

THE CASE OF LIBYA'S WMD: ANALYSIS OF KEY FACTORS FOR NUCLEAR TURNAROUND

*Muhammad Usman Asghar, Dr. Muhammad Bashir Khan and Dr. Shahzad Hussain**

Abstract

Libya has pursued its quest for the acquisition and development of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in general and nuclear weapons in specific since the regime change in 1969. This wish was shattered when Libya renounced to give up its pursuits of WMD, especially nuclear bomb aspiration. This paper examines the puzzle of Libya's nuclear rollback and the factors, which compelled Libya to give up its nuclear arms ambition. Libya's decision to renounce its nuclear program, in 2003, was not less than a shock for the world. There exist different views regarding Libyan nuclear turnaround, justifying the factors behind this move. This paper argues that the decision by Libyan leadership to give up the WMD ambition was not merely due to the US invasion in Iraq in 2003 rather it was the consequence of the unfolding of variables like security, economy and political concerns of Libya over the decades, ultimately forcing Libyan leadership to surrender its WMD dreams.

Keywords: Libya, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Disarmament.

Introduction

Libya renounced to give up its WMD program at the end of 2003. Libya (The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) made it public by issuing state policy on December 19, 2003 showing its willingness to dismantle its WMD program.¹ This announcement was very shocking for the world community who had been witnessing the desperate efforts of Libya, either to acquire or develop indigenously the WMD at any cost, since 1969's regime change in Libya. The Libyan aspiration for the WMD included the chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

In this backdrop, different views and conspiracy theories surfaced about the factors which induced Libya and its leadership to abandon its WMD programs. It is learnt that there exist two major perspectives about the Libya's case of WMD and its subsequent policy decision for wrap-up of WMD. According to one popular perspective in West, many analysts emphasize that the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, besides the interdiction of a Libya bound ship in October 2003, loaded with accessories and components allegedly used in nuclear facilities, became the key factor in Tripoli's decision. The other major perspective refers towards the evolving dynamics of the

*Muhammad Usman Asghar, Dr. Muhammad Bashir Khan and Dr. Shahzad Hussain are faculty members at the Department of Government and Public Policy, Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad.

regional security, depleting economy as a consequence of years long economic sanctions and isolation on diplomatic fronts as the key factors in Libya's decision of a turnaround regarding the WMD.

The article examines and analyses these underlying factors, which compelled Libya to give up its WMD aspiration. The article is based on the main argument that Libya's renouncement was not merely due to US invasion of Iraq; rather it was the result of diplomatic efforts of the international community, evolving security situation of the region and indigenous economic and political layout of Libya over the decades. This paper will briefly outline the history of WMD in Libya and its struggle to achieve WMD and analysis of key factors which changed the ideology of the Libyan leadership regarding the WMD.

Historical Background

Libya's long-time leader Colonel Muammar Qadhafi has utilized all of his country resources to get the WMD technology since 1970. Colonel Qadhafi sought to obtain and develop nuclear weapons besides chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction as well. There could be certainly strong and compelling logics with the Libyan leader but the reality unfolds that the world super powers were not happy with the Libya's intentions for the acquisition of WMD. Libya's WMD aspirations date decades ago in the history.

Libya got its independence on 24 December 1951 as United Kingdom of Libya under the monarchy of King Idrees who was the only monarch of Libya. Under the King Idrees's regime, Libya enjoyed very cordially relations with Western countries, especially USA. Libya signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in July 1968 under King Idrees.² The monarchy was toppled by a coup that changed the regime and Colonel Qadhafi took control of Libya.

