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


# *Margalla Papers*

**2015**

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**National Defence University  
Islamabad – Pakistan  
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## Margalla Papers

**Institute for Strategic Studies, Research & Analysis  
National Defence University, Islamabad**

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# THE IRRELEVANCE OF NUCLEAR GLOBAL ZERO IN THE CHANGED STRATEGIC DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

*Dr. Zafar Khan and Dr. Rizwana Karim Abbasi*

## **Abstract**

*The language of Global Zero (GZ) initiated from the US and got currency particularly after the Obama's Prague speech. The GZ phenomenon is simple to pronounce but gets difficult and complex when it comes to changing contours of the international politics. Although the GZ phenomenon reminds both the nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states of the commitments that they would work for a complete disarmament, which in turn, becomes one of the important ingredients of the non-proliferation regime, both the major and minor nuclear weapons states have yet to work on these commitments. This article is to find out the relevancy of GZ in today's changed strategic environment amongst all nuclear weapons states irrespective of the region, these states belong to. It is to find out the complexities associated with the GZ and what they mean for the world free from nuclear weapons. While analyzing the difficulties the GZ confronts both at the regional and international level, this article aims at finding out whether or not the language of GZ remains any longer relevant in the nuclear politics and ultimately how this would affect the non-proliferation regime.*

**Keywords:** The language of Global Zero; changing contours of nuclear politics; GZ and nuclear weapons states; the GZ and complete disarmament

## **Introduction**

Many think and closely observe that the US and Russia should go for more strategic force reduction after the end of the Cold War. Other think of bringing more openness and greater transparency in terms of nuclear doctrinal posture and yet many others talk about the Global Zero (GZ). Although lots

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Dynamics of International Politics*

have already been written on enhancing the conceptual understanding in the mid and late 1990s, the talk for GZ is speeded up in the 2000s particularly after Obama's Prague speech in 2009 and the development of strategic partnership in the form of New START replacing the older strategic arms reduction talks; that is, START 1. The GZ is a concept that speaks for a nuclear free world, which has a link with the NPT's provisions for disarmament of nuclear weapons by major nuclear weapons states that in reality has not occurred yet. Even if does, the knowledge for re-acquiring nuclear capability cannot simply be eliminated. States forgoing their nuclear weapons today could acquire back when the security threat emerges. It is more to do with the knowledge and greater economy embraced with sophisticated technology that can enable states to acquire nuclear weapons in a shorter period of time.

Little work has been done on the possibility of GZ in the contemporary world. The works that have covered up so far by the Global Zero policy organization co-founded by Bruce Blair depict one-sided picture.<sup>1</sup> It has a little or no policy implications on the US to go for an actual GZ, though Russia and the US are committed to reduce their strategic forces. However, as both the US and Russia tend to reduce their strategic forces to desirable minimum number, more advanced conventional armed forces are acquired by all major powers to replace the level of nuclear deterrence capability, but even the concept of minimum deterrence gets complex when it comes to its actuality. For example, the setting of minimum deterrence for the US and Russia may not be minimum for smaller nuclear weapons states. Therefore, the parameters of minimum deterrence of the major nuclear weapons states may not be applicable on the smaller nuclear weapons states. That said, it is also important to understand how their desired level of strategic reduction, but the continuous and persistent conventional advancement are observed in the real world when it comes to the conceptual understanding of getting other nuclear weapons states on board towards GZ. Both France and Britain retain nuclear deterrence forces. They modernize and upgrade these

deterrent capabilities. Although China has kept its modest number of deterrence forces, it also develops conventional capabilities. None of these major nuclear weapons states have yet crafted a strategy for a universal arms control regime (ACR). Also, smaller nuclear weapons states India, Pakistan and Israel are not part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Therefore, GZ becomes a complex phenomenon. Is nuclear global zero relevant in the changed strategic environment affecting both major and smaller nuclear weapons states? This is very simple and straight forward question, but there is no simple and straight forward answer to this. It would require deeper and critical understanding of the emerging theoretical and conceptual phenomenon of GZ by analyzing various factors that make the concept of GZ irrelevant and unpersuasive. Hypothetically speaking, the GZ remains an irrelevant concept in the changing contours of international politics where uncertainties prevail and struggle for power remains predominant factor despite the needed cooperation amongst states. As the concept of GZ confronts issues, it may become extremely difficult for the states both at the international and regional level to agree on common mechanism to pave ways towards GZ.

This article closely focuses complexities associated with the conceptual understanding of global zero by unpacking the discussion. In doing so, it begins with a series of articles written by the former US officials who have served the US on the top influential positions asking for a global zero. It then examines the conceptual development of the global zero phenomenon around the world and its implications on major and smaller nuclear weapons states. Also, it analyses the challenges from the nuclear aspirant states and what they could mean for the concept of global zero as a whole. It concludes that global zero confronts complexities and seems irrelevant to both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states and that the goal for a world free from nuclear weapons becomes difficult to achieve in the foreseeable future. Also, it concludes that nuclear zero may not be possible without a conflict-zero world.

## **The Gang of Four for Global Zero**

The gang of four: William J. Perry, George P. Shultz, Henry A. Kissinger, Sam Nunn are the four US influential characters who have served the US administration at the top level and contributed in terms of US strategic and security postures. Since they served the US at the top level, their statements matter a lot, affecting the policy choices of the US. Once used to be hawkish for the US policy advancement, the gang of four greatly desires for a global zero. They contributed few short articles in the *Wall Street Journal* in order to convince the US administration in general and the international community in particular, about the need for a nuclear zero and the relevance and irrelevance of nuclear weapons in the post cold war period. The aim of these influential writings is not merely the review of these pieces, but to systematically unpack the grammar of so-called concept of GZ. For example, the language of GZ remains strong in the initial writings of these four men, but that changes gradually in the favor of beast (nuclear forces) reflecting that without these deterrent forces the world could be more chaotic and unstable. In their first article in 2007, they have asked for change in the nuclear policy; that is, the need for a departure from the Cold War greater reliance on nuclear weapons. They opined that although North Korea's nuclear test and Iran aspiration to acquire nuclear weapons undermine the possibility for a nuclear free world, but the consistent Cold War reliance on nuclear weapons have become "increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective".<sup>2</sup>The central argument of the four men is based on the following futuristic agenda: 1) changing the Cold War posture of deployed nuclear weapons to increase warning time; 2) substantial reduction of the size of nuclear weapons in all states; 3) elimination of short-range nuclear weapons (tactical nuclear weapons) between the US and Russia; 4) ratification of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); 5) stopping and banning the production of fissile materials for weapons globally; and 6) achieving the goal of world free from nuclear weapons.<sup>3</sup>



In 2008, the four men stressed on similar points with special emphasis for more strategic reduction of nuclear forces by means of extending the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START 1) which was due to expire in 2009. They stressed that both the US and Russia need to take lead in terms of reducing their armed forces as only they possessed 95% of the total world nuclear warheads. Another emphasis was the need for improvement of verification mechanism bolstered with trust between the two sides just to follow the maxim of the US President Ronald Reagan: “Trust, but verify”.<sup>4</sup>In 2010, there is a change for the first time in a strategic tune of the four men. They assert that the US needs to retain safe, secure and reliable deterrent forces as long as other states possess nuclear weapons. This reflects barriers in the long road towards nuclear zero and it also indicates ambiguity when it comes to the US nuclear policy orientation towards reduction of strategic forces vis-à-vis Russia. While realizing the complex phenomenon of nuclear zero, the four men asserted that, “we will need to maintain our nuclear arsenal, whatever its size, for as long as the nation’s security requires it.”<sup>5</sup>In 2013, the four men still put emphasis of the non-reliance on nuclear and suggested for improving the verification mechanism. Also, they suggested for inclusion of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) as part of the New START strategic dialogue between the US and Russia.<sup>6</sup>

From 2007 to 2013, these four men urged the US and Russia to reduce the strategic deterrent forces towards the ultimate goal of global zero, but they have also realized the difficulties with this regard as they, at the same times, asserted that the US retain its deterrent forces and extends its deterrence to its allies and partners as long as nuclear weapons exist. The language for the desired GZ changes as the gang of four observes complexities with regard to their individualistic approaches towards the so-called GZ phenomenon. The language in these pieces creates dichotomy and ambiguity with regard to GZ phenomenon. This shows ambiguity within the US nuclear policy. Also, this builds up a dilemma between nuclear zero and nuclear deterrence –that is, the concept of GZ speaks for irrelevance of nuclear weapons

in the post cold war era and nuclear deterrence reemphasizes the significance of these forces for strategic stability. The dilemma consistently exists and it exists in the US President Barak Obama's Prague speech too, when he desired for a nuclear zero, but at the same time asserted that it may not be possible at least in his life time. The ambiguity with regard to nuclear zero enlarges.

### **Obama's Dream for a Nuclear Zero**

Obama highlighted the fear and deadly consequences of these weapons and the risk associated with nuclear proliferation. However, Obama asserted the complexity associated with the world free from nuclear weapons when he stated, "this goal will not be reached quickly...perhaps not in my lifetime." This indicates that on one hand the US desires for a world free from nuclear weapons, but on the other, the US retains safe, secure and reliable deterrent forces as long as nuclear weapons exist; that is, to protect the US heartland and its allies and partners. Paradoxically, global zero is not happening and it would perhaps not occur as long as we have conflicts and security threats around the world. Perhaps, nuclear zero would first require conflict zero world, but in reality, unfortunately, the world would confront with uncertain and unpredictable episodes that would open new avenues for more conflicts. In such a chaotic and uncertain world, nuclear forces become the grammar of deterrence. Nuclear weapons states would consider these weapons for deterrence purposes and greater assets for their ultimate survival.

Obama's Prague speech is encouraging in terms of strengthening the non-proliferation measures and conveying a message to other nuclear weapons states in particular to Russia, that the Cold War greater reliance on nuclear weapons has dramatically changed and the policies of nuclear weapons states with regard to both employment and deployment of these weapons need to be revisited. This may also reflect upon other outstanding challenges emitting from non-state actors, rogue states, and emerging threats of cyber warfare where

sheer reliance on nuclear weapons may not necessarily be required. Nuclear deterrence may not be applicable to successfully counter these emerging challenges which in turn, would require states to craft innovative strategies.

