

SYNERGIZING FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OF PAKISTAN

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Abstract

The foreign and security policy of Pakistan need to be rationalized without bandwagoning with any state. Every country's real source of power is embedded in its economic foundation and internal cohesion, which enables it to develop other elements of national power to effectively compete in a competitive world. On the other hand, the issue of terrorism especially associated with Al Qaeda and its affiliates, warrants effective and resolute eradication measures. Pakistan has to craft a flexible nuclear deterrence strategy to stabilize its strategic equation with India, and to prevent escalation of crises. The acme of diplomatic and strategic finesse necessitates that Pakistan synergize its instruments of maneuverability – nuclear deterrence, diplomacy, strategy, geo-economics, internal and external balancing in harmony with the transforming regional/geostrategic environment.

Keywords: India-Pakistan, Nuclear Deterrence, Foreign and Security Policy, Strategy, Balancing.

Introduction

Instrategic dialect, nuclear deterrence¹ and posturing is a combination of all elements of the national power to achieve states' policy objectives.² The chain of strategy is linked with other components of national power, which are considered to be the fundamental tools to pragmatically protect states' interests. "Strategy is the bridge that relates military power to political purpose," writes Colin Gray, and "it is neither military power *per se* nor political purpose." He further elaborates that strategy is "made of *force and the threat of force for the ends of policy*."³ The foremost tenet of strategy is, that it should constantly adapt to the shifting conditions of the ever-changing world "where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate" the international system.⁴ Therefore, posturing is a reflection of the states' collective power that positively or negatively impinges upon their relative position in the ever-changing world. It is argued that nuclear posturing and foreign policy of Pakistan need to be premised on the principles of pragmatism, flexibility, and proportionate strategy by reinforcing all elements of its national power to protect its national interests in view of asymmetrical nature

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of India-Pakistan's adversarial relationship. In this respect, Bernard Brodie observes that the strategic thinking and theory becomes flawed, if it is not pragmatic.⁵

Foreign & Security Policy

In international politics, the balance of power has been in practice since the time immemorial, and it is considered to be of immense significance in inter-state relations/diplomacy. David Hume describes the balance of power as a scientific pursuit of law. On the other hand, Glenn Snyder viewed it as the central theoretical concept in international politics. Generally, the golden age of the practice of the balance of power theory was 18th and 19th centuries. In the 20th century, Hans Morgenthau elucidated Hume's perspective by referring to the balance of power as an iron law of politics. Henry Kissinger treated it as an art instead of a science, which could be adroitly employed by the policymakers to protect their foreign and security policy objectives.⁶ Jack S. Levy writes that the balance of power is the most critical component of international politics; but, simultaneously it is also the most ambiguous and complex.⁷ But, in contemporary world, the existence of international nuclear order also has a significant role. In this context, William Walker writes:

Given the existence of nuclear technology, the international nuclear order entails, evolving patterns of thought and activity that serve primary goals of world survival, war avoidance and economic development; and the quest for a tolerable accommodation of pronounced differences in the capabilities, practices, rights and obligations of states.⁸

In such a transforming environment, Pakistan's insecurities are heightened; therefore, it need to rationalize its internal and external balancing strategies by acquiring additional countervailing capabilities to favourably rebalance the present power differential.⁹ Hence, instead of bandwagoning it may be prudent for Pakistan to pursue a sophisticated balance of power policy in an anarchic world.¹⁰ The dominant states are primed toward offensive behavior, war, blackmail, and buck passing.¹¹ The power differential between India and Pakistan is markedly in favor of the former, therefore, imbalance would tend to invite aggression against the weaker state,¹² and hence the case for synergizing of Pakistan's foreign and security policy becomes more critical. Nowadays, relations amongst nations are premised on a complex web of interdependencies.¹³ The past two decades has witnessed a marked imbalance in Pakistan's internal, external,

and geo-economic policies that has adversely conditioned its socio-economic, law and order fabric, and undermined its relative position and image abroad. In essence, it is a question of capability and the state's specified function to readjust with the unfolding environment.¹⁴ Most importantly, now the concept of states' sovereignty is under stress due to variety of factors, including transnational crime, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and non-state actors' (NSA) activities. Consequently, it is being linked with trans-border movements, including that of NSAs.¹⁵ This does not mean that states' sovereignty is dead, or it has become redundant; rather, it emphasizes the need to regulate the behavior of all instruments of the state in harmony with transformation in international realm. States are expected to freely enter into any agreement with other states in a legitimate way.¹⁶

