



MARGALLA

P A P E R S

A Journal of International Affairs



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MESSAGE OF PATRON-IN-CHIEF

In an environment of rapidly transforming geopolitical realities, a constant and timely reckoning of policy substitutes is necessary to evaluate the veracity of present course of action. South Asia has long been a sensitive region, destabilized by the complexities arising out of international power play, bitter internal and mutual conflicts and hindered growth despite its enormous economic potential. Thriving in such an environment poses a huge challenge to Pakistan whose frontline status has often embroiled it in situations detrimental to its core interests.

The demands of desired progress entail a delicate strategic balancing and intricate policy maneuvers. It is incumbent upon the cognoscente to acquaint the decision-makers of the eminent potentialities in order to adjust to the shifting sands of regional and international phenomena. Fortunately, our intelligentsia is alive to this obligation and fully perceptive of the portents of future changes.

I congratulate the Editorial team of "*Margalla Papers*" for providing a platform that affords an uninhibited intellectual discourse aimed at situational and policy assessment. My appreciation is also due towards the contributors for their incisive inquisition into the thorny labyrinth of foreign relations which has made this publication a valuable study into geostrategic evolution. I sincerely hope that in its coming issues, "*Margalla Papers*" will emerge as a dependable source of creditable opinion on matters of national and international significance.

**Lieutenant General
Majid Ehsan, HI(M)
President National Defence University**

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the background of emerging global challenges, Pakistan is actively playing the role of a responsible nation to maintain peace in the region. Though our country is confronting with both internal and external variegated challenges yet we believe that days are not far ahead when we will achieve the ultimate destination of peace and stability both on the economic and social platforms. Pakistan Army has successfully met the target of defeating terrorism and militancy within the county by virtue of unprecedented professionalism coupled with the sacrifices which have been acknowledged by all nations in the world. The current operation '*Radd-ul-Fasaad*' to eliminate terrorists across Pakistan will prove peacemaker for the society and pacemaker for the economy; with special reference to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. We believe in peaceful coexistence and expect of all our neighbours' to honour our peaceful existence in the region. We strongly condemn all shapes of aggression and extremism and respect the integrity and sovereignty of our neighbors'.

Our professionalism and commitment which we have displayed during our war on terror has been acknowledged by the international power-players. This capability and performance of Pakistan Army remains unprecedentedly unique in the world. No doubt our achievements would not have been possible without the support of our nation.

The latest edition of *Margalla Papers*, offers a panorama of defence and security related strategic issues with the solution oriented objective judgments and views of various scholars in the relevant fields. The objectivity and impartiality is commendable. The peer reviewers and editorial boards deserve appreciation.

Major General
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REFLECTIONS ON INDO – PAK 1971 WAR THROUGH THEORIES OF WAR AND PEACE

*Zahid Latif Mirza**

Abstract

The authoritative account provides an excellent overview of reflections on Indo-Pakistan 1971 war through theories of war and peace. He is of the view divergences of East Pakistan began to surface with West Pakistan soon after independence, when a group of students protested the Quaid-i-Azam's speech in Dacca in 1948, making Urdu the national language. Two years later in 1950, the East Pakistan Muslim League asked for maximum autonomy. Then in 1954, after elections in East Pakistan, the United Front, which won with overwhelming majority, asked for a complete autonomy according to the Pakistan Resolution. A West Pakistan dominated central government's manipulation to deny power to the elected majority in East Pakistan added to the accumulating grievances. Delays in constitution-making and holding national elections exacerbated East Pakistan's sense of deprivation.

Keywords: Reflections, Pakistan, War, Peace, Pakistan's Resolution, East Pakistan, Autonomy, Operation.

Introduction

Shared interest in the protection of cultural, economic and political rights brought the Muslims of British India to a common platform. The leaders of Bengal played a seminal role in the formation of the Muslim League and the formulation of the demand for Pakistan. After the state came into existence, the unity of the two wings came under strain as a result of several factors; some of which were inherent in demography, differential-colonial-legacy and resource endowment, while others arose from narrow and short-sighted politics.

Differences between West Pakistan began to surface soon after independence, when a group of students protested the Quaid-i-Azam's speech in Dacca in 1948, making Urdu the national language. Two years later, the East Pakistan Muslim League asked for maximum autonomy. Then in 1954, after elections in East Pakistan, the United Front, which won with overwhelming

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majority, asked for a complete autonomy according to the *Pakistan Resolution*. The West Pakistan's dominated central government's manipulation to deny power to the elected majority in East Pakistan added to the accumulating grievances. Delays in constitution-making and holding national elections exacerbated East Pakistan's sense of deprivation.

East Pakistan's isolation during the 1965 War and its lack of self-defence capabilities gave a fillip to the existing demand for autonomy. In March 1966, the Awami League (AL) leader Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman put forward the demand of Bengalis in the form of *Six Points*. Ayub Khan's highly centralised government equated this demand for autonomy with secessionism.

Monitoring the brewing trouble and growing alienation in East Pakistan, India encouraged the separatist sentiments. The same year, a group of nationalists in Agartala planned sabotage. A raid on an armoury led to the arrest of twenty-eight people including armed forces personnel in January 1969. The government also implicated Mujib-ur-Rehman in this case, though he was in custody during the Agartala Conspiracy period. Mujib's Six Points and his trial made him a hero out of nothing. As if this was not enough, the federal government's indifference to the plight of the people in East Pakistan after 1970's flood broadened the mistrust fissures.

The December 1970 elections further polarised the united Pakistan. As a result, Awami League, led by Mujib-ur-Rehman swept polls in East Pakistan, winning absolute majority in National Assembly. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan People's Party emerged as a runner up. These election results indicated with clarity the devastating polarization of popular feelings between East and West Pakistan. Faced with this unexpected outcome, the West Pakistani leaders sought for other means to maintain their hold on power. Bhutto in an ill-conceived move, with the help of military leadership, tried to stall the convening of the National Assembly; which at later stage proved a decision with fatal consequences.

Mujib, unable to get his fair share in power, took an extreme position. He declined any invitation to visit Islamabad for talks. The political situation worsened. Yahya - Mujib talks in Dacca broke down on 23rd March 1971 when the Awami League proposed Pakistan should be made a confederation. On 25th March 1971, the Army started a crackdown in East Pakistan to restore law and order situation. Though the military within a month reasonably restored the law

and order situation but unimaginative use of force further alienated the masses in East Pakistan. This element contributed in worsening of situation beyond control later on.

After Yahya Khan's military action in East Pakistan, Yahya Khan's military action gave a chance to India to play its role and cut Pakistan into two, the Indian Government with revisionist designs moved into a higher gear. India fully exploited this window of opportunity to cut Pakistan into two. Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) operatives facilitated move of Tajuddin Ahmed, an Awami League leader, to a border village in India to proclaim independence of Bangladesh and installed him as head of the Provisional Bangladesh Government in Calcutta rented by RAW. On 31st March 1971, the Indian parliament adopted a resolution assuring the East Pakistani insurgents that their struggle and sacrifices from will receive the wholehearted support of the people of India. The Indians first secretly, and later overtly, began building up a rebel militia force called the Mukti Bahini.

As per West Pakistan's assessment, Indians would restrict their assistance to moral and material support but the Indian government ordered plans for a campaign to take over East Pakistan. It however, deferred the implementation in light of their Army Chief General Manekshaw's view that the army needed six to seven months to prepare for war. The Indians planned their offensive in November 1971 when the weather in Himalayas would make Chinese intervention more difficult.

The Indians started an all-out war by end of November. With the complete numerical superiority in air, sea and land, its forces overrun the Pakistani Eastern Command leading to surrender on 16th December 1971.

Genesis of Issue

The Language Issue

The language issue started on February 25, 1948, when a Bengali Hindu member, Mr Dharendra-Nath Dutta, moved a resolution in the constituent assembly that Bengali, along with Urdu, should be used in the assembly proceedings.¹ To this development, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan responded, "It is necessary for a nation to have one language and the language can only be Urdu and no other language." This had negative implications for Bengalis as their language was spoken by 54.6% of the people of Pakistan while Urdu was the

language of only 7.2% of Pakistan's population.² The central government's insistence to bulldoze the issue resulted into *Language Riots of 1952*.

Constitutional-cum-Political Issues

The most serious challenge faced by Pakistan after independence was formulation of a constitution. The assembly however, failed to draft a constitution till its dismissal in 1954. The consequences were serious: politics reverted to provincial levels and trust deficit started to increase between both the wings and there were calls for more autonomy from East Pakistan. 1954 is sub-national tendencies started to appear in East Pakistan. AK Fazlul Haq pioneered these tendencies, when as Chief Minister of East Pakistan; he made statements which were suggestive of independent Bangladesh. It is unfortunate to point out that government failed to fully comprehend the consequences of such divide. This was made obvious by its almost inaction to the United Front's 21 points, which asked for greater autonomy for East Pakistan.³

The constitutional problem lingered on. Dismissal of various governments, formulation and abrogation of 1956 Constitution and introduction of a system of *parity* through *One Unit Formula* further aggravated the political crisis. Imposition of martial law in 1958 stalled political processes and thus paved the way for political polarization. Ayub's 1962 Constitution also failed to provide any solution to the problem, as it contained substantial executive powers for the president and thus became presidential in nature. As a whole, sub-national tendencies, which started surfacing in 1951, finally dominated the political scene in 1966. These were manifested in Mujib's Six Points, which ultimately led to the breakup of the country.

Economy

"East Bengal was the poorest part of the province of Bengal in undivided India." The economic activity suffered further at the time of partition by award of Calcutta – the economic hub of Bengal to India. Economic deprivation and its realisation by Bangalis though justified, need to be seen in this context. It may however, be noted that the central government did not do enough to alleviate the economic sufferings of East Pakistanis, instead its economic policies further alienated the Bangalis.

Comparative Share in the Government' Services

Notwithstanding the inbuilt inadequacies in representation of East Pakistan in the armed forces, civil services and other government institutions, and also the fact that government did quite a bit to improve the situation, the overall political and economic environment led many in the East to believe that enough was not being done to overcome the inadequacy of representation.

Major Events Leading to 1971 War

Mujib's Six Points

After 1965 War, Mujib and other East Pakistani politicians felt that West Pakistan cared less about them and also felt economically strangled by 1965 war. Consequently sub-national themes gained further support in East Pakistan and in March 1966, less than six months after the war ended; Mujib advanced a six point programme to resounding public response.⁴ The programme fundamentally called for a separate foreign exchange accounts for both wings and asked for permission to raise para-military forces at the provincial level.⁵ Politicians of West Pakistan felt that six points were secessionist in nature and therefore, did not support them. However, due to inept handling of essentially a political issue, the six points became a popular political demand in East Pakistan.

Round Table Conference (RTC)

Frustrated by agitations in both wings, Ayub Khan decided to call a Round Table Conference (RTC) in early months of 1969. Mujib was acquitted from charges of Agartala Conspiracy Case to attend the conference. However, Bhutto and Maulana Bhashani refused to attend.⁶ Results of RTC further alienated the Bengalis, who felt that their basic demands were put under the carpet; and in doing so, most of the West Pakistani politicians also supported the government.

Outcome of Elections

After assuming office, General Yahya announced elections under universal suffrage to be held in December 1970. 'One Unit' was also abolished, which implied permanent majority for East Pakistan in the National Assembly. Awami League (AL) got thumping majority, winning 160 out of 162 East Pakistan National Assembly seats.⁷ In the west, PPP of Bhutto won 81 out of 120 National Assembly seats. As a result of elections, Bhutto insisted on some power sharing

formula, and continuously refused to go to Dhaka to attend the assembly session, which had been called on 3rd March 1971. Unfortunately, General Yahya, on 1st March 1971 postponed the assembly session, a decision which had disastrous consequences. Postponement of the assembly session resulted in a wave of protests and demonstrations. It is generally agreed upon that Bhutto's decision not to attend the assembly was very unfortunate.

Awami League called for civil disobedience. Political activists of Awami League took over the administration. Writ of the government virtually evaporated. Army and civilian mobs clashed, further deepening the divide. Mujib ran the administration through directives issued on his behalf. Dhaka was physically barricaded by Awami League activists. At this juncture, the government took the fatal decision to use the force, which was resented by Lieutenant General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan who tendered his resignation. A military operation code named *Operation Search Light* was launched on night 25/26 March, 1971.

Operation Search Light⁸

The unfortunate decision for suppressing the uprising in East Pakistan by military force was taken on 22nd March 1971 at a meeting between the president, the governor and the martial law administrator at Dacca. No party leader opposed the use of force to re-instate the government's authority.

However, it was not till 24th March 1971 that the final decision to crush the Awami League and its supporters was taken. No amount of persuasion, reasoning or discussion had made Mujib or Bhutto change their rigid stand. The point of no return had arrived. "The killing of a few thousand would not be too high a price for keeping the country together. Show them the teeth and they will be quiet," said General Yahya to General Tikka Khan.⁹

Objectives of Operation Search Light

- To seal-off the borders.
- To create conditions for selecting a civilian set up.
- To regain the administration of the province.
- To accommodate the non-radical elements of the elected representatives into a new political arrangement.
- Disarming all Bengali troops.

- Arresting of all prominent Awami League leaders.
- Imposing of martial law strictly.
- Controlling of all airfields.
- Securing of the Chittagong naval base.
- Ensuring the security of all towns.
- Cutting off East Pakistan from the rest of the world in terms of communication links.
- Taking away Radio and TV stations from the clutches of the Awami League and placing them again under the control of the government.

The Crackdown

In such an environment, Pakistan Army began the military crack-down on the night 25/ 26 March 1971. The next day, Major Zia-ur-Rahman's (a Bangali officer) voice on the radio proclaimed East Pakistan as People's Republic of Bangladesh. "Today Bangladesh is a sovereign and independent state,"¹⁰ said a voice from a clandestine radio station. Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman was arrested and all other leaders of the Awami League escaped to India. The Dacca University was made the first target of the military action on the night between 25 / 26 March 1971.

After Effects of the Military Action

Mujib claimed that over 3 million were killed during the military crackdown. Indians reduced the figure to 1 million. General Tikka Khan admitted 34,000 casualties. The missionaries in East Pakistan estimated a loss of life of about 30,000. Casualties suffered by the Pakistan Army in the counter insurgency operations between March to November, 1971 were 237 officers, 136 JCOs and 3,559 other ranks killed and wounded. Most of the history books give inflated figures of civilian casualties. Sarmila Bose in her latest Book has crystalized the figures with more accuracy.¹¹

By 31st May 1971, the writ of the government had been restored. However a large number of Bengali troops both from the regular army, the para military forces and the police deserted to India with their weapons. They formed the core of the Mukti Bahini. The military action, falsely projected as genocide, added to the antipathy against Pakistan in the international capitals. The bitterness against West Pakistan leadership in general and Pakistan Army in particular had increased manifold.

Out of the eight immediate objectives of Operation Search Light only a few could be achieved and that too partially.

Mukti Bahini Activities

Bengali representation in the armed forces and para military forces in East Pakistan in March, 1971 was about 21,000. After 3rd March 1971, a de-facto Bangladesh had come into existence and the loyalty of the Bengali officers and men had become questionable.¹² Ex-servicemen had already formed a para-military force in support of the Awami League. The turning point came in the form of a military action when the East Bengal Regiments and the Bengali elements in the East Pakistan Rifles were ordered to hand over their weapons to West Pakistanis. As expected, they rebelled and fought their way and joined separatist forces.

On 10th April 1971, Syed Nazr-ul-Islam, so-called acting president of Bangladesh, proclaimed the independence of Bangladesh from Calcutta, formerly the offices of the Deputy High commission for Pakistan. A 'war council' was formed with Bengali Colonel MAG Osmani as its Chairman. Other members of the council included middle tier Bangali Army officers.

The strength of the Mukti Bahini and other allied organizations kept growing and when war broke out, it had reached around 100,000. "The resistance needed planning, weapons training and leadership and only India could provide them," accepted Brigadier Jagdev Singh.¹³ Six training centres were established in India, each commanded by an Indian brigadier with arms and ammunition provided by Indian Army.

Conduct of 1971 War

Sustained operations for about eight months in an unfavourable environment of climate, terrain and hostile population had battle fatigued the Pakistan Army. Casualties were mounting and could not get proper attention because of inadequate facilities for their evacuation. Thus there was a steady erosion of morale, aggravated by propaganda in the international media.

The Indians started an all-out invasion of East Pakistan on 21st November 1971. It was the day of Eid-ul-Fitr. Pakistan Army gave an excellent account at tactical levels and fought gallantly in sectoral battles; however tactical brilliance could not compensate the systemic operational and strategic failures.

When the battle of Dacca started, Army formations of the Eastern Command had already been seriously imbalanced and had lost cohesion. Indians closed in toward Dacca from north and east. The feeling of impending defeat and insecurity pervaded Dacca. The UN had arranged an airlift to evacuate foreign nationals on 8th December and requested India to guarantee safe air evacuation from Dacca. On 9th December, Governor Malik sent his second message to General Yahya Khan to consider an immediate ceasefire and political settlement. The same day General Niazi informed Islamabad about the critical military situation in East Pakistan leading to surrender on 16th December 1971.

Theoretical Lens at Individual Level

Application of Theories

Conduct of key individuals, organizations, groups, states and international actors before, during and in the aftermath of 1971 War can best be analysed through application of some of the established theories explaining the behavioural patterns of individuals, organizations and states.

Rational Choice or Rational Actor Theory

It is a framework for understanding social behaviour based on cost / benefit analyses. The theory therefore focuses on the determinants as to how individuals make certain choices. Rational actors optimize given opportunities. Therefore, from the perspective of rational choice theorists, any rational actor model assumes that actors (such as decision makers) make choices that the actors believe will lead to the best feasible outcomes for them as defined by their personal values or preferences.¹⁴ The rational actors may be individuals in decision making positions as leaders in states or non-state entities.

Sub-Nationalistic / Ethnic Politics of Mujib-ur-Rehman as a Rational Actor

Mujib's role and attitude in 1971 can best be analysed by applying *Rational Actor Theory* if studied in historical perspective. He rose in Bengali politics as a student leader. He was a forceful orator, charismatic leader and became popular for his opposition to West Pakistan's ethnic and institutional discrimination against Bengalis by exploiting their sense of alienation and victimization. In 1963, Mujib's Awami League Party had dropped the word "Muslim" from its name in a shift towards secularism and a broader appeal to

non-Muslim communities. Hence projection of ethnic and sub-nationalist interests far above the interests of Pakistan as a federation became a rationale choice for Mujib as it served both - the Bengali Nationalism as well as his personal aspirations to be the rightful Prime Minister of the country.

Lust for Power and Egoistic Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as a Rational Actor

Bhutto wanted to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan at all costs (regardless of the circumstances) despite losing elections. He never reconciled with the ground realities and considered Bengalis / Mujib to be far too inferior to govern the country as Prime Minister. Following developments amplify Bhutto's behaviour as a rational actor pleading for self-glorification.

Immediately after the elections, Bhutto issued statements which generated inter-regional tension and provoked the Awami League leadership by emphasizing the importance of Awami League - Pakistan People's Party compromise and at same time adopting a threatening posture. On 21st December 1970 at Lahore, he expressed his desire to form a coalition government with the Awami League at Centre. It is generally agreed upon that Bhutto's decision not to attend the assembly session, which was to be held in Dhaka on 3rd March 1971, was very unfortunate as perhaps, proved last straw on camel's back for negotiated settlement of the issue.

Ill Fated Efforts by General Yahya Khan as a Rational Actor

In March 1969, once General Yahya took control of the state, Army stood completely discredited, struggle for restoration of democracy had assumed character of an organized movement and many feared that another long period of military rule was in the offing. Therefore, his top priority was to dispel these apprehensions and deliver message to the public that he was there only for transitional period.

General Yahya sensitive to Bengali grievances endeavoured to give them equal representation in the administration and discussed the system of elections and government with political parties. Subsequently, he issued 'Legal Framework Order' carrying guidelines for election including the grant of universal adult franchise by discarding 'principle of parity'; which favoured Bengalis.

He ensured the conduct of 1st free and fair elections by remaining neutral and became the 1st military ruler to keep his word. The picture that emerges from available material highlights Yahya's efforts to bring Mujib and Bhutto on negotiating table to arrive at a compromise for transfer of power to an elected government.

Aspirations of Indira Gandhi as a Rational Actor

Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi did exactly what a rational actor in those circumstances could have done.¹⁵ As a whole she fully exploited the window of opportunity. She provided extensive diplomatic and political support to the Bangladeshi movement. She toured a large number of countries in an effort to exploit Pakistani atrocities against Bengalis. It proved vital later during the war in convincing the international community military action by India was justified. Also, following Pakistan's defeat, it ensured prompt recognition of the newly independent state of Bangladesh.

Based on the internal dynamics of East Pakistan and glaring division in Pakistan's political and military leadership, Indira Gandhi decided to use the military instrument. Having analysed the diplomatic situation and evaluation of public opinion, the key political trio, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram and Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, are said to have weighed the likely consequences of different and complex courses of action and adopted a strategy which not only minimized the adverse impact of the East Bengal crisis on India's national interests, but leveraged that challenge to militarily split Pakistan and create an independent Bangladesh.¹⁶

Theoretical Lens at Sub State Level

Groupthink Theory

Groupthink was first coined by William H. Whyte, Jr. in *Fortune* magazine, March 1952.¹⁷ In 1972, Irving Janis, a research psychologist in USA published a thought provoking book dealing with Groupthink.¹⁸ Later studies were built on his model. As a psychological phenomenon it occurs within a group of people, having harmony and cohesiveness resulting in poor decision-making. Group members endeavour to reach a consensus decision without deep analysis and have tendency to suppress dissenting viewpoints by isolating themselves from external influences. Loyalty demands conformity thus leading to loss of creativity and critical thinking.

Groupthink was amply reflected at sub state level within political and military institution of Pakistan. In this context, some examples are given below:-

- Pakistan's military suffered from illusion of invulnerability thus based its decisions on wrong assessments.
- Political elites of West Pakistan had unquestionable belief in their ethnic superiority and their undisputed right to lead the Country.
- Military 'internal cohesiveness' led to lack of free and critical thinking. Difference of opinion was ruthlessly curbed. Resignation of Lieutenant General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, General Officer Commanding Eastern Command amply reflects the groupthink phenomenon.

Awami League headed by Mujib-ur-Rehman

Criticism of Ayub after 1965 War coupled with resignation of Bhutto as foreign minister followed by a campaign against the government led to a chaotic situation. In East Pakistan, Mujib advanced a six point programme to resounding public response.¹⁹ Politicians of West Pakistan felt that six points would lead to disintegration of Country and therefore, did not support them considering them to be 'Out-group'. However, the six points became a popular political demand in East Pakistan and later became the basis of secessionist struggle of Awami League leaving no room for some voices of sanity (by Jamat-e-Islami) supporting the federation.

Pakistan People's Party headed by Bhutto

Ayub decided to call a Round Table Conference (RTC) in early months of 1969. Mujib was acquitted from charges of Agartala Conspiracy Case to attend the conference. 'Groupthink' psyche prevailing in West Pakistani politicians against Awami League led to irrational decision making. Bhutto and Maulana Bhashani refused to attend.²⁰ Roundtable conference, therefore, further alienated the Bengalis.

Pakistan Army headed by General Yahya

In the national perspective, military hierarchy misconceived that application of force can resolve political problem and Country can be kept united through coercive means. Group thinking was fully reflected in the usefulness of military, 'one pill for all ills phenomenon' or once you have a good hammer all

problems look like nails. Mounting a military solution to essentially a socio – political and economic problem proved fatal.

General Niazi and his aides in Eastern Command were obsessed with the notion of defending every inch of motherland, without understanding its implications in the context of its negative implication of dilution of forces in vast spaces and underestimating full scale Indian invasion. He kept telling his troops “not an inch of territory would be allowed to be lost.” Obsession with the idea that a withdrawal from the border that is from the forward posture would be construed as a stigma leading to an unrealistic land strategy, which hastened the defeat of military forces.

Theoretical Lens at State Level

Democratic Peace Theory

It takes time to mature into a stable democracy. Usually transition is volatile as mass politics mixes with authoritarian elite politics. Authoritarian states under a process of democratization are more likely to go to wars than stable democracies. States that make a big leap, from total autocracy to extensive mass democracy - are about twice as likely to fight wars in the decade after democratization as are states that remain autocracies.²¹

Democratization generally creates a syndrome of weak central authority leading to unstable political coalitions, and confrontational politics.

Since its inception, democratic culture could not be successfully nurtured in Pakistan. Resultantly even after 24 years (from 1947-71) the state of Pakistan (in comparison to India) was still struggling with weak institutions, imperialistic coalitions, incompatible interests and short sighted bargains of politico-military elite.

West Pakistan

Corrupt / Inept political elites marred by moral bankruptcy, ethnicity and lust for power were unable to accommodate any diverging views or conflicting opinion thus played politics of division and confrontation based on ethnic and nationalistic concepts.

- Failure of democratic dispensation as per electoral mandate.

- Failure to reconcile divergent threat perception as West Pakistan perceived Indian military aggression as the main threat to territorial integrity but this perception was not shared by East Pakistan. They perceived economic problems as the main threat.

East Pakistan

Despite the Hindu-Muslim socio-cultural divide, Bengalis were comparatively more accommodative to Hindu culture and were very proud of their own values. This was partly due to the influence of nationalists like Rabindranath Tagore and Romesh Chunder Dutt and partly because Calcutta remained the capital of the country till 1911. The intensity of their sentiment was vividly displayed when the partition of Bengal carried out by Lord Curzon in 1905, had to be undone in 1911. However, their sentiments were overshadowed by the overwhelming force of the “Idea of Pakistan”, resulting into landslide victory of Muslim League in 1946 elections. Political elite of Pakistan could not fully grasp the power of Bangali sentiments, the nature of local politics and its apt handling with visionary statesmanship.

Bengal projected a very vibrant socio-cultural environment, which cut across the Hindu-Muslim divide. It was largely dominated by Hindu traditions, which were willingly accepted and followed by the Muslims. Except for religious values, Bengalis did not share any common grounds with West Pakistanis. Their language was also looked down upon by the West Pakistani aristocrats.²² As a whole, these disparities led to different identities in East and West, which gave rise to different interest. Weak institutions, lack of matured political culture, led to politics of confrontation which could not be managed by the Central Government thus leading to disintegration of Pakistan.

Theoretical Lens at Dyadic and International Levels

Theory of Balance of Power

The international system is defined by anarchy. Every state endeavours to maximize its power and if states fail to do so, they may become subservient to other powerful states. This anarchical structure thus compels states to increase their power. States, especially small ones, often cannot achieve security on their own. So they have to depend on powerful states for attaining a balance of power against a powerful enemy.²³ States are also security maximizers. When Italy find a window of opportunity, the opposing state may be weakened through direct or

indirect means, a point worth noting in Indo-Pak relations. When confronted by a significant external threat, states may balance or bandwagon. Balance of power encompasses three concepts—hard balancing, soft balancing, and asymmetric balancing.²⁴

Application of Balance of Power Theory at State Level

Since its inception, the festering ideological differences and lingering territorial disputes impinged on regional stability and dyadic rivalry were enduring between India and Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan sought power maximization, manipulating hard, soft and asymmetric means. Resultantly a state of relative stability / uneasy peace existed prior to 1971. Sensing the opportunity arising from Pakistan's failure in internal balancing, India capitalised on it fully.


Application of Balance of Power Theory at International Level

In a bipolar world of 1970s with Cold War at its climax; Pakistan was in the Western Camp whereas India (though trumpeting non-aligned mantra) was effectively in USSR Camp as a strategic ally of USSR.

Pakistan was an ally of USA being a small state since 1954.²⁵ It joined SEATO and CENTO and had been given written and unwritten assurances that USA would support Pakistan, in case of aggression from any country including India.²⁶ However, due to Indian factor, USA was hesitant to interfere in a bilateral dispute between the two neighbours. The leverage emboldened India to use the military instrument in East Pakistan.

USSR had a reasonably balanced policy towards India and Pakistan after 1965, but openly supported India in the months before and during the conflict. Soviet Union's support to India was formalized through the *Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation* signed between India and USSR on 9th August 1971.²⁷ During the conflict, Soviet Union provided military equipment to India, acted as a counter balance to China at the regional level and USA at the international level. It also played a major role at the UN Security Council by vetoing resolutions directed against India thus actively facilitating dismemberment of Pakistan.

Causal Factors in 1971 War – Linkages



Conclusion

1971 War is a story of systemic failures at individual, sub-state, state and international levels. Existence of state in this anarchic world becomes questionable if:-

- Aspirations of its key politico-military figures (in their own best interest) run tangent to national interests, once interpreted as per **Rationale Actor Theory**.
- Its politico-military elite suffers from ills of dysfunctional decision making no room for opposing views once viewed with the lens of **Group Think Theory**.
- Weak state institutions and powerful groups / lobbies with vested interests can push the state towards war as enunciated in **Democratic Peace Theory**.

- A state which makes little or no effort in restoring the rapidly swinging **Balance of Power** in opponents favour can face serious consequences.

Badly marred by preceding ills, the State of Pakistan failed in successful prosecution of war politically as well as militarily, resulting into dismemberment.

NOTES

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ROLE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF SENATE IN THE FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN: AN ANALYSIS BEFORE AND AFTER 18TH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF 1973

*Dr. Umbreen Javaid & Zainab Ahmed**

Abstract

Federation is a setup which has more than one level of governments. Bicameralism is the essential feature of federations. Bicameralism is most suited to the multi-ethnic states which have inherent potential to end up in chaos in absence of satisfactory division of powers. Bicameralism ensures continuity of legislation, second deliberation, impartial role in legislation and equal representation of all diverse federating units, balance of political power and accountability. Bicameralism is also best choice for transitioning democracies. In Pakistan, all constitutions after partition maintained uni-cameralism until separation of East Pakistan. Only after Dhaka debacle it was realized that domination of one federating unit, Punjab, and grievances of smaller ones should be patterned by some other way. It was realized in through bicameralism in the constitution of 1973. Senate is the upper body of parliament with equal representation from all federating units making sure that smaller provinces are characterized not by their numerical strength. Senate should guarantee impartiality and second deliberation to the matters considered at National Assembly overshadowed by majority population provinces. Provincial autonomy was the long demanded right of provinces which was brought about through 18th amendment to the Constitution. This amendment gave a new and dynamic role to the Senate. Multi-ethnic society like Pakistan needs equality at some elevated level where the small federating units can have feeling of equality and utmost power. This study is aimed at analyzing the role of Senate of Pakistan thoroughly and theoretically.

Keywords: Federation, Bicameralism, Uni-cameralism, Transitioning democracies, Federating Units.

Introduction

Federation is a system of governing various federating units through a center and maintains a relationship by giving adequate autonomy. With autonomy of federating units national unity is not compromised. Federation came into being through a process of convergence of geographical, economic and security issues. Federation evolved into a system in USA, Switzerland and Australia. The federation is managed through a constitution dealing matters of federating units

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at one or two levels. Geographical contiguity is an integral factor which helped evolution of this system in USA while prevented it in Britain. Pakistan had also this problem of geographical contiguity¹.

Pakistan inherited a system from British colonial power where the authority was maintained through much control. Pakistan inherited the provinces which experienced less federalism. In NWFP and Balochistan, tribal authorities were recognized by British through Sandeman Treaty or Forward treaty². Pakistan found federalism as most suited system after partition but the initial constitutions (1956 and 1962) retained uni-cameralism. It was after separation of one federating unit, East Pakistan (Bengal) that was geographically far away, that need of bicameralism felt. Bicameralism provides a framework of representation of provinces at two levels. This paper focuses on the role of senate in federation of Pakistan and its anticipated significance in a transitioning democracy.

Literature Review

Federalism was the most suitable choice of Pakistan as economy, security and identity were the common goals of all federating units. Dr. Iram Khalid (2013)³ in 'Federalism in Pakistan: Prospects and Problems' endeavors to surface the history of constitution making and predicaments in this way. Pakistan's choice of federalism was deep rooted in British legacy. During Pakistan movement Islam emerged as a common identity to join distinct federating units. This reality gave credence to the idea of federalism as a viable system for Pakistan. Government of India Act, 1935 was adopted as Pakistan's transitional constitution which also laid foundation of federalism and further constitution making. Uni-cameralism and bicameralism were most contested choices within federalism. Bicameralism was opted for after separation of East Pakistan.

Muntazra Nazir takes a deep insight into federalism as a state system theoretically in 'The Problems and Issues of Federalism in Pakistan'. Geographic contiguity and democracy are two main features of this system. Level of centralization may vary. Diversity of federating units remains safe in constitutional set up under federalism. However, a common identity is divulged in search of a national outlook based on a common factor. Economic prosperity and security are common goals. The author maintains that choice of federalism in Pakistan was also result of choices of Muslim League's leadership during

Pakistan movement to safeguard rights of Muslims in all federating units of India.

Mansoor Akbar Kundi⁴, establishes in his research paper 'Federalism In Pakistan: Problems and Prospects' that federalism was the cornerstone of Pakistan's post partition set up as it was indispensable for the establishment of Pakistan. Muslim League's political negotiations laid this foundation as their all constitutional demands revolved around federalism. The fundamental principles of federalism were undermined by political crises after creation of Pakistan. Constitutional history of Pakistan is marred by various constitutional crises due to disagreement on level of centralization.

The level of decentralization was finally decided through 18th Amendment to constitution. Concurrent list was abolished transferring about 47 items to provinces. Through this amendment the role of Senate is also increased and made effective. The upper house is the cornerstone of bicameral federalism. Tahir Mehmood⁵ in his research piece 'A Comparative Analysis of the Functioning of the Senate in USA and Pakistan' tries to give the comparison of role and functioning of the Senate. The concept of Senate is adapted from American federalism in the constitution of Pakistan. US Senate is however, very powerful chamber with equal legislative powers with the first chamber. In Pakistan, Senate was not that effective when formed. However, its role and scope is enhanced through 18th Constitutional Amendment. There is no theoretical ground for committees in American Senate but in practice it has become integral to the functioning of Senate. In Pakistan's Senate Committees are getting momentum but still their role is recommendatory.

Objectives

This study has following objectives:

- To understand the role of federalism in a transitioning democracy like Pakistan
- To get an insight into suitability of bicameralism in federalism and study the role of Senate
- To comprehend the role of Senate before 18th Amendment and enhanced significance after it.

Federalism and Federation of Pakistan

According to Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Federalism is the theory or advocacy of federal principles for dividing powers between member units and common institutions”. Sovereignty in Federal system is functioned through decentralized order which is divided among federating units at, at least two levels, usually through constitution. The levels are divided to ensure that units have final authority at one level and are self-governing too. The division of power varies, however it is a settlement between center and the units but usually center has foreign and defense policies but the federating units can also have international role⁶.

By middle of eighteenth century global politics was mainly among imperial states which were about two-third of total countries. By twenty first century the same proportion had federations. In 1994, it was estimated about over 100 of 180 recognized states were federation having 80% of global population. This system has a tendency of higher representation of individuals. This system has been preferred system of states due to political participation and economic efficiency⁷. In political science, plethora of literature has been written on federalism but there is no consensus on a single definition or theory. This is primarily understood by the etymology; in Latin word ‘foedus’ means covenant. Thus, federalism encompasses both unity and diversity. The covenant of federal government and constituent units is about the powers of the respective units distributed by the federal government and also their entitlement to participate in government at federal level. This is the relationship of coordination, cooperation and subsidiarity. The role of subsidiarity explains that powers are delegated to the constituents units not just as to be shared but actually because this exercise of power is in their interest and they are accountable to perform efficiently⁸. Forms of federal governments vary in different federal states as this concept is embedded in society and history.

In federalism, statehood of federal state is different from that of constituent units. Latter exercises it within the limit set by federal government. Constituent units cannot enjoy external sovereignty rather federal state as a whole enjoys sovereignty. Constitutional Compact Theory considers the constituent units actual bearers of sovereignty which approach confederalism instead of federalism. In Decentralization Theory, constituent units are neither states nor sovereign. This theory does not see any qualitative difference in constituent units or local governments. The system is only for administrative

purposes. According to three-circle-federalism the criteria of statehood and sovereignty are not central. The classical theories are inherently dualistic⁹.

Schmit considers federalism as a revolution defining the face of globe. Three first modern states adopted federalism; United States of America in 1787 constitution, Switzerland under 1848 constitution (later 1874 constitution) and Canada under 1867 Constitution. A defining factor of federalism is the division of law making powers between center and constituent units. The determining factors of federalism can be summed up as;

- A sense of insecurity and need for common defense
- Aspiration of economic advantage
- Historic association continued in this form of system
- Some form of mutual compatibility
- History of peaceful co-existence¹⁰.

Friedrich maintains that federation is a political evolution, rather than a system it is a process. Any design or pattern of jurisdictions is merely a phase. This system is usually adopted and suited to multi-national polities as they desire a union without compromising their regional and sub-nationalities. It leads to integration and diversification, both Akindele and Olaopa. The system of post-colonial state lies in the colonial state system. The apparatus developed by colonial states aims at subordinating all groups and classes of colonized state. This aim is attained by a strong and dominant military-administrative system which a colonized state inherits. This domination also earns maximum control over national economic surplus. Post-colonial states practice more centrality where control lies in bureaucracy. Hamza Alvi describes the inheritance of colonial system by post-colonies and its functioning as 'overdeveloped states'. Pakistan's federation problems are better explained through the thesis of over developed state where centrality is functioned to control the relation between center and provinces¹¹.

Pakistan inherited the federalist form and set up given to British India by British government. Government of India Act, 1935 was an effort to accommodate disparate regional ethnicities and aspirations. Through this set up the spirit of federalism was aspired to be put in practice as to accommodate and enhance ethnic diversity. Pakistan was later carved out of Muslim majority provinces. Two wings of Pakistan after 1947 were not geographically contiguous and there was a continued tussle for power between East and West wings. East

Pakistan had about 55% of population which justified their claim for representation according to proportion of population. In 1952, Nazimuddin Report proposed bicameralism with 60 seats in upper house and 200 seats in lower house. In 1953, Muhammad Ali Bogra formula endeavored to readjust the balance by proposing 10 and 165 seats for East Pakistan respectively and 40 and 135 seats for West Pakistan respectively. There was a provision proposing joint session of parliament in case of disagreement. This scheme gave majority to East Pakistan in lower house but it was not adopted. Punjab's Chief Minister campaigned and asserted zonal sub-federation for West Pakistan which was adopted. In 1955, One Unit Policy, merging territories and provinces was an attempt to carve out equal provinces and to develop the base for federations of 1956 and 1962¹².

After the separation of East Pakistan, in the Constitution of 1973, the balance is struck by giving share according to population in lower house and equal representation in Senate. Punjab dominated the lower house with 58% of population and ultimately in bicameralism it was tried to be adjusted. But Senate's role was still limited as it had no control over money bills¹³. In Pakistan the major obstacle in federalism's viability has been derailing democratic system which is prerequisite to it. Lack of pluralistic framework is another predicament. Weak and divided political forces could not contest effectively for provincial rights¹⁴.

Bicameralism-A Viable System in Pakistan

Bicameralism is widely associated with federalism only. But various states which are non-federal opted to be bicameral. So many non-federal states opted two or more houses of parliament such as Britain, France, Japan and Netherlands. All federations are not bicameralism too necessarily. Bicameralism is closely associated with federalism as most of the federal states opted for bicameralism. United States had a long debate over federal legislature whether representation should be on basis of population representation. Connecticut Compromise brought respite in form of bicameral legislature where lower house, House of Representatives, is on the basis of population and Senate on equal representation. Following this precedent, most federalist states opted for bicameral legislatures but there have been enormous variations in method of selection of members and regional composition. Often it is to ensure equality of state representation. Almost nine federalist states are strictly adhering to equal

state representation including USA, Australia, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Pakistan and Russia¹⁵.

The fundamental role of federal second chambers is legislation, reviewing federal legislations affecting regional interests. German Bundestrat performs an additional function of interprovincial coordination¹⁶. Bicameralism in United Kingdom evolved without a written constitution. Lower house, House of Commons, was convened in thirteenth century to assist House of Lords. In House of Lords, membership was through royal appointment, inheritance and seniority of Catholic Church. By mid-seventeenth century, lower house was protesting against unchecked power of upper chamber. In 1832, legislative reforms redistributed the seats diminishing role of aristocracy and clergy in House of Commons. Currently, the powers of House of Lords are considerably diminished still it maintains the power to delay the bill for one year (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs).

A long debate in United States preceded adoption of bicameral federal system. Large states demanded for representation according to population. . Diverse interests of 13 states required imposition of federal system. Finally, Connecticut Compromise of 1787 brought final form of bicameral federal system. This compromise established a bicameral system where House of Representatives has representation. Smaller states had a continued demand of equal representation. Following War of Independence, central system was required. Larger states emphasized according to population and Senate has equal representation. This set up was a result of contesting demands of both groups of states. Difference of terms of legislators of lower and upper house ensure distinctiveness. Senators are elected for six years. Senate was conceived for more deliberation and longer term ensures this deliberation. One-third of Senate goes for re-election after two years ensuring continuity (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs).

According to the data of April 2014, about 41.5% of global legislatures are bicameral. In Europe 64.58% of legislatures were estimated to be unicameral. The first development of bicameral set up was in United States federation. The early confederations demanded unanimous passage of legislation from both the houses. In States General of the Dutch Republic matters of war, peace, truce and financial contributions were decided with unanimous vote. Gradually these systems also evolved. In USA, the compromise opened a new way in political

development. Earlier the Senators in USA were elected by indirect vote by state legislatures, who are elected through direct vote after seventeenth amendment to the constitution in 1913. This was the first parliament which was not representing social classes rather it was designed to be based on territories¹⁷.

Madison wrote that the idea of Senate conceived in USA had more practical benefits than theoretical. It is a constant check on government. It could curb the reactionary or emotional legislation of the other chamber. This house had better position of deliberation and verification and it was factor of stability through continuity. For these purposes, Madison had the view that Senate must be small with small number of members. However, in United Kingdom the upper house remained a stabilizing factor against increasing democratization with retaining the character of aristocratic chamber. In systems which are inspired by Westminster models and where governments are part of lower houses, Senates are taken as a body neutralizing and independent factor¹⁸.

In parliamentary democracies there is apprehension that legislator may become a tool of executive as legislators are controlled by political parties. Upper houses do not constitute the composition of executive. It can play a role of strong reviewing authority. It also may ensure consensus democracy. Upper houses play a role in forming public opinion and a viable opportunity of second thought¹⁹.

Bicameralism is a viable system of legislature for heterogeneous society like Pakistan. Since partition, the problem of equitable representation was main obstacle in the way of smooth federation. East Pakistan had continuous apprehension about West Pakistan's domination in military, bureaucracy and politics. Federation as a system of Pakistan was the very choice of its leadership before its creation as leaders of Muslim League had been urging a federal system to ensure rights of Muslim minority. Quaid-i-Azam had ensured in 1945 that viable system for Pakistan would be autonomy of all federating units. After partition, the quest for acceptable and equitable representation of federating units led to constitutional crises. This was a continued dispute between East and West Pakistan (Muntazra).

After separation of East Pakistan, Punjab became dominant federating unit being most populous. There was natural uneasiness on part of smaller federating units. The issue was sought in form of bicameral legislature in the constitution of 1973. Senate, the upper house, balanced the representation in

lower house according to population through equal representation of all federating units. This was adopted to allay the fears of small federating units. Senate's role in federation of Pakistan evolved over the decades. Political instability remained an obstacle in the way of smooth growth of legislation to a strong federation. Senate's role enhanced after 18th Amendment to the Constitution of 1973.

Role of Senate Before and After 18th Amendment

Bicameralism in Pakistan is result of cognitive insecurity due to separation of East Pakistan. Pakistan inherited the constituent Assembly as result of 1945 elections in India. There had been lot of hindrances and obstacle in way of smooth constitution making. One of them was form and kind of legislature. First Constituent Assembly was dissolved in 1954 over political differences. Second was introduced in 1955 which gave first constitution on 23rd March 1956. This constitution introduced unicameral legislature. Second constitution, which was given by General Ayub Khan in 1962, also introduced unicameral constitution with presidential system²⁰. This constitution was framed to give maximum power to the office of President ignoring ground realities and demands of East Pakistan. This crisis brewed as ethno-cultural and regional diversities were ignored.

After separation of East of Pakistan, bicameralism was introduced in the Constitution of 1973. There was a realization now that sub-national authorities must be represented. After separation of East Pakistan, Punjab dominated with about 58% of total population. In lower house, naturally Punjab dominated. In order to balance this dominance and to avoid augmenting of grievances of small provinces Senate was formed with equal representation of provinces. This was conceived as adequate representation for regional and minority interests and viewpoints. The problem of ethno-regional differences was endeavored to be resolved through equal provincial share in upper house. This house also ensures particular kind of expertise for second thought as reserved seats for technocrats²¹. The Senate was formed with some objectives as;

- A majority constrained federalism
- Equal representation in politically empowered Senate
- As a legislative chamber with equal power to National Assembly
- As an institution where interest of states could be projected and safeguarded

- A deliberative chamber where greater and diverse experience is brought on questions of significance²²

Initially this chamber was conceived and formed for with no extra ordinary role or unique role. The very immediate purpose was to off- set lower house's representation on basis of population. The arrangement could be formed to before Dhaka fall to placate the political grievances of East Pakistanis. But after this crisis which separated one half of the country it was important to provide a platform at highest level to characterize and honor regional, linguistic, cultural and religious and community representation.

Senate was also formed with a principle of 'Chamber of continuity'. To ensure smooth transition of power of lower house and government, this house remains in place to oversee this process. This house has no role in making and unmaking of the government. This principle ensures its role as a Second and higher chamber. This house has various Senate committees to ensure overseeing few matters in particular But there is one matter where this house has been constrained considerably; money bill. The matters in federal legislative list can be initiated in any of the houses except money bill which is sent to the Senate after passage from National Assembly²³.

In 1973, when this house was formed under constitution it had 100 seats. First elections of Senate held on 10th July, 1973. Article 59 of Constitution provided for formation of this house. Each provincial assembly elects its members on respective seats. This is the permanent legislative body with a process of continuity. The house is elected for six years. One-half of the house is elected every three years²⁴. After 18th Amendment to the Constitution, the division of seats is as following;

Table-1: Division of Seats

Seats from Four Provinces	23 seats from each Province <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 14 General Seats • 4 Technocrats/Ulema • 4 Women • 1 Non-Muslim
Islamabad Capital Territory	4 seats <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 General Seats • 1 Technocrat/Alim • 1 Woman
FATA	8 seats

The role of Senate enhanced considerably after 18th Amendment to the constitution. This amendment fulfilled the promise of provincial autonomy. Concurrent list was abolished and provinces were entrusted with all those portfolios. This amendment also brought spirit to the role of senate as it was promised at the time of promulgation of constitution. The main changes brought to the role of constitution were;

- Annual Report on implementation of Principles of Policy is to be placed before constitution
- No ordinance can be promulgated by the President when Senate is in session.
- For recommendations on money bill, time duration is increased from 7 to 14 days.
- The responsibility of Prime and Minister and the Cabinet has been ensured to both house, instead of lower house.
- Members are increased from 100 to 104, four seats given to Non-Muslims
- Number of Compulsory working days increased from 90 to 110 days (PILDAT, 2011).
- Chairman and Deputy Chairman are re-elected at the time of election of one-half of the house. Both are elected within the house.
- Senators are elected to the seats from respective provincial assemblies
- Members are elected on basis of proportional representation by means of single transferable vote to fill seats reserved²⁵.

Theoretically, Senate in Pakistan enjoys legislative parity with the National Assembly. But practically its role is revisory. There are no diverse sources of legislation. Mainly legislation arises from the National Assembly and is based on priorities of the government. Still, legislature is considered subservient to the executive in Pakistan which undermines the effective functioning of the Senate. The legislation brought to the Senate is mainly divided into two categories;

- Official Business; all bills and resolutions introduced by any minister
- Private Business; any bill, resolution and privilege motion introduced by any Senator (Not a minister)²⁶.

This draws a clear distinction between minister and not minister legislation. According to rule 86 when any bill is introduced it is referred to the standing committee. It is the minister who can ask for Senate referral and bill's

immediate consideration. The standing committee cannot be comprised of less than 6 and more than 12 members. The concerned minister automatically becomes ex-officio member of the committee. According to need, further committee or sub-committees can be formed on the matter. From National Assembly a bill is not directly sent to Senate until a motion is carried out. If that motion is passed the motion is referred to the Upper house. Senators cannot continue the debate on any matter for indefinite period. A period is fixed for this purpose²⁷.

In US federalism, the basic principle is complete division of powers. Senate is considered to be a house of honor and repute. In British parliamentary system House of Lords is a mere accommodative body enjoying almost no legislative power. Pakistan stands between these two systems. Its form of government is parliamentary. But the needs of federalism required for a bicameral parliament adjusting federating units. Senate was formed as a result of grievances of provinces against domination of a single province overshadowing their role and scope.

Since, there is no complete division of powers through constitution between legislature and executive. Pakistan is a transitioning democracy. The systems are evolving. The main hurdle in the way of neutral functioning of Senate is powers of executive to interfere in legislation through business official. The other predicament is still it's no power over money bills. The Senate was formed to address and represent the regional and ethnic diversifications of federating units. However, the differences over distribution of economic resources still persist.

Conclusion

Pakistan opted for federalism due to two main reasons; demand for federalism in Pakistan movement and throughout political negotiations and movement of Muslim League. It was the only way for safeguarding rights of Muslims in Hindu majority India. Pakistan inherited this system also through British legacy which used federalism after 1909 to control India by sharing powers gradually with federating units. After partition, the major obstacle in the way of smooth transition to an acceptable federalism was due to constitutional crisis emerging out of political differences. East Pakistan crisis was the deciding point for opting bicameralism. The upper house was formed to placate the grievances of small provinces through equal representation to adjust Punjab's

domination in National Assembly. But its role could not be effective until passage of 18th Amendment. This amendment paved the way for enhanced role of Senate with a better position to share legislative authority. Now theoretically Senate has legislative parity with the lower house. But still there is long way to go to evolve senate into a neutral and effective body.

NOTES

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IS THERE A DRIFT TOWARDS POST-HEGEMONY IN THE GLOBAL HIERARCHY?

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Abstract

The impending power transition in the global hierarchy has already triggered post-hegemonic phase in the international system. The 'Rise of China' along with alternate power centers have considerably constrained US clout to obtain 'desired outcomes' and few significant political developments in the first decade of the twenty-first century are already tilting the debate in favour of drift towards post-hegemony. A review of the academic debates between 'primacists' and 'declinists' school has been done within the article to establish that uncertainty and ambiguity prevailing in the contemporary global hierarchy not only provides substance to the scholarly debate on post-hegemony, but speaks of a world away from US dominated and controlled patterns of interaction and influence.

Keywords: US, Hegemony, Primacy, Post-Cold War, International System.

Introduction

The sudden demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 along with the disappearance of a bipolar international order led to enthusiastic proclamations of "Unipolar moment"¹ by advocates of US primacists. The unprecedented military preparedness and economic prowess with explicit absence of a peer competitor gave credence to the argument that the "American Century"² is not only well entrenched but capable to last further into the twenty-first century. Thus preserving "US hegemonic role in a unipolar world" became the over-riding objective of every post-Cold War US administration.³ While *Pax Americana* was being hailed by a number of security study scholars, foreign policy analysts and policymakers, another heated debate started at about the same time with primary focus on whether unipolarity can sustain or the maintenance of "hegemony" a wise policy for the US?

With balance-of-power realists predicting unipolarity to backfire as had repeated bids for hegemony in past by counterbalancing efforts of other great powers, advocates of "American exceptionalism" continued to view failure of this hitherto ironclad rule as an exception to "American primacy"⁴. Despite the most

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forceful and comprehensive defense of unipolar stability, and durability of American hegemony from Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth in their 2008 book *World Out of Balance*, scholars in the opposite camp kept predicting impending end of *Pax Americana*. It won't be wrong to claim that for every analyst announcing the demise of America's power potential and global leadership, we find an equally compelling American or Western analysis securing another decade of American preponderance.

Amid all these conflicting views, my argument about US drift towards post-hegemony will discuss the current academic debate between US "primacists" and "declinists" school, shedding light on the uncertain times we are surviving and how this ambiguity provides substance to debate on post-hegemony.

Power Structure of the Post-Cold War International System

Henry Kissinger wrote in 1994 that "almost as if, according to some natural law, in every century there seems to emerge a country with the power, the will, and the intellectual and moral impetus to shape the entire international system accordance with its own values".⁵ Twentieth century bore witness to the application of the statement by blessing US the pre-eminent status, whether the twenty-first century will also, is a question still being contested in the academic circles.

Two most significant events in the last quarter of the twentieth century that not only brought an end to more than five decades of intense rivalry between two competing ideological blocks (US/Soviet Union; Capitalism/Communism) but also led to vast speculations about the future power structure had been the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. Some authors tried to make sense of the post-Cold War period, especially after September 11 as "post-post-Cold War"⁶, referring the tragic and terrible event as the clear dividing line that made world different from what it had been hitherto then.⁷ However, the world had changed in far more complicated ways than to be made sense of it by just adding another "post" to already existing "post-Cold War" label.

A "new world order" by G.H.W. Bush was one of the foremost ideas to be floated immediately after the end of the Cold War i.e. on September 11, 1990.

