In his view, Islam stood for an altogether different order of things, "a different design for living"²².

Rehman explained that Islam's conception of man and his relationship to the universe was fundamental to any workable philosophy of life. According to the Holy Quran, man stood supreme in the order of creation; he was made to rule the world, for everything on earth had been created for man and made subservient to him. Rahman rhetorically asked: "Where else may one find a conception of man so exalted as this? It gives him a sense of dignity, of self-confidence, of power which is not vouchsafed by any other philosophy of life". With the world as his stage man had infinite scope for the realization of his potentialities to develop physically, mentally and spiritually to the fullest extent possible. The statement of aspirations on the part of the Minister of Education bears a fuller quotation²³.

It is my firm conviction that by recapturing this spirit we can demonstrate to the world that the spirit of inquiry and of free thought can once again be harnessed for the task of human regeneration and progress. But mere professions or declarations would not help. What is required is an earnest and determined effort to get at the root of Islamic principles and to embody them in the theory and practice of education. This is what we are attempting to do in Pakistan, so that our coming generations may be reared on the teachings of Islam, imbued with the same spirit that inspired the achievements of their forefathers, and endowed with the same outlook that pursued knowledge to the end of the earth and pressed it into the service of God and His creatures.

The Minister attached the highest importance to the spiritual element. In his view, neglect of such elements in contemporary education resulted in ruinous circumstances. He pointed out the aftermath of the two world wars and the wanton abundance of weapons of mass destruction, indeed, they had already brought home "the realization that unless the moral or spiritual growth of man keeps pace with the growth of science, he is doomed to utter extinction".²⁴

Ideas of the Education Minister were further articulated by educationists who participated in the conference held in November-December 1947. The participants in the conferences were highly educated in the Western, mainly English tradition. At the same time, persons they belonged to Indian Muslim culture on the basis of which Muslims in the Indo-Pak subcontinent were successful in carving out a separate territory for their national existence. The point is that the participants had comparative knowledge of both the Western educational system and strengths, weaknesses and aspirations of the newly-born state within the system of United Nations Organization.²⁵ While such educationists could be said to present/represent aspirations of their

countrymen, they were aware of the international order then in existence and constraints and opportunities that the system offered.

The educationists, participants, unanimously decided that the educational system of Pakistan was to be based on ideology as prescribed by Islam which highlighted, among other attributes, the virtues of tolerance and fair play along with a concept of universal brotherhood. The Conference was of the view that if education was to be in conformity with the needs and requirements of Pakistan, it must undergo a radical re-organization, and the re-organization should embrace the content as well as the spirit of education. The Conference established an Advisory Board of Education to interact with the Federal and Provincial governments to take stock of the situation and make recommendations.

The Advisory Board reiterated the view that Pakistan was a realization of the Muslims' desire for a motherland, a country where they would be masters of their own destiny and would live freely as per their own aspirations. These aspirations naturally emitted from the teachings of Islam, the Board held, were not a set of dogmas or rituals. On the other hand,

“They constituted a philosophy of life, based on the conception of universal brotherhood, democracy, justice and equality. Islam does not accept any barrier between man and man. It discards all prejudices resulting from racialism or geographical nationalism. It takes a global view and is essentially cosmopolitan, universal and humanitarian in its approach.”²⁶

The Muslims of Pakistan, the Board emphasized:

“Firmly believe that Islam has a great message for the world peace and that it is the destiny of this new-born State to convey it to the sick and sore humanity. For this, it must inculcate the true spirit of Islam among her own citizens and it is, therefore, imperative that so fundamental an activity as education which moulds the outlook and character of future citizens should be inspired by it.”²⁷

In the opinion of the Board, the educational system of Pakistan was to inspire the students with a conviction about Pakistan that it would prosper, to be a beacon to the world based on the Islamic model of a tolerant and just state, sponsoring equality and equity. The educational system was to have a social purpose based on honour and dignity.²⁸

Vision of Whole Man Reinforced through Views Foreign Educationists

The Six-Year National Plan of Educational Development of Pakistan prepared in 1951 undertook a further rationale for establishing an Islamic educational system. It was noted that the British colonialist educational policy had, in British India “impoverished moral fiber of society.” The education imparted was “devoid of spiritual content, maimed and mutilated.”²⁹ The Advisory Board which prepared the education development plan did recognize that certain famous European education theorists also

propounded views very relevant to Pakistan Project of the education of whole man. The Advisory Board cited M.V.C. Jeffrey's book, *Glaucon: An Inquiry into the Aims of Education*. This book was published in 1951 in London and was favorably quoted in the proceedings of the 1951 Conference.³⁰ Jeffrey held: "The ends and means of education must be seen in relation to the ultimate problems of life problems that concern the nature and destiny of man both as a member of historically developing society and as a being in the presence of eternity."³¹ The Board pressed this view in its argument for Islamic ideology as basis for education.