Therefore, the security governance concept is expected to be dominated by the principles of assurance, prevention and protection as internal instruments of states to strengthen their institutions, and to resolve their conflicts.¹⁷ Per se, the post-Westphalian states' national security cultures are likely to be influenced by four factors: "the worldwide view of the external environment; national identity; instrumental preferences; and interaction preferences," which would impact the dynamics of international system.¹⁸ This does not necessarily denote world government or global governance, writes Jessica T Mathews, through various national and international institutions.¹⁹

Internal Dynamics & Geo-Economics

In essence, the significance of states' foreign and security policy is driven by its geopolitical and geo-economic base that strengthens or erodes its relative power in international affairs.²⁰ In the fast transforming world, carrots are becoming more important than the sticks, observes Nye.²¹ However, military power is still considered as a potent tool in the hands of states.²² Actually, the military power can only flow from the economic base.²³ Basically, it is the amalgam of geo-economics that produces the hard and soft power, ranging from Gross Domestic Product (GDP), per capita income, the level of technology, natural and human resources, political and legal institutions for markets, such as trade, finance, and competition,²⁴ that shape nation-states' future. For instance, E H Carr described the national power as the sum combination of military, economic, and opinion making potentials that determine the relative position of a state.²⁵ Furthermore, in the post-9/11 world, there are divergent perspectives relating to tackling of pressing problems and issues through the economic,

political, and diplomatic toolkits, and not necessarily through the countervailing military force.²⁶

The Pakistani policymakers should realize that, in nuclear domain, it is fundamentally the state's "power to hurt" capability that accords it the bargaining position vis-à-vis adversary.²⁷ While the "brute force succeeds when it is used, whereas the power to hurt is most successful when held in reserve," writes Thomas Schelling.²⁸ Essentially, the power potentials coupled with states' internal and external dynamics and equitable "opposing strengths may cancel each other," instead of inflicting "pain and grief"²⁹ or making rhetorical statements and futile complaints or indulging in blame games.

Other problems directly linked to Pakistan are: turmoil in Afghanistan and its adverse fallouts on the state of terrorism in Balochistan and tribal areas; cost of the counter-terrorism drive; rampant corruption, and dysfunctional governance structure; revival of the economy; efforts "to heal the festering sore in Balochistan;" security and Kashmir-related challenges from India; strategic marginalization of Pakistan; growing conventional military asymmetry; and the growing role of nuclear deterrence.³⁰ In addition, the multiple internal and external problems of terrorism and NSAs associated with Pakistan are also responsible for creation of a negative perception about country as a source of threat to international peace and security.³¹ On this issue, US policymakers appear to be frustrated, writes Talat Masood, since Pakistan's attempts to block the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) supply line in 2014 (after killing of 25 Pakistani soldiers in a NATO/US strike) undermined its pivotal role as a regional power; thereby leading to its further marginalization. In the context of strategic marginalization of Pakistan and the imperative of a "new strategic paradigm," Ambassador Munir Akram, writes:

Pakistan's endeavor to reverse its political marginalization would become much easier if it can change the strategic paradigm regarding South Asia that emerged over the last decade. This change can emanate mainly from a shift in the security parameters and perceptions of the United States and its allies.³²

Another Pakistani scholar, Mahleeha Lodhi, surveys that Pakistan's foreign and security policy take into account the legitimate aspirations of Kashmiri people, sustain its conventional and strategic deterrent posture vis-à-vis India; but, at the same time, adroitly exploit the mutually advantageous trade and economic relations.