The concept manifested that not only would “power” play a secondary role along with “state” as primary actor but would be replaced by international organizations and entities as the lead actors. The basic objective behind this proclamation being that realism and power politics have been replaced with a cooperative liberal perception of international relations in this new order. Since then the idea has been hailed through different labels from “idealpolitik”⁸ to “neo-liberalism”⁹ to “neo-Wilsonian idealism”¹⁰ and “neo-idealist moment”.¹¹

When scholars like Francis Fukuyama were hailing “The End of History”¹² back in late 1980s and celebrating ultimate triumph of market economy and liberal democracy espoused by the West as the final form of human government expecting all states to gravitate towards it for pure self-interest, there were others like Paul Kennedy who saw a vision of a multipolar world owing to the “imperial overstretch” of the reigning hegemon and rise of other influential actors like European Union and Japan¹³. How strong this perception was, can be gauged from statements of Paul Tsongas - the US Massachusetts Senator - who said, “The Cold War is over: Japan won” at 1992 Democratic Convention.¹⁴ Still others like John Mearsheimer in an article in 1990 argued that international order in post-cold war period would be a reversion from bipolarity to multipolarity. But his vision was of a far more pessimistic world. A world that cast doubts on optimistic projections of a peaceful, prosperous future; A world that he arrived at by drawing parallel between early twentieth century experience of Europe and future great powers.¹⁵

Apart from the two grand ideas being floated immediately in the post-Cold War period, a third perspective gained importance and they were proponents of the ‘unipolarity’ school. It stressed US hegemony¹⁶ and expressed admiration for Pax Americana¹⁷. One of the most initial and clear manifestation of this vision appeared in the leaked draft of Pentagon’s *Defence Planning Guidance* (DPG) for the fiscal years 1994-99, in March 1992. It referred to preserving unipolarity as its goal which was subsequently altered owing to its very controversial nature and strong resistance against it. It explicitly stated:

*We must account sufficiently for the interests of the large industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political or economic order and that we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring political competitors for even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.*¹⁸

The main protagonist of grand idea of unipolarity was Charles Krauthammer, who in a 1990 article “The Unipolar moment” proclaimed an unprecedented era of US dominance that was expected to last for approximately a decade before giving way to multipolarity.¹⁹

Did US have any idea “what to do with it primacy”²⁰ was a question put forward by Robert Art. Most agree that in the era after the end of the Cold War, US did not play part of the sole remaining superpower.²¹ It found itself in a position that required understanding of the new prevailing situation.²² Hence, 1990s made the unipolar vision moot²³ as neither G.H.W. Bush nor the first Clinton administration could either devise a new foreign policy vision or implement “the idea of unipolarity”. Thus, argued L. Gaiser and I. Kovac: “Consequently, the power structure of the international system changes from bipolar (in the Cold War) to multipolar (in the post-Cold War).” Further adding, if the Gulf war is accepted as an indication of unipolarity, even then US did not follow up, missing the historic opportunity to be reduced to a historical moment. “It was so brief that it lasted a few months in the transition from bipolarity to multipolarity,” and failed to have “a relevant impact on the changing of the power structure of the international system....the unipolar moment of the US came to fruition 10 years later.”²⁴

Though the second Clinton Administration was a bit more assertive and Madeline Albright, the then United States Secretary of State, for the first time stated publicly “the indispensable nation” title for the US in 1998²⁵ but it was the G.W. Bush Administration in 2001 to be credited for a clear vision and strategy to implement the unipolar moment. Even before the catastrophic event of September 11, his administration emphasized national interests and the military preparedness to implement their grand vision.²⁶ Bush Junior was determined to preserve US supremacy²⁷ and Condoleezza Rice article in *Foreign Affairs* in 2000 made explicit such an intention.²⁸

Opening of new bases in ex-Soviet Republics (Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Uzbekistan)²⁹; withdrawal from Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty; veto on BWC (Biological weapons Convention) protocol verification; disinclination to sign the Kyoto-Protocol; refusal to ratify the Rome Statue of ICC (International Criminal Court) were all early manifestations of the new grand vision which Ikenberry saw nothing less than “neo-imperialistic”.³⁰ This was unabashed vision of US global supremacy

and aggressive unilateralism. It involved deep distrust of global institutions and multilateralism generally; emphasis on military “pre-emptive strikes” to defeat terrorism and curb “rouge states”; keeping “weapons of mass destruction” out of wrong hands and a putative campaign for creation of new democratic regimes.³¹ What intensified the unipolar drive of the Bush Administration after September 11 was not a significant change in the international structure rather it were the political decisions that made the world unipolar in 2001, like the political decisions that had made it multipolar in 1990s.³²

The unparalleled political-military-economic preponderance generated equally unprecedented confidence in Bush Administration, which not only came forward with its own “Bush doctrine”³³ conceptualized in 2002 US National Security Strategy but also in the 1-4-2-1 strategy of Pentagon. This strategy visualized an unprecedented force that would not only defend US homeland, operate in and from four forward regions but would defeat two regional adversaries swiftly and simultaneously along with the ability to achieve regime change in one of the regions.³⁴ Such was a pervasive impact of this preponderant power that not only Kennedy has to retract his statement of the decline of the US owing to “imperial overstretch” predicted in late 1980s³⁵ but even Krauthammer was compelled to reframe the earlier “unipolar moment” into a “unipolar era”.³⁶ Even a noted American journalist W. Pfaff writing in the *The International Herald Tribune* stated “Washington is considering whether it should deliberately use American political, economic and military activities to consolidate and expand American global might, making the twenty-first century even more the American century than was the second half of the twentieth,” and reminded us that “sun sets on every empire”.³⁷

The triumphant mood of the Bush administration manifested itself in assertive unilateralism. It was especially visible in swift ousting of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and that too with substantial international approval, and of Saddam Husain in Iraq. In the later case there was prevalent international opposition and few key NATO allies publicly registered their disapproval too. These episodes led to apprehensions about the very nature of American power and words like “superpower”, “hyperpower”, “empire” and “hegemon” increasingly came to be associated with US sometimes as acknowledgement of its unprecedented power and at others as warnings from others; as a sign of growing resentment towards unbridled and overwhelming power exercised by the lone

superpower. It was not until 2008, US had to learn the hard way that military power was not “the almighty” that could solve all challenges.³⁸

The new imperialism which turned into simple militarism and US steadily lost ideological legitimacy abroad. Michael Mann reflected, “whereas in the recent past American power was hegemonic....now it is imposed at the barrel of a gun.”³⁹ He further stated that though American empire might not yet be over-stretched but “its stretch is incoherent”. “This giant’s military might sits uneasily with economic and geopolitical resources that originate in multilateral arrangement....Its militarism also greatly outstrip its political capacity to rule any conquered country and contradicts the ideology of freedom and democracy.”⁴⁰

This unilateral adventurism generated widespread resentment and dented US “soft power” significantly. At about the same time, we saw that some scholars and analysts were coming round to another perception. Krauthammer asserted that US was “past the apogee” of its unparalleled power.⁴¹ In spite of having the strongest power and the largest military, US power to get others do what it wants them to do was constrained and it led Joseph Nye to state that unipolarity is a misleading term as it exaggerates the degree to which US can obtain outcomes it requires in different dimensions of world politics.⁴²

Besides Nye also mentioned how some aspects of international system were unipolar while others multipolar. He made a distinction between “relative” and “absolute” decline; while later is defined as the sense of decay and former is one in which the power resources of other states are used effectively vis-a-vis US. He refuted US decline because of “imperial overstretch” but cited “domestic under reach” as a reason that can precipitate such a path. His “three-dimensional chessboard” concept captures the diffused nature of power, which according to him posed a greater danger than power transition. In this concept the top chessboard is occupied by military which is largely unipolar with US. According to him, America is likely to retain the unprecedented position for quite some time. Economic power occupies the middle chessboard and its been multipolar for more than a decade where others besides US, Europe, Japan and China are gaining in importance. The bottom chessboard is the realm of international relations; here power is largely diffused because of non-state actors. He further asserts it makes no sense to speak of hegemony, primacy, unipolarity or multipolarity as far as the bottom dimension of chessboard is concerned.⁴³

Friedberg addresses the same problem by differentiating “power as control over resources” with “power as control over outcomes”. He further elaborates just because the US has the largest economy and the most powerful military might does not mean it can get preferable and desired outcomes all of the time.⁴⁴ Samuel Huntington has debated concept of unipolarity back in 1999 when he came forward with one of his own “uni-multipolarity” concept. He said, “There is now only one superpower. But that does not mean that the world is unipolar. A unipolar system would have one superpower, no significant major powers, and many minor powers.... Contemporary international politics..... is a strange hybrid, a uni-multipolar system with one superpower and several major powers.”⁴⁵

While there were others who believed that US had been declining since 1970s and US response to September 11 attacks only accelerated decline. Immanuel Wallerstein remarked, “The economic, political, and military factors that contributed to US hegemony are the same factors that will inexorably produce the coming US decline”.⁴⁶ How far damage has been done through its self-interested unilateral assertiveness can be gauged from the statement that “the United States finds itself –a lone superpower that lacks true power, a world leader nobody follows and few respect, and a nation drifting dangerously amidst a global chaos it cannot control”.⁴⁷ Wallerstein was not the only one expressing concern about US unilateral exercise of its huge military might, Kishore Mahbubani also saw blind pursuit of its narrow self-interests which were costing US a lot. “The ‘root causes’ of the problem of American power vis-à-vis the rest of the world,” has aptly been identified as “this huge edifice of American power is structurally designed to serve only one purpose: to further American interests”.⁴⁸

Hass asserts that though US is and will remain the single largest power but “the reality of American strength should not mask the relative decline of the United State’s position in the world – and with the relative decline in power an absolute decline in influence and independence”.⁴⁹ For him multipolarity might be a generation or two away but power and influence are even less linked in era of nonpolarity and it will be increasingly difficult for Washington to lead an occasion, where collective responses to regional and global challenges are required. For him history, US policy and globalization have brought the inevitable end of the unipolarity.⁵⁰ Power and influence are interlinked and this theme is repeatedly invoked by those who point out declining ability of the US to get desired outcomes and as a sign of its vanishing hegemony. Power shifting

sideways is another argument given by Susan Strange as she delineates this drift from states to markets and to non-state actors.⁵¹

Hass “age of non-polarity” thesis wasn’t the only novel addition to the debate of alternative world order, Nail Ferguson has already aired his idea of “a polarity” and warned those who were eagerly looking towards retreat of American hegemony that rather than a multipolar world of competing great powers, a world that was awaiting them is a world with no hegemon – “a polar” world- “a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.”⁵²

Amitav Acharya looks beyond the language of hegemony and polarity, and gives a vision of a world order realized through the metaphor of a multiplex cinema, which according to him is “a complex that houses several movie theaters”. “In a multiplex world, the making and management of order is more diversified and decentralized, with the involvement of established and emerging powers, states, global and regional bodies, and transnational non-state actors”.⁵³ In such a world the liberal hegemony story presented by its American proponents is equivalent to one movie at one time in one theater. Although American show may dominate the box office for a while Acharya asserts, but audience are bound to lose interest when given alternative choices.⁵⁴ He clearly differentiates this multiplex world from that of a multipolar world. It stresses not the number of powers but the interdependence among them and is more decentred than a multipolar world with more scope for local and regional approaches.⁵⁵

Another notable figure who contributed to this declinist perspective was Fareed Zakaria with his “rise of the rest” thesis and vision of a “post-American world”. This is a world where except the politico-military level, power is moving away from American dominance in every other dimension (industrial, financial, cultural, educational and social). A post-American world is likely to be different from anything that has preceded it – a world defined and directed from many places and by many people.⁵⁶ Rise of alternative centers of power chiefly will bring end to US primacy is debated by Charles Kupchan who thinks it would actually be because of the “tiring burdens of global hegemony”. Further adding “what makes America’s unipolar moment fleeting is the combination of the rise of other powers and US waning and unilateralist internationalism.”⁵⁷ He

visualizes a digital era replacing today's industrial era and multipolarity replacing unipolarity.⁵⁸

Amidst all these divergent speculations, there were still others who saw a return of bipolarity with China replacing Soviet Union of the last bipolar order. As early as 2007, Carlo Pelando made a very compelling case for a new inevitable bipolar strife between US and China. In his book *Grand Alliance* he argued that this new fight would be played for triumph of either autocratic or democratic capitalism and suggested a grand alliance of US, Europe and Russia to be forged for democratic capitalism to prevail.⁵⁹ One thing that had been consistent through all these speculations had been theme of the US decline. Even the National Intelligence Council made a prediction about the future trajectory of power, speculating that in 2025 "the US will remain the pre-eminent power but the American dominance will be much diminished".⁶⁰

Thomas Wright also believed that unipolarity waned in 2008 and he designates the period from 1990-2008 as a "post-Cold War Concert of Power" that "rested on US unipolarity and hegemony as well as the collective willingness (of other major powers) to work within it to varying degrees".⁶¹ While "declinists" were forcefully arguing their case, there were others ready to brush aside these arguments and stress on US ability to reinvigorate its waning hegemony and primacy. Confident about the resilience of American system and society and they believe that prognostications of American decline are nothing new. Back in 1980s this debate had raged between scholars in the field of International Political Economy (IPE) especially when Robert Keohane talked about a period "after hegemony";⁶² Robert Gilpin referred to "intensified mercantile competition" because of decline of US hegemony⁶³ and David Calleo raised the question for policy makers how to grapple with US power in decline.⁶⁴ Others however dissented at that time too. Notable among them were Susan Strange and Stephen Gill. Strange wrote about the myth of the hegemonic decline, insisting that many contributors to literature have chosen indicators which are either irrelevant or imprecise⁶⁵; while Gill broke away from theory of US decline by presenting his neo-Gramscian perspective on hegemony, which according to him was not simply a physical capability such as military might and economic weight but as "intellectual and moral leadership"⁶⁶.

Some of these authors prefer to use anemic words like global "leadership"⁶⁷ while others go for the inoffensive terms like "primacy"⁶⁸. Still

there are others who unabashedly use the term “hegemony”⁶⁹. Brooks and Wohlforth had been the most ardent champions of US unipolarity and its durability. They claimed “If today’s American primacy does not constitute unipolarity, then nothing ever will.... There has never been a system of sovereign states that contained one state with this degree of dominance.”⁷⁰ While Mandelbaum went a step further and claimed, “The United States is no longer a mere superpower; it has ascended to the status of a ‘hyperpower’”,⁷¹ though he nonetheless cautioned that US might not be able to sustain the burdens of global leadership.

“Empire” was another term being used to encompass the extent and the vastness of US power. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri asserted that that what we are dealing with, is in fact an “Empire”, that is “a regime that effectively encompasses the spatial totality, or really that rules over the entire ‘civilized world’” and in which “United States does indeed occupy a privileged position”.⁷² While the role of restructuring unipolar world by arrogating to itself “the global role of setting standards, determining threats, using force and meting out justice” was US “neo-imperial vision” in eyes of Ikenberry.⁷³

This overwhelming power was being acknowledged from every nook and corner. US dominate business, commerce and communications; its economy is the world’s most successful, its military second to none.”⁷⁴ While for American triumphalists like Robert Kagan and William Kristol: “Today’s international system is built not around a balance of power but around American hegemony”.⁷⁵

Another addition to the debate is Nye latest book with the title *Is the American Century Over?* For him the American Century began when US economy represented nearly half of the share of the world economy in the post-war period and dated it from 1945-70. Though the abnormal share returned to the normal - of roughly one fourth of the world economy to its pre-war portion but it led widely to perceptions of American decline. Nye remarks: “the American Century roughly coincides with the twentieth century, reaching its peak in the mid-century, and it will end in the next decade or so when analysts expect China to pass the United States as the world’s largest economy.”⁷⁶ As far as “purchasing power parity” unit is concerned China has already passed US in GDP (gross domestic product) while if the economy is measured through exchange rate of currencies then it may take a decade for China to beat US.⁷⁷

Nye asserts that China overtaking US in economic size will not automatically mark end of the American Century. He defines power as “the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one wants and there are three ways to do that: by coercion (sticks); by payments (carrots); and by attraction or persuasion”.⁷⁸ Relying only on economic size to define American Century would be misleading. Instead it should also take into account the resources which are used to affect global balance of power.⁷⁹ However, in my opinion downgrading role of economy would also be tantamount to distorting the entire picture and it would not be an exaggeration if I say that it was the economy as the single largest indicator that brought the mighty Soviet Union to its knees, more than any other factor.

Conclusion

The list of scholars celebrating US unipolar durability and sustainability is just as long as those speculating its exit and announcing end of *Pax Americana*. The debate hitherto has been inconclusive and it is expected to go on till a clear new hierarchy of power is apparent. One argument which has been established beyond doubt is the gradual shift of power from one centre of power to an unknown and uncharted territory. It seems too early to speculate what it will be. Will it be an age of “non-polarity”, “a polarity”, a “multiplex world” or will it be “no one’s world” or simply the familiar “multipolar” or “bipolar” international order, is too early to speculate. What, however, is written on the wall that China is emerging fast and it is set to make its presence felt and go for its rightful place which its growing power has entitled to it.

Henry Kissinger saw scope for “so dominant an America” shrinking in 2010 because of three successive wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan and because of economic conditions which will inevitably bring about pressure on military budgets, constraining the scope for intervention and imposing the need for establishing priorities.⁸⁰

Similarly those who for long have been hailing explicit absence of counterbalancing and revisionist behavior of other major powers can see the return of both through Russia and China. Russia’s coercive diplomacy and military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine and Armenia had been useful in checking and preventing further expansion of EU and NATO in Russian “near abroad”. Besides it has also launched countless provocations against Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Sweden, Finland and Denmark by intruding into their air and

maritime space. Such provocations cannot be brushed aside without labeling them as hard-balancing by a resurgent Russia.

China and Russia are not the only states vying for their place in the emerging configuration of powers. States like India and Brazil has also been hailed as new members of this powerful circle and they are actively seeking to establish themselves as great powers with their own “area of influence” and interests. Besides these new emerging power centers, European Union and Japan have increasing realization of changing international environment. Though still firmly allied with the US, they are nervously watching as US is gradually losing its hegemony and with it the power to shape “desired outcomes”.

One of the leading challenges that a declining power has to confront when a power transition is taking place at the global level is the ‘crisis of its legitimacy’. With the emergence of new powerful actors and competing interests, the actions of a declining hegemon come under increased scrutiny. Approval of the domestic public assumes importance especially when it involves spending taxpayers’ money and no adventurous foreign expedition could be undertaken without having public’s back. “Any system of world order, to be sustainable, must be accepted as just – not only by leaders, but also by citizens”.⁸¹ US assertive and militant unilateralism in the first decade of the twenty-first century made its legitimacy disputed and made it questionable even to those Western allies which have so far been ardent followers of US led order. “If the approval of those whom its policies affect is the test of a government’s legitimacy, then the United States, in its capacity as the world’s government, looked distinctly illegitimate”.⁸² But the rising speculations of US impending decline made all these assertions even more vocal. This “legitimacy crisis” has constantly figured in post-hegemonic phase, when public fatigue with protracted Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts linger into Libyan, Ukrainian and Syrian cases.

How strong had been the perceptions of American decline in public can be gauged by the Pew Poll surveys of 2002 and 2013. In 2002 survey about US place in the world about 55% of Americans felt it was more important and powerful than it had been a decade before while 17% felt contrary. By 2013 those figures had been almost been exactly reversed.⁸³ Nye notes that even though America is not in absolute decline but American century may still end simply because of the rise of others. No single country is set to replace US but alliances

among them might bring an end to US pre-eminence and its ability to maintain an international order.⁸⁴

Question is not whether China, Russia, India and Brazil can construct an alternative collation with ability to overwrite rules centering US, EU and Japan priorities. Such a proposition hinges on the assumption that changing international environment has kept previous loyalties intact or is unable to interfere much with already established political fault lines. One of the timeless facts associated with international politics is that it had always been in flux. This flux introduces unpredictability element into the equation. Fierce enemies might become staunch allies or the vice versa. If history is any guide than case of Japan and Germany would testify to afore-stated hypothesis. This argument only suggests that counting Japan and EU in the American camp can be as misleading as placing China, Russia, India or Brazil in the opposite camp. The only thing which distinguishes former from the later is that they have underwritten rules of the established international order and hence their satisfaction with the status quo rests higher than the later. While the later still are struggling for their rightful place where their newly earned positions have placed them and they might be willing to cooperate with each other on this single indicator even if nothing else provides enough incentive to be in the opposite camp.

Post-hegemony characterizes this ambiguous situation. If, on the one hand, time tested friends are getting beleaguered due to US inability to comprehensively address their concerns in their respective regions and these erstwhile allies are assessing their neighborhood and maneuvering their options; On the other hand, US ability to affect desired outcomes is increasingly coming under strain and deepening the "legitimacy crisis" it is already facing. It is not the material factors alone which could be bringing an end to US hegemony, but the political decisions taken by US, its allies and even competitors have already heralded post-hegemony in international relations.

Not only is the unipolar era visibly drawing to a close but a drift towards post-hegemony is simultaneously underway.

NOTES

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SYNERGIZING FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OF PAKISTAN

*Dr. Zulfqar Khan**

Abstract

The foreign and security policy of Pakistan need to be rationalized without bandwagoning with any state. Every country's real source of power is embedded in its economic foundation and internal cohesion, which enables it to develop other elements of national power to effectively compete in a competitive world. On the other hand, the issue of terrorism especially associated with Al Qaeda and its affiliates, warrants effective and resolute eradication measures. Pakistan has to craft a flexible nuclear deterrence strategy to stabilize its strategic equation with India, and to prevent escalation of crises. The acme of diplomatic and strategic finesse necessitates that Pakistan synergize its instruments of maneuverability – nuclear deterrence, diplomacy, strategy, geo-economics, internal and external balancing in harmony with the transforming regional/geostrategic environment.

Keywords: India-Pakistan, Nuclear Deterrence, Foreign and Security Policy, Strategy, Balancing.

Introduction

Instrategic dialect, nuclear deterrence¹ and posturing is a combination of all elements of the national power to achieve states' policy objectives.² The chain of strategy is linked with other components of national power, which are considered to be the fundamental tools to pragmatically protect states' interests. "Strategy is the bridge that relates military power to political purpose," writes Colin Gray, and "it is neither military power *per se* nor political purpose." He further elaborates that strategy is "made of *force and the threat of force for the ends of policy*."³ The foremost tenet of strategy is, that it should constantly adapt to the shifting conditions of the ever-changing world "where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate" the international system.⁴ Therefore, posturing is a reflection of the states' collective power that positively or negatively impinges upon their relative position in the ever-changing world. It is argued that nuclear posturing and foreign policy of Pakistan need to be premised on the principles of pragmatism, flexibility, and proportionate strategy by reinforcing all elements of its national power to protect its national interests in view of asymmetrical nature

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of India-Pakistan's adversarial relationship. In this respect, Bernard Brodie observes that the strategic thinking and theory becomes flawed, if it is not pragmatic.⁵

Foreign & Security Policy

In international politics, the balance of power has been in practice since the time immemorial, and it is considered to be of immense significance in inter-state relations/diplomacy. David Hume describes the balance of power as a scientific pursuit of law. On the other hand, Glenn Snyder viewed it as the central theoretical concept in international politics. Generally, the golden age of the practice of the balance of power theory was 18th and 19th centuries. In the 20th century, Hans Morgenthau elucidated Hume's perspective by referring to the balance of power as an iron law of politics. Henry Kissinger treated it as an art instead of a science, which could be adroitly employed by the policymakers to protect their foreign and security policy objectives.⁶ Jack S. Levy writes that the balance of power is the most critical component of international politics; but, simultaneously it is also the most ambiguous and complex.⁷ But, in contemporary world, the existence of international nuclear order also has a significant role. In this context, William Walker writes:

Given the existence of nuclear technology, the international nuclear order entails, evolving patterns of thought and activity that serve primary goals of world survival, war avoidance and economic development; and the quest for a tolerable accommodation of pronounced differences in the capabilities, practices, rights and obligations of states.⁸

In such a transforming environment, Pakistan's insecurities are heightened; therefore, it need to rationalize its internal and external balancing strategies by acquiring additional countervailing capabilities to favourably rebalance the present power differential.⁹ Hence, instead of bandwagoning it may be prudent for Pakistan to pursue a sophisticated balance of power policy in an anarchic world.¹⁰ The dominant states are primed toward offensive behavior, war, blackmail, and buck passing.¹¹ The power differential between India and Pakistan is markedly in favor of the former, therefore, imbalance would tend to invite aggression against the weaker state,¹² and hence the case for synergizing of Pakistan's foreign and security policy becomes more critical. Nowadays, relations amongst nations are premised on a complex web of interdependencies.¹³ The past two decades has witnessed a marked imbalance in Pakistan's internal, external,

and geo-economic policies that has adversely conditioned its socio-economic, law and order fabric, and undermined its relative position and image abroad. In essence, it is a question of capability and the state's specified function to readjust with the unfolding environment.¹⁴ Most importantly, now the concept of states' sovereignty is under stress due to variety of factors, including transnational crime, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and non-state actors' (NSA) activities. Consequently, it is being linked with trans-border movements, including that of NSAs.¹⁵ This does not mean that states' sovereignty is dead, or it has become redundant; rather, it emphasizes the need to regulate the behavior of all instruments of the state in harmony with transformation in international realm. States are expected to freely enter into any agreement with other states in a legitimate way.¹⁶

Therefore, the security governance concept is expected to be dominated by the principles of assurance, prevention and protection as internal instruments of states to strengthen their institutions, and to resolve their conflicts.¹⁷ Per se, the post-Westphalian states' national security cultures are likely to be influenced by four factors: "the worldwide view of the external environment; national identity; instrumental preferences; and interaction preferences," which would impact the dynamics of international system.¹⁸ This does not necessarily denote world government or global governance, writes Jessica T Mathews, through various national and international institutions.¹⁹

Internal Dynamics & Geo-Economics

In essence, the significance of states' foreign and security policy is driven by its geopolitical and geo-economic base that strengthens or erodes its relative power in international affairs.²⁰ In the fast transforming world, carrots are becoming more important than the sticks, observes Nye.²¹ However, military power is still considered as a potent tool in the hands of states.²² Actually, the military power can only flow from the economic base.²³ Basically, it is the amalgam of geo-economics that produces the hard and soft power, ranging from Gross Domestic Product (GDP), per capita income, the level of technology, natural and human resources, political and legal institutions for markets, such as trade, finance, and competition,²⁴ that shape nation-states' future. For instance, E H Carr described the national power as the sum combination of military, economic, and opinion making potentials that determine the relative position of a state.²⁵ Furthermore, in the post-9/11 world, there are divergent perspectives relating to tackling of pressing problems and issues through the economic,

political, and diplomatic toolkits, and not necessarily through the countervailing military force.²⁶

The Pakistani policymakers should realize that, in nuclear domain, it is fundamentally the state's "power to hurt" capability that accords it the bargaining position vis-à-vis adversary.²⁷ While the "brute force succeeds when it is used, whereas the power to hurt is most successful when held in reserve," writes Thomas Schelling.²⁸ Essentially, the power potentials coupled with states' internal and external dynamics and equitable "opposing strengths may cancel each other," instead of inflicting "pain and grief"²⁹ or making rhetorical statements and futile complaints or indulging in blame games.

Other problems directly linked to Pakistan are: turmoil in Afghanistan and its adverse fallouts on the state of terrorism in Balochistan and tribal areas; cost of the counter-terrorism drive; rampant corruption, and dysfunctional governance structure; revival of the economy; efforts "to heal the festering sore in Balochistan;" security and Kashmir-related challenges from India; strategic marginalization of Pakistan; growing conventional military asymmetry; and the growing role of nuclear deterrence.³⁰ In addition, the multiple internal and external problems of terrorism and NSAs associated with Pakistan are also responsible for creation of a negative perception about country as a source of threat to international peace and security.³¹ On this issue, US policymakers appear to be frustrated, writes Talat Masood, since Pakistan's attempts to block the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) supply line in 2014 (after killing of 25 Pakistani soldiers in a NATO/US strike) undermined its pivotal role as a regional power; thereby leading to its further marginalization. In the context of strategic marginalization of Pakistan and the imperative of a "new strategic paradigm," Ambassador Munir Akram, writes:

Pakistan's endeavor to reverse its political marginalization would become much easier if it can change the strategic paradigm regarding South Asia that emerged over the last decade. This change can emanate mainly from a shift in the security parameters and perceptions of the United States and its allies.³²

Another Pakistani scholar, Mahleeha Lodhi, surveys that Pakistan's foreign and security policy take into account the legitimate aspirations of Kashmiri people, sustain its conventional and strategic deterrent posture vis-à-vis India; but, at the same time, adroitly exploit the mutually advantageous trade and economic relations.

She further remarked that:

*Vastly expanded strategic and economic relations should be pursued with China which offers Pakistan the best hope for the realization of its security and economic objectives. A balanced and stable relationship with the US should be built on mutual accommodation of legitimate national interests, respect for Pakistan's sovereignty and expanded cooperation in areas of benefit to both sides.*³³

Other critical aspect for Pakistan is the changing dynamics of geopolitics, where its credentials are being questioned and tainted due to prevalent dysfunctional internal regulatory mechanism of the state against NSAs' activities. On the external front, the onslaught of NSAs with alleged linkages with different transnational organizations, including with other states, is undermining its relative standing.³⁴ While the present US policy of pursuing a transactional relationship with Pakistan - is another negative development. On the other hand, the US has established a strategic alliance with India at the cost of its traditionally cordial ties with Pakistan.³⁵ In fact, Pakistani policymakers are vying for a durable strategic engagement with US, even after the announced withdrawal of latter's forces from Afghanistan,³⁶ which till April 2017 did not materialize. The US appears to be apprehensive about Pakistan becoming another North Korea.³⁷ Concurrently, influential US opinion formulation organs, including the print media are portraying Pakistan in a negative hue.³⁸ Unfortunately, negative perceptions has been built by some academics and intellectuals and are incessantly urging that Pakistan be treated at par with Iran and North Korea - as a hostile country that requires containment instead of friendship.³⁹ While powerful Indian Diaspora based in US-West also tend to magnify, if not over-dramatize, concerns regarding the safety and security of Pakistan's strategic arsenal, and accuses it of supporting NSAs.⁴⁰ On the other hand, Pakistan has already provided evidence of alleged Indian sponsoring of terrorism in Balochistan, Karachi and in tribal regions to the United Nations and US.⁴¹ The ostensible unfavorable projection of Pakistan has tremendously undermined Pakistan's diplomatic position in spite of its intellectuals' and policymakers' constructive leanings toward US-West. In actual fact, the country's overall strategic and diplomatic position is a sum reflection of its governance, socio-economic base, and internal cohesion, as how its resources, including material and human, are optimally harnessed for the end of "maximizing the total effectiveness" of state in critical circumstances.⁴²

Despite perceptible US pressure on Pakistan,⁴³ it cannot discount the latter's significance in geopolitical calculus. According to Vali Nasr, "In this great-power rivalry, Pakistan is a strategic asset to China – a thorn in India's side, a useful balancer that occupies many of India's military and diplomatic resources and distracts India from focusing on China." Therefore, in the case of conceding Pakistan to China, observes Nasr, US would entangle itself in another phase of rivalry with Beijing. This, in his perspective, would be one of United States' worst nightmares as it would impact its counterterrorism efforts.⁴⁴ Presently, Pakistan does not possess adequate power index ranging from resources to technology, economy, infrastructural base, and military capabilities.

Nuclear Deterrence Dimensions

The concept of regional-centric nuclear deterrence or proportionate strategic policy would accord Pakistan an effective channel to reinforce its military muscle, which is still considered as an effective instrument of power in the world affairs. It has become more critical especially when India, according to Vipin Narang, is reportedly reconfiguring its no-first use policy to first-use/preemptive strategy against Pakistan. Whereas India's former National Security Adviser, Shivshankar Menon, writes in his memoir that, "There is a potential gray area as to when India would use nuclear weapons first."⁴⁵ Secondly, the geopolitical transformation has furthermore changed Pakistan's significance in US, which during the Cold War period was a linchpin of Washington's strategic calculus under its "Northern Tier of Defense" policy that was outlined by Eisenhower Administration in 1950s.⁴⁶ The Northern Tier of Defense states were Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, which were taken on board as allies in order to contain Communism. Nasr observes that, "Now China is rebuilding old 'Northern Tier of Defense' multilateral organizations for its own strategic ends."⁴⁷ In addition, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), according to Nasr, aims to achieve the objectives of security and economic related issues, and to foster Chinese-Russian collaborative framework.⁴⁸ Interestingly, once again, Pakistan is on the volatile edge of the Northern Tier of Defense, which is now linked to US policy of rebalancing Chinese rise and its impact on Asia-Pacific.⁴⁹ Ipso facto, due to strategic dynamics of contemporary world, Pakistan forms an integral part of the chain stretching from Turkey to the Asia-Pacific region. Because of these dramatic geostrategic transformations from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Rim, India appears to be well integrated with the United States' "Indo-Pacific pivot" policy.⁵⁰

The establishment of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is expected to further increase the geopolitical significance of Pakistan, as it possesses a critical location that would provide China an access to two Oceans – Pacific and Indian. Opening of strategic link of CPEC under China’s “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) vision would enable Beijing through CPEC to establish its connectivity stretching from Central Asia, Iran, and Middle East to Africa and Europe. Actually, the changing geostrategic dynamics have prompted Pakistan and China to join hands to construct a geo-economic, geo-political and security architecture under the framework of CPEC to safeguard their national interests. For the realization of these objectives, China started its “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “Maritime Silk Road of the Twenty-First Century” projects, which were with clear design to achieve Beijing’s long-term strategic and economic goals. On the other hand, Pakistan had joined CPEC to stabilize its internal/ external security and socio-economic situation, to build its communication infrastructure, increase energy generation, and to rehabilitate its geopolitical standing, which is fast eroding due to US-India burgeoning strategic partnership. These initiatives were launched by President Xi Jinping in October 2013.

In contemporary world, nuclear deterrence is difficult to effectively balance the unbalanced power equation between the rival states. In such a volatile environment, the stronger state is likely to pressurize the weaker country through coercive tactics or use of force.⁵¹ In asymmetrical circumstances, Pakistan per se would fundamentally rely on its regional-centric nuclear deterrence theoretical *model* to standardize measures to streamline the whole gamut of its foreign and security policy. In this perspective, when battlefield-tactical nuclear weapons are integrated into Indian and Pakistani military doctrines, however, there is still a space to calibrate strategies below the threshold levels of each other.⁵² In fact, already both countries’ conventional war-fighting capabilities and other non-military elements of security are asymmetrical; therefore, the testing of weaker state’s threshold level would be too destabilizing and perilous for the regional peace and security. Actually start of confidence and security building measures to resolve their bilateral issues would go a long way in minimizing the possibilities of crafting of limited war fighting doctrines.⁵³ In this asymmetrical environment, it is believed that Pakistan’s plan to integrate the low-yield nuclear weapons into its arsenal and military calibration with objective to enhance its defensive-offensive capability, and to evolve a viable strategy against the conventionally and strategically stronger India. Moreover, it would assist Pakistan to counter wide range of

threats, and to deny manoeuvrability space to India's plan to initiate a limited war.⁵⁴ Therefore, Pakistan's induction of battlefield nuclear weapons appears to be a deterrence stabilization strategy to balance the regional security equation.

Concluding Observations

The existing asymmetrical power equation between India and Pakistan, it was argued, can be prudently balanced by Pakistan through synergizing of its foreign and security policy, and with adroit employment of flexible policy, proportionate conventional, tactical, and strategic strategizing vis-à-vis militarily, geopolitically, economically, and strategically much superior power – India. One, a fine-balance could be adroitly achieved by removing all irritants with the regional countries and by eradicating the scourge of terrorism and fundamentalism. Two, Pakistan to effectively balance its relationship with the Gulf Cooperation Council and the European Union countries, including China, and US; however without bandwagoning with any predominant regional or extra-regional state(s) – and to consider having productive ties with all the countries of the Asia-Pacific, including India, China, US, and the EU. Three, in spite of prevailing asymmetry between India and Pakistan, the latter can sustain its independence and prevent adversary from gaining escalation dominance, employment of coercive tactics in a crisis, or to attain power at its expense.⁵⁵ Four, it should take this fact into account that, every country's real source of power flows from its natural resources, economic and industrial potentials that enables it to build military power and to hold adversaries at bay.⁵⁶ Five, the international relations theorists write that the options of bandwagoning and balancing are the key strategies to neutralize the peer-competitors.⁵⁷

Both India and Pakistan still lag behind in many institutional and societal reforms in comparison to most of the industrialized nations, including in the realm of socioeconomic, political, meritocratic-based culture/society, institutions, and in inculcation of modern liberal *ethos* in their social structures. However, with respect to India, it is expected to play a pivotal strategic role in accord with United States' global policy to contain China's rise in 21st century. In the case of Pakistan, it had earlier performed a similar role for US to contain Communism during the heydays of the Cold War under Eisenhower's policy of Northern Tier of Defense.⁵⁸ At this intersection, Pakistan again has a significant balancing and stabilization role to perform in the nuclearized, volatile and terrorism infested environment of South Asia, northwest Asia/ Afghanistan and Middle East.

Most significantly, now, there are few lingering irritants between US-West and Pakistan concerning the issue of terrorism, Al Qaeda, drone strikes in latter's tribal areas, which undermined Washington's soft power image in Pakistan.⁵⁹ On the other hand, this has created a negative image of Pakistan in US as well. Moreover, US have also accused Pakistan of harbouring terrorists.⁶⁰ In fact, history tells us that the problem of terrorism, especially associated with Al Qaeda affiliates, is in fact the *lasting legacy* of the Cold War's last battlefield – Afghanistan, when US and its allies walked away from the region after the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989 consequently leaving Pakistan on its own to manage the remnants of this ideological conflict persisting in the form of terrorism and proliferation of NSAs. In essence, as per one writer, “the onus of responsibility of this distressing situation equally rests with the world that had earlier enthusiastically supported the then front-line state – Pakistan.”⁶¹

The present uneasy phase of Pakistan-US relationship has been succinctly summed up by Vali Nasr: “Nowadays it is quite clear that America's favor lies with Pakistan's neighbor and nemesis, India, and at times it seems as if Pakistan is reacting to the uncomfortable fact by embodying all the anti-American anger.”⁶² Therefore, it is important for US as well to consider balancing its relationship with Pakistan by keeping in view Islamabad's sensitivities vis-à-vis India.⁶³ Most significantly, United States' transactional policy with regard to Pakistan is clearly “a failure of American policy, a failure of the sort that comes from the president handing foreign policy over to the Pentagon and the intelligence agencies.”⁶⁴ In India-Pakistan context, as argued in the preceding sections, the latter ought to proportionately align the principles of regional-centric nuclear deterrence to stabilize peace, prevent escalation of crises from spirally out of control,⁶⁵ communicate to adversary about the consequences for any misadventure, and to *finesse* its foreign and security policy with the emerging contours of international politics.⁶⁶

NOTES

- ¹ For a broader understanding of concept of deterrence, Keith B. Payne writes that: “This multidisciplinary approach, instead, is designed to use informed judgments about the specific actor’s decision making in context to help understand and thus establish expectations about the directions of its likely decision making. These expectations then drive judgments about the likely value and effectiveness of alternative deterrence strategies. The basic assumption of procedural rationality may still pertain, but the variables that determine the actual direction of decision making following from procedural rationality are derived from judgments about the opponent given its unique character and place;” see Keith B. Payne, “Understanding Deterrence,” in *Understanding Deterrence*, ed. Keith B. Payne (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p. 34.
- ² According to Lawrence Freedman, the nuclear weapons “disproportionate character guarantees some deterrent effect in any situation in which there is the slightest chance of the employment of any nuclear weapons;” see Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. xiv, 45-85. While Sir Michael Quinlan remarked that the nuclear weapons “could play a stabilizing role in East-West relations” see, Tanya Ogilvie-While, *On Nuclear Deterrence: The Correspondence of Sir Michael Quinlan* (London: The International Institute of International Studies, 2011), p. 37.
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- ¹¹ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), pp. 3, 21, 29, chapter 5.
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HURDLES IN WOMEN DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN

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Abstract

The paper endeavours to engage with development literature grounded in sociology and anthropology in an effort to highlight the conceptual shortcomings of development debate that sees status of women narrowly defined in terms of certain measureable indicators. It builds around the central theme that based on such universalistic assumptions, policies targeting the uplift of women's status in the developing countries have not achieved the desired results. In Pakistan's case, such failure is generally laid at the door of religious traditionalism and such conservatism is seen as the biggest hurdle in the path of women's development. The paper uses historical and philosophical methodologies to answer two central questions posed by it in terms of the adequacy of the criterion of status measurement as well as the role of religion in the status of women. Within sociology it is well known that the identification and definition of problem has a bearing upon its solution. The paper deconstructs the 'definition of the problem of women's low status' within the development discourse and establishes that status as is currently defined by development agencies does not reflect the particularities of Pakistani women's situation. It also concludes that as opposed to religious traditionalism, cultural imperatives, govern women's roles and statuses. It therefore, challenges the dominant perspectives of women development as universalistic and of minimal relevance to Pakistani women calling for extensive research on the lives of Pakistani women that can be used as the basis for development interventions.

Keywords: Literature, Anthropology, Assumptions, Methodologies, Universalistic, Perspectives.

Introduction

Women as a subject of research and policy are a late entrant in the history of development. The term Development itself is complicated by a plethora of definitions. The large number of key actors involved in the field of development further adds to this complexity.¹ Since the solution to a problem is dependent upon the identification and definition of the problem, women's issues too have been dependent upon how they have been identified, defined and later translated into policies. Development for women has largely been identified in terms of improving their status in the society with the implicit assumption that women in developing countries, in general, occupy an inferior status. Following this line of thinking, certain indicators have been identified like education,

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employment, political participation etc. that determine the status of women in a society.

The primary task of this paper then is to look at whether the biggest hurdle in the path of women development in Pakistan is the definition of the problem itself and that do we need to rethink how status is defined and measured.

Background

Pakistan is home to over 180 million people.² More than half of this population comprises of women. This demographic share looks rather overwhelming at the outset; however, amid a mix of religious and cultural taboos and stigmas they are exposed to on a daily basis, the figure does not translate into tangible financial, social and political standing for women in this country. Traditionally, women's status has been measured in terms of educational attainment and labour-force participation. In Pakistan's case, irrespective of the measure used, Pakistani woman's status is viewed to be inferior relative to that of men in comparison with other societies. Empirical evidence for this is provided, for example, by the limited participation of women in economic activities outside the house and by the high percentage of women who are illiterate.³

Some authors have attributed this low status of women in Pakistani society to misconceived notions and practices in the name of Islam – the religion of majority population in Pakistan. The commonly perceived role of women in Islam is often thought as the major determining factor of women's status in society⁴ and hence an inferior status in society implies an inferior role prescription in religion. What has been overlooked is that the status of women within Pakistan varies from region to region although the dominant factor of the religion remains the same. Also if we expand our analysis to both India and Pakistan, the status of women is the same within a particular region irrespective of their religious beliefs whether Islam or Hinduism.

Perspectives and Policy Approaches on Women in Development

The term "Women in Development" (WID) was brought into usage by the work of a network of women development experts based in Washington DC in the 1970s. The involvement of these women in overseas missions led them to

start questioning the “trickle down” theories of development. They debated that modernization had a different impact on men and women. Instead of improving women’s rights and status, the development process appeared to be contributing to a deterioration of their position. Here the work of Ester Boserup, a Danish Economist needs special mention within this WID based perspective. Ester Boserup’s publication, ‘Women’s Role in Economic Development (1970)’ challenged the assumptions of the “welfare approach” highlighting women’s importance to the agrarian economies.

Building on Boserup’s research, WID supporters rebuffed the narrow view of women’s roles within development policy vis-à-vis women which only viewed them in their caring and rearing roles. WID approach characterized women as “productive” members of society rather than the “needy” beneficiaries. Women were now to be seen as actively contributing to development rather than passively receiving welfare hand-outs. Women under this perspective were re-framed as ‘the missing link’ in development, a previously unrecognized economic resource.

The focus on poverty alleviation and basic needs represented a transitional phase between early emphasis on women, welfare and the full-blown concern with efficiency which has emerged as a dominant theme in current WID policies. Later a fourth approach emerged owing to the inclusion of Southern voices. Empowerment – an approach that signifies third world feminist scholarly and activist endeavours.

By the late 1970s, WID’s narrow focus on reducing inequality in education and paid work without paying attention to the overarching structural factors that supported such inequalities was being seriously questioned. In such an atmosphere, Marxist views gained importance that attributed women’s inferior status to structures of production - a view shared by liberal feminists. Marxist theory holds that women’s unpaid labour within the household and reproductive services are critical for capitalist employers. They produce future generations of labourers and maintain the current ones on a daily basis for the capitalists free of cost thereby keeping costs down and profits up. In times of dire need they can also be useful as a reserve army of easily exploitable and cheap labour. Marxism’s concern with structural basis of exploitation endeared it to some feminists working in the development field.

Current Status of Women in Pakistan – A Situational Analysis

Four features generally considered important in measuring the status of women in any society⁵ i.e. education, employment, political participation and health. Some studies⁶ also include women's autonomy and independence as a measure of their status; however, these are 'means' to achieve education, employment and political participation as well as the 'end objectives' that can be achieved through these means.

Education

Education is the most significant aspect of modern human life. It is the primary yardstick to measure the progress of a nation. Around the world it is being deliberated to promote education and make it universally accessible to every individual. However, in most of the developing countries this basic right is denied by structural and cultural hindrances. In Pakistan this pattern is most obvious when it comes to female literacy. The official statistics released by the Federal Ministry of Education reveal that in an overall literacy rate of fifty eight percent, women have only a dismal forty percent share. The constitution of Pakistan states that: "*The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of five to sixteen years in such manner as may be determined by law.*"⁷ The constitutional guarantee has not translated into a reality as on the Education Development Index, Pakistan lies at the bottom with countries like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka as compared to other countries of the world. Although, the link between literacy and education has been proven worldwide, the current combined budget allocation of Pakistan on education amounts to 1.9% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

Employment

Pakistani women live in a classical patriarchal society⁸ which tends to mask their productive contributions. It wrongly depicts them as relegated to the domestic spheres spending larger parts of their adult lives taking care of their families. This misconception is saddled with faulty enumeration systems that collect information largely from men in the family who may feel embarrassed admitting that women in their families earn an income. Women in rural areas undertake unpaid farm labour as part of family enterprise that is not reflected individually nor is seen as an extension of their household duties like livestock

rearing. They are also largely concentrated in the informal economy doing work at home under a highly exploitative putting out system. All these result in an invisibility of women's productive work in Pakistan. The economic activity of women is grossly underreported both in rural as well as urban areas. The invisibility of women's work is not the only issue. Domestic work is a case in point. In Pakistan, women form the major bulk of domestic workers. Domestic service is an unregulated, unorganized, undervalued and highly exploitative form of employment. This kind of employment does not improve the social or economic status of women workers.⁹

Political Participation

Women in Pakistan have been part of, and continue to participate in politics, at various levels, from mobilization on specific issues to taking part in electoral politics (largely as voters), to sitting in local bodies and provincial and national legislatures. While women have been taken to collective and individual political activism during critical junctures in Pakistan's political life; like the Pakistan Movement, fight against the Hudood ordinances under the Zia regime and repeatedly during the various elections, their presence in the decision-making bodies of both political parties and national institutions has been minimal.¹⁰ On recent intervention and pressurizing by international agencies, a guaranteed share of participation in national and provincial legislatures has been delegated to women. This has resulted in the increased visibility of women within these law making bodies. However, this increased visibility has not translated into any significant gains for women, as female representatives are bound by their class and party affiliations.

Health

Health statistics for women in Pakistan are one of the poorest in the region. Considering that Maternal and Child health was one of the primary objectives of development policy approaches. Recorded maternal mortality stands at 260 deaths by 100,000 live births. In addition restrictions on mobility place health services out of their reach. Early marriages and frequent pregnancies due to preference for more children are added disadvantages.

Status of Women and its Indicators

A woman's status could thus be defined as her standing expressed in terms of prestige, power, or esteem, vis-a-vis men. Operationally, status was

defined in terms of the indicators that reflected the social position of women in society; which was principally labour force participation and educational enrolment with a passing reference to political rights and social conditions.¹¹

Anxious to go down the development route, successive Governments in Pakistan since independence too focused on the need to have programmes and projects for the uplift of women. Starting in 1955, every successive five-year development plan of the government acknowledged the low status of women and recognised the need for better education opportunities and improved health facilities for women if they were to fully participate in the economic life of the nation.¹² Whether it were the five year plans, or the reports of the Commissions on the Status of Women (1983 and 2000) or the workings of the Women's Division; all used the internationally established categories of measuring women's status and advised policies and plans for improvement based on these. Education, health and employment seemed to be the all-important sectors where effort was needed by government if the status of women was to be improved.¹³ It is interesting to point out here that despite years of development planning, even the government from time to time acknowledged its failure to ameliorate the position of women.¹⁴

Low literacy and labour force participation levels of Pakistani women are indicators of a low status 'freeze them in time in the form of a spectacle'¹⁵ and ignore the fact that there is a wide range of variety in their position within the country. For a Pakistani woman 'can be a highly qualified and self-confident professional, or a self-effacing peasant toiling alongside.'¹⁶ It is no wonder that women in Pakistan, though in a minority, can be doctors, lawyers, engineers, vice chancellors of universities, bureaucrats, presidents of labour unions, entrepreneurs and even occasionally the head of the governments. On the other extreme, however, in areas like Baltistan, women may be used in place of bullocks to till the land.¹⁷

Similar is the case of labour force participation which is also seen as an indicator of women's status. Women working outside their homes for cash-income are generally supposed to have greater say in household decision-making and more awareness of the outside world. In Pakistan's case however women's labour-force participation is not associated with enhanced status. Very few women worked out of choice and even majority of them were willing to give up work if their financial condition improved. Society frowns upon a working

woman. Man is the breadwinner and woman's place is in the house. Only certain types of jobs are considered respectable namely of teachers and doctors.

Another phenomenon which has been considered important in relation to women's status in Pakistan is son preference and fertility behaviour. Societies that are marked by gender inequalities and inferior female status are characterised by preference for male children.

Pakistani Society, Role of Religion and the Status of Women

The entire development agenda that aims at improving the status of women is indicator driven. These indicators are derived from top down universalistic approaches grounded in Western liberalism that assume a researcher what Naila Kabeer calls the universal belief in 'individual rationality and a global commonality of interests among women.'¹⁸ This belief leads us to assume that women are disembodied individuals whose lot can be improved by introducing similar types of policies around the world. If education, skill, training and outside paid employment can improve the status of women in America and Africa, same is true for women in Pakistan.¹⁹

Customary practices contrary to Islamic beliefs and statutory law are not uncommon in Pakistan.²⁰ Not only are they indicative of the Pakistani society but also bring to surface the gender inequalities inherent in it. The first incident cited is that of Karo Kari, literally meaning black, a name for honour killings. It is a Balouch tribal tradition now increasingly being followed by Sindhi and Punjabi feudal living in the tribal belts. It has been practiced for hundreds of years. The dice is heavily loaded against women as the accusations are always made by men who are the custodians of power in a feudal setup. The killers take pride in what they have done, the tribal elders condone the act and protect the killers and today the police connive in the cover-up. The mullah, the religious authority, is almost never consulted or involved, as the tradition has nothing to do with religion.²¹

Traditionally Pakistani society has been analyzed as composed of four ethnic groups – Punjabis, Sindhis, Pukhtuns and Baloch. Such an analyses, however, excludes people of places such as Gilgit, Hazara and Kashmir who cannot be placed in the four major groupings. To avoid such exclusions, ethnic groups in Pakistan can be classified into categories defined by social structure,

emphasizing each group's characteristic behaviour and values. Each such category is defined by characteristic patterns of leadership by its networks and organizations and by social and economic activities.

Female education is not considered a priority by majority of the villagers. In their value system the girls' activities in their adult life will be limited to domestic tasks and the rearing of children. When villagers send their daughters to school it is only so that they can read and write letters to them if they have problems with their husbands and in-laws. They do not want them to acquire some kind of professional qualification in order to earn an income. As to their attitude towards religious education is concerned, it is assumed that the women who taught Quran in the village in their homes to girls (a widow and a crippled woman) complain about the parents' lack of respect towards them as Quranic teachers and about their ignorance concerning the importance of religious education. Their pupils represent only a fraction of the total number of children in the villages.

Women do inherit land but leave their share of land to their brother or a close male relative after the death of the father; to do otherwise would lead to social conflicts and ostracism. In compensation, they receive a portion of the harvest and are guaranteed support of the brother in case of fallout with her husband or his death. Widows too are left with land by their husbands and are not required to marry their deceased husband's brothers to keep the land within the family like the tribal women. But their in-laws usually cultivate her late husband's land and may or may not take their own share of the production, depending on the type of relationship they have with each other. However, widows often face great social and economic difficulties, especially when there is no adult male child in the household, i.e. when no man can defend her interest. This shows that even owning land or property does not bestow a higher status on her and she generally has to rely on assistance from men. Everyone in the village tries to snatch her land through all kinds of means, including physical pressure and violence. Both men and women may use accusations of illegitimate relations to ostracize the widow and make her give up rights to her land. Her life is often ruined by permanent worries, insecurity and court action.

Although, majority of population in Pakistan lives in rural areas there is a substantial 34.3% living in the urban centers. The gendered social norms vary greatly among the four main provinces, especially in the urban centers. In cities

like Peshawar or Quetta, seclusion of women and gender segregation are followed most strictly, with women being almost invisible in public spaces that are dominated by men. In contrast to this, Karachi, the most modern city in Pakistan, women's visibility in public spaces and paid employment is more common. Lahore is situated in-between these poles. Certain influences of tribal life, dominant in Pukthun and Baloch tribes are obviously visible in the urban centres of the respective provinces populated by these tribes. In others, economic realities are rapidly changing social norms. Religious reality or tribal practices tend to turn a blind eye to the realities of economic hardships. More and more women are being pushed into the labour market due to economic pressures and they are finding paid employment in untraditional sectors where gender segregation is difficult to uphold.

As compared to rural areas, cities are places where one tends to encounter maximum dichotomies in theory and practice, between professed religion and practiced norms. A study of lower, middle-class working women living in a hostel in Lahore by Jasmin Mirza²² revealed quite contradictory notions in relation to purdah norms. Women in the study claimed to use veil not for any religious reasons but rather to protect themselves from harassment through behaviour exhibited by men in the public sphere. When they were alone in the public spaces, they generally covered their heads with the dupatta, although they might not do so if accompanied by their brother or mother. Women who did not otherwise cover their heads with a dupatta definitely do so in crowded places like bus stops, in buses or in the bazaars, only because the danger of being harassed or touched is greater than in other places. Women living in the city dressed, in a burqa with niqab, when they visited their families in villages. Even women who were strong supporters of the burqa moved around in the hostel – and in front of male servants – without even a dupatta. They would go to the neighbourhood bazaar clad only in a chaddor because, as the researcher was told, it was not far – just around the corner. It would be too tiring for them to always dress in the burqa just for short trips like shopping or making phone calls from the Public Call Office. Also women who wore burqa or niqab in their hometown were not seen dressed like this in Murree, a tourist resort. They all moved around in Murree in chaddors or even just the dupatta and, contrary to their behaviour in Lahore, most of them did not even consider covering their heads. In Murree, a tourist resort affected by the casual attire of many local and foreign tourists who come from urban areas and the West, an atmosphere has

been created in which women can sit in snack bars and stroll around in the bazaars and the public without fear of being harassed.²³

Their narration of their practice of purdah with Islam also proved contradictory in many instances. Mirza cites the example of a lower-middle-class working woman in her study who said she was against wearing jeans because her religion (Islam) forbade women to wear men's clothes. On the researcher's comment that then women should not even wear shalwar kameez as it is traditionally also worn by men she became confused. This is typical of Pakistani society as they confuse religion with social practices. A religious answer would have been that women cannot wear figure hugging clothes. That too is debatable on several grounds as in Islam men are also not allowed to wear figure hugging jeans that pronounce their manhood. Also women wear figure hugging shalwar kameez in urban areas with a dupatta no more than a thin scarf hanging symbolically from their shoulders but cannot go out without it as it is not a socially accepted norm.

Conclusion

The paper presents a snap shot of what development is, what is meant by women development and what approaches are used across third world countries to bring about improvement in the lives of women. It provides a critical summary of how development process is driven by universalistic approaches that are considered appropriate in all countries irrespective of their specific histories and geographies. It attacks the core of development 'ends' and the 'means' to achieve these end objectives. Where the end is an improvement in the status of women, the means adopted to achieve these are education, employment and political participation. When development process fails to achieve these ends through these means, it lays its failure at the door of religious traditionalism.

The paper inverts this reasoning on its head and claims that status itself is being measured by faulty indicators. Education and employment have not necessarily brought status to women in Pakistan. Majority of women in Pakistan are employed in low paid, low status jobs which do not bring social or economic betterment with them. Those women who have benefited from education and employment are already privileged in terms of caste and class. Political participation in provincial and national legislatures is limited to elite women who do not share interests with the poor women.

The paper also takes to task the misconception that development policies have failed to deliver in Pakistan as shown time and again by its poor performance on Gender Gap Indicators because of religious traditionalism. Pakistan is a feudal-tribal state governed by caste and class hierarchies. When it comes to the lives of women, these cultural imperatives are paramount even in face of religious instructions that give women right to education, work, choose their partners in marriage, and inherit property etc.

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INDIAN STRATEGIC THINKING & PARTNERSHIP WITH ISRAEL: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

*Attiqu ur Rehman & Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal**

Abstract

Classical Kautilyan and modern Nehruvian wisdoms laid the foundation of Indian strategic thinking. While maintaining cooperative interaction with the outside world, New Delhi endeavours to establish its hegemony in South Asia. New Delhi's closeness with Tel Aviv is an appropriate example of Kautilyan realpolitik model of pleasantly managing of foreign relation beyond the neighbouring nations. In opposition to Pakistan's counter weighting behaviour, New Delhi preferred to uphold Israel in its mainstream Middle Eastern policy. The mutual geostrategic interests of both India and Israel in Middle East and South Asia forced them to develop multiple areas for strategic cooperation while fighting against their bordering Muslim states. Moreover, the persistently increasing regional hegemonic thrust of Tel Aviv and New Delhi jeopardized the security of both Western and Southern corners of larger Asian region. The anti-Islamic collaboration cemented in racially discriminatory patterns of Hindu-Zionist ideologies leaves serious repercussions for territorially adjoining Islamic states generally, and Pakistan specifically. Islamabad's counterbalancing role against New Delhi's offensive South Asian policy along with its non-recognition of Israel's as a de jure state let India to explicitly pursue Kautilyan model of diplomacy. Indeed, Indo-Israel strategic cooperation would be having impact on the South Asian strategic environment in general and Pakistan in particular.

Keywords: Kautilyan, Politics, South Asia, Security, Strategic Environment.

Introduction

India's aggressive approach towards its neighbours is a mirror image of Kautilyan Arthshastra, philosophy of governance. Indian foreign policy review reveals, the foreign policy makers in New Delhi are immensely influenced by Kautilyan pessimistic perceptions about its neighbours, which was a hallmark of Mauryan dynasty foreign policy. The classical wisdom of managing foreign relations by expanding territories can be termed today as expanding the sphere of influence for the achievement of geostrategic objective. In this way, the persuasion of Kautilyan maxims always remained an unavoidable component of Indian strategic thinking.