Muammar Qadhafi started materializing his dream to acquire the nuclear weapons in the very first year of his reign. Qadhafi was so desperate for nukes that he sent his trusted aide (Lieutenant Major Abdelsalam Jallud) to Peoples Republic of China repeatedly with the hope of getting success to purchase the of nuclear weapons. On same lines, Qadhafi took his chance to convince India as well under a deal that offered India repayment of all its foreign debts (estimated at \$ 15 billion) in exchange of nuclear weapons but both attempts could not reap the desired results for Libyan leader.³

It was year 1971, under the new regime when Libya opted to be part of the 1925 Geneva Protocol that bans both chemical and biological weapons and their use in wars.⁴ Libya had not shown any serious intentions to opt for the possession or development of WMD. Libya institutionalized its nuclear energy aspirations under a commission in 1973.⁵

Libya's agreement with international treaties posed no serious threat to the world peace. Libya ratified the NPT on May 26, 1975.⁶ It is worth mentioning here that

NPT was signed by the pro-Western monarch; King Idrees whereas, it was ratified after seven years by an anti-Western military dictator; Colonel Qadhafi.

Libya also cooperated with Pakistan in 1974. Libya helped financially to Pakistan besides providing the vital ingredient for nuclear energy (Uranium, “yellow cake”) from Niger. It remains uncertain that, what was Libya’s demand in reward from Pakistan either some nuclear technology transfer or share in nuclear weapons.⁷

Libya and USA relations saw first confrontation, when the US embassy was attacked and set on fire by a mob in Tripoli on December 2, 1979.⁸ This incident gave birth to a new era of tension between the Libya and USA. America has always disliked Libya under Qadafi rule.⁹ In the backdrop of this incident, the U.S. government labeled Libya as the terrorist country. US government also imposed sanctions on Libya for the first time, after this incident. As a matter of fact, the bilateral relations between the USA and Libya have remained hostile since mid 1970’s.

In pursuit of its covert and classified WMD program, Libya has reportedly procured almost 2 kilo-tons of Uranium (that was lightly processed for further use) from Niger for its 10 megawatt nuclear research reactor at Tajoura which was completed by the Soviet Union during 1978-1981.¹⁰ Despite being the signatory to NPT, Libya continued its clandestine nuclear program and tried to make the nuclear bomb as soon as possible.

Libya was playing on both the fronts in 70’s and 80’s. On one hand, it was continuously making agreement with the international world community against the proliferation of WMD whereas on other hand, it was pursuing its WMD program desperately. In 1982, Libya signed the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) that prohibits the states from developing, producing, and stockpiling offensive biological agents.¹¹

Another wave of sanctions shocked Tripoli on January 7, 1986 when US President Ronald Reagan imposed additional economic sanctions in the milieu of two attacks at airports in Rome and Vienna in 1985.¹² This reinforcement of sanctions added the burden on Libyan economy. The West was blaming Libya for its support towards terrorism. The tense bilateral relations become more aggressive and hostile when an American airplane carrying 259 passengers exploded en route from London to New York over Lockerbie, Scotland. It is reported that this fatal accident caused a death toll of 270 lives on December 21, 1988. Two Libyan officers were identified as chief suspects of the bombing incident by the investigators.¹³ After a year, in 1989, another similar act of terrorism shocked the world when a French airliner bound for Paris exploded killing all 171 people. Once again, the traces of miscreants who were allegedly involved in this heinous act were two Libyans and this was also evident from the subsequent reports of investigating authorities in 1991.¹⁴

These two heinous acts of terrorism paved the way for Western powers to make their Alliance against Libya. As a result, United Nations Security Council adopted

Resolution 748 in 1992 and Resolution 883 in 1993 sanctioning Libya (arms embargo, international travel restrictions, limited freeze of Libyan assets and ban on oil exports).¹⁵

Libya joined the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in April 1996, by signing the Treaty of Pelindaba.¹⁶ This treaty was aimed to bar its member states from developing, acquiring, and possessing nuclear weapons. By signing the Pelindaba Treaty, Libya's policy on WMD experienced paradigm shift and its WMD surge was expected to be reverted in near future. Libya brought a major shift in its WMD stance. As a consequence, Libyan officials approached to US for secret talk regarding the elimination of their chemical weapons in May 1999.¹⁷ Eventually, Libya also signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 2001.¹⁸

It is reported that Libyan regime through its intelligence officials approached British intelligence counterparts to initiate covert dialogue regarding the termination of Libya's WMD programs in early 2003.¹⁹ These subsequent negotiations also included U.S. officials. The meetings took place prior to US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003.²⁰

In an allegedly intelligence based operation, officials from Germany and Italy successfully managed to intercept a ship bound for Libya with centrifuge components on October 4, 2003.²¹ This revelation proved to be the last nail in the coffin of Libyan nuclear program and proved to be a big blow to Libyan covert aspirations for the nuclear program.