Among other more contemporaneous literature on the subject, the Board cited the *Harvard Report: General Education in a Free Society*, which said: "Our society, like any society, rests on common beliefs and a major task of education is to perpetuate them."³² In the Board's view, the Education Act of 1944 in Britain was animated by a re-affirmation of Christian values as it had made obligatory a daily act of worship or religious instruction in schools. And the Board drew its conclusion from the history of the West: "Thus the wheel has come full circle and the West, after a century or two of secularism and materialism, is harking back to the need for a Christian orientation of its values."³³ Further evidence for the conclusion was adduced from the ideas of Christopher Dawson, published in 1949. He said: "The catastrophes of the last thirty years are not only a sign of the bankruptcy of secular humanism, they only go to show that a completely secularized civilization is inhuman in the absolute sense—hostile to human life and irreconcilable with human nature itself."³⁴ Echoing the views of the Minister for Education, the Board held that there was at hand a moral crisis of civilization. Pakistan's project in this connection was:

"Its education is to be inspired by Islamic values, for these values constitute a valid and coherent philosophy pervading all aspects of life. On such a basis alone can it build a new social order and contribute to the peace and progress of the world. There can be no doubt that the task is stupendous. It calls for a radical transformation not only of the form and content of education, but of the prevailing ethos of parents, teachers, educational administrators and the general public."³⁵

The Central and Provincial Governments as well as the Universities were to engage in recasting the existing syllabi and curricula with a similar revision of the teachers' training courses. The educational system was to correspond more or less closely to the ideological *rationale* of Pakistan.³⁶

The 1951 Conference particularly emphasized the views of a 17th century theorist of education, namely Jan Comenius. Reference to Comenius' view of 'education of the whole man' is highly meaningful in that it tells quite a lot about the nature of Pakistan's envisaged educational vision.³⁷ Comenius has been hailed as "Father of Modern Education" in Europe and, as he lived between 1592 and 1670, he could also be seen to present a bridge between the 'modern' and the 'medieval'. The Advisory Board put a lot of emphasis on Islam as a basis to national education and that implied emphasis on history of education among Muslims along with direct inspiration from Iqbal's philosophy. Indeed, in a recent article, Sebastian Gunther has pointed to such

connection. According to him, Comenius maintained “that education should aim, in particular, at equipping young people with a profound knowledge of the Holy Scriptures and religious duties—ideas that are major concepts in Islamic education also.”³⁸ Comparing the views of Muslim education theorists with those of Comenius, Gunther says that pedagogy should make a quick, palatable and thorough education possible which should imitate the natural phenomena. Like Muslim theorists, Comenius emphasized that intellectual, spiritual, and emotional growths were all woven together. According to Gunther, such views were discussed most insightfully by Al-Ghazali and several of his predecessors and successors “in the rich tradition of Islamic educational theory.”³⁹

Gunther goes even further, and in the interest of the present study, there is need to reproduce his view verbatim:

“I believe that medieval Muslim educators understood well the intimate relationship between knowledge, theoretical and practical wisdom, logical reasoning, ethics and aesthetics of learning, loving and caring, and spirituality. If modernity is willing to learn from the past and, as the great American educational reformer and pragmatic philosopher John Dewey (1859–1952) put it, ‘conceive education as the process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow-men, we can be confident that we can recreate that which we seem to have lost and so restore our picture of an education system that gives credence to human development as a whole’.”⁴⁰

The 1948 Advisory Board’s emphasis on Islamic basis of national education very much implied a study of history of Muslim education. Study of educational past was deemed as important and useful on several counts. In particular, as Gunther has mentioned in detail, medieval Muslim scholars gave central place to ethics and aesthetics of learning. Ethical conduct of education was deemed essential to achieve success in learning. Instruction was seen only to impart knowledge of fact. More fundamentally, it was a teacher’s responsibility to inculcate enduring values, and desire of the good. Moreover, Muslim education theorists emphasized passion for teaching and passionate desire for learning. Modesty, patience and passion for working with children were deemed as indispensable qualities for those who undertook teaching. Teachers were to be knowledgeable persons, hardworking and with tremendous sense of care for their students. Teachers invariably adopted methods that were student-centred, making their lessons fully comprehensible to their students. Pedagogical adequacy was indispensable. At the same time, teachers were to be virtuous people, possessing laudable character.⁴¹ After recounting such major features of Muslim education system in the past, Gunther advances the view:⁴²

“These are ideas of great appeal to the modern educator, since the ethical and emotional aspects of learning seem almost to be disappearing in our technologically defined, bureaucratic world. Similarly, today’s educators would benefit from re-emphasizing the idea that teaching is a caring profession”.