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New Delhi's approach of managing the territorial and oceanic matters pugnaciously on Kautilyan philosophy has resulted in a quarrelsome South Asian environment, in which the regional states facing Indian antagonism are trying to secure their sovereign positions. India's relations with bordering nation bases on unresolved territorial disputes cemented in incompatible national standings have caused an instable regional security environment of South Asia. The persistent increase in conventional and nonconventional military capabilities of New Delhi have further caused the insecurity of bordering nations. The bellicose behaviour of Indian leadership has entangled territorially adjoining states into an unending strategic competition. Perhaps, it is the cause of India and Pakistan arms race.

Israel has failed to resolve its disputes with its neighbours. Both Tel Aviv, like New Delhi successfully camouflage its warlike destabilizing regional policies and also represent itself as a victim of neighbours sponsored violence.

On July 2017, Prime Minister Modi made an historical visit to Israel. The agreement in various areas of mutual interests and supply of Israeli weapons to India were the main points of discussion during the Modi-Netanyahu meeting.¹ It was considerable to be unignorably an important shift in India's policy towards Zionism and Israel. The two-sided multiplying strategic bounds have significant implications for Pakistan.²

The increasing New Delhi-Tel Aviv multidimensional cooperation particularly in military and security fields is a serious concern for Islamabad, because the joint Israeli-Indian state capacities have explored every possible dimension of cooperation. The mutual efforts of both nations in the strategic domain witnessed a promising behaviour of authorities from two sides. Unlike the Indian model of violently managing external relation based on Kautilyan principles, the mainstream Pakistani leadership preferred to develop friendly ties with neighbouring nations and established cooperatively dynamic relations with China.

The critical examination of Indo-Israel strategic relations and their impact on Pakistan has become a question of great significance in the prevalent regional and global strategic environment. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the Indian strategic thinking and its impact on neighbouring states generally, and Pakistan specifically. Indo-Israel strategic partnership and their various joint ventures for supporting each other against regional rivals is the central theme of this study.

Genesis of Indian Strategic Thinking

Chanakya (famously known as Kautilya or Vishnugupta), an advisor of Mauryan Empire, laid the foundations of Indian strategic thinking. Kautilya's vision for dealing with the economic affairs of state parallel to warfare strategies for decisively defeating the potential rivals, served the administrative and strategic objectives of ancient India, and helped Chandragupta in the establishment of the Maurya Empire after successfully overthrowing the Nanda Empire.³

The classical literature derived from the Mauryan dynasty was further advanced by initial Indian leadership in the post-independence era when the first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, chalked out a plan of upholding his country as a sovereign entity in world politics.⁴ In order to acquire a hegemonic position in the larger South Asian region, Pandit Nehru persuaded both United States and Soviet Union in the strategic support of his country.⁵ In the last phase of US-USSR rivalry, New Delhi decided to stay in the Soviet camp against Beijing, Islamabad, and Washington. The demise of the Soviet Union showed a dramatic change in New Delhi's foreign policy and resulted in close Indo-US cooperative relations.

A critical analysis of New Delhi's external relations presents a shrewd pattern of varying foreign policy paradigms adopted by Indian leaders throughout the history. The aftermaths of Cold War competition convinced the Indian leadership to end its diplomatic reluctance for Israel and considered it a potential ally. In this way, Israel gradually emerged as one of the key states for supporting India in the larger South Asian region and became a gravitational point of Indian Middle East policy. In the absence of a diplomatically conflicted environment, the economic, strategic, cultural and social bounds rapidly bonded two states to supportably remain in closer relationship.

Nature of Indo-Israel Bilateralism

The nature of a well-established and well-structured bilateral collaboration between New Delhi and Tel Aviv contains several commonalities which placed both states into a closer diplomatic and strategic formats while locating in separate regions. The longstanding bilateral settings of both states on the basis of following similarities force them to assist each other in playing of principally key roles in their regional politics.⁶

- The national security professionals of both states perceive their neighbours as potential rivals and always prefer to undermine their sovereign existence. Such bilateral ventures consequently threatened the survival of their adjoining countries. Israel feels threatened by Arab states, whereas India perceives China and Pakistan as hostile states.
- Pakistan's refusal to recognize the Jewish occupation in Middle East parallel to its own creation against Hindu dominated nation provided initial basis for Indo-Israel friendship. Contrary to Pakistan's non-recognition of Jewish state of Israel, India preferred to accept formally the state of Israel and allowed the Jewish state to open a Consulate in Mumbai in 1953.⁷ The consular services of both states kept their diplomatic communities to closely work for the enhancement of bilateral ties of their states.
- Since Israel's birth and independence of India, both countries have started to look their regions negatively and adopted a militarized policy for managing of their external affairs. The inflexible positions of both Tel Aviv and New Delhi further ignored the role of international forums (United Nations) for maintaining of peace in their regions.
- The geostrategic thrust of both nations sparked an unending nuclear race in Middle East and South Asia. Israel clandestinely developed a nuclear weapons capability and forced the neighbouring states (mainly Iraq and Syria) to start their nuclear programs, whereas Indian self-proclaimed peaceful nuclear intentions in 1974, and inaugurated the South Asian nuclear arms race. Tel Aviv even restrained from condemning the New Delhi's proclamation of its nuclear armed capability in 1998.

In this way, mutually agreed context of Indo-Israel nexus has resulted in various joint ventures and considerably prevented the historical gaps between Jewish and Hindu communities.

New Delhi-Tel Aviv Strategic Cooperation

A thin layer of bilateral values were covertly constructed by the governments of both sides and a phase of reciprocal visits gradually became an undeniable fact of the partnership. In 1960s, the signs of military-to-military cooperation began to surface when Israel supported India initially against China and later against Pakistan (1962, 1965), and India reciprocated Israel against Arabs states in 1967.⁸ Later, the Moraji Desai administration attempted to

enhance the unuttered India-Israel diplomatic confidence and arranged a secret visit of Israeli officials in New Delhi in 1977.⁹ The option for adopting a more effective and cooperative Israeli policy was further explored by the sixth Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi.¹⁰ He vigorously followed his predecessors and decided to foster the incremental measures toward Israel.¹¹ Rajiv Gandhi met with Shimon Peres during the UN General Assembly meeting in 1985 and attempted to strengthen the cooperative potential of the two states.¹²

After the launch of a surprise air strike on an Iraqi nuclear facility (*Osirak* reactor) in 1981, Israel expressed support for the Indian idea of destroying the embryonic growth of Islamabad's nuclear program.¹³ Mossad was exceedingly active in providing the intelligence services and sharing details with the Gandhi regime about Pakistani nuclear facilities.¹⁴ The IDF agreed in facilitating the Indian Air Force (IAF) for adopting Israeli plan which was applied on *Osirak*.¹⁵

The mainstream leadership from New Delhi and Tel Aviv decided to antagonistically polish their strategic muscles with the aim of compelling their territorially adjoining nations to accept their regional hegemonic schemes while offensively suppressing the role of counterbalancing forces.¹⁶

Israeli's Military Industrial Complex and India

The principle imperative of Indo-Israeli policy is chiefly inherited in a dramatic shift of New Delhi's foreign relations in the post-Cold War era when the disintegration of Soviet Union and emergence of American sole super power status altered global historical alliances of the Cold War era.¹⁷ The mutual cooperation in the technologically advanced field of defence coupled with crafting of various avenues for united research and development work were emphasized in the meeting.¹⁸ The fifth Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin, decided to connect New Delhi's Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) to Israel's main military-industrial complex.¹⁹

The last five years have witnessed annual defence trade between the two states upward of 1 billion dollars.²⁰ The genesis of strategic collaboration between both states tentatively initiated in 1962, but the decade of 1990 observed the rapid growth in military-to-military ties between the governments of the two states. The up-gradation of Soviet obtained ageing MiG-21 aircraft communicated Indian requests for getting Israeli assistance in 1995, and Indian government further hosted a visit of Israeli Air Force Major General Herzl Bodinger in New

Delhi.²¹ Moreover, New Delhi paid 14 million dollars to Israel against a major arms deal in addition to the purchase of an upgraded aircraft carrier, INS *Viraat*.²² The government owned IAI, recognized as Tel Aviv's main aerospace and aviation producer, agreed to serve Indian maritime interest in 1996 and agreed to provide two Super Dvora Mk-2 fast patrol boats.²³ The manufacturing of further Super Dvora boats were allowed by IAI to India and six additional boats were manufactured at Goa shipyard.²⁴ In 1998, Indian Navy received additional Israeli assistance in the form of patrol boats and electric warfare computers.²⁵ The acquisition of Barak-8 missile system is planned to enable Indian navy to increase its air-defence capabilities.²⁶ The cooperation of New Delhi-Tel Aviv naval forces expand Israel's sphere of influence from Mediterranean Sea to larger Indian Ocean, which will serve in Jewish greater security concerns in oceanic politics in the future.

The Israeli supplies ensured India the sale of ground-to-ground Barak missile system in addition to Green Pine Radar System as an anti-missile shield. A set of three Phalcon long-range radars, as a part of AWACS India has purchased from Israel in 2003.²⁷ The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) from New Delhi expressed its intentions of purchasing more Israeli-manufactured surveillance aircrafts.²⁸ Moreover, the renovation of Mikoyan-Gurevich (MiG 21) supersonic fighter jets, pilotless planes, Sakohi helicopters, and Russian-made T-72 tanks further materialised the defence promises of Israeli and Indian leaders.²⁹

In the field of space, Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) in collaboration of Israel Space Agency (ISA) finalized a deal for Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV C-10) in 2008 on the basis of historical ties between ISRO and IAI.³⁰ The recent visit of Modi has concluded three main space agreements for bilateral cooperation in the areas of small satellites, GEO-LEO optical links and atomic clock (satellite based equipment for getting precise locational data).³¹

The IAI, by maintaining its commercial interest, was agreed to enhance its working relations with Indian army and finalized a contract of 1.6 billion dollar. According to signed deal, the IAI will provide medium-to-air missile (MRSAM) along with long-range surface-to-air missile (LRSAM) to India.³² On December 29-30, 2015, Indian Naval Ship (INS) Kolkata tested the missile LRSAM into Arabian Sea.³³ The IAI and TATA signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in February 2008 and TAT's new wing TaTa Advanced Systems agreed to

work with IAI in aerospace industry.³⁴ IAI remained active in various projects while Indian government and DRDO proposed several programs with IAI for the advancement of Indian air and naval forces. On December 2012, the IAI and BEL signed another MoU for the development of LRSAM ship-defence system projects.³⁵ Elbit officials visited India and introduced the company's hi-tech inventions in Aero-India Air & Space exhibition.³⁶ Further Israeli defence pacts promised to provide India Thermal Imaging Stand Alone Systems (TISAS), Long Range Observation Systems (LOROS), Hand Held Thermal Imaging Systems (HHTI), Portable Laser Designing Systems (PLDS), and Thermal Imaging Fire Control Systems (TIFCS) in addition to different hi-tech sensors and advanced surveillance equipment.³⁷

India's agency for foreign intelligence Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) and Israel's similar intelligence services Mossad secretly established their connections and developed common areas for cooperation. The two-sided intelligence agencies gained substantial growth for bringing two states too closer and countering the common threats through clandestine operations.

As the biggest importer of Israeli military technology, India posed serious threats to its territorially adjoining countries especially Pakistan. The hostile ideological and racist attributes of Indo-Israeli regional policies directed the Jewish and Hindu leaders to carry offensive policies for their closest neighbours.

In theory, the Kautilyan model of pursuing national interest by increasing ties with powerful states, or especially the rivals of neighbouring countries permits India to apply a model of combined covert and overt values for keeping Israel in its close sphere of foreign policy. Without upsetting its relations with Muslim countries of Middle Eastern and Persian Gulf regions, New Delhi has chosen to associate the major domains of its strategic partnership with Israel which has become a highly secret feature of its foreign relations.

Implications for Pakistan

New Delhi's security demands to meet its offensive South Asian policies and aspiration for establishing its regional hegemony has provided an appropriate customer to Tel Aviv. The multifaceted weaponry supplies to New Delhi can give Indian both qualitative and quantitative superiority over other states in the larger South Asian region.

The more promisingly transfer of Israeli technology for mainly in convention dimension to India leave worse impact on Pakistan, because the conventional imbalance in Indo-Pak dispute will augment New Delhi's position by increasing the existing gap in conventional capabilities of both states.

Apart from the conventional dimension, the cooperation in the nuclear field between India and Israel will attempt to inflict a sense of strategic inferiority in Pakistan's mind-set, and significantly will demand Islamabad to design suitable measures against gradually rising a thin layer of New Delhi-Tel Aviv nuclear tie. The state authorities of both countries were agreed launching a preemptive strike in any attempt to demolish the nuclear program of Pakistan. The anti-Islamic sentiment inherited in ideological confrontation permits the Jewish-Hindu friendship to consider Pakistan's atomic bomb as Islamic bomb.

In this way, the fulfillment of Indian regional hegemonic ambitions will disturb the security environment of the Indian Ocean where Sino-Pak economic collaboration, under CPEC, will highly be pushed towards a quarrelsome atmosphere instead of discovering economic opportunities in oceanic waters.

A close association of both communities on foreign land observed to be unignorably a major factor, leaving a negative impact on Pakistani immigrants. Both countries always attempt to cultivate concrete diplomatic bounds with great powers while portraying themselves the victims of regional terrorism. In order to gain sympathetic promotion in the international system, the governments of both countries choose to join US-led war on terror. In this way, the American addition in Indo-Israel friendship resulted in a trilateral alliance of Washington-New Delhi-Tel Aviv. A close network of secret agencies of India, the United States and Israel has become a direct threat to Pakistan.

India, desires to suppress Pakistan's claims on the Kashmir issue is also another area of Islamabad's concern. Thus, the US is also becoming an unignorable an important factor in Israel-Indian alliance. Without achieving American confidence, the Indian-Israeli relations cannot maintain the concrete bilateral bounds. Now, it is essential for the United States to review its ongoing strategic imbalances between India and Pakistan before designing any action for India and Israel.³⁸

A close bilateral framework for upholding each other against common threats posed serious challenges to Pakistan's position in the region. Moreover,

the partnership in the military domain between New Delhi and Tel Aviv profoundly upset the regional nuclearized order of South Asia. Furthermore, Indian bellicose South Asian policy upsetting the regional atmosphere of South Asia in which the Kautilyan maxims allow India to turn its closest neighbouring states as potential enemies and launch offensive wars against them. Therefore, the emerging Beijing-Islamabad economic ties have become an unacceptable reality for New Delhi and convinced Modi government to increase its strategic partnership with Tel Aviv. The emerging antipathy of Modi and Netanyahu towards Pakistan contain enough potential to cause unpredictably an insecure South Asian atmosphere, because the Israeli transfer of technologically advanced military arsenal to India through multiple channels generates worrisome future of Islamabad.

Conclusion

The Kautilyan driven foreign policy model of India preferred Israel in opposition of Pakistan as a potential ally and started a multi-dynamic strategic collaboration with it. The persuasion of national interest mainly inherited in the New Delhi's geostrategic objective of acquiring the regional hegemonic position in South Asia by diminishing the role of emerging counterbalancing forces, India has to acquire Israel's support. The inevitable role of Indian strategic thinking greatly derived from the maxims of Kautilya determine the logic of varying formats rooted in Indian relations with other states including Israel. The major shift, from divergence to convergence, after the vanishing of bipolar division of the international system, occurred in New Delhi's foreign relations and the main architectures of national security from New Delhi attempted to place the militarily advanced and technologically upgraded nations close to India by revising its relations with them.

The belligerent Indian strategic behaviour in the larger South Asian region generally, and against Pakistan specifically portrays a worrisome picture in which the scope of peace and stability has been diminished. The strategic balance of the region will be fractured further as the result of increasing strategic joint ventures of New Delhi and Tel Aviv which ultimately can jeopardize the security of the entire South Asian region. The regional implication of Indo-Israeli nexus cannot simply be ignored, because the power balance of a nuclearized subcontinent needs a cautious examination of New Delhi's strategic connections with extra-regional powers. Contemporary Modi regime is obsessed with anti-neighbourhood policy and ambitious for achieving the dream of 'Make in India'

aggressive pursuing the offensive models of its South Asian policy.³⁹ Such behaviour of New Delhi will cause disastrous impact on nuclearized subcontinent. The people from world's capitals are exhibiting high concerns about the subcontinent's nuclear order without analytically inspecting the growing strategic relationship between New Delhi and Tel Aviv.

Moreover, Indo-Israeli collaboration is actively lobbying in the international community to push the sole nuclear power in the Muslim World, in which Pakistan into critical circumstances. The global efforts of Hindu-Zionist collaboration has already pushed the people from world's capitals towards a critical examination of Islamabad's nuclear armed status instead of impartially examining the clandestine nuclear activities of Israel. An impartial investigation of international community, in addition to Israel, can reveal the unsafeguarded nature of the Indian nuclear program.

The nature of mutual interest has resulted in a close strategic partnership which has become a genuine area of concern for Pakistan. The mainstream policymakers from Islamabad, in the presence of a growing strong Indo-Israeli connection, need to seriously emphasize the Hindu-Jewish strategic cooperation which are not only a threat for Pakistan, but contains sufficient potential to effect the entire South Asian region. The main architectures of national security strategy from Pakistan needs not to leave it an unnoticed political development, and attempt to review or reconsider their policy response for Indo-Israel coalition.

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CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF GILGIT-BALTISTAN: AN ISSUE OF HUMAN SECURITY

*Ehsan Mehmood Khan, PhD**

Abstract

Situated amidst the world highest mountain ranges of the Himalayas, Karakoram and Hindukush, the thinly-populated federally-administrated Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) region of Pakistan enjoys immense geostrategic significance. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) enters Pakistan via Gilgit-Baltistan. Nearly 500 km of the Karakoram Highway traverses the folds of GB from Khunjerab Pass to the boundary of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province. However, people of this region are struggling to attain constitutional status as the fifth province of Pakistan since independence. It remains in limbo due to the linkage of the region with the issue of Kashmir. This has serious ramifications for human security profile of the region. There are competing perspectives on the issue, and opinion is divided among Pakistan, India, the people of Kashmir, the international community and the people of GB. The people of GB region itself, being the main arbiter over their political future have started to assert as a stakeholder in social space. With diverse viewpoints and outlooks, it is a politically contentious and analytically challenging topic. This paper discusses various options to reach policy recommendations on the issue.

Keywords: Gilgit-Baltistan, Human Security, Geo-Strategic and Geo-Economic Significance, Constitutional Status, Provisional Provincial Status, Kashmir, China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Introduction

The question of constitutional status of GB predates the partition of South Asian subcontinent and creation of Pakistan. However, it assumed a blaring tone in the aftermath of accession of this region to Pakistan in 1947-1948.¹ Because of a host of factors, the idea of constitutional status remained short of realization even though the administrative structures of the region continued to evolve. Today, GB has reached an important milestone in its administrative journey with the virtual status of a province both in structural and functional terms. Nevertheless, politically, it remains “disputed” due to its linkage with the issue of Kashmir since 1948, which has pros and cons both for the state sovereignty as well as the human security.


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During the current years, a surge has been observed in the public opinion in GB with growing demand for grant of provincial status. It was also observed as a popular political slogan during the GBLA Elections 2015 and thereafter. The constitutional argument is not as simple. Since the status of the region has been kept in limbo for decades, a number of ideas, including centrifugal notion, are taking root. Relevance of the region in context of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the Chinese interest and the Indian political gesticulation add to the importance of the issue. Thus, it merits the attention of Pakistan's national leadership, intellectual community and media more than ever before. This calls for an in-depth analysis to examine all aspects of the issue, which can act as a foundation for the decision-making process on the issue.

The paper has been developed to include geo-strategic and geo-economic significance of the region, historical perspective, structural and contextual makeup of GB, constitutional and administrative journey since 1947-48, analysis of important aspects, constitutional options and policy recommendations.

Geo-Strategic and Geo-Economic Significance of Gilgit-Baltistan

Gilgit-Baltistan is located between Xinjiang Autonomous Region of China, Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan, the Ladakh region of Indian Occupied Kashmir, Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K) and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. Central Asia and the Tibet region of China are distant neighbours. Being located both on the old and the new Silk Route and on the snout of CPEC, the GB region possesses immense geo-strategic and geo-economic significance. Because of the emerging regional geo-politics, Pakistan is being termed as the zipper of the Pan-Eurasian economic integration.² Figure-1 containing map of the region shows GB's location and surroundings.³ Nearly 440 km of the Karakoram Highway traverses the folds of GB from Khunjerab Pass to the boundary of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province.



The geography of the area *per se* to include the lofty peaks, Deosai Plateau and strategic high altitude passes add to its significance. The presence of the forces from three countries – India, China and Pakistan – in and around GB epitomizes the same. Due to its geo-strategic significance and relative remoteness from the remaining provinces of Pakistan, it is of paramount importance to have political stability and economic security in GB region so as to do away with the feelings of deprivation that could be exploited by the hostile powers and agencies.

Historical Perspective

The history of Gilgit-Baltistan can be divided into four distinct eras to include the Ancient Era i.e. BC era to 7th century, the Medieval Era i.e. 8th century to 18th century (Islam arrived in the region during this period), the Dogra Rule from 1840 to 1947-48 and the post-Liberation phase i.e. 1947 to date. In 1840, the Dogras of Kashmir invaded Baltistan region and later expanded towards Gilgit thereby annexing the area with the state of Jammu and Kashmir.⁴The people of Baltistan revolted against the Dogras in 1842 and the people of Gilgit in 1852. Dogra rule was re-established in Baltistan in 1842 and in Gilgit in 1860. On the other hand, in 1846, the British replaced the Sikhs in Punjab.⁵ In 1876, the British established the Gilgit Agency.⁶ Later, the British acquired the Gilgit Agency from Dogras on 60-year lease from 26 March 1935.⁷ The people of the GB region had


neither accepted the Dogra rule nor their status as part of the state of J&K. During this period, the Diamer region remained largely free and its status was akin to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

With awakening of the Muslims across the subcontinent, the people of GB also stood against the Dogra rule, defeated them by 1 November 1947 in Gilgit and acceded to the newly created state of Pakistan.⁸ The rulers / people of the states of Hunza, Nagar, Yasin and the tribal areas of Darel and Tangir were also willingly acceded to Pakistan. The liberation war continued. The Dogras were defeated in Baltistan (today's Skardu, Ghanche, Shigar and Kharmang districts) on 14 August 1948 and the region became part of Pakistan.⁹ The GB sought accession to the state of Pakistan in five phases as follows: the state of Yasin on 7 November 1947; Gilgit on 16 November 1947; The states of Hunza and Nagar on 19 November 1947; Diamer (Darel and Tangir) in 1951-52; and Baltistan on 14 August 1948. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah ratified the accession documents of Hunza and Nagar states with his own signatures on 7 December 1947. Since then, the people of GB are struggling for grant of constitutional status. The region has traversed a constitutional journey steadily, but is still short of grant of provincial status in line with other provinces of the country.

Structural and Contextual Makeup of GB

GB is northern most "yet-to-be" federating unit of Pakistan. Before analyzing other facets, it is important to look at the structural and contextual makeup of the region. With a territorial area of 72,496 km², which makes up for nearly 9 percent of Pakistan's territory, its population is over 1.4 million as per estimates of the 2017 National Census of Pakistan, which makes up for less than 1 percent of Pakistan's population.

Figure-2 contains the map of the districts of Gilgit-Baltistan with territorial area.¹⁰



GB is home to four major sects of Islam to include *Shia*, *Sunni*, *Ismaili* and *Noorbakhshi*. *Sufia Noorbakhshia* and *Imamia Noorbakhshia* are two subsets of the *Noorbakhshi*. Because of small size, the Ahle Hadith community is generally considered to be part of the Sunni sect. Details are shown in Table 1.2.¹¹ Some other sources show different percentage of various sects.¹²

Sectarian Profile of GB as in March 2016

District	Percentage (as of total population)			
	Sunni	Shia	Ismaili	Noorbakhshi
Gilgit	35	45	19.5	0.5
Skardu	6	88	-	6
Diamer	100	-	-	-
Ghizer	10	5	85	-
Ghanche	23	2	-	75
Astore	70	30	-	-
Hunza-Nagar	-	55	45	-
Total	28	41	20	11

Source: Official Website of Gilgit-Baltistan Scouts.

GB is a multi-sectarian, multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic and largely multi-cultural society. Seven major languages are spoken in GB to include *Shina*, *Balti*, *Burushaski*, *Khowar*, *Wakhi*, *Domaki*, and *Gojri*.¹³ Punjabi and Pashto are also spoken by a few settlers and workers. However, Urdu remains to be the *lingua franca* of the region. People from various parts of the region communicate with each other through Urdu.

The Constitutional and Administrative Journey since 1947-48

The GB region has traversed a phased constitutional and administrative journey during the last seven decades. It may be noted that notwithstanding the Indian stance, the Government of Pakistan has practically kept the status of GB as different and separate from that of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K) heretofore. An interim government was established in the region on November 1, 1947 by the revolutionary council under Raja Shah Rais Khan.¹⁴ The Gilgit Agency joined Pakistan. On the call of the Interim government, Sardar Alam Khan reached Gilgit as the political agent of the Government of Pakistan on 16 November 1947. Initially, GB was made a part of (the erstwhile) North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) renamed as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, and Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) were imposed in Gilgit (later extended to Baltistan and other areas of GB).¹⁵ In 1950, it was taken under the direct federal rule as part of the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs.¹⁶

In 1970, the region was named "Northern Areas and made as separate administrative unit. A consultative council was also instituted. In 1974, reforms were introduced, which led to abolition of *Jagirdari* and *Rajgiri* system. FCR was also ended and replaced with local laws.¹⁷ In 1980s, Syed Alhmed Ali Shah (Late) was made advisor on Northern Area. This post was equal to a cabinet minister. In 1994, administrative makeup of GB was reformed on provincial lines. Chief Secretary and other departmental secretaries were appointed. The post was also designated as Deputy Chief Executive.¹⁸ On 28 May 1999, the Supreme Court of Pakistan decreed: That the People of Northern Areas are citizens of Pakistan for all intents and purposes and like other citizens have the right to invoke any of the Fundamental Rights as enshrined in the Constitution. Following the decision of Supreme Court in May 1999, the federal government took a number of steps to devolve power to local level. Seats for technocrats and women were also included in NALC. Later, the posts of speaker and deputy speaker were also created.

In 2009, Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self Governance Order was promulgated by the federal government.¹⁹ According to this order, the area was renamed as Gilgit-Baltistan. This was followed by complete administrative restructuring of the region on provincial lines by including the posts of Governor, Chief Minister and ministers for various departments. However, the region is still short of constitutional status as the fifth province of Pakistan, even interim or provisional. This is a popular narrative in socio-political circles of the region. The traders' community of the region supported by the general populace across the entire socio-political spectrum has linked the payment of taxes to the federal government to the constitutional status under the slogan of *pehlay huqooq phir tax*, literally meaning (*constitutional*) *rights before tax and no taxation without representation*. Actually, this was in response to the GB Council's effort to implement federal tax under the income tax law it adopted through Act-IX of 2012, which was approved in January 2013 by the GB government.²⁰

Relevance with the UN Resolution on Kashmir

The UN Resolution of 21 April 1948 calling for plebiscite in the state of Jammu and Kashmir does not definitely point to GB or NA region.²¹ However, due to the background discussion at that time and subsequent developments, the political destiny of GB region had been inextricably linked with that of Kashmir. Nevertheless, it does not bar the Government of Pakistan or the people of GB to grant and attain a provisional status that may work well to ensure that the human security dreams or fundamental rights of the people of GB are realized. The people retain the final say in their economic, social and political affairs. The government and people of AJ&K consider the GB region to be part of Kashmir. They deem that any change in the constitutional status of GB would harm the cause of Kashmir.

The Indian Stance

A lot of Indian literature and propaganda material has been focussed on GB, its significance, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), various other economic and energy-related projects and its political future. India is opposing CPEC on the same grounds and would resent the political upgradation of GB but it should not make any difference when it comes to national interest of Pakistan and human security interest of the people of GB.

Public Opinion in GB

The popular opinion of the intellectuals, journalists, teaching community, government officials hailing from GB and the commoners is clear. They deem that GB has never been part of the state of J&K. When the British sold J&K to the Maharaja of Kashmir for 750,000 Nanak Shahis vide the Treaty of Amritsar dated 16 March 1846, Ladakh and Baltistan were not part of it. People argue that after remaining independent for thousands of years and later having been under Dogra oppression for 108 years (1840-1948 AD), the region does not become an inseparable part of J&K. They argue that Pakistan too was once part of India but is a free country now.


Mr Qasim Nasim, a senior journalist from Skardu, presents his logic on the issue as follows:

*“The point to understand is that the Dogras entered Baltistan by means of military aggression. Other than that, there had neither been a constitutional or legal basis, legitimacy or rationale for their rule in GB, nor the people accepted their illegitimate rule. Hence, the Dogra occupation of the region following a military invasion cannot be a *raison d’être* for GB to be part of J&K. If GB can be declared a part of Kashmir, then both Pakistan and India could be declared a constitutional part of Britain. Kashmir itself has been ruled by Sultan Saeed Khan Kashgari and for a given period Afghans too. But it neither became a part of Kashgar nor an atoot ang (integral part) of Afghanistan. Likewise, we are not ready to accept Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) as part of India despite that it is under Indian administration since 1948.”²²*


Most people of GB argue that there is no need for plebiscite in the region and that their elders had already acceded to the state of Pakistan in 1947-48. Youth expresses its views in the favour of constitutional status fiercely, often on social media. The views of youth are important from many angles. It is also of note that during 2017, there was a region-wise movement in GB against taxes levied by the government with a popular slogan “*pehlay huqooq, phir tax*” meaning (constitutional) rights first then tax. Another similar slogan *no taxation without representation* was also used. Representation denotes constitutional recognition of the region as a federating unit of Pakistan, permanently or as an interim measure, and representation at in the national parliament and other institutions of the federation.

One of the questions during a public opinion survey conducted by the author as part of PhD research was: What should be the constitutional status of

Gilgit-Baltistan? The result was startling. Out of total 600 respondents, an overwhelming majority of GB i.e. over 85 percent supported the status as a province of Pakistan for GB. Chart-1 carries the details.



The 33 members of the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly (GBLA) were also part of these 600 respondents. Twenty nine of them ticked to be a province of Pakistan, three of them were in favour of attaining a status like AJ&K and one of them opined to be part of AJ&K. Chart 2 bears details.



Syed Mehdi Shah, Chief Minister of GB from 2009 to 2014, during an interview with the author, said, “Our forefathers had willingly decided to join Pakistan. We are Pakistani and are more patriotic than the people of any other province.”²³ He further said:

Our people want to get the status at par with the Punjab and other provinces. In the present status, we are not getting rights compatible with other provinces. The GBLA members do not get development funds as for MNAs or MPAs from other provinces.

*People want to pay taxes but only after Gilgit-Baltistan region is declared as constitutional province of Pakistan. After proper constitutional status, we will be able to speak in the National Parliament on the basis of equality.*²⁴

Being asked as to why GB should not be part of Kashmir, Syed Mehdi Shah opined, “being comparatively smaller in population, GB will be at disadvantage vis-à-vis the larger population of Kashmir despite that GB has a large territorial area.”²⁵

Haji Fida Muhammad Nashad, Speaker Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly said, ‘GB is not part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir but a part of the Kashmir dispute against the wishes of the people of GB’.²⁶ According to Muhammad Sikandar Ali, Chairman Public Accounts Committee GBLA, “GB is part of Pakistan, not Kashmir. We believe that Kashmir is also part of Pakistan. If Pakistan government cannot give complete constitutional status to GB because of linkage with the Kashmir issue, it should extend an interim provincial status with complete powers at par with other provinces of Pakistan.”²⁷ Mr. Ibrahim Sanai, the Minister for Information and Education in GB, said, “The Kashmiri people say, *Kashmir banay ga Pakistan* [Kashmir will become part of Pakistan]; we say, ‘We were, are and will remain part of Pakistan’.”²⁸

The constitutional status-quo has serious ramifications. Mr. Yousaf Hussainabadi, a renowned intellectual from GB said, ‘I can see anger in the eyes of youth. I also see the leadership swapping into the hands of the third generation, which looks at various issues with emotions. If the issue of constitutional status is not resolved, matters may aggravate.’²⁹ Mr. Afzal Ali Shigri opined, “Sub-nationalism is raising head because of constitutional status in limbo. If proper constitutional status is not given to GB, then the only linkage between Pakistan and GB is that of the UN Resolution on Kashmir.”³⁰

The Constitutional Linkage

Having discussed other pertinent facets including the view of the people of the region, it is imperative to view the case through the prism of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Some people in GB refer to the region as *sarzamin-e-be-aaeen* (literally *the land without constitution*). However, this notion is not based on absolute truth. Gilgit-Baltistan is an essential part of the federation of Pakistan both constitutionally and administratively. Two articles of the Constitution are important as regards the status of GB. Article 257

titled *Provision relating to the State of Jammu and Kashmir* notes: “When the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede to Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and that State shall be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State.” This article is relevant considering the GB’s linkage with the Kashmir dispute though the majority of the people of GB do not subscribe to the idea of being a part of Kashmir. It is also of note that in accordance with the Karachi Agreement dated 28 April 1949, the administrative control of GB had been taken over by the Government of Pakistan.³¹ Thus, practically the GB region has remained a *de facto* federating unit of Pakistan since then albeit without being a constitutionally declared province or a part of any province. To this end, Article 258 of the Constitution titled *Government of territories outside Provinces* notes: “Subject to the Constitution, until [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)] by law otherwise provides, the President may, by Order, make provision for peace and good government of any part of Pakistan not forming part of a Province.” The Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order 2009 (short form: the Governance Order 2009) should be viewed in the light of this Article. The Governance Order 2009 is manifestation of the administrative linkage of the GB region with the federation of Pakistan: *a part of Pakistan not forming part of a province* (Article 258). Administratively, it is a federal territory awaiting a provincial status, its intricate linkage with the Kashmir issue notwithstanding.

The Human Security Linkage

The current constitutional status of GB is a source of human insecurity in a number of ways. Even though a complete provincial structure exists in region, nevertheless, the federation-federating unit relationship is not akin to the other provinces of Pakistan. The GB region is not represented in the national parliament (the National Assembly and the Senate) and thus remains unrepresented in the national cabinet, too. Hence, a person from GB cannot become the President or Prime Minister of Pakistan. All this indeed deprives the people of the region from participation in the national decision-making process. Likewise, the region has no direct representation in National Finance Commission (NFC) Award, the Council of Common Interests (CCI), National Economic Council (NEC) and other national institutions, awards and councils. In most cases, it is represented through bureaucracy part of the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan. All this has implications for political security and socio-economic development of the region. The taxation argument discussed

earlier amplifies the economic woes of the region. The current constitutional status also causes an identity concern for the people of the region, which is yet another imperative of human security. Thus, in view of the human security needs, the region can be better administered as a federating unit rather than a federal territory.

Analysis

GB is a unique region in the world where exists a unification/integration movement with full centripetal propensity rather than centrifugalism. However, there is a need to analyse the issue from various angles. It is important to debate the question of constitutional status vis-à-vis the UN resolutions. To some, declaration of GB as a province maybe tantamount to *de facto* acceptance of status quo on Kashmir, which India has been endeavouring for decades. It may also be propagated by some that Pakistan has practically accepted the division of Kashmir along the current Line of Control. Thus, a constitutional decision on GB would be a bold decision. It would call for strong measures both in physical and cognitive domain to make all those concerned believe that Pakistan continues to support the Kashmir cause politically, diplomatically and morally in addition to their right of self-determination through a plebiscite to be held under the UN auspices. Granting fundamental rights to a people of GB does not, at any rate, cancel out their right to self-determination of the people of J&K.

The GB region is inhabited by deeply patriotic Pakistanis. During the last about seven decades, a number of options have been discussed with regard to Kashmir but the people of GB have embraced a single option: Pakistan. They do not consider them to be Kashmiris, nor do they want to be part of AJ&K. Their popular demand is to become a constitutionally declared province of Pakistan at par with the other provinces. They fear that plebiscite held in line with the UN resolutions could go to their disadvantage because of comparatively smaller population vis-à-vis Ladakh, AJ&K, Jammu and the Valley regions.

If a provisional constitutional arrangement is adopted, a parallel already exists in the form of the Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement - 1963. Article-6 of the said agreement points to its provisional nature and that the negotiations will reopen after the settlement of Kashmir issue.

The government of Pakistan/GB need to engage the GB's youth who are better educated than the previous generation. It is noteworthy that the

international NGOs and other countries are gradually attracting the GB's youth. Indians are trying to engage the GB's youth by means of social media and publications focussing on region's history, culture, economic conditions, sub-nationalist trends, prospective political future and the linkage with India with ostensibly appealing narratives. All this can be subsided only through constructive engagement of youth. This would be easier after assigning a defined political status to the region. Other international players are keeping their imprints in GB – USA, Iran, Saudi Arabia, EU, China and others to meet their own ends. Nearly 1,000 NGOs of various sizes are working in GB. USAID is spending heavily on different socio-economic projects in GB. However, despite all this, the state of Pakistan is still strong both notionally and physically. The state can make the most from it for generation of positive vibes.

Sub-nationalists have started advancing their agenda. Hostile agencies are supporting it. Sub-nationalist elements are taking advantage of the constitutional limbo.³² Many pro-Pakistan elements are inadvertently sliding towards sub-nationalism due to delay in accord of proper constitutional status to the region. Ismaili community of Ghizer and Hunza is being taken to sub-nationalism; Nawaz Naji and Baba Jan are cases in point. It may be noted that from the point of view of location, the Ismaili community forms an important strategic quadrangle: it is located in GB and Chitral, Badakhshan province of Afghanistan, Xinjiang (China) and Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region of Tajikistan. To ward off any centrifugal tendencies in this community, it is imperative to engage it politically drawing it to the Centre constitutionally. Sub-nationalist mind in Baltistan thinks in terms of Tibetan blood. It does not have strong basis. However, it is imperative to sever even the minor roots so as to keep the youth free from such trends or feelings. GB's constitutional status as a province of Pakistan can undo many such leanings.

A few people from the non-Shia communities in GB, mainly Sunni and Ahle Hadith, believe that if GB is given a constitutional status, it would emerge as a Shia-majority province – all to the disadvantage of other communities. This concern is actually far from reality. If five different sectarian communities – Shia, Sunni, Ismaili, Noorbakhshi and Ahle Hadith are putting up together both socially and politically within a de facto provincial structure today, why would it be difficult if the region gets a defined provincial status? As a matter of fact, such feelings are detrimental to national integration. If this analogy or fear is taken as true, will we call the remaining provinces as the Sunni-dominated? Thus, such a

notion needs no attention. It is also of note that majority of these sects too are in favour of provincial status, whether permanent or interim.

People are the final arbiter on their political future. The question is as to whether the constitutional status is to be decided by the government in line with some statist notions or in keeping with the popular demands of the people. To go in line with the latter would bring an enduring outcome. It is also of note that the people of GB may tend to get disenchanted with Pakistan after remaining in constitutional ambiguity for so long. Thus, if the decision on GB is delayed, it may not be as easy in the future.

Likely Effect of Constitutional Status to GB

Grant of constitutional status of GB will have definitive fallout both at home and abroad. *Firstly*, the Kashmiri leadership of both sides i.e. Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K) and Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) is expected to react to the decision of granting even provisional provincial status to GB claiming it to be a part of the State of J&K. Besides, political statements, mobilization of masses against the decision cannot be ruled out. Pakistan's action may be portrayed as withdrawal from the original stance on Kashmir, thereby adversely affecting Kashmir freedom struggle. Sentimentality in the backdrop of sacrifices of Kashmiri Mujahideen is also likely. Decision may be challenged in the Apex Courts of AJ&K, GB and Pakistan. *Secondly*, some sub-nationalist elements from GB supported by India and Kashmiri community, may oppose the move in media and on the streets. However, this component is likely to make negligible impact in the face of overwhelming acceptance by the GB's population at large. *Secondly*, it may lead to surge in demand for various other provinces such as Muhajir Suba, Saraiki Suba and Hazara etc. *Fourthly*, most serious opposition is expected from India as it claims the whole region as its integral part. However, it would be in a catch since it has already taken a stance that UN Resolutions on Kashmir are not relevant after Simla Agreement. Thus, they are not likely to take the issue to the UN. Moreover, this opposition is likely to remain restricted to diplomacy.

The United States may side with the Indian viewpoint, which is evident from the recent statement of the US Defence Secretary James Mattis. He stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee in October 2017: "The One Belt, One Road also goes through disputed territory, and I think that in itself shows the vulnerability of trying to establish that sort of a dictate."³³ Muslim countries in general are expected to remain neutral owing to their indifference and

economic relations with India. Because of sectarian affinity, Iran may support the decision. Despite its strong relations with India, Iran has been supporting the Kashmir cause and stated the same position even during 2017. The Kashmiri community abroad, especially in UK, is likely to oppose the move.

Indian opposition can be effectively countered in the light of historical perspective, aspirations of native people, Indian atrocities in Kashmir and its non-acceptance of the UN resolutions on Kashmir. Some international pressure is also likely, which would need to be managed by the Pakistan government. The office of the permanent representative of Pakistan at the UN needs to play a proactive but pacifying role to counteract against the fallout of any protests or memorandums forwarded by different quarters to the UNSG. The Kashmiri community abroad would also exert pressure and would thus need a government policy to deal with. They need reassurance that the Kashmir cause will not be hurt by granting constitutional status to GB.

The scholars' community in GB believes that the provisional provincial status will not outdo the linkage between GB and settlement of Kashmir issue in accordance with the UN Resolutions. Firm commitment to the cause of Kashmir has always been shown by the people of GB. However, the people of GB strongly voice for constitutional status, something that cannot be held in limbo for an indefinite period of time as it is severely impinging upon the human security profile of the region. It would also be of the essence for the Pakistani government to launch an internal diplomatic drive in order to take into confidence the Kashmiri politicians, populaces and other elements that may have apprehensions on the move. The Supreme Court of Pakistan's decision of 1999 may be taken as one of the primary guidelines.

Constitutional Options available with the Pakistan Government

- **Option-1: Provisional provincial status.** This can happen without completely delinking it from the issue of Kashmir.
- **Option-2: Final provincial status.** This is indeed the popular demand in GB. However, it has more cons than pros. More so, it would have no fallback position.
- **Option-3: Status quo.** If maintained, it would lead to the following: (1) It is already being contested and would continue to be so; (2) Fallout may be irreparable; (3) Today or tomorrow, status quo will have to be

changed. Today, it can be done at the choice of the State; tomorrow it may not be without cost.

- **Option-4: AJ&K-like status.** This is not a popular demand in the region except for a few proponents. However, this too would not have a fallback position and would go against the needs for national integration.

Policy Recommendations

Option-1 is recommended, keeping in view the discussion made in the preceding paragraphs. The GB region should be granted interim / provisional provincial status pending the settlement of Kashmir issue along with the following (by means of a constitutional amendment): (1) The region should have representation in the lower house of the National Parliament in accordance with its population proportion (however, due to thin population density over a large territorial area some, additional seats may be considered); (2) It should also be represented in the upper house i.e. Senate like other provinces. A parliamentary committee may be formed to rationalize the seats of all provinces. (3) GB Council should be abolished after representation in the parliament (4) GBLA should be renamed as Provincial Assembly of Gilgit-Baltistan as for other provinces; (5) The range of responsibility of federal KA&GB ministry should end inasmuch as GB is concerned; (6) Jurisdiction of Supreme Court of Pakistan should be extended to GB in addition to establishment of GB High Court and lower judiciary (7) The new provinces should be directly represented in the NFC Award, the Council of Common Interest (CCI), National Economic Council (NEC) and all other national awards and accords; (8) Direct share in federal public sector development programme (PSDP); (9) and the new province should receive royalty and share of net profit on generation of hydro-electricity.

Conclusion

Gilgit-Baltistan is an inseparable and indivisible part of Pakistan. GB and Pakistan have a relationship of “head and body.” The question of constitutional status of the region has been held in limbo for nearly seven decades. Its Kashmir linkage may be the need of the people of Kashmir or the State of Pakistan when seen through the prism of plebiscite under the auspices of the UN. But the constitutional status as a province is the call of the day in keeping with the wishes of the people of GB. In point of fact, this serves the larger cause of human security of the people of GB. It is also imperative in the wake of CPEC so that the

region does not look like un-governed, less-governed or constitution-less. It is easier to declare GB a province in line with Option-1 today. It may not remain the same during the times to come. Thus, it needs to be handled by the national leadership with a sense of urgency.

NOTES

- ¹ The region sought freedom from the Dogra rule after a fierce campaign by liberation forces formed by the people of Gilgit-Baltistan. Gilgit was liberated on 1 November 1947 while the liberation of Baltistan coincided with the first anniversary of Pakistan's Independence i.e. 14 August 1948.
- ² Andrew Korybko, a Russian political analyst, coined this term in 2015. Andrew Korybko, "Pakistan is the "Zipper" of Pan-Eurasian Integration," *Russian Institute for Strategic Studies* (September 2015), <https://en.riss.ru/analysis/18882/> (accessed December 12, 2017).
- ³ Map by the author.
- ⁴ Muhammad Yousaf Hussainabadi, *Tareekh-e-Baltistan* (Skardu: Baltistan Book Depot: 2006).
- ⁵ John F. Riddick, *The History of British India: A Chronology* (London: Praeger, 2006), 48.
- ⁶ Madhvi Yasin, *British Paramountcy in Kashmir, 1876-1894* (New Delhi, Atlantic Publishers, 1984), 94.
- ⁷ Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 25.
- ⁸ William A. Brown, *Gilgit Rebellion: The Major who Mutinied over Partition of India* (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword, 2014), 139.
- ⁹ Banat Gul Afridi, *Baltistan in History* (Peshawar: Emjay Books International, 1988), 232.
- ¹⁰ Map by the author.
- ¹¹ "Population/ Sectarian Profile," *Gilgit-Baltistan Scouts*, <http://www.gilgitbaltistanscouts.gov.pk/geodemo.htm> (accessed March 10, 2016).
- ¹² Mr. Muhammad Feyyaz, "Sectarian Conflict in Gilgit-Baltistan," *Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT)*, Islamabad (May 2011): 12, is one such source.
- ¹³ "Languages," *Gilgit-Baltistan Scouts*, <http://www.gilgitbaltistanscouts.gov.pk/geodemo.htm> (accessed December 12, 2017).
- ¹⁴ A number of authentic sources, some of them with competing narratives, are available – both primary and secondary accounts – to know the events preceding 1 November 1947. Colonel Mirza Hassan Khan, *Shamsheer Say Zanjeer Tak*, 3rd edition (Rawalpindi: Northern Printing Press, 2010) and William A. Brown, *Gilgit Rebellion: The Major Who Mutinied over Partition of India* (London: Pen and Sword, 2014) are two such important volumes.
- ¹⁵ Shaheen Sardar Ali, Javaid Rehman, *Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Minorities of Pakistan: Constitutional and Legal Perspectives* (Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001), 136.
- ¹⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁷ Priyanka Singh, "Gilgit-Baltistan: Between Hope and Despair," *Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis* (March 2013), 17.
- ¹⁸ Muhammad Qasim Naseem, *Gilgit Baltistan aur Masla-e-Kashmir* (Lahore: Sang e Meel Publications, 2007).
- ¹⁹ "Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly," <http://gbla.gov.pk/page/history#GBselfGOrder2009> (accessed November 13, 2017).
- ²⁰ Afzal Ali Shigri, "Taxation without Representation," *Dawn*, Islamabad, January 2, 2018.
- ²¹ An interactive list of UN Security Council Resolutions of 1948 can be found at <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/1948.shtml> (accessed November 13, 2017). UN Resolution of 21 April 1948 can be found at [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/47\(1948\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/47(1948)) (accessed November 13, 2017).
- ²² Muhammad Qasim Naseem, op.cit. Translated by this author.
- ²³ Syed Mehdi Shah, Chief Minister of GB from 2009 to 2014, Interview by the author, Skardu, January 14, 2016.
- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ Ibid.
- ²⁶ Haji Fida Muhammad Nashad, Speaker Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly (GBLA), Interview by the author, Skardu, October 28, 2016.
- ²⁷ Muhammad Sikandar Ali, member GBLA from Roundo and Chairman Public Accounts Committee GBLA, Interview by the author, Skardu, October 28, 2015.
- ²⁸ Sanai, 2015.

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- ²⁹ Muhammad Yousaf Hussainabadi, author, historian and research scholar, Interview by the author, Skardu, March 14, 2015. Muhammad Hassan Hasrat, another scholar from Baltistan, shared these views.
- ³⁰ Afzal Ali Shigri, ex Inspector-General Police (IGP) Sindh (hails from Shigar district of GB), author, analyst and columnist, Interview by the author, via email, May 13, 2016. According to Muhammad Ibrahim Sanai, the Minister for Information and Education in GB, "Sub-nationalism cannot succeed in GB. We have a lot of divergences within: ethnic, linguistic, sectarian, cultural and historical etc. The best for us is to remain part of Pakistan." Sanai, 2015.
- ³¹ K. Warikoo, *Himalayan Frontiers of India: Historical, Geo-Political and Strategic Perspectives* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 85. The Karachi Agreement had three signatories to include Sardar Ibrahim Khan, President AJ&K, Sardar Ghulam Abbas, the Muslim Conference and Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani, the Minister without portfolio of Pakistan. However, this too is not without controversies. The people of GB argue that they were neither represented nor were signatory to the agreement.
- ³² In February 2017, The GB police apprehended two members of Balawaristan National Front (BNF), a sub-nationalist organization for being involved in buying arms in order to 'sabotage' the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and engaging in 'anti-state' speech. For details, see Imtiaz Ali Taj, "GB police arrest two people for 'anti-state' activities," *Dawn*, February 12, 2017. This has been cited herein just as a case in point. There are other instances that point to the importance of the matter. However, lest we are carried away, sub-nationalism in GB is much below the level of that in Balochistan.
- ³³ Anwar Iqbal, "CPEC passes through disputed territory: US," *Dawn*, Islamabad, October 7, 2017.

PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN SINCE OPERATION FREEDOM SENTINEL: AN OVERVIEW

Maliha Zeba Khan*

Abstract

This paper discusses Pakistan's foreign policy toward Afghanistan in the wake of the Operation Freedom Sentinel since January 01, 2015. As this work is based in Pakistan-Afghanistan regional security complex and its interplay with other territorial and non-territorial sub-systems, in this article the complex nature of relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been emphasized. Since 1970s Pakistan had adopted rather strong policy towards its neighbour Afghanistan during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's premiership. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided basis to Pakistani leadership for active involvement in Afghanistan which lately caused serious repercussions for Pakistan. Pakistan's foreign policy has gone through various ups and downs during the 1990s, and then the War on Terror changed the course of action with Afghanistan. Afghanistan had been important in Pakistan's foreign policy as 'strategic depth' due to which Pakistan could never be indifferent from Afghanistan's precarious situation of peace, security, and stability in which Pakistan had been playing its role. Even in the post-War on Terror era, Pakistan is trying to broker peace between the stakeholders, Taliban, other militant groups, the government of Afghanistan, and the US. In the absence of peace in Pakistan-Afghanistan security complex, it will not be possible for Pakistan to pursue effective foreign policy in the region.

Keywords: Pakistan-Afghanistan Regional Security Complex, Durand Line, Taliban, Afghan Peace Process.

Introduction

Afghanistan has been the cornerstone of foreign policy of Pakistan. Particularly since Pakistan has played an important role of the frontline state against the Soviet offensive in Afghanistan, fought the proxy war, and fulfilled the Capitalist resolve of containing Communist expansionism towards South Asia. It has emerged an important regional actor. But with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US too withdrew its interest and support from the region creating a political mess in the region. Being an immediate neighbour,¹ stakeholder of the Afghan *jihad*, and host of large numbers of Afghan refugees, it was not possible for Pakistan to become indifferent from the political turmoil and civil war in Afghanistan. Pakistan had been trying to pursue its

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efforts to bring peace in Afghanistan because a peaceful Afghanistan, particularly under the rule of group/s which would be complying with Pakistan's interests could be beneficial. Even Pakistan's support to the *Taliban* government established in 1996 in Kabul was reflection of such desire.

The incidents of 9/11 and the retaliatory war against terrorism by the US brought a paradigm shift to the foreign policy of Pakistan one more time and the state had to make a drastic turn from its previous posture of supporting *Taliban* regime to ceasing all kind of support to them and becoming an ally to the US-led alliance against terrorism. The War on Terror was formally concluded in December 2014 after thirteen years of its initiation with the rolling down of the flag of the US-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in a formal ceremony in Kabul, wherein Obama declared it a 'responsible conclusion'. However, that was not an absolute ending, but rather the beginning of a new strategy which was named as "Operation Freedom Sentinel" with another international mission, the Resolute Support.² Since Afghanistan had still been facing precarious situation of law and order due to the *Taliban* issue and its political instability, the state was too fragile to handle these challenges. On the other hand, Pakistan had been grappled by a fresher wave of terrorism and needed a foreign policy which could address the Afghan problem as its long-range, long-term objective.³

Every policy has some flaws and shortcomings which are studied, or to be studied to avoid such happenings in future. Despite the fact that numerous authors and researchers have worked on different dimensions of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations after 9/11 with every possible perspective, studying Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan has always been an agenda to be evaluated fully. Since then, tremendous amounts of literature have been proliferated on Afghanistan, Pakistan, *Taliban*, War on Terror, and all kinds of transnational terrorism. The available literature can be divided into four categories. The first category includes literature discussing the history of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations since Pakistan's independence for which abundant scholarly work is available as Mehtab Ali Shah's *The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy*,⁴ Ahmad Shayed Qassem's *Afghanistan's Political Stability: A Dream Unrealised*,⁵ Thomas H. Johnson and Barry Scott Zellen's edited work *Culture, Conflict, and Counterinsurgency*,⁶ and Bijan Omrani's article "The Durand Line: History and Problems of the Afghan-Pakistan Border."⁷ The second category embraces the books, articles, research papers, and reports about terrorism, trans-

national ties, and support of terrorists of Taliban and Al-Qaeda, cross-border terrorist networks in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and role of the US and its allies to end terrorism from Afghanistan and rest of South Asia which includes Bruce Riedel's *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad*,⁸ Zahid Hussain's *Frontline Pakistan: The Path to Catastrophe And the Killing of Benazir Bhutto*,⁹ John K. Cooley's *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism*,¹⁰ and Mariam Abou Zahab and Oliver Roy, *Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection*.¹¹ The third category contains literature which discusses shifts and challenges of foreign policy of US, Afghanistan, and Pakistan during the War on Terror which includes Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn's *Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond*,¹² and James J. F. Forest's *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives*.¹³ The fourth category includes *Afghanistan Post-2014: Power Configurations and Evolving Trajectories* by Rajen Harshé and Dhananjay Tripathi, eds.,¹⁴ and *Afghanistan, Arms and Conflict: Armed Groups, Disarmament and Security in a Post-War Society* by Michael Vinay Bhatia and Mark Sedra, which explain the role of different international and regional actors in Afghanistan. But since the commencement of the Operation Freedom Sentinel in Afghanistan, Pakistan's foreign policy toward Afghanistan and strategies to address that issue are largely lacking the substantial debate.

Pakistan-Afghanistan Regional Security Complex in the Post 9/11 Era

This section discusses the Regional Security Complex framework presented by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever as the theoretical ground for this paper. This framework explains concept of security at regional level as the primary level to discuss security. The region is determined basically as the territoriality and geographical proximity; and the security of the states in that region is highly interlinked and dependent on each other. According to Buzan and Waever, the region would be the level "where states or other units link together sufficiently closely that their securities cannot be considered separate from each other."¹⁵ This framework puts Pakistan and Afghanistan into a tight Regional Security Complex because the national security of both states cannot be exclaimed in seclusion from each other, and peace, security and stability of this region is guarantee of peace and security at large. But it is not as straight forward as it seems. The regional security complex which these two states create make

becomes truly complex when sub-systems not based upon territoriality will enter and make constellations according to their own national interests.