As a preemptive prudent gesture, Libya's Foreign Ministry publicly renounced its WMD programs with a promise to terminate such programs, adhering to its obligations under the NPT and BTWC, as well as acceding to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).²² Libya also ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on October 4, 2003.²³

Libya's Quest for WMD

Libya pursued its agenda of achieving the WMD, which could raise the Libya's strategic power and importance to the optimum level. Libya's adrenal rush for WMD in general and for nuclear weapons in specific, are believed to be in response to Israel's nuclear weapons program. Libya envisaged itself to be the sole and first nuclear Islamic state. This was aimed to give boost to its military might regionally and globally. Israel was always perceived as a major external threat to its security, whereas, Israel enjoyed the full support by the Western states, especially United States of America. Libya's quest for WMD was based on the assumption that the WMDs are inevitable for Libya and its security both regionally and globally. Nuclear weapons as the symbol of modern statehood were the big fascinating indoctrination of Libyan leadership in pursuit of its nuclear program. During the Cold War Era, nuclear weapons were deemed as the excellence of scientific and technological supremacy over archrivals. This capability and capacity was also perceived as a ticket to an exclusive and elite international club of nuclear states.²⁴

Chemical Weapons

Libya has been involved in the chemical weapons (CW) and its production programs. The aspiration for the CW was the part of its major aim to achieve capabilities of WMD. Libya has developed indigenous production capabilities for CW and their storage facilities as well. Libya had developed more than one facility for the CW as the same is evident and shown in the Figure 1.

Pharma 150 (Rabta)

The first CW production facility, known as Pharma 150, was a large industrial complex at Rabta, a sparsely populated and mountainous desert area about 75 miles southwest of Tripoli.²⁵

Pharma 200 (Sebha)

Libya was keenly pursuing its chemical weapons program. A second Libyan CW plant, called Pharma 200, was reportedly almost identical to the Rabta plant and was located underground in a remote desert location, approximately 650 miles south of Tripoli in the Sebha Oasis, which is a military base, located about 95 kilometres north of the Chadian-Libyan border.²⁶

Tarhunah

Tarhunah was an underground CW production complex near the town of Tarhunah, 50 miles southeast of Tripoli, intended to supplant the Rabta plant.²⁷




Figure-1: Map of Libyan CW Facilities²⁸

Biological Weapons

There was no evidence of Libyan biological weapons program or any facility in Libya. This could have been an agenda for future pursuits of Libyan leadership but was not initiated on ground.

Nuclear Weapons

Libyan nuclear program was not at advance stage as compared to that of Iran, because it lacked the basic infrastructure and technical capacity to lead its rudimentary nuclear program into a complete nuclear facility. Libya's nuclear capabilities were of basic research and development nature. Libya's only declared nuclear facility was a 10-megawatt research reactor at Tajura known as Tajura Nuclear Research Center (TNRC), which was being purchased from the former Soviet Union.²⁹ This reactor was subject to IAEA safeguards. Libya intended to build a 440-megawatt power reactor near the Gulf of Sidra, which it had initially sought from the Soviet Union in 1977 but could not materialize. Due to sanctions, Libya mostly attempted to acquire weapons-grade fissile material and technological assistance from the black market for its nuclear program. Figure 2 illustrates the location of Libyan nuclear facility.³⁰




Figure-2: Map of Selected Nuclear and Chemical Facilities in Iran

The TNRC consisted of numerous laboratories and facilities. One such facility is the 10-megawatt (MW), pool-type Tajura Research Reactor (IRT-I), which was constructed in 1980 along with a TM4-A Tokamak fusion reactor.³¹

From the years 1983 to 1989, Libya had conducted various small-scale uranium conversion experiments and again after 1994 had some experiments to limited extent, at Tajura Nuclear Research Center.³² Such kind of experiments, leave the traces for experts, regarding the Libyan efforts to enrich the uranium through isotope separation. Enriched uranium can be used for both civil and military nuclear weapons. Libya had exerted its maximum capacity and resources for the development of nuclear bomb but could not succeed due to various reasons.