Apparently, Obama's Prague speech calling for a nuclear zero becomes logical for the US when the US makes remarkable endeavors in terms of conventional weaponry; that is, the US technological innovation makes its conventional weaponry system more unique and stronger than other nuclear weapons states. This provides the US an extra confidence to quicken the process for strategic force reduction with its counterpart Russia. Russia, unlike the Cold War time, is weak in conventional innovations against both the US and its NATO allies in Europe.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, the Russians stride for MIRVing –increasing the lethality and sophistication of Multiple Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) because it is considered that increasing the number of warheads on MIRV is cheaper than building an intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and/or making anti-ballistic missile complexes. Also, given the increasing conventional disparity between the US and Russia, the Russia might not agree to reduce further its strategic forces including the non-strategic weapons which have not yet become part of the New Start treaty. Presumably, the more the US increases its conventional capability, the more it gives itself a confidence to decrease its strategic forces with Russia. It is observed that the US has used its advanced conventional capability in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya and currently against the Islamic States (ISIS) forces in the Middle East. Seemingly, the US remains comfortable in terms of archiving its geopolitical and military goals through its advanced conventional forces. Why to rely on nuclear forces? Arguably, the more the conventional force disparity increases between the US and Russia, the more the Russians rely on nuclear forces to offset the conventional stronger side. In this context, the Russians have got two possible options. First, try not to decrease their strategic forces to the US desired level which could undermine the Russian deterrence capability. Therefore, Russia would retain some form of both strategic and non-strategic

deterrence forces to offset the rising US conventional might. Second, deploy its offensive forces closer to the Eastern border as part of escalation tactics to put pressure on the US to restrain from any military adventurism vis-à-vis the Russian interest.<sup>8</sup>

Nevertheless, Obama's Prague speech paved the way for building a strategic partnership with Russia regarding the renewal of START I by the New START to reduce the strategic forces to 1550. This would be a remarkable strategic achievement, but the world free from nuclear weapons is yet to be witnessed. Even if one closely and critically analyzes the New START, one can find certain weaknesses that could make other states ponder whether or not the New START between the two sides (i.e., the US and Russia) would last longer. For instance, the New START does not include: first, the strategic discussions about the future of TNWs. It is considered that US has got approximately 200 TNWs placed in Europe, but the Russians believe that it is more than that. On the other hand, the US believes that the Russians have got about 2000 TNWs. The possibility and the danger associated with the TNWs use in the direct limited war between the US/NATO and Russia still exist, although these weapons have not been used yet. Second, the New START does not include the talks on ballistic missile defense (BMD). The US had withdrawn from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty (ABM) in 2002 showing the desire to build defense shield both within the US and in Europe against the possible missile threats from North Korea and Iran. Both Russia and China look at this US development with suspicion. Third, the New Start does not prohibit both the US and Russia for modernizing their strategic and conventional forces. Also, it does not prohibit either side from deploying conventional warheads on long-range ballistic missiles. This provides both the US and Russia an excuse for modernizing conventional forces and introducing new technologies into their strategic innovations. Last but not least, the member can withdraw from the New START on the extraordinary rise of threat that undermines each security.

The analysis reflects difficulties the global zero would confront when it comes to more clear conceptual and practical understanding of the possibility of a nuclear free world. The process is difficult if not impossible, but the world may not expect the GZ very soon, not at least in the near future. To understand this, we need to closely see what is happening between the major nuclear weapons states at the international level and smaller nuclear weapons states at the regional level. Are they, seriously engaged to meet the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which they pledged at the time of its creation? Is the complete disarmament happening? Is there a fair and non-discriminatory treatment of the major powers towards minor nuclear weapons states? Is there occurrence of any major breakthrough between the major and smaller nuclear weapons states in terms of the creation of a universal arms control regime? What would be the future of CTBT? These are some of the key areas, which ultimately could be linked in an effort for the concept of GZ.

### **Conceptualizing the Challenges for Global Zero**

Conceptually crafting strategies for global zero is a complex phenomenon, though it appears extremely innocuous. Initially, it may not be applicable for those regions particularly that comprise smaller nuclear weapons states because of the acuteness of security dilemma and the embryonic stages of their nuclear development programs. Apparently, if the ambitious program GZ is to be strategized, it would possibly involve major nuclear weapons states more particularly the US and Russia to begin with. In the meantime, there are some conceptual and practical issues with regard to nuclear free world. We need to consider the challenges the goal for GZ may confront; that is, major nuclear weapons states role, the weaknesses within the non-proliferation regime, the small nuclear weapons states grievances, and the challenges emitting from the nuclear aspirant states.

### **Major Nuclear Weapons States and Global Zero**

Besides the US and Russia, other established nuclear

weapon states namely France, UK, and China are in possession of hundreds, if not thousands of nuclear weapons with sophisticated delivery systems. Like the US and Russia, they also modernize, upgrade and procure more sophisticated deterrent forces. For instance, UK spends billions of pounds in developing new nuclear submarine to replace its aging nuclear submarines. France replaces its *Rubis-Class* submarine with the modernized *Suffren* nuclear submarine.<sup>9</sup> China has recently developed anti-satellite missile vis-à-vis the US ballistic missile system and spends on modernization of its nuclear submarines.<sup>10</sup> Also, as it feels threatened, it develops Multiple Independently Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) to increase the lethality and credibility of its deterrent forces.<sup>11</sup> Both France and the UK retain deterrent forces despite having no major nuclear threat unlike the US and Russia and/or India and Pakistan. All the three states (i.e., France, UK and China) have not yet become the part of the wider international or regional arms control and disarmament processes. Perhaps, one day soon the US and Russia would urge these tiers of nuclear weapons states to become part of the universal strategic partnership when it comes to a proposed universal arms control and disarmament. Given this, the minor nuclear weapons states urge the major nuclear weapons states to play a meaningful role for a complete and verified non-proliferation, thus, providing an incentive to smaller nuclear weapon states to be part of the process of non-proliferation. So long as the established nuclear weapon states keep and plan to upgrade and modernize their deterrence forces, it becomes very difficult for minor nuclear weapons states to forgo their nuclear weapons and sign the NPT.<sup>12</sup> Besides, there is a danger of more withdrawal of the NPT member states to develop and acquire nuclear weapons for security purposes. This depicts that the US has adopted a policy of ‘engagement’ – that is, on the one hand it makes efforts towards non-proliferation calling for a Global Zero. On the other hand, it does not only modernize its deterrence forces and work on a national missile defense system, but also extends its nuclear deterrence to its NATO allies and partners.<sup>13</sup>

The major powers role in terms of arms control and

disarmament, as it promises before the non-proliferation regime becomes more responsible. At present, they affect the policies of other nuclear weapons states at the regional level. The smaller nuclear weapons states feel that they are affected one way or the other by not only the offensive policies of the major nuclear weapons states, but also, their sophisticated advancement and modernization of their deterrent forces at all major level of deterrence. These are threatening for both smaller nuclear weapons states and those within the non-proliferation regime who have not yet acquired nuclear weapons.

### **The Weakness within Non-Proliferation Regime**

Despite heavy weight membership and life extension of NPT since 1995, the NPT is largely considered a weak regime to help achieve the GZ. Often, it is considered that states in the past accessed to the NPT not because that NPT had the greater influences in terms of compelling states to become part of the NPT, but largely number of states accessed to the non-proliferation regime because of geo-political dynamics; that is, these states did not confront security threats.<sup>14</sup> That said, states with greater security concerns have not yet become part of the treaty and the treaty has failed to prohibit them to go nuclear. Even the treaty faces similar practical issues halting withdrawal of the states. For example, North Korea withdrew from the NPT before it tested nuclear capability and Iran could be the next challenge if it desires to acquire and test its nuclear capability. The NPT fails to craft a strategy to deal with these emerging challenges in the changing contours of international politics.

First, the provisions within the formation of the NPT seemed blurred and create contradiction for the future survival of the NPT. For example, article 1 of the NPT directs the nuclear weapon states party to the NPT to “undertake not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons of explosive devices directly or indirectly”.<sup>15</sup> Similarly, in accordance with article 2 of NPT, “the non-nuclear weapons

states party to the treaty undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly”.<sup>16</sup> It may be considered that the US transfer and its NATO-led European allies being the recipient of TNWs may somewhat violate the provisions of the NPT, though these types of nuclear weapons could be under direct command and control of the US.<sup>17</sup>

Second, the US-India nuclear deal involves the transfer of nuclear technology to India which encourages Russia and Australia to strike similar deals with India, is considered a violation of the NPT made by the NPT members to a non-NPT nuclear weapon state which, in turn, provides an incentive for other established nuclear weapons states of the NPT to assist states outside the treaty.<sup>18</sup> At the same time, both member states party to the NPT and non-NPT nuclear weapons states can claim the possession of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes as their “inalienable right” which, in turn, can be converted into military purposes as both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the NPT have not developed a thorough safeguards procedures due to which member states can cheat.<sup>19</sup> On one hand, NPT prevents states from transferring nuclear weapons and their related technology to other states directly or indirectly. On the other, it makes a provision for securing the similar technology as an “inalienable right.” There exists ambiguity with NPT provisions which perhaps needs further elaboration and modification to satisfy the concerns of the smaller nuclear weapon states such as Pakistan.

Third, NPT creates discrimination between nuclear “haves and have nots”. It permits all the major nuclear weapons such as the US, Russia, UK, France, and China to be legitimate nuclear weapon states, but denies this legitimacy not only to the member states of NPT, but also non-member of the NPT nuclear weapon states. It is one of the major obstacles to non-member NPT nuclear weapon states signing the treaty and loopholes within the treaty that could allow other states to develop and acquire their own nuclear weapons.<sup>20</sup> The



weaknesses within the NPT, which urges the major nuclear weapons states to work for a complete disarmament, pose a challenge to the so-called conceptualization of the GZ. The language of GZ seems irrelevant for smaller nuclear weapons states that consider themselves to be more vulnerable without nuclear weapons with poor conventional capabilities.

### **Smaller Nuclear Weapons States and Global Zero**

Since the major nuclear weapons states confront issues of nuclear transparency and verification mechanism and since nuclear ambiguity exists in their nuclear policy framework despite the official documentations, the smaller nuclear weapons states confront the similar challenges. The gap between the major and smaller nuclear weapons states is enormous in term of nuclear and conventional forces. The concept of GZ may not initially be applicable to smaller nuclear weapons states given the deterrence force disparity, security dilemma, and changing security dynamics where inter-state rivalry continues to prevail. Arguably, it would be too early crafting and conceptualizing strategies for a nuclear zero for smaller nuclear weapons states when, in fact, the major nuclear weapons states have not crafted one for themselves yet; that is, how they could agree for a road towards nuclear free world; which states would be the first in this process; what would be the possible verification mechanism; how the trust amongst all nuclear weapons states could possibly be built; and whether or not this could possibly be accomplished. These are some of the rudimentary queries; smaller nuclear weapons states may ponder before they become part of this visionary GZ process. In the meantime, the smaller nuclear weapons states would wait and see how the major powers behave in the changing security dynamics of international politics and how they treat the smaller powers.

Given the logic of extra-regional-link factor, smaller nuclear weapons states are affected directly and indirectly by the deterrent policies of the major nuclear states. For example, whatever happens between the US and Russia, it affects China. China affects India and India then affects

Pakistan. The extra-regional-link factor does not only work in terms of replacing, modernizing, and procuring of deterrent forces, but also in terms of non-proliferation efforts. That said, if there are strategic restraint measures amongst the major nuclear weapons states, this would reduce the pressure at the lower trajectory. The reduction of this strategic pressure promotes deterrent stability that, in turn, enhances the possibility for crafting a framework for universal arms control regime in general and regional arms control regime in particular. However, the phenomenon of universal arms control regime remains ambitious and complex. It would require greater flexibility and transparency within nuclear weapons states doctrinal postures both in terms of employment and deployment of deterrent forces. Also, smaller nuclear weapons states may not be taken on board with regard to non-proliferation measures and ultimately for a complete disarmament unless the efforts become incentive and criterion based strategy; that is, smaller nuclear weapons states may demand for equal treatment and even nuclear recognition. They may not desire diplomatic pressures and economic sanctions on them as part of the major powers non-proliferation efforts. To show more responsibility, the smaller nuclear weapons states may convey to the major powers that they follow minimum deterrence; they are not interested in testing nuclear weapons anymore; they can better protect and secure their nuclear weapons given the lessons learned from the Cold War hot strategic environment; their nuclear command and control would remain robust and effective because they would possess only small number unlike the two superpowers (i.e., the US and the Soviet Union) during the peak of the Cold War; they would keep their nuclear weapons in de-mated position to avoid the accidental use of nuclear weapons; and they would also say that they are responsible and rational actors when it comes to inter-state crisis. Conceptually, the major nuclear weapons states may get convinced as the small nuclear weapons states get to level of maturity and they demonstrate to be rational and responsible nuclear states, but major powers may not desire the nuclear aspirant states to acquire nuclear capabilities because it would further undermine their efforts for a complete disarmament;

that is, a nuclear zero. What strategy needs to be crafted for nuclear aspirant states: diplomatic and political approaches or options to strike?