Allama Iqbal's Views on Education for Whole Man

The Advisory Board was very much aware that a tremendous contribution could come from the philosophy of Allama Iqbal to the educational enterprise that the Board had recommended to the country. Iqbal once reasoned that his aim was to discover a universal social reconstruction. In such philosophical endeavour, he reasoned, he could not ignore a social system (i.e. Islam) which came to exist with the express objective of doing away with all the distinctions of caste, rank and race. Islam's distinctive feature, in Iqbal's view, was that it kept a watchful eye on the affairs of this world; it fostered a spirit of unworldliness so absolutely essential to man in his relations with his neighbours. In Iqbal's view: "this was what Europe lacked and this was what she could still learn from us."⁴³

Iqbal's views on Allah, Universe and Man are important and furnish a strong basis for a philosophy of education that extols man's dignity and makes scientific endeavours part and parcel of man's rise to spiritual heights. Iqbal agreed with Asharite School in Muslim thought that the world is compounded of jawahir or atoms. Number of such atoms is not finite. Creative activity of Allah does not cease and for that matter, new atoms come into being. According to the Quran, "Allah adds to His creation what He wills."⁴⁴ The main point is that the universe is not something fixed. It is changing, being formed and reformed.

Iqbal conceptualizes human personality in terms of Khudi, individuality, ego; universe is a valley of egos, each ego being a centre of consciousness. Iqbal says: "Through the entire gamut of being runs the gradually rising note of ego-hood until it reaches its perfection in man."⁴⁵ This is because there are different degrees of individuality depending upon consciousness. Man is conscious that his well-being depends upon his engagement with the world around him; in this engagement is the material of man's own development. The more he engages with it, the more he develops his potentialities and, thus, partakes in the creative activity of the Maker of the universe.

In his creativity, man re-shapes the matter and the universe. "He also has the capacity to build a much vaster world in the depths of his own inner being."⁴⁶ In that activity, man produces art, literature, philosophy and religion and, of course, science. Iqbal wanted that "the relationship of man to Nature must be exploited in the interest not of the unrighteous desire but in the nobler interest of a free upward movement of spiritual life."⁴⁷ In this view of man, Iqbal's philosophy provides guidance for education, both intellectual/scientific and moral. Man's liberty implies that he could make mistakes and learn from them. By trial and error, he can create scientific knowledge. Iqbal would have the teacher guide and let students make their own experiments and discoveries. In learning morals, Iqbal again emphasizes freedom. Iqbal's view is:

"Goodness is not a matter of compulsion; it is the self's free surrender to the moral ideal and arises out of willing cooperation of free egos."⁴⁸

The method involved in promoting moral education would be that the schools arrange opportunities for students to have healthy social discourse and learn to practice

give and take, thereby developing a sense of sacrifice.⁴⁹ Most learning, according to him, takes place in social environment and social context. Social environment provides both content and method of learning. Change in the social context would change the individual. The social structure as method would aim at democratic citizenship of pupils through student government, civic projects in the economic and political life of the community, and classroom teaching and learning by sharing with the teacher the selection of projects and their execution and evaluation.

This method links learning with life. Iqbal's emphasis on the world of phenomena as real requires that the school should try to elicit the intellectual, aesthetic, and moral significance of the ordinary occupations and interests of life, and bring the activities and occupations of life into the work of the school; knowledge divorced from activity in actual situations becomes dead and superficial. Iqbal would urge that the school should be in vital rapport with the life outside school. The school should educate children for a changing and dynamic environment. Excursion, observations is a valuable procedure involving scientific method. It supplements the learning at school.⁵⁰ The Advisory Board of Education was very much aware of the ideas of Allama Iqbal and their relevance to the educational enterprise in Pakistan. It was out of this reason that apart from Pakistan Academy, they also recommended the establishment of Iqbal Academy.

Conclusion

Proper education of the youth was of great concern among Muslim leaders even when they were engaged in struggle for achieving Pakistan. After independence in 1947, a series of conferences on evolving education worthy of the Islamic aspirations of the country were held, culminating, in 1951, an indigenously articulated philosophy of education. The philosophy emphasized the education of whole man, i.e. education embracing physical, moral, spiritual aspects of human life. Owing to security and economic issues and coming into power of less visionary leadership, vision of education of whole man was replaced by emphasis on human resources for economic development. Education being a vital sector of national life has continued to place in political rhetoric through the country is still groping to formulate an education policy consonant with its cultural aspirations and physico-economic needs of its people.