Challenges to Libyan WMD Program

The major challenge to Libyan WMD program was the technical capacity and availability of nuclear related apparatus. Libya's nuclear program was dependent on the supplies from the foreign suppliers. In this backdrop, Libya relied on both legal and illegal ways to acquire the nuclear related material, equipment, and expertise. Despite the availability of the Libyan resources for the nuclear program, international sanctions played vital role in barring Libya from acquiring required nuclear support from abroad. It is already discussed that US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in collaboration with its British, German and Italian counterparts successfully seized over 1,000 assembled gas centrifuges and components from German flagged Libya-bound ship.³³ This interception was a big blow to the Libyan nuclear program, authenticating its covert efforts to acquire nuclear supplies from the black market. Libya did not surrender till 2002 and kept working on its WMD program under the strict vigilance and restrictions of international sanctions and arms control initiatives by super-powers.

Key Factors for Libyan Turnaround on WMD

Libya concluded that it should give up its WMD program in greater national interest on the basis of a variety of the following factors:

Security

- Right from the advent of Qadhafi Regime in 1969, Libya opted aggressive policies and postures against Israel, challenging its growing hegemony and influence in the region. Qadhafi wanted to lead the Arab against the Israel based on its military strategy. Qadhafi had an influence of Arab defeat in the 1967 war against Israel, which was a 'searing blow to Qadhafi's nationalist and pan-Arab pride'.³⁴ In order to achieve strategic edge over other Arab countries, Libya pursued WMD program with all its resources. The Arab-Israeli conflict lied at the centre of Qadhafi's ideology and Libya's policy.
- Libya never faced serious threats to its national sovereignty. Libyan neighbours were not a strategic risk to its national security. The entire logic and motivation behind the acquisition of WMD was to portray Libya as a regional power. Over the decades, Libya realized that the security narrative has yielded nothing to it, except economic deprivation and isolation among the international community. This became the strong argument for the Libyan leadership to revisit its aggressive policy, towards self-perceived threats and west.

Leadership and Ideology

- In a bloodless military takeover, Muammar al-Qadhafi overthrew the monarchy on September 01, 1969 and established a new authoritarian political system.³⁵ Since its conception, the new regime under Qadhafi's rule, developed hostile relations with USA unlike the previous regime of King Idris was a pro-Western regime in its nature. Qadhafi and his fellows inherited the same ideological background which was centric to anti-US and Israeli sentiments. In the later years, Qadhafi regime got even more rigid, in its ideology of hostility which was evident from serious incidents, ranging from clashes with neighbouring states to the promotion of fascist ideology, in its international affairs.

Arab Unity and Pan-Africanism

- Qadhafi was strong advocate of Arab Unity. This motivation was derived from the defeat of Arab countries by Israel, which was due to lack of unity among the Arab states. For this purpose, Qadhafi exerted his best efforts to bring all Arab countries on single page but he could not succeed. This shattered him and became a factor of Libyan turnaround on its pursuits of WMD. Qadhafi's Universal Theory which he proposed in 1978 seemed no more realistic.³⁶
- Desperate Qadhafi did not restrict Libya's role as a regional power and leader among Arab countries. Instead, Qadhafi portrayed Libyan state as an integral part of sub-Saharan Africa by involving Tripoli in African affairs. The reduction of Western and Israeli influence in the middle east was the main driver of Libya's policy and to achieve this goal, Qadhafi offered financial and military aid to several 'liberation movements' across Africa and played a mediatory role in various conflicts between African countries.³⁷