### **Nuclear Aspirant States and Global Zero**

It was once considered during the peak of Cold War when the US President John F. Kennedy stated that there could be more than a dozen of nuclear weapons states. Therefore, the efforts for non-proliferation were speeded up to contain such a scenario. Today, the good news is that amongst 190 members of the NPT, only nine acquired nuclear capability. It is considered that anyone country desiring to go nuclear would be from within the NPT and they would acquire nuclear weapons either by commencing its nuclear weapons programme clandestinely or quitting the NPT by giving a three-month advance notice as part of the provision of the NPT if a state confronts an acute security threat. The challenge for the major powers including the non-proliferation regime is what measures need to be taken and how these nuclear aspirant states may be contained before they actually acquire the nuclear weapons capability. Theoretically, state's acquisition of nuclear weapons is predominately linked with the security threats emitting from within the hostile neighbourhood that the state perceives. The US feared that the Germans would acquire and threaten the US security; the Soviet Union acquired because of the US; the Chinese did because of the Soviet Union; both France and Britain acquired nuclear capabilities because they felt vulnerable to both the Soviet Union growing conventional and nuclear deterrent forces; India did because of the threat from China as they fought a short war in 1962; and Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons capability because of the rise of acute security threat from the growing India's conventional forces and nuclear weapons acquisition. The growing conventional capabilities and security dilemma between the states played a significant role in terms of state's acquisition of nuclear weapons. The nuclear aspirant states such as Iran, South Korea, and Japan have shown their willingness to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities to meet their security

needs. Iran desires to acquire nuclear weapons capability to retain a strategic balance in the Middle Eastern region vis-à-vis Israel who has had nuclear weapons capability since 1960, but has not yet tested its nuclear weapons capability. Although the P-5+1 (i.e. the US, Russia, China, UK, France and Germany) have reached a historic deal in terms of successfully prohibiting Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability, It is observed that this joint comprehensive plan of action does not eliminate Iran's nuclear programme rather it substantially slows down Iran's nuclear weapons capability for at least fifteen years.<sup>21</sup> Israel largely practices nuclear opacity.<sup>22</sup> Both Japan and South Korea have desired to go nuclear given the recent development of strategic dynamics in their periphery, which could turn into military escalation. Both the states have the potential to go nuclear in a very short period of time. However, the major nuclear weapons states including the US do not desire the South Korea and Japan to go nuclear as part of the non-proliferation pledges to the NPT and also the kind of nuclear security guarantee provided to these states. The major powers can adopt certain practical measures to discourage the nuclear aspirants: 1) the major powers can provide a negative security assurance, that is, that nuclear weapons would not be used against them in the event of crisis; 2) major economic and military assistance including the peaceful uses of nuclear facilities under a strict verification mechanism can also discourage aspiring states to go nuclear; and 3) decreasing the security threat environment both at the regional and international level and increasing the possibilities for crafting several prolific strategies to help resolve the issues peacefully without the use of force.

### **Futuristic Aspects of Nuclear Zero**

Following the dictum of a renowned military strategist Carl Von Clausewitz that "Everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean everything is very easy."<sup>23</sup>It may be safe to argue that any strategy for nuclear zero might be easy to craft, but difficult to execute given the strategic complexities and security issue of each individual states. States that have already acquired nuclear weapons may not desire to abandon

them unless others do so first. This is expressed by the major nuclear weapons states, say, the US who has emphasized the security need for retaining some nuclear weapons despite its efforts for reducing their number vis-à-vis its counterpart Russia. The US has clearly expressed that as long as nuclear weapons exist, it would retain its nuclear weapons capability. This indicates that the US would like to see other nuclear weapons states to get on board for an idealistic goal of nuclear zero. It means the US would not be the first to forgo its nuclear weapons capability unilaterally. Also, this indicates the growing level of mistrust, lack of transparency in nuclear policies of nuclear weapons states and the absence of a clear theoretical and conceptual mechanism for nuclear zero. The dichotomy and ambiguity with regard to nuclear zero enlarge when on the one hand, talks for promoting the concept of nuclear zero amongst nuclear weapons states are initiated, but on the other, nuclear weapons states consistently retain their nuclear weapons along with development of advanced conventional weapons capability.

Security remains a predominant factor for states to retain nuclear weapons for their ultimate survival. International politics teaches the dictum of uncertain world where each state prioritizes its national interest. States would weigh the cost and benefit analysis, that is, how much they would gain and how much they would lose by abandoning their nuclear weapons capability. If states would lose much and if their security would be undermined absent from nuclear guarantee, they would not forego their deterrent forces for the sake of idealistic conceptualization of global zero. Idealistically, the goal for a nuclear zero may be attained if international community comes up with such a framework based on nuclear free world that is unanimously accepted both by nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states. First, nuclear weapons states would need to resolve the issues of states that fall within security dilemma. The security concerns of these states vulnerable to security threats and pre-emptive strikes by the adversaries can be resolved when and if nuclear weapons states execute the strategy of negative security assurances – that is, these states would not strike other states with their

nuclear weapons. Second, all the major nuclear weapons states party to the NPT would meet the promises of nuclear disarmament that they have made at the initiation of this treaty. Also, they would attempt to strengthen the non-proliferation regime by not only eliminating their nuclear weapons, but also urging others to do so. Third, before the GZ to occur, there is a need for a conflict free world that in reality may not be possible because of greater security issues of greater number of states. Each one of these belongs to threatening scenarios and each of these states confronts security issues against the others. The resolution of these conflicts confronting each individual states becomes so complex that conflict remains inevitable, though these states may not desire to be trapped by these security issues.

That said, it is simple to conceptualize the phenomenon of nuclear zero or nuclear free world. Also, it might be simple to theorize what needs to be done for achieving the perimeters of global zero. However, the difficulty comes in the strategic execution of this conceptualized phenomenon. Idealistically, GZ may be possible in terms of conceptualizing the phenomenon, but in reality, it becomes vague, ambiguous and complex which in turn makes the concept of GZ irrelevant in the changing contours of international politics.

## **Conclusion**

The phenomenon of global zero got famous at the US president Obama's Prague speech. Conceptually, it basically aimed at reminding both major and smaller nuclear weapons states to become part of the arms control and disarmament discussions both at the regional and international level in order to fulfill their commitments for a complete nuclear disarmament. Also, it aimed at encouraging the strategic relationship between the US and Russia to strike meaningful deals towards more and/or deep reduction of their deterrent forces. The language of global zero meant for a world free from nuclear weapons seems simple and idealistically attractive for both the major and smaller nuclear weapons states, but it becomes difficult and complex when it comes to

the changed and/or changing strategic environment of each nuclear weapons state confronts. In other words, the goal for a global zero is simple to pronounce, but difficult to achieve. Scrutinizing the complexities closely of both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states can assess this. First, although both the US and Russia have agreed to reduce their strategic forces by striking a New Start treaty, there is no deep reduction taking place. Both states still rely on nuclear forces in the event of war. Both the sides pursue a policy of first use nuclear option. Both the US and Russia are modernizing and advancing their conventional forces. Both are still keeping tactical nuclear weapons. Second, despite the NPT's life extension and expansion in terms of its membership, the NPT confronts challenges. For instance, there is still no talk on how to construct a dynamic mechanism under which both major and smaller nuclear weapons states would work for a complete disarmament. In addition, India, Pakistan and Israel are not part of the NPT. North Korea withdrew from the treaty and tested its nuclear capability. Iran could be next. Also, the future nuclear aspirant states would be from within the NPT. Third, member states have yet to work on the possible creation of universal arms control regime, which could involve both the major and smaller nuclear weapons states. But this is easier said than done. Security interest, security dilemma, deterrence stability, and equal treatment are some of the major ingredients that would become part and parcel of the establishment of universal arms control regime and states would play around these essentials as part of the nuclear politics. Last but not least, given these challenges arising both from nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, the phenomenon of global zero becomes irrelevant. It remains difficult and complex to achieve. Since the Obama's Prague speech, the talks on global zero seem to be losing strength which in turn, indicates that both the major and smaller nuclear weapons states may not be ready to develop a concrete mechanism for a complete disarmament which idealistically leads these states towards a world free from nuclear weapons.

## **Notes**

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<sup>1</sup> For details see, James Cartwright, Richard Burt, Chuck Hagel, Thomas Pickering, Jack Sheehan, Bruce Blair, “*Global Zero US Nuclear Policy Commission Report: Modernizing US Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and Posture*,” (Global Zero, 2012)

<sup>2</sup> George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” *The Wall Street Journal*, January 04, 2007

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*,

<sup>4</sup> George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, Sam Nunn, “Towards a Nuclear Free World,” *The Wall Street Journal*, January 15, 2008

<sup>5</sup> George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, Sam Nunn, “How to Protect our Deterrent,” *The Wall Street Journal*, January 19, 2010

<sup>6</sup> George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, Sam Nunn, “Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Risks: The Pace of Nonproliferation Work Today Doesn't Match the Urgency of the Threat,” *The Wall Street Journal*, March 06, 2013

<sup>7</sup> For interesting discussion see, Michael Peck, “Five NATO Weapons of War Russia Should Fear,” July 01, 2014, available at: <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/five-nato-weapons-war-russia-should-fear-10769> (accessed on November 16, 2014).

<sup>8</sup> Along with keeping some form of both strategic and non-strategic deterrent forces, Russia plans to increase its conventional forces to recall the Cold War era when the former Soviet Union (now Russia) were superior in terms of conventional forces. For interesting discussion on this see, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “The Bear Awakens: Russia’s Military is Back,” *The National Interest*, November 12, 2014, available at: <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/russias-military-back-9181> (accessed on November 16, 2014).

<sup>9</sup> For details see, “France Submarine Capabilities,” August 15, 2013, available at: <http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/france-submarine-capabilities/> (accessed January 06, 2015)

<sup>10</sup> Zachary Keck, “China conducted anti-satellite missile test,” July 29, 2014, available at: <http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/china-conducted-anti-satellite-missile-test/> (accessed January 06, 2015)

<sup>11</sup> For details see, “China’s ICBM with MIRV warheads will be commissioned soon,” April 05, 2013, available at: <http://chinadailymail.com/2013/04/05/chinas-icbm-with-mirv-warheads-will-be-commissioned-soon/> (accessed January 06, 2015)

<sup>12</sup> ‘Pakistan Rules out Joining Non-Proliferation Treaty’ (23 Feb. 2010), available at: [www.nti.org/gsn/article/pakistan-rules-out-joining-nonproliferation-treaty/](http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/pakistan-rules-out-joining-nonproliferation-treaty/) (accessed on 14 May 2012).

<sup>13</sup> The term conengagement is an economic term, which is the amalgamation of both connection and engagement. I have borrowed this term from ZalmayKhalilzad’s two influential pieces: see for example,



ZalmayKhalilzad, 'Congage China', Rand Issue Paper (1999), available at [www.rand.org/pubs/issue\\_papers/2006/IP187.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/2006/IP187.pdf) (accessed on 23 May 2012); and ZalmayKhalilzad, 'A Strategy of 'Congagement' toward Pakistan', *Washington Quarterly* 35/2 (Spring 2012) pp.107–19

<sup>14</sup> Christine M. Leah and Andreas Lutsch, "To Go Nuclear or Not: Does the Non-Proliferation Treaty Really Matter?" *The National Interest*, November 18, 2014, available at: <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/go-nuclear-or-not-does-the-non-proliferation-treaty-really-11698?page=2> (accessed on November 20, 2014)

<sup>15</sup>See the NPT article I 'Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,' IAEA (22April 1970), available at [www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infocircs/Others/infocirc140.pdf](http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infocircs/Others/infocirc140.pdf)(accessed on 14 May 2012).