Education vision articulated as a result of 1947-51 educational conferences catered to the national requirements. The vision of the education of whole man i.e. an education program emphasizing physical, moral and spiritual aspects of the human person eminently suits requirements of the country. A lot of effort was expended in the articulation of the vision. Top policy makers of time, including Quaid-e-Azam M. A. Jinnah, a galaxy of experienced educators and educational administrators participated in the effort. In the articulation of the vision of educating the whole man, the participants took into account update relevant literature from the Western educational policies and practices.

Most emphasis was placed on the ideas of Allama Iqbal, particularly his philosophy of Khudi, with abundant attention to man's physical, moral and spiritual

aspects. Any worthwhile educational policy in Pakistan needs to take into account the documents that contain the educational vision articulated as a result of the 1947-51 conferences on education.

NOTES

- ¹ Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) is generally regarded as the person who first articulated the idea of separate entity for Muslims of British India. See Iqbal: Poet Philosopher of Pakistan ed. Muhammad Hafeez (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1971). Iqbal's emphasis on culture as a basis for separate entity was first expressed in his "Presidential Address delivered at the Annual Session of the All India Muslim League at Allahabad on the 29th December, 1930, reproduced in Thoughts and Reflection on Iqbal, ed. Syed Abdul Wahid (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1964) Pp.161-194
- ² Saleena Karim &Fazal Karim, (ed). *Did Quaid-i-Azam want to make Pakistan a Secular State?* (Lahore: Tolu-e-Islam Trust, 2012), pp.12-13.
- ³ Government of Pakistan. *Proceedings of the Pakistan Educational Conference held at Karachi from 27th November to 1st December 1947* (Karachi: Ministry of Interior, Education Division. 1947).
- ⁴ Jan-e-Alam Khaki and Omar Safdar, [ed.] *Educational Leadership in Pakistan - Ideals and Realities* (Oxford University Press, 2010). p.16 and 27-28
- ⁵ George Rosen (1985). *Western Economists and Eastern Societies: Agents of Change in South Asia, 1950-1970*. Oxford. Quoted in Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.239
- ⁶ Government of Pakistan, *Report of the Commission of National Education* (1959). p.13.
- ⁷ Dawn E. Jones and Rodney W. Jones, "Educational Policy Developments in Pakistan: Quest for a National Program" in Manzooruddin Ahmed, ed. *Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy, and Society* (Karachi: Royal Book Co. 1980). p.25
- ⁸ Louis D Hayes, *The Crisis of Education in Pakistan* Paperback, Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1987.
- ⁹ Bob Lingard and Sajid Ali, "Contextualising Education in Pakistan, a White Paper: Global/National Articulations in Education Policy" *Globalisation, Societies and Education* 7, no. 3 (2009): 237-256.
- ¹⁰ Government of Pakistan, *National Education Policy 2009* (Islamabad: Ministry of Education, 2009).
- ¹¹ Bob Lingard and Sajid Ali, "Contesxtualising Education in Pakistan" p.237
- ¹² Ibid.,
- ¹³ Ibid., p.251
- ¹⁴ Government of Pakistan, *Draft New Education Policy* (2017). p.iii
- ¹⁵ Ibid.,
- ¹⁶ Ibid., 8.Miichael Barber
- ¹⁷ Ibid.,
- ¹⁸ Ibid., 5, Conference 1947.
- ¹⁹ Ibid., p.6.
- ²⁰ Rahman, Fazlur, *New Education in the Making in Pakistan Its Ideology and Basic Problems* (London: Cassell and Co. Ltd 1953). p.29
- ²¹ Ibid.,
- ²² Ibid., 37
- ²³ Ibid., 151
- ²⁴ Ibid., 7
- ²⁵ The word aspiration has been emphasized to take note of the feelings of the Muslims in Pakistan. Indeed, one participant of 1947 Conference wrote a book in 1956, *'The Pakistani Way of Life'*. Three of the seven chapters of the book contain these headings: "Political Institutions and Aspirations", "Economic Institutions and Aspirations" and "Religious Institutions and Aspirations" See Qureshiop.cit.
- ²⁶ Ibid., Government of Pakistan, 1951, p.359.
- ²⁷ Ibid.,
- ²⁸ Ibid.,
- ²⁹ Ibid., 359
- ³⁰ M.V.C. Jeffrey, *Glaucon: An Inquiry into the Aims of Education* (1950). p.359.
- ³¹ Ibid.,
- ³² Ibid., 361
- ³³ Ibid.,
- ³⁴ Dawson, Christopher *Education and the Crisis of Christian Culture* No.43 (Henry Regnery Company. 1949).
- ³⁵ Ibid.
- ³⁶ Ibid., 362
- ³⁷ Ibid.,
- ³⁸ Sebastian Gunther, "Be Masters in That You Teach and Continue to Learn; Medieval Muslim Thinkers on Educational Theory". *Comparative Education Review* Vol. 50, No. 3 (2006), p.387
- ³⁹ Ibid., 388.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid. For Reference to Jim Garrison, Dewey and Eros: *Wisdom and Desire in the Art of Teaching* (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1997), Introduction, pp. xx.
- ⁴¹ Gunther, op. cit., p.389.
- ⁴² Ibid.,
- ⁴³ Syed Abdul Wahid, *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1964) pp.100-101.
- ⁴⁴ The Quran 35:1
- ⁴⁵ Iqbal quoted in K.G. Sayyedain p.82

⁴⁶ Ibid.,

⁴⁷ Ibid.,

⁴⁸ Ibid., 53.