Buzan and Waever consider such inclusions “fully compatible with the meta-theory of securitization” but with overriding of the fundamental principle which explains that intensity of the threats will naturally be intense in closer proximity. They suggest two ways in which such overriding can occur: “(1) by a shift from more territorialised (e.g., military) to less territorialised (e.g. economic) threats; and/ or (2) by a rise in levels of absolute power sufficient to enable more and more actors to ignore the constraints of distance.”¹⁶ When applied on Pakistan-Afghanistan Security Complex, the issues not only include the other regional actors but the non-territorialised sub-systems at international level too emerge as potential stakeholders in the complex. Iran, China, and three Central Asian states Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are in proximity with Afghanistan and make individual security complexes with the state; whereas their security concerns also impact Pakistan-Afghanistan Security Complex. For these Central Asian states, Russia has rather stronger standing in their domestic politics, particularly trade and energy sector, and in the post 9/11 time period, Russia does not want to let this hold weak.¹⁷ Particularly President Putin’s foreign policy vision of February 2013, which strongly emphasized upon stepping up of Russian involvement and role in the Central Asian states¹⁸ which undoubtedly affects foreign policy of those states in favour of Russia. Simultaneously there are two more sub-systems that affect the two-state security complex. One sub-system that is proximal to this complex is India, while the US, Russia, Central Asia, and Middle East (Saudi Arabia and Iran in particular) make non-territorial sub-systems which affect Pakistan-Afghanistan Security Complex.

In the post 9/11 era, Afghanistan-Pakistan Security Complex has emerged as an epicenter of capricious international politics. Its geographical location as well as its volatile history makes it too complex. There are number of international actors playing their roles accordingly in the two states. The interplay of all these security complexes makes South Asia increasingly vulnerable and prone to overriding each other interests. Pakistan’s foreign policy needs to encompass all these ground realities to be effective in the given security complex.

Brief History of Pak-Afghan Relations

Afghanistan has always been a tough neighbour to Pakistan, since beginning, a major issue between these two states was the Durand Line, the border established since times of the British India and about which there had not been any misunderstandings between the British India and Afghanistan.¹⁹ After Emir Abdul Rahman was sworn in, the British adopted a rather assertive foreign policy at that time and in 1886 the delimitation of the border was completed and an agreement was signed in which Emir Abdul Rahman ceded territory to the British India²⁰ which includes parts of present-day Western Baluchistan, Quetta and large territory of Federally Administered Tribal Area.²¹

This delimitation of the border remained unaltered but as soon as the partition plan of Indian subcontinent surfaced and it was decided to make two independent states of Pakistan and India out of the British India, the separatist demands were being made on the basis of ethno-nationalism by the factions residing on both sides of border. After this inception of Pakistan, Afghanistan refused to recognize Pakistan and cast the only vote in the United Nations against the grant of membership to the newly-independent state. Afghanistan also started igniting these elements on the irredentist grounds that started claiming of "Pakhtoonistan/ Pashtunistan" which held a strong ground in the Pakhtoon/ Pashtun nationalists and Baloch nationalists causing serious threat to Pakistan's national integrity.²² Pakistan always tried to resolve these issues politically and diplomatically, and proved the legitimate status of the Durand Line being a successor state of the British India.

During the Bhutto era, Pakistan adopted a rather enhanced posture; and strong steps were taken at domestic and external fronts, i.e. deployment of military at borders, military action in Balochistan against the ethno-nationalists; and diplomatic and official visits were extended to Afghanistan simultaneously which played significant role. The foreign policy of Pakistan toward Afghanistan during that period provided the basis to address the bilateral issues which had been straining relations between the two states. It was being assumed that the issue of Durand Line would be resolved, but the assassination of President Daud in Afghanistan as well as military coup by General Zia-ul-Haq in Pakistan stalled the progress in that regard for some time. After President Daud's assassination, his successor Taraki tried to re-instigate irredentist claims and even despite Zia's efforts to continue the process and dialogue with Taraki, he did not show any sign of reconciliation. But soon the process was revived as Taraki felt his

weakening political position and increasing Soviet interference in Kabul, and he offered Zia recognition of the Durand Line as the international border if on the basis that he would ensure to seal border from Pakistani side, for which Zia suggested that the border should be sealed from Afghan side as well to stop the infiltration of the insurgents on both sides.²³ That seemed a logical demand from Pakistani side which suggested reciprocity of action. However again it could not be materialized as Taraki was killed, and the Soviet invasion changed the political situation in the region.

Though Afghanistan had largely been a turbulent area historically, but since the Soviet invasion of the state in 1979 which took place to support the Communist regime in Afghanistan at that time, initiated a new wave of militancy and violence. The Islamist resistant groups (denoted as *mujahidin*) being supported, funded, and trained by the international actors and agencies²⁴ during Afghan *jihad* were left unsupported and unguided by the US and its Western allies after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan which resulted a massive power vacuum; power struggle among Afghan war lords (previously fighting as *mujahidin*), and widely spread civil war across Afghanistan. Pakistan along with the some Arab states which did not leave Afghanistan, and continued its support in anticipation of a long lasting peace in the country. Particularly for Pakistan, the peace and stability in Afghanistan was core national interest without which Pakistan would not be able to maintain peace in its own territory and sustainable development for its people. Afghanistan was considered as 'strategic depth' to Pakistan against any possible aggression from the western borders.²⁵

The *Taliban* movement emerged in the mid 90s and eventually succeeded to establish a government gaining control over massive area of Afghanistan which announced to approximately 90% of land of the state.²⁶ Supporting *Taliban* was more like a compulsion for Pakistan as continuously warring Afghan groups were threat for Pakistan's peace, security, and stability, as well as due to the religio-political parties of Pakistan which too were inclined towards *Taliban's* implemented Islamic system. Unfortunately *Taliban* failed in getting international support due to the version of Islamic political system and legislation, which was according to their own interpretation of Islam; and largely a violation of not only fundamental human rights but even the ideology of Islam. They were basically representatives of a tribal society which mainly followed the age-old system of norms and traditions known as *Pashtunwali*.²⁷ Providing sanctuary to *Al-Qaeda* leadership and not handing over Osama Bin Laden to the

US by *Taliban* was also abidance of *Pashtunwali* which caused huge antipathy in the US government for *Taliban* regime. The incidents of 9/11 proved to be the last nail in the coffin, and the US decided to launch a retaliatory war against Afghanistan's *Taliban* government after their repeated refusal of unconditional handing-over of Osama Bin Laden to the US.

In October 2001, the War on Terror with global reach was waged and Afghanistan was attacked by the US and the NATO forces. Due to inevitable historical factors as well as geo-political facts which have been determining dimensions of Pakistan-Afghanistan mutual relations, Pakistan's role in Afghanistan could not be negated by the US and its allies, and when Musharraf agreed to become an ally to the War on Terror, it caused drastic reaction within Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. Nevertheless the War on Terror was continued for a little more than thirteen years, and it was formally conducted in December 2014. It was not an abrupt end. Rather it was well-worked upon before and gradual drawdown of NATO/ISAF forces from Afghanistan took place. The time period was assigned with the vision to launch a strong final offense against *Taliban* and *Al-Qaeda* and to enable Afghan Security Forces to take over their responsibilities in the meantime.²⁸

From War on Terror to Operation Freedom Sentinel: Challenges to Pakistan's Foreign Policy toward Afghanistan

This section discusses the challenges to Pakistan's foreign policy toward Afghanistan after US policy shift in Afghanistan from the War on Terror to the Operation Freedom Sentinel. Contextually these challenges are identified and discussed as Pakistan's role in Afghan peace initiatives, cross-border attacks by US and/ or Afghan security forces, border management, and the issue of Afghan refugees. Soon after announcement about the US-schedule to drawdown the security forces from Afghanistan by the US President, the regional actors started realizing the potential hazard of re-emergence of the violent extremism and terrorism in the region. Pakistan-Afghanistan regional security complex had already suffered a lot at all levels of state and society, whereas at that time when both countries would have invested heavily into the counter-terrorism strategies and operations which could go futile at that point. It was the stage when both states had to take decisive measures for peace, security, and stability in the region as both regional actors had started realizing that after this withdrawal, similar situation of power vacuum could take place as it had happened in 1990s.

The only viable solution was peace-building with *Taliban* and finding a political solution. The US which previously had been opposing the efforts of reconciliation with the militants by Pakistan's political and military leadership, had realized that the solution of Afghan problem was not only military offense, but multi-pronged strategy which could address and involve the moderate elements from within the militants would be more beneficial as Obama mentioned in his 2009 speech which was appreciated by Pakistan and Afghanistan as well.²⁹

Prior to that, Afghanistan's political leadership had been in favour of reconciliation and inclusion of *Taliban* in the national politics. The aim was peace-building in the region with a broader focus.³⁰ For this purpose, there had been several initiatives taken at different times since 2003 which due to their limited nature or other issues could not be eventful.³¹ A joint peace *Jirga* based upon *Pashtunwali* was held in August 2007 as a ground-breaker in the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan.³² The apparent reason for failure or minimum success of all these peace efforts was lack in understanding the dynamics of peace process. A big breakthrough after Obama's visionary speech about integrating the moderate elements present within *Taliban* was Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) in 2010 by Afghanistan government on the principle to engage the willing moderate elements into integration process and weaken the strong weave of *Taliban* militancy. But the military offence was being considered more effective than integrating the Afghan insurgents into political process in dealing with Afghanistan issue. The strategic lacunas and divergence of opinions in dealing with *Taliban* weakened the peace process at all levels as the American decision makers were divided into groups as one group was in favour of talks with *Taliban* and thought that peace in Afghanistan was not possible without that step; while the other group was skeptical about the efficacy of the talks and wanted to deal with the militancy and insurgency iron-handedly.³³ Similar happened with the initiatives of the International Conferences held to find solution of Afghanistan issue in different years from the Conference held in 2001 in Bonn to the Conference held in 2014 in London; no remarkable solution came forward other than frameworks which had been tried accordingly.

Pakistan's Role in the Afghan Peace Initiatives

The Pakistan-Afghanistan regional security complex and rather inter-dependent security challenges and issues make Pakistan indispensable to initiate

any peace process in Afghanistan. It does not mean that peace, security, and stability in Afghanistan are conditional with Pakistan's inclusion in the process, or that Pakistan would be trying to control internal politics of Afghanistan. Rather, the ethnic and religious ties across the border, and support to militants, particularly *Taliban* into each other's territories determine the role and limits of involvement of Pakistan in Afghan peace process.

Since the NATO forces drawdown was nearing according to the given time frame, the terrorist activities were predominantly increased in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The *New York Times* mentioned in a report based on the figures provided by the Afghan Ministry of Defence, "...of the 4,451 Afghan soldiers killed in the war, 2,771, or over 60 percent of the total, were killed in the three years that ended March 20, 2013."³⁴ Similarly Pakistan was facing brutal terrorist attacks, target killings, firing, bomb blasts in all areas of Pakistan, from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to Balochistan, from Shiites, Sunnis to minorities, from infants to elderly, and without any discrimination of civilians or security forces after the gradual process of the NATO forces drawdown started taking place in Afghanistan. That increased terrorism was indication of several factors; weakening and frustrating terrorists/militants taking revenge from the governments, implying different strategies by the militants like attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, or outbidding³⁵ to extend their influence through terror, and attempting to get noticed politically and getting better bargains. However after several unsuccessful or inconclusive efforts like involvement of Qatar, Iran, and Saudi Arabia to bring *Taliban* or other militant groups into meaningful talks, Pakistan facilitated the Murree Peace Process in July 2015.³⁶ Since then the talks and peace-building process have been occurring under different arrangements like Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG), and the Heart of Asia Conferences, however with stalls and breaks. Therefore without Pakistan's role as an effective facilitator, the peace-building could not be presumed in the Pakistan-Afghanistan regional security complex.³⁷

Cross-Border Attacks by the US and/or Afghan Security Forces

The cross-border attacks including the drone strikes by the US and/or Afghan security forces have already emerged as major irritant between the relations of the two countries. These attacks have questioned Pakistan's sovereignty and security by and large, and Pakistan has been demanding to stop these attacks, and since Operation Freedom Sentinel has been taking place in

Afghanistan, Pakistan is addressing this issue rather effectively. One of such example is incident of retaliatory firing from Pakistani side in May, 2017 due to a cross-border attack on Chaman border which killed 50 Afghan soldiers.³⁸ However the drone attacks are still a challenge to Pakistan's national security.

Border Management

Illegal cross-border movement of the natives and the networks of militants and terrorists, transnational organized criminals, smugglers, and traffickers are the most serious challenges for the foreign policy of Pakistan. These activities can be controlled only if the border management will be enhanced from both sides. Unfortunately the Afghan government as well as the tribal people opposed the idea of strictness on the borders. Despite all the opposition, Pakistan took some effective measures like installation of gates on entry and exit points, establishing check posts, fencing in some areas, documentation of the people moving across the border, bio-matric identification, and data collection to stop the terrorists, militants, and other culprits. Despite all these measures, the smugglers, traffickers, and transnational organized criminals do find the ways to infiltrate into each other's countries and challenge the state writ and make law and order more wobbly. As it is a long and porous border, the only solution is recognition of border and fencing it completely to control such unwanted movement.

The Issue of Afghan Refugees

Pakistan has been hosting large number of the Afghan refugees. Nevertheless the international community as well as the humanitarian organizations are quite helpful in managing the burden but the worrisome part is the socio-economic factors which have been affected by these refugees. As these refugees are unable to earn their livelihood in appropriate manner, majority of them are living under the poverty line and get easily involved into crimes. Some of them are the ones who work for the terrorists and militants as they are the easy prey to such elements. The repatriation process under the National Action Plan is underway but rather less effectively. Their return to their homeland is only possible if there will be peace for which the international community should play its role.

Energy and Trade Agreements

Another important area in Pakistan's foreign policy which needs continuous development is fulfillment of the energy and trade agreements in which both states are party. The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline and KASA-1000 Project among Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan about electricity transmission are example of such agreements. Similarly trade agreements in which both states are party need to be worked upon persistently to get the spill-over effects of economic peace. All these arrangements and consolidations can be successful if the peace, security, and stability in both countries will be assured.

Peace and Stability in Afghanistan: Long-Range, Long-Term Objectives of Pakistan's Foreign Policy

This section emphasizes upon the importance of peace and stability in Afghanistan as it will be considered as long-range, long-term objective of Pakistan's foreign policy. Pakistan and Afghanistan as regional security complex are interlinked for their national security. The ominous threat from Afghanistan-side of border has been a matter of serious concern for Pakistan; however major focus in conceiving the solution of the issue would have been shifted. It can be exclaimed as shift in perception from controlling Afghan politics to cooperating with the Afghan government in dealing with common enemy, the terrorism. However Pakistan had learnt its lesson and no longer willing to provide any guarantees other than playing its role in facilitating the peace initiatives regarding Afghanistan. Pakistan's willingness to play a calculated role in Afghan conflict was a reflection of its changing approach towards Afghanistan. The dynamics of Pakistan's foreign policy had been changed and the state was no longer ready to fight anyone's war. This shift was not an easy one; rather Pakistan had paid heavy toll at domestic level in form of human losses of its citizens and security forces, material possessions, as well as national cohesion. The newly assumed role of Pakistan as 'facilitator' in Afghan peace processes, and not a 'guarantor' for any of the sides was a wise decision in the light of previous experiences.³⁹

Pakistan and Afghanistan have been viewed through different lenses by the US and its allies. Since initiation of the War on Terror, Pakistan's leadership had been blamed by Afghanistan and the US for putting least effort in anti-terrorist actions and operations; whereas Pakistan had been facing serious

political turmoil internally due to its anti-terrorist operations starting from Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and later spreading across the country causing serious opposition politically. The terrorism has not been eradicated from the nip as yet due to the number of factors involved in the regional security complex of Pakistan-Afghanistan. These operations however have controlled such incidents to an extent.

The *Taliban* has emerged as resilient and undeniable stakeholder in Afghanistan's politics over all the years of War on Terror and even after that. Afghanistan's peace, security and stability is greatly dependent on the solution of *Taliban* issue. Pakistan is directly affected by Afghan's political situation due to its geopolitical and ethnic connections. *Talibans* are not mere in a group of people. Rather they have emerged as a particular mindset which could be found on the both sides of border. Their cross-border connections provide support and safe havens to like-minded people even after carrying out terrorist activities. There is a similar issue with the smugglers, traffickers, and transnational organized criminals which have extensive links across the border. Even they can have political or popular support in their areas which would make it difficult for the law enforcement agencies and/or security forces to take action against them. The logical solution is extensive dialogue on border management between the two states, and recognition of the Durand Line as an international border because being a successor state of the British India, Pakistan's claim on the Durand Line is legitimate.⁴⁰ The United Nations, the US and international community should play their role in resolving this issue as it would provide permanent legality to the Pakistani government to manage the infiltration of insurgents and illegal movement. Even *Taliban* were not willing to recognize the Durand Line as they did not want to lose their safe havens in Pakistan. Now when the US and the Afghan government are admitting political existence of *Taliban* in Afghanistan and extending opportunities for talks to seek political solution, they should recognize the international border first in spite of hue and cry about Pakistan's not doing enough to stop the terrorism and providing safe havens in its territory.

Pakistan-Afghanistan regional security complex has complicated interplay of other sub-systems with their own agendas, national interests, and patterns of convergence and divergence. These sub-systems as discussed earlier in this paper, do act, re-act, and/or interact at different levels making the security situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan further precarious. These sub-systems are based on territoriality and non-territoriality too. Figure 1 shows the

complexity of the interplay of all these territorial sub-systems with Pakistan-Afghanistan Regional Security Complex.

If the above figure about the territorial sub-systems is elaborated, the most complex picture comes afore. Pakistan and India have been locked in enmity since inception and have fought four wars and numerous skirmishes on their borders and/or the Line of Control. Biased or unbiased, both states have similar attitudes towards each other. Evidently India has been trying to destabilize Pakistan through implying different strategies and doctrines, particularly in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, e.g. Ajit Doval, founder of the Doval doctrine about whom the Indian media reported that he had spent 7 years in Pakistan in disguise of a Muslim,⁴¹ and Kulbhushan Jadhav caught for espionage and terrorist-funding charges in Pakistan whose case is in International Court of Justice (ICJ).⁴² Contrarily India has accused Pakistan's involvement in Kashmir, Urri attack, Mumbai terrorist attacks, and Indian Parliament attacks in different time periods. In that context, Indian investment in Afghanistan's infrastructure development and training Afghan security officials as well as its use of soft power in Afghanistan intensifies Pakistan's insecurities, and Pakistan interprets such actions as the Indian policy of Pakistan's encirclement.

When all these territorial sub-systems and non-territorial sub-systems further interact with each other, their individual national interests or mutual interests further intricate the regional politics and politics of the security complex. For example, Iran shares borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan both states of the complex, and due to its converging strategic and economic interests with India, is playing role in regional politics despite the fact that India has strategic partnership with the US due to which India had suspended its part from the IPI gas pipeline. Similarly India and the US have strong economic and strategic relations since 2005, which has caused concerns for its long-time strategic partner Russia which consequently has improved relations with Pakistan rather cautiously. Central Asia and Middle East have their own concerns linked with Pakistan-Afghanistan security complex but when the Middle East is mentioned, Iran and Saudi Arabia have mutual divergence which is quite apparent from their postures in having relations with the said security complex; whereas the Central Asia is predominantly linked with the Pakistan-Afghanistan regional security complex through the energy and pipelines' routes. On the contrary, the Central Asian states have become a ground of competing control

and influence between the US and Russia. China which has emerged as a challenger to the US hegemony has its own agendas of convergence and divergence with the security complex. It has territorial boundary issues with India and has gone to a war in 1962 and number of skirmishes on that border. China extends immense support and assistance to Pakistan as Pakistan provides 'strategic depth' to China. Another area of convergence with Pakistan and several other states emerged potentially is China's One Belt, One Road (OBOR) and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects which have capability to engage several countries of the region will require peace, security, and stability in the region.

Conclusion

Pakistan's foreign policy toward Afghanistan has been rather dynamic. It has been going through continuity as well as change. Since 9/11 the nature of this shift is quite visible. Pakistan has devised and adopted different strategies to address all aspects of the Pakistan-Afghanistan regional security complex, i.e. bowing to international pressure and disconnecting support and ties with *Taliban* government, regaining status of the frontline state in the War on Terror, extending the anti-terrorist activities and operations across Pakistan, the civil-military unified stance regarding countering terrorism in the state, developments regarding the border management between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and peace-building efforts at the national and regional levels as well as playing important role in facilitating the Afghan government to build peace. The War on Terror was continued in Afghanistan for more than a decade, and ultimately ended in 2014 with the apparent upshot that *Taliban* were stakeholders in Afghan politics and they could not be terminated even with the use of the accumulated resources of the great powers and security forces across the world. The only solution to *Taliban* issue has been understood as extending opportunities to *Taliban* and other militant elements to become part of the talks and legitimate political integration into Afghanistan's politics. However the world has yet to think about the flip side of their demand of implementing Islamic political and legislative systems in Afghanistan.

The *Taliban* leadership has presented their demands as pre-requisite to the talks in January 2016 which comprised upon the points about withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghan soil, lifting of the UN sanctions against their leaders, re-opening their political office in Qatar, release of their prisoners, and ending propaganda against the group which caused much reluctance in Afghanistan and

US. Nonetheless, Pakistan has been considered crucial for the peace talks among the parties,⁴³ but Pakistan also requires assurance from the Afghan border which is only possible if the Durand Line would be recognized as the international border. Contrarily since President Donald Trump has assumed the office in January 2017, his contradictory approach toward Afghanistan issue has further complicated the situation. President Trump has presented his Afghan policy in which he has intended to increase the number of troops again in Afghanistan. He has accused Pakistan for harboring terrorists and Afghan *Taliban* while opening doors to peace talks with *Taliban*.⁴⁴ Hence his attitude has made peace-building further difficult. Pakistan-Afghanistan regional security complex can only get peace, security, and stability when the issue of *Taliban* will be resolved. Pakistan's foreign policy objectives toward Afghanistan can be achieved effectively only if Pakistan would be able to expand its writ to the tribal areas through extended reforms at large and bring them to the mainstream. Simultaneously Pakistan needs to reshape its strategies to enhance the efficacy of its foreign policy according to the changing policies of the territorial and non-territorial sub-systems as well as improve its diplomatic skills too to present its rightful position to the world about Afghanistan issue.

NOTES

- ¹ Pakistan shares 2,430 km long porous border with Afghanistan. See "Geography: The borders of Pakistan," *Dawn* (Karachi), October 17, 2009, accessed on November 10, 2016, <https://www.dawn.com/news/884966>.
- ² "Obama heralds formal end of war in Afghanistan after 13 years," *The Guardian* (London), December 28, 2014, accessed on January 12, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/28/us-nato-formally-end-war-afghanistan-kabul-ceremony>.
- ³ These two terms used in this section have contextual linkage to the foreign policy. The long-range objectives usually include the nature and significance of the objective or goal having intense impact on beholder like peace-building, democracy, state ideology, international regimes, nationalism etc on the expense of other states. It is achieved over long period of time that is why it is mentioned as long-term.
- ⁴ Mehtab Ali Shah, *The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy* (London: I.B.Tauris, 1997).
- ⁵ Ahmad Shayed Qassem, *Afghanistan's Political Stability: A Dream Unrealised* (Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate, 2009)
- ⁶ Thomas H. Johnson and Barry Scott Zellen, eds., *Culture, Conflict, and Counterinsurgency* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2014).
- ⁷ Bijan Omrani, "The Durand Line: History and Problems of the Afghan-Pakistan Border," *Asian Affairs* 40, no. 2 (June 2009): 177-195, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03068370902871508>.
- ⁸ Bruce Riedel, *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011).
- ⁹ Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan: The Path to Catastrophe And the Killing of Benazir Bhutto* (India: Penguin Books, 2008)
- ¹⁰ John K. Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism* 3rd edition (London: Pluto Press, 2002).
- ¹¹ Mariam Abou Zahab and Oliver Roy, *Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection* (London: Hurst & Company, 2004).
- ¹² Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn, eds., *Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond* (Oxon, New York: Routledge, 2004).
- ¹³ James J. F. Forest, *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives, Volume 1, Strategic and Tactical Considerations* (Connecticut, London: Praeger Security International, 2007).
- ¹⁴ Rajen Harshé, Dhananjay Tripathi, eds., *Afghanistan Post-2014: Power Configurations and Evolving Trajectories* (London: Routledge, 2015).
- ¹⁵ Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 43.
- ¹⁶ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Power*, 12.
- ¹⁷ Craig Oliphant, "Russia's Role and Interests in Central Asia," *Briefing Safer World*, October 2013, accessed on June 02, 2017, <https://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/russias-role-and-interests-in-central-asia.pdf>, 6-8.
- ¹⁸ Witold Rodkiewiicz, "The Russian Federation's Foreign Policy Concept," February 20, 2013, accessed on February 03, 2017, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-02-20/russian-federations-foreign-policy-concept>.
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LIVING ON THE FRONTLINES: PERSPECTIVE FROM THE NEELUM VALLEY

*Dr. Shaheen Akhtar**

Abstract

The impact of Kashmir conflict and volatility of the 740km Line of Control (LoC) dividing erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir, on the lives of peoples inhabiting the frontline villages in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) remains an untold story. The Neelum valley runs parallel to the LoC and in many places the Neelum River itself forms LoC. It is highly vulnerable to firing and shelling on the LoC and was the worst affected region during the 1990s. The bordering areas in the valley faced the brunt of hostilities on the LoC in the 1990s and felt much relieved by the 2003 ceasefire. The study tries to examine the impact of escalation of conflict on LoC and post 2003 ceasefire on the people living on the zero line the Neelum valley.

Keywords: Kashmir Conflict, Line of Control, Neelum Valley, Impact on People, 2003 Ceasefire.

Introduction

The Kashmir conflict has deeply impacted the lives of the people living in proximity of the LoC. The people living in frontline villages of AJK, particularly in Neelum valley are highly vulnerable to volatility of the LoC which adversely affects their physical security, livelihood, socio-cultural life, educational development, psychological health and wellbeing. The region was the worst affected by LoC firing and shelling during the 1990s. The 2003 ceasefire restored a semblance of peace on the LoC which resulted in marked improvement in the lives of the people living in the valley. The study assesses the impact of Kashmir conflict and escalation of LoC tension on the lives of the people living on the zero line in Neelum valley in the 1990s and subsequently the impact of 2003 ceasefire on these areas. It is divided in two periods: the first period explores impact of Kashmir conflict and escalation of conflict on the LoC on the people living in the Neelum valley in the 1990s. The second period analyses the impact of 2003 ceasefire on these people. It argues that impact of Kashmir conflict on the people living along the LoC should be recognized, ceasefire institutionalized and stalemated political dialogue for the resolution of Kashmir dispute should be resumed.

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The study is mainly based on the field analysis.¹ The universe of the study was the bordering villages of Neelum Valley that were deeply affected by firing and shelling on the LoC from 1990 to 2003. These included Bugna, Bore, Lawat, Rwata, Lala, Laswa, Nagdhar, Athmaqam, Kundal Shahi, Dawarian, Mirpura, Jura, Alagdar, Athai Anmigan, Dudhnial, Karalpura, Chandermano, Kawja Siri, Sharda, Phulwari, Pernat, Wawar Haji, Pernai, Chakmaqam and Karen. The LoC divides Bugna and Bore while there are two separate but contiguous villages called Karen, falling on both sides of the LoC.

Specificity of LoC in the Neelum Valley

The Line of Control, referred to as ceasefire line (CFL) until 1971 divides the pre-1947 state of Jammu and Kashmir into Indian and Pakistani Administered zones of Kashmir. The Karachi Agreement signed between India and Pakistan in July 1949 established the CFL that 'runs from Manawar in the south, north to Karen and from Karen east to the glacier area.'² It reflected the troop positions of December 1948 and was to be supervised by United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).³ However, after 1972 Simla Agreement India maintains that that the mandate of UNMOGIP has lapsed while Pakistan disagrees with this position. The mission has remained in the area to 'observe developments pertaining to the strict observance of the ceasefire' and report them to the Secretary-General.⁴

Neelum Valley falls in Muzaffarabad division and until 2008 was part of Muzaffarabad district. Geographically, the valley is in the lower reaches of greater Himalayas. It is mainly hilly with thick forests, and is relatively inaccessible, especially the northern part beyond Kel which is snow bound in the winters. Endowed with rich natural beauty, mineral and water resources, it has great potential for tourism but remains underdeveloped due to the volatility of the LoC.

The Neelum valley straddles the LoC, and at several points the Neelum River forms LoC between Indian and Pakistani positions. Much of the valley is vulnerable to the Indian positions, commanding strategic heights. In particular 7 km. stretch from Athmaqam to Dawarian and another 12 km between Chillyana and Barian where the Neelum river forms LoC, is quite exposed to the Indian firing and shelling. The valley has been the front-line between India and Pakistan since 1948. Until November 2003, small arms and artillery firing by both sides

were a frequent occurrence. Thereby the people living on the frontlines have faced the brunt of the tension on the LoC.

Impact of Firing and Shelling

The people living in frontline villages of the Neelum valley were severely affected by firing and heavy shelling on the LoC from 1990 to 2003. This resulted in heavy loss of human life, destruction of public and private property, damages to road infrastructure, schools, and healthcare facilities. According to Mian Abdul Waheed, Education Minister of AJK, about 2300 people were killed while over 5000 were injured or disabled due to shelling.⁵ The field analysis revealed that before the 2003 ceasefire, people living in the frontline villages in the area felt extremely insecure, in terms of threat of life, threat of losing loved ones, losing their belongings and livelihood. An overwhelming majority of over 86 percent of the respondents maintained that their lives were directly threatened while over 13 percent feared loss of life most of the times.

Responses/Frequencies for the 1st Period before 2003 Ceasefire in Neelum Valley

	Security Risk/Threat	Emotional Loss	Economic Loss	Environmental & Social Loss	Travel and Communication Ease
None	-	-	-	-	98.0
least	-	-	-	-	1.0
Fair	4.9	-	-	2.0	1.0
Good	8.8	12.7	12.7	7.8	-
Most/Best	86.3	87.3	87.3	90.2	-
Total %	100	100	100	100.0	100

Besieged Valley in the 1990s

The Neelum valley is connected via Muzaffarabad by the Neelum Valley road which runs for about 100 miles from Muzaffarabad up to Kel. This acts as the main supply route. Until the 2003 ceasefire, the valley was completely cut off from the rest of AJK as this road was permanently closed due to intense firing and shelling. The Neelum Valley, in fact, witnessed some of the heaviest artillery exchanges between the Indian and Pakistani troops in the 1990s and in 2001-02. At three points on this route, "Indian forces occupy distinctly advantageous

positions in the heights overlooking the road from which they can bombard the highway and civilian settlements as well as delicately suspended footbridges across the raging Kishanganga (Neelum).⁶ Beyond Kel, there is no all-weather, all-year road so the valley can be completely choked. During firing, Neelum road used to get closed from the point where the river forms the LoC. Consequently, the people living along those stretches were completely besieged. To avoid Indian firing, three bypasses were built to provide access to the Neelum valley in the 1990s. These were the Karen by-pass, Laswa and Jalkhad bypass (Surgan-Nurinar-Jalkhad) which runs from the Kagan valley. The Jalkhad by-pass is a high altitude road; treacherous at the best of times, impassable in the winter and at certain points vulnerable to Indian attack. So as a result of closure of the main supply route, the communities living near the LoC suffered severe shortages of supply of foodstuff such as rice, flour and vegetable oil and daily use items. The prices of daily use commodities were 50-100 percent higher than the prices in Muzaffarabad.

The residents of the frontline villages of Neelum valley narrate stories of the pain and suffering that they went through in that period. Almost every house was hit by firing or mortar shelling. Roshan Jan from Akhai village, Athmaqam recalled:

'There was always a threat to life. It was a warlike situation. Whenever there was firing or heavy shelling, life was paralyzed and one did not know what will happen in the very next moment. Firing was unpredictable; it would start any time, crippling daily life completely. The businesses were shattered and the people were unable to work in the fields. We used to live in trenches and our children could not go to school. People were under constant stress and could not do anything properly in time.'

Local community living in Dawarian, Lawat, Bugna, Bore, Karen, Lala, Laswa, Nagdar, and Athmaqam was hit hard by intermittent to heavy firing and shelling on these villages. The heavy firing and shelling destroyed their houses, schools and hospitals and resulted in deaths and injuries. Mahina, a resident of Bugna which is a divided village on the LoC said 'those living near the LoC were always worried about their own lives and that of their near and dear ones. Amiruddin Mughal, a resident of Kundal Shahi added, "There was more firing in summer. People of the border areas went to *dhokes* (alpine pastures) in jungles to escape firing."⁷ Many would travel in the dark at night to get essential goods and take the roads or paths that were not directly exposed to Indian fire. Shelling

also scarred the village of Nagdar. Eleven children were killed in a single day when mortars fired by the Indian army landed at a school in the village in 1993.⁸ In 1996, a bus travelling at night in front of the Indian positions was hit, resulting in the death of 40 passengers. Almost every family living along the LoC has lost a member. Khawja Farooq from Dawarian, which is half a kilometer away from the LoC, still remembers the “general sense of insecurity and uncertainty.”⁹

Internal Displacement

For over a decade or so, a large number of people were temporarily or permanently displaced from the forward villages of Neelum due to artillery fire. In general, internally displaced people (IDPs) with sufficient resources of their own rented accommodation in the towns of AJK or moved to neighbouring districts of Punjab province, others stayed with their relatives. However, not everyone had the means to relocate; their relatives could not afford to take them in, or they felt they couldn't earn a living elsewhere as their livelihood was linked with their local habitat. Those who opted to stay behind lived in perpetual fear and with few, if any, means of subsistence; often living on whatever they received in special packages offered by the AJK government. Some camps were set up for the displaced, such as Katha Piran, Thorar and Kalkan. The AJK government also provided tents, ration and daily allowance.¹⁰ The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Islamic Relief also assisted IDPs from the Neelum valley. Mohammad Ejazul Islam from Lawat said due to heavy shelling people had to migrate; many moved to Kundal Shahi, which lies a few kilometers away from the bank of the Neelum river and is relatively safer.¹¹

Land Mines Victims

Planted here before 1990, landmines are a serious menace in the Neelum valley, which has not been demined yet. People from Bugna and Rwata villages, in particular, have fallen victim to mines — usually treading on them while collecting firewood, gathering *guchhi* (wild mushrooms) and cutting grass for the cattle. Children have also been struck by toy bombs. Officially, 42 landmine victims have been reported from the two villages. Heavily mined on both sides of the LoC, Rwata though has the dubious distinction of being village with the most landmine victims in the Neelum valley. The melting snow from the high mountains in the nullah Rwata and landslides in the rainy season scatter these mines across unmarked land, often killing people and livestock. A 32-year-old local schoolteacher, Mir Shakeel, accidentally lost both his legs on his way to

work. Incidents like these also make parents anxious when their children leave for school. A woman here expressed her wariness as a mother, even as she revealed that a landmine ripped one of her sister's feet from the ankle while collecting grass for cattle. Women here are put in the path of danger usually when they graze cattle. Unemployment also forces the menfolk of Rwata to venture into the forests nearby to collect mushrooms and herbs, making them vulnerable to landmines too. Similarly, the villagers of Bugna have been hit by landmines and many have lost their limbs, partially or fully. Gulzameen, for instance, lost his leg while cleaning a water channel, which irrigates fields in the area. Children who played unawares with toy bombs have also succumbed to them. In 2005, five young girls died in Kel while playing with a toy bomb. Unexploded explosives used also explode at times, often claiming the lives of women and children.

Victims of landmines are treated free of cost at the Muzaffarabad Physical Rehabilitation Centre (MPRC), says its director Dr. Bilal Zafar. MPRC was set up in 2007 with the support of the ICRC after the earthquake in 2005.¹² However, there is not much information about the Center in remote villages infested with landmines. The local government and Pakistan Army organise sessions at schools to create awareness and avert landmine accidents.

Psychological Scars of Security Conditions

Villagers, especially young children who grew up in an atmosphere of fear; riddled with incidents of firing, heavy mortar shelling and mines, have suffered deep psychological trauma. Raised under warlike conditions, they have developed special survival instincts over the years. In the survey, a huge majority of 87.3 percent respondents felt that the environment of fear and uncertainty, restrictive mobility, dislocation, destruction of homes and livelihood had a telling impact on their psyche, while another 12.7 percent felt that conflict conditions greatly affected their lives psychologically and emotionally. Junaid Mir, who grew up in the Athmaqam tehsil, observed, "I never enjoyed a normal childhood; threat to life and fear of migration were constants in our lives."¹³ Forced isolation also marked the conflict years for many on the LoC. Abdul Waheed from Palari, Dawarian, remarked, "The movement of civilians was severely restricted due to heavy shelling, and most of the times, they were confined to their homes."¹⁴

Economic Impact on the Communities

During the 1990s, up until 2003, intense cross-LoC firing affected the socio-economic fabric of the Neelum Valley. Even though occasional firing and skirmishes along the LoC did occur prior to 1990, it did not affect the life and livelihood of people as much as it did after the eruption of heavy fighting along LoC in the 1990s. The field analysis revealed that 88.3 percent of the respondents strongly felt that the conflict along the LoC destroyed their houses and their sources of income; 11.7 percent felt it affected the local economy badly.

During this period, the civilian population and infrastructure were constantly at the receiving end of firing and shelling, altering the ways of life and socio-economic sustainability in the valley. There was massive damage to private property, livestock, crops and businesses. The public infrastructure, schools in particular, healthcare units and roads were damaged. Already an economically marginalised region, the LoC conflicts caused further devastation to the valley's economic infrastructure. Intikhab Jan, a resident of Warwar Haji, a village on the zero line, recalled how the decade was marked by heavy shelling, dread, and destruction. A large number of cattle were also killed. Unemployment increased too as people were forced to stay indoors. Fishing was hardly possible anymore. Being the center and trading hub of the Neelum valley from where goods are transported upward to Kel and Phalawai, Athmaqam was the site of the heaviest pounding — disrupting trade, shops, healthcare units, schools, colleges, and administrative offices. The LoC shelling burnt the local Bazaar to the ground on five occasions, in which many shops were gutted. Besides incurring huge losses, the bazaar lost its traditional woodwork heritage. The supplies of daily essentials were also suspended, causing severe shortages of food and medicines in the valley and pushing up the prices. The cost of a single packet of salt shot up to PKR 150-200.¹⁵ Similarly, Jura Bazaar went up in flames and Kel Bazaar was heavily damaged. As the area ahead of Nauseri was cut off from Muzaffarabad, road travel and vehicular movement was also not possible either. People had to walk for hours, carrying utilities and consumables on their back mostly in the night to avoid casualties. Long walls were erected along the road to make movement in vehicles and on foot safe from fire.

People were unable to sow or harvest crops or water their fields in the Nagdar and Neelum villages. At times, sudden firing forced them to flee the fields. A considerable number of farmers died or were severely injured every year. But it was women, who were the primary victims since they had to tend to cattle,

cut grass and harvest crops. Even marriages and funerals were targeted, resulting in more civilian casualties.

The most fertile and populous land on the right bank of the Neelum river — stretching from the villages of Marble, Barian, Jura, Kundal Shahi to Athmaqam, from Karen to Nagdar, from Lawat, Dawarian to Changhan and from Dudnayaal to Tejan — was directly under small arms and heavy artillery fire. Prior to the eruption of hostilities about 80 to 100 tons of walnut was produced and sold from the valley. Apart from cattle and sheep farming, paddy, wheat, corn and lentils were grown here as well. The wool produced was either sold or used to make blankets and *gaba* (textile). But such sources of income dried up due to the conflict. Visitors avoided the valley too. “How would tourists come,” said Waseem, a resident of Karen, “when we could not step out of our own homes?”¹⁶ The village of Rwata, 7km away from the Athmaqam market on the left bank of the Neelum, and southwest of the Karen village, suffered the most in the valley until the ceasefire was declared in 2003. The uneven pedestrian track leading to it runs along the Nullah Rwata. It has about 40 wooden huts with a small bazaar of five shops. The population here has always relied on incomes generated through cultivation and animal husbandry, and has foraged mushrooms and herbs from the mountains, later sold to contractors. Under direct fire through the 1990s due to its proximity to the LoC, the village is a classic example of one of the most marginalised settlement in the Neelum valley. It has no government schools and most children here walk two hours to a school in Athmaqam.

Social, Educational Losses & Impact on the Environment

The conflict situation along the LoC in Neelum valley shattered the education sector and socio-cultural life of the local community. An overwhelming majority of 90.2 percent respondents maintained that the warlike conditions on the LoC hugely impacted their cultural and social activities and denied their children the opportunity to go to schools, and 9.8 percent felt that there was substantive impact in these areas. Education was the greatest casualty in the Neelum valley through the decade of conflict between 1990 and 2003. Cross-LoC shelling destroyed many buildings of educational intuitions, including the Nagdar High School, which was hit by Indian shelling that claimed the lives of 38 children.¹⁷

“Due to seething conflict along the LoC, many families had to migrate from their [domicile] areas, and it was not possible for the children to continue

their education,” remarked Professor Khawaja A. Rehman, who teaches at a postgraduate college in Muzaffarabad.¹⁸ “For 15 years, our children were unable to go to school, and we couldn’t apply for jobs in other places. We couldn’t leave our families behind due to the constant firing,” said Ali Raza from Rwata, adding, “We dug ditches and lived inside these to save our lives for days and weeks, coming out only at night to do what was necessary.”¹⁹ “Our generation never got the chance to attend schools,” said, Mir Iklaqu, another resident of Rwata.²⁰

The healthcare facilities also came under fire, and doctors were unavailable. Many who were wounded lost their lives because they couldn’t be taken to health centres due to the unrelenting exchange of fire. Living in bunkers also pushed people to live in unhygienic conditions, resulting in poor health. Lack of mobility also gave rise to arthritis, a disease that is otherwise rare in mountainous regions. “We have been treating hundreds of arthritis patients in recent years. They got it because they were forced to spend long hours — sometimes up to 18 hours at a stretch — sitting on damp ground inside the bunkers,” said Mohammad Khursheed, a pharmacist who runs a medical store in Athmuqam.²¹

Effect on the Environment

Neelum is a lush green valley, rich in flora and fauna, ravaged during this period. “Forests caught fires along the LoC due to heavy mortar and artillery shelling,” said Safina Bibi from Lala village.²² Trees were charred in mortar shelling in Akhai, Athmaqam, and a lot of precious wood was lost as a large number of pine and deodar trees were gutted. It was difficult to put out fire during firing, which continued for days. In 1998, a jungle was set ablaze by intense Indian shelling and continued for two months. Burnt trees are still visible in Athmaqam. The indiscriminate damage caused by forest fires resulted in pollution and environmental degradation and loss of biodiversity and habitat. The soil erosion has led to landslides, sometimes forcing people to migrate even. Springs were also affected, making access to water more difficult. Wild animals like bears and chimpanzees were compelled to come down from the forests into human habitat, giving rise to man-animal conflicts.

Travel and Communication Ease

The movement of the local population was impinged upon in the Neelum valley and communication with the people outside the area was virtually

cut off. Those who lived along the riverbank, especially Chillyana, Lawat, Karen, Bugna and Bore lost contact with their relatives across the river. An overwhelming majority of 98 percent respondents stated that they were compelled to live in bunkers, their mobility was restricted and contact with their relatives across the LoC was entirely disrupted.

The Impact of the 2003 Ceasefire

Improved Security Conditions along the LoC

The ceasefire restored a great sense of safety and provided relief to the frontline villages of the Neelum valley. The field survey revealed that a majority of 89.2 percent felt very secure after the ceasefire in 2003, while 10.8 percent felt fairly secure. Threat to life and livelihood was visibly reduced. Life returned to normalcy and people now moved freely in their fields, at home and outside. The threat of dislocation subsided too. Most people returned to their homes and started rebuilding them. The Neelum Valley Road was reopened, improving connectivity with the region and bolstering the socio-economic conditions in the area.

The ceasefire meant that people living in the most vulnerable villages and border towns like Athmaqam, Bugna, Rwata, Bore, Karen, Dawarian, Nagdar and Lawat now could live outside bunkers and move about and pursue their daily lives without restraint. “The ceasefire has restored physical security, and the fear of loss of life has greatly subsided,” said Seemab Ahmad from Athmaqam.²³ For a while now, adds Mansoor Ahmad from Bonchattar, dislocation and death were no longer a threat. However, traumatised by years of strife, many locals were apprehensive still and believed that the ceasefire was fragile, and one bullet could shatter the peace and security in their lives.

Positive Psychological Impact

Improved security conditions contributed hugely reduced the sources of psychological and emotional stress. The fear of losing life, home, kith and kin and livelihood was replaced by normal social, economic and cultural activity. Now, people can celebrate festivals, attend weddings and share their grief at funerals held in broad daylight. The field survey revealed that over 71 percent of respondents strongly felt that the ceasefire had had a positive impact on their emotional life and over 28 percent observed that it had restored their peace of mind to a great extent.

It took a while, in fact, for the villagers of Rwata to get a feel of the ceasefire. “Four years after the declaration [in 2003], we could not start living a normal life, worried that the firing might start again. Even the government never considered constructing any roads or helping the local community by establishing a school or dispensary, which strengthened the fear that firing might erupt any time,” said Muhammad Nawaz from Rwata.²⁴ In Lala, Nighat Jabeen observed, “We live on the edge every minute of our life and are always ready to jump into the bunkers as soon as we hear the sound of gunfire. Each time we hear a blast, even when it’s just fireworks at a wedding, our hearts sink in the fear that one of our loved ones might have been struck by a mine.”²⁵

Revival of Economy

In contrast to the 1990s, the ceasefire had the most visible impact on the economy of the Neelum Valley. People started rebuilding their houses, but not everyone has the means to do that, so it has been a slow process. Businesses have been restored and shops are being reconstructed as well. Agricultural activity has also been revived. People are cultivating their land, a major source of income in the area, and the livestock is safer too. But in many ways, the socio-economic conditions of the valley started improving only when the rebuilding of roads and communication networks were initiated after the ceasefire. Infrastructure along the LoC and the forward villages also improved, and the reconstruction generated a lot of economic opportunities for the locals. The field survey revealed that over 84 percent respondents felt that the valley has undergone tremendous socio-economic progress post-2003, and 17 percent respondents recognised that peace has enhanced economic conditions in the area. With the reopening of the Neelum Valley Road, the supply of essential daily items has also been restored and the prices have gone down. “One can gauge the impact of peace from the price of a packet of salt, which means a lot to the local population,” observed Shah Ghulam Qadir, a leading political figure of the area.²⁶

Tourism Taking Off

With peace and normalcy and the reconstruction of roads and communication infrastructure, tourists started pouring in the valley. This has injected new life in the local economy. Karen and Neelum villages, once most affected areas of the valley have now developed tourist resorts. As Swat valley in the Khyber Pukhtoonkhaw Province of Pakistan, a major tourist hub came under attack by the Taliban, a bulk of the domestic tourists found their way to the

newly opened Neelum valley. Further reconstruction after the earthquake in 2005 also put a lot of emphasis on building tourism infrastructure in the area, consequently transforming the entire socio-economic framework. In a short span, several government and private tourist resorts were established here. And by 2013, several dozen hotels and motels were available in the Neelum valley to accommodate the surge in tourism. Meanwhile, Sharda, an ancient archaeological site, was reopened for tourists and researchers.

According to Shehla Waqar, former Secretary for the Department of Archaeology and Tourism, AJK, the year 2011 saw 250,000 visitors in the valley; in 2012, the number had more than doubled to 600,000.²⁷ In the Neelum valley, there was no private guesthouse till 2011, but in 2012 tourist season, there were 115 private guesthouses, built in the span of a year. At the moment, the target group for them is domestic tourists because of restrictions on foreigners.

Revival of Education and Socio-Cultural Life

There has been great revival of educational activities and the socio-cultural life in the Neelum valley. The field survey revealed that over 92 percent respondents felt strongly that the prevailing peace had allowed them to send their children to schools and enjoy normal cultural activities that were rarely, if ever, experienced due to the firing/shelling and recurrent migration earlier. In addition, peace had resuscitated the local ecology and wildlife. Another 8 percent also appreciated the dividend of peace for the residents of the Neelum valley.

The education sector, which was devastated in the 1990s, found its feet again after the ceasefire. Many new schools and colleges were reconstructed, especially in the wake of the earthquake in 2005, and several educational activities were restarted. The University of AJK opened the doors to its campus in Athmaqam, and is now planning to open a branch in Sharda. The number of students from the Neelum valley who enrolled in other universities in AJK has also gone up sharply. In Rwata village, a private school was recently opened for primary education.

The cultural life has also got an impetus, as social gatherings are no longer off limits. "People had lost contact with each other, snapping social linkages within the community. Peace has now restored societal interaction," said Khawja Muhammad Akber from Athmaqam.²⁸ Plus, many locals are engaged in community work in their areas. The healthcare facilities too have improved a

lot, and many new Basic Health Units have been constructed. Hospitals damaged in the firing have been rebuilt and are now equipped with state-of-the-art equipment.

Improved Environmental Conditions

Peace has given new life to the environmental sustainability of the area. Forests, grazing lands, orchards and fields are becoming green again. The forests damaged in the firing and heavy shelling are recovering. The grazing pastures, which had turned barren after being hit by explosives, are turning green again. Although the adverse impact of the explosives used has not disappeared completely, the situation is gradually improving. Thus, peace is restoring the biodiversity of the region and consequently, improving the livelihood opportunities of the local population.

Ease in Travel and Communication

The ceasefire has effectively reconnected the people of the Neelum valley with each other and with the rest of AJK. Communication with the world beyond had been severed almost entirely for those living in the frontline villages during the conflict years. As the roads vulnerable to Indian shelling became safer, movement was less restricted and the valley witnessed a revival of the economic and socio-cultural life. Given the difficult terrain and the 2005 earthquake, the reconstruction of the roads took some time. But now, the arterial Neelum Valley Road is fully operational. Communication links with the valley have improved, and the resumption of cross-LoC bus services and the opening of the crossing points, especially the Nauseri-Titwal point, has restored some contact across the LoC as well. While this allows people to meet their relatives, since the 1990s refugees cannot travel across, there is lot of frustration amongst those who crossed over to the AJK and are living closer to the LoC or in refugee camps. A huge majority of the 75 percent of people is very satisfied with the freer movement along the LoC and improved communication facilities, while a segment of 25 percent is fairly satisfied.

Response to the Ceasefire and the CBMs

The local population, especially in the forward locations in the Neelum valley, strongly supports the ceasefire because it has restored normalcy to their lives. They are also quite positive about trade- and travel-related CBMs, but feel that due to many operational difficulties they could not benefit from them, not

as much as they would have liked to. Reopening of the crossing point of Nauseri-Titwal is much appreciated too, but it provides limited opportunity to the divided families to reconnect with their relatives across the LoC. The field survey found that a staggering majority of 92 percent respondents were in strong support of peace on the LoC, while 8 percent were quite satisfied with the ceasefire and felt that it has stabilised the security situation and helped them rebuild their lives. The local community is pitching to consolidate the ceasefire along the LoC, especially after an upsurge in the incidence of cross-LoC firing in recent years. The women of Neelum valley in particular have organised peace marches in support of the ceasefire as tension on the LoC escalated. Chand Bibi, a 60-year-old illiterate housewife from Athmuqam, has led at least three demonstrations by women between July 2008 and August 2013 to sustain peace along the LoC.²⁹ The protestors urged India and Pakistan to maintain peace along the LoC to avoid civilian and armed casualties. Locally, the civil society is also quite active in this regard.

Fear of Renewed Firing and Shelling in the Neelum Valley

During the past 14 years, the ceasefire has largely been upheld along the Neelum valley, barring few occasions. In some incidents, people living in vulnerable villages have gone missing while cutting grass, collecting firewood or foraging for herbs. In September 2007, three men went missing from the Dhakki and Chaknar hamlets of Neelum valley. Their relatives maintained that they had been 'kidnapped' from the AJK side by the Indian Army. In June 2009, another resident of the same area was allegedly picked up and taken across by the Indian troops. In July 2013, four Neelum valley residents who were collecting medicinal plants along the LoC went missing — later, it turned out that they had been taken across by the Indian Army and killed.

In the last few years however, the ceasefire has come under lot of strain which has created fear and anxiety amongst the LoC residents in the Neelum valley, besides Nakyal and Battal area. This rising incidence of ceasefire violations has revived bitter memories of 1990s amongst the locals. They fear that yet again heightened military activity on the LoC would adversely impede their normal lives and means of livelihood. In the Neelum Valley the people feel even more threatened given their far worse experience of LoC conflict and as the incidence spiraled in the Poonch, Kotli and Working Boundary, they got scared of its expansion to their area. In August 2013, killing of a Pakistan army Captain in LoC firing in Shaqma sector near Skardu created panic in the bordering areas

of the Neelum Valley. After the killing of Burhan Wani in July 2016, tension went up on the LoC and further escalated in the wake of Uri attack on September 18 in which 18 Indian soldiers were killed.³⁰ On September 29, 2016, India claimed to have conducted a “surgical strike” in the Bhimber, Hotspring, Kel and Lipa sectors against alleged “launch pads of terror” in AJK. Pakistani side brushed aside the claim, but exchange of fire on the LoC has not abated since then. This spiral in LoC tension has claimed several civilian lives, beside killing soldiers on both sides. In a major incident in Neelum valley, on 23 November 2016, eleven people were killed and nine others injured as a passenger bus heading towards Muzaffarabad from Kel was attacked by mortar shells fired by Indian troops near Lawat Kanari Bala.³¹ The ambulance carrying injured also came under fire. This has created anxiety amongst the locals in the area. They consider ceasefire as tenuous and fear that an escalation of hostilities in the Poonch-Kotli region and Working Boundary as witnessed over the past few years will extend to Neelum valley as well. To impress upon the governments of India and Pakistan to end escalation of tension on the LoC, the local civil society, especially residents of Rwata and Athmaqam, have organized peace rallies.

The Way Forward: Consolidating Ceasefire & Resuming Dialogue

The fragility of ceasefire on the LoC and absence of political dialogue between India and Pakistan is impending threat to the dividend of peace, accrued to the people living along the LoC in the Neelum valley. The ceasefire is tenuous and will remain so until it is institutionalized and is supported by a vibrant political dialogue.

Consolidating the Ceasefire

The 2003 ceasefire put in place after the 2001-2002 military stand-off between India and Pakistan was the first major CBM that restored a sense of security to the communities living along both sides of the LoC. It allowed those displaced by recurrent shelling across the LoC since the escalation of hostilities in the 1990s, to return home, rebuild their houses and restart their livelihood activities. From 2003 to 2005, there was no incident of firing across the LoC and only three occurred in 2006. With India-Pakistan peace process slowing down, the number of violations on the LoC began to increase. The figure on violations varies from the Indian and Pakistan official and media sources, but an increased trend in ceasefire violations is quite obvious.³² From 2008 through 2012, there

were occasional spells of firing across the LoC. This situation began to change in late 2012 when India began to build additional bunkers along the LoC.³³ Firing across the LoC increased further in January 2013, with reports that two Indian soldiers were killed, their bodies mutilated, and one beheaded. The situation along the LoC calmed somewhat in the following months, but firing again surged from late summer through November 2013 and became a routine occurrence. Ceasefire violations have continued since Narendra Modi's came to power in May 2014. Incidents of shelling have increased in intensity and duration and have usually graduated to the use of heavy weaponry as was the case in 1990s.

A limited number of military and political CBMs are in place to defuse tensions between the Indian and Pakistani armies. Hotlines are in place between the Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMOs),³⁴ and sector commanders. In 2005 both sides agreed to upgrade to a secure and dedicated hotline between DGMOs, hold monthly flag meetings between formation commanders at four points on the LoC - Kargil (Olding in Pakistan), Uri (Chakothi), Naushera (Sadabad) and Jammu (Sialkot) - and implement the 1991 agreement on airspace violations. They also agreed not to build any new posts or Defence Works along the LoC and to ensure the speedy return of those (mostly civilian but the occasional military personnel) who inadvertently crossed the LoC. Formal agreements on construction along the LoC and the return of those mistakenly crossing the line have been under negotiation since 2006 but remains uncompleted.

Meanwhile, the LoC continues to be heavily militarised with Indian and Pakistani soldiers equipped with small arms and heavy artillery sitting eye ball to eyeball. In the absence of credible and effective monitoring mechanism the ceasefire violations remain point of contention between the two countries. The management of the LoC requires cooperation between the two countries to monitor the ceasefire violations. Pakistan supports strengthening of UNMOGIP, while India proposes joint patrols which Pakistan finds impractical. The UK, EU and US had explored an international helicopter borne force to monitor infiltration along the LoC during the 2001- 2002 standoff. This could be revived without prejudice to existing Indian and Pakistani positions on the issue. Several other steps could be taken at the bilateral level to institutionalise the existing CBMs or further build on them:

- The early conclusion of agreements regarding construction of new posts on the LoC and speedy return of inadvertent line crossers.
- Demining of areas along the LoC and expansion of the no man's land area regulated by designated authorities on both sides.