<sup>16</sup>See the NPT article II, Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>The Iranian Ambassador, Ali AsgharSoltanieh, to International Atomic Energy Commission(IAEA) has recently stated during the first session of the NPT Preparatory Committee in Vienna that, 'The deployment of hundreds of the US tactical nuclear weapons in EU states is a blatant violation of the NPT by the US and the host countries.' See, for example, 'US, EU Worst Nuclear Proliferators, NPT Violators, Iran Says' (7 May 2012), [www.presstv.com/detail/240046.html](http://www.presstv.com/detail/240046.html)(accessed on 3 Aug. 2012).

<sup>18</sup>Many in Pakistan accuse the US of violating not only the NPT but also UN Security Council Resolution 1172, which was adopted after the South Asian nuclear adversaries tested nuclear weapons in May 1998, to deter them from carrying out more tests. See, Bast, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Calculus' p.79; For useful readings on the Indo-US Nuclear Deal see, for example, M.V. Ramana, 'The Impact of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal on the NPT and the Global Climate Regime' (8 Dec. 2009), available at [www.boell.de/intlpolitics/security/foreign-affairs-security-7983.html](http://www.boell.de/intlpolitics/security/foreign-affairs-security-7983.html)(accessed on 7 Aug. 2012); JayshreeBajoria, 'The US-India Nuclear Deal' (2010), available at [www.cfr.org/india/usindia-nuclear-deal/p96663](http://www.cfr.org/india/usindia-nuclear-deal/p96663)(accessed on 7 Aug. 2012); Sharon Squassoni, 'The US-Indian Deal and Its Impact', *Arms Control Today*, July/ Aug. 2010; and NasrullahMirza and M. Sadiq, 'Indo-US 123 Agreement: Impacts on Deterrence Stability in South Asia' (January 2008), available at [www.sassu.org.uk/pdfs/Research\\_Report\\_7.pdf](http://www.sassu.org.uk/pdfs/Research_Report_7.pdf) (accessed on 7 August 2012).

<sup>19</sup>For details, see Henry Sokolski, 'The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty's Untapped Potential to Prevent Proliferation' in Henry Sokolski (ed.), *Reviewing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty* (Carlisle, PA: US Strategic Studies Institute 2010) pp.10–11.

<sup>20</sup>It is clearly stated in the NPT's article IX that, 'for the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear weapon state is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967', see for example, 'Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', IAEA (22 April 1970), available at:

[www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infocircs/Others/infocirc140.pdf](http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infocircs/Others/infocirc140.pdf) (accessed on 14 May 2012). It depicts that those who have, or will have acquired nuclear weapons are not nuclear weapon states in light of article IX of the NPT despite their nuclear weapon acquisition and when they join the treaty, they will have to forgo their acquired nuclear technology.

<sup>21</sup> For interesting analysis on this see, Daniel R. DePetris “Israel’s Master Plan to Crush Iran’s Nuclear Program,” *The National Interest*, (July 22, 2015), available at: <http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/israels-master-plan-crush-irans-nuclear-program-13392> (accessed on July 24, 2015); John Allen Gay, “Iran: A Deal Worth Celebrating?” *The National Interest*, July 17, 2015, available at: <http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/iran-deal-worth-celebrating-13365> (accessed on July 24, 2015); ZalmayKhalilzad, “Congress Must Strengthen Iran Deal,” *The National Interest*, July 14, 2015, available at: <http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/congress-must-strengthen-iran-deal-13335> (accessed on July 24, 2015)

<sup>22</sup> Although it is considered that Israel has achieved nuclear capability in the 1960s, it does not declare that it has got nuclear weapons. Israel only claims that it would not be the first one to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East. There is no evidence of nuclear policy and nuclear policy remains largely ambiguous. For interesting readings see, Avner Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); also see, Cohen *The worst kept secret: Israel’s bargain with the bomb* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

<sup>23</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, (trans.) M. Howard and P. Paret (NJ. Princeton, 1976), p. 178

# STRATEGIC IMPACTS OF IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

*Masoud Amin and Muhammad Khurshid Khan*

## **Abstract**

*Iran becomes a nuclear weapon state in immediate future or not is hard to predict forecasted, however, this study reveals the implications of a nuclear Iran for the Middle East in specific and the world at large. Unlike De Gaulle, a nuclear analyst who opined that the possibility of the states with nuclear weapons behaving illogically has been based on unfounded fear and blown out of proportion, the analysts belonging to other school of thought assume that if Iran gains nuclear status, it would enhance her influence on the Arab states that would increase rift between Shiite and Sunni states of the Persian Gulf, the signs are already visible. Some analysts also believe that in future, nuclear Iran would go to war in Middle East that probably would be nuclear, against the U.S. and Israel. None of these scenarios can be either accepted or rejected out-rightly. Even the accord between Iran and P-5 plus 1 does not provide clear direction as to how Iran would behave 10 years down the line if strict measures are taken by the U.S. and its allies. However, it is viewed that the situation for Pakistan as a result of a nuclear armed Iran might not be as grim as considered by some scholars. Pakistan and a nuclear Iran being the two neighbouring countries might continue to enjoy good brotherly relations.*

**Keywords:** Middle East, Persian Gulf, P-5 plus 1.

## **Introduction**

There is a general consensus amongst the scholars/analysts that Iran's nuclear program has strategic implications. Iran's quest for nuclear weapons is perceived by the West as the most dangerous development at the strategic level. The discovery of Iran's nuclear program during the early part of the last decade and its continuous defy complying with

the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards agreements has pushed Iran to the center of international attention.<sup>1</sup> Despite denials, Iran's continuous delay to explain inconsistencies in IAEA findings and safeguards raised alarms that its peaceful nuclear program was being diverted to nuclear weapons development.<sup>2</sup> It is because of the nuclear concerns that the P-5 plus1 conducted extensive dialogue with Iran for a prolonged period and managed to strike a deal though, the contours of the deal have yet not been crystallized. To analyze Iran's approach towards nuclear weapons correctly, one needs to look at the security and geopolitical environment of Southwest Asia and the greater Middle East.

Given its bitter history with the United States (U.S.) and its troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran is increasingly concerned about her influence in the region. Adding nuclear-armed Israel to the situation, Iran suddenly finds itself in a hostile environment with increasing isolation.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, it is believed that Iran is also concerned about the future discourse of the U.S. that had captured Iraq even after it did not possess nuclear or chemical weapons.

Iran is conscious of the fact that if Iraq had the nuclear weapons, the U.S. would not launch offensive attack twice during early 1990s and later on during 2003. Iran is therefore, watchful of its weakness vis-a-vis that of the U.S. and Israel. Above all, Iran does not enjoy good relations with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) especially Saudi Arabia which also maintains a well equipped military establishment fully backed by the U.S, being its close ally.

It is believed that these are emerging strategic threats to Iran's sovereignty which compel her to look for alternative security arrangements. Like any other state, Iran is also expected to follow the realist school of thought by perusing the 'Theory of Realism'.<sup>4</sup> Keeping in view its security concerns and limitations, Iran seems to maximize its security by acquiring nuclear weapons as explained by Kenneth Waltz in his theory of 'Neo-realism' or 'Structural Realism'.<sup>5</sup>

Since 2003, working both tracks was kept secret by Iran in violation of the IAEA safeguards agreements. As listed in the Director General's report of September 2005, Iran failed over an extended period of time to report on important transactions and activities; to declare the existence of important facilities; to provide design information; and on many occasions, to cooperate or facilitate the implementation of the safeguards.<sup>6</sup> In 2005, Ahmedinejad said in his election campaign speech, "I don't agree with those who say the nuclear issue has created a crisis for the country. What crisis? Nuclear technology is our right and no one can deprive us of it. We have come so far, and, God willing, we will need just one more push [to reach it]".<sup>7</sup>

Later on, Obama administration tried to convince Iran to give up its plan and extended numerous friendly gestures. Obama said, "If countries like Iran are willing to unclench their fist, they will find an extended hand from us" but Iranian regime did not change its attitude and continued to behave aggressively by adopting back and fro policy on the issue of its nuclear program.<sup>8</sup>

In the backdrop of these developments, some nuclear non-proliferation experts like Orde Kittrie further suggests that the America and her allies should intensify sanctions to increase negotiating leverage with Iran. They believe that the existing level of sanctions against Iran is quite weak as compared to the sanctions imposed against other countries during 1990s including Libya, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Yugoslavia, Haiti and South Africa.<sup>9</sup> Kittrie suggests that instead of outsourcing the mission to Israel, U.S. should do the job itself because Israel's involvement would make the issue more intricate.<sup>10</sup>

This research paper aims at understanding, how Iranian nuclear program has made strategic impacts on the regional security and stability in specific and the world at large. The arguments presented in this paper have been unfolded in following sequence: One, brief history of the Iranian nuclear program, two, NPT obligations and Iran, three, Iranian nuclear program and its implications for the regional stability,

fourth, the nuclear danger and the possible way forward and finally the conclusion.

### **NPT Obligations and Iran**

Nuclear weapons continue to pose a threat to the world community. The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, (NPT) signed more than four decades ago, established a significant framework for the security in the world.<sup>11</sup> The treaty constrained free will of obtaining the nuclear weapons.<sup>12</sup> Despite being signatory to the treaty, Iran will ultimately go for development of nuclear arsenals because she continues to defiance the compliance. Iran has thus, created strategic threat to the regional stability.<sup>13</sup> It is viewed that the recently concluded agreement between the U.S. and Iran might give a pause to the ongoing strategic threat to the regional stability, but Iran being a realist country, might come back to pursue its nuclear program after a decade as soon as she regains the economic strength.

Iran believes that each nation has the 'inalienable right' to enjoy the benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, in conformity with the provisions of non-proliferation and safeguards obligations in the NPT and the IAEA statute. Iran considers that it has the right to access peaceful nuclear technology and accordingly, it has given its expression of readiness to guarantee the 'three Ss', safety of its facilities and operation; security of facilities and materials; and safeguards. Tehran's official stance on the issue is that the enrichment of uranium has nothing to do with the development of nuclear weapons but in reality, all indicators are going against Iran's declared stance.

### **Iranian Nuclear Program: Implications for the Regional Stability**

As pointed out earlier, Iranian nuclear program dates back to later half of 1950s and continued to prosper till late 1979. The U.S. cooperation with Iran turned into confrontation after the fall of Pahlavi. Since then, the U.S. pursued a coercive

diplomacy towards Iran. In turn, the discourse of the Iranian leadership in the backdrop of Islamic Revolution clearly demonstrates that Iran considers the U.S. as its number one enemy referring it as 'the Great Satan'. Since 1979, both the countries have had bitter experience of dealing with each other. Making hostage of 52 diplomats of the U.S. Embassy by Iran from late 1979 to early 1981 was a serious issue. It ended into a disaster because all the members were killed during the U.S. operation to rescue them from Iran's captivity. It brought huge embarrassment for the U.S. back home.<sup>14</sup>

Furthermore, the Iran-Iraq war had a detrimental effect on Iranian nuclear program as Iraq frequently bombed the Iranian nuclear installations. It is viewed that Iraq was duly supported by the U.S. during its 10 years war against Iran. However, there is a consensus on the view that the Israeli attack on Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 and subsequently, the first Gulf War in 1991 must have convinced Iran that without a credible deterrence, it stands no chance to effectively defend its interests and stature in the region.

Additionally, as explained earlier, the U.S. presence in the region and its support to Saudi Arabia is yet another factor that must have encouraged Iran to look for credible security mechanism to protect its supreme national interests in the region and beyond. In this background, during 1991, Iran succeeded in obtaining nuclear cooperation from China thus, she reinitiated its nuclear ambitions as China provided the components of Uranium conversion at Isfahan.<sup>15</sup> Subsequently, Iran also managed to negotiate a contract with Russia in 1995 to complete the nuclear facility at Bushehr.