⁴⁹ Ibid., Syed Abdul Wahid, 54-55.

⁵⁰ Mian Muhammad Tufail, *Iqbal's Philosophy and Education* (Lahore: Din Muhammadi Press, 1966).

THE EXODUS OF JEWS FROM ARAB AND MUSLIM COUNTRIES OFTEN COMPARED TO THE NAKBA AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF ARAB PALESTINIANS. WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR THIS COMPARISON? IS IT VALID?

Tariq Suleman*

Abstract

The establishment of state of Israel by the Western powers created a permanent rivalry between the Muslims of the Arab world and Israel. The seeds of genesis of Israel's bright were sown in the Balfour Declaration in 1917. A movement particularly Middle East has been started by the Zion's of the West. Since then, Zionist are advocating a symmetry between the two in order to absolve Zionism from the Nakba and deny the Palestinian refugees' right to return; Arab scholars tend to interpret the departure of Jews as a consequence of Zionism alone and downplay the role of Arab governments in the departure of Arab Jews from their countries. It is not realistic to equate sufferings of Palestinians with those of Jews from Muslim lands. Palestinians are most egregiously wronged by Zionism and we cannot think to compare the long lists of crimes against both. Till now both Palestinians and Arab Jews have been the objects and not the subjects of Zionist ideology and policies.

Keywords: Exodus, Jews, Arab, Muslim, Country.

Introduction

Zionism¹ was originally a European movement – appealing principally to the persecuted Jews of Russia and East Europe; Oriental Jews were certainly not an integral part of the intellectual struggles and national aspirations of European Jews. Until concrete economic and demographic needs emerged, Oriental Jews were not part of the Zionist plan.

There is no doubt that discrimination with the Muslims in Israel was and is aboveboard. This apartheid and discrimination has been accepted by the international community at all platforms including United Nations. The discrimination within Israel with its own community (Jews) because of migrations of Jews having different cultural backgrounds is natural and is lower in its content and magnitude as compared to the Muslims.

Oriental Jews were about to assume an even more vital role in Zionist enterprise. By the early 1940s, Zionist leaders were grasping the scale of the Holocaust

*Tasriq Suleman is a PhD scholar at the Department of Middle Eastern Studies, SOAS University of London, UK.

as Nazi horrors were unfolding in Europe. Without Oriental Jews, David Ben-Gurion argued, there wouldn't be enough Jews in Palestine, and Zionism would collapse. Ben-Gurion made it clear that when Herzl wrote of the 'Jewish People' he had meant 'the Jewish People in Europe ... the people that bore the Zionist movement on its shoulders'. After the Holocaust, Ben-Gurion lamented: 'The State was formed, but could not find people who had expected it.'²

At the time of the establishment of Israel, the population was not so large to run the state securely. For this purpose, a well thought plan was formulated so that the Arab Jews may be migrated into Israel. In next fifteen years, a large number, of not only Arab Jews but also Jew from different parts of the world migrated to Israel because of different reasons and incentives. Till 1965, a sufficient population based to run its security coupled with state apparatus matters.

Among Muslim countries Iraq was where the Jewish community prospered most. It traces its history back to 597 BC, when around forty thousand Jews were exiled to Babylon, which has since been Judaism's global centre and has been a Jewish address for over two millennia – the longest record of Jewish residence, anywhere. (Shabi:2009) Babylon, later came to be known as Iraq, witnessed the rise and fall of countless empires, but a Jewish community stayed put throughout. The centre of Jewish faith shifted in thirteenth century to a Sephardic base in Spain and then to an Ashkenazi base further east in Europe. But Iraq's Jews continued to thrive. In the early 1950s, the majority of the Jewish population of Iraq, which was least likely to uproot and go, left at once for Israel --- as part of the necessity to 'liquidate the (Jewish) exile' as a prerequisite for materializing Zionism.³

Under Muslim rule the legal status of Jews became dhimmi, 'protected'. Some scholars highlight all the degradations inherent in this second class, non-egalitarian status of dhimmi. Others point out it's changing nature according to which ruler was enforcing it and apart from some exceptions such as Yemen, dhimmi did mean protected, a liberal measure and quite explicable by the sociological and historical conditions of the time, and not the product of a pathological European-style anti-Semitism.