Domestic Economic and Political Changes

- At the time of independence, Libya was among the world's poorest countries. Pro-Western monarchy of Libya was dependent on foreign aid. In mid 1950s, Libya discovered oil reserves and extracted it with the help of West. This exploration of oil made Libya one of the highest grossing countries in Africa. At the time of Libyan Coup, it was ranked among the wealthy countries. Libya adopted the socialist policies in Qadhafi regime.
- In a very short span of time, Libyan economy showed the signs of recession caused by numerous factors such as command economy, bad governance, lack of institutional capacity, stagnate oil prices, lack of new economic reforms to attract foreign investments, costly military expenditures, and most important of all were the international sanctions. All these factors accompanied by Soviet Union collapse, dragged Libya towards the status of a 'rogue state'.³⁸ It seemed that Libyan leadership was madly involved in the WMD pursuits, ignoring rest of the state responsibilities. These policies were not sustaining the growing problems of the Libyan economy. New generation was no more interested in the old rhetoric of the Libyan leadership regarding the WMD.

- Qadhafi had been ruling Libya since 1969. With the passage of time, he felt to prepare the next generation as a replacement to him in the future. This unfolds another major factor regarding the succession planning by Qadhafi. In this context, most suitable candidate for the regime was his own son 'Saif ul Islam'. Qadhafi wanted to hand off a stable, successful government to his son, realizing that the reforms would be difficult for his son to implement after Qadhafi's death.³⁹

Libya in Turmoil

- Given all the resources, Libya was not growing and developing, both economically and socially. This was an alarming situation for the leadership. In this backdrop, Libyan leadership started pondering on the contemporary geo-strategic and political situation of the world politics in mid 90s. As a matter of fact, Libya was producing 1.488 million b/d in the year 2003, which accounted for less than half of its production in 1970.⁴⁰
- These factors compelled Libya and Qadhafi, to revisit his policies and vision, regarding Libya, so that further harm to its identity and economy could be avoided.
- In April 1999 (the same month he agreed to release the Lockerbie suspects for trial, and one month before he offered to give up his WMD to the United States), Qadhafi declared: "The world has changed radically and drastically. The methods and ideas should change, and being a revolutionary and a progressive man, I have to follow this movement."⁴¹
- Sanctions had severely depleted the Libyan economy and its resources over the years. Qadhafi regime was desperate to get rid of these sanctions in 90s, which had become inevitable for a prosperous and developing Libya. It is estimated that lifting of sanctions would mean "a several billion dollar infusion into the Libyan economy and new jobs for thousands of Libyans."⁴²

Libyan Nuclear Turnaround

- Ultimately in 2003, Libya renounced the WMD program. The breakthrough was shocking for the international community. Certain arguments surfaced in the backdrop of this announcement by Libya. A clear divide was witnessed among the experts and political figures regarding the Libyan decision to abandon its WMD program. A new debate overcame the world political analysts, pondering on the exact reasons for Libya's give up.
- US Vice-President Dick Cheney said, 'Five days after we captured Saddam Hussein, Qadhafi came forward and announced that he was going to surrender all of his nuclear materials to the United States', whereas the British Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon stated, 'We showed after Saddam failed to cooperate with the UN that we meant business and Libya will draw that lesson.'⁴³
- In fact, Libya's decision to abandon its WMD program was not reached upon overnight. It was the result of a range of factors (security, ideology, economy and diplomatic isolation) being spread over years since 1970s.

Analysis of Libyan WMD Disarmament

Being the unique case, Libya is the only example in the history of WMD, where the same leader made the decision to acquire the WMD and after 30 years of struggle, renounced to forgo the WMD. Qadhafi regime had to surrender its pursuit of WMD on the basis of evolving security paradigms on the regional and global level, depreciate economy, long standing diplomatic isolation, evolving political scenarios and tight sanctions. US invasion in Iraq was not a major driver for Libya's renouncement. It is evident from the fact that Qadhafi had been trying to negotiate with the United States for WMD since the early 1990s.⁴⁴ Libya wanted to remove the tag of 'rogue state' from its identity in the world which was labelled to it as per the 'rogue states' doctrine of Clinton era.