Since the Islamic revolution, the U.S. was always wary of the Iranian nuclear program and perceived it as a threat to Israel and vital U.S. economic and strategic interests in the Middle East. The U.S. apprehensions were based on the behaviour of the Iranian leadership who frequently hinted to strike against the U.S. and Israel's interests. The former Iranian President Rafsanjani, in a speech at Tehran University in December 2001, specified that "on the day Iran comes into

possession of a nuclear weapon, Israel will cease to exist". Additionally, the U.S. is also worried that Iran is already working on the Shihab-5 missile; it will enable her to hit the U.S continent in addition to Israel.<sup>16</sup>

As Gold Dore in one of his writing states "The Iranian nation will not give up until the corrupt leadership in the world has been obliterated".<sup>17</sup> Iranian nuclear program has in fact created dilemma for P-5 plus 1. Since 2003, it has been evidently proven that Iran has been violating its international commitments by passing the existing system. The Director General of the IAEA has identified "many breaches of Iran's obligations to comply" with the safeguards, Iran agreed to under the NPT.<sup>18</sup>

In the backdrop of the international pressure, keeping the Iranian nation united was a vital factor for the President of Iran. In researchers' view, the narratives structured and promoted by Ahmadinejad were probably aimed at convincing the domestic audience to remain united in the face of economic difficulties that Iran was likely to face due to the international sanctions and the sanctions that the U.S. imposed unilaterally.<sup>19</sup>

The U.S. security concerns notwithstanding, the imposition of latest round of UN sanctions in June 2010 has put Iran in a further defiant mode with a belief that pushing Iran further would prove to be counterproductive and may compel her to pursue a course towards an acquisition of nuclear weapons similar to that of the North Korea. Probably, it was because of this reason that during the prolonged parleys with Iran, the U.S. and her allies did not cross the 'redlines' despite the fact that they had been frustrated by Iran quite often. Resultantly, they could not draw maximum advantage of the long awaited agreement between Iran and the P-5 plus1. Timmerman and Kenneth in the book "Countdown to Crisis: The Coming Nuclear Showdown with Iran" has analyzed Iran's nuclear weapon program and its impacts by giving the facts that former CIA Director R. James Woolsey is of the view that acquiring a nuclear weapon would embolden Iran to



become more aggressive in a number of ways against the Iraqi government. Albeit, the political situation in Iraq has already turned in Iran's favor. Nuclear capability will also embolden the regime to stamp out domestic dissent. At the same time, it will actively seek ways of lashing out at what it sees as the sources of that dissent: the U.S. and Israel.<sup>20</sup>

Indyk and Martin in the book "Restoring the Balance: A Middle East Strategy for the Next President" has discussed that in order to contain Iran's nuclear program, although diplomatic efforts could not be so far successful, yet it will take 2-3 years that Iran acquires the capability of nuclear weapons. The intrinsic problem to detect and monitor weapon program denotes most consistent measure and capability of producing nuclear fissile material, the most challenging technological hurdle in development of nuclear weapons.<sup>21</sup> Whether or not Iran could develop the capability, it took considerable amount of time by prolonging the dialogue process with the P-5 plus 1. Mahjoob Zweiri in his article "Arab-Iranian relations: New Realities", discussed how Arab and the GCC countries perceived Iranian nuclear program. Soon after Ahmadinejad came into power, Arab countries, as well as the European Union and the U.S., expressed their concern about Iran as a threat to security in the Middle East. The GCC countries are apprehensive of the using Russian technology by Iran.<sup>22</sup>

These concerns have been articulated by Arab officials and GCC countries. The foreign minister of Saudi Arabia has announced that the Iranian nuclear program is not a threat to their country, but at the same time, he has asked Iran to pay more attention to the demands of the international community. Egypt takes the same position. Interestingly, the secretary of the Arab league has criticized Arab countries for not doing enough to have their own nuclear program so that they can join the nuclear club and follow the examples of Pakistan and India.<sup>23</sup>

The U.S. and Israel have proclaimed that Iran, with nuclear weapon capability, is unacceptable and all options including military strikes are on the table. Israel's stance

regarding attack on Iran's nuclear investiture is older than the hardliner regime and had in fact helped them in coming to power. Most neutral experts believe that there is no way to stop Iran from acquiring the ability of nuclear weapons. Even if Israel makes a decision to attack on Iranian's nuclear program, there is very rare chance of completely eradication of Iran's conventional military and nuclear capacity. The Israeli initiative might complicate the situation in the Middle East.<sup>24</sup> Irrespective of the decision that Israel might take in future to eliminate Iranian nuclear capability, she is not convinced about the positive outcome of the agreement between Iran and the P-5 plus 1. Thus, Israel has explicitly criticized the deal and registered her concerns with the U.S. decision makers.

Nonetheless, Israeli initiatives to eliminate Iranian nuclear program would involve such a heavy cost for the U.S. and Europe which would be far greater than having a nuclear Iran in the region.<sup>25</sup>

➤ **Iran's Nuclear Program and Arab World**

- Arab World shows great concern over Iranian nuclear program and their strategic ambitions. The world powers are concerned about the response of major countries in the Middle East, like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt. Iran's nuclear proliferation will comprise a considerable threat to the security of the region. Hence, counter security measures in the form of nuclear weapons technology would remain as an option open on table by the other regional states. Krepon concluded that if Iran is not contained, it might lead to the spread of unsafeguarded enrichment plants in the Middle East that will doom the NPT.<sup>26</sup>
- 2003 has been marked as a turning point because Iran's bitter relationship to its neighbors became more stressed as Iran made achievements in two fields. Firstly, the civilian nuclear plant at Bushehr was near to completion and Iran started arrangements for its operation. Secondly, the

reactors having capacity of producing weapon grade uranium were discovered at Arak and Nantanz. The Middle East's Arab states took two years in clasp the fact, as King Abdullah of Jordan stated, "the rules of the game have changed" consequently, uncovering Iran's nuclear activities paved way for revitalization of nuclear program.<sup>27</sup> Iran's advancement became a major distress of Arab countries, because Iran also remains involved in the internal matters of some of the Arab states.

- Iran did not re-assure the regional countries about the environmental effect of civil nuclear plant at Bushehr. Moreover, in Middle East, the balance of power would incline the U.S. and (possibly) Saudi Arabia to support an Israeli attack, if not publicly, then privately, country that seems prepared to take out Iran's nuclear program by launching pre-emptive strike.

➤ **Regional Dominance and Hegemony**

- Iran, in the Middle East, has two major objectives; first establishment of its hegemony in the region, especially, in 'Strait of Hormez' and the second is exporting Shiite revolution to other countries in the Middle East. Most of the countries in the region have fears that if Iran becomes a status of nuclear state, its hardliner regime would possibly utilize this weapon as a psychological instrument to establish her hegemony. Iran would, obtain bargaining position and international importance because of its control over the oil supply route.
- Iran seems pursuing 'Defensive Realism promoted by Waltz, but when we consider it in the regional context, Iran's strategy appears to be offensive in nature, following Mearsheimer's school of thought which persuades her to maximize military power vis-a-vis that of the other regional states with an ultimate aim to gain regional hegemony.<sup>28</sup>

- Hence, a nuclear Iran might force her regional adversaries to follow the strategy of ‘Defensive Realism’ by maximizing their security. This situation would create a state of ‘Security Dilemma’ in the region that might lead to an unending competition in arms race including acquisition of nuclear weapons.<sup>29</sup>
- **Rift between Sunni and Shiite**
- Iran’s endeavors for exporting Shiite to other countries with nuclear weight behind. These efforts could critically multipart the rift between the Sunnis and Shiites within the entire region. This would also have severe effect on Pakistan. Pakistan, having friendly relationship with both Iran and Middle East’s Sunni states could face a very hard situation to choose Iran, a Shiite state, or other Sunni states of the Middle East. It would also cause stress among Sunni and Shiite sects in Pakistan.
  - Pakistan being the next door neighbor and a center for Shiite-Sunni conflict is likely to suffer more especially with Iran becoming a nuclear state. Regrettably, since the last four decades, Pakistan has failed to contain the influence of the outside powers especially that of Saudi Arabia and Iran which has made Pakistan a battle ground to promote their respective brands of religion. With Iran becoming nuclear, it might come up with more strength to encourage Shiite in Pakistan without caring for its sensitivity.
  - This kind of scenarios would have very serious consequences for the whole region engulfing the entire Middle East where the majority of the established Muslim communities live. It is believed that the outside powers might not be very serious about containing the conflict of this scale among the Muslims.

➤ **Serious Blow to NPT**

- If Iran becomes a nuclear weapon state, it would seriously damage the efforts for non-proliferation. Other regional countries, for example, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan and Egypt (some of them already hinting at starting their nuclear programs) would be compelled to go nuclear. This situation would lead to a stage where the NPT might become fruitless. Since we live in realist world therefore, we must expect a matching response from the regional states to protect their respective national interests.
- Additionally, if Iran becomes a nuclear state, it would open a Pandora box and encourage South Korea, Japan and Indonesia<sup>30</sup> as well as Malaysia<sup>31</sup> to pursue their nuclear programs in South Eastern region. This development would also help North Korea to further strengthen its stance over the nuclear program and its possibility to come back in the NPT fold would be minimized.
- Finally, the leading provisions of NPT have already been shattered by the U.S. and its allies by striking a nuclear deal followed by the waiver given by the Nuclear Supplier Group to India. There are over 44 countries with nuclear weapons' technology. If Iran is not stopped, no one would be able to stop all 44 nuclear technology possessor states from developing nuclear weapons' program. Therefore, a nuclear Iran would have implication for the whole world.

➤ **Bolstering Non State Actors**

- In case Iran succeeds in developing its nuclear weapons technology, she might bolster non state actors like Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and splinter groups in Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. This scenario might embolden these groups to undertake clandestine and surgical operations within Israel and Afghanistan respectively.

- It would significantly increase the violence at regional level, besides further strengthening these groups militarily. Pakistan would also be confronted with a troublesome scenario as some groups operating from Pakistani soil usually adopt a hostile posture towards Iran which would profoundly affect the Iran-Pakistani relations in this power struggle.
- **Escalating Scenario towards Israel**
- Presently, Iran is involved in hostile diplomatic relations with Israel and the U.S. Though, Iran has developed political conflict with the U.S., its conflict with Israel is religious in nature. Iranian leadership has been hinting to eradicate Israel, following the advent of their twelfth Imam, called Imam Mehdi.
  - Iranians believe that the world would have to face a situation of anarchy and turmoil, prior to advent of Imam Mehdi hence, an Israel's invasion on Iran or some catastrophic occurrence of alike magnitude would paved the way for advent of Imam Mehdi<sup>32</sup> and he would subjugate the whole world, starting from East to West, thus, establishing Shia rule throughout the world.
  - Therefore, it is opined that if Iran gains the nuclear power, it might launch a nuclear attack on Israel to create favorable condition, in the light of their belief regarding arrival of Mehdi. Furthermore, Israel contemplates nuclear Iran to be threat to its existence<sup>33</sup> primarily for its size that recognizes it to be a country of single bomb.<sup>34</sup> It is because of these concerns; Israel is convinced that if diplomacy fails, the sole method to avert Iran from attaining the nuclear capability would be the full military attack.<sup>35</sup>
  - While Israel has guaranteed the U.S. to refrain from assaulting Iran, till they feel to be left alone and forsaken however, she is of the view that the moment of action against Iran would come soon for

which Israel's army is fully prepared regardless being a challenging mission.<sup>36</sup>

➤ **Easing of Pressure on Pakistan**

- From realist perspective, no country would like to have a powerful neighbor and Pakistan is no exception. The national interests get preference over all other factors. A nuclear Iran, as a next door neighbor is not in Pakistan's national interest. Pakistan has had a neighbour with nuclear weapons in the East, and therefore, it would not like to have another neighbour with nuclear weapons along its western border.
- In the international relations, today's friend can be tomorrow's enemy. Secondly, one has the flexibility to change friends but there is no possibility to change neighbours. Prior to Iran-Iraq conflict, no one could imagine that Iran would suffer for 8 long years due to war imposed on her by Iraq. Likewise, prior to the Iranian revolution, no one could imagine that one day, Iran would stand in the opposite camp of the U.S.
- Nonetheless, on the plus side, if Iran succeeds in attaining the capability of nuclear arms, this would release international pressure, especially by the West, on Pakistan. It would generate new debate over legality of Iran's nuclear arms that might help Pakistan strengthening its position on its nuclear program including its stance over the issue of fissile material cutoff treaty.