Since long those Jews which were inhabited in Middle East were well organized and were retaining their identity through cultural variation and different religious practices. The legal status of Jews changed from being dhimmi to millet as a result of modernization initiated by Ottoman rulers. Equal rights and parliamentary representation was granted to all minorities along with religious and educational autonomy.⁴

To attract migration of Jews in state of Israel and to influence the Western capitals in their favours Zionist propaganda that Jews are mistreated and are marginalized by the Muslim rulers created a soft corner for the Israeli government in the Western capitals. This well received propaganda precipitated in the form of unconditional support to Israel. In this context, generous economic aid and arms were given to Israel.

Advent of Zionism in Muslim Lands

The emergence of Zionism in the Muslim world posed serious problems for Arabs as well as for Jews living among them. Zionism's claim to be a liberation movement for all Jews and Zionist ideologists' attempt to make the two terms 'Jewish' and 'Zionist' virtually synonymous (Shohat:1988,p1) further sealed the fate of Jews living in Muslim lands. For the Jews of North Africa, 'word of the Zionist movement's birth in Europe fuelled the cherished hopes for national redemption that were an integral part of their religious conviction.'⁵

In 1898, a Zionist association was established in the Egyptian city of Alexandria and by 1904, Zionist organisations mushroomed across the country. Several hundred Jews throughout Egypt paid their shekel for membership in the World Zionist Organisation. Zionist associations proliferated in towns across Morocco. (Abitbol:1981) By 1911, Zionism had gained foothold in North Africa. Zionism was gradually spreading among Jewish communities in the Arab World. A Jewish literary society, formed in 1920, aroused significant misgivings and tensions in Iraq. Manahem Saleh Daniel, a Senator in the Iraqi Parliament, warned the Zionist Organization in London of the dangers of a Zionist policy. 'You are doubtless aware,' he wrote, 'that, in all Arab countries, the Zionist movement is regarded as a serious threat to Arab national life... in the mind of the Arab,' sympathy with the Zionist movement 'is nothing short of a betrayal of the Arab cause'.⁶

Regionalisation of Palestine Question

The period of 1936–39, which witnessed the first comprehensive Palestinian anti-colonial revolt and the first proposal to partition Palestine, is most important for understanding the regional dimensions and trajectories of Arab Jews before and after 1948. 'In this sense, 1936–39 seems more of a terminus a quo in terms of its explanatory power of the emerging interdependencies between the Arab Jews, Euro-Zionism, Arab nationalism, and the conflict'.⁷

Peer partition plan of 1937 resulted in Arab Muslims discontent against the policies of West as these were apartheid in its nature and content. However, the British who were the colonial master of that time were in favour of creation of state of Israel on Palestinian land. In 1937, Egypt British ambassador was of the view that Palestinian question is a domestic political issue particularly in Egypt.⁸

The Muslim Arab intellectuals and policymakers were of the view that creation of state of Israel on the land of Arabs was a unjust decision of the West and it is colonial master approach. The regionalization of the Palestine issue was materialized upon the migration of the Palestine question to neighbouring Arab states and its fusion with Arab national politics.⁹

Egypt's religious scholars met in 1938, to discuss the 'Palestine Question'. Al-Azhar rector Sheikh al-Maraghi delivered its decisions to the British emphasizing: 'the propaganda of creation of state of Israel on Palestinian land was well received Jews who were living in the Middle East since centuries. They realized that creation of state of

Israel may put them in clash with the Arabs because Muslims view the idea and moment of creation of Israel will result in capture and possession of Muslim lands of Middle East in general and Palestine in particular. It was quite possible ... that the Jews in Iraq and Egypt ... might shortly find themselves involved in the general anti-Jewish hostility of the Moslem world.'¹⁰

A week earlier Iraqi Minister of Interior predicted: 'Before long, a demand might arise for the expulsion of all the Jews in Iraq ... It was not entirely fantastic to visualize the 90,000 Jews of Iraq being escorted across the Euphrates ... to this Palestine of theirs ... sooner or later it was bound to happen...'¹¹

Middle Eastern Jews did not end up in Israel just because of the deliberate Zionist policy and unscrupulous activities of its Ashkenazi emissaries throughout the region; they received equally deliberate 'assistance' from such regimes as those of Nuri al-Said and Zaydi Imam Ahmed and the accidental help from the Arab xenophobic groups.