*It was General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint-Chiefs of Staff, who developed the strategy, given the imminent collapse of the USSR in 1989-90, Powell proposed a set of guidelines upon which US military strategy would be based. Thus, 'the anti-rogue strategy has become the defining paradigm for American security policy.'*⁴⁵

Except for Cuba and North Korea, most of the 'rogue states' were in the Middle East and were Muslim states namely Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan and Syria.⁴⁶ Libyan economy and public suffered massively, due to the international sanctions and isolation and have to revert from its year's long struggle of WMD. This argument is not true that Libya gave up its WMD program due to the fear of US invasion, similar to that of Iraq in 2003. There are numerous evidences that Libya had shown its interest to roll back its WMD program in 90s.

Bush government was in serious and tough situation when it could not ascertain the WMD allegations, despite invading Iraq. In this backdrop, Libyan confession provided them with a breath of credibility among the international community. The US administration was embarrassed by its subsequent failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. President Bush and other administration spokespersons were quick to portray Libya's December 2003 decision to abandon unconventional weapons as the direct result of the US invasion of Iraq.⁴⁷ In fact, reality is altogether opposite and the Libya's decision was the result of years of repercussions.

Libya's decision was warmly welcomed by the international community. It was a big leap towards securing the world from WMD.

*Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker stated May 2, 2005 during the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference that Libya's choice "to demonstrate that, in a world of strong non-proliferation norms, it is never too late to make the decision to become a fully compliant NPT state," noting that Tripoli's decision has been "amply rewarded."*⁴⁸

USA and British were not the only stakeholders in Libya's surrender for WMD. It is worth mentioning here that Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the IAEA have played their vital role in helping the proponents of non-

proliferation of WMD by assessing Libya's efforts and providing technical assistance.⁴⁹ The efforts of these organizations, interest groups, advocacy groups and other international institutions are commendable.

There are certain additional factors which should not be ignored while analysing the Libyan WMD program. First of all, Libya was not the only state in Middle East and African region who pursued WMD. Iraq, Israel, Egypt, Syria and Iran have also sought different varieties of WMD.

Libya has proved its willingness to disarm its stockpiles of nuclear weapons and to roll back its nuclear program through transparency and dedication via cooperation with the international community and institutions. This unearths the fundamental change in Libya's policy from a 'pariah state' to a responsible member state in the international community. Libyan leadership realized over the years that WMD were no more useful in world politics. Qadhafi had been vocal against Israel since the advent of its regime in defence to Palestine's rights whereas no significant success was achieved due to this hostility, rather race for WMD proved to be a futile struggle.

Saiful Islam was quoted as, "We have seen that the armed struggle of the Palestinians, which lasted 50 years, did not produce results such as those obtained by means of negotiations that lasted five years. They told the commander [his father] that they had given up the rifle and taken the path of negotiations, and obtained what they had not obtained in 50 years."⁵⁰

Conclusion

The undertaken study concludes that US led Invasion in Iraq had no major role in compelling Qadhafi's regime to give up WMD. A deeper analysis of Libya's case study reveals that security dynamics and repercussions, ideological change, International isolation, economic downfall with stringent sanctions, and international pressure were key drivers behind Libyan decision to roll back from WMD route. Another noteworthy factor that proved to be a prudent step in this case was international dialogue and engagement effort, in order to bring the desired outcome. Thereby, Libya's renouncement of WMD has proved to be a success for the policy of engagement through dialogue accompanied by non-coercive efforts in the shape of economic and diplomatic sanctions. This event in particular has also foiled the notion of pre-emptive strike as a strategy to force the opponent in international security environment.

Qadhafi's decision to disarm its country from WMD and abandoning the nuclear weapons program was a success for the arms control and disarmament regimes. Eventually Libyan leadership was compelled to give up its WMD program and surrender to non-proliferation regimes. This was marked as an accomplishment by the advocates of WMD free world. Libya's policy decision to windup its WMD program was warmly welcomed by the international community.

However, this episode does not end here. It was witnessed that the same Western powers that first played their role in disarming Libya, later played their vicious role in toppling the Qadhafi regime, in the name of introducing democracy to Libya. All the guarantees and sureties to Qadhafi for abandoning WMD program proved mere tactics to weaken his strength. After Qadhafi regime, Libya still looks for peace and development as promised by the Western actors. Libya's current socio-political and economic situation depicts a very grey picture of the affairs as compared to that of Qadhafi's era. This raises serious questions regarding the credibility of international mediation and engagement efforts, and, highlights a critical flash point of trust anxiety for non-nuclear NPT signatories. Another scenario also concludes that the Libya's decision to give up its WMD was a respite for the Qadhafi regime which added few years to its reign otherwise this coercive action could have been initiated decades ago.