Military CBMs can be expanded to consolidate de-escalation measures on the LoC. These may include:

- Increasing the frequency of meetings at the local commanders' level.
- A policy of no construction without informing the other side.
- The facility to call a meeting with the other side within 24 hours.
- Delegation of responsibility to brigade commander level.
- No firing on civilians or civilian transport.
- Creation and maintenance of safe farming zones on both sides of the LoC.
- Relocation of heavy artillery to at least 30 km away from the LoC.
- Reduction of troops along the LoC.

Resumption of Political Dialogue

A sustained political dialogue between India and Pakistan is essential for stabilising ceasefire on the LoC and taking Kashmir specific CBMs on trade and travel to the next step. Cross-LoC travel and trade are facing several operationalization difficulties which could not be removed due to stalemate in the India-Pakistan peace process. Similarly, intra-Kashmir dialogue could not take off due to lack of interest in particular on part of India to make people of Kashmir are primary stakeholders in the resolution of the Kashmir conflict. It is pertinent to note that degree of tension on the LoC and in India-Pakistan relations directly affects the growth of cross-LoC CBMs. Thereby an early resumption of dialogue process between India and Pakistan is crucial to revive cross-LoC CBM process that would directly and indirectly improve the security and economic conditions along the LoC.

Conclusion

The Kashmir conflict has profoundly affected the people living along the LoC that remains highly militarized, volatile and mined. In Neelum valley the lives of the people, their livelihood, socio-cultural interactions and educational activity is subjected to the prevailing security conditions on the LoC which in turn largely depends on India-Pakistan relations. The 2003 ceasefire and India-

Pakistan dialogue led to resumption of travel and trade across LoC which brought a semblance of normalcy in the lives of the people living in proximity of LoC. The deadlock in the dialogue process growing escalation of tension on the LoC has raised apprehensions that gains of ceasefire and CBMs would wither away if peace process is not resumed and steps are not undertaken by India and Pakistan to consolidate ceasefire and existing CBMs on Kashmir.

Early resumption of peace process between India and Pakistan is very important for stabilizing ceasefire on the LoC. Management of LoC requires institutionalization of ceasefire. Steps should be taken to expand military CBMs including strengthening of de-escalation mechanisms, early conclusion of agreements regarding no construction of new posts on the LoC and the speedy return of people who inadvertently cross the LoC. Both sides should engage in serious discussions on reduction of troops along the LoC and relocation of the heavy artillery 30 km away from the LoC as civilian population is highly vulnerable to exchanges of heavy firing on the LoC as witnessed in recent times and during the 1990s. The areas along the LoC should be de-mined as they continue to threaten civilians and constrain their livelihood activities.

NOTES

- ¹ The study is based on the field analysis and uses various research tools of qualitative as well as quantitative research. The field survey was conducted from August to December 2014. It used the Stratified Random Sample survey (SRS) method and design questionnaire to explore the impact of conflict and ceasefire on the people living in the forward areas Neelum district. The civilian population living along the LoC formed the universe and an appropriate sample of 200 persons from Neelum Valley was drawn to find out the effects of conflict and ceasefire on the local community living in these areas. The survey tried to cover maximum social strata across gender, age and occupation. A ratio of 60 percent males and 40 percent females was maintained. The female respondents included housewives, farmers, health care and social workers, teachers and students. The male respondents comprised those engaged in small businesses, farmers, labourers, traders, transporters, cross-LoC traders, office workers, journalists, students and teachers. There was mix age group across gender- youth, middle aged and elderly who have experienced the conflict in a varied manner and at different times. There were 15 % from 60 and above; 40 % between 40 and 60 and 45 % between 18 and 40.
- ² See text of the 'Agreement between Military Representatives of India and Pakistan Regarding the Establishment of a Ceasefire Line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir (Karachi Agreement)' http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IN%20PK_490729_%20Karachi%20Agreement.pdf. In July 1972, India and Pakistan signed an agreement defining a Line of Control in Kashmir which, with minor deviations, followed the same course as the ceasefire line established by the Karachi Agreement in 1949.
- ³ The strength of UNMOGIP is 114 personnel including 45 military observers. It has suffered 11 fatalities including 5 military men since its inception. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmogip/facts.shtml>. UNMOGIP established headquarters in Rawalpindi (Pakistan) and Srinagar (India) and set up 11 field stations along the ceasefire line. The observer group is financed by the United Nations regular budget and appropriations for biennium 2014-2015 are USD 19.64 million.
- ⁴ UNMOGIP's functions were to observe and report, investigate complaints of cease-fire violations and submit its findings to each party and to the Secretary General.
- ⁵ Mian Abdul Waheed, interview with the author, September 8, 2014.
- ⁶ Robert G. Wirsing, Kashmir Conflict in Charles Kennedy (ed), *Pakistan 1992* (Westview Press, 1993) 154.
- ⁷ Amiruddin Mughal, a photo journalist from Kundal Shahi, interview with author, November 7, 2014.
- ⁸ Irfan Ghauri, "Tales from LoC-3: Neelum valley people thirst for peace," *The Express Tribune*, July 4, 2011. <http://tribune.com.pk/story/202001/tales-from-loc-3-neelum-valley-people-thirst-for-peace/>
- ⁹ Interview with author, October 2014.
- ¹⁰ Muhammad Akram Sohail, former DC, Muzaffarabad, interview with the author, January 8, 2015.
- ¹¹ A respondent from Lawat.
- ¹² Amiruddin Mughal's documentary on landmine victims of Azad Kashmir Bimbher to Neelum Valley near Line of control LoC by SAMAA TV. June 21, 2014. http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1zxr4m_first-ever-documentary-in-pakistan-about-landmines-victims-of-azad-kashmir_news
- ¹³ A respondent from Athmuqam.
- ¹⁴ A respondent from Dawarian.
- ¹⁵ Interview with Shah Ghulam Qadir, former speaker of the AJK Assembly who is extensively engaged in the Neelum valley and contested from the area in the last Assembly elections. December 12, 2014.
- ¹⁶ A respondent from Karen.
- ¹⁷ Interview with Amiruddin Mughal.
- ¹⁸ Interview with Professor Khawaja A. Rehman who teaches at a postgraduate college in Muzaffarabad, September 5, 2014.
- ¹⁹ A respondent from Rawata.

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- ²⁰ A respondent from Rawata.
- ²¹ M. Ilyas Khan, 'The housewives taking on militants in Kashmir', November 17, 2013. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-24426555>
- ²² A respondent from Lala.
- ²³ A respondent from Athmuqam.
- ²⁴ A respondent from Rawata.
- ²⁵ A respondent from Lala.
- ²⁶ Interview with Shah Ghulam Qadir, former speaker of the AJK Assembly who is extensively engaged in the Neelum valley and contested from the area in the last Assembly elections. December 12, 2014.
- ²⁷ Interview with Shehla Waqar, Secretary for the Department of Archaeology and Tourism, AJK. Also see <https://storify.com/theglobeandmail/in-pakistan-kashmir-a-valley-bets-on-tourism-and-p>
- ²⁸ A respondent from Athmuqam.
- ²⁹ Tariq Naqash, 'LoC peace within grasp,' *Dawn*, December 26, 2013.
- ³⁰ "18 jawans killed in pre-dawn strike at Uri", *The Hindu*, September 18, 2016. <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/18-jawans-killed-in-pre-dawn-strike-at-Uri/article14988716.ece>
- ³¹ M.A. Mir, Kamran Yousaf, "8 killed as Indian forces target passenger bus near LoC", *The Express Tribune*, 23 November, 2016
- ³² According to Indian official sources, the number of incidents of fire increased from 28 in 2009 to 44 in 2010, 51 in 2011, 114 in 2012, 347 in 2013, 562 in 2014, 405 in 2015, and 449 times in 2016. See, Pakistan violated ceasefire daily in 2015, 2016: MHA", PTI May 7, 2017, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/pakistan-violated-ceasefire-daily-in-2015-2016-mha/articleshow/58558231.cms>. Pakistani official and media figures are: 20, (2009) 67 (2010), 86 (2011), 230 (2012), 315 (2013), 234 (2014), 221 (2015), 382 (2016). See, "India violated ceasefire 221 times in 2015", *The News*, September 11, 2015. <https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/8092-india-violated-ceasefire-221-times-in-2015>. Baqir Sajjad Syed, "Threats of retaliation traded with India", *Dawn*, June 6, 2017. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1337734/threats-of-retaliation-traded-with-india>. "India violated ceasefire along LoC, working boundary 563 times in 2014-15", *Pakistan Today*, September 19, 2016. <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2016/09/19/india-violated-ceasefire-along-loc-working-boundary-563-times-in-2014-15/>
- ³³ Julia Thompson, "The Dynamics of Violence along the Kashmir Divide, 2003-2015", <https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/dynamics-violence-kashmir-divide.pdf>
- ³⁴ A hotline between the Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMOs) was established in 1971 and after the 1990 crisis the decision was made to use it on a weekly basis.

UNDERSTANDING THE CAUSES OF MILITANCY IN PAKISTAN'S FRONTIER

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Abstract

In an attempt to assess the causes of militancy in KP & FATA, an empirical study was conducted in form of interviews of highest state officials and civil society leaders. The group highlighted that the political causes were linked to the inefficacy and outdatedness of the Jirga system of decision making; the absence of local governance in the tribal areas; the inefficacy of the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR); People's lack of trust in the prevalent system and lack of accountability of the elected national (MNAs) and provincial (MPAs) parliamentarians. Economically, the common elements that came out in most group interviews were lack of adequate infrastructure for economic activity; underutilization and mal distribution of resources; population explosion and lack of attention to agricultural development. Social factors deemed responsible for militancy were atomization and the breakup of the traditional order; Intolerance attributable to religion (wahabi factor, sectarianism); intolerance leading to social marginalization of the Pushtuns. Security reasons for militancy were state neglect of these areas; a contention between groups that held security forces in the area as the problem and others maintained that use of military to clear up the extremists is the solution. Finally, almost without exception, all groups pointed out to the 'foreign factor' as the biggest cause of this crisis. The role of several pivotal countries such as USA, China, India, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey was also discussed. USA, India and Saudi Arabia were seen as the spoilers of peace, while China, Turkey and Iran were seen as the promoters of peace.

Keywords: Civil, State, Military, Society, Pakistan, Frontier, Militancy, Pushtun.

Introduction

Thenon-settled tribal Pushtun belt of Pakistan has never been governed directly by the center and not provincial government since the end of the British colonial area in this region. According to the modern understanding of statecraft, this region in recent history can be conceived as a stateless society in the sense that the writ of the Pakistani state wasn't there because of large ungoverned or semi-governed spaces. This was not accidental but under the policy of 'strategic neglect' aimed at safeguarding the northern/western borders of Pakistan using Pushtun tribes.¹ Between 1947 and 1977, the Political Agent

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(PA) appointed by the state administered this area in consortium with local *maliks* and elders through the system of *jirga* (tribal consultation) in matters of dispensation of justice and litigation of crimes. Most Pushtuns agree that there was no out of the ordinary turmoil for three decades until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which ushered forth a new era of global power rivalry in the region between USA and USSR.

Although the inhabitants of this area have always borne weapons (an element of Pushtun culture), but it hadn't heretofore militarized as it did in the aftermath of the Afghan-Soviet war. The Soviet defeat and the US withdrawal led to a civil war in which the Taliban (second generation Mujahideen) surfaced as the new state of Afghanistan whose Islamic worldview was partially borrowed from the Saudi/wahabi doctrine. Between 1989 and 2001 there was enormous weapons proliferation in this region, but by and large the Taliban state established their territorial control, disarmed the opposing groups in their held areas, removed landmines from many parts of their country and reduced poppy production to zero. Since 2001 however, the United States occupied Afghanistan and re-militarization of the region took place once again. This has produced a fresh wave of extremism for the adjacent Pushtun regions of Pakistan.

The extremist elements destroyed the traditional structure of governance in these areas, generally known as Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The FATA region and recently also the non-FATA Pushtun regions belonging to the province of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KP) have also seen this wave of a fundamentalist take over at places such as Swat, which the Pakistani Army successfully cleared and re-established its writ. The army has undertaken a similar operation in the sensitive Waziristan area at the behest of US and Western pressure. Pakistani military has quite successfully cleared these areas in addition to defeating the foreign supported insurgency in Karachi.

Political Causes of Crisis in Pakistan's Frontier

My first cluster of questions was to investigate the particular causes of crisis. I began with investigating the political causes in order to know whether the government was effective in meeting the expectations of citizens of FATA and KP. These questions also sought to know how the local government representatives were selected and what constraints were there, particularly on the local level executive, the strength and efficacy of the judicial system and

whether constitutional reforms were needed to address the structural causes of conflict.

The main causal factors identified as the crucial 'common denominators' were: *the inefficacy and outdatedness of the Jirga system of decision making along with its concatenation of the PA and the local malik; the utter absence of local governance in the tribal areas; the inefficacy of the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), FATA's non-mainstream status; People's lack of trust in the prevalent system and lack of accountability of the elected national (MNAs) and provincial (MPAs) parliamentarians.*

Historically, the North-West Frontier Province NWFP² had an unusual political set up from rest of the country. It was divided into mainland NWFP (now KP) the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) and the Frontier Regions (FR). Whereas the KP uses a mix of anglo-saxon law and shariah as the codes of law (like the rest of Pakistan) with more or less the same administrative structure, the other three regions have variable political structures. The common structure of the latter is a Political Agent (PA) who is the administrative liaison between the federal government and the tribal elders or chiefs. The law administered there is called the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), arguably a draconian set of laws suitable for the British but not for post-independence Pakistan. Most litigation and settlement of disputes that took place in the pre-crisis KP used *Pukhtun-wali* (the Pushtun socio-legal code of law and behavior) *rawwayat*, i.e., (customary law) and the Islamic Shariah.

The above arrangement was shaped by the British for the purposes of their colonial state. Pakistan perpetuated this set up for almost three decades until the beginning of its dissolution upon the Soviet invasion. Most respondents argued that this system has now outlived its validity and is only there in name. They argue that while this system worked well for the last century, the pillars on which it was based have now caved in. It has been reduced to a subverted form of the original set up and won't deliver anymore to the pushtun public. First pillar was the *malik* or the tribal chief. Respondents stated that the *malik* has either been killed by the *talib* or he has simply absconded. The other pillar was the PA who is too afraid, politically impotent and ashamed to come out of his office and perform his function in isolation of a consensually elected *malik*. Thus the *jirga* (consultative apparatus for dispute-solving/planning) has been subverted or at

places imploded. What we see is an earliest transition of the Pushtun society from being a community towards a mass society. This transition is a very thorny process that requires the presence of the state or at least one 'legitimate' group that has a monopoly on the use of force. In the absence of such a group (state or freedom fighters), the conditions can lead to a civil war which can potentially inflame the region.

Most respondents agreed that there is a need to mainstream the entire KP. The four-tiered administrative set up is discriminating and a systemic factor in promoting this crisis. They argued for a uniform rule of law in the entire country. Without any exception, all groups asked for the abolition of FCR and bringing back the FATA into the national life of Pakistan. Most respondents argued that the PA behaves like a king and he is synonymous of a mixture of an American Police sheriff and the bandit in the Wild West! Most groups upheld that the PA is in cahoots with the governor and the tribal chief, and that he was corrupt, giver and receiver of bribes, and embezzler of funds. The security forces in contrast argued the opposite. They said that the system is inefficient but it is working for now. However, they also believed that eventually FCR should be abolished and mainstreaming of FATA with the rest of provincial and national life is imperative.

The security forces respondents believed that the corruption was at the sub-PA level, between the PA and the *maliks*. PA was not extorting money from the tribal area to the governor's office, he was taking money from the governor's office and giving it to tribal chiefs. In either case, the mainstreaming of FATA was deemed necessary by all groups without any exception. The Police force respondents stated that the politicians cannot do much in this area because they have their hands tied. People don't trust the system (as there is no MNA/MPA contact with their constituencies). This condition necessitates urgent reforms, but only reforms and plans short of deployment of funds on ground will not accomplish anything. The lack of absence of local governance in the tribal areas was attributed to the mentality and attitude of elected and state appointed official towards the people. The people are of the view that the government has the attitude of control through subjugation, rather than serving its people.

Economic Causes of Crisis in Pakistan's Frontier

The second set of questions dealt with understanding whether the economic causes were a factor in perpetuating the crisis. It was asked whether

rising income disparity between the rich and poor, between the local and national levels, and redistribution of resources were factors in exacerbating the crisis. The issue of parallel illegal economies and demographic explosion were also discussed.

Other than the most obvious factor of active insurgency and war, the common elements that came out in most group interviews were *lack of adequate infrastructure for economic activity; underutilization and mal distribution of resources; population explosion and lack of attention to agricultural development.*

Respondents bemoaned the lack of basic services that citizens of any country expect. FATA and KP are undoubtedly economically underdeveloped, but so are many other parts of Pakistan. However, the agriculture sector was pointed out to be the most important one to build on. But modern agriculture requires infrastructure of road, railroads, canals and electricity. None of these are there in FATA but they have been there in many other parts of KP. Like most states in the international arena, agricultural sector, if left alone without subsidies will burden the farmer to an extent that he will gradually begin to move to subsistence than maximization of output because of the law of diminishing returns. Subsidies to farmers, which unfortunately have been taken away subsequent to macroeconomic 'reforms' by international institutions therefore, are absolutely essential for developing this most crucial sector of economy because food security constitutes the first step towards self-reliance. Due to the lack of attention in this sector, people in the rice growing area have resorted to growing *Cannabis Sativa* (from which the narcotic *hashish* is made).

Now some people have privately installed tube wells and other methods of modern irrigation which has turned Waziristan into a green place, which suggests that if the state were to take active interest in supporting this crucial sector, it will most likely be a huge success. Intra-regional self-sufficiency in this sector is crucial for food security in the region. There was also a feeling on the behalf of some respondents that many in the Pushtun society want to be content with daily subsistence and with non-modern professions. I don't know to what extent this is true because it doesn't seem so in the urban areas. But it could be the mindset of people in the FATA region. Even if this is so, it makes the agricultural sector even more crucial because this sector could help them catapult into the agro-industry and its exports which could turn around fortunes for many. Currently, most areas are dependent on rain irrigation, which is good

against soil exhaustion but does not fulfill the consumption level of a modern mass society. At any rate, sustainable agriculture that has minimal reliance on the use of fossil fuels is a good eco-sustainable model for the whole country and certainly suitable for this region of Pakistan given its culture and demography.

The problem of wealth accumulation is a universal problem linked with modern capitalist economy and world system and FATA and KP are not immune from it either. Some respondents argued that whereas the whole of the country was facing economic challenges (as well as the global economy itself), one could narrow down the concentration of wealth in districts such as Swat in the hands of a few individuals. Similarly, the universal macroeconomic debacle of mal distribution of resources was also pointed out. However, under-utilization of resources was special to this area of Pakistan alone.

Poverty and demographic explosion were also highlighted as causes, however, it is my contention (as well as that of some respondents that were outliers numerically) that these are more of effects of economic backwardness than causes. If poverty was the sole cause then South Punjab and parts of Sindh and Baluchistan would also experience similar crises. If population explosion was a causal factor across board, then China would also experience a similar phenomenon. Rather, poverty and population explosion should be seen as effects that reinforce the structural factors brought about by forces that have shaped the current culture. Militancy does not originate from poverty; however, poverty makes the land fertile for militancy. Poor are especially vulnerable to being janissaries and mercenaries. The militants' recruitment offers money to buy the youngsters who are lured by excitement, adventure, promise of identity assertion and above all financial security.

Social Causes of Crisis in Pakistan's Frontier

In this section, I asked if there was evidence of systematic marginalization of any ethnic groups, and whether the traditional kinship/community structures could serve to ameliorate the crisis. Of particular heuristic interest was to understand the role of religion in relation to this crisis; its use by militants or by the state and understanding its role in education and propaganda.

Most causes identified in this section were: *Atomization and the breakup of the traditional order; Intolerance attributable to religion (wahabi factor,*

sectarianism); Intolerance because of talibanization leading to social marginalization of the Pushtuns.

Many respondents were of the view that there was re-configuration of Pushtun society in the process. Pushtun society has been one of the latecomers to modernity because of being isolated due to their geography and their unique political arrangement with the state of Pakistan. With the cities modernizing earlier than the hinterland, the upper classes of Pushtun society moved to the cities initially while retaining contact with their rural areas (as it is still there in many parts of KP), but gradually many lost a functional contact with their areas due to land changing hands from the traditional elite to the new middle classes as well as the new moneyed class. The latter includes the *gujjar* minority as well as the lower trading classes, both of whom are looked down upon in the traditional Pushtun society.

The new classes do not have the 'credentials of nobility' like the old class. The old rural elite has transformed into the new secular, ostensibly liberal urban elite, distanced from the people and quite westernized. Some respondents criticized Westernization of values through media as a cause, reaction to which is a swing towards religion. It is observable that the upper classes' values are being influenced by Hollywood, while the lower classes are being influenced by Bollywood. The respondents from media were especially of the view that the Pushtun society by large had a reactionary culture and due to elements alien to their traditional culture, there was a backlash which was not due to religion but it was legitimized by religion. It is my contention as well that it is not Taliban that has produced extremism; rather it is extremism that has produced the Taliban. The popularity of al-Huda and other religious groups in the Punjabi civil society is a factor that may be at play in the Pushtun areas as well, or for that matter the general resurgence of religion since the 1990s which so many experts have sought to explain. Part of the Pushtunistan crisis is due to the strategic use of religion by outside powers such as the USA and Saudi Arabia, but partly it could be due to the dissolution of traditional structures and a general loss of meaning in life which especially the Europeans have painfully experienced as a consequence of modernization.³

Most respondents in this group were of secular orientation which should not be assumed as a 'given' in Pakistan. Many respondents tend to argue that intolerance is because of religion. The extremists are intolerant because they

are religious entities imbibing the Wahabi doctrine of Islam. Whereas it is true that Wahabi/salafi understanding of Islam is angry, fundamentalist to quite an extent while also being anti-intellectual and anti-aesthetic. It may be important to bear in mind that it is not religion that has produced extremism, but it is extremism born out of suffering and injustice which has led to fundamentalist Islam, just as it has led to Hindu fascism, Political Zionism and the Christian Right.

As mentioned earlier, if it had been because of Islam, all of the Muslim world today would be extremist, which is not the case. It is also our contention that snatching religion or tempering with orthodoxy in the name of reform is a Pandora's box to be kept away from. The underlying causes are all political and we should jettison the possibility of a moral ban on religion. Most groups were quite right in pointing out that if you allow the extremist elements to participate in our national life, it will de-marginalize them and the specter of fundamentalism will gradually be ameliorated by the softer and gentler elements in religion. The predominant element in the responses to this set of questions was the confluence of religion, state's (mis)use of religion and its inability to deliver public goods as the main cause of the present crisis. If Islam was a factor to which they would reduce their analysis to, then Malaysia, Morocco and Turkey should also be experiencing similar conflicts in their regions.

Most respondents pointed out to the Zia regime as the origin and evolution of this phenomenon. Some mentioned at other instances that this development came at the behest of Pakistan's collusion with the United States during the cold war period in an effort to fight the communist onslaught in Afghanistan (suggesting by default that the causes may be political and not religious). This information is not new. It is common knowledge. Even the American Secretary of State has publicly acknowledged that the United States promoted Jihad to the Afghan Mujahideen to fight communism. Most respondents kept in tune with the most commonly accepted story of the origin of evolution and extremism to the Zia era. Support of Jihadism through madrassahs was the commonly accepted 'truth' of the modern liberal Pakistani.

I would like to contend that the origins of this phenomenon lie in the Bhutto period and not Zia period, in which massive middle class emigration happened from the Middle Eastern gulf countries. It was during Bhutto regime that the Ahmadis were declared *kafirs* (infidels) and not during Zia's regime. It

was during Bhutto period that earlier Shia-Sunni sectarian clashes began to take place. Whereas Zia's period saw the manifestation of this phenomenon, it was in the brew during the earlier regime.

International Causes of Crisis in Pakistan's Frontier

In this cluster, it was asked if the past experience in Afghanistan has contributed to the most current crisis and how will the new US strategy in Afghanistan impact Pakistan. We also sought to know if this conflict had any linkages with the conflict with Kashmir. Further, a list of regional and global nations were provided and asked which ones play a supportive role in crisis resolution in Pakistan. Also discussed were global/regional incentives that may sustain this crisis and whether Pakistan should accept foreign aid at the cost of its national sovereignty. Almost without exception, all groups pointed out to the *'foreign factor' as the biggest cause of this crisis; along with it the role of several pivotal countries such as USA, China, India, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey was also discussed. USA, India and Saudi Arabia were seen as the spoilers of peace, while China, Turkey and Iran were seen as the promoters of peace.*

There was almost no disagreement in all the groups that it is due to the foreign involvement because of which the entire region has been in turmoil. From the Soviet invasion to the NATO invasion of Afghanistan, things have progressively and steadily deteriorated. Even though the American presence was seen as the essential cause, there were mixed feelings in some groups whether the US should leave the region abruptly for the fear of a civil war in Afghanistan and its spill over affects in rest of South Asia. US's confrontational relations with Iran were also criticized. American support for the Saudis was also criticized.

Turkey and Iran were seen as the promoters of peace with minor reservations against Iran's efforts to circumvent the Wahabi influence from the Saudis that was exacerbating the Shia-Sunni sectarian crisis. China was most trusted by all groups and seen as an all-weather friend of Pakistan. Saudi Arabia was playing a dubious role. It was supporting militancy through the Taliban by giving them money and ideology. The respondents argued that it enjoyed American immunity as the Americans not only protected the Saudis in this factor; they were also talking to the Taliban through the Saudis. While supporting the agents of terrorism in the region, they were also supporting the Pakistani state and its security forces by financial bailouts. The security forces group also maintained that Saudi Arabia had realized that this policy had hit the

law of diminishing returns and may no longer benefit the Saudis. As for India, most groups were of the view that India was culpable of fueling the unrest in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Nearly all groups corroborated the fact that presence of the foreign global & regional actors has been there since the very beginning of Pakistan. In this light, if the Pakistanis see the Indians as adversaries with whom they have fought three wars, the Pakistani suspicions of India are justified. Lastly, peripheral role was also perceived to be played by Russia. Russia would like to see America bleed in Afghanistan and its subsequent withdrawal from the region which would reduce its status as a superpower incapable of enforcing its will on smaller nations. Russia hopes to see an end to the two decades of unipolarity and the rise of multipolarity in which Russia and China emerge as powerful actors.

Conclusion

The overall feeling in entire belt was that the older system of *jirgas*, *maliks* and Political Agents is now outdated. Kinships are still important, but we may not be able to resuscitate the old system at this point, and the only way that seems forward is the abolition of the FCR and integration of FATA into KP. A referendum should take place that re-integrates FATA into KP thereby redefining the administrative boundaries of this province. Economically, the area requires new strategy for development that would circumvent the problem of recruitment by the militants. However, it is noteworthy to state that albeit on all indicators of Pakistani national economy, the FRs, FATA and PATA are behind the rest of the country, but a Pushtun have relatively better standard of living than many other poor groups in Pakistan. Even inside Baluchistan, a Pushtun has better lifestyle than the native *Balochi*. Social causes of militancy are linked to the misuse of religion. The modern neo-Wahabi Islam is responsible for narrow outlook leading to sectarianism. However, it is still possible to mitigate fundamentalism through the still prevalent traditional understanding of Islam. Lastly, and most importantly, the United States, India and NATO are spoilers of peace, who also want to subvert the CPEC and OBOR. On the other hand, Iran, Pakistan, China, Turkey (and increasingly also Russia) want to see peace in Afghanistan for Eurasian connectivity and viability of CPEC and OBOR.

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- ¹ Although the Pakistani state gave free electricity to much of this area as a carrot to stay in the federation, it was due a confluence of factors that this area was never integrated into the mainstream. Main factor on the part of the Pakistani state was that it continued to govern with complacency and bureaucratic inertia inherited from the British period. Moreover, the 'strategic neglect' was that bringing development (such as road and railroad) could facilitate the citizens of this area, but it could also facilitate the invaders. For the same reason, military kept the Pakistan controlled Kashmir region inaccessible for potential Indian aggression. As the country gradually became addicted to foreign aid, many of its 'mainstream' areas also never developed so benefit of doubt can be given to the state for not developing them.
 - ² KP is an unsuitable acronym for the Pushtun province which according to most Pushtuns should be called Pukhtunkhwa, and quite rightfully so. Just the name of this province symbolizes in the Pushtun mind a divorce between their geographical and ethnic identities. While the Punjabi has Punjab, Sindhis have Sindh, Baluchis have Baluchistan, the Pushtun does not have their Pushtunistan. Although this does not alter ground realities of the Pushtun, but it has led to psychological marginalization of Pushtun identity.
 - ³ Dissolution of family, increasing disenchantment from life and anomie are elements sociologists agree are the byproducts of modern urban existence.

INDIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (BMD) SHIELD AND SPACE WEAPON AMBITIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

*Ahmed Saeed Minhas & Dr. Farhat Konain Shujahi**

Abstract

South Asian strategic environment pivots around threat perception and security dilemma vis-à-vis India and Pakistan. It encompasses all elements of strategic environment theory i.e. Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity and Ambiguity (VUCA). The rapid technological transformation and subsequent doctrinal shifts reflect the causal effects. However, the strategic stability largely depends upon the robustness of deterrence stability which is being eroded in purview of armed forces' modernization in the South Asian region. India has been given discriminated memberships of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) –and Australia Group (AG) three out of the four export control cartels, which would enable India to put its BMD program and space weapons ambition on a fast track, thus eroding strategic stability and deterrence equation in the region. In addition, India is being projected as counter weight to rising China at the cost of peace and stability. The article puts in perspective elements of strategic environment with regard to South Asia and epitomizes the causal effects of the Indian operationalization of BMD shield and space weapons which could initiate a new wave of arms race thus compromising South Asian strategic stability.

Keywords: Strategic Environment, Revolution in Military Affairs, Space Weapons, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), Export Control Cartels.

Introduction

The transitional nature of international power structure results in the emergence of new power centers, blocs and states. These state actors pursue revisionist policies to bring the balance of power at the regional level in their favor to become a new power center. The international hierarchy of states is determined by Military and Economic power status. Therefore, great power aspiration is coalesced with modernizing military capabilities. Theoretically, structural realists believe that anarchical international system instigate states to achieve absolute power. The rationale for states to acquire unlimited power is

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embedded in their intensions to seek great power status in international system.¹ South Asia is no different.

The paper puts in perspective elements of strategic environment theory on South Asia where security driven competition between India and Pakistan is in full swing. Subsequently the paper enlists regional and global implications of India's aspiration of acquiring military advanced technologies like Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System and outer space weapons through its memberships of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) respectively. In the end a doable and much needed way forward is suggested to address the threats posed by the BMD shield and space weapons to the South Asian strategic stability and environment.

Strategic Environment - A Generic Perspective

Strategic Environment is best defined by Yarger as;

A world order where the threats are both diffuse and uncertain, where conflict is inherent yet unpredictable, and where our capability to defend and promote our national interests may be restricted by materiel and personnel resource constraints. In short, an environment marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA).²

Strategic environment comprises of both internal and external relations, existing threats, risks, and opportunities, and gives a direction to the international relations of a state. It is a dynamic system which evolves with the macro and micro levels of circumstances. It can also be termed as a force, which operates in a complex international political system and remains committed to maintain its equilibrium. Strategy is ways and means to achieve policy, but the environment is crafted in purview of desirable and undesirable effects. Succinctly, an environment is characterized by VUCA which is dynamic in nature and oscillates between stability and instability.

Strategic Environment - South Asia

India's strategic thinkers derive inspiration from ancient strategist Chanakya Kautilya who in his book Arthaashastra laid down the principles of diplomacy and war. Indian strategic thinking reflects Chanakya's six fold policy which directly impact upon South Asia's strategic environment. The six fundamental principles are Policy of Peace, Strategy of War, Policy of Neutrality,

Strategy of Marching, System of Alliance, and Double Policy.³ These principles are evident in India's foreign and defense policies.

Nehru laid down the foundation of Indian foreign policy and advocated the principles of non-violence and peace. However, this policy was transformed in 1962 after Sino-India war, where India incorporated the principles of real politik. Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971 are the manifestations of Kautilya's waging wars policy i.e. wage war when you are superior in capabilities vis-à-vis enemy. India's out of proportion military spending⁴ and continued military modernization besides evolving war fighting doctrines for instance, Cold Start and Pro-active doctrines are indicative of its offensive posture.⁵

South Asia is peculiar in its outlook as it comprises of proximate nuclear weapons states i.e. China, India and Pakistan whose relationships are shaped by mutual deterrence. The strategic triangle between the three define strategic environment of South Asia.⁶

South Asia nuclear competition became a reality in the aftermath of nuclearization. The deteriorated relations between India and Pakistan determine the future of millions of people of the subcontinent.⁷ The political and security dynamics is continuously evolving in bilateral relations of India and Pakistan.⁸ The historical relationship between the two remained in doldrums since their inception in 1947 and they have been at loggerheads with each other. Technological advancements and advent of nuclear weapons in the region have introduced a new dimension to the conflict riddled bilateral relationship i.e. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) scenario.⁹

Nuclearization of South Asia has induced caution in both Indo-Pak relations and policies towards each other.¹⁰ The volatility and chances of inadvertent escalation demand to keep crises stability mechanism intact.¹¹ India and Pakistan are in the process of assimilating the strategic implications of the nuclearization of South Asia¹² and are aligning their doctrines with evolving RMA. There could still be miscalculations, of course, but both sides have demonstrated awareness of the risks posed by escalation and took compromises to avoid such risks.¹³ Thus, the parity between India and Pakistan nuclear equation is imperative for South Asian peace and stability.

Elements of Strategic Environment Theory and South Asia Volatility

VUCA thinking maintains that the strategic environment is subjected to swift and volatile change and reaction, often characterized by violence. In South Asia, the strategic environment remains hostage to factor of volatility. The nature of relationship between India and Pakistan is characterized by mistrust and hostility.¹⁴ Their past experiences are bitter as they have fought wars and experienced low intensity conflicts. The escalation ladder is less time taking and there is always an element of inadvertent escalation.¹⁵ The composite dialogue process between the two states is stalemated. The only working strategic communication link is between National Security Advisors (NSAs) of the two states besides a few tactical level communication links such as occasional talks held between Pakistan Rangers and Indian Border Security Force (BSF).¹⁶ There is yet another hot-line which is between the two foreign secretaries;¹⁷ however, it generally remains dormant. Preference of NSA hotline over foreign secretaries' one, amply illustrates primarily security based bilateral relations between the two nuclear armed neighbors and that, there is very less space for the diplomatic channels to take the roots in building grounds for the better bilateral relations.

Uncertainty

Uncertainty also embodies the South Asian strategic environment, which is intrinsically challenging and unhinged. Technological transformation, RMA and doctrinal shifts South Asia is undergoing in the region. It's but natural that enhancement of security by one state in-turn reduces the security of others in vicinity.¹⁸ The action-reaction syndrome is common feature of South Asian stability and strategic environment. Each strategic move either in terms of new weapon system's introduction in the region is bound to receive counter measures that adds to the volatility and uncertainty to the South Asian strategic environment.

India is excessively building its military muscles while on the parallel track champion peace and Gandhi's non-aggressive narrative. India tries to hedge behind the Gandhi's saying, "Non-violence is the first article of my faith. It is also the last article of my creed".¹⁹ India, for instance, professes 'No First Use (NFU)' nuclear posture²⁰ which goes well with the Indian 'Smiling Budha' approach followed in its 1974 testing of nuclear device.

Complexity

The South Asian strategic environment is extremely complex as well. Sometimes the environment is so complicated and entangled that complete understanding and permanent solutions are improbable to be prioritized.

Overall, contemporary political system is identified by its anarchic nature; in which all sovereign states remain conscious of their survival; however, ironically, once survival is assured, states do not hesitate to opt for hegemony. It could only be achieved if maximization of hard power is pursued relentlessly. In South Asian perspective, complexity of the region stems from Indian quest for the great power status. India after attaining major regional power status is also likely to exercise hegemony thereby dictating and imposing its political will on its neighbors. As an Indian military analyst notes,

*'India has achieved a near super power status... to consolidate this mantle of responsibility, and also to safeguard our political and economic aspirations within the region, we need a viable military capability, which besides being a deterrent force, could be used in a 'first strike' scenario if the need arises.'*²¹

Recently, in a presentation at Stimson Centre Washington, Gurmeet Kanwal acknowledged Indian desire of getting major power status. He stated:

*"India is all set to join world's major powers' club through attaining capacity to undertake 'out-of-area' operations."*²²

The optimism of becoming a major or super power sounds good but it has a cost to pay as all revisionist approaches are bound to be resisted. Evidently, India is exponentially building its military muscles not only in numbers but in quality as well. Resultantly, Pakistan feels insecure and tries to balance the stability equation by matching the perceived threat by appropriate and corresponding counter measures.

In addition, the history of South Asian region has remained thunderous. Super powers divergent interests in the region have added to the complexity of the region besides making it unpredictable.²³

Ambiguity

The South Asian strategic environment is also characterized by ambiguity. The environment can be interpreted from multiple perspectives with

various conclusions that may suggest a variety of equally attractive solutions, some of which will prove to be good and others bad.

South Asia presents entirely different picture than Cold War. The détente is missing. There is no arms control bilateral mechanism exists between India and Pakistan. The learning nuclear curve is slow. In a complex system, the numerous independent elements continuously interact and spontaneously self-organize and adapt for survival in increasingly more elaborate and sophisticated structures over time. Cause and effect are not proportional to each other and often cannot be related.

Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and South Asian Strategic Environment

The anarchic international system warrants sovereign acts for survival which include invention of new weapon systems through RMA. The South Asian strategic environment is very much affected by the military modernization. Academically, there are mainly four transformations which encompass RMA process i.e. induction of new weapon systems, formulation of corresponding doctrines for effective employment of newly invented or inducted weapon systems, increasing the capacities of armed forces in terms of quality and quantity and lastly, the impact on society.²⁴ In nutshell, RMA is technology driven.

The contemporary advanced technological era has further enshrined the importance of RMA which is being considered to be an important tool for meeting the strategic objectives.²⁵ South Asia region is also affected by the technological transformations where new weapons are being introduced and researched.

India tops the list of arms importers and has been the largest importer of the weapon systems from 2012-2016.²⁶ Indian acquisitioning of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) shield through foreign defense cooperation ventures as well as indigenous production could severely impact upon strategic stability of the region as the RMA always leads to new conceptual approach to war.²⁷

Indian Discriminatory Memberships of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and Australia Group (AG)

Indo-US civil nuclear deal of 2005 changed the strategic scenario of South Asia. It did not only offer India with access to civil nuclear technology at par with other Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) members but also included provisioning of access to technology related to BMD shield. In fact, BMD cooperation has been one of the main elements of the Indo-US nuclear deal.²⁸ The discriminated Indo-US nuclear deal was followed by the US commitment and efforts to get India full membership of the four technology control cartels:²⁹

- NSG- controls nuclear technology proliferation
- Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) - exercises control over missile related technologies
- Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) - controls transfers of dual use technologies besides conventional arms those could contribute to destabilize a region
- Australia Group (AG) - deals with export controls over Chemical and Biological weapons

It may be recalled that it was Indian Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) of 1974 which resulted into creation of the NSG.³⁰ Despite the Indian track record of diverting civil nuclear technology towards making Budha to Smile thereby opening the South Asian region towards overt nuclearization, the US support for Indian membership of the NSG and other export control regimes is discriminatory and destabilizing for the region especially in the context of Indo-Pak traditional security based competition.

Due to the US perusal and support, India has until now won the memberships of three export control cartels i.e. MTCR in June 2016,³¹ WA in December 2017³² and Australia Group (AG) in January 2018 as stepping stones towards full membership of the most desired NSG membership.³³

Indian Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) Membership and its Space Weapons Ambition

As an indicator of Indian double policy, it has been accusing US for being part of a triangular nexus comprising of US, China and Pakistan that posed

threat to Indian interests in South Asia. It had also been making political pressures on US by rhetoric such as,

*“India and the US [bilateral relations would remain] ...at strategic cross roads and US policy regarding dual-use will be the real sign of US acceptance of the China factor in Indian strategic behavior”.*³⁴

The same has now actualized and India has been given access to the dual use technologies through WA membership. Indian membership of WA implies that India would be at free will to divert dual use technologies to exponentially advance its military modernization programs. For instance, WA membership would enable India to advance its space program which if desired so, could be diverted towards building space weapons. Space weapons are perceived to be an important tool to exercise control over outer space - the strategic center of gravity for extending power and strategic reach.³⁵ The evolving numbers of space faring and aspiring nations have increased the corresponding interests which virtually swelled the probability of space based conflicts.³⁶

Indian MTCR Membership and its BMD Program

Indian scientists' community has already claimed to have developed its indigenous multi-layered consisting of Advanced Air Defense (AAD) and Prithvi Air Defense (PAD) systems, capable of engaging missiles in exo and endo atmospheric domains with a joint kill possibility of 99.8%.³⁷ The indigenously built BMD shield capability makes it member of elite BMD capable club inter-alia the US, Russia, Israel and China.³⁸ In addition to the above narrated traditional BMD shield capability, India is also carrying out an extensive research and development for acquiring laser based BMD shield which would be capable of engaging targets at the speed of sound.³⁹

BMD is directly linked to the viability of strategic stability and there has been a debate with regard to deterrence and defense differentiation. As Wyn Q. Bowen claims that Europeans during the Cold War and thereafter has been supportive of MAD based deterrence instead of building missile shield. On the flip side, the US has been supportive of adding BMD shield to deterrence quality for filling credibility gap especially in the South Asian strategic environment.⁴⁰ With regard to India, it is also seen in favor of US way of adding credibility to deterrence value by introducing BMD shield to its arsenal i.e. adding flavor of

defense with deterrence. MTCR blessed access to high end technologies to India would augment subject Indian approach.

Political and Diplomatic Implications of MTCR and WA Memberships on South Asian Strategic Stability and Environment

Indian evolving BMD shield, although a non-starter has a threat value for the Pakistani deterrence equation and merited a response as per the action-reaction syndrome attached to the South Asian strategic environment. Pakistan, thus tested its MIRV based *Ababeel* ballistic missile as a counter measure to Indian BMD shield program⁴¹ - an initiation of the missile race in South Asia. Missile race would not remain restricted to missile arena only but could spill over to the nuclear fissile material side as well.

BMD shield could put Pakistan command and control apparatus into a kind of nervousness and also add to the denseness of the fog and uncertainty related to war. It could bring into play nuclear brinkmanship and lowering of nuclear threshold. Incentive for launching preemptive strikes both in conventional and unconventional terms could increase manifold for India and on the parallel, same rate would be there for Pakistani military planners to relegate their claimed restrained approach in favor of preventive strike – a nuclear preventive strike. Whether preventive or preemptive strikes, both kinds are least desired in a heavily populated region.

Way Forward

Out of proportion strengthening of India as part of US recently declared strategy of 'Afghanistan and South Asia' is detrimental to South Asian strategic environment and stability. The US is all set to empower India vis-à-vis Pakistan and China while keeping Afghanistan issue in front. The claim can be substantiated by the new US vice President's visit Afghanistan in December 2017.⁴² Though not exhaustive, two of the major stability seeking measures are:-

Bilateral Treaty or Moratorium on Non-Acquisitioning of Space Weapons

India has a full fledged space program and it is in advanced stages of securitizing the outer space. Scientists ex Indian Space and Research

Organization (ISRO) and other military/ political leaders have indicated the Indian will to have space weapons for countering threat against Indian space assets. On the other side, Pakistan's outer space program is in evolving phase and in process of developing own satellites. Indian space weapons ambition could lead to another destabilizing act and pose a direct threat to Pakistan's command and control mechanism. Foregoing, a bilateral moratorium or treaty is the need of time so as to address the evolving security threat right in its initial stages.

Bilateral Declaration on Non-Deployment of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABMs)

Pakistan and India maintain divergent positions on impact of ABMs on deterrence stability in the region. Pakistan perceives development and deployment of ABM counter-productive to strategic stability and environment in South Asia, while on the other hand India considers it as a defensive measure against pre-emptive missile threat from Pakistan and China. Rationale behind proposing the CBM is based on the spirit of an earlier Pakistani proposal of declaring South Asia as an 'ABM Free Zone'.

Conclusion

Pakistan's co-existence with India has never been a peaceful endeavor. In a region which is marred by history of conflicts and mistrust, Pakistan's nuclear deterrent has brought comparative peace in the region. Various crises thereafter for instance, Kargil, Mumbai Crises and 2001-02 military standoff are testament to the fact that it was nuclear deterrence stability which kept the two sides away from initiating an all-out war. Any revisionism in terms of armed forces modernization thereby disturbing the deterrence stability would be counterproductive. Pakistan cannot remain oblivious of its security concerns which pose a direct threat to its existence.

NOTES

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THE NEW AMERICAN MILITARISM AND ITS IMPACT ON WORLD POLITICS

Dr. Mansur Umar Khan*

Abstract

The author explores the relationship between war and peace via US foreign policy. It asserts that in a globalized world, war is measured by its profitability while peace is actually seen as an obstacle to profitability, and is thus consequently shunned. The article ends with the prediction that high levels of military spending will lead to the downfall of any empire or superpower. As the Soviet Union showed increased militarism ends, virtually inevitably, in demise. The same prediction is made for the USA, but since the USA's economy is run by far more efficient means (capitalism) and penetrated the global market, in contrast to the Soviet Union, the USA's demise will probably come in 2025 or 2030.

Keywords: American Militarism, World Politics, Diplomacy, Security, Peace.

Introduction

This article explores the relationship between war and peace via US foreign policy. It asserts that in a globalized world, war is measured by its profitability while peace is actually seen as an obstacle to profitability, and is thus consequently shunned.

This has huge implications for concepts like *territoriality*, (military) *victory*, *diplomacy*, *security*, *peace*, and the *nature of war* itself. For instance, war has been completely transformed, whereas in the past war was historically about taking another nations territory; territory is no longer the goal of war. Victory itself is no longer the object of fighting, as wars (esp. by the USA) have merely been continued rather than fought to victory.

The reasons for this are almost always financial, as victory would mean the end of war, but that is shunned since it would also mean the end of lucrative profits. See the for example, the *War on Terror*, which top US policy makers have proclaimed as a long war without any end in sight.² *Diplomacy* is likewise another concept that has been turned upside down, whereas historically diplomacy meant using non-military means of resolving conflict and war, nowadays diplomacy has been subverted as it is largely conducted by the

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Pentagon that has a budget 20 times that of the State Department, which has been totally relegated in its historical task of finding diplomatic solution to end conflict. *Peace* has also been turned upside down, meaning that a condition of peace is maintained throughout the world by waging war. Obviously peace was meant to be achieved primarily by peaceful means and not by war. But again, peace is not lucrative, as there is no money in it; therefore, war must replace it.

The article ends with the prediction that high levels of military spending will lead to the downfall of any empire or superpower. As the Soviet Union showed increased militarism ends, virtually inevitably, in demise. The same prediction is made for the USA, but since the USA's economy is run by far more efficient means (capitalism) and penetrated the global market, in contrast to the Soviet Union, the USA's demise will probably come in 2025 or 2030.

The Changing Face of War

Despite the fact, it is because the USA does not look like a militarized country that Americans find it hard to acknowledge that Washington is constantly at war, that it garrisons much of the planet, and that the norm for the US is to be at war somewhere (usually at many places simultaneously) at any moment in time. Furthermore, the means to fight wars have been both quantitatively and qualitatively enhanced, in this sense, more has become the order of the day for the USA.

The USA's citizens should also ask themselves what it means when the most military-obsessed administration in its history, which, annually submits ever more expanded Pentagon budgets to Congress, is succeeded by one headed by a president who ran, at least partially, on an antiwar platform, and who then approved of an even larger Pentagon budget?³

The US military has robot assassins in the skies over its war zones, 24/7, and the "pilots" who control them from thousands of miles away are ready on a moment's notice to launch missiles—"Hellfire" missiles at that—into Pashtun peasant villages in the wild, mountainous borderlands of Pakistan and Afghanistan?

All of this leads to the paradoxical situation that despite tremendous expenditures for all sorts of weapon systems and means to wage war, in order to make the USA safe and secure, the opposite has actually happened. Since "War is now the American way, even if peace is what most Americans experience while their proxies fight in distant lands. Any serious alternative to war, which means

our “security,” is increasingly inconceivable. In Orwellian terms then, war is indeed peace in the United States—and peace is war.”⁴As Engelhardt wrote so eloquently:

When it comes to war (and peace), we live in a world of American Newspeak in which alternatives to a state of war are not only ever more unacceptable, but ever harder to imagine. If war is now our permanent situation, it has also been sundered from a set of words that once accompanied it. It lacks, for instance, “victory.” After all when was the last time the United States actually won a war (unless you include our “victories” over small countries incapable of defending themselves, like the tiny Caribbean island of Grenada in 1983 or powerless Panama in 1989)? The smashing “victory” over Saddam Hussein in the First Gulf War only led to a stop-and-start conflict now almost two decades old that has proved a catastrophe.⁵

Here, we can see the immense changes of war and the way war is nowadays being fought. War is now no longer fought for a (military) victory but rather it is simply sustained, and, therefore; wars become endemic long term conflicts with no real end in sight. Once they die down they can easily flare up again; in that sense, they are like civil wars that may get quiet for a while but may then pick up again where they left off in terms of the fighting. To put this into a historical perspective for the US:

Keep heading backward through the Vietnam and Korean Wars, and the last U.S. military was truly victorious in 1945. But achieving victory no longer seems to matter. War American-style is now conceptually unending, as are preparations for it. When George W. Bush proclaimed a Global War on Terror (aka World War IV), conceived as a “generational struggle” like the cold war, he caught a certain American reality. In a sense, the ongoing war system can’t absorb victory. Any such endpoint might indeed prove to be a kind of defeat.⁶

Even more interesting and perhaps disturbing is the fact that war has no longer anything to do with the taking of territory, or even with direct conquest. Moreover, war is increasingly a state of being, not a process with a beginning, an end, and an actual geography.⁷ In that sense, war is much like the phenomenon of *globalization*. It is hard to find its beginning, and equally impossible to find its end; it is also devoid of territoriality, and its conquest is not direct anymore, it has for all intents and purposes become instead financial.

How the Meanings of Security, Peace, and Diplomacy have Fundamentally Changed

All of this also has a huge impact on the meaning of security: “its traditional meaning has ... moved from a state of being (secure) to an eternal immensely profitable process whose endpoint is unachievable. If we ever decided we were either secure enough, or more willing to live without the unreachable idea of total security, the American way of war and the national security state would lose much of their meaning. In other worlds, in our world, security is insecurity.”⁸

What has happened to the concept and idea of peace, much like security it has been turned upside down. As analyzed by an astute observer:

As for “peace”—war’s companion and theoretical opposite—it, too, has been emptied of meaning and all but discredited. Appropriately enough, diplomacy, the part of government that classically would have been associated with peace, or at least with the pursuit of the goals of war by other means, has been dwarfed by, subordinated to, or even subsumed by the Pentagon. In recent years, the U.S. military with its vast funds, has taken over, or encroached upon, a range of activities that once would have been left to an underfunded State Department, especially humanitarian aid operations, foreign aid, and what’s now called nation building.”⁹

Even diplomacy is no longer what it used to be. It has completely transformed itself into something different, than what it stood for traditionally. Diplomacy has been militarized! For instance, the *State Department’s* embassies are now bunkers and military style headquarters for the prosecution of war policies.

The problem with peace is that there’s no money in it. World driven by *globalization* is always about money! Anything that does not produce enough money will be ultimately left by the wayside, as profitability, shareholder value, and derivatives are the new gods of the post-modern age. This type of turbo or casino capitalism has no use for peace, since peace can’t increase profits or the shareholder value of stocks around the world. Indicative of this are the US policies: as the USA invests nearly a trillion dollars in war and war related activities but invest nothing in peace. Therefore, there is one resounding message to all of this: **War is measured, in a globalized world, by its profitability while peace is actually seen as an obstacle to profitability,**

and is thus consequently shunned. This in a nutshell, summons up US foreign and domestic financial and global policy towards both war and peace. As an observer remarked, almost sarcastically: “The very idea that there might be peaceful alternative to endless war is so discredited that it’s left to utopians, bleeding hearts, and feathered doves.”¹⁰ Peace is then just a rhetorical flourish embedded, like one of our reporters, in wars around the world, who present war more as if they are reporting a live sports event on our TV screens. Even the once seemingly appropriate “peace dividend” that was somewhat seriously discussed when the Soviet Union collapsed, is nowadays nothing but a phrase from not just a different era but seemingly also a different world. It is now totally out of touch with the world we are living in, where suicide bombers may detonate themselves globally anytime and anywhere, where a *War on Terror* is still ongoing without any end in sight.

Even to imagine that the mighty USA would divest itself somehow of its tremendous arsenal of all sorts of deadly high-tech weapons seems to be bordering on the ridiculous. In such a world, politicians of all types can talk endlessly about peace, but it will always amount to an exercise in futility, for the bitter reality is that peace does not sell.

How Globalization has Changed War

Globalization has been defined as the development of an increasingly integrated global economy marked especially by free trade, free flow of capital, and the tapping of cheaper foreign labor markets. If we then look at the conduct of war since the demise of the Soviet Union and thus bipolarity we can see just how much *globalization* has affected and changed the conduct of war.

Wars, as already mentioned, are no longer fought to secure territory. For the longest time in history, wars had one principal goal and that was to conquer territory. For the nation, state or kingdom that takes territory and adds it on to its own territory would become generally more powerful and wealthy. This was true of all wars until the end of the 2nd World War were the Soviets added additional territory on to their empire by subjugating Eastern Europe.

But World War 2 was to be the turning point in this sense. From then on wars were not really fought for increasing a state’s territory. The few exceptions made the rule, which would include Israel’s taking of Arab territories in the 1948 and 1967 wars. Something significant happened after World War 2

and it was that *globalization* came up in the form of US “free trade” policies that were supported throughout the Western world. G.A.T.T., the World Bank, the I.M.F. and later the W.T.O. (the successor to G.A.T.T.) made sure that *globalization* was the new phenomenon that would sweep most of the world. This only increased after the demise of the Soviet Union, when Washington declared, mostly via Francis Fukuyama, that *liberalism*, meaning “free trade” and *democracy* were now the way history would unfold. This type of *globalization* also referred to at time as *Americanization* of the world, or casino and turbo capitalism became the order of the day globally. Thus being a profound change for the conduct of war. War itself was now more than ever a huge business. The Cold War was immensely lucrative for Wall Street as trillions of dollars were invested and made by producing and selling all sorts of weapons, both domestically inside the USA and to its export markets globally. It is therefore no secret that the US economy was for all practical purposes, ever since it joined the 2nd World War in 1941, a war economy. This is explained under the heading: “The US Needs War Every 4 Years To Maintain Economic Growth” “This is not a secret,” explains Kris Roman, director of geopolitical research center Euro-Rus, “The whole [US] economy is built on the military theme: to maintain its economic growth, the United States needs a war every 4 years, otherwise the economic growth slows down.”¹¹ It is also clear that war is seen as good business by the ruling elites in Wall Street and their counterparts in Washington.¹²

Militarization is Now a Way of Life in the USA

Reuters notes that: \$8.5 trillion in taxpayer money doled out by Congress to the *Pentagon* since 1996, the first year it was supposed to be audited, has never been accounted for. That sum exceeds the value of China’s economic output last year.¹³

Yet for the first time public surveys show, at the end of 2013, that American citizens believe that the war in Afghanistan should have never started. The *Washington Post* subsequently revealed: “Fully 66 percent of Americans say the battle, which began with nearly unanimous support, has not been worth fighting”.¹⁴ While concurring in a separate *Associated Press-GfK* poll, “57 percent of Americans said the United States did “the wrong thing” in going to war with Afghanistan, with mixed feelings toward keeping troops in the country past 2014.”¹⁵ Interestingly enough a website reiterates: “The same is true in Iraq. American people don’t want to go to war against Syria, Iran or anywhere else.”¹⁶ The report asserted further:

But D.C. politicians do a lot of fundraising from defense contractors and make a lot of money from inside trading related to military spending.

And war helps distract people from the economic mess that the politicians are largely responsible for (the old distraction trick.)

And so – as the L.A. Times, Mother Jones and Counterpunch report – Washington has just passed a budget which will strip away the so-called “sequester defense cuts”, and gear up for a new series of wars.

As usual, government policy will make the rich richer and everyone else poorer.

It will keep the bloated defense industry fat and happy ... while making everyone else poorer, and gutting the civilian economy.¹⁷

It stands therefore exposed that the voice of the people, “in the home of the free and the land of the brave”, means nothing when it comes to *Wall Street* and *Pentagon* profits. Democracy is thus dethroned when it comes to the supremacy of the military-industrial complex and its *Wall Street* financiers. Corporate America’s rule of the few, which means in essence the plutocracy, over the many, is thus the order of the day. This is brilliantly exposed in Michael Moore’s documentary *Capitalism – A Love Story*, which takes a scrutinizing look at how the USA was once a thriving nation, where the rich, back in the 1940s, paid taxes up to 90% on their incomes.¹⁸

What will the Future Bring? Peace or War

It is asserted and shown from the outset that the main problem with peace in a globalized world economy is that peace does not sell! Meaning that peace will not be profitable to businesses, increase shareholder value, or the value of derivatives on the stock markets of the world. This is always going to be true in a world where *globalization* and *casino capitalism* reign supreme.

To answer our question, whether the future will be more peaceful or a continuation of the “War on Terror”, or whether other forms of war will dominate world politics, we need to look at the only remaining superpower the USA, and its pervasive military-industrial complex. It is this modern institution that will give us the necessary insights into answering our crucial question. If history is a guide in helping us then we must also focus on the demise of the other superpower: the former Soviet Union. While it was not exclusively the arms race, and thus militarization of the S.U., that caused it to collapse at the end of 1991; if we are to find the dominant reason why the collapse of this

superpower occurred. Then, it is clearly to be found in what can be called a type of military imperial overstretch.

A website describes why the downfall of the Soviet Union was virtually inevitable?

.. there were more immediate causes for the collapse. In the middle 1980's about seventy percent of the industrial output of the Soviet Union was going to the military. Oleg Gordievsky, a KGB official who defected to Britain, asserted that at least one third of the total output was going to the military. British intelligence could not believe such a high figure but later Western intelligence sources estimated that it was at least fifty percent. One can only imagine what a severe shortages of industrial goods there were for the rest of the economy.¹⁹

Economic management was another pitfall for the Soviet Union. In a command economy the state or government tries to plan everything via its bureaucracy, whereas in the West the “free market” economy principle was applied, which was by and large based on the universal law of supply and demand. This proved to be far more efficient than the Soviet model, where bottlenecks and shortages both in the agricultural and industrial sectors were common.

The Soviet model was also riddled with corruption and had a huge black market economy that was tolerated by the authorities in order to satisfy public demand. Another crucial deficiency was that the Soviet model gave no incentives to its workers, rather it taught them to do a sham job and practice getting by more than anything else. There was a common saying in both the Soviet Union and the East Bloc countries that criticized the inefficient Soviet economic model: “They pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work”. More than anything else this showed just how flawed the Soviet command economy had become by the 1970s. By the time that Gorbachev was in power (starting in 1985), millions of Soviet workers didn't even bother coming to work anymore, and; alcoholism cost the Soviet economy billions of rubles every year, since workers that did actually come to work were often drunk. This is why Gorbachev started his anti-alcoholism campaign, but it was to no avail as people preferred drinking over almost anything else.²⁰

Yuri N. Maltsev worked as an economist on Mikhail Gorbachev's economic reform team, comparing prices in the S.U. to those in the USA, during the Gorbachev era, he asserts:

(P)rices for basic goods in the Soviet Union were already extremely high. A person had to work 12 times longer there to buy beef than here, 18 to 20 times longer for poultry, seven times longer for butter, three times longer for milk, 16 times longer for a color television, and 180 times longer for a car. With the new price hikes, the required work hours multiplied by two or three times. It is easy to understand why one fifth of the population lived at the poverty line, below which meant serious malnutrition. The government said 85 percent of the new revenues would go back into raising the wages of workers and peasants, but, in fact, most of it went into government coffers to pay the military and run failed state enterprises.²¹

When analyzing why the Soviet Union ultimately collapsed we can see the detrimental effects of military imperial overstretch. One has to ask the question whether the USA can sustain its huge defense expenditures without also undergoing severe strain on its economy. While it is undoubtedly true that the US economy is more efficient than the Soviet one was, there can still be no doubt that negative effects will take its toll on the US economy as well. For example, Alfred McCoy reminds us of the fate of empires in decline:

Despite the aura of omnipotence most empires project, a look at their history should remind us that they are fragile organisms. So delicate is their ecology of power that, when things start to go truly bad, empires regularly unravel with unholy speed: just a year for Portugal, two years for the Soviet Union, eight years for France, 11 years for the Ottomans, 17 years for Great Britain, and, in all likelihood, 22 years for the United States, counting from the crucial year 2003. ...

Available economic, educational, and military data indicate that, when it comes to U.S. global power, negative trends will aggregate rapidly by 2020 and are likely to reach a critical mass no later than 2030. The American Century, proclaimed so triumphantly at the start of World War II, will be tattered and fading by 2025, its eighth decade, and could be history by 2030.²²

Ultimately the question is not whether the United States will lose its unchallenged global power, but just how precipitous and wrenching the decline will be.

Economic Decline: Present Situation

Today, there are 3 main threats that exist to America's dominant position in the global economy: (1) loss of economic clout thanks to a shrinking share of world trade, (2) the decline of American technological innovation, and (3) the end of the *dollar's* privileged status as the global reserve currency.²³

*By 2008, the United States had already fallen to number three in global merchandise exports, with just 11 percent of them compared to 12 percent for China and 16 percent for the European Union. There is no reason to believe that this trend will reverse itself.*²⁴

All these negative trends are encouraging sharp criticism of the *dollar's* role as the world's reserve currency. "Other countries are no longer willing to buy into the idea that the U.S. knows best on economic policy," observed Kenneth S. Rogoff, a former chief economist at the *International Monetary Fund*. In mid-2009, with the world's central banks holding an astronomical \$4 trillion in U.S. Treasury notes, Russian president Dimitri Medvedev insisted that it was time to end "the artificially maintained unipolar system" based on "one formerly strong reserve currency."²⁵

Simultaneously, China's central bank governor suggested that the future might lie with a global reserve currency "disconnected from individual nations" (that is, the U.S. *dollar*). Take these as signposts of a world to come, and of a possible attempt, as economist Michael Hudson has argued, "to hasten the bankruptcy of the U.S. financial-military world order."²⁶

The bottom line of all these statistics is that it will be increasingly difficult for the USA to maintain its leadership role as the unchallenged only remaining superpower. At some point in the not too distant future, perhaps 2025 or 2030 the USA's economy will start to feel the increasing strain of its excessive defense expenditures, just like the Soviet Union did in the late 1980s.

The reason the USA has been able to postpone its rapid decline has been due to the fact that its economy was generally managed far more efficiently than that of the Soviet Union's and because it was integrated with the global capitalist market and flooded it with imported goods, so that its wreckage did not show up directly in shortage of consumer and producer goods.²⁷

But as the famous saying goes: “what goes up must come down”. This is the sheer logic of overspending, in this case on a huge military-industrial complex. Accordingly Lloyd Dumas in his 1986 book, *The Overburdened Economy*, makes a convincing case that the U.S. as well as the S.U. has been economically devastated by the counter-productive effects of military spending.²⁸

This also has consequences for the future role of the USA in world politics. It would indicate that the USA will find it increasingly more difficult to sustain such high rates of military expenditure on the one hand, and keep on fighting a “war on terror” on the other hand. The dilemma will be whether to continue down the road of ruin – just like the Soviets did and to face the predicament that comes with it, or whether the USA will start to withdraw more from world affairs, and thus also have to end the “War on Terror”.

There are unfortunately two scenarios left to contemplate: (1) would be that the leaders of the USA continue to overspend on their gigantic military-industrial complex or the alternative (2) would be that they anticipate the danger of this and start to reduce huge military expenditures and begin withdrawing more from global politics by choosing to terminate the “War on Terror”, and start to confront their huge domestic problems instead of maintaining the role of the world’s policeman. Unfortunately, if history is any guide, then the 2nd alternative option is not likely to be used by US elites; rather they will continue with their downward spiral, which also means that unlike the Soviets they will not accept a diminished role in world politics and will try desperately to remain the only superpower regardless of the consequences. These consequences are likely to give us more proxy wars, in the so-called 3rd world, where basically all the strategic resources (oil, gas, and precious metals) are located. This means that peace is going to be increasingly a rare condition in the world and that proxy wars, mostly by the USA and other Western countries, will continue to plague this planet.

Despite being voted against in the Security Council on December 1:14, 2017, US have not showed any willingness to rescind her decision to shift US embassy to eastern Jerusalem. The UN General Assembly vote against the US decision by 128:8 has even not been an eye apart for the US. USA still persists in choice of belligerence and militarized diplomacy.

NOTES

- ¹ When the author refers to the transformation of war he is strictly speaking of the advanced Western countries and how war has completely changed when they engage in it. This means that for example, in some 3rd world countries war can still be about *territorial* gain, and that military *victory* may still be the primary goal of wars waged by these nations. It may also mean that their concepts of *diplomacy* and *peace* may not have turned upside down.
- ² Shortly after 9/11 Vice President Dick Cheney declared that the War on Terror will last a very long time, it could probably last generations. (A generation is usually seen as a 30 years in duration.) See: James Stern gold, *Cheney's grim vision: decades of war / Vice president says Bush policy aimed at long-term world threat*, SFGATE.com, <http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Cheney-s-grim-vision-decades-of-war-Vice-2812372.php>, accessed: 27th, Jan., 2016.
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REALISING SOUTH ASIAN ECONOMIC UNION IN 21st CENTURY

Raza ul Munem*

Abstract

The article presents a conceptual framework to quantitatively and qualitatively prove that within 21st century, SAARC's enormous economic potential can be liquidated to capitalise on the available opportunities and drivers like; China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and in particular; China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), ultimately forming a South Asian Economic Union (SAEU). The analysis vindicates that other than extremists BJP's ultra-right wing Hindu activists, there exists an overwhelming international and regional political support for BRI and CPEC especially; among the divided Kashmiris, including the sitting Chief Minister, Ex-President Jammu & Kashmir Chambers of Commerce, officials from Indian Ministry of External Affairs, mainland State Ministers, academia, think tanks, renowned journalists, lawyers and other segments of the civil society. The Trump Administration's aggressive policies are fuelling a fiercely competitive international economic and political order. Luckily, China's vision of South Asian economic integration provides a crucial window of opportunity to SAARC, particularly; India-Pakistan to harmonise their antagonistic policies in favour of geo-economics. To secure great power status India, with SAARC, states must support China's BRI and CPEC to further capitalise their growing trade; culminating into a SAEU with China as a member state. The article quantitatively and qualitatively proves that there exists an enormous trade potential to manifest such a conception for which commensurate political support exists in India-Pakistan and, indeed among the remaining SAARC states.

Keywords: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, Belt and Road Initiative, China Pakistan Economic Corridor, South Asian Economic Union.

Introduction

At the outset, let us frame a research question for this article: "growing economic interdependence of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (acronym; SAARC) on China together with China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) can lead to formation of a South Asian Economic Union (SAEU), subject to India's political will". Given the current regional and international environment, realisation of such a union may appear to be difficult. However, during the 17th and 18th centuries, the trade in sub-continent was thriving with free movement of goods, labour and capital.¹ The agricultural growth was just 0.44 percent compared to non-agricultural trade forming 1.69

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percent. Accordingly, the ratio of productive growth between agriculture vs non-agriculture products was 7:38.² Why then in the 21st century South Asian regional trade is the lowest compared to other regions? The answer, most likely, lies in the historical pangs of the subcontinent, as we will see later in this article. Contrary to intra-regional trade in SAARC, the bilateral trade of SAARC with China is actually growing since 2003. In fact, the main protagonist; India's bilateral trade with China has grown from \$2.94 billion in 2003 to about \$100 billion in 2017³. It means the potential to trade and form an economic union in South Asia does exist but SAARC states' in particular; India-Pakistan's perpetual acrimony has created an impasse, ever since the partition of subcontinent. Not only that the impasse can be unleashed but instead, the opportunities and drivers offered by China's One Belt One Road (OBOR) or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and particularly; CPEC can transform SAARC to a SAEU. Thus: "growing economic interdependence of SAARC on China and CPEC – an independent variable; formation of SAEU – the dependent variable; and, India's political will – an intervening variable, will be corroborated using a cogent set of quantitative and qualitative analysis.

Conceptual Framework of SAEU

A conceptual framework to establish a SAEU was provided during the 18th SAARC Summit including its infrastructure, institutional mechanism outlining the broad contours. The report was sponsored by SAARC's Secretariat and prepared by ADB in 2015. This article will present a new perspective to explore SAARC's transformation into a SAEU by capitalising CPEC opportunity with China as a member state. The new perspective will provide solid foundations to transform SAARC into SAEU by exploiting the available opportunities and drivers.

SAARC is suffering from an impasse for over 30 years, even though the region was known as the golden basket for entire Asia. To revive its dynamism of erstwhile pre-partition period, China's OBOR and CPEC projects can act as catalysts. Thus South Asia, once again can become an integrated community, where Spill-over⁴ effect can permeate all sectors of the economy and domestic political life, culminating into formation of a SAEU. Driven mainly by CPEC, the potential for economic interdependence can be manifested through Complex Interdependence (CXI) theory, where trade activities seamlessly Spill-over to political interests thus creating perfect regional environment for acceptance of SAEU by all the SAARC states.

Ever since 2017, fierce economic and political international order has been further accentuated by the US President Trump's aggressive foreign policies. These US policies are radically altering the global value system to cause a visibly worsening behaviour by other world powers. On the basis of financial and job reduction shocks, leading to infringement of sovereign independence, Brexit process in the UK, also sent tremors across the entire Europe in 2016-17. However, China-India bilateral trade has grown to almost \$100 billion in 2017, which compelled both countries to back off from the brewing Doklam, Tibet border stand-off. If India, due to socio-economic compulsions decides to support CPEC and joins the prospective SAEU then strategies like; Cooperative Economic Interdependence (CEI) internally (within SAEU), and Cooperative Hegemonic Interdependence (CHI)⁵ externally (for extra-regional states), can be employed both by China and India. It means a common regional tariff, while a synchronised trade policy for extra-regional states.

SAARC's Impasse - Myths and Realities of Regional Integration

The above conception about SAEU may be challenging for scholars due to SAARC's failure to integrate as a cohesive regional economic bloc like EU or ASEAN for over 30 years. However, literature review revealed that before partition of the subcontinent, South Asia was thriving in regional and extra-regional trade, indicating a high level of interdependence whereas the EU was not even conceptualised. It indicates that SAARC is not ineffective because leaders of subcontinent are in different. It has been unproductive because the same leaders have not changed their approaches to resolve regional issues. Mr Asad Ali Khan⁶ negated the prevailing myths about SAARC's impasse. According to him, South Asian inhabitants produced agricultural as well as manufactured goods and traded raw material with neighbouring regions. South Asia then, was an economically vibrant part, which had the most extensive network of road-rail and shipping infrastructure. Gowher Rizvi⁷ traced the seeds of India-Pakistan discord to the unimaginative division of an erstwhile synergized political and economic hubs of Punjab and Bengal, triggering centrifugal tendencies resulting in Kashmir, Mizoram, Nagaland and Khalistan; each clamouring for independence. Thus, the rivalry between India-Pakistan was built into the political structures of the two countries. Nonetheless, the most glaring conclusion is that South Asian region had all the ingredients to be integrated into a productive economic bloc like the EU or ASEAN. Gowher Rizvi also claims

that even the regions outside subcontinent were indirectly integrated with subcontinent right up to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Interplay of Strategic Goals of the Key Regional States

The challenges of SAARC not only stems from the regions' chequered history but these are also the creation of individual nations' incoherent strategic goals and objectives. For example, Indian national objective is to become a major world power for which it is forging international alliances with the West particularly; USA. India is also pursuing to become a permanent member of UNSC and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). However, India's stride towards gaining a major world power status will be hard to materialise without mutually inclusive and economically integrated SAARC with China on board. Unless, India is physically connected to the silk route under OBOR (BRI) to which CPEC is a flagship project, it will not be able to meet its growing infrastructure, energy and socio-economic needs. On the contrary, India's policies are geared to gain US support in return for a proxy role to contain China and isolate Pakistan. Thus Mr Modi's strategy is an antithesis to the basic tenants of inclusive regional integration for a sustained economic growth, therefore, is most likely to fail.

Pakistan's primary national goal is to maintain integrity and independence in political, security and economic decision making in line with its own national interest.⁸ This comes into direct clash with India since amongst all the SAARC nations, Pakistan always challenges Indian dominance within and outside the sphere of SAARC. Pakistan's nuclear capability has created the required space to secure its national integrity and defence. Together with China, it has been able to achieve a crucial economic cooperation in the form of FDIs through CPEC.

China's main goal is to acquire "comprehensive national power." Her grand strategy is to associate and transcend the US and Asian rivals for regional primacy by maintaining internal order, sustain high economic growth, pacify the periphery and cement international status.⁹ To achieve this goal, President Xi Jinping is striving to make China's neighbours friendlier in politics, economically integrated with closer people to people ties. China's foreign policy goals are; ensuring a stable Pakistan with a pro-China outlook, developing it as a transport corridor, conduit for energy supplies and as an entry point into the markets and energy resources of the Islamic world.¹⁰

India wishes to build and strengthen its global image, commensurate to its size, population and the strength of its economy. It also wants to sustain the current economic growth of around 7 percent. Strategically, it wants to be the pre-eminent power in South Asia, be part of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), obtain a permanent seat on the UNSC and emerge as the dominant Indian Ocean power. India also aims to prevent China's foothold in the Indian Ocean choke points. With regards to Pakistan, India wants to constrain its ability to challenge her national aspirations, maintain current policy towards Kashmir and manage potential water security challenges. For remaining SAARC states India's goal is to restrict China's growing economic influence in SAARC and prevent regional interferences.¹¹

China's core concern is to enhance regional and extra-regional connectivity to secure her future trade and energy needs. Contrary to this, India is growing at the cost of smaller SAARC states and wishes to gain US technical and defence support in exchange for playing proxy against China. This strategy is in stark contrast to Chinese philosophy of "Peace Zones" and "Cooperative Economic Prosperity". Essentially, both India and Pakistan have developed diverging policies focusing more on the extra-regional than adopting regional integration policies. Consequently, for over 70 years of their independence, both states are being exploited by extra-regional powers to exploit enormous potential to economically develop their countries.¹²

SAARC (SAEU), EU and ASEAN – A Comparison

To reach at a reasonably workable model of regional economic integration, it is important to compare SAARC (SAEU), EU and ASEAN's main features and pitch them against the intended variables. The comparative study yields that all the three regional blocs were formed in different historical contexts and sets of environment. In case of EU, US provided a Marshall Plan and ASEAN got an extended security support against an erstwhile USSR, while SAARC was created to achieve socio-economic objectives. However, SAARC may get an Asian Marshall Plan of economic support, energy generation and infrastructural development from China's BRI and CPEC projects, subject to political will. If India supports CPEC, it can lead to expeditious formation of SAEU Alternatively, another arrangement could be modelled along ASEAN Plus One equated to SAARC (SAEU) Plus One (SPO) mechanism by including China. However, political and economic stakes wouldn't be high enough for either side

to provide strong economic and political as well as leadership role to sustain a fierce international political and financial order.

Secondly, to evolve an amicable dispute resolution mechanism like ASEAN, an appropriate role by major regional stake-holders i.e. China-India-Pakistan in SAEU could play critical part. Instituting a formal dispute resolution mechanism may be required to address issues of unequal sizes, relative national power differential, bilateral conflicts, domestic political and trade sensitivities as well as diversified strategic outlook within SAEU. As observed in the case of ASEAN, role of private sector, business community and civil society is crucial to sustain regional peace.

CPEC – An Opportunity and a Driver for SAEU

Let us now evaluate as to how CPEC provides opportunity, which India and other SAARC states cannot ignore. Chinese President Xi Jinping, in May 2013, announced OBOR (BRI) and CPEC projects to supplement domestic growth and rebalance it with external investment opportunities in Asian, Mediterranean, African, Middle Eastern, Central Asian and South East Asian regions. In May 2017 Belt and Road Forum, China hosted 29 heads of states, chiefs of the UN, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank including 1500 delegates and governments, reinforcing her leadership claim in a changing geopolitical and geo-economic world order in which more than 40 countries and multilateral financial agencies participated.¹³ In November 2017, President; Xi Jinping, during the 19th CPC Congress, outlined China's modest objectives; to become "a moderately prosperous country" and a "fully modern" economy and society by 2035 and "a global leader of composite national strength and international influence" by 2049. This vision though appears humble, provides glimpses of China's future catalytic role in South Asia and beyond.¹⁴ Four main pillars of CPEC; Gwadar Port, Communication Infrastructure, Energy Infrastructure and Industrial Zones would attract huge FDIs for SAARC states. CPEC comprise a 3,218 kilometers long route, consisting of highways, railways and pipelines. The actual estimated cost of the CPEC is expected to be 75 billion US dollars, out of which 46 billion US dollars plus will be spent to make it operational by 2020.¹⁵ Afghanistan has already shown willingness to join CPEC. If India cooperates with China, it would transform South Asia into a hub of communications, trade, energy corridors, Information Technology (IT) and industry to boost economies and GDPs of the whole of Asia.

Secondly, OBOR (BRI) is under development for four years, spanning 68 countries and accounting for up to 40 percent of global GDP.¹⁶ Commerce Minister, Zhong declared that China plans to import products worth 2 trillion US dollars from participating countries over the next five years.¹⁷ This huge financial and infrastructural development capacity of China to connect entire South, Central and West Asia into a web of intense economic activities will ignite regional economies to create multiple jobs and business opportunities especially; once SAEU is established.

Thirdly, CPEC has regional and global trade implications. For example, if North-Western Chinese and Indian regions were to use Gwadar Port, it would be cheaper and quicker to do business. At the global level, trade by OBOR and CPEC can bypass the Strait of Malacca in Southeast Asia by 32000 kilometers and vice-a-versa.

Fourthly, one of the most crucial role of CPEC's success could be to have fully secured and an assured connectivity from China through to Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) to Pakistan (AJ&K) to Afghanistan and on-wards to CAS (refer to map, above). If North-South Corridor (NSC or CPEC) is connected to the East-West Corridor (EWC) then China-Bhutan-Nepal-India-Pakistan and Afghanistan could be linked to BRI and CPEC. Goods trains and trucks from the landlocked countries can easily access Central, Eastern, European and African markets. The Island nations of Maldives and Sri Lanka can also connect through Gwadar Port thus saving a huge cost and boosting national revenues. These are most attractive prospects for SAARC states, which can resolve conundrums like; Kashmir, poverty, extremism, cross-border terrorism thus ensuring peace and security in South Asia.

Fifth, to connect CPEC with Afghanistan, Pakistan has already constructed 75 kilometers Torkham-Jalalabad road, while the Peshawar-Torkham road is underway. In addition, Pakistan has constructed two roads leading from D.I. Khan to Angoor Adda and Ghulam Khan, linking with the Paktika and Khost provinces of Afghanistan respectively. These roads will enable Afghan businesses and investors to access a huge consumer market using BRI and CPEC. According to data from the UN Comtrade database, in 2015, over 70 percent of Afghanistan's total exports were delivered to Pakistan and India alone. Accessing the wider BRI network will provide access to almost entire globe. The two major

projects; CASA-1000 hydroelectricity grid and the TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) natural gas pipeline can change the fate of SAEU.

Sixth, another opportunity at the intra-regional level opens up with India, Iran and Afghanistan's trilateral transit agreement of 2016. Although, it skips Pakistan, and makes its way to Afghanistan through Iran's Chabahar Port, but causes delays and adds to cost for shifting of cargos from land routes to ship and then again back to trucks and vice- a-versa. Chabahar port, initially labelled as a rival to CPEC can actually complement Gwadar Port. It's a real opportunity for Afghanistan and Iran to build their infrastructures linking with CPEC and BRI. As per United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2015 forecast, the future potential of South Asian regional trade will increase by 50 billion US dollars with well integrated policies. Thus, CPEC can easily trigger formation of a SAEU.

Confirming the Research Question and Variables

So far two of the three variables of research question i.e. "Growing bilateral trade between China and SAARC (SAEU) states" – an independent variable; "CPEC and Formation of SAEU" – as dependent variable have been quantitatively and qualitatively vindicated. Measurement of intervening variable: "India's Political Will" can be quantified by recording the statement of Indian officials, public representative and civil society activists.

"India's Political Will" to join CPEC and form SAEU was clearly witnessed during a seminar in "Kashmir Institute, Srinagar"¹⁸ where Kashmir Chamber of Commerce Ex-President; Mr Mubeen Shah appealed that the divided Kashmir be declared as one combined Free Economic Zone (FEZ) to trade horticulture, textiles, Small and Medium Industries (SMI) with CA where the distance, resources, time and cost can be much reduced. IOK sitting Chief Minister; Mehbooba Mufti and Chairman of Hurriyat Conference; Mirwaiz Umar Farooq strongly supported this venture stating that the proposal is practical from both geo-economics and geopolitics points of view¹⁹ and, may actually lead to Kashmir solution with win-win for China-India and Pakistan. Professor Siddique Wahid, a historian and former vice-chancellor of the IUST, Kashmir, people in Pakistan's Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan²⁰, a number of Indian State governments, Chief Ministers Shivraj Singh Chouhan from Madhya Pradesh and Chandrababu Naidu from Andhra Pradesh and leaders from Indian Government in Punjab, all are demanding from BJP led government to join

China's CPEC. Some Indian officials also formally indicated their willingness to join Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade and Transit Agreement.²¹ Muhammad Adil Sivia, an Indian writer declared China's OBOR and CPEC as a lasting solution and a God sent opportunity for India. Mr A.G. Noorani,²² another very famous and a credible Indian author, lawyer and a scholar, based in Mumbai supported Mr Mubeen Shah and Chief Minister IHK 'Miss Mehbooba Mifti's proposals and suggested to open Kashmir, and Bhutan-Nepal to connect with CPEC. Mr Noorani also quoted Jawaharlal Nehru's address to Indian Lok Sabha in 1952, "Kashmir was indeed the subcontinent's bridge to Central Asia (CA)." A famous Kashmiri scholar, 'K Warikoop' recorded, "Central Asia and Kashmir" affirming these views. Mr Haseeb Drabu of IHK, in 2008, as head of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) Programme 'Aspirational Agenda-2014' asked to establish banking and telecommunications facilities through which Kashmir can reclaim once lost status of a gateway to CA. Indian MOEA 'Shiv Shankar Menon' recommended to use those parts of CPEC, which complement their sub-regional economic corridors. This public mood was well captured by a respected journalist 'Iftekhar Gilani' in an article "DNA India" on 18 August 2017; claiming that until the early 20th century, the Kashmir valley was an economic hub, linking South and Central Asia.

Main Phases and Contours of the Proposed SAEU

As set out earlier, the main aim of this article was to suggest a broader road map of forming a SAEU, included her: -²³

- A top-down approach based on binding agreements, as in SAFTA.
- A top-down approach based on open-regionalism and voluntary principles, as practiced by SAARC and ASEAN.
- A bottom-up market-driven approach, based on global value chains and cross-border production and distribution according to the most cost and time effective locations.
- Geographically-focused programs and projects to secure cross-border connectivity (e.g. transport corridors) and to resolve impediments to trans-boundary integration.
- **Pillar 1**, Market Liberalization (Trade Liberalization Program under SAFTA and SAARC Agreement on Trade in Services [SATIS], Reduction of Sensitive List, Rules of Origin, Non-tariff Barriers [NTBs], services trade, investment).

- **Pillar 2**, Sector Liberalization (priority sectors are identified for fast-track liberalization).
- **Pillar 3**, Economic Corridors (promoting integration into global and regional value chains).
- **Pillar 4**, Cross-border connectivity (especially transport and energy).

Conclusion

The topic for this article was selected on the basis of an enormous potential of South Asia, which ironically has not been realised in accordance with the core SAARC objective; “socio-economic development leading to peace and prosperity”. However, the rising domestic expectations of South Asian people and a fiercely competitive future global economic and political order have changed the regional dynamics. This changed dynamics has been catalysed by China’s CPEC project thus, opening up new vistas of regional economic cooperation, and opportunity, which can transform SAARC into a prospective SAEU especially with China as its member.

The readers, having gone through this article, are bound to get a fresh perspective of otherwise much debated subject of SAARC. The combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis has proved that SAARC’s transition from a position of impasse to a prospectively progressive and forward-looking SAEU, led by both China and India is not only possible but very much implementable. The article also presents a unique solution to SAARC’s conundrum through economic integration leading to political resolution of Kashmir – an issue considered by many scholars, a nuclear flash point in South Asia. China, together with India and Pakistan are the key regional states to resolve socio-economic and political issues in South Asia affecting nearly 1.7 billion inhabitants.

NOTES

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SOURCES AND IMPACT OF THE TRUST DEFICIT IN PAKISTAN – US RELATIONS (2008-2014)

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Abstract

The history of Pakistan US relations is an excellent example of on-again, off-again partnership and marked by convergence and divergence of national interests. The current relationship is strained due to many issues creating mistrust and resentment between the two states. The prevailing mistrust and dissatisfaction creates hurdles in the way of attaining mutual goals and objectives and obstruct cooperation between the two countries. A strong Pakistan US alliance is important for peace and stability of the whole South Asia. This paper focuses on the need for strong bilateral relationship, mutual trust and close cooperation between Pakistan and United States for attaining both countries objectives in Afghanistan and South Asia. It also aims at exploring the causes of prevailing mistrust and dissatisfaction that obstruct cooperation and progress in Pak-US relationship. This qualitative study identifies; misconceptions about policies, conflicts of interests, US covert military operations and drone strikes, the US-India nuclear deal and increasing US- India relations , internal disturbances in Pakistan, Pakistan's relations with China and the US demand to do more as the major contributing factors for the strained US-Pakistan relations. This paper concludes that a viable, stable and healthy relationship is possible only when there is an increased trust and mutual respect between the two states. Moreover, both US and Pakistan must work on identifying mutual interests and increased relations in trade and social sector besides war on terror.

Keywords: Pakistan US Relations, Close Cooperation, Mistrust and Dissatisfaction.

Introduction

Pakistan is vital to the US interests because of its geographic location in the region. Pakistan's borders with Afghanistan, Iran, China, India, and its proximity with Indian Ocean make it attractive for the US South Asian region has always remained a focus of great power politics. United States needs strong, bilateral, and mutually beneficial relations with Pakistan in order to secure its long-term interest in the region. Pakistan and the US share common objectives of eliminating terrorism, defeating Al-Qaeda and Taliban and other extremist groups, peaceful solution of Afghanistan, and promoting peace and development

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in the region. There is a crucial need of close cooperation between the US and Pakistan for attaining these objectives. Recently the relations between the two countries are declining because of mutual distrust and resentment. United States and Pakistan also pursue some conflicting goals and interests creating security deterrence and the struggle of one state for achieving its own objectives and interests create hurdles for the other. Both the US and Pakistan hold each other responsible for failure in attaining their goals and interests.

The need for close cooperation between the US and Pakistan is not limited to terrorism but also in economic, political, social, and diplomatic fields. Strong bilateral and mutually beneficial relations with Pakistan are essential for United States for attaining its objectives in Afghanistan and South Asia. The US core goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating Al-Qaeda and its safe haven in Pakistan and prevention their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan requires Pakistan's active support.¹ Pakistan also need close ties with the US for advancing its objectives in the region. However, some recent events have spiraled down relations between Pakistan and the US to their lowest point. This study is an attempt to highlight the root causes of mistrust between the US and Pakistan and the effects of this mistrust on Pak- US relations and recommend ways for overcoming the prevailing mistrust and dissatisfaction.

Causes of Mistrust

A combination of the US and Pakistan policies are the root causes of mistrust and dissatisfaction. The continuous US allegation against Pakistan, especially its military, NATO military actions on Pakistan's western border, the increasing unmanned drone attacks on sovereign Pakistani territory, and CIA covert military operations inside Pakistan has created mistrust and anti-American sentiments in Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan's support to the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network and other policies are the cause of concern for the US.

Conflicting Goals and Interests

US goal and interests in Pakistan and the region are in direct conflict with that of Pakistan. US wants Pakistan's continuous support in war on terrorism, peaceful settlement of Afghanistan, control over the natural resource of Baluchistan and Central Asia, support to India to emerge as a dominant regional player, containment of Chinese advancement in economics and military

fields, access to Gwadar port and Iran nuclear technology. The US wants access to Gwadar port constructed with heavy Chinese investment and China's access is unacceptable for the US.² Pakistan wants to improve its military capability against India and reduce Indian influence in Afghanistan.³ While Pakistan interest towards US include legitimate space and a pro-Pakistani government in Afghanistan, good and friendly relations with neighboring countries without the US dictation, sufficient economic and military aid without conditionality and accountability from the US, similar treatment with that of India, realization of Pakistan's difficulties and sufferings in war on terrorism and promoting Pakistan's stability.

The US failure in achieving its goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan, frustration over the US drone attacks, NATO military actions on western border, CIA covert military operations, and the US strategic partnership with India brought the two countries in direct confrontation with each other. In fact, both the US and Pakistan pursue conflicting goals and interests, which not only deteriorate the security of Pakistan and Afghanistan but also disturb the peace and security of the whole region. This mutual distrust and dissatisfaction between the two countries are the main hurdles in the way of achieving durable peace and stability in Pakistan, Afghanistan as well as in the whole region.

Misperceptions

Misperceptions regarding each other policies are perhaps the most significant factor that has created a huge gulf between Pakistan and the US. United States wants to secure its interests in the region at the cost of Pakistan national interests, which reaffirm the belief that United States is not a reliable ally and will abandon it once its interests are achieved. Pakistanis are frustrated with the recent US covert military actions inside Pakistan without taking Pakistan into confidence. Being a non-NATO ally in the war on terrorism, Pakistan has suffered more than the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. There is a wide spread perception in United States that Pakistan supports the Afghan Taliban and is also responsible for cross border skirmishes in Afghanistan. Pakistan's notion of good and bad Taliban is also controversial and not acceptable to the US. Both the countries have their own notion of good and bad Taliban.⁴ Matt Waldman believes that there is an extensive cooperation between the ISI and the Afghan Taliban at both operational and strategic levels.⁵ These negative perceptions about each other create resentment and mistrust which hampers the durability and efficiency of Pak-US relations.⁶

Drone Attacks

US drone strategy designed to execute Al-Qaeda, Taliban and other extremist targets in western part of Pakistan is a controversial and unpopular strategy, which has resulted in flaming insurgencies and militancy. The drone attacks on sovereign Pakistani territory and the US increasing political pressure on Pakistan have jeopardized Pakistan's sovereignty and stability. Although these attacks may be effective in targeting the militants yet they have also contributed to strain relations between the Washington and Islamabad.⁷ The Pakistani government officials strongly condemn the strikes and regard them as illegal, counterproductive, unacceptable and a violation of territorial integrity.⁸ The perception that drone strikes are a clear violation of Pakistan sovereignty leads to high anti-American sentiments among the Pakistani public.⁹ Drone attacks are a constant source of irritation in Pakistan, leading to misunderstanding among the public, and rising anti-American sentiments in Pakistani. Although the drone strikes target high value terrorists but they also kill and injure innocent civilian which promote protest against the strikes.¹⁰ The death ratio of civilians in drone attacks is more than that of terrorists as shown in the figure below:-

Table: Drone attack in Pakistan: 2005-2013

Year	Incidents	Killed	Injured
2005	1	1	0
2006	0	0	0
2007	1	20	15
2008	19	156	17
2009	46	536	75
2010	90	831	85+
2011	59	548	52
2012	46	344	37
2013	24	158	29
Total	286	2594	310+

Source: <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/.htm>

US Covert Military Actions inside Pakistan

US military actions inside Pakistan are a source of perpetual disturbance in Pakistan that further broadens the trust deficit, creates anti-American sentiments, and demoralized Pakistani institutions. Growing US covert military actions are the result of her dissatisfaction with the level of Pakistan's support. The Raymond Davis affair has reinforced the perception that the US is involved

in covert military actions inside Pakistan.¹¹ The recent US covert military operations produced vibration between the already complex Pak-US relations. The killing of Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011 in Pakistani city Abbottabad has created a sense of insecurity, further infuriated the Pakistani public and military against the US, and fueled anti-Americanism. This unilateral action of the US without informing Pakistan's security agencies has widened the trust deficit between the two countries.¹² NATO forces conduct military actions on western Pakistani border. Although these cross-border strikes are in hot pursuit of fleeing militant but they violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan. On November 26, 2011, NATO forces attacked on Salala air base (a check post near Pak- Afghan border), killed twenty-four Pakistani soldiers, and injured thirteen. The incident was a grave violation of Pakistan's sovereignty and received strong protest from the public, military and government. In response, Pakistan closed NATO's ground logistics routes, boycotted Bonn conference on Afghanistan, vacated Shamsi airbase from the US and demanded formal and unconditional apology from the US¹³ These US and NATO military operations against its own ally which has suffered more in US war on terror badly damage US image of a reliable friend, created gulf and broadened mistrust between the two countries.

US India Strategic Partnership

After 9/11, event brought in drastic changes in Indian foreign policy towards the US and offered full support and cooperation to the US in the war on terror. The two countries also implemented a cooperative framework of relationship based on democracy, economy, and security. Recently both countries established strategic partnership on nuclear energy through the US-India civil nuclear cooperation. This civil nuclear deal will assist India's nuclear weapons program directly or indirectly which is against article 1 of NPT.¹⁴ India is not eligible to import controlled nuclear goods from the US or any other member of NSG¹⁵ because it has not signed NPT and has refused to open all nuclear installations to IAEA inspection. The US-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement will disturb the balance of power between India and Pakistan and will lead to nuclear arm race in South Asia. The strategic partnership between the US and India will assist India not only in Nuclear weapons but also in sophisticated conventional arms, which will further widen the already prevailing conventional imbalance between the two countries. Moreover, the US endorsement to support India for permanent seat in UNSC will raise a number of challenges for Pakistan

because after having seat in UNSC India will exploit Pakistan's interests through veto power.

Demand to Do More

Pakistan is a non-NATO ally of the US in the ongoing war on terrorism and actively struggling for eliminating Al-Qaeda and other extremists, capturing terrorist activists, banning the organizations that support extremism, and undertakes military operations against militants in various parts of the country. In spite of all Pakistan's efforts, the US senior officials pressurize it to do more. The US secretary of state Hillary Clinton during her visit to India in May 2012 warned Pakistan to do more and clear its territory from terrorist sanctuaries.¹⁶ The US constantly pressurizes Pakistan to expand its military operations to other areas especially North Waziristan and other tribal areas irrespective of the fact that military are engaged on many fronts. It is very difficult for Pakistan to fulfill the increasing US demands.

Pressure Tactics

The US pressure tactics also increase the already existing mistrust and lead to anti-Americanism in Pakistan. Pressurizing statements of the US high rank officials, do more, conditionality on economic and military aid and assistance, and strengthening ties with India, are the tactics which the US uses to pressurize Pakistan and gain its cooperation with minimum cost. Senior U.S officials and diplomats frequently issue statements that fuel frustration and feelings of being pressurized by the US Pakistanis view these pressure tactics as insensitive and overbearing.¹⁷ Donald Trump said in interview to Fox News that Pakistan is a real problem because of their nuclear weapon and until they get rid of their nuclear weapons, the US should not give any money to it. He added that Pakistan and China are the same and both are not friends of the US.¹⁸ On one occasion, Senator John Kerry who visited Pakistan after Osama Bin Laden death said that he has not come to Pakistan to apologize for US raid and warned Pakistan's intelligence agency that road ahead will be defined by action instead of words. The trust deficit further broadened between the two countries when the US government offered reward of 10 million dollars for those who inform about Pakistani citizen Hafiz Saeed.¹⁹

US Policies towards the Muslim World

United States wants to install western type political and economic system in the Muslim countries in order to increase its soft power and influence in the Islamic world. Nevertheless, the Muslims feels that the US is struggling to reshape the Islamic system and tries to install a pro-western clients Islamic world that would work on the dictates of the US. Moreover, the Muslims feel that US intervention of Muslim countries were not about democracy, human rights or elimination of terrorism but were about removing threats to the US global security.²⁰ The US supports westernization process in the Muslim world and work for liberal habits of thought and social change. Because of these efforts of the US reactionary elements, the Islamic world is resisting the US influence with force.²¹ Pakistanis being a part of Muslim Ummah is frustrated with the US policies towards the Muslim world.

America's Anti-Islamic Propaganda

Islam is a religion of peace and aimed at reforming humanity. For centuries, the West has carried out an ongoing campaign in an attempt to dominate the rich natural resources of the Muslim World, which has led to widespread anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world.²² The Western countries especially the US are attempting to disgrace the true religion of Islam. The recent offensive of the Euro-American Zionist bloc is the anti-Islamic US-made propaganda film 'The Innocence of Muslims' which is against the Holy Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him), Islam and the Muslims. The Innocence of Muslims genuinely incensed the Muslims of the world as they see it as an attack on the image of their beloved Prophet (PBUH) and as a part of series of attacks on their religion.²³ This has frustrated the Muslims of the world and lead to high anti-Americanism in the Muslim world. The Muslims of Pakistan view this anti-Islamic propaganda film as an attempt to demean and disgrace Islam. The people of Pakistan are deeply concerned about the negative propaganda of the Western countries against Islam. They share the same anger and anxiety common elsewhere in the Muslim world that feed on the perception that US is deliberately attacking the Muslims and inflaming the very scourge it seeks to eradicate.²⁴

Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear weapons are a guarantee of Pakistan's survival as a nation-state and are instrumental in advancing Pakistan standing as a nuclear weapon state

on international level. The safety, command, and control arrangements are important component of Pakistan's nuclear deterrence.²⁵ The western commentators on Pakistan fear the proliferation of nuclear assets and the growing Islamic militancy in Pakistan and its misuse against the US or her allies.²⁶ The security of Pakistan's nuclear weapon is still the top US priority. Recent reports show that Pakistan is rapidly growing its nuclear weapons with the help of China perhaps in response to the US-India civil nuclear deal. China is planning to build up two nuclear reactors in Pakistan for which the United States wants China's international justification.²⁷ Historically, United States has undermined Pakistan's security concerns and underestimated its strong commitment to its nuclear program.²⁸ The continuous US concerns about Pakistan's nuclear program angers the Pakistani public, military, and lead to mistrust between the two countries.

Role of Religious Political Parties

The role of religious political parties in the politics and society of Pakistan have been a point of concern for the US and a factor for mistrust. The US has great concern about Islamism, Islamic militancy, and religious political parties in Pakistan. There are fears in the west that Pakistan is on the brink of a takeover by the Taliban and Islamic militant groups that will destabilize the region and will enable terrorist networks to gain access to Pakistan's nuclear weapons. The US is also concerned with the rise of religious political parties in Pakistan. There are two main religious parties the Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam. Jamaat-e-Islami work for the replacement of secular government with that of Islamic rule and has close ideological linkages with the Muslim Brotherhood Movement of Middle East.²⁹ Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam is the second largest religious party in Pakistan working for protecting and advancing the interests of Madrassas.³⁰

The US believes that the increasing influence of these religious parties will endanger its interests and destabilize the region. The combine electorate influence of these religious parties is quite modest and there is no chance of their dominance on political scene.³¹ Pakistan alliance with the US as frontline state in the war against terrorism and its support to unpopular US policies has created resentment and hatred among the public in Pakistan. They believe Pakistani government work on the dictation of the US providing support to the US against the Muslims. Such beliefs frustrated the people and attracted people towards Islamic militant groups. Numerous militant groups, which were previously

hostile towards each other come together and increase their level of coordination and planning.³² These militant groups meet, train and raise funds throughout Pakistan and sought observance of strict Islamic rules and are notable for expression of anti-American sentiments. The realization of South Asian stability requires combine efforts of both the US and Pakistan to break the nexus that bred and nurtured militant groups.³³

Disturbance in Baluchistan

The deteriorated security situation in Baluchistan indicates the ground realities of the US “Great Game” which is a part of the US efforts to redraw the map of the Muslim world in the Middle East and West Asia, and a part of its plan of Broader Middle East, which will have serious implications for Pakistan’s security.³⁴ Baluchistan, the longest province of Pakistan with its borders with Iran and Afghanistan gained strategic importance in post 9/11 scenario because of its natural resources, strategic location, and specially Gwadar port. The February 2012 hearing of the US Congressional committee on Baluchistan infuriated Pakistan.³⁵ The terrorist attacks become more extensive in Baluchistan since 9/11. These sophisticated acts of terrorism indicate strong external linkages to what is going on in Baluchistan.³⁶ The US occupation of Afghanistan and the collapse of Taliban government provided India an opportunity to gain strategic space in Afghanistan. India has opened consulates in Afghanistan along Pakistani border with the purpose of creating instability in Pakistan from its western border. United States and India wanted to separate Baluchistan from Pakistan to create a corridor from Afghanistan to Arabian Sea which will not only bypass Pakistan but also deprive it of a major source of natural resources and Strategic value.³⁷ The ongoing security situation in Pakistan especially in Baluchistan is enough for understanding US objectives and its dual policies toward Pakistan. Pakistan must realize the changed priorities of the US in South Asia.

Recommendations for Reducing Mistrust

Drone attacks have been a source of perpetual disturbance, causing uncountable collateral damage and resulting in hostile attitude towards the US motives in Pakistan. The US needs to rethink this strategy if it really wishes to restore the confidence and trust of Pakistani public. There is a need for greater coordination between the US and Pakistan military and intelligence for the selection of drone targets. The do more policy of US cause resentment and frustration not only in governing circles, military but also creates mistrust among

Pakistani public. United States exit from Afghanistan is impossible without Pakistan's help. Keeping in view this fact US must abandon its do more policy. Instead the US itself need to do more to win the trust and confidence of Pakistani public, achieve cooperation of its military especially the ISI and gain the support of government.

US covert military actions inside Pakistan create anti-American sentiments among Pakistani public, frustrates the military, and damages the image of Pakistan as a sovereign independent state. These unilateral actions not only paint negativism in Pak- US relationship but also reaffirm the belief that United States is not a reliable friend that violates the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its non-NATO ally. United States must abandon this strategy if it wants to restore its image of a reliable friend. Furthermore, United States use economic and military aid and assistance as a mean to gain support of Pakistan and frequently withhold and suspend aid and assistance in order to ensure irresistible and unquestionable Pakistan's support. US should avoid accountability and conditionality on economic and military aid and assistance because Pakistani view fluctuations in the US aid and assistance policies as insulting. In addition, United States needs to target Pakistani opinion about its intentions in the region specially its involvement in Baluchistan disturbance.

US Indian strategic partnership through civil nuclear deal, which would directly or indirectly advance Indian Nuclear weapons and consequently disturb balance of power between Pakistan and India is of great concern for Pakistan. United States should rethink its civil nuclear agreement with India or provide similar status to Pakistan. Despite the fact that South Asian security complex is always dominated by Pakistan India rivalry, US encouragement to India to emerge as dominant regional power is one of the causes of strained Pakistan US relationship. India's emergence as dominant regional player will create serious threats to the security of whole South Asian region.

United States hold Pakistan's Intelligence agency responsible for instability in Afghanistan and accused that ISI play both sides of the road. Pakistan on the one side is a non-NATO ally of US in war on terrorism and strives to eliminate terrorism, extremism, and Islamic fundamentalism and on the other side support Afghan Taliban against the foreign forces. United States should realize Pakistan's legitimate interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan wants to secure its western border, reduce Indian influence in Afghanistan and demand

due role in post withdrawal from Afghanistan. Being a strategic partner in war on terror US should recognize and accommodate Pakistan's legitimate interest in Afghanistan. United States need to involve Pakistan strategically if it wants durable peace in Afghanistan. In this connection, US should build a comprehensive trilateral partnership among Pakistan, Afghanistan, and United States.³⁸

Conclusion

Since Pakistan joined, the US led war on terrorism, the relationship between US and Pakistan have never been at ease and presently there is total trust deficit relationship and deep suspicions are observed in their policies towards each other. The relations remained strained over a number of issue and both countries do not trust each other and the consequent events have created anti-Americanism and mistrust among Pakistani public. US is also not satisfied with Pakistan's efforts in eliminating terrorism, extremism, and Islamic fundamentalism and pressurizes it to do more. The west has been facing difficulty in deciding about Pakistan as an ally or an obstacle.³⁹ Tension between Pakistan and US has reached at alarming levels because of a combination of US policies hostile to Pakistan's interests. Pakistan is playing the role of a client state fighting the US war and accepting its strategic interests of defeating Al-Qaeda, Taliban and religious extremists. Instead of giving due respect and recognition to Pakistan's sacrifices the US continuously show dissatisfaction over Pakistan's efforts; pursue policies hostile to Pakistan's interests and shaking the very existence of Pakistan.

NOTES

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INTER-FAITH DIALOGUE; A SOLUTION FOR GLOBAL PEACE

*Dr. Muhammad Khan & Arshmah Jamil**

Abstract

Interfaith dialogue has surfaced as an emblem of peace becoming a voice for peaceful relations amongst the adherents of different religions in a world embroiled in wars, conflicts and religious intolerance. It focuses on the dialogue of the followers of different religions especially on a scholarly level to identify the commonalities in various religions in order to proceed towards the common aim of communal harmony. This paper aims to examine the importance of interfaith dialogue in contemporary era and provides the rationale to pursue this dialogue by elucidating statements from the Holy Qur'an and the Hadith. Furthermore, it examines the rationale of inter-faith dialogue present in other religions including Christianity, Judaism and Buddhism. The dialogue faces various challenges which need to be dealt with a comprehensive approach. As a result of this dialogue, mistrust and inaccurate perceptions will be removed and empathy between religious communities will be enhanced. The inter-faith dialogue will not only open channels of communication between the factions that are unable to interact normally but also confront the realities of hate, discrimination and violence in our society.

Keywords: Interfaith, Dialogue, Environment, Conflict-Resolution, Hadith, Rationale.

Introduction

The root of the word dialogue originates from the Greek word 'dialogues' from *dia* (across) and *legin* (to speak). In essence, it is an effort to share meaning with someone and deepen understanding about a particular subject. Interfaith dialogue implies a conversation between different groups or individuals with an aim of enhancing mutual understanding and engaging in a positive manner. This type of dialogue is different from a debate where the aim is to win an argument or persuade others to accept one's viewpoint.

David Yankelovich writes in his book '*The magic of Dialogue*'¹ that it has the potential to transform conflict into cooperation. He argues that dialogue is a conversation carried out under three conditions: Firstly it operates under the condition of equality for all; secondly it operates in an environment where

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listening to others with empathy is required to deepen understanding and lastly it provides the necessary interaction to address assumptions out in the open.

All examples from Islamic history, the teachings of Holy Quran and Sunnah require Muslims to engage positively with their fellow human beings from diverse cultural and religious groups. It is the prerogative of the individual Muslim to explore in various ways in which they can participate in formal or informal dialogue.

Fetullah Gullen, prominent Turkish preacher, writer and Islamic opinion leader strongly believes in religious tolerance and interfaith dialogue. In his paper '*The Necessity of Interfaith Dialogue*'² published in 1999, he maintains that dialogue is necessary and all people, regardless of nation or political borders have more in common than they often realized.

Inter-Faith Dialogue for Conflict-Resolution

In his book *Interfaith Dialogue and Peace-building*³, David Smock highlights the importance of interfaith dialogue and Peace-building. According to him, dialogue involves: High-level religious leaders who speak collectively as advocates for peace, elite interfaith bodies who engage in conflict mediation between combatants and grassroots participants who unite across religious divisions to promote cross-community interaction and develop participants into agents of reconciliation.

In the peace building theory and practice, there has been an enhanced focus on transforming the conflict intervention from an outsider, neutral, expert approach to a partnership facilitator approach. This approach is effective as it is designed to empower people to develop values such as non-violence, courage, wisdom and compassion.

Religious leaders play a pertinent role in conflict resolution as they have the potential to influence policy and law makers as well as the wider community. Most religious leaders serve as the representative in dialogue during the time of the conflict or post-conflict aiming for reconciliation. This is because they are competent, knowledgeable and committed to their religions and can avoid misinterpretation during the dialogue process. The religious leaders can build healthy and cooperative relationship with their counterparts of other faith. They

would be a role model for a positive and sustainable dialogue by setting a high standard of building tolerance, rapport and justice with non-Muslim community. Interfaith dialogue can also interconnect public policy through a variety of avenues, such as increased religious literacy in state officials and incorporating Religious Transnational Actors (RTAs) and soft power entities into peacemaking processes. Career diplomats and other officials must actively engage in this process where their knowledge regarding religious beliefs and values of the people with whom they routinely engage is enhanced. RTAs such as clergy, academics, religious scholars, and students can have a substantial impact on policy and interfaith discussions. These individuals work outside the government and possess "soft power," or the ability to directly and indirectly influence state policy⁴. Consequently, public policy can encourage these actors to participate effectively by establishing cultural and academic exchanges, as well as peace building for global conflicts.

Rationale for Interfaith Dialogue

Qur'anic Rationale

The verses of Holy Quran provide the strongest rationale for dialogue. According to Holy Quran:

*"People, we created you all from a single man and a single woman, and made you into races and tribes so that you should get to know one another."*⁵ (Al-Quran 49:13).

This verse clearly articulates Islam's call for embracing diversity and understanding each other. Fourteen centuries ago, Islam made the greatest universal call the world has ever witnessed. The Qur'an calls the People of the Book (Christians and Jews primarily):

*Say: "O People of the Book! Come to common terms as between us and you: that we worship none but God; that we associate no partners with Him; that we take not, from among ourselves lords and patrons other than God." If then they turn back, say you: "Bear witness that we are Muslims (i.e., those who have surrendered to God's Will)"*⁶ (Qur'an 3:64)

This call comes in the ninth year of the Hijra. A very important point addressed in this call was that in case this call was rejected, Muslims were to adopt the attitude expressed in another Surah known as Al-Kafirun⁷:

"Your religion is for you; my religion is for me."
[Al-Qur'an: Surah Al-Kafirun (109:6)]

That is, if this call is not accepted, Muslims will continue on their path and leave others to go on their own path.

The Qur'an verifies the Holy Scriptures that came before it including the Torah and the Gospel. Allah says in the Holy Quran:

"Say (O Muslims), "We believe in Allah and that which has been sent down to us and that which has been sent down to Ibrahim (Abraham), Ismail (Ishmael), Ishaq (Isaac), Yaqub (Jacob), and to Al-Asbat (the offspring of the twelve sons of Jacob, and that which has been given to Musa (Moses) and Isa (Jesus), and that which has been given to the Prophets from their Lord. We make no distinction between any of them, and to Him we have submitted (in Islam)"⁸ [Al-Qur'an: Surah Al Baqarah (2:136)]

This verse is important to understand the value and respect that has been given to other scriptures and it is clearly ordained that Islam does not differentiate and makes distinctions between other faiths.

Islam has always encouraged interfaith dialogue for the sake of world peace. According to Quran⁹:

Say (O Muhammad.): "O people of the Scripture (Jews and Christians)! Come to a word that is just between us and you, that we worship none but Allah (Alone), and that we associate no partners with Him, and that none of us shall take others as lords besides Allah" [Al-Qur'an: Surah Al-Imran (3: 64)]

Islam places utmost emphasis on respecting people from diverse religions: This is clearly articulated in Quran¹⁰

"And insult not those whom they (disbelievers) worship besides Allah, lest they insult Allah wrongfully without knowledge." [Al-Qur'an: Surah Al-An'am, (6:108)]

These verses accept that Islam approved interfaith dialogue for its adherents but also encourages the people of other religions to come forward for the sake of peace and harmony.

It is not only the Holy Qur'an that offers a rationale for interfaith dialogue but also the Hadith of the Holy Prophet that vouched its significance.

The Hadith Rationale

The life of the Prophet Muhammad shows us that he was a model of positive engagement with the people around him and even before he became the

Prophet he was known as Al-Sadiq (Truthful) and Al- Amin (trustworthy). Thus even before the revelation of the word of God (Holy Qur'an), the Prophet (P.B.U.H) engaged with others due to obedience to the norms of God's creation known as innate disposition (fitra) which every human being possesses. In the Prophet's life the charter of Madinah for the citizens of Madinah city state and the Treaty of Hudaibiah made with the people of Makkah were two important documents that testify the importance of dialogue.