She further remarked that:

*Vastly expanded strategic and economic relations should be pursued with China which offers Pakistan the best hope for the realization of its security and economic objectives. A balanced and stable relationship with the US should be built on mutual accommodation of legitimate national interests, respect for Pakistan's sovereignty and expanded cooperation in areas of benefit to both sides.*³³

Other critical aspect for Pakistan is the changing dynamics of geopolitics, where its credentials are being questioned and tainted due to prevalent dysfunctional internal regulatory mechanism of the state against NSAs' activities. On the external front, the onslaught of NSAs with alleged linkages with different transnational organizations, including with other states, is undermining its relative standing.³⁴ While the present US policy of pursuing a transactional relationship with Pakistan - is another negative development. On the other hand, the US has established a strategic alliance with India at the cost of its traditionally cordial ties with Pakistan.³⁵ In fact, Pakistani policymakers are vying for a durable strategic engagement with US, even after the announced withdrawal of latter's forces from Afghanistan,³⁶ which till April 2017 did not materialize. The US appears to be apprehensive about Pakistan becoming another North Korea.³⁷ Concurrently, influential US opinion formulation organs, including the print media are portraying Pakistan in a negative hue.³⁸ Unfortunately, negative perceptions has been built by some academics and intellectuals and are incessantly urging that Pakistan be treated at par with Iran and North Korea - as a hostile country that requires containment instead of friendship.³⁹ While powerful Indian Diaspora based in US-West also tend to magnify, if not over-dramatize, concerns regarding the safety and security of Pakistan's strategic arsenal, and accuses it of supporting NSAs.⁴⁰ On the other hand, Pakistan has already provided evidence of alleged Indian sponsoring of terrorism in Balochistan, Karachi and in tribal regions to the United Nations and US.⁴¹ The ostensible unfavorable projection of Pakistan has tremendously undermined Pakistan's diplomatic position in spite of its intellectuals' and policymakers' constructive leanings toward US-West. In actual fact, the country's overall strategic and diplomatic position is a sum reflection of its governance, socio-economic base, and internal cohesion, as how its resources, including material and human, are optimally harnessed for the end of "maximizing the total effectiveness" of state in critical circumstances.⁴²

Despite perceptible US pressure on Pakistan,⁴³ it cannot discount the latter's significance in geopolitical calculus. According to Vali Nasr, "In this great-power rivalry, Pakistan is a strategic asset to China – a thorn in India's side, a useful balancer that occupies many of India's military and diplomatic resources and distracts India from focusing on China." Therefore, in the case of conceding Pakistan to China, observes Nasr, US would entangle itself in another phase of rivalry with Beijing. This, in his perspective, would be one of United States' worst nightmares as it would impact its counterterrorism efforts.⁴⁴ Presently, Pakistan does not possess adequate power index ranging from resources to technology, economy, infrastructural base, and military capabilities.

Nuclear Deterrence Dimensions

The concept of regional-centric nuclear deterrence or proportionate strategic policy would accord Pakistan an effective channel to reinforce its military muscle, which is still considered as an effective instrument of power in the world affairs. It has become more critical especially when India, according to Vipin Narang, is reportedly reconfiguring its no-first use policy to first-use/preemptive strategy against Pakistan. Whereas India's former National Security Adviser, Shivshankar Menon, writes in his memoir that, "There is a potential gray area as to when India would use nuclear weapons first."⁴⁵ Secondly, the geopolitical transformation has furthermore changed Pakistan's significance in US, which during the Cold War period was a linchpin of Washington's strategic calculus under its "Northern Tier of Defense" policy that was outlined by Eisenhower Administration in 1950s.⁴⁶ The Northern Tier of Defense states were Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, which were taken on board as allies in order to contain Communism. Nasr observes that, "Now China is rebuilding old 'Northern Tier of Defense' multilateral organizations for its own strategic ends."⁴⁷ In addition, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), according to Nasr, aims to achieve the objectives of security and economic related issues, and to foster Chinese-Russian collaborative framework.⁴⁸ Interestingly, once again, Pakistan is on the volatile edge of the Northern Tier of Defense, which is now linked to US policy of rebalancing Chinese rise and its impact on Asia-Pacific.⁴⁹ Ipso facto, due to strategic dynamics of contemporary world, Pakistan forms an integral part of the chain stretching from Turkey to the Asia-Pacific region. Because of these dramatic geostrategic transformations from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Rim, India appears to be well integrated with the United States' "Indo-Pacific pivot" policy.⁵⁰

The establishment of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is expected to further increase the geopolitical significance of Pakistan, as it possesses a critical location that would provide China an access to two Oceans – Pacific and Indian. Opening of strategic link of CPEC under China’s “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) vision would enable Beijing through CPEC to establish its connectivity stretching from Central Asia, Iran, and Middle East to Africa and Europe. Actually, the changing geostrategic dynamics have prompted Pakistan and China to join hands to construct a geo-economic, geo-political and security architecture under the framework of CPEC to safeguard their national interests. For the realization of these objectives, China started its “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “Maritime Silk Road of the Twenty-First Century” projects, which were with clear design to achieve Beijing’s long-term strategic and economic goals. On the other hand, Pakistan had joined CPEC to stabilize its internal/external security and socio-economic situation, to build its communication infrastructure, increase energy generation, and to rehabilitate its geopolitical standing, which is fast eroding due to US-India burgeoning strategic partnership. These initiatives were launched by President Xi Jinping in October 2013.