Colonialist Stratagem

When British conquered Iraq in 1917, Iraqi Jews, numbered around 87,500, perfectly fitted the requirement of a British colonial power, reliant on support from a favoured minority community. Highly educated, business minded, the Jewish population featured disproportionately in private business - oil, banking, railroads, postal services, the customs office etc. Salman Shina, a newspaper editor said: 'Commerce blossomed and flourished, the Jews made fortunes, and gold descended upon them like rain on grass'.¹²

The discussion about the Zionist's claim to have saved Mizrahi Jews from the harsh rule of their Arab captors (Shohat: 1988) and the claim that Jews from Arab lands were unnecessarily uprooted by the forces of Zionism, is irrelevant, given that by the late nineteenth century the Arab countries in question were under colonial rule. Colonising forces in each country promoted Jewish communities over their compatriots, thereby causing inter-communal hostilities as nationalist independence movements developed.

Zionism and Its Backlash

Between 1917 and 1948, a large number of Jews migrated to Palestine. During this period a total 420,000 Jews, from all corners of the world including Middle East settled in Palestine. Out of 420,000 migrates, 385,066 came from Western Europe including American continent and remaining 44,809 came from the Middle East. The Middle Eastern Jews did not face systematic anti-Semitism, or pogroms; in the Middle East, a 'Jewish question' did not exist so the Middle Eastern Jews did not develop Jewish national consciousness.

The leadership of Zionist regime was well aware that the escalating conflict in Palestine would imperil Jews in the Middle East. 'The very same day that brings redemption and salvation to European Jewry will be the most dangerous day of all for

the exiles in Arab lands.' said Eliyahu Dobkin, head of the Jewish Agency for Immigration, in July 1943.¹³

The head of Egyptian delegation, Muhammad Hussain Heykal Pasha, warned the UN General Assembly during the debate on partition of Palestine on 24 November 1947, that 'the lives of one million Jews in Moslem countries would be jeopardised by partition.' He further warned that 'If a Jewish State were established... Riots would break out in Palestine, would spread through all the Arab States, and might lead to a war between two races.'¹⁴

On 22 January 1948 the President of the Federation of Jewish Societies of Algeria, Elie Gozlan, wrote, 'The Muslims do not hesitate to accuse North African Jewry of sending money, arms, and men to the Zionists.' He then added: 'What prudence the Jews must show in dealing with the Palestinian affairs!' (Stillman:1991,p510) The Jewish community was damned either way: those who opposed Zionism weren't believed by their co-nationalists; those who did not oppose it were considered traitors. Those who kept in touch with relatives who had already migrated to Palestine were accused of having contact with the enemy.

After secret negotiations in Baghdad with the Iraqi Prime Minister Tawfic al-Suwaidi [Zionist emissaries Shlomo] Hillel and [Mordechai] Ben-Port succeeded, on the basis of a substantial cash payment, in securing a law allowing Iraqi Jews to immigrate to Israel. The Bill to this effect was introduced to the Iraqi parliament on 5 June 1950.¹⁵

In December 1951, three Jews were found guilty of planting series of bombs in Baghdad with the express intention of terrorising the Jewish community and precipitating its exodus. Though some Israeli historians do not consider these bombings the work of Zionists but neither British nor American reports from the period think the Iraqi trial of the alleged bombers a sham. Wilbur Grane Eveland, a former CIA adviser, in Baghdad at the time, wrote: 'In an attempt to ... terrorize the Jews, the Zionists planted the bombs ..., and soon leaflets began to appear urging Jews to flee to Israel'. In 1954, when the Israeli government was reeling from the Laevon affair, an IDF minister said: 'This method of operation was not invented for Egypt. It was first tried in Iraq.'¹⁶

The prominent Iraqi Jewish poet Me'ir Basri stated: 'If Israel had not been established, nothing would have happened to the Iraqi Jews...' The existence of Israel was a powerful incentive for Jews to leave Muslim lands. 'Without internal impediment or harassment, 25,000 Iranian Jews immigrated to Israel in 1950 and 1951. Many of these immigrants were members of Zionist youth movements and wanted the opportunities to use their youth and energy to build up the Jewish State.'¹⁷

The establishment of the State of Israel aroused messianic enthusiasm among the Jewish population of Morocco. From May 1948 to 1956, more than 90,000 Moroccan Jews left for Israel. One of the first actions of the new Moroccan government, after gaining independence in 1956, was to order the Jewish Agency to close down the emigration camp. On 25 November 1961, a secret agreement, to pay the Moroccan

authorities \$ 100 for each emigrant, was signed between the Israeli government and King Hassan II. Operation 'Yakhin' brought 100,000 Moroccan Jews to Israel between 1962 and 1964 at a cost of \$ 10 million paid to the Moroccan authorities.¹⁸

The birth of the State of Israel, the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem, the military defeats of 1948, 1956 and 1967 and the loss of Jerusalem --- all combined to embitter Arab attitudes toward Jews in general. The new bitterness was an important factor in the mass exodus of the Jewish population from most Arab countries. The Zionist menace became a reality in the eyes of the majority of Arabs, and the term 'Zionist' took its place alongside 'imperialist', and 'colonialist' in the Arabic lexicon of epithets - perhaps the most sinister of them all.