People residing in Madinah irrespective of the religions they followed lived a life of peace and harmony under the jurisdiction of the Charter of Madinah. Conflict resolution was apparent in the discussion of treaties and truces with non-Muslims during this time. The agreement between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Constitution of Medina ensured that once a treaty is made, all people in that area are protected¹¹ and non-Muslims who have a promise with Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) were protected regardless of whether the region in which they are located has signed a treaty¹².

Several hadith reveal that the Prophet (P.B.U.H) was always resistant to display anger and unhurried to fight non- Muslims. Rather than calling for jihad when the tribe of Daus refused the invitation to embrace Islam, he prayed for them. Further emphasis of his patience is present in al-Bukhari's declaration that "Patience is to be observed at the first stroke of a calamity."¹³ Al-Bukhari, Sahih, Book of Funerals, (2: 218).

The strongest example of Prophet (P.B.U.H) supporting peace efforts is narrated from Abu Hurayra, who said, "Allah's Apostle said,

"The strong is not the one who overcomes the people by his strength, but the strong is the one who controls himself while in anger"¹⁴ [Al-Bukhari, Sahih, Book of Good Manners, chapter 76, hadith 135, (8: 86-87).]

The Same Nature of all Religions

All religions including Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism accept the same source for themselves. A Muslim is true follower of Abraham, Moses, David, Jesus and all other Prophet. There is oneness and basic unity in all religions which is a symphony of God's blessings and mercy and the universality of belief in religion. Religion provides a system of belief that embraces all races and beliefs and united everyone together in brotherhood according to Gullen¹⁵.

Regardless of how the adherents implement faith in their daily routine, the common fact is that all religions exalt general accepted values such as love, forgiveness, tolerance, mercy, human rights and peace. The messages by Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H) or by Prophet Musa, Prophet Isa as well as messages from Buddha, Zarathustra, Lao-Tzu, and Confucius all preached these values.

Allah says in the Qur'an:

"O Mankind: We created you from a male and a female; and made you into tribes and nations that you may get to know each other. And verily, most honored before God is the most virtuous." – [Al-Qur'an 49:13]⁶

It can be assessed from the above quote in the Qur'an that all people are made equal in God's eyes and one's true test of character is not decided by the tribe/ethnicity/sect the person belongs to; but the degree of virtuousness of the individuals. Furthermore, Holy Qur'an stresses on the importance of unity by declaring that all of the God fearing believers of this world are a part of a single brotherhood.

"And verily this Brotherhood of yours is a single Brotherhood, and I am your Lord and Cherisher: therefore fear me (and no other)."⁷ [Al-Qur'an: Surah Al-Mu'minun 23:52]

The purpose of Inter Faith Dialogue is to create a social change through collective effort for a peaceful co-existence with followers of other faiths. This dialogue would not only remove misconceptions, mistrust, and inaccurate perceptions but also identifies the common values and understandings between Muslims and followers of other religions. The opening of channels of communication between the different factions that are unable to interact normally will lead to a greater personal or community growth and understanding.

The rationale for interfaith dialogue exists not only in Islam but in other religions including Christianity, Buddhism, Judaism and Hinduism.

Christianity

Both Islam and Christianity urge for dialogue and cooperation between Muslims and Christians. The church teachings regarding interfaith dialogue are

positive and encouraging:

“The plan of salvation also includes those who acknowledge the Creator; in the first place among them are the Muslims: these profess to hold the faith of Abraham, and together with us they adore the one, merciful God, mankind’s judge on the last day”¹⁸
[Second Vatican Council, Lumen Gentium 16]

This statement issued from the second Vatican Council signifies the positive attitude towards dialogue between Muslims and Christians. The document places importance on striving sincerely for mutual understanding and aiming to join hands towards the goal of safeguarding and fostering social justice, freedom, peace and moral values. The need for harmony through dialogue is reflected in the Gospel’s call where it places emphasis on loving each other.

Christians, just like Muslims have to play a prominent role in creating a society where they can co-exist with their neighbors and live peacefully.

The Guidelines for Interfaith events and dialogue emphasize this further by asserting that

“All our encounters with people of other faiths must be based on the Christian principles of faith, hope and love. They ought to also be based on respect for human rights, tolerance of difference and openness to new experiences and fresh learning.”¹⁹

The Holy Qur’an gives clear guidance to Muslims about having a cooperative attitude towards Christians and it says

‘Argue with them in ways that are best’²⁰.
[Al-Qur’an: Surah An-Nahl (16.125)]

Scholars also assert the significance of Christian-Muslim Dialogue. ‘*The Pastor and The Imam*²¹’, a book written by Nigerian Iman Muhammad Ashafa and co-authored with a Christian Pastor Wuye highlight the importance of interfaith dialogue. According to them Interfaith dialogue presents an ideal opportunity for Muslims and Christians to understand each other and only through this understanding, conflicts will be prevented. They contend that the violence between the two is a result of misperceptions, assumptions and stereotyping. Ashafa argues that to practice forgiveness is the ideal quality and was followed earnestly by the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H). To elucidate his arguments he cites Quranic verses (49:6), (4:83) encouraging Muslims to be always be assured about the accuracy of information shared and cites Qur’anic verse (4:148) to correct evil

talk. Wuye and Ashafa recognize the importance of finding a common ground and unearth the similarities between Islam and Christianity supported with Qur'anic and Biblical verses. Interfaith dialogue is not restricted to Muslim and Christian encounters. This dialogue can be enlarged to include the third Abrahamic tradition, Judaism.

Judaism

There is a special relationship between Jews, Christians and Muslims that cannot be overlooked. The Qur'an refers to them in a collective manner as the '*Ahl-al-kitab*' or 'People of The Book' where the translation implies 'followers of an earlier revelation'²² as in [Al Quran: Surah Al-Imran (3:199)]. In essence, all three religions are connected through their common worship of the same God. There are various verses in Qur'an which do not refer directly to Christians but to monks who worship 'the one God'. Quranic verses from [Surah Al Qasas (28: 52-55)]²³ refer to both Jews and Christians as 'those unto whom we have vouchsafed revelation aforetime' predicting that Christians and Jews would recognize and profess the beliefs of Islam, Judaism and Christianity were one and the same.

For Jews, the basis for a theology of dialogue can be found, in Leviticus (19:33-34)²⁴:

"When a stranger lives with you in your land, do not ill-treat him. The stranger who lives with you shall be treated like a native-born. Love him as yourself for you were strangers in the land of Egypt. I am the Lord your God."

The importance of loving the stranger is emphasized by the fact that it is commanded on 36 separate occasions in the Torah. Understanding the other is dependent upon embracing the dignity of difference. In essence, there must be a willingness to understand difference in order to enhance understanding.

Similarly, the message of embracing diversity is mentioned in Al-Hujurat (49:13)²⁵ This Qur'anic text clearly places emphasis on the diversity amongst Mankind with a comprehensive affirmation that the purpose of different groups to enhance empathy with each other. The point is reinforced by several other verses clearly pointing out that diversity in color, faith, culture and ethnicity was intended by the creator.

*"If your Lord had pleased, He would have made all people a single community, but they continue to have their differences."²⁶
(Al-Quran: Surah Al-Hud, 11:118)*

*"Had your Lord willed, all the people on earth would have believed? So can you [O Prophet] compel people to believe?"²⁷
(Al-Quran: Surah Al-Yunus, 10:99)*

The rationale for inter-faith dialogue also exists in Buddhism which is one of the most tolerant religions historically.

Buddhism

The dominant philosophy of Buddhism is 'live and let live' and throughout history Buddhists have never interfered or done harm to any other religion. The 14th Dalai Lama has done considerable interfaith work throughout his life as he believes that the common goal of all religions is to foster tolerance, love and altruism.

The common aspect between Buddhism and Islam is the concept of the consequence of actions. For Muslims, all humans will be judged on the basis of their right and wrong deeds on the Day of Judgement. The Holy Quran states this

'Whoever does an atom's weight of good will see it, and whoever does an atom's weight of evil will see it'²⁸(Al-Qur'an: Surah Al-Zalzala 99:7-8).

An in another verse²⁹ it is mentioned

*"Then, he whose balance (of good deeds) will be (found) heavy, (6)
Will be in a life of good pleasure and satisfaction. (7)
But he whose balance (of good deeds) will be (found) light, (8)
Will have his home in a (bottomless) Pit." (9)
[Al-Qu'ran : Al-Qari'ah 101 : 6 -9]*

These teachings make Muslims realize that this life is a temporary existence and their good deeds will be rewarded in Paradise.

This belief is similar to the Noble Truths of Buddhism which state that all life is transitory and suffering is an inevitable part of it³⁰. For Buddhists, the only way to escape suffering is to achieve nirvana by distancing from personal attachments and following the Eightfold Path. One of the important elements of this path is known as 'Karma' which states that every good action will be

rewarded and every bad action will be punished. There are some schools of Buddhism that claim that after death, the souls with good karma enter the seven hierarchical heavens that correspond to the degree of person's virtuousness, while those with bad karma enter one of the many hells that relate to the degree of person's evilness. The unified aspect that both Muslims and Buddhists believe is that every action has a consequence and encourages the followers to do good deeds.

Although Islam does not have a common heritage with Buddhism like Judaism and Christianity it has theological motivations that encourage Muslims to pursue dialogue with Buddhists.

Allah says in the glorious Qur'an:

"If Allah had so willed, He would have made [mankind] a single religion [or community], but (His plan is) to test you in what He hath given you: therefore, strive to race each other in all virtues"³¹ (Al Quran: Surah Al-Mai'dah 5:48).

This verse implies that Allah deliberately created diversity amongst Mankind's nations and in order to nurture righteous actions and foster dialogue across difference.

Inter-Faith Dialogue: The Prominent Challenge

While Inter-faith dialogue is an excellent initiative towards harmony and peace, it is faced with an important challenge which is the inability to unite the extrinsic and intrinsic motivations on which the harmony is sought. The external factors such as the need to do damage control after provocative attacks on members of another faith by a radical faction or the need to fight deadly conflict or crime can provide a powerful impetus for interreligious cooperation.

The Suggested Strategy for Interfaith Dialogue-As a Way Forward

Despite the commonality that exists between Islam and other faiths, a widening rift that exists between Muslims and followers of other faith cannot be ignored. Something as beautiful as religion which serves the basic purpose of providing peace to adherents is actually being utilized to fuel conflict and hatred. While violence in the name of religion can never be completely stopped, its

prevention is possible. The basic principles which can form an inherent component of inter-faith dialogue are: Respect for others, and life.

Inter-faith dialogue recognizes that human beings are fundamentally equal and respect for human dignity is the fundamental principle of our religion. Respect for people who belong to different religions, even with the ones we most profoundly disagree is the first step. By giving respect to people from other religion, we can engage in meaningful dialogue.

The Glorious Qur'an says:

*"And hold fast, all together, by the rope which Allah (stretches out for you), and be not divided among yourselves;"*³² [Al-Qur'an: Surah Al-Imran 3:103]

Respect for others must also include respecting their freedom of expression. Humanity is characterized by the ability to freely express one's thoughts and views. The prime purpose of the dialogue is to accept these differences and enhance understanding about the view point of the other sect. It does not involve persuading the other religion that 'we are right' and 'you are wrong' rather it is a platform to increase empathy and deepen understanding of the other's perspective.

Human life is a creation of God and its respect and value must be given the highest precedence even if the world perceives it as expendable for reasons such as political power, economic gain etc. The care and protection of lives of people belonging to any religion is another aspect of inter-religious dialogue. The Muslim community must unite to engage in dialogue in which the importance of protecting the lives of individuals belonging from any is religion is discussed.

The Holy Quran says³³

"..Whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for corruption [done] in the land – it is as if he had slain mankind entirely. And whoever saves one – it is as if he had saved mankind entirely."
[Al Quran: Surah Al-Imran 5:32]

Furthermore, interfaith dialogue must follow certain etiquettes to enhance its effectiveness.

- Firstly, the dialogue must be conducted within a meta-religious framework that accepts the common beliefs of the participants and is not prejudiced to their differences

- Secondly, the dialogue should provide a platform for candid discussion about the differences without being insulting or condescending.
- Thirdly, the dialogue must work on a common agenda where the participant should seek not just similarities and differences but insights into how these differences or similarities could enhance understanding of their faith tradition.
- Fourthly, the dialogue must challenge the participant to understand the perspective of the other religion but this should not challenge their faith.
- Fifthly, the dialogue should seek opportunities for common cause without compromising on principle.

Given the realities of the present day, where differences and conflicts exist, interfaith dialogue can no longer be confined to a discussion about peace and understanding. The dialogue must be action oriented and confront the realities of hate, discrimination and violence in society. This sense of shared concern to address humanitarian issues will cause the dialogue to go beyond conversation and transformed into action. Words and dialogue on their own cannot just lead to reconciliation and institutions for dialogue must be created. These institutions must introduce cultural exchange programs and create platforms for a common study of Islam and other faiths.

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LIBYA DESCENT INTO CHAOS - THE NEED FOR STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

*Dr. Hassan Jalil Shah**

Abstract

This paper gives an appraisal on how post 2011 revolution Libya has descended into chaos. An overview of political impasse, shrinking economy and various armed groups and terrorist groups responsible for the existing mayhem has been given. Based on the obtaining environment and various indicators like Global Terrorism Index, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, and Crisis Research Network, the situation of Libya has been analysed to determine whether it is a failed state or otherwise. Mired in an unenviable situation, the interests and leaning of various regional and extra regional adding fuel to the fire has also been elaborated. The paper culminates by recommending a way forward as a recipe for bringing Libya from the brink of disaster.

Keywords: Arab Spring, Political Landscape, Militias, Armed Groups, Terrorism, Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), Failed State, Strategic Vision, Grand Bargain.

Introduction

Post Qaddafi, Libya is in a complete mayhem with infighting multi-polar conflicting political structure, militias fighting across the entire landscape of Libya, the capital Tripoli at the mercy of these warring militias, terrorists finding safer havens in the vast lawless land and the writ of the internationally recognized government of National Accord limited to the limits of the Naval base in which is located.

Geo-Strategic and Geo-Economic Significance of Libya

The geo-strategic importance of Libya stems from its location and possession of huge hydrocarbon reserves. It is located in the North Africa, at the cross junction of Mediterranean, African and Arab Worlds, with 1800 kilometers coast line just miles away from Italy, Libya is the ideal launching pad for power projection into MENA and beyond. The fact that post-independence, the British, French and US payment for military basing rights was the main stay of Libyan economy before the discovery of black gold elucidates the geo-strategic importance of Libya. The proximity to the turbulent African Saharan region adds to its significance.

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Standing at 47.1 billion barrels, Libya has the largest oil reserves in Africa, of which 85% is exported to Europe¹. Libyan crude considered to be of high quality with low refining cost, most of Italian refineries are structured to refine the Libyan sweet crude, restricting of refineries to take Saudi heavy crude is a no go option. Libyan gas reserves as per Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCED) 2010/2011 is estimated to be 52.7 trillion cubic feet with large swath of land still remaining unexplored.

Arab Spring – Regional Milieu

Originating from Tunisia in 2010², the Arab Spring quickly engulfed the other states of the region including Egypt and Libya³. Whereas the mass uprising resulted into peaceful regime change in Tunisia and Egypt, the 40 years repressive regime change was written with blood of the Libyans at a mass scale, culminating at the brutal murder of Qaddafi on 20 October 2010⁴.

The four decades of Qaddafi rule, singularly focused on extending his rule, was characterized by intentional erosion of institutional development and capacity. The resultant absence of political system, state institutions, economic associations or defence forces to run the post Qaddafi resulted into mayhem, leading to a wrecked and failed Libyan state.⁵

Post Regime Change

The demise of Qaddafi left the Libyans and international players in a quandary regarding the future of Libya with some accusing the major power players of deliberately creating a mess of Libya. The implosion of Qaddafi regime left a vacuum which the new institutions were unable to fill. The void in the state institutions was resultantly filled by armed non-state actors, particularly those Islamists groups which had been haunted during Qaddafi regime. The loss of state monopoly over violence led to creation of violent armed groups leading to an armed struggle, resulting into institutional partition of the country⁶.

The General National Congress (GNC) elected through the first elections on 7 July 2012 replaced the National Transitional Council (TNC), a conglomeration of anti Qaddafi forces which had been formed during the uprising to act as the “political face of the revolution⁷”. GNC was mandated to form a constituent assembly which would form a constitution through referendum. GNC voted to form a new ‘House of Representatives’ (HoR) on 30 March 2014. However, GNC rejected the results and instead re-convened in the

Eastern city of Tobruk. The HoR and new GNC signed a political agreement on 17 December 2015 to form a Presidential Council consisting of 9 members and a 17 members Government of National Accord (GNA). The HoR would continue to function as the legislative arm of the state and a 9 members GNC nominated 'State Council' would act as advisory body. The Libyan Political Accord (LPA), signed in December 15 in the Moroccan city of Skhirat envisioned holding of new elections within 2 years of the formation of GNA⁸.

Taking Stock of the Situation

Ever since the ouster of Muammar Qaddafi, the various stake holder of Libya's political and military factions are engaged in an ongoing politico-military struggle for control of political patronage networks and for influence over Libya's post-revolution future. The power struggle has led to civil war in the country.

Political Landscape

Libyan politics is based on local politics and tribal allegiances. Since 2014, there are effectively three power centres in Libya, namely; the Presidential Council (PC), the House of Representative (HoR), and General National Congress (GNC).

The Presidential Council (PC), headed by Fayaza al-Sarraj since 30 March 2016. Borne out of Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), the PC oversee the Tripoli based Government of National Accord (GNA), which is required to be endorsed by HoR, which has moved to Tobruk and has yet to endorse the GNA. PM Khalifa Ghwell heads the rival entity 'Government of National Salvation', which rests on the authority of 'General National Congress' (GNC), also called Tripoli Parliament⁹. The bulk of these members are anchored in the 'State Council' which acts as advisory body to GNA/ PC. GNC made an attempt in October 2016 to oust the GNA through a coup d'état¹⁰. The Third power centre, anchored in the Eastern Part of Libya i.e. Tobruk and Al-Bayda consists of HoR in Tobruk and the government of Abdullah al-Thinni based in al-Bayada are effectively under the control of Khalifa Haftar, the Commander of Libyan National Army (LNA) which is based in Marj¹¹.

Military

The Libyan Armed Forces were completely paralyzed and decimated in 2011 uprising through the US led UN approved sustained international aerial

campaign¹². Destroying the bulk of hardware¹³, the troops either abandoned their barracks or captured in the campaign. The efforts of internationally recognized GNA to raise the Libyan Armed Forces are yet to see the light of the day. Khalifa Haftar on the other hand commands the Libyan National Army with his base in Marj, Eastern Libya. Haftar recently went to Russia for a shopping spree to add to his stockpile of ordinance. LNA possess guns, tanks and aircraft to conduct its battle and control most of the Eastern Libya barring a few pockets held by Jihadist elements.

Militias/ Armed Groups

Libya is littered with all sorts of armed groups ranging from fully equipped armies to locally operating militias throughout the length and breadth of its land. Militia groups that operate in and around Tripoli are considered as those who support the government of GNA. The most important militia supporting the Unity government is the Salafist leaning Special Deterrent Force (RADA) numbering 1,500 which is based in Maitiga Complex (containing the airport area). Haitham Tajouri, protect his gains through the one of the largest militia in Tripoli. Islamist learning militias having their roots in the defunct "Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)" are considered opposing the GNA. Misratan militias are considered to be the most powerful militias and by and large support the GNA. Misratan militias as part of 'Libya Dawn' were primarily responsible for evicting Zintanian militias from Tripoli in 2014 and are now credited with re-taking of Sirte from ISIS. They are thus considered as the most potent militia on Libyan landscape. Having lost key strategic locations in Tripoli and surrounding, Zintan militias are re-grouping in their abode for any future encounter.¹⁴

Terrorism – Libyan Context

Post revolution, Libya's rapid transition to democracy, given the absence of governance and democratic institutions coupled with nationwide mass armament, the country descended into 'war for territory' that was manifested in different forms; political and intra-organizations power struggles, as well as physical violence for territorial control¹⁵. Amidst the chaos, as a result of the 'war for territory' the circumstances were ripe for the emergence and spread of extremists and terrorist groups, which eventually led to the outbreak of the 'war on terrorism' phase.

Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) – Counter Terrorism Efforts

The LPA¹⁶ provides the tool to address the challenges of fighting terrorism by expressing the determination of all parties to confront all forms of terrorism in all its forms, manifestation and funding sources, regardless of its motives with the responsibility of counter terrorism resting with the state (Governing Principle 17 & Article 36)¹⁷. Article 24 of LPA stipulate that State Council would be competent to examine and propose necessary policy recommendations on combating terrorism, extremism, violence and exclusion. Article 35 of LPA stipulates GNA to combat terrorist organizations including ISIS – Ansar Al Sharia and Al Qaeda with international support. Article 58 posits that an international conference to build state's capacity in combating terrorism would be organized by GNA in cooperation with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).

Jihadist/ IS Groups in Libya

Libya is home to a range of jihadist groups, from the Islamic State group (ISIS) to al Qaeda-linked groups, to other Salafi-jihadi factions. Some are wholly indigenous and rooted in particular locales while others – particularly ISIS affiliates – have many foreigners at both leadership and rank and file level. Libya's jihadist network can be divided along generational lines; the first generation belongs to those jihadists who fought against defunct USSR in 1980s and who established now defunct Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) in opposition to Qaddafi regime. Several former LIFG figures, including its final leader, Abdelhakim Belhadj, played key roles in the 2011 uprising and went on to participate in the country's democratic transition, forming political parties, running in elections and serving as deputy ministers in government.

- **ISIS in Libya;** ISIS is the most active group responsible for at least 42 percent of terrorist incidents and 69 percent of deaths. Established by the Third Generation Jihadist in Derna in 2014, Libya has been divided into three Wilyats (provinces); Barqa, Tarablus and Fezzan, led by a Saudi named Abd al-Qadir al-Najdi as its leader.¹⁸ The total number of ISIS fighters remains ambiguous with Pentagon reporting their strength around 6,000 (Toaldo and Fitzgerald 2016). Post Sirte, these

ISIS cadre is reported to have moved to other parts of Libya, specially, towards West¹⁹.

- **Ansar al-Sharia in Libya;** With the leadership anchored in the Second Generation of Jihadist and cadre drawn from Second Generation, formed in 2012 by former revolutionary fighters calling for the immediate imposition of sharia law, Ansar al-Sharia's first branch was set up in Benghazi, followed by Derna, Sirte and Ajdabiya. The UN has put Ansar al-Sharia on its al-Qaeda sanctions list in 2014.²⁰
- **AQIM/ Al-Mourabitoun;** Led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, these groups have their foot prints in Libya, in the south and central/eastern regions, largely through Libyans who once worked with them elsewhere, particularly in Algeria, before returning home after Gaddafi was ousted²¹.
- **BRSC;** In response to Khalifa Haftar's Operation Dignity, Ansar al-Sharia's Benghazi unit merged with other militias to form the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council (BRSC) in summer 2014.²²

Libyan Economy

Once considered as one of the strongest African economy, the protracted standoff, institutional collapse and lower international oil prices have decimated the mainly oil based Libyan economy. Prior to the 2011 revolution, Libya had one of the highest balance surpluses in the world. Post revolution, Libyan economy observed an upward trend in economic growth owing to an enhanced oil production. Since 2013, Libyan economy has shrunk dived by 22% with a forecast of further shrink by 5.2%, inflation has risen from 2.6% to 11 % in 2016²³. With this pace of economic nose dive, World Bank has cautioned that Libya is on the brink of economic collapse²⁴. With complete dependence on oil as the mainstay of the Libyan economy, and 1.6 million Libyan on public payroll, the Libya reserves depleted to 56 billion US dollars in 2015 from 108 billion US dollars in 2013. With the current expenditure of US dollars 20 per annum, this surplus is expected to further slash to US dollars 43 by the end of 2016.²⁵

International Carousal

The international community remains starkly divided over the peaceful resolution of Libyan imbroglio. Broadly speaking, US, UK, Italy, Turkey, Qatar and immediate neighbour Algeria support the GNA in the west, whereas Russia,

France, Eastern neighbor Egypt and UAE have thrown their weight behind the Tobruk based government in the East²⁶.

Regional Milieu

Post Arab Spring, initiated from the North Africa, whereas Tunisia and Egypt have recovered from the shock of the Arab Spring, Libya remains in turmoil. On the South of Libya is located the Sahel region, which is suffering from food crisis, economic meltdown, terrorism, insecurity and political instability. The ongoing anarchy in Libya resulting into porous border has thus provided the most feasible escape route to the migrants to the European shore.²⁷

Extra Regional Players

- **US and EU;** Having far reaching interests in Libya, many western countries (including US and EU) have their overt and covert foot prints in Libya both in military as well as diplomatic domain. Their geo-strategic and geo-political interest range from the proximity of huge sweet and cheap oil to Europe to countering terrorism and stopping the refugees' flux of refugees reaching the European shores. Besides, the huge contract for reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure and rebuilding of Libyan Defence Forces also offer a golden opportunity to these technology developed nations. The famous axiom of Rothschild merits mentioning over here "The time to buy is when there's blood in the streets²⁸".
- **France;** Having actively participated in the 2011 Qaddafi removal through sustained air operation and presently militarily active in the neighboring Sahel region, France has strategic interests in the stability of Libya. The porous borders of Libya provide safe haven to ISIS and AQIM for to and from movement between Sahel and Libya, thus posing a threat to French interests in that region²⁹. Financial interests and migrants issues occupy central stage in French interest in Libya. As a part of 'Operation Barkhane', French troops based in Madama, Northern Niger are reported to be operating in areas along Libyan Southern borders³⁰.
- **Italy;** The closest geographical proximity and being the former colonial ruler of Libya, Italy's stakes in Libya are the highest as compared to other regional and extra regional forces. Dependent on Sweet Libyan Oil for its refineries, Italy is the first stop for illegal migrants sailing out of

Libya. Though a close ally, Italy was at the forefront of military intervention to topple Qadaffi regime in 2011 and still maintains its presence in Libya, though in a benign form³¹.

- **Russia;** In an effort to ingress deeper in North Africa, Russia has established cooperation with Khalifa Haftar, the Commander of LNA whose recent visit to Moscow was an effort in the same direction. Reportedly, Haftar has earmarked 4 billion LYD for military deals with Russia³². The Iranian-Russian victory in Aleppo and other cities in Syria would further embolden Russia to exert herself more vigorously in MENA region in the coming days.

Regional Players

- **Egypt;** Egypt has the most at stake in Libya by virtue of its long shared border and the love-hate relationship that these two Arab countries have been having since long. Egypt has the most to gain from a pro-Egyptian government in Libya, hence it's sustained and determined support to Tobruk based politico-military alliance in Libya. Containment of Islamists and ISIS cadre in Libya, eradicating political Islam and a pro-Egyptian Eastern region of Libya 'Cyrenaica' in the shape of Haftar creates a solid buffer zone for Egypt. While maintaining close ties to Haftar, Egypt at the same time is also supporting the UN-led political process³³.
- **UAE;** Though ostensibly supporting the UN peace process, French-Emirati air base has been reported in the Eastern City of al- Marj, the headquarters of Khalifa Haftar.³⁴ Emariti ordinance has also been reported to be in use of Haftar's forces.
- **Turkey;** once a dominant power in the region, Turkey has huge financial interests in Libya, hence working hard to bring stability to the war torn country. Though not having any physical presence, Turkey is reportedly been supplying weapons to Tripoli based Islamist Libyan Dawn forces.
- **Qatar & Saudi Arabia;** Qatar is reportedly supporting a former jihadist Abdelhakim Behlhadj, whereas with its hands full in Yemen and Syria, Saudi Arabia, ostensibly does not have any appetite for partaking in Libyan imbroglio.

UNSMIL

UNSMIL spearheading and supporting the political reconciliation process in Libya, was forced to evacuate from Tripoli in July 2014. The intense efforts of UNSMIL managed to bring the opposing side on the table in December 2015 in the Moroccan city of Sikharat, culminating into signing of Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) which resulted into formation of Government of National Accord. Whereas UNSMIL continues to support the political process from Tunis, majority of political and military players opposes the LPA, hence undermine the efforts of UNSMIL.

Contextual Analysis

Libya – The Notion of a Failed State?

The failed state or "State deconstructed" is characterized by the absence of any formal structure which could guarantee order and justice. "State without government" is always the result of uncontrolled violence situations that prevent the constituted authorities to run correctly. The Crisis States Research Network, an organ of London School of Economics has defined failed states, Crisis State as well as Fragile State. According to this definition, a Crisis state is where "reigning institutions face serious contestation and are potentially unable to manage conflict and shocks".³⁵ Failed state on the other hand has been defined as a state that no longer perform its basic security, development functions and that has no effective control over its territory and borders. A failed state is one that can no longer reproduce the conditions for its own existence.

The extremely fragile political process centered on multiple power centres, dividing country into two halves, omnipotent security threats marked by violence and turf war between a plethora of militias, the relentless terrorist activities throughout the length and breadth of Libya, free passage way for illegal immigrants, the failure of the state to provide protection as well as basic services to its citizens makes Libya a strong candidate for being labeled as a failed state. The socio-political structure fragmented beyond the expectation of international community, failure of the government to assert the writ of the state, severe liquidity crisis, fuel shortage, healthcare deficient and AGs/ militias calling the shots on the streets of Libya accentuate the assertion of Libya being a failed state. Based on the extremely fragile state of affairs, Commander US Africa Command, General Rodriguez testified before the US Senate Armed Services Committee in

March 2016. Secretary of State Johan Kerry however, stopped short of declaring Libya as a failed state, declaring it as close to being a failed state³⁶.

Way Forward

The Libyan kaleidoscope is mired with a multitude of challenges including; dependence on a plethora of militias having nexus with political factions to provide basic security, the looming threat of ISIS, multipolar political power centers, and divergent interests of regional and extra regional players. The Libyan imbroglio thus presents extremely complex challenges to national and international community with no single or short term solution in sight. Failure, on the other hand is also no option as failure of Libya would lead to uncontrollable consequences. Any enduring solution to Libyan mayhem would be a long and painful process and would be long lasting unless and until it has buy-in from all stake holders including regional and extra regional players.

Strategic Vision and Strategic Oversight; It is felt that piecemeal and fragmented efforts to resolve Libyan crisis would prove to be counterproductive. The present arrangement of being in a reactive mode, responding to evolving situation in a reactive mode has to be replaced by a well thought out fully integrated plan with keeping contingencies ready as the situation evolves on the ground. The strategic vision to keep the Libyan on correct path would also require to be supplemented by strategic oversight by UNSMIL.

Coordinating International Engagement; Rather than putting their weight behind one faction, the regional and international power brokers would also have to take the aspirations of all the stake holders. The existing arrangement of regional and extra regional players pursuing their own agendas and promoting their own interest is proving detrimental to the overall peace process and has resulted into deep fissures in the Libyan society. There is therefore a need for creation of uniformity of opinion amongst all the players on returning normalcy to Libya. An effort at the level of Security Council (SC), followed by an International conference under the auspices of UNSMIL may pay due dividends in due course of time.

Political Buy-in-Grand Bargain; Any enduring solution to Libyan crisis must have political buy-in from all stakeholders, the existing polarity must come to an end, the mighty ones of Libya would have to bury their egos and self interest in the dunes of Sahara Desert, if they want their country to be on set

path, a prosperous nation where their youth can realize their dreams. This would require a 'Grand Bargain' and huge compromises by all the stakeholders. The stakeholders have to realize that with all its blemishes, LPA is the only workable solution for peaceful resolution of Libyan Crisis. Rather than initiating the whole process from the scratch, the constitution drafting of Libya would have to be based on LPA, there is no looking back, all stake holders have to look forward for crisis resolution.

Establishing the Writ of the State; The establishment of the writ of the state is the edifice on which the peace of Libya would be restored. For establishing the writ of state and its monopoly over violence, the AGs and militias controlling the streets of various cities and town would have to be re-integrated into society through a specially created Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) plans, tailored to unique and challenging environment of Libya.

UNSMIL; To gain wider acceptance and greater credibility, UNSMIL would have to return to Libya sooner than later. A Tripoli based UNSMIL would gain wider access and restore the confidence of Libyans in the viability of their state. Their return would also be a harbinger for the other international organizations and countries to return to Libyan polity.

Combination of Approaches-Look Forward Not Backward (Local Governance/ Municipalities); While continuing to restore peace to Libya through the political dialogue and international support, there is also a need for resorting to a bottom up approach by investing in local governance and making these institutions as focal point to resolve the dispute at local level and then projecting the trajectory upwards. The effective engagement of youth at local level would kill their appetite for taking part in the conflict at national level.

Gender Based Approach for Peace Making; The universally acknowledged fact that women have more to gain from peace and more to lose in conflict, making women as the focal point for initiating peace process would pay rich dividends in a complex Libyan environment.

Arms Embargo: The arms embargo imposed through UNSC resolution 1970 of 2011 has proved to be a bonanza for black arms market. Whereas the AGs and militias are procuring their ordnance easily from black market, acquisition of weapons and ammunition by government through the exemption process is an

extremely cumbersome process, when viewed in the background of the fact that most of the government departments are dysfunctional. The government has to be facilitated for raising their combat potential for establishing the writ of the state.

Soft Power: Soft power could be another instrument through which the Libyan could be culturally catalyzed for having the need for having enduring peace in Libya³⁷.

Conclusion

The politico-military brass of Libya must realize that their self-centered key-hole vision interests are the core of the whole quagmire that they have created and the international actors are exacerbating these fissures by lending support to one side or the other. They have missed a great opportunity of making Libya a democratic, modern and viable country. Libya must be brought back by them from the brink of disaster. Libyans have to decide themselves whether they want Libya to become another Somalia or they are willing to make hard choices to steer Libya out of trouble and set it altogether on a new course. Reaching consensus on power sharing mechanism through politico-economic compromises is the only way forward to decisively reverse the negative trajectory that Libya is undergoing and put it on a path of prosperity and unity.

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EXIT OF PAKISTAN FROM IMF: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ECONOMY

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Abstract

International Monetary Fund (IMF) was established in December 1945. Pakistan became member of IMF in 1950. Due to poor economic conditions Pakistan sought help from IMF again in 2008. Fiscal programs of IMF have shown remarkable effects on economies of some countries. Yet in case of Pakistan there were negative effects. The primary reason is the non-compliance to the conditions agreed to at the time of obtaining loan. The factors leading to agreement were aimed to restore macroeconomic stability, bringing down inflation and strengthening foreign currency reserves. However later on, there was a continuous increase in budget deficit and inflation. Low level of economy and law and order situations affected the Fiscal policy of Pakistan. Lately, Government of Pakistan decided to quit IMF Program on its expiry on 30 September 2011, seemingly in view of fiscally better placed. In this paper an analysis has been made in view of post quitting scenario which may accrue to our economy.

Keywords: International Monetary Fund, Pakistan, Conference, Monetary, Loans, Fiscal, Economy.

Introduction

International Monetary Fund (IMF) was formally established in December 1945, as a result of outcome of Bretton Woods Conference held from 1-22 July 1944 in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire (USA), when legislative bodies from 44 states gathered for the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference¹. It was formed along with IBRD - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development – known as World Bank, that could not only restore the economy in future but to establish IMF for providing a platform to member countries for centralized consultations and collaboration on matters pertaining to international financing and related issues. The IMF and the World Bank lend money to member developing countries whose per capita income gross national product (GNP) exceeds 1305 US \$ having serious balance of payment issues.²

We can divide Pakistan's history of using IMF into three distinctive phases. First phase (1970 to 1988), Pakistan had utilized for one-year SBAs (Stand by Agreements) with three-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF). Second phase

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(1988-1999), Pakistan availed both short term and long-term arrangements with the IMF. In the third phase, 2000-2004 Pakistan availed only one facility each of SBA and Poverty Reduction and Growth Fund (PRGF).

The reasons cited for quitting the program say that the administration has no balance of payment crises and sufficient foreign trade reserves to meet its international obligations like payment of loan installments etc.³ The decision was formally conveyed to the Fund and World Bank meetings at Washington held from 23-25 September 2011⁴. Pakistan is one of those countries, which suffered negative effects after taking IMF loans, and probably it is due to non-compliance to the conditions, which were agreed to at the time of obtaining loans.

This research paper is intended to carry out in depth analysis of the conditions, Pakistan government's inability to carryout structural reforms, total IMF programs so far availed by Pakistan. Whether the country has been successful in achieving the desired aims and objectives or these programs further burdened the lives of common people and the impact of quitting IMF program on the economy of the country.

Standby Arrangement facility enabled Pakistan to implement a stabilization program that was characterized as development of tight economic policies to control the price rises and overcome the deficit in foreign current account. IMF, through this program wanted to bring low financial shortfall from 7.4 percent of the GDP (2007/08) to 3.3 percent (2009/10) by lowering public expenditure, eliminating tax exemptions, gradually withdrawing electricity subsidies and increasing electric tariff by 18 percent⁵.

The study taking Pakistan as a test case to evaluate the conditions, their long-term impact on the overall economic growth, stability, the Fund's role in the fiscal management of Pakistan and *implications* on the economy after quitting the IMF Program. The study would be conducted in the following sections: In first section background, historical context, concepts, functions and dynamics of IMF Program are discussed; second section contained detailed IMF program, structured reforms, conditions imposed by the Fund, the country's success in realizing its goals or otherwise are also discussed; third section contained information on Structural Fiscal issues, measures to improve tax administration and collection and special initiatives taken by FBR to increase revenues; fourth section outlines the post program analysis and exit implications; the last section provided conclusion.

Significance and Scope of the Study

The study aims to provide an inclusive overview of the core issues of prevailing economic conditions of Pakistan and numerous financial challenges it is facing and the policies to be adopted to meet the possible situations arising after quitting IMF program. The paper discusses the economic measures that constitute a condition for IMF disbursements to strengthen the economy and improve governance.

A well-designed program approximately the escalated strategy devised by the Planning Commission needs to be finalized and offered to polygonal agencies to assist in economic stabilization⁶.

Background

In the Federal Budget 2008-09, the government embarked on a stabilization program aimed at restoring macroeconomic and financial stability with enough protection for the poor. Four major challenges at that time were facing by Pakistan's economy: first, deterioration in economic growth, second, high inflation, third, rising financial deficit and fourth unfavorable extending gap in trade leading to quick reduction of overseas exchange reserves and plunging exchange rate. Economic growth was projected at 2%, inflation peaked 2.5% in August 2008, fiscal and current account deficit reached 7.6% and 8.5% in 2007-08, and exchange rate depreciated by 22% in six months⁷.

Now Pakistan is not inclined to approach IMF for further facility. It appears that political considerations are of paramount importance then the country's economic interests. Now the situation is graver than it was prior to February 2008 general elections⁸. Pakistan's Finance Minister announced to quit the IMF's \$ 11.3 billion program from 30 September 2011, Pakistan's public debt increased by Rs 60 billion due to increased dollarization amid fears of rise in inflation in the days to come⁹. In June 2011, the exchange rate was Rs 86 to one US dollar which appreciated to Rs 90 within few days, later State Bank of Pakistan intervened and pumped in dollars which bought the situation under control. Later Rupee again plunged to Rs 88.45 on 2 December 2011, thus increasing the public debt by Rs 130 billion¹⁰. It had earlier increased by Rs 180 billion when the Rupee depreciated by PRs 2.02 against dollar from June 2011 onward till the announcement was made.

Using IMF resources by Pakistan can be alienated into three different phases. Phase -1, (1970-1988), Pakistan had for one-year SBAs pursued by one three-year EFF. Phase-2, (1988-1999), had both the small term and multi-year arrangements with IMF. Phase -3, (2000-2004) Pakistan utilized one facility of SBA and PRGF each.

Pakistan signed second IMF program in 1965 by securing loan of 37 million SDRs. The third plan under SBA was obtained in 1972 by marked loan amount of 100 million SDRs. Similarly, fourth, fifth and sixth SBA programs were signed during former PM Z. A. Bhutto's era. During the government of General Zia-ul-Haq Pakistan and IMF had signed loan agreement worth 1.268 billion SDR in 1980; out of which Pakistan drew only 1.079 billion SDR till 1983¹¹. Point to be noted that during the last two decades, almost 44% of the total loan has been drawn from the original 100% agreed upon loan due to weak government which could not act upon the firm procedures determined by the IMF. This tradition was broken for the first time in 2000 when Musharraf came in power and implemented the conditions suggested by IMF and successfully withdrew the whole lending amount of 1.3 billion US dollars¹². On 24 November 2008 Pakistan approached the IMF for availing the 18th program with the Fund. At first, the loan amount allocated at 7.6 billion US dollars but later increased to 11.3 billion US dollars¹³

To sum up, Pakistan has received billions of dollars from the IMF under several schemes up to 1980. Table 1.1 below explains the details: -

Table 1.1: Details of the Loan Arrangements with the Fund

Date	Type	Date (Expiration or Cancellation)	SDR - Amount Agreed	Amount Drawn	Undrawn Balance
Nov 80	EFF	Dec 81	1286	394	919
Dec 81	EFF	Dec 83	919	730	189
Dec 88	Standby	Nov 90	273.15	194.48	78.67
Dec 88	SAF	Dec 91	382.41	273.15	109.26
Feb 94	EFF	Feb 97	379.1	-	-
Feb 94	ESAF	Feb 97	606.6	-	-
Dec 95	Standby	Sep 97	401.85+16 0.74	-	-

The Table shows that most of the time whole amount was not obtained due to non-adherence to the conditions agreed to at the time of signing of the agreement. It is very sad to note that the conditions were for the betterment of economic health of the country but due to political issues then, despite agreeing to, were not implemented.

Pakistan faced a short fall in GDP growth rate and other economic gauges right after blend of IMF funds in the economy, apart from the second last lending agreement in Musharraf's tenure when full amount of loan was drawn successfully from IMF¹⁴.

The IMF Program

- Following a period of rapid growth, Pakistan began experiencing severe economic crises in late 2007 which started aggravating further in July-August 2008 due to unsustainable policy-induced imbalances in the economy leading to a macroeconomic crisis, external terms of trade shock, sharp rise in food and energy prices in 2008 coupled with the global financial crisis, which amplified the negative effects on the economies worldwide in general and Pakistan's economy in particular and finally adverse impact of war on terror on Pakistan.
- In the backdrop of this scenario, Pakistan signed Stand-By Accord with IMF for funding of SDR 5.1685 billion (7.6 billion US dollars) on 24 November, 2008. The Board conference held on 7 August 2009 and IMF approved an extension of SBA to SDR 7.2359 billion (10.66 billion US dollars)¹⁵

Most prominent points of SBA meeting with IMF in November 2008 are as under¹⁶:-

- SBA for 7.6 billion US dollars (SDR5.169 billion) signed.
- Augmentation of SBA by 200 percent increasing the total assistance to 10.66 billion US dollars (SDR 7.236 billion) in August 2009.
- Program period up to end-December 2010.
- Disbursements under the program thus far amount 8.7 billion US dollars, including 1.46 billion US dollars for budget financing.
- Five reviews of IMF SBA had been completed successfully.

Following key areas were selected for implementation of the program through reforms and corrective measures: -

- Tax enforcement regime to be further strengthened. In this connection FBR was required to suggest a summary of governmental alterations to the Parliament to correspond the Income Tax and GST laws.
- Government to increase social safety net spending.
- Prepare a plan for elimination of inter-corporate circular debt.
- Limit SBP financing of the budget.
- Implementation of VAT with minimum immunity to be directed by FBR during the Program period.
- Maintaining a Flexible Exchange Rate Regime¹⁷.
- Fiscal deficit to decline from 7.6% of GDP in 2007-08 to 4.9% by 2009-10 and 2½% of GDP by 2012-13¹⁸.

The fourth review of SBA was completed on 14 May 2010 with following salient: -

- Waiver request for the end of March maximum on the overall budget shortfall (grants are not including).
- All other structural and quantitative benchmarks set for March 2010 met barring SBP borrowing and slight slippage in fiscal deficit.
- As part of major structural benchmark, the Federal VAT bill was presented to the National Assembly and the provincial bills were proposed to the provincial assemblies.
- The current account deficit had improved as mentioned in table 2.1: -

Table 2.1: Recent Account Deficit

	\$ Billion	% of GDP
2007-08	13.9	8.5
2008-09	9.3	5.7
2009-10	3.5	2.0

- The Gross Foreign Exchange Reserves improved from import coverage of less than one month before SBA to about 4½ months of imports in June 2010. Details are shown in Table 2.2 on next page: -

Table 2.2: Gross Foreign Exchange Reserves

	\$ Billion
End-October 2008	6.4
End-June 2009	12.4
End-June 2010	16.4

- Exchange rate which plunged by 22 percent between March 2008 and October 2008 remained stable up to August 2011¹⁹.

Salient features of the fifth review are as under:

- Regarding 5th Review of the SBA were held in Washington DC from 23 August 23 to 2 September 2010. Technical discussions were held during August 23-25, 2010 for initial spadework and issues pertaining to end-June 2010 data and prospects for 2010-11.
- Some of the contentious issues emerged from 2009-10 data like slippages on revenue and expenditure accounts led to missing of fiscal deficit target as well as net zero borrowing from the SBP were brought in notice of IMF officials.
- There was general consensus among IMF team, MOF and the SBP about Macroeconomic Framework for fiscal year 2010-11. The underlying factors and impact of flood was assessed that brought the growth prospects down from 4.5% to 2.5%. The inflation escalated from previously projected 9.5-10% to 13%. The higher imports because of floods were likely to exert pressure on the current account deficit which was projected to reach 3.4% of GDP²⁰. Apart from these agreements, there were disagreements as well.
- Ministry of Finance presented the case for fiscal deficit of 4% of GDP based upon assumption of FBR tax revenue of Rs. 1689 billion including Rs. 85 billion worth of revenue and revenue measures, and lower subsidy on electricity.
- The structural benchmarks like elimination of circular debt and implementation of VAT/Reformed GST remained at the center stage of policy meetings.
- Regarding energy sector issues an understanding were to be reached among the trio of GOP, ADB and World Bank.

- Regarding progress on Reformed GST, the mechanism to align draft legislation in line with understanding reached with the Government of Sindh was discussed.
- It was also agreed that Pakistan may draw first of the remaining two installments based on end-June 2010 benchmarks and next tranche based on end-September/ December 2010 benchmarks. In the meanwhile, IMF will monitor seriousness of Pakistan's commitments until September before initiating the Staff Report for the Board.

Overview of Progress on SBA

Following are the successes: -

- Since November 2008, Pakistan pursued Stabilization Program amidst extremely hostile external and domestic environment. For the first five quarters of its implementation (January 2009 to March 2010) policy implementation had been good. Pakistan successfully completed four quarterly reviews of the SBA in extremely testing times.
- All quantitative performance criteria and the structural benchmarks were met. The government had taken several painful and politically tough decisions for the sake of stabilization and economic stabilization program and surmounted many obstacles²¹
- Although agreed reforms and procuring of foreign loan through IMF at a crucial juncture had a positive impact in initial phase as it relieved pressure on foreign exchange reserve and stabilized the currency performance of Pakistan remained satisfactory till March 2011.
- An overview of successes for end-June 2010 is précised in the table 2.3: -

Table 2.3: Achievements for End-June 2010

Quantitative Targets for 2009-10		Likely Outcome	
Floor on NFA Stock (\$ Billions)	5.2	5.8	Met
NDA Stock Ceiling (Rs. Billion)	1320	5108	Met
Continuous Ceiling on Forex	2.5	2.7	Met

Fiscal policy was affected due to following reasons: -

- The desired increase in tax to GDP ratio could not be achieved due to politicization of the issue resultantly VAT or RGST could not be introduced.

- Proposed SBP autonomy could not be implemented and the draft bill is still lying with the parliament for approval.
- Reforms meant for power sector like elimination of subsidies and full cost recovery and elimination of inter-corporate circular debt could not be successfully implemented for a variety of reasons.
- An overview of failures for end-June 2010 is mentioned in the table 2.4: -

Table 2.4: Deficits for End-June 2010

Quantitative Targets for 2009-10		Likely Outcome	
Fiscal Deficit (% of GDP)	5.1%	6.2%	Breached
FBR Revenue (Rs. Billion)	1380	1325	Breached
Net Borrowing from SBP	0	44	Breached
Government Borrowing from SBP (Stock in Rs. Billion)	1130	1208	Breached
Structural Benchmarks for 2009-10			
VAT Implementation	July 01, 2010	Replaced by Reformed GST	Not Met
Amendment in SBP Act	July 01, 2010	In Parliament	Not Met

Actions to Improve Tax Administration and Collection

Current measures are taken to develop tax management and support tax collection is as under: -

- 8 to 12 members are reduced after the result of downsizing. One Member (Inland Revenue) has replaced the two Members responsibilities.
- The functional distribution and distribution of work (separation of functions of audit, enforcement and legal) will be implemented only up to the Additional Commissioner (Inland Revenue) level who will report to the Commissioner.

Till December 2010 10% of the identified non-registered, income tax non-filers had filed returns whereas 18% of the identified non-registered sales tax and federal excise non-filers had filed returns. A short-term enforcement plan has been developed with following targets:

- Completing desk audit of all corporate Income Tax returns for the FY 10 by 15th March and then initiating compliance by non-filers.
- Monitoring and audit of Withholding Tax agents specially banks, air ticketing agents and motor vehicle authorities since statistics indicate that the budgetary measures taken for FY 11 in respect of the identified three areas, are not generating the estimated revenues.
- Collection of stuck-up arrears by arranging special court benches for speedy hearing of the cases.

July 2009 - June 2010 (Tax Year 2008) Composite Audit figures are given in Table 3.1 and 3.2: -

Table 3.1: Composite Audit Figures

	Allocated Targets	Audits Completed	Demand Created (Rs. Millions)	Amount Recovered (Rs. Millions)
AOP	453	81	9	3
Company	468	25	135	-
Total	921	106	144	3

Table 3.2: Other Audits - Tax Wise

	No. of Audits Completed	Demand Created (Rs. Millions)	Amount Recovered (Rs. Millions)
Income Tax	60677	116636	61697
Sales Tax	353	36975	2360
Total	61030	153611	64057

Audit Policy 2010-11 (Tax Returns 2009)

Audit policy and risk criteria was formulated for the fiscal year 2010-11 (for Returns of 2009), after getting inputs from the relevant quarters and sent to the field formations for implementation. Salient are as under: -

- To follow the risk-based criterion for selection of cases for audit instead of random for almost all types of audits.
- Exceptional Management System (XMS), already developed and deployed by M/s PRAL to be used effectively.

- Audit selection to be done by RTO & LTU, based on parametric short-listing and local knowledge.
- Reasons for selection of a case are to be recorded and communicated to the concerned taxpayer.
- Audit staff training needs shall be indigenously enhanced.

Cases for composite audits were selected by the relevant field formations in accordance with the Audit Plan and the audit activities were in progress. The latest progress report in this respect is given in Table 3.3 and 3.4: -

Table 3.3: Audit Performance: July 2010 - June 2011

	No. of Audits Completed	Claim Created (Rs. Millions)	Amount Recovered (Rs. Millions)
AOP	80	18	01
Corporation	04	16	-
Total	84	34	01

Table 3.4: Other Audits - Tax Wise

	No. of Audits Completed	Demand Created (Rs. Millions)	Amount Recovered (Rs. Millions)
Income Tax	2272	30114	3273
Sales Tax	196	7376	16
Total	2468	37490	3289

Initiatives Taken by FBR

- Inadmissible input tax adjustment of Sales Tax involving more than Rs.24 billion and supplies made by blacklisted units of Rs. 16.5 billion has been identified and sent to field formations for verification/audit. The cases are under process and substantial amount is expected to be recovered.
- Approval was accorded for audit of 77 taxpayers involving irregularities pointed out by field formations. As an outcome, detection of about Rs. 7 billion was made by only LTU Karachi out of which recovery of about Rs. 4 billion had so far been made in 4 cases. Similarly, the LTU, Lahore had detected an amount of Rs. 11 billion in 40 cases and an amount of Rs. 03 billion had been recovered so far.

Post IMF Program Analysis

IMF Stand-By loan was meant to allow Pakistan impose a stabilization program that visualized major reduction of fiscal and monetary policies to bring down price rises and decrease the foreign current account debit to more maintainable levels. In this way IMF wanted a decline in the fiscal deficit from 7.4 percent of GDP in 2007/08 to 4.2 percent to a more manageable 4.2 percent in 2008/09 and 3.3 percent in 2009/2010²². In fact, in April, 2011, IMF appreciated Pakistan for preparing very well. Some of the important achievements made till then are as under:

- External position had strengthened; the exchange rate stayed stable till August 2011. Existing account deficit also pointed significantly which was assisted by lower imports, elevated exports and a strong increase in payments from abroad.
- External currency treasury also enlarged from 3.3 billion US dollars in November 2008 (before the SBA approval) to over 18 billion US dollars in July 2011.
- Initially with the introduction of reforms under SBA, the macro-economic indicators had the signs of improvements like stable exchange rate and foreign currency reserves. The external position improved with substantial decrease in Current Account Deficit (CAD) accompanied by improvement in financial and capital account. Gross official for ex reserves increased to around \$11 Billion and deposits in the banking system began to recover. As an effect of lower foodstuff and power prices, inflation declined from 25% to 13.7% in January 2010. The overall fiscal deficit also remained within the prescribed limit in 2009-10²³.
- Petroleum subsidies were eliminated in 2008 which had a positive effect on overall macro-economic situation of the economy, though there was resentment against this... In order to introduce new mechanism for social safety net for lower income groups, the government introduced necessary changes in the Benazir Income Support Program.

However, the desired objectives/goals could not be fully achieved for the reasons as mentioned below: -

- Enough revenues could not be generated through internal resources, as steps required for the same, like introduction of value added tax etc were not taken, were rather politicized. As a result, borrowing from

- central bank and others were relied upon which consequently led to high inflation, increased fiscal deficit and low growth.
- Circular debt problem could not be solved and the nation is still haunted by this grave problem which is not only affecting the masses but also adversely affecting our manufacturing sector leading to low GDP growth.
 - Reforms in SBP and energy sector were not taken to logical end and as a result the basic flaws noticed by IMF and our economic managers could not be rectified.
 - The devastating floods in 2010 and heavy rainfall in 2011 in Sindh and instability in the cost of food items and petroleum further exacerbated the problem which hit our fragile economy adversely. This resulted in low GDP growth @ 2.4% and tax to GDP ratio to record low level²⁴. If increase in exports and foreign remittances had not come to the rescue of the economy, we would have faced another crisis like one in 2008.

Decision to Quit IMF Program - Economic Implications

Following are some of the likely implications for the economy of Pakistan of quitting IMF program: -

- The recent decision of quitting IMF Program will give the current government a political power especially in upcoming elections. Self-reliance will be developed in the public of Pakistan.
- Refuting such a loan facility may be a good populist move for the government in view of election years but may not go well with the economic conditions of the country in of different challenges like Taliban uprising, crippling power cuts and growing balance of payments.
- Quitting the IMF program means less foreign inflows and the government will have to print more currency notes to bridge the budget deficit. The cost of all imported stuff such as petroleum products, furnace oil and food items particularly palm oil will go further up.
- The circular debt in the energy sector will also increase in the wake of increase in the price of imported furnace oil used for internal power generation. This will push the cost of electricity up further and if the government does not increase the power tariff for political reasons, then it will be left with no option but to increase the subsidy in the power sector.

- Pakistan this year had to import vegetables from India because of the damage caused to vegetables in Sindh by the recent floods. The imported vegetables also cost more, as will be the raw material, which is imported for the export-oriented industry. As a result, Pakistani products will become costlier and less competitive in international markets.

The outlook for FY 2011-2012, however, does not look promising because of a variety of factors. First and foremost is the plight of cotton where the commodity's prices have already softened. This has led the country's economic managers to revise GDP growth target for the current fiscal year from 4.2 % to 3.5 %. Moreover, world oil prices are likely to soar during the current fiscal year badly impacting the country's trade balance.

Government would make its best efforts to achieve the fiscal deficit target for FY 2011-2012. In the past, US political support helped Pakistan make a comfortable arrangement with the international financial institutions but this year the Americans appear reluctant to provide that support.

Conclusion

Unless we ourselves manage our affairs with commitment and in a professional manner no program can alter the fate of our economy. Foresightedness along with wisdom and political will are the essential requirements which should motivate the masses to contribute to the national exchequer by setting examples. No other foreign donor agency or organization can help us unless we are prepared to change our own destiny through tight fiscal measures. There was nothing wrong with conditions/parameters laid down by IMF but our level of commitment and sense of responsibility are the missing links between the goals and achievements.

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PAK-CHINA PARTNERSHIP: US AND INDIA'S RESPONSE

Asma Rashid*

Abstract

Pakistan and China have always enjoyed multidimensional and cordial relations on the basis of mutual trust and understanding. These relations have taken a further boost in the post 9/11 era. Though they made policy adjustments in the light of global transformations, yet their relations continued to be in harmony with each other. The year 2015 marked the big boost in these relations through the culmination of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) agreement worth \$ 46 billion. CPEC brought forth many opportunities for both the countries to promote their interests respectively, is viewed negatively by US and India, as a step to contain US role and Indian ambitious designs in South Asia. Many other countries who were previously against the CPEC, are now taking interest and wanted to be a part of it. US has developed Asia pivot to contain China's rise and to reinforce its position in the Asia pacific region and also supports India's reservations over it. While India views it from the prism of its security concerns in the light of its rivalry with both China and Pakistan. As an emerging global power, China has the potential and willingness to support and promote Pakistan more than any other power of the world. This paper looks into the interests of Pakistan and China associated with each other, CPEC and the US and India's responses over their strategic partnership.

Keywords: China, Pakistan, US, India, CPEC, Interests.

Introduction

Pakistan and China are 'all weather tested allies' yet the signed agreements need to be implemented in their true letter and spirit to grasp the actual potential of this partnership. In fact, it is the mutuality of interests and shared threat perception that not only have led to the convergence of their interests but also have made complementary to each other. Pakistan and China both depend on one another for the fulfillment of their strategic interests as nations have interests not the friendships. Whenever, Pakistan faces any external pressure or threats to its security, China has always extended its support to Pakistan via giving its air cover, supported its nuclear program, and protected its economy from external pressures. It also supports Pakistan on various international forums like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the G-20 etc. Pakistan reciprocates with supporting China on

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every issue either pertaining to national security related to Taiwan or Xinjiang or any other matter etc. However, growing China-Pakistan association is often seen with skepticism by the US and India. US is apprehensive due to China's rise as a major challenger to U.S. hegemony while India sees growing China-Pakistan partnership through the prism of its security interests. This paper examines the Pak-China partnership by addressing the following research questions. First, how and Why Pakistan and China are important for each other? Second, How Pakistan and China are supporting each other? Third, how this entente between Pakistan and China is viewed by US and India? This paper's research methodology contains the use of appropriate secondary sources and the official statements issued by the leaders of concerned countries during different timings.

This paper has been divided into three sections. First section after giving a brief description of historical relations, spells light over the importance of China and Pakistan for each other. Second section probes into the Pak-China cooperation during the war on terror, explores CPEC and discusses the role of regional states over it. Third section looks into the US and India's concerns and actions to derail this strategic partnership. The final section concludes the whole article.

Historical Relations between Pakistan and China

Since China's inception in 1948, both countries started their relations on the basis of cordiality as Pakistan was among those few countries who accorded recognition to the newly born state of China in the first week of its independence. On May 21, 1951, China and Pakistan established diplomatic relations. Relations were amicable and were on good note. Though China did not like Pakistan's entry into west sponsored defense pacts like SEATO, CENTO, etc. However, it did not criticize Pakistan as it understood that these pacts are driven on the basis of Pakistan's security needs. In 1951, China had to intervene in the Korean war to protect its security interests in the region at that time, Pakistan did not vote against China, in the United Nations General assembly (UNGA) to label it as an aggressor, this gesture helped both states to strengthen their relations and was appraised by Chinese leadership.

At systemic level either commonality of interest or shared threat perception led the states to cooperate with each other. In case of Pakistan and China, India is a common enemy. The matter of fact is Pakistan's policies are Indo-centric but China is a state who never cherished to have good relations with

India at the expense of Pakistan. Though, initially Pakistan was less careful in its anti-communist rhetoric as Prime Minister Bogra at a conference in Colombo in May 1954 spoke of international communism as the biggest potential danger to democracy in the region¹. Premier Zhou Enlai communicated it to the departing ambassador that he was hurt by Pakistan. Yet still he said that, he fully understood Pakistan's circumstances. This signal was carefully taken by Pakistan and at a meeting after the Bandung conference (April 1955) between Prime Minister M. Ali Bogra and Premier Zhou Enlai, it was explained to China that Pakistan's entry in west sponsored pacts were not to encircle China and that Pakistan would not take part in any alliance and war against China². In 1956 Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visited Pakistan and in a joint communique it was stated that the differences of opinion on various issues would not block the strengthening of relations among Pakistan and China³. Developments during 1957 and 1969 had brought the relations of both countries into a new phase of cooperation. India put an allegation on China for supporting the war within parts of Ladakh (Kashmir) and North East Frontier Agency (NEFA). At the same time, the American and Soviet inclination towards India revealed the fact that India got all kinds of military support from both power blocs while Pakistan's request was ignored and put down. In the same way Pakistan openly opposed India's acts of waging war to get the weapon from West and U.S. in particular. Amidst the 1965 Indo-Pak war, China fully supported Pakistan not only by extending diplomatic support but also provided necessary military technology and financial assistance. All this moved the partnership to the new horizons beyond the state level interactions and extended to the people of both states⁴. In 1971, Pakistan was disintegrated and Bangladesh was created due the Indian conspiracy. Remapping of Pakistan after Bangladesh creation suited well to the interests of China and they touched the new heights of friendship.

Connected to late 1970s' politics of Cold War, Pakistan at western side was essentially a focal point of the Cold War rivals—especially due to Afghanistan in the aftermath of Soviet invasion. Pakistan suited well to China's strategic interests within South Asia and across the region owing to Pakistan's centrally-located position in southern Eurasia; its nearness to the Muslim world and due to its role in Afghanistan-Iran-Pakistan triangle which held its influence upon Central Asian Republics, Gulf States, and the Middle Eastern states⁵.

In 1970's and 80's China supported Pakistan especially in the field of defense. It also provided the economic aid and financial assistance in 1977 to

overcome economic difficulties and in 1979 to cope up with the Afghan migrant issue, who came to Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Then, the ending of the cold war and the shifting of the world's focus from traditional security to socio-economic matters changed the spectrum of Pak-China relations. During this period, China maintained a neutral stance over the Kashmir issue because, it wanted to settle border dispute with India. Yet, India's reluctance to sort out Indo-China border disputes had given further boost to Pakistan-China entente.⁶ In 1998 nuclear explosions first by India and then by Pakistan, China held that India's nuclear explosion test had created a threat of War in the region and it had damaged the atmosphere of trust among the two nations⁷, while it kept quiet over Pakistan's explosions. The dawn of the new century further strengthened their ties.

Importance of China

China is a state that is bordering the fourteen countries of the world, namely Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, India, Nepal, Korea, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Bhutan, Russia and Tajikistan. China is a peace loving nation and they believe that peace with neighboring countries is vital for their own security and well-being⁸.

The pace of Chinese progress is so fast and its progress is not limited only till China but it is recognized internationally. It is contributing a lot more for regional integration and for integration of the economies of the friendly states. This century is said to be of Asians due to shifting of world political focus from Europe to Asia, and due to the rise of Asian powers like China, India, etc. There is increased US presence in the region that is on one hand to constrain and counter increased Chinese influence and on the other to have access and control over the untapped resources of Central Asia. US's defence pacts with Australia, South Korea, Japan, India and ASEAN states are steps to contain China's increasing power and influence in Asia Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions. On the economic front, the US and its allies (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, New Zealand, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam) were negotiating and successfully signed Trans-Pacific Partnership was signed on 6 October 2015, aiming to strengthen US business opportunities in the region and counter China-ASEAN trade⁹.

Keeping in view the regional and global dynamics, China has tried to pacify its image by replacing the term "Rising China" with the Peaceful Rise of

China. It is making its advances to engage the states with whom it was having hostile past like India and Japan.

Pakistan's Importance for China

Pakistan due to its the strategic location as a gateway to the Strait of Hormuz (which enjoys strategic importance) in the Indian Ocean, blessed with natural resources and sharing of borders with two Islamic countries, Afghanistan and Iran, has always been a center piece for Regional Politics¹⁰. Like China, Pakistan has always supported China in its times of crises. During the isolation period of China, Pakistan supported China and played a vital role in establishing its relations with the US.

During his visit to Pakistan in 2013, Chinese Prime Minister made it clear that the development of China cannot be separated from the friendship with Pakistan.¹¹ To make the friendship more strong, the Chinese Prime Minister gave a proposal which emphasized "strategic and long-term planning", "connectivity and maritime sectors" and "China-Pakistan economic corridor project". China has a great strategic interest in the Silk Road and Gwadar. In the same year 2013, president Xi Jinping presented China's vision for a "Silk Road Economic Belt" during a speech in Kazakhstan. The basic idea of this project was to increase and expand the cooperation and develop economic ties for the development of the Euro-Asia region¹².

The strategic location of Gwadar is very important because it lies on the gateway to the Strait of Hormuz. It is situated at a point that can link three regions i.e. Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East. Gwadar port provides the shortest, cheapest and a safer route through Karakoram Highway (KKH). Currently, China is dependent on the Gulf oil that has to follow a strong route through the Strait of Malacca that is under US influence and after reaching China's east coast, it has to travel thousands of miles for reaching west of China. China relies on the Middle Eastern oil reserves, under CPEC Pakistan would give a naval base to China at Gwadar Port to minimize the cost of transportation of oil to China.

China is highly sensitive over the growing partnership between India and US that is aimed at encirclement. China's increasing influence and power in Asia. To counterbalance this problem, Pakistan is a best alternative who has supported Chinese stance right from its inception. Pakistan played an active role

in normalization of US China relations and also supported its stance on Tibet and Taiwan's issue. Pakistan has never sit behind to extend its support to China. So, Pakistan is a very important state for China. China favors stable, prosperous Pakistan, and helps Pakistan to come out of extremism and terrorism menace as these issues have its spillover effects over China. China fears the rise of terrorism and extremism in its Muslim majority Xinjiang province.

U.S. has been making use of India for advancing its interests in South-Asia. In fact, it has been a tactic to pressurize China and put down its rising power. China's pace of progress is so fast in every field of life and in order to limit it, U.S. has developed strategic partnership with India that has been evident from Indo-U.S. nuclear deal 2005, maritime strength and moving forward towards the New Silk route. Against this background, China-Pakistan partnership becomes a necessity to maintain the balance of power in Asia, and to tackle the moves India and U.S. have been making against Pakistan and China. Pak-China friendship has also been very unique in the sense that both the states are ideologically different, having different administrative set-ups and have formed such a lasting and durable partnership between them.

China has supported Pakistan's stance regarding Osama Bin Laden and defended that Pakistani government may not have known about Laden's presence on its soil.¹³ During his April 2015 visit to Pakistan, President Xi publicly stated that Pakistan has played a productive role to resolve the Afghan problem and that China would continue to cooperate with Pakistan to promote the reconciliation process to ensure the peaceful transition of Afghanistan¹⁴.

China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Cooperation & Opportunities

CPEC is a project of 46 billion US dollars that is under progress. It consists of a 3,000-km, long extensive network of roads, railways, pipelines, special economic zones, dry ports and other infrastructural projects across Pakistan. The idea of CPEC dates back to the Musharraf era and gained popularity in May 2013 when Chinese Premier Li Keqiang signed the agreement for the construction of the CPEC during his visit to Pakistan.

Operational Activities of CPEC

The game changer project of CPEC has been operational and its first ever trade activity took place on 31st October, 2016 when the hundred Chinese containers reached at the Sust port in Gilgit Biltistan¹⁵. The First operational activity at the Gwadar port took place on 13 November, 2016. Three conveys of containers originated from Sust, Sailkot and Lahore reached at Quetta by following the different routes, from where they moved to Gwadar through N 85 Highway.

Response of Regional States

CPEC is not a project that is only limited to Pakistan and China rather it is an international project. Being a multidimensional mega project it will change the regional dynamics through its road networks, energy projects, trading conveys and people to people contacts in the coming years. International as well as regional countries are taking interest in the project. Some are attempting to be a part of the project while others are viewing it as prosperity gate for China and Pakistan only.

Afghanistan is the landlocked country and CPEC has operationalized the Gwadar port first time in its history. Being a bordering state, CPEC appears likely fruitful for Afghanistan, if it becomes a part of this project. Afghanistan's Ambassador to Pakistan said that, Kabul will obviously want to become the part of CPEC and it is equally important for Afghanistan as it is for Pakistan. It will enable Afghanistan to recover the damages of the decade's long war.¹⁶ The western route of CPEC will connect Pakistan and Afghanistan through Chaman and it will provide the shortest transit route between the two countries.

US and India views Pak-China Partnership

United States Views

US does not openly oppose the idea of CPEC and a US State Department official said, " we very much support and share the idea of regional economic connectivity. Fundamentally, we hope that eventually not only Pakistan and China, but other neighbors, particularly Afghanistan would be a part of it."¹⁷ But, US has concerns about the project, due to its strategic interests in Central Asia and close proximity of this region to Russia, Iran, and China.¹⁸ It keeps an eye over the resources of energy rich states of Central Asia. That's why US makes use of all the instruments of power-diplomacy, information, military, and economic

to pursue these interests. Pakistan is a state who facilitated the establishment of the relationship between two erstwhile enemies the US and China during the cold war era. The sole super-power US sees the rise of China with caution. Ideological and territorial conflicting relations between China and the former Soviet Union have given way to cooperative ties between Pakistan and China. China and India fought a war in 1962, have since stabilized their relationships, the casus belli, i.e., the unresolved border dispute notwithstanding¹⁹. All these factors lead to the closing together of India and US for their interests that is problematic for Pakistan and China. The growing cordiality between U.S. and India has been disturbing the balance of power in South Asia in favor of India which is directly effecting Pakistan and China²⁰.

In the last thirteen years during its global war on terror, US has supported Pakistan by providing \$10.5 in economic assistance, 7.6 billion US dollars security assistance and 13 billion US dollars as a reimbursement for counterterrorism²¹.

It shows that US wants to contain China and is cynical of the rising partnership between Pakistan and China and wants to dissuade both the states from this cordiality. Pakistan owing to its geo-strategic location in South Asia has been an important player in world politics. U.S. has always exploited Pakistan for the pursuance of its strategic interests. After the fulfillment of these interests Pakistan is left alone to cope up with the whole situation. As being the front line ally of the US and after sacrificing a lot in terms of material and human resources. Pakistan has now developed the feeling to explore other foreign policy options like the growing partnership between Pakistan and China and Pakistan and Russia, in order to survive and act according to its national interests, yet this partnership is viewed with skeptical eyes.

In 2011, US gave the idea of New Silk Road Initiative (NSRI) and the basic aim behind this initiative was to integrate Afghanistan with the region and to link the regions of south and central Asia. All this would be done through regional energy markets, trade and transport, increase their customs and border operations and people to people contacts.²² CPEC is also for integration and it is integrating China and Pakistan currently and other states like CARs, Afghanistan, Iran, Russia are showing their interest and taking initiatives to be a part of this mega project. Russia has sent its elite forces for military drills in GB and FATA to support CPEC. It seems that the US role from South Asia is likely to

decrease due to China's presence as a balancer and CPEC might also challenge the US influence on the oil CARs, yet the strong US-India partnership can't be ignored in this regard, as both countries have developed strong strategic, economic and political partnership. While, Pakistan is viewed only through a security lens and in the future US and India may work together to contain China's role in the region.

India's View

India keeps a strict watch over China's developments. Though, the thaw is coming in India-China relations as both are engaging in successful diplomatic engagements, India is cautious and suspicious enough over every China's moves to Pakistan. For India and China, the point of annoyance is the balance of power considerations, although both put down this proposition²³. It is attempting its best to disrupt and damage China-Pakistan cordiality through its antagonist diplomacy."²⁴ It sees the growing warmth between Pakistan and China as an attempt to counter India. It considers that China avoids discussion over the nuclear issues with India having the fear that it will give de facto recognition to Indian nuclear power status.

India is having the aims of getting the regional superiority in South Asia and China Pakistan cooperation is a direct challenge to Indian hawkish policies. Indian Prime Minister is openly criticizing CPEC and says that it poses a great threat to the Indian interests because it passes through the disputed areas of Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan that is very near to Indian borders.²⁵ India and China both are energy consumers and both are emerging economies.

India considers CPEC as a thorn in its paw, has chalked out new ways to put obstacles in the smooth implementation of CPEC. Indian intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing's (RAW) opening of an office in Delhi and allocation \$300 million to disrupt the projects associated with CPEC²⁶ has been a clear indication of Indian plans and actions. Pakistan has handed over Gwadar port to China and India feels perturbed due to the edge China will get in the Arabian Sea.

Evidences suggest that India has been involved behind the Baluchistan's insurgency, the province that is abundant in oil and gas reserves. India strongly object to the civilian nuclear deal between China and Pakistan on the charge that

it would violate international protocol related to trade of nuclear equipment and materials²⁷.

India develops new ties with Iran and this Indo-Iran nexus is founded to counter the CPEC. Indian Prime Minister in his historic visit to Iran in May 2016 showed his deep interest in Chahbahar Port and signed MOU for the development of port. India, Afghanistan and Iran has signed a trilateral treaty for developing the port and other projects²⁸. India is renewing its relations with UAE, Prime Minister Modi visited UAE and both countries vowed to establish the infrastructural investment fund and aim of reaching the target of 75 billion.²⁹ All this has been done to counter and contain the Pak-China partnership and particularly CPEC.

Analysis & Conclusion

China and Pakistan will continue to be time-tested in the contemporary world. In order to sustain this cordiality, both the countries need to work more closely to counter the hurdles, enemies posing in their way to distract them from each other. The competitors like India and US will continue to not only suspect this growing cordiality, but will attempt to contain it. Evidences suggest that Chinese developmental projects and efforts have proven more beneficial and fruitful than US support to Pakistan. It is due to the fact that Pak-China partnership is based on development and cooperation while the US-Pakistan partnership is security driven. Under the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act, the US has provided the civilian assistance of \$5 billion but, the scale of China's investments suggests that it will be more effective for the economy of much more than the US civilian aid. So, Pakistan should now say "no more" to the U.S. in response to "do more" demand. Instead of relying and looking towards the US, Pakistan should work closely with its all-time tested ally China.

Both countries have proven committed, reliable and friendly towards each other in the times of crises. Pakistan has always supported China and China has understood Pakistan's sensitivity and security vulnerability vis-à-vis India. To make their ties more concrete, strong, meaningful, and mutually beneficial, Pakistan needs to develop an independent Foreign policy on the basis of its national interest and needs to relinquish its "YES SIR" approach to U.S. orders. China has been propelling Pakistan, in order to sustain it further on a good note, Pakistan needs to stay very active and vigilant in the light of internal and

external dangers, and otherwise in the future China might have other priorities as well as alternatives.

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USA'S PIVOT TO ASIA; COOPERATION OR CONTAINMENT- AN INTRUSIVE ANALYSIS FROM REALIST PERSPECTIVE

*Dr. Waseem Ishaque, Saqib Anjum & Syed Jawad Shah**

Abstract

Southeast Asia stems its geopolitical significance predominantly from its position at the intersection between the accumulation of military power, technological and industrial advanced states in Northeast Asia to the north, the oil rich Middle East and Indian subcontinent to the east and Australia lies towards the south. It is also a region of massive unexploited natural resources and junction of the world's supreme sea trade routes. Since the end of Second World War, the USA has maintained substantial presence in Southeast Asia which has provided stability to a large extent. The massive investment and development of infrastructure resulted in rapid post war recovery of devastated region, which also helped China (Now World's Economic Giant) towards rapid pace of economic development. Southeast Asia reverberated even during Cold War times and in the Vietnam War. After the end of Cold War, the U.S A shifted its focus from security to economic issues in Southeast Asia. "Market access" and "market-opening" became the prominent slogans of US policy for this region, which focused on the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC). President Trump after taking over office renewed his commitments and policy preferences for greater focus and engagement in Asia-Pacific region by rephrasing it as Indo-Pacific region for dealing with the existential threat of North Korea and assuring allies of unstinted US support for continued engagement in the region. This is an academic discourse; therefore, views expressed in this research are author's own views.

Keywords: Pivot to Asia, rebalancing, Cooperation, Containment.

Introduction

The geopolitical importance of Southeast Asia is chiefly attributed to its location at the hub of technologically and industrially advanced Northeast Asia to the north, oil rich Middle East and the Indian subcontinent to the East and the Australian continent to the south. Significant trade of Japan, China, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia, mostly their oil imports, transport through the straits and Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) in Southeast Asia¹. U.S has maintained a significant foot prints in this region immediately on termination of Second World War as USA was victor and the outcome was decided by US nuclear strikes against Japan as war termination strategy. The

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presence in the region has been manifested with varying intentions, generally unclear². Since the global inflation and China's economic boom, the geopolitical balance in the region has shifted towards China, the relations of Southeast Asian countries with China have been generally positive. USA's recent overtures has reinvigorated the relations with the Asia-Pacific and other global powers and is significantly supporting increase in defense spending and ambitious modernization programs of Southeast Asia and other countries of the region. US joint military exercise with Republic of Korea, Japan, Myanmar and Vietnam and enhanced engagements with Philippine are some of the factors contributed towards heightened tension in the region. On the pretext of freedom of navigation, ASEAN countries are encouraged to follow the suit of USA, which is creating friction with China. While China and USA have pragmatically handled the controversial issues of South China Sea by demonstrating restraint and mutual accommodation, yet occasional distractions due to heating of temperatures are causing a degree of destabilization.

Significance of Research Article

Asia – Pacific region has always been very important due to its geopolitical and geo-economic potentials and power tussle between USA and China. USA considers important pillar and guarantor of stability and development of region, while China considers it as her near abroad with legitimate right for bigger influence in the region. While Chinese approach has generally been demonstrated by common development and prosperity through win-win cooperation, whereas, USA's approach in contrast is manifested more in security and military dimensions, with overwhelming cooperation in boosting offensive capabilities and enhanced physical presence in the region. The war of words has been softening since then, however, a covert mind-set of China containment remains at the heart on new US Administration's policy planning. This research article will unveil and analyse the constituents of USA's Pivot to Asia with potential implications on China and the region.

Discourse Analysis on USA's Pivot to Asia Strategy

US presence in troubled region of North and South East Asia provided greater degree stability and large scale development of the region after devastation caused by World War-II. The massive investment and development of infrastructure resulted in rapid post war recovery of distressed region and also helped China in rapid economic development. In the period 1947-1950, the

national security planners drafted policy guidelines for maintaining visible US presence in order to continue her influence in post war recovery of Southeast Asia. National Security Council (NSC) architects realized the need for building the old colonial state's capacity for long term sustenance and development, therefore, the region of Southeast Asia boomed even during Cold War and Vietnam War.

As the Cold War ended, the U.S shifted its focus from security to economic aspects in Southeast Asia. George H. W. Bush (1989-1993) made free trade as the dominant objective, and as a result "Market access" and "market-opening" became the buzzwords of U. S. policy for the region, which centered around the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC). In the recent past, the U.S has begun to recognize the strategic importance of Southeast Asia by realizing the need of "Pivot to Asia" or "Rebalance"³. Hillary Clinton former US Secretary of State described this region as the "fulcrum" of developing a regional economic and security architecture⁴. Another important aspect worth noting is that U.S arms sales and technology transfers are assumed to be essential factors for maintaining balance of power and dissuading China from cooperative engagement⁵. This has been pooled with a placid rebalancing of regional political dynamics as the states begin to pivot against China's envisaged leading position by reiterating their associations with the U.S.⁶.

Washington has indicated that it does not recognize China's sovereignty over the several islands including reefs in the Spratly archipelago by stating that for the sake of retaining hard earned freedom of navigation, the U.S. Navy will endure to operate here⁷. This policy shift implies shifting of diplomatic, military and economic resources to the region from other parts of the world. In Southeast Asia, a dominant manifestation of the pivot includes developing relations with these countries and reviving close U.S. links with Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand. The previous administration of President Obama also elevated defense cooperation with most of regional countries with emphasis on port and basing of combat ships in Southeast Asia. The pivot had several constituents; mainly shifting of U.S. foreign policy orientation from Afghanistan and Middle East to Asia-Pacific, relocation of naval assets and new dispositions of U.S. Marines to other locations and forging treaties with allies and partners⁸.

The "pivot" to Asia was introduced through an article in foreign policy magazine published in November 2011 authored by Hilary Clinton, the former

Secretary of State. It elucidated the future plans for the military relocations as *“We are modernizing our basing arrangements with traditional allies in Northeast Asia while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia and into the Indian Ocean. In the section of “Primary Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces,” rotating presence is cited as “U.S. forces will conduct a sustainable pace of operations abroad, including rotational deployments and bilateral and multilateral training exercises. These activities reinforce deterrence, help to build the capacity and competence of U.S., allied, and partner forces for internal and external defense, strengthen alliance cohesion, and increase U.S. influence”.*

New USA-Japan Defence Guidelines

U.S. and Japan signed a new Defence Guidelines in 2015⁹. The main components are;

- Ensure long term strategic commitment including the presence of the U.S. forces in Japan.
- Augment the known collective self - defense, the growth of mutual defense cooperation from regional to international level in traditional and new areas are considered vital to current geo-strategic settings, mainly the cyber security and space.
- The 1997 effort was made to settle North Korean issue and its revised version in 2015 is perceived as a counter action against Chinese expansionist designs.
- A key area underscored in new strategies is maritime security. This is relevant to Southeast Asia, as the tensions in maritime domain increased substantively in the South China Sea succeeding to host of incidents, like Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil-rig stand-off between China and Vietnam, and China's reclamation activities to name a few.
- One initiative announced in the new guidelines is the “Partner Capacity Building”.
- Through power projection strategies, Japan's enhanced involvement points towards possible appearance of Japan as a counter weight to China.
- New Navel and Sea concept also implies growing USA's engagement with Japan to isolate China.

Analytical Debate on the Emerging Scenario and its Implications

The Realists believe in the concept of Power as the ultimate human desire. It has two dimensions, i.e. Offensive Realism which is manifested in Power maximization and secondly Defensive realism which is manifested in Security maximization. The previous US deployment and basing in Southeast Asia and current Pivot to Asia perfectly fits in both dimensions of Realism. The ensuing analysis will touch on both these aspects.

Visualized Impact of USA's Pivot to Asia

There is increased U.S emphasis on demographic shift from Middle East to Asia-Pacific in all policy guidelines, National Military Strategy and defense reviews. This shift is assessed to be the current economic growth of China which has averaged 9.5% since last three decades. The analyst debate that the Chinese economy, currently the 3rd largest, and world's fastest growing, is destined to become the world's leading economy by overtaking the U.S.A in coming decade. The U.S is likely to strengthen associations with Philippines, Japan, Singapore and the Republic of Korea for manifestation of Joint Force's contingencies. U.S is providing aid package to archipelagic states to deter Chinese Coast Guard in South China Sea and boost respective maritime law enforcement flotillas. The U.S has contributed to the misperception by frequently framing the strategy, which was initially a 'pivot' and later transformed into a 'rebalancing' which is now a 'Pacific Dream'. The U.S has been unsuccessful in countering media narratives of the pivot as an essential military endeavor, partly because the pivot's military portion is the only one that has encompassed the overarching goals of this shift. The futuristic procurement plan and all other endeavours are confirming that U.S policies are China-centric with implied leaning towards North Korea. Moreover, for spreading negative perceptions about China, frequent anti-China statements by the U.S officials and policy documents and other U.S allies around Southeast Asia are testimony of growing risks of China containment. It is worth mentioning that U.S is planning to have an Air Force capable of worldwide projection of power competencies as these are critical for manifestation of new strategy. Concurrently, updating new generation Air Force combat apparatus containing bombers and fighters – predominantly against advance air defense systems possessed by China.

Factoring North Korean Nuclear Posturing and President Trump's Overtures

North Korean nuclear posturing and ensuing exchange of heated words between North Korean leader Kim John Un and President Trump present highly charged regional environment with trigger ready alert positions on both sides. President Trump's tweet in March 2017 "*North Korea is behaving very badly. They have been 'playing' the United States for years. China has done little to help*"¹⁰. It is evident that USA is trying to club China with North Korea, thus setting the stage for casus-belief for containing China. Despite Chinese protests and concern, US is perusing disposition of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) in South Korea on the same pretext of dealing with North Korea and potential deterrent against China.

Evolving Security Architecture

The security architecture in the region suffers from lack of trust between the China and U.S bilateral and military relations due to clash of interests. Preventive actions by both states to pre-empt each other's perceived intentions continue to feed instability in the region. The rebalancing act of the U.S packaged under the notion of Asian Pivot appears to contain China's growing power, triggered apprehension within the regional powers about their own security. The presence of U.S forces are largely considered synonymous to Cold War Containment that will increase militarization, friction and increased regional tension.

South China Sea Issues

The claim of South China Sea is supported by government of China's proclamation of a map in 1948 and the subsequent notes submitted to the U.N in May 2009. Therefore, the claim should be interpreted and accepted accordingly by the international community. The claim by China for maritime regions in the South China Sea has origin of past several decades. It firstly elicited less agitated reactions by other plaintiffs because China was economically more involved with all the countries of ASEAN.

Conclusions Drawn from the Analytical Debate

Containment of China

USA's "Pivot to Asia" strategy with demonstrated intentions of military posturing and basing in China's near abroad in East Asian region has contributed to a large extent in creating mistrust and instability. In China, it is widely perceived in policy circles that Obama Administration's "Pivot to Asia" in-fact interrupted the course of joint development and needlessly strewed dissatisfaction by bringing the conflicts at center stage thus creating haze among the neighbours regarding Chinese future intentions despite China's outreach and assurances of settling disputes through peaceful means and dialogue. The scenario thus created point towards mistrust which is considered unfavorable towards regional stability, bilateral and military relations between China and USA. It is also worth mentioning that Air-Sea Battle element of Pivot to Asia is offensive in outlook and manifestation and perceived to be directed against China, which also contributed towards growing suspicion with deleterious prospects of military relations. The frequently discussed preservation of hard earned freedom of navigation by USA containing surveillance of China undermine trust and harm China's core security concerns, impinge on China's sovereignty which have proved to be destabilizing factors. With above stated empirical evidences, it can be concluded that "Pivot to Asia" appears to be self-fulfilling prophecy of USA by depicting China as competitor rather than partner in regional and global affairs and keeping the trumpet of "**China Threat Theory**" alive, thus retaining legal grounds of enormous US military presence in the region. The aspects of "**China containment**" are aptly exemplified from offensive military doctrines, posturing and joint military exercises by USA and its regional allies.

USA's Over Commitment to Alliance Partners

USA's overt support to alliance partners in this region and sequestering their behavior are also contributing towards instability and trust deficit between China and USA. Notwithstanding USA's firm partnership with ROK, Taiwan, Japan and several other regional countries are understandable and much appreciated, however, USA's security treaty and enormous arms sale to Taiwan, Japan and Philippine with offensive posturing demonstrated during joint military exercises with USA, witnessed as regular yearly feature are considered as China specific which degenerates prospects of enduring stability and trust building.¹¹ The two militaries i.e. USA and China believe that better relations and

understanding of each other's sensitivities are vital for enduring stability, yet US military is regularly involved in mock exercises of worst case scenarios of military confrontation demonstrated during joint exercises with alliance partners.

China's Emphasis on Negotiated Settlement of Disputes

Another important aspect worth highlighting is the Chinese government and military's preference for negotiations and mutual respect without use of force for dispute resolution. However, China has explicitly demonstrated for preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity like any other sovereign nation. At regional and international level, the China has adopted official policy of not challenging the leadership of USA which is exemplified by joint press conference between President Xi Jinping and President Obama on the sidelines of APEC. President Xi announced that "*China will never challenge the leadership of USA*" and President Obama announced that "*USA welcomes peaceful development of China and does not support the independence of Taiwan*". President Trump has also reiterated his administration commitment to "*One China policy*"¹². It is worth noting that in last 30 years, China has successfully maintained regional peace and stability despite challenges, disputes and peacefully settled its border issues with twelve countries, which indeed are highly creditable endeavours. China has also declared supportive engagement with the militaries of regional countries and USA in order to formulate joint response mechanism against evolving nontraditional security threats. The manifestation of "Pivot to Asia" has been perceived as containment of China for regional dominance by USA supported by her allies due to overwhelming military component and offensive posturing by USA and allies, thus eroding trust level and pushing the region back into cold war mentality.

Recommendations for Enduring Stability and Trust Building

Trust Building between USA and China

Both USA and China have to develop comprehensive understanding of the relationship following the principle of "*managing differences for common development*", avoiding confrontation and taking steps for furthering trust. In this backdrop, following measures are recommended;

- The **first** aspect is that Chinese President Xi Jinping's offer of building "New Type of Major Power Relations" should be formalized at an early

date by signing a 4th Communiqué and preparing comprehensive implementation road map. Both countries should also pursue the goal of long term relationship which has not yet been demarcated despite changing geopolitical realities and transformation in the international order after demise of USSR dimming the cold war notion of containment.

- The **second** aspect needs consideration is the United States explicit commitment on removing the prevailing haze and any misperception on its intentions of containing the peaceful rise of China by assuring the respect for China's territorial integrity and national sovereignty as well as political system. The USA is suggested to dispel any misinterpretations of her over commitment to alliances in East Asia, take contemplation of the sensitivities of non-allied countries, ; avoiding a new cold war by demonstrating that it has no intentions of dividing the region.
- And **lastly**, it is suggested that both countries should refrain from demonizing each other and take measures for enhancing communication on policies and actions to avoid misunderstanding. Use of media or press conferences to some extent have impacted negatively on bilateral relations, therefore, dialogues and exchanges of education, positive assurances, joint training in addressing non-traditional security threats should be formalized and implemented immediately.

Mechanism to Manage Tension and Crises

In the region of heightened tension and prevailing mistrust, following is recommended for avoiding conflict and managing crises arising due to perceived miscalculation by any side;

- The **first** and foremost important aspect is the policy of robust engagement between USA and China both at bilateral diplomatic and military levels to keep channels of communications open. Through military exchanges and joint military exercises, both countries can be partners in major international issues concerning non-traditional security. Template of cooperation in Gulf of Aden anti-piracy cooperation is a good starting point which is recommended to be capitalized and enhanced for mutual benefit and the world at large. Another positive avenue is the engagement in regional security matters

and humanitarian relief activities, where both countries can become dependable members in the Asia-Pacific region. With due regards to the outcome of process in immediate or later timeframe, the suggested process of dialogue, cooperation and commitment will create conducive environment for positive development of the relationship between USA and China.

- **Secondly**, the most important aspect needs consideration for all stake holders is the initiation of significant measures for building trust and bridging communication gap at the governments and military levels. One such method to be initiated early is the open ended and constructive dialogues between the government ministers and senior military officials. The dialogues should not be expected to be conclusive overnight, therefore, should be perused with continued emphasis and hectic efforts are suggested to be made to keep these focused and result oriented, while listening to each other's positions carefully with patience and open mind. It is suggested that frequent reciprocal visits of Defense Ministers, services chiefs, and staff officers will also pave the way for enhanced cooperation and building trust. A lot of ice melting has occurred with engagement policy of new Trump Administration which has helped in understanding each other's positions, concerns and increased the prospects of enhanced engagements for eventual benefit of all parties. Both governments should also pledge to veneration of core interests of each other, view each other's strategic intents tangibly and factually and take steps for blossoming of positive environments by eliminating the chances of unsubstantiated accusations.
- **Thirdly**, enhancing bilateral cooperation on host of global issues like; DPRK nuclear issue, Iranian nuclear issue, non-traditional security like disaster relief operations, anti-piracy operations etc, counter terrorism and transnational crimes, cyber-security, environmental challenges, steadiness of international economic system and ensuring uninterrupted energy supplies.
- **Fourthly**, the conflict prevention, risk management and mitigation. Few suggested measures are; establishing of hot lines between the two militaries and formalizing the mechanism of notifying each other's military manoeuvres and major exercises and routine training events for trust building and avoiding any miscalculations and stimulate better synchronization. The subsequent aspects relate to the devising Rules of

Engagement and SOPs for dealing with problematic circumstances in a befitting manner.

Conclusion

There is no denying the fact that USA's presence in this region in post-world war II era has immensely contributed towards stability and economic development. However, recent developments like USA's "pivot to Asia" and other such provocative actions like joint military exercises and infringing on the sovereignty of China has heightened the tension as the scenario is once again pushing the region into cold war mentality of containment. Being sole super power, USA has to reach out to China and other regional countries for bridging trust gap and maintaining conducive environment, therefore, military transparency has to be backed up by practical actions for trust building between USA and other stakeholders.

NOTES

- ¹ Shipping transiting the region must pass through one of four chokepoints: the straits of Malacca, Sunda, or Lombok, or possibly the straits east of East Timor. See John H. Noer, *Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1996.
- ² Creating Framework to Assess Mil Transparency by POSSE (Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation), 11 - 14 November, 2012, Workshop at Vienna, Austria.
- ³ Ernest Z. Bower, CSIS; *Southeast Asia's Geopolitical Centrality and the U.S - Japan Alliance*. June 2015.
- ⁴ Hillary Clinton, "America's Engagement in the Pacific", Remarks at the Kahala Hotel, Honolulu, Oct 28, 2010.
- ⁵ Lexington Institute, 9 November 2011.
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- ⁷ Adam Rose and David Brunnstrom, December 10, 2015: China warns U.S. it will not allow violations of its waters, Beijing/ Washington.
- ⁸ East Asia does not include Australia, which is usually analyzed separately, although Australia is an important ally and has played a major role in the pivot.
- ⁹ *Asia Pacific Bulletin*, No 329, 25 March, 2016.
- ¹⁰ Time to end wishful thinking about China's North Korea Policy, *The Diplomat Newspaper* , 5 August 2017.
- ¹¹ US Pacific Fleet Commander Joins 7 Hour Surveillance over South China Sea, *US News-Newspaper*, 15 July 2015, <http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2015/07/19/us-pacific-fleet-chief-joins-surveillance-of-south-china-sea> (2 November 2017)
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STRATEGIC NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE & CPEC UNDERSTANDING THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL PARADIGMS

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Abstract

National interest is considered as the top priority for the survival of any country. With the changing paradigms at regional and international level, Pakistan's national position is facing ever-changing scenario of its dynamic nature. The regional and international powers, (especially China) with their mega projects have created ripples in the region, thus changing the paradigms internationally. CPEC is among one of the paradigms, which is a Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) that involves Chinese investments of over 46 billion dollars in various sectors including; Gwadar Port, energy projects, infrastructure development, and industrial cooperation. CPEC has been rightly titled a "game changer" in terms of its promise to transform regional connectivity through shared economic development. The paper highlights various existing as well as upcoming challenges, and presents a comprehensive solution to move forward.

Keywords: CPEC, National Interest, Infrastructure Development, Changing Paradigms, SEZs, Challenges and Threats.

Introduction

China Pakistan Economic Corridor is a huge initiative and offshoot of the enormous portfolio "One Belt One Road (OBOR)" initiated by China to establish its strategic and economic strength in the region.

There are many aspects leading towards mega benefits of the Chinese projects related to the 900 billion dollar OBOR concept. This is an overland project sided by the SREB (Silk Route Economic Belt) by the Maritime Silk Road (MSR). Here it is important to mention that there are multiple frameworks of OBOR, and CPEC is one of its six frameworks passing through the Pakistani landscape. When it comes to the investment point of view on CPEC, financial investment from the Chinese side is more than 46 billion US dollars, which is considered as one of the largest investments since 1947. This is supposed to be used towards strategic development as it has plan to construct mega structures intended to join the western part of China with the Pakistani new port, Gwadar,

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through a long road and railway network. This is also considered a strategic route for Pakistan as it includes road and rail track with Eastern Route, Western Route and Central Route. The whole project is comprised of many years to get accomplished. The time span for the project is set as of fifteen years that includes four phases and around fifty-one projects related to various sectors like; energy sector, strategic economic zones and rail network.

CPEC a Flagship Project

CPEC is a flagship, mega and high-level project that focuses on the shifting of Pakistan's position from Geography Oriented Contingency (GOC) into a Strategically Economy Oriented Contingency (SEOC). It is considered as a strategic move by the Chinese president Xi Jinping, when he visited Pakistan and the idea was turned into a bilateral strategy of both countries.

Background Milieu

There were some substantial occurrences, which pushed both the countries forward toward this mega project. Some significant initiations are as below:

- Since 1963, in January, both China and Pakistan started their economic linkages by agreeing on long-range bilateral contracts including FTA (Free Trade Agreement) in November 24th 2006. Then both started working closely with each other on economic aspects and thus operationalized the Port of Gwadar in 2007. It was also considered as state held and Chinese owned overseas port in Feb 2013, but later on it has been emerged as deep seaport of Pakistan, which is definitely going to be the strategic strength for the nation in the future.³
- Then in 2006, both countries tried to work on bilateral benefits and the then president of Pakistan, presented the idea of connecting Gwadar to China through any strong link. It was just an idea and discussed among the top leadership of the country. However there was no substantial initiation taken on it at that point of time.⁴
- Later, President of China initiated his strategic visits to various countries with a great policy move. He visited different countries including Kazakhstan, Indonesia and others, presenting the concept of Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) in 2013. When President of China Xi Jinping put forth his idea, it was really appreciated by many regional

leaders. Later on the idea was named as One Belt One Road (OBOR) encompassing various projects. CPEC has become one of the significant points in OBOR because it links the West China to the Port of Gwadar strategically, and this would provide connectivity to deep seas to China and hence optional path for the transfer of oil and goods. This can enhance offering inter and intra state trade opportunities. Thus supporting the oil transfer from Middle East, linking Africa establishing connectivity with Europe.⁵

- The visit of Chinese Prime Minister was considered very fruitful as it resulted in establishing the secretariat of CPEC in the capital of Pakistan, Islamabad, on August 27, 2013. Later on, then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif visited China and held an elaborative discussion on the mega project of CPEC in the month of April 2014. The discussion focussed on planning of the project with the Prime Minister of China Li Keqiang. After that, for the support of the project in financial terms, Government of China allowed financial support to the Chinese companies in order to construct infrastructure and energy projects, which were estimated as more than 46 billion US dollars.⁶ After that, this all was made official and both countries' representatives signed the contract in April 20th, 2015.⁷

South Asia

CPEC has the potential to promote the whole South Asia into a more developed and improved region, with much better coordination and collaboration of the regional countries. Through better connectivity of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, China and others, it seeks to further expand its nature to also include Myanmar the success of this project is directly linked with the commitment of Beijing and its interests. This further stretches towards Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka, which pushes itself towards achieving full potential, and fruits to be harvested from one belt one road mega project of China.⁸

Afghanistan

As it is the fact that Afghanistan is rich in minerals, gas, oil and further resources to be explored, may turn into an economic power but the issue is that, it has no sea route to get the resources exported to other countries and parts of the World. This is considered as one of the major deficiencies of any country, to

be dependent of any other state for sea connectivity. To get the access of a sea route, CPEC can help Afghanistan, by providing it access to sea through Gwadar Port.

Iran

The country has been friendly and cooperative with the initiatives of Pakistan like gas pipeline and its expansion to China. CPEC linkage is considered to develop more strategic unity among the various segments of the society having their ideal within and outside Pakistan. CPEC is understood as an initiator of the regional stability through trade enhancement. Iran is also having its port, Chahbahar, in competition with the port of Gwadar with the support of Indians. New Delhi is considered a competitor, but here it is considered as cooperative initiative instead of pure competition, because it would definitely bring economic growth, stability and prosperity to the region. This could be bilateral support to each other as mutual connectivity may bring stronger and long-term development between two great countries. Thus Chahbahar and Gwadar would be considered complementary to each other, instead of competitive to one another. Both ports would be based on sharing and coordination, which would lead both nations towards prosperity and development in the region.¹⁰

Central Asia

The expansion of Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline till the port of Gwadar would augment the trade with central Asian countries in the area. This would also increase the transportation of goods and services to each other from Gwadar port. In this way, Central Asian States would also get benefit through CPEC strategically.¹¹

Russia

Russia has been a strategically important country in the international community, throughout the World history. Being super power, it has strategic stakes in various parts of the Globe. It is trying to revive its global role. CPEC and development in the world policies of Gwadar would provide opportunity to open its trade in the warm water. As a vest country and super power, Russia would get the opportunity to expand its trade routes and economic activities towards South Asia.¹²

USA

Earlier it was believed that United States did not have any great interest in the CPEC, but later, CPEC has become part of USA's think tanks for future moves. United States of America would definitely have its strategic and security aspects linked with CPEC, but it has not shown any substantial interest in it overtly. On the other side, USA depicted its apprehension towards China that it's stretching its influence in Indian Ocean through what they call string of pearls strategy. Being the ally of both India and Pakistan, USA tried to keep a balanced approach towards such mega project, and it has not openly opposed or supported the CPEC, but definitely CPEC is going to be influencing the economic and strategic activities of USA in the South Asian region.

India

India is neither considering CPEC as supportive to itself nor does it considers CPEC strategically positive for its economy. Therefore, India puts its weight in opposition with the so-called argument that CPEC crosses through the Gilgit Baltistan region, which is, disputed territory as per India's bogus claim. It doesn't seem a sensible argument because the Karakorum Highway already passes through the same territory, thus making India's claim juvenile conjecture. As a matter, the same point has been taken throughout and this situation is by mischief utilized by India in different forums, furthering the movements based on nationalism and sub nationalism and even sectarianism oriented issues in order to turn the focus away from the development of CPEC. After feeling the strategic threat, India started using soft and hard tactics to stop the development of the project. The evidence is seen in the form of terrorist attacks and the personnel caught by Pakistani security agencies in Karachi and other parts of the country. Therefore, clashes against CPEC emerge on line of control and even on its working boundary.

Middle East

Although countries in Middle East are brotherly countries and have been supportive to Pakistan, the initiative of CPEC has created a sort of competitive and undesirable perception in their minds. This carries out a perception of progress of Pakistan that may undervalue the significance of Middle East. Thus some countries may attach with the confronting allies and thus oppose the development, however, this seems to be just transitory as due to tactical moves of India. It's also true that CPEC would ultimately help and

support the Middle East countries towards more stability, trade and development.¹⁵

CPEC Plan and Emerged Themes

In order to have a detailed view of the CPEC mega project phases, let's have a brief overview of all the four phases.

- Early harvest projects completion by 2018 - The projects called early harvest projects, value more than twenty eight billion US dollars in almost all provinces of Pakistan, which were agreed upon on the visit of Chinese president Xi in 2015. This basic phase is going to be done fast and it is planned that this may be accomplished till the last month of 2017 or around somewhere in 2018.
- Short term projects completion by 2020 - Secondly, the CPEC phase is related to projects oriented to energy and other development related aspects and infrastructure. This second phase is expected to be accomplished by 2020, most probably if the continuous co-work kept up consecutively.
- Mid-term projects, completion by 2025 - This next phase is considered third phase related projects, which incorporates the SEZs, or what they call is Special Economic Zones. This phase is expected to include establishing these zones and industrial parts, which are expected to be completed by 2025.
- Long term projects completion by 2030 - next is the fourth phase, which mostly includes the functionalization and operationalization of railway mostly. This is expected to complete by 2030.

Energy Sector Development

Another aspect of CPEC includes the energy production based on supply and demand. This is expected to meet 10,400 MW by 2017 and in addition to it, 6645 MWs afterwards would be produced and managed.¹⁸

CPEC is expected to increase energy mix through adding the production of 13,005 MW's of electricity generated from coal, and around 1,000 MW's to be produced from solar and similarly 350 MW's to be produced from wind. This all would add up in the energy sector and the contribution from the only coal would add up 48%.

Infrastructure Development

Generally in South Asian countries and specifically in Pakistan, inadequate infrastructure is the most problematic factor for business. There is another school of thought which states that infrastructure may not play a vital role in the development of a country but it is not acknowledged among the world community. As far as Pakistan is concerned, Pakistan's ranking in availability of infrastructure, is 119 out of 142. Through CPEC, it is expected that this issue would be addressed largely and after development, Pakistan would benefit hugely, its infrastructure.²⁰

Road and Railway Networks

Considered the foundation at and core elements of CPEC, road and railway lines are to be established. It is planned that CPEC is going to contribute by adding around 829 km road structure in the already sited structure. After completion of the CPEC, the side-by-side road structures would be developed in order to have better distribution of traffic. This would enhance connection and commute of public and the flow of traffic on roads. Similarly, CPEC would help enhance the passenger share of 10% and freight of 4% to higher figures in Pakistan's railway.

The rail network is considered the backbone of transportation of any state and Pakistan has been suffering poor structure, networking and performance here. Through reconstruction and up-gradation of Pakistan railway lines from Karachi to Lahore, is likely to partially address this anomaly and would enhance Railways share in both passenger and freight traffic. Additionally, it is considered that new rail tracks would also be developed, and Construction of new railway tracks like Karachi - Gwadar which is of around seven hundred kilometres, Sukkur-Gwadar line which is around 1048 kilometres, and similarly Khunjrab-Havelian link which is around 652 kilometres would definitely generate a new "Freight Corridors", that would be better and more effective.

Gwadar Port

Being considered the economic engine of Pakistan, the bulk of imports and exports are handled from Karachi. There has been a long awaited alternative as support to this port, which may handle the imports and exports through its sea route. Thus, the Gwadar port has its crucial significance in the region both nationally and internationally. Transformation of Gwadar into a port city would

bring local as well as foreign investments in the Special Economic Zones and would flourish by improving the quality of life of the people.

Industrial Growth

Strategically assessing, it is seen that the industrial growth is inevitable after CPEC. As textile industries are based on electricity, and through CPEC, various initiations in the shape of projects would increase their capacity and production. Similarly, many industries including, rubber, leather, and other industries including plastic manufacturing and processing would also start functioning at their optimum capacity. This would be possible through the improving energy shortage issues, as expected by the year 2018. Numerous mushroom growths of small and medium industries may emerge including trucking related business and alike, by getting benefits from CPEC development.²¹

Special Economic Zones (SEZs)

When it comes to SEZs, any country's position is based on two important factors; military and economy. To strengthen a country economically, its not possible to achieve the target without the exposure and encouragement of economics hubs. Pakistan is situated at a strategic position already, and its strategic position is seen getting better and stronger in times to come, especially in terms of economy. The establishment of mining, processing of food, agriculture, livestock, and energy related businesses would be established at the economic zones.

Labor Market

Labor market of South Asia is not only abundant, but also is blessed with multiple skills and creativity. As the youth of Pakistan constitutes larger share of the population, that has to be given proper consideration. Many initiations have been taken by the Government to date to harness the potential but no effective system has been established yet. Through the inception of CPEC, various projects related to CPEC, which include; building of roads, infrastructure, development, economic zones and hubs would ultimately generate jobs for semi-skilled, and skilled youth of Pakistan. Thus channeling the major potential of the labor market. Additionally, if the twenty-six economic zones are established, they would encompass a major chunk of the Pakistani youth, almost equal to that of "Hattar Industrial Estate" (HIS). As Hattar Industrial Estate is constituted

of around 230 operational units, encompassing more than 65,000 workers and employees. This can be expected positively that CPEC and its economic zones would generate more than 1.7 million jobs for the people of Pakistan.

Defence and Security – bringing Balance of Power and Minimum Deterrence

As far as defence and security are concerned, both have been crucial for the country, since its inception. For coping with this aspect, short-term mechanisms have been developed many times but there was always a need of long-term strategic development and sustainability in the region. It is considered that CPEC would definitely strengthen Pakistan's security aspects as well. Not only because of the significance for the project to Pakistan but it's also because China is becoming the core stakeholder and thus this corroboration would establish stability in the overall region.

From the Security Aspect

To ensure the successful accomplishment of the mega project, security of the workers and contractors needs to be ensured. Therefore, various security organisations including; federal as well as provincial ones are the major stakeholders. CPEC needs fool proof security of the workers and employees of its projects, especially the security related to foreigners, and more specifically the Chinese employees working on various projects. At the national level, the National Crisis Management Cell (NCMC) is considered responsible to provide the security to all the workers, locals as well as the foreigners. It is considered more important to provide security to all the foreigners through National Foreign Security Cell (NFSC) and this cell operates in collaboration with district and provincial level foreign security cells. A Special Security Division (SSD), in the year 2015, has been established for China Pakistan Economic Corridor. The objective is to provide, coordinate and monitor security of Chinese personals on Government sponsored CPEC projects and also to monitor and advise other stakeholders including private businesses in coordination with NCMC and Ministry of Interior.

Control and Reporting Mechanism

The security apparatus works under Article 245 of constitution of Pakistan and ATA 1997 (Amended), with the intention that it has to have

intelligence sharing mechanism with all intelligence agencies of the country including NADRA interface and all departments assist it.

The Way Forward

Generically, strategic positive impact is potentially observed from the beginning of CPEC, but some recommendations are presented here for the effective and efficient execution of this mega project. These recommendations are for timely completion and effectively achieving the milestones as set in the planning phase.

Realm of Political Arena

In the political arena, CPEC seems to have more complications but these are not due to real issues but more so due to a lack of clarity in various aspects of the project. Such aspects may distort the essence of the project and may hinder or negatively influence the very progress of CPEC. Therefore, there is a dire need to address such aspects in the political arena.

- It is recommended that all the Provincial Government representatives to be effective part of JWG, in order to discuss the issues related to the respective province and thus managing the existing apprehensions.
- A major stakeholder of CPEC is Gilgit Baltistan (GB) which requires a more focused and considerate approach. It is recommended that the representatives from the GB Government have to be given due consideration and included at the federal level committees including JWG, Economic Coordination Committee (ECC) and Council of Common Interest (CCI) as well.

Realm of Diplomatic and International Arena

Reputation can be developed or distorted through diplomatic moves, in the international community, therefore, it is, an important function of now-a-days strategies to handle issues diplomatically in order to be successful

- There is a competitive rift between US and China, and here again Pakistan can play a vital role in balancing this rift. As the US has been one of the big investors in Pakistan and it may have great interest of investment in some of the economic zones. Thus, considering US for the investment purpose in CPEC, there can positive impact on this region.

This would also additionally the problems iron out related to Afghanistan and the stability of Afghanistan would help its development, which is beneficial for Pakistani economy. It would not only help Pakistan in economic terms but also strengthen Pakistan strategically and security wise as well.

- Engaging India may also be an aspect of success, as being neighbour, it is crucial to deal the relations strategically based on mutual benefits and future prospects. Related to CPEC, a balanced approach may be more suitable and it may be done through economic strategies and joint collaboration
- Similarly, Iran has been Pakistan's brotherly Muslim ally and there is a need of proactive engagement with Iran to re-establish the strong brotherly coordination through gas pipeline and similar other projects. This would not only strengthen the bond but also enhance the security of both countries and ultimately of the region. The projects like gas pipeline and alike may be stretched to China through CPEC, and this could make Iran one of the major stakeholders in CPEC too.

Realm of Economic Arena

- Economic benefits can be gained if the project milestones are accomplished in time because lagging behind can cost much. It is recommended that mostly projects lag behind their timeline, and as CPEC is a mega project and it is apprehended that it may lag behind its scheduled timeline. In order to ensure its completion on time, there is a need to develop a commission to monitor the progress and the system has to be established that check and reports about milestones of the project from the start till end. It is crucial and may be critically necessary because if the economic zones are not established within the scheduled time, the energy wouldn't be provided and if the energy would not be provided to other in line projects, the further functioning can't be done, thus hampering the whole project and costing hugely.
- One of the corporate responsibilities is Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) where the organisations have to consider the community as one of the stakeholders. The employment for locals is also very important, as the projects need to up-grade and provide employment to the local community. This mega project is expected to upgrade the society through local people employment in various projects through non-skilled, semi-skilled and skilled jobs. Then, additional vocational

training institution may be established to provide adequate skills to the local people of the region. It's recommended that almost 50% of the employment could be done from Pakistani population and contribution may be ensured in every project related to CPEC.

Realm of Security Arena

CPEC needs high levels of security, not only for its planning phase but also till its completion and maintenance. Pakistan has already raised security personnel for this purpose but the technologically advanced equipment and mechanism need to be installed for this purpose. An elaborate and effective maritime security plan is the need of the hour, in order to provide security to whole CPEC especially the Gwadar Port and the related operational works. For this purpose, Pakistan Navy needs to play its crucial role by adding up its strength in all aspects to safeguard this national mega project.

Conclusion

China Pakistan Economic Corridor is a mega project, a well-perceived vision, and well initiated by both friendly countries. This would strategically establish both the countries' interests closer, more secure and economically stronger. CPEC, potentially is going to establish information networks, industries, economics zones, development related to agriculture, infrastructure development, and connectivity but would also be very fruitful for all the provinces / regions to be united together through one mega project and upgrade the life style, socially, financially and health wise.

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