In contemporary world, nuclear deterrence is difficult to effectively balance the unbalanced power equation between the rival states. In such a volatile environment, the stronger state is likely to pressurize the weaker country through coercive tactics or use of force.⁵¹ In asymmetrical circumstances, Pakistan per se would fundamentally rely on its regional-centric nuclear deterrence theoretical *model* to standardize measures to streamline the whole gamut of its foreign and security policy. In this perspective, when battlefield-tactical nuclear weapons are integrated into Indian and Pakistani military doctrines, however, there is still a space to calibrate strategies below the threshold levels of each other.⁵² In fact, already both countries’ conventional war-fighting capabilities and other non-military elements of security are asymmetrical; therefore, the testing of weaker state’s threshold level would be too destabilizing and perilous for the regional peace and security. Actually start of confidence and security building measures to resolve their bilateral issues would go a long way in minimizing the possibilities of crafting of limited war fighting doctrines.⁵³ In this asymmetrical environment, it is believed that Pakistan’s plan to integrate the low-yield nuclear weapons into its arsenal and military calibration with objective to enhance its defensive-offensive capability, and to evolve a viable strategy against the conventionally and strategically stronger India. Moreover, it would assist Pakistan to counter wide range of

threats, and to deny manoeuvrability space to India's plan to initiate a limited war.⁵⁴ Therefore, Pakistan's induction of battlefield nuclear weapons appears to be a deterrence stabilization strategy to balance the regional security equation.

Concluding Observations

The existing asymmetrical power equation between India and Pakistan, it was argued, can be prudently balanced by Pakistan through synergizing of its foreign and security policy, and with adroit employment of flexible policy, proportionate conventional, tactical, and strategic strategizing vis-à-vis militarily, geopolitically, economically, and strategically much superior power – India. One, a fine-balance could be adroitly achieved by removing all irritants with the regional countries and by eradicating the scourge of terrorism and fundamentalism. Two, Pakistan to effectively balance its relationship with the Gulf Cooperation Council and the European Union countries, including China, and US; however without bandwagoning with any predominant regional or extra-regional state(s) – and to consider having productive ties with all the countries of the Asia-Pacific, including India, China, US, and the EU. Three, in spite of prevailing asymmetry between India and Pakistan, the latter can sustain its independence and prevent adversary from gaining escalation dominance, employment of coercive tactics in a crisis, or to attain power at its expense.⁵⁵ Four, it should take this fact into account that, every country's real source of power flows from its natural resources, economic and industrial potentials that enables it to build military power and to hold adversaries at bay.⁵⁶ Five, the international relations theorists write that the options of bandwagoning and balancing are the key strategies to neutralize the peer-competitors.⁵⁷

Both India and Pakistan still lag behind in many institutional and societal reforms in comparison to most of the industrialized nations, including in the realm of socioeconomic, political, meritocratic-based culture/society, institutions, and in inculcation of modern liberal *ethos* in their social structures. However, with respect to India, it is expected to play a pivotal strategic role in accord with United States' global policy to contain China's rise in 21st century. In the case of Pakistan, it had earlier performed a similar role for US to contain Communism during the heydays of the Cold War under Eisenhower's policy of Northern Tier of Defense.⁵⁸ At this intersection, Pakistan again has a significant balancing and stabilization role to perform in the nuclearized, volatile and terrorism infested environment of South Asia, northwest Asia/ Afghanistan and Middle East.

Most significantly, now, there are few lingering irritants between US-West and Pakistan concerning the issue of terrorism, Al Qaeda, drone strikes in latter's tribal areas, which undermined Washington's soft power image in Pakistan.⁵⁹ On the other hand, this has created a negative image of Pakistan in US as well. Moreover, US have also accused Pakistan of harbouring terrorists.⁶⁰ In fact, history tells us that the problem of terrorism, especially associated with Al Qaeda affiliates, is in fact the *lasting legacy* of the Cold War's last battlefield – Afghanistan, when US and its allies walked away from the region after the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989 consequently leaving Pakistan on its own to manage the remnants of this ideological conflict persisting in the form of terrorism and proliferation of NSAs. In essence, as per one writer, “the onus of responsibility of this distressing situation equally rests with the world that had earlier enthusiastically supported the then front-line state – Pakistan.”⁶¹

The present uneasy phase of Pakistan-US relationship has been succinctly summed up by Vali Nasr: “Nowadays it is quite clear that America's favor lies with Pakistan's neighbor and nemesis, India, and at times it seems as if Pakistan is reacting to the uncomfortable fact by embodying all the anti-American anger.”⁶² Therefore, it is important for US as well to consider balancing its relationship with Pakistan by keeping in view Islamabad's sensitivities vis-à-vis India.⁶³ Most significantly, United States' transactional policy with regard to Pakistan is clearly “a failure of American policy, a failure of the sort that comes from the president handing foreign policy over to the Pentagon and the intelligence agencies.”⁶⁴ In India-Pakistan context, as argued in the preceding sections, the latter ought to proportionately align the principles of regional-centric nuclear deterrence to stabilize peace, prevent escalation of crises from spirally out of control,⁶⁵ communicate to adversary about the consequences for any misadventure, and to *finesse* its foreign and security policy with the emerging contours of international politics.⁶⁶

NOTES

- ¹ For a broader understanding of concept of deterrence, Keith B. Payne writes that: “This multidisciplinary approach, instead, is designed to use informed judgments about the specific actor’s decision making in context to help understand and thus establish expectations about the directions of its likely decision making. These expectations then drive judgments about the likely value and effectiveness of alternative deterrence strategies. The basic assumption of procedural rationality may still pertain, but the variables that determine the actual direction of decision making following from procedural rationality are derived from judgments about the opponent given its unique character and place;” see Keith B. Payne, “Understanding Deterrence,” in *Understanding Deterrence*, ed. Keith B. Payne (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p. 34.
- ² According to Lawrence Freedman, the nuclear weapons “disproportionate character guarantees some deterrent effect in any situation in which there is the slightest chance of the employment of any nuclear weapons;” see Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. xiv, 45-85. While Sir Michael Quinlan remarked that the nuclear weapons “could play a stabilizing role in East-West relations” see, Tanya Ogilvie-While, *On Nuclear Deterrence: The Correspondence of Sir Michael Quinlan* (London: The International Institute of International Studies, 2011), p. 37.
- ³ Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 17.
- ⁴ Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley, “Introduction: On Strategy,” in *The Making of Strategy, Rules, and War*, eds. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 1.
- ⁵ See Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1973), p. 452.
- ⁶ See David Hume, “Of the Balance of Power,” in *Balance of Power*, ed. Paul Seabury (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965), pp. 32-36; Glenn H. Snyder, “Balance of Power in the Missile Age,” *Journal of International Affairs* 14 (1961), pp. 21-24; Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1967); and Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).
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- ⁸ William Walker, *A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), p. 12.
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- ¹⁰ See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 126.
- ¹¹ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), pp. 3, 21, 29, chapter 5.
- ¹² See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 26-27.
- ¹³ See Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little Brown, 1977).
- ¹⁴ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 107, 97.
- ¹⁵ Stephen D Kransner, “Sovereignty,” in *Essential Readings in World Politics*, eds. Karen A Mingst and Jack L Snyder (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), p. 144.
- ¹⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁷ Ibid. p. 9.
- ¹⁸ Ibid. p. 11.
- ¹⁹ Quoted by Anne-Marie Slaughter, “The Real New World Order,” in *Essential Readings in World Politics*, eds. Karen A Mingst and Jack L Snyder (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), p. 149.
- ²⁰ See Joseph S Nye, Jr., *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), p. 51.
- ²¹ Ibid.

- ²² See Robert Gilpin, *US Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), p. 24.
- ²³ Nye, *The Future*, p. 52.
- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ E H Carr quoted in *ibid.* p. 82.
- ²⁶ Paul, "Introduction," p. 15.
- ²⁷ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New York: Yale University Press, 2008), p. 2.
- ²⁸ Ibid. p. 3.
- ²⁹ Ibid.
- ³⁰ Akram, "Reversing Strategic," pp. 284-300.
- ³¹ Worldwide International Network/Gallup survey quoted by Imtiaz Gul, "Maybe it's time we Change our Ways," *The Express Tribune*, January 8, 2014.
- ³² Akram, "Reversing Strategic," p. 302.
- ³³ Maleeha Lodhi, "Concluding Note," in *Pakistan: Beyond the "Crisis State,"* ed. Maleeha Lodhi (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 352.
- ³⁴ According to US Defence Secretary, Chuck Hagel, "India, for some time, has always used Afghanistan as a second front, and India has, over the years, financed problems for Pakistan on that side of the border;" "India Bank-rolled Problems for Pakistan in Afghanistan: Hagel," *The Express Tribune*, February 17, 2013.
- ³⁵ Vali Nasr, *The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat* (New York: Doubleday, 2013), p. 81.
- ³⁶ Ibid.
- ³⁷ Ibid.
- ³⁸ Jeffrey Goldberg and Marc Ambinder, "The Ally from Hell," *Atlantic*, December 2011, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archieve/2011/12/the-ally-from-hell/8730/>, accessed December 12, 2012.
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- ⁴³ Nasr, *The Dispensable*, p. 91.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid. pp. 90-91.
- ⁴⁵ See Zulfqar Khan and Ahmad Khan, "The Strategic Impasse over India's Doctrinal Restructuring," *The Washington Quarterly* 39:1 (Spring 2016), pp. 139-157; Shivshankar Menon cited in, Max Fisher, "India Rethinking Nuclear Policy," *The New York times International Edition*, April 5, 2017; and see Vipin Narang's statement cited in, Yashwant Singh, "India could Strike Pakistan with Nuclear Weapons if Threatened, says expert," *Hindustan Times*, March 21, 2017, <http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-could-strike-pakistan-with-nuclear-weapons-if-threatened-says-expert/story-P5N8QuKOldxAJ9UPjboijM.html>, accessed April 7, 2017.
- ⁴⁶ See Herbet Feldman, *From Crisis To Crisis: Pakistan 1962-1969* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972); and Nasr, *The Dispensable*, pp. 247-248.
- ⁴⁷ Nasr, *The Dispensable*, p. 248.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid.
- ⁴⁹ See Sushil K. Singh, "India Shore up Defence Ties, Sign Nuclear Deal," *Asia-Pacific Defense Forum*, October 11, 2013, http://apdforum.com/en_GB/search?q=India%2C+US+Shore+up+Defense+Ties%2C+Sign+Nuclear+Deal&commit=Search, accessed November 17, 2013.
- ⁵⁰ See Vivek Mishra, "India and the Rise of the Indo-Pacific," *The Diplomat*, September 30, 2013.

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- ⁵² Khan and Abbasi, "Regional-Centric," pp. 498-499.
- ⁵³ Ibid. p. 499.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 495.
- ⁵⁵ John J Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2001), p. 139.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 138.
- ⁵⁷ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy*, p. 139.
- ⁵⁸ Feldman, *From Crisis*, pp. 247-248.
- ⁵⁹ Nye, *The Future*, p. 226.
- ⁶⁰ Nasr, *The Dispensable*, p. 65.
- ⁶¹ Zulfqar Khan, "Pakistan's Security: Strategic & Nuclear Perceptions," in *Contemporary Geopolitics: Afghanistan & Pakistan*, eds. Muhammad Saleem Mazhar, Umbreen Javaid and Naheed S Goraya (Lahore: University of the Punjab, 2013), p. 134.
- ⁶² Nasr, *The Dispensable*, p. 66.
- ⁶³ Ibid. p. 71.
- ⁶⁴ Ibid. p. 94.
- ⁶⁵ Khan and Abbasi, "Regional-Centric," pp. 498-499.
- ⁶⁶ Robert Stewart-Ingersoll and Derrick Frazier, *Regional powers and Security Orders: A Theoretical Framework*, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), p. 1. Also see, Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (London: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983); Barry Buzan, "The Case for a Comprehensive Definition of Security and the Institutional Consequences of Accepting it," *Working Papers 4/1990* (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1990); Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century," *International Affairs* 67:3 (1991), pp. 431-451; and Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structures of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 17, 99.