➤ **Iranian Nuclear Weapons - A Political Bargain**

- Some analysts in the western diplomatic circles believe that Iranian nuclear capability doesn't pose a threat to the West rather it is a weapon for a grand political bargain especially against the U.S. This is also the assessment of Australian Office of the National Assessments which has recently been made public through a leaked wiki leaks cable.<sup>37</sup> It

would therefore, be naive to think that the Iranian regime will adopt a suicidal approach to directly confront with either the U.S. or Israel only to lose all the political and diplomatic benefits of the nuclear capability.

- Despite an agreement between the P-5 plus-1 on November 24, 2013 in Geneva on a six-month ‘Joint Action Plan’, the interim deal could not make any headway for negotiations over a longer term comprehensive agreement. During the deal, Iran was able to get several months of relief and gained time to look for an alternative strategy.<sup>38</sup> However, the U.S. administration is optimistic that the “Joint Action Plan’ is being followed in letter and spirit by Iran.<sup>39</sup>
- Another round of negotiations was held between Iran and P-5 plus-1 at Vienna to conclude a nuclear deal which ended on November 24, 2014.<sup>40</sup> The extensive dialogues continued for five days without making any headway.<sup>41</sup> After a long discussion, the deadline was extended to finalize the nuclear agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, until July 01, 2015.<sup>42</sup> The two sides also “extended the Geneva nuclear deal, which was signed in last November for providing Iran with some sanctions relief in exchange for Tehran agreeing to limit certain aspects of its nuclear activities”.<sup>43</sup>
- The fresh deadline has given sufficient cushion to Iran to think over its future strategy and come back with a renewed vision to protect its national interests without further annoying the stakeholders. Miles A. Pomper opines that the next phase too is unexpected to lead to the long term agreement which could impose permanent restriction on Iran’s enrichment program. <sup>44</sup> Pomper is of the view even if the U.S. is able to strike a deal; Iran could still violate the terms and conditions thus, would continue to use its nuclear weapons program as a



bargaining chip with the U.S. and its allies including P-5 plus 1.<sup>45</sup>

- Kittrie, reinforces what Pomper has said about Iranian intents. He says, “It seems likely that Iran will violate the temporary freeze agreement, as it violated a similar agreement in October 2003, or that follow-on negotiations will fail to extend the temporary freeze”.<sup>46</sup>
- Mark Dubowitz and Kittrie opined that “In the absence of verifiable Iranian commitments not to proceed with nuclear-weapon and ballistic-missile research, there is nothing to stop Iran from having a designed bomb and ballistic missile ready to go”.<sup>47</sup>
- The P-5 plus 1 group and Iran on July 14, 2015 entered into a comprehensive agreement called as the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”, in order to limit the sensitive nuclear activities of Iran.<sup>48</sup> Iran in return, has succeeded to secure the relief of about 150 billion dollars that were frozen in the banks in European countries and also lifting of the international sanctions gradually in fields of energy, trade, finance and transport.<sup>49</sup>

### **Nuclear Dangers and the Way Forward**

Once Iran completes a dash to weapons-grade uranium, it can insert the warhead and quickly have a deliverable nuclear weapon. Therefore, as suggested by Albright and others, “Washington and its allies must insist that Iran verifiably stops increasing the number and quality of its centrifuges. Anything short of that will leave Iran far too close to an undetectable breakout capacity”.<sup>50</sup>

The latest accord is an attempt in the right direction but it is still not a foolproof system to ensure that Iran roll back its nuclear program. In the long term, Iran is unlikely to compromise nuclear program even if it is given extra ordinary space by the P-5 plus-1 unless its security concerns are addressed amicably. Krepon suggested that “At this juncture,

the best of a poor set of choices is to constrain Iran's nuclear capability under close scrutiny".<sup>51</sup> Persuading Iran for adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA and its greater cooperation with the Agency is also essential to give confidence to the international community that Iran is serious to implement the latest accord with P-5 plus 1.

A long term diplomatic resolution of the issue depends upon America's readiness to deal with Iran in transparent manner by adopting the policy of cooperation, instead of confrontation. The success of the recently concluded agreement between the U.S. and Iran depends how Washington behaves with Iran in coming years. A greater cooperation from the U.S. might help them in maintaining and sustaining the agreement in the long term.

However, depending upon the political and strategic situation in the region, the leverage to abrogate the treaty remains with Iran. Therefore, the authors sincerely believe that besides cooperation, a deterrence of a more serious consequences must also be created by the U.S. so that Iran does not exercise the option of sabotaging/abrogating the recently concluded 'accord' at any stage.

The fact requires dire consideration that Iranian President has very less role in formulating Iran's nuclear program. The President only implements the instructions issued by Iranian Supreme Leader. Therefore, if the West has to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue, they should try to get an access to the Supreme Leader rather than relying on the statements of the President.<sup>52</sup>

Finally, in the larger interest of the Middle East and the world, the U.S. will have to resolve Palestinian issue and take away the genuine cause of the insecurity from Israel. It having resolved the long pending Palestinian issue, similar to that of the Kashmir, comprehensive dialogue for Middle East nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) be initiated. Unless, this initiative is taken, this region would remain under tension and unending debate would continue without any result.

## **Conclusion**

Impact of Iran's nuclear program has mostly resulted from its leadership. Former President Ahmedinejad believes that God has entrusted him with a divine mission. Some people in Iran are worried about threat of the U.S. and Israeli attack on their nuclear facilities. The options of isolating Iran from the world will be direr then to reduce the Iranian quest of nuclear weapons. It will be a threat to global security.

There should be a comprehensive strategy to meet the Iran security dilemma and its future energy needs. The West should also consider living with nuclear Iran. However, if the nuclear risk in the Middle East is to be removed, serious talks should take place over Israel case to rollback its nuclear program for the sake of global security. That can be made possible only if Palestinian issue is resolved amicably. Additionally, the West must also understand the history and culture of Iranian nation and accordingly plan their negotiating strategy to deal with them.

Containment, sanctions or military action would not be a perfect or a foolproof policy against Iran's nuclear program. A weaker state has to see threats posed to its security by a much stronger state and the only viable response against such a threat is the nuclear deterrence. It is worth mentioning that Iran's security needs and regional objectives against the U.S. are compelling her to look for alternative security arrangements. If its national interests are well protected through assured guarantees, Iran might change its position and come forward with a positive response.

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# **PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: A NEW FOREIGN POLICY PARADIGM**

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## **Abstract**

*Soft power and Public Diplomacy became a buzz word in international politics. Despite the fact that the idea of soft power and Public Diplomacy has attracted considerable attention throughout the world, yet the concepts, actors, approaches and practices of both the dynamic concepts remained ambiguous. Public diplomacy, which carried the soft image of a nation, is somewhat naïve to majority of academia, diplomatic scholars and practitioners. Initially, the term Public Diplomacy was considered as the jurisdiction of state domain only, however with the increased number of international actors, the non-state actors legitimately played their role in the working of public diplomacy. This research work attempts to conceptualize Public Diplomacy and try to clarify different terms, methods and actors associated with Public Diplomacy. Further it tries to highlight challenges and prospects of the concept and related activities.*

**Key words:** Public Diplomacy, Actors Stages, Challenges, Future, Foreign Policy.

## **Introduction**

Twenty first century is termed as the century of soft power, the term coined by Joseph Nye. The concept has attracted and infiltrated in the entire world. The developed countries as they have resources and expertise in terms of researchers, scholars and diplomatic practitioners, immediately followed the suite and started practicing and adopting new techniques of Public Diplomacy. It is considered as one of the best means to achieve the foreign policy objectives of a country. Now the narrow concepts of diplomacy, state to state relations have been changed and new actors, issues and concepts also joined

the ranks of diplomatic system. This further facilitated conceptual development of the term public diplomacy.

However, the term Public Diplomacy is somewhat new for the developing countries` scholars, practitioners and citizens etc. Also among the developed countries, there is no consensus as far as the definition of the term is considered. Different people define Public Diplomacy differently while others differ as far as the mechanism is considered while for others, there are different actors to argue upon. Presently, the debate of diplomacy does not center on the role, kind or strategies of diplomacy. Now those who are associated with diplomacy in any form and capacity argue about the relevance and role of hard power, role of public in diplomacy and Public Diplomacy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Still Public Diplomacy is exploring its horizon.

### **Definition of Public Diplomacy**

Joseph Nye coined the concept of soft power. He is of the view that other than military and economy, there is soft power which helps the government to achieve its foreign policy aims. According to Joseph S. Nye Jr

“...One can affect others’ behavior in three ways: threats of coercion (“sticks”),. Inducements and payments (“carrots”), and attraction that makes others want what you want”<sup>1</sup>

Nye believes that soft power rests on, culture, political values, institutions and foreign policies.<sup>2</sup> Thus art, literature, architecture, media, education system, politics, vibrant civil society, tourism and much more can contribute in the soft power image of a country. Nye, in his book *Soft Power*, identified the differences between high and popular culture. He also clarified that soft power is not only about entertainment and popular culture but the universal values that a country culture have and shared by the others also like human rights, democracy, market economy, equality and rule of law. Similarly, narrow domestic policies and foreign agenda

can undermine the soft image of a nation<sup>3</sup>. Currently Russia, China, Japan, Spain, EU, Germany, Singapore, Malaysia and India are successfully utilizing the soft power concept into reality<sup>4</sup>. However, the success of soft image of any country depends upon the accomplishment of its public diplomacy- as a tool to communicate.

Public Diplomacy is considered as a platform from where one can initiate its soft power policies. However, there is no agreed definition of the term public diplomacy. It can be defined as engaging foreign audience to achieve the desired foreign policy goals. The term was coined in 1965 by Edmund A. Gullion, former Dean of the Fletcher School, said

“Public diplomacy” deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications. “Central to Public Diplomacy (PD) is the transnational flow of information and ideas”.<sup>5</sup>

Another definition is given by **Alan K. Henrikson**  
**Professor of Diplomatic History**

“Public Diplomacy may be defined, simply, as the conduct of international relations by governments through public communications media and through dealings with a wide range of nongovernmental entities (political parties, corporations, trade associations, labor unions, educational institutions, religious organizations, ethnic groups, and so on including influential individuals) for the purpose of

influencing the politics and actions of other governments”<sup>6</sup>.

Nicholas J. Cull describes:

“Public Diplomacy is an international actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through engagement with a foreign public”<sup>7</sup>

Over the time, people related to the field of diplomacy coined different definitions and broaden the conceptual scope of Public Diplomacy. The above definitions revealed that Public Diplomacy is concerned with:

- Listening to foreign audience
- Related to foreign policy goals
- Inter cultural communications
- It’s a long term process.
- Approaches are carved out according to the situation and demand
- The ultimate aim is to manage international environment.
- Different and effective means of communication to be utilized.
- It is open and based on reliable information.
- It must have comprehensible message and goals and strategies.
- It’s a concept revolving around branding a nation.
- It must be credible.
- It’s a two way process.

The above mentioned definitions revealed the fact that Public Diplomacy cannot be related with propaganda. Public Diplomacy is based on facts and persuasive policies. It is all about worldwide streaming of ideas and information.

### **New Public Diplomacy**

In international political communication, Public Diplomacy is considered as the paradigm shift which is

termed as 'transformational diplomacy' by the former USA secretary of state Condoleezza Rice in 2006. On the other hand, scholars preferred to use the term new Public Diplomacy because of following factors.

- New and more actors became the part of diplomatic mission.
- It`s about people to people contact.
- New and faster means of communication developed.
- Blurring of domestic and international issues.
- New terminologies for Public Diplomacy, like soft power and branding.
- New Public Diplomacy strategy is based on people to people contacts
- New Public Diplomacy is described as relation building<sup>8</sup>.
- New thinking and new solutions are given chance to solve the problems.
- Increased role of NGOs, supranational and sub national actors.

Following tables highlight the differences between traditional Public Diplomacy and Public Diplomacy for twenty first century.

	<b>Traditional Public Diplomacy</b>	<b>21<sup>st</sup> Century Public Diplomacy</b>
Conditions	Conflict, tensions between states	Peace
Goals	To achieve political change in target countries by changing behaviour	Political and economic interest Promotion to create receptive environment and positive reputation of the country abroad

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Strategies	Persuasion Managing Public	Building and maintaining relationships engaging with public
Direction of Communication	One-way communication (monologue)	Two-way communication (dialogue)
Research	Very little, if any	Public Diplomacy based on scientific research where feedback is also important
Message Context	Ideologies Interests Information	Ideas Values Collaboration
Target Audiences (public)	‘general’ public of the target nation; Sender and receivers of messages	Segmented, well-defined publics + domestic publics; Participants
Channels	Traditional mass media	Old and new media; often personalised
Budget	Sponsored by government	Public and private partnership

**Source:** Gyorgy, Szondi. Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences.” *Netherlands Institute of International Relations* (October 2008):11 cited in Bilgesam SAM,

Public Diplomacy: A Remedy for NATO’s Image Problem [http://www.Academia.Edu/2606658/Public\\_Diplomacy\\_A\\_Remedy\\_for\\_NATOs\\_Image\\_Problem](http://www.Academia.Edu/2606658/Public_Diplomacy_A_Remedy_for_NATOs_Image_Problem)

### **The Old Public Diplomacy and the New**

<b>Dominant Characteristics</b>	<b>Old Public Diplomacy</b>	<b>New Public Diplomacy</b>
Identity of international actor	State	State and non-state
Tech. environment	Short wave radio Print newspapers Land-line telephones	Satellite, Internet, real-time news Mobile telephones
Media environment	Clear line between domestic and international news sphere	Blurring of domestic and international news sphere.
Source of approach	Outgrowth of political advocacy & propaganda theory	Outgrowth of corporate branding & network theory
Terminology	“International image” “Prestige”	“Soft power” “Nation Brand”
Structure of role	Top down, actor to foreign peoples	Horizontal, facilitated by actor
Nature of role	Targeted messaging	Relationship-building
Overall aim	The management of the international environment	The management of the international environment

Source: Nicholas J. Gull, *Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past*, (Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, 2009), p.14

The above tables show that the main driving force for traditional and 21<sup>st</sup> century public diplomacy is to manage the relations among states and international environment. Now in

the present century, Public Diplomacy has broader concept, goals, and more players working together and sharing responsibilities. It's all about building relations by using modern technology and terminologies.

### **Goals of Public Diplomacy**

Different scholars mentioned different goals; nevertheless the underlined theme remains the same.

- Introducing or familiarizing the country to foreign targeted audience.
- To exhibit positive image of a country.
- To engage and influence the foreign public.
- To influence people.
- To respond to any kind of propaganda
- To correct the misunderstandings and misinterpretations.

### **Stages of Public diplomacy**

Joseph Nye mentioned three dimensions of Public Diplomacy and all are important.

- **Daily Communications:** At this stage, the government tries to explain the daily domestic and foreign policy decisions. It occurs within hours or days. It can be a press conference or policy brief by the government. It's a short term arrangements.
- **Strategic Communication:** It aims to develop a theme; it is for weeks, months or even years. Shared Values Initiative by USA in 2002 to inform the Muslim world that Muslims living in USA have positive aspects and are respectable and prosperous citizens. It's a medium term approach.
- **Lasting Relationships:** It develops over a decade and involved long term planning. It involves scholarships, exchange programmes or media campaign.<sup>9</sup> It's a long term planning.



Reactive, proactive and relationship building are the terms used by M. Leonard for the three stages of public diplomacy<sup>10</sup>. “*Reshaping perceptions and opinions of foreign individuals is key to all three efforts*”<sup>11</sup>

### **Actors of Public Diplomacy**

Traditionally, diplomacy and foreign policy are considered as a state domain. Public Diplomacy was also under the jurisdiction of state. With globalization, non-state actors sprout with global agenda and interests. As defined by The National Intelligence Office of the United States:

“Non-sovereign entities that exercise significant economic, political, or social power and influence at a national and at international levels (National Intelligence Office, 2007)”<sup>12</sup>.

The major strategy of non-state actors is to rely on soft power. Not only has this, the non-state actors like NGOs, multinational co-operations, think tanks, religious groups, transnational diaspora communities<sup>13</sup> do have the clear objectives, resources, means of communication, net working abilities and human expertise to effectively carry out Public Diplomacy activities and strategies. All the major capitals in this world have the head offices of NGOs and INGOs. Talking about the role of non-state actors in Public Diplomacy Nye said that:

“These flexible nongovernmental organizations and networks are particularly effective in penetrating states without regard to borders. Because they often involve citizens who are well placed in the domestic politics of several countries, such networks are able to focus the attention of the media and governments on their issues. They create a new type of transnational political coalitions. For example, the coalition to ban land mines brought together NGOs, celebrities, and politicians in many countries”<sup>14</sup>.

Besides NGO, there are terms like non-profit organization, civil society organizations, self-help organizations, voluntary organizations, which are playing active role in the domain of non-state actors. Now Public Diplomacy is number one priority of the diplomats and the governments which they carried out with the help of numerous players.

### **Approaches to Public Diplomacy**

Nicholas J Gull has identified, listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, International broadcasting and psychological warfare as the core approaches to public diplomacy<sup>15</sup>. Bruce Gregory has mentioned understanding, planning, engagement and advocacy as the core approaches and concepts of public diplomacy.<sup>16</sup> To him, understanding is equivalent to listening. Listening is related to understanding the foreign public opinion and gathering information with the help of different strategies like survey, media, and opinion research. Once the listening has been done, the actors try to map out the planning and support for their public diplomatic goals. To Bruce, engagement and advocacy are related to operational categories<sup>17</sup>. However, they are somewhat overlapping, but one cannot put them in the same category.

Cultural and exchange diplomacy works, according to Cull, are overlapping. Cultural diplomacy is based on the nation's cultural resources to be shared with the foreign audience. The aim of exchange diplomacy is also the same. To show ones culture, civilization, values, education system and political pluralism, to those who visit the country. While making use of modern technologies like TV and radio, government can cater all the functions of Public Diplomacy. International broadcasting is vital to achieve the goals of Public Diplomacy. Psychological warfare is the term which seems to be eccentric with the concept of Public Diplomacy, however, Public Diplomacy can turn into psychological warfare if it is *used for an immoral purpose*<sup>18</sup>, as mentioned by Cull.

## **Evolution of Public Diplomacy**

Since the dawn of history of diplomacy, the practitioners tried to achieve their national interests with the help of persuasion, promotion, projection and presentation (culture, gifts, their national souvenirs) Public Diplomacy has been practiced since many centuries, where countries engage the process of formulating international public opinion through education, culture and exchange programs. Public Diplomacy (PD) was practiced by Romans, Greeks, French, German and many others. Although the term Public Diplomacy is new, but as far as the practices of Public Diplomacy are considered, those were practiced by France, Germany, UK, Italy, and many others during pre-world war I. However, later during World War I and II, and even the cold war, the countries were more interested in propagating their objectives and ideologies. The history of Public Diplomacy can be divided into following phases:

### **Cold War Period**

Over the years, the term Public Diplomacy is associated with the terms like communication, information and influencing the foreign audience. It means that Public Diplomacy during the cold war period is associated with state to state diplomacy. <sup>19</sup>It was considered as a powerful contrivance to achieve the aim of bipolar world. Both USA and USSR tried to convince the domestic and foreign audience that they were right and their enemy was evil. It's not only the two super powers, but other major powers were also engaged in projecting their culture, sports, education, music, art, technology, movies, theater and much more.

US President Woodrow Wilson in 1917 formulated a Committee on public information with the aim to inform foreign audience about the foreign policy goals of USA. Later on USA Public Diplomacy initiative include: cultural exchange programme in Latin America, International visitors programme, Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Fulbright exchange program, US

information Agency, US International communications Agency. American libraries were established and published Washington File<sup>20</sup>. Not only that with the help of print and electronic media, USA was successful in winning the ideological war.

Like USA, former Soviet Union also comprehended the importance of public opinion. In 1955, Moscow formulated the Soviet All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS)<sup>21</sup>, with the aim to *revive Soviet American cultural exchanges*<sup>22</sup>. Thus cultural agreement in 1958 was signed between the two rivals.<sup>23</sup> While the visit of VOKS delegation to USA was highly publicized. Both the nations realized the *"usefulness of exhibits as an effective means of developing mutual understanding."*<sup>24</sup> It was all about presenting Soviet technology, industry, and culture to the USA citizens. The US held The American National Exhibition in Moscow in 1959. This exhibition tried to present the American achievements in the field of technology, fashion, art, culture, to soviet citizens.<sup>25</sup> With the passage of time, USA utilized cultural and educational exchange programmes to promote friendly relations between USA and audience abroad.

However, the two super powers, with the passage of time, were engage in propaganda. Soviet Union fully utilized Radio Moscow which by 1970, broadcast in 70 languages. Soviet used movies, television, books and all kinds of media to project USA as racist. Soviet desire to become hard power undermined its soft power strategies and achievements.

### **Post-Cold War Period**

With the end of cold war, it seems that the ideological war is over. Thus in 1999, the USIA was abolished and its functions were handed over to State Department, under the newly created Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The main aim of the US Public Diplomacy in post-cold war period is to

“.. Support the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign public and by expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and Government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world”<sup>26</sup>.

To achieve its foreign policy objectives, US Public Diplomacy is making use of communication with foreign audience by relying on cultural, educational and academic programmes along with use of media- print and electronic.

### **Post 9/11 Period**

By going through the history of US and other nations' public diplomacy, the underneath message remains the same, to tell one's story to rest of the world. However, the tragic event of 9/11 has put a question mark over the ineffectiveness of US Public Diplomacy initiatives. To handle those who were responsible for the tragic event of 9/11, USA resorted to military solution as first reliable option and Public Diplomacy the second. To answer the question why they hate us? USA carved out two phases of public diplomacy. First to promote US values and secondly to isolate the radical and fanatic elements<sup>27</sup>. New Public Diplomacy campaign started for the Muslim and Arab world. The campaign was mostly based on media and respond to misunderstanding and misinformation about USA. Zahrana cited three reasons for the failure of US Public diplomacy.

- **Firstly:** USA Public Diplomacy is based on one way communication rather than a two way process. USA just try to present their point of view, without understanding the grievances' of the other side. Its only information driven campaign.
- **Secondly:** USA didn't fully comprehend the cultural values and core identity of the targeted audience- Muslim world. They tried to implement their values, ethic, morality and political system, without giving due

consideration to the ground realities. It's a common perception among the Muslim world that USA wanted to Americanized the entire Muslim world.

- **Thirdly:** There is no relationship and connection between USA Public Diplomacy and foreign policy. USA is more interested in building cordial relations with the public of Muslim world and believe that Muslim public will accept their campaign without giving due consideration to public attachment to Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine<sup>28</sup>.
- Post 9/11 is the incident which gave impetus to the Public Diplomacy throughout the world.
- Entire world realized the importance of soft power and Public Diplomacy and initiated the public
- Diplomacy policies and strategies. Germany, China, Russia, France, India, reframe and boosts. Their public diplomacy. Scholars started discussion and research on the theory, challenges, strategies, goals, achievements and much more related topics of public diplomacy.

### **Current Situation**

The term Public Diplomacy gained prevalence after 9/11 incident when USA tried to find out the reasons behind tragic incident and answer to the question why they hate us? Immediately, USA made Public diplomacy, after military to win war on terror, a national security tool to win the hearts and minds of the people abroad,<sup>29</sup> particularly, the people of Arab and Islamic world. USA current Public Diplomacy campaign is based on two objectives. Firstly, to promote USA values and secondly, to marginalize the extremist elements<sup>30</sup>. USA government fully utilized print and electronic media along with the use of social media like twitter, face book and You Tube. Outreach programmes like lecture tours, listening tours, public private partnership programs, exchange programs, educational scholarships, regional media campaign and much more has been designed for the Arab and the Muslim worlds<sup>31</sup>. All the Public Diplomacy initiatives by USA government is to improve the country image abroad. Thus, currently USA, for instance, to improve its image among the

public of Muslim world, is spending a great deal of money and resources on the projects related to public diplomacy. These are related to youth, media campaign, education resources, exchange programmes, established USA center to engage in a dialogue with Muslim and Arab world public, interfaith dialogue, and much more. For the success of the public diplomacy, USA government is making maximum use of the available recourses including private sector like nongovernmental organizations.

Currently, almost all ministries of foreign affairs started giving importance to Public Diplomacy and they set the goals and targets along with well-defined strategies for public diplomacy.

### **Challenges to Public Diplomacy**

Although Public Diplomacy or new Public Diplomacy has become the routine practice by different governments but it's not a simple road to follow. Public Diplomacy has to face many challenges and here only few are mentioned.

First challenge is how to conceptualize the Public diplomacy. Some scholars viewed Public Diplomacy as a bridge to narrow the gaps and bring understanding between different nations, groups or regions of the world, for others like Mohan Jyoti Dutta and Mahuya Pal are of the view that transnational companies, developed nation states and other actors in order to keep their hold on the resources and markets, facilitate the privatization policies and economic liberalization, a neocolonial agenda, Public Diplomacy programmes are initiated.

“One of the primary public relations functions through which neocolonial interests are carried out by nation-states is public diplomacy; that is using the government's ability to enact power and control in international arena to create spaces for neoliberal hegemony in foreign spaces”.<sup>32</sup>

Neo-imperialist powers made Public Diplomacy strategies to further their interests globally.

Secondly, how to separate Public Diplomacy from propaganda. Many scholars are of the view that propaganda and Public Diplomacy are the same interchangeable terms that is to capture the minds of the people or to influence the opinion of foreign audience. According to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke “*Call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psychological warfare, or – if you really want to be blunt – propaganda...*”<sup>33</sup> However, many are of the view that Public Diplomacy and propaganda are two different terms. For Nicholas J. Cull propaganda is used for immoral purposes and its not a two way communication. For Public Diplomacy it must be based on moral grounds and one of its strategies is that it’s a two way process<sup>34</sup>. It’s a dialogue based course.

Thirdly, modern information revolution has created an environment where public, governments, organizations all depend on the means of communications like, newspapers, radio, television, internet and much more. The problem with the modern age of communication is that there is so much information, opinion, government owned means of communication that people get confused. Most of the time, people don’t trust the government explanation regarding any issue. Furthermore, there is stereotype explanation to issues by the media, which also present the biased information and analysis. Ineffective listening and misperceived messages make Public Diplomacy an uphill task. In such a situation, it’s difficult to effectively carry out Public Diplomacy and convey the message in a convincing manner.

Finally, the government is not the only actor to control the information. More influential civil society actors play their role as far as the diplomacy is considered. Non state actors effectively and diplomatically are entering into the domain of state. They are credible and effective as they do have recourses, expertises and modern technologies, thus they can



easily influence the public opinion. Thus making it difficult for a state to achieve its public diplomacy objectives.

### **Future of Public Diplomacy**

According to Silvia Kofler, Spokesperson, Delegation of the EU to the U.S.

“I predict that the ongoing democratization of Public Diplomacy will not only continue, but grow exponentially. In the past few years, Public Diplomacy has already changed dramatically. No longer simply the purview of nation-states, it is practiced by international and non-governmental organizations, regional governments, and other new actors”<sup>35</sup>.

Those who are associated with Public Diplomacy, either as professionals or practitioner, are very much convinced about the future of Public Diplomacy. For their conviction following reasons can be mentioned.

- More and more Public Diplomacy practitioners', diplomats, are utilizing the tools of Public Diplomacy and their number is on increase.<sup>36</sup> It has a large number of governments from all continents which are making strategies and programs to fully use the Public Diplomacy to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Furthermore, governments are spending more resources on Public Diplomacy than ever before.
- Increase in number of academics and scholars to write about Public Diplomacy<sup>37</sup> history, objectives, programs, challenges, role of non state actors and so on. New Public Diplomacy institutions, centers and departments are mushrooming among academic circles as well as non-governmental offices. More horizons are being exposed by the scholars and practitioners. First, its Public Diplomacy, then new Public Diplomacy, social media Public Diplomacy and now Public Diplomacy.

- Further, the scope of activities related to Public Diplomacy has increased. Now, more and more areas are coming under the jurisdiction Public Diplomacy like fashion industry, sports, music, art, culture, media and so on.
- The number of actors, to carry out the activities of Public Diplomacy, has increased. Now, its not only state but non state actors are also involved.
- Because of new technologies and media as the use of Public Diplomacy tools has also given a boost to Public Diplomacy activities. Twitter, face book, internet, YouTube are all being used as Public Diplomacy tools. Role of social media cannot be denied or overlooked in the age of globalization. One can cite the role of face book and twitter during the spring revolution in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Now diplomats and politicians have to be online to keep in touch with their goals.

## **Conclusion**

In twenty first century, Public Diplomacy is considered a tool to manage international environment. Public Diplomacy is different from traditional diplomacy as far as its scope and actors are considered. It is a dialogue oriented and engaging the public rather than the one way flow of information from the state. The process of globalization makes Public Diplomacy even more important and indisputable with the fact that more effective actors like global NGOs, multilateral organizations and IGOs are more influential than the national governments. New means of communication further the role of Public Diplomacy. Use of Social media is increasing, those who wanted to communicate with public cannot ignore it. Embassies must develop their potentials to fully utilize the social media. Governments must pay more importance to Public Diplomacy and allocate more funds for its activities. It does not mean that every government use Public Diplomacy for every country but it is recommended that priority must be given to those who are vital for the interest of a country. Similarly, every state has to set its own objectives, and

strategies to achieve its foreign policy objectives. For this, state has to engage more actors. Public Diplomacy is the need of time, it cannot be done on ad hoc bases neither it can be ignored. If governments wanted to be at the top of their foreign policy goals, they must know how to fully utilize the Public Diplomacy tools. Public Diplomacy is the diplomacy for the contemporary world politics.

### **Notes**

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<sup>1</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., Public Diplomacy (PD) and Soft Power, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097996>

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. p. 95.

<sup>3</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Soft Power: The Means To Success in World Politics (Public Affairs: New York, 2004.),

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> What is Public diplomacy?

<http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Murrow/Diplomacy>

<sup>6</sup> Definitions of Public diplomacy. The Edward R Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy. <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Murrow/Diplomacy/Definitions>

<sup>7</sup> Nicholas J. Cull, Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past, ( Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, 2009)., p.12.

<sup>8</sup> Nicholas J. Gull, op.cit., pp. 12-13.

<sup>9</sup> Joseph S. Nye, The New Public Diplomacy, Project Syndicate <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-public-diplomacy>

<sup>10</sup> Leonard, M. (2002) *Public Diplomacy*, The Foreign Policy Centre: London, p. 10-11. cited in <http://search.conduit.com/results.aspx?q=the+new+era+of+diplomacy+the+effects+of+public+diplomacy&Suggest=the+new+era+of+diplomacy+the+effec&sttype=Results&FollowOn=True&SSPV=FFSB10&SelfSearch=1&SearchType=SearchWeb&SearchSource=13&ctid=CT3067892&octid=CT3067892>

<sup>11</sup>Arranged Marriage of the Willing: Public Diplomacy (PD) Prescriptions for Sino-Japanese Relations by Peng Claire Bai, Pacific Forum CSIS: Issues and Insights

[http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/issuesinsights\\_v06n17.Public Diplomacy \(PD\)\(PD\)f](http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/issuesinsights_v06n17.PublicDiplomacy(PD)(PD)f)

<sup>12</sup>[http://yu.edu/admissions/events/yunmun/CTC/Goldstein\\_CTC\\_Topic2\\_NSHAHS.Public Diplomacy \(PD\)\(PD\)f](http://yu.edu/admissions/events/yunmun/CTC/Goldstein_CTC_Topic2_NSHAHS.PublicDiplomacy(PD)(PD)f)

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Joseph S Nye, Jr., *Op.cit.*, p.91.

<sup>15</sup> Nicholas J. Gull, *op.cit.*, pp. 17-22.

<sup>16</sup> Bruce Gregory

American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 6 (2011) 351-372 [http://resources.columbian.gwu.edu/upload/pub/2011/10/BGregory.Public Diplomacy \(PD\)\(PD\)f](http://resources.columbian.gwu.edu/upload/pub/2011/10/BGregory.PublicDiplomacy(PD)(PD)f)

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. Also see Nicholas J. Gull, *op.cit.*, pp. 17-18.

<sup>18</sup> Nicholas J. Gull, *op.cit.*, pp. 19-22.

<sup>19</sup> What is Public diplomacy?  
[http://uspublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/about/what\\_is\\_Public Diplomacy \(PD\)\(PD\)/](http://uspublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/about/what_is_PublicDiplomacy(PD)(PD)/)

<sup>20</sup> America's Mixed Image Abroad,  
<http://www.gannettonline.com/gns/mideast/diplomacy.htm>. Also see Public Diplomacy; An on line Exploration of Diplomatic History and Foreign affairs,  
<http://www.usdiplomacy.org/diplomacytoday/contemporary/public.php>

<sup>21</sup> **The Soviet Union and CD: The forgotten tale of 'low politics' in a 'high politics' era., 27<sup>th</sup> March 2011**, Public and Cultural Diplomacy E: A reflective group blog by students on the Public and Cultural Diplomacy module at London Metropolitan University <http://publicandculturaldiplomacye.blogspot.com/2011/03/soviet-union-and-cd-forgotten-tale-of.html>

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

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<sup>23</sup>Gienow\_Hecht, J. C. E. and Donfried, M. C. (2010) Searching For A Cultural Diplomacy. United States: Berghahn Books. pp.33-74.cited in Ibid.

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<sup>25</sup> Sean Mills, The 1959 National Exhibition in Mosco <http://eamesdesigns.com/library-entry/1959-exhibition-in