The Zionist activities and the emergence of State of Israel resulted in irrevocably identifying Jews with Zionism. Zionism by turning into a global Jewish nationalism posed a serious threat to the survival of local Jewish communities living in Arab lands. The creation of Israel resulted in non-acceptance of the principle of self-determination aspirations of the Arabs. So violation of this principle resulted in continued persistent conflict between Jews and Arabs. Further, installation Jewish state in the heart of Arab world was viewed by all Muslim world and illegal act.

Suddenly, robust Judeo-Arabic tradition, once an integral part of the region, came to an abrupt end. Multiple narratives describing the diverse facets of Jewish life steeped in the Muslim lands trickled through the cross cultural checkpoints operating in Israel into the experience of animosity in the Muslim lands, magnified into central significance.

The mass migration of the Middle Eastern Jews to the new Jewish state was dictated by history, not part of the original plan. Zionism was born as a reaction and a solution to the rampant anti-Semitism in Europe. There are no Oriental Jewish names on a list of key Zionist thinkers precisely because there was at that time no Jewish nationalism in the Middle East.

Oriental Jews posed a real dilemma for Zionism by resembling and behaving like the 'uncivilised' enemy. A real fear was that the high influx of immigrants from the Middle East might actually impede the project of building a Jewish homeland. Jews from the Arab countries were emblematic of many of Israel's fears about the region that it was part of but wanted no part of it. Fearing an encroachment of the contaminative Eastern forces upon the West, the establishment repressed the Arabness of Oriental Jews. Ben-Gurion voiced these fears: 'We do not want Israelis to become Arabs.' (Smoocha:1978,p88) The Oriental Jews were urged to see Judaism and Zionism as synonyms and Jewishness and Arabness as antonyms, when in fact they were both Arab and Jewish.

The process to develop Israel as a viable state resulted in dispossession of Palestinian Muslims of their lands. The migration of Jews from the West and Middle East was programmed and resulted less damage to their properties as state of Israel was their dreamland. Now they were in Jewish culture. Due to class distinction, the

Oriental Jews who migrated were called 'human dust,' and crowded into transient camps, hastily constructed out of corrugated tin. The Israeli media refers to these slums of the Mizrahi population as 'the second Israel': low status, low income, underachieving. Many were stripped of their 'unpronounceable' Middle Eastern names at arrival and were given new names by whimsical Israeli bureaucrats.¹⁹

Conclusion

Nakba is catastrophe of a magnitude in which Arab Muslims lost their property and rule and were converted into subjects at their own land. The Arab Jews who migrated to state of Israel were less in loss as compared to the Muslims. Zionism is sole responsible for the Nakba against the Muslims. In Nakba, Palestinian people are worst loser. However, within a state of Israel Oriental Jews have certain problems. The peace in Middle East not possible without recognizing couple with granting the rights of land to the people of Palestine.

NOTES

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- ¹ Zionism is the movement of the Jewish people who supported the re-establishment of a Jewish state in the territory on Arabs land. Modern Zionism emerged in the late 19th century in Central and Eastern Europe as a national revival movement, both in reaction to newer waves of antisemitism and as an imitative response to other nationalist movements. Soon after this, most leaders of the movement associated the main goal with creating the desired state in Palestine, then an area controlled by the Ottoman Empire. Until 1948, the primary goals of Zionism were the re-establishment of Jewish sovereignty in the Muslim Palestinian land, ingathering of the exiles, and liberation of Jews from the antisemitic discrimination and persecution that they experienced during their diaspora. Since then Zionists have expansionist design and are still grabbing Arabs land. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zionism>
- ² Meir-Glitzenstein:2004,p53
- ³ Behar:2012
- ⁴ Gilbert:2010,p127
- ⁵ Stillman:1991,p72
- ⁶ Stillman:1991,p331-3
- ⁷ Behar:2008
- ⁸ FO407/222, Lampson (Cairo) to Halifax, 24 May 1938.
- ⁹ Behar:2007
- ¹⁰ Behar:2007
- ¹¹ FO406/76, Houstoun-Boswall (Baghdad) to Halifax, 29 August 1938
- ¹² Meir-Glitzenstein:2004
- ¹³ Shabi:2009,p88
- ¹⁴ Gilbert:2010,p208
- ¹⁵ Gilbert:1998,p167
- ¹⁶ Woolfson:1980,p199
- ¹⁷ Gilbert:2010,p268
- ¹⁸ Gilbert:2010,p279
- ¹⁹ Shohat:1988