This study seeks subsequent research in the matter where the nexus between WMD and its significance as a tool of national power was compromised with claims of peace and development in exchange by the West to Libya. It is anticipated that this episode has shattered the trust of non-proliferation regime among the nuclear states specially those who are non-signatory to the NPT.

NOTES

- ¹ Gawdat Bahgat, 'Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Case of Libya', *International Relations* 2008; 22; 105. Accessed from <http://ire.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/22/1/105>
- ² Ibid.
- ³ Etel Solingen, "Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East", Princeton University Press, 2009. Accessed from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7sokp>
- ⁴ See, "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Case of Libya".
- ⁵ Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, "Libya's Nuclear Turnaround: Perspectives from Tripoli", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Winter, 2008), pp. 55-72. Accessed from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25482472>
- ⁶ Chronology of Libya's Disarmament and Relations with the United States, published on Arms Control Association (<http://www.armscontrol.org>), updated on Feb 2014.
- ⁷ See, "Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East",
- ⁸ Chronology of Libya's Disarmament and Relations with the United States, published on Arms Control Association (<http://www.armscontrol.org>), updated on Feb 2014.
- ⁹ Yahia H. Zoubir, "Libya in US Foreign Policy: From Rogue State to Good Fellow?", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Feb., 2002), pp. 31-53. Accessed from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993575?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents
- ¹⁰ See, "Chronology of Libya's Disarmament and Relations with the United States".
- ¹¹ See, "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Case of Libya".
- ¹² See, "Chronology of Libya's Disarmament and Relations with the United States".
- ¹³ Ibid.
- ¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁸ See, "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Case of Libya".
- ¹⁹ See, "Chronology of Libya's Disarmament and Relations with the United States".
- ²⁰ Ibid.
- ²¹ Ibid.
- ²² Ibid.
- ²³ Ibid.
- ²⁴ Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, "Libya's Nuclear Turnaround: Perspectives from Tripoli", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Winter, 2008), pp. 55-72. Accessed from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25482472>
- ²⁵ Joshua Sinai, "Libya's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction", *The Nonproliferation Review*, Spring-Summer 1997.
- ²⁶ Ibid.
- ²⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁸ Ibid.
- ²⁹ See, "Libya's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction".
- ³⁰ The map was accessed on May 18, 2015 from the website of "Federation of American Scientists" http://fas.org/irp/threat/prolif96/me_na.html
- ³¹ Jack Boureston and Yana Feldman, "Verifying Libya's nuclear disarmament", *Verification Yearbook* 2004.
- ³² See, "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Case of Libya".
- ³³ Ibid.
- ³⁴ Ibid.
- ³⁵ See, "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Case of Libya".
- ³⁶ Ibid.
- ³⁷ Ibid.
- ³⁸ Ibid.
- ³⁹ Maria Rost Rublee, "Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint", University of Georgia Press, January 2010, Accessed from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46ncd5>
- ⁴⁰ See, "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Case of Libya".
- ⁴¹ See, "Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint".
- ⁴² Ibid.
- ⁴³ See, "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Case of Libya".
- ⁴⁴ See, "Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint".
- ⁴⁵ Yahia H. Zoubir, "Libya in US Foreign Policy: From Rogue State to Good Fellow?", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Feb., 2002), pp. 31-53. Accessed from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993575?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents
- ⁴⁶ Ibid.
- ⁴⁷ Ronald Bruce St John, "Libya Is Not Iraq": Preemptive Strikes, WMD and Diplomacy", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 58, No. 3, 2004, pp. 386-402 accessed from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4330031>
- ⁴⁸ See, "Chronology of Libya's Disarmament and Relations with the United States".
- ⁴⁹ See, "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Case of Libya".
- ⁵⁰ See, "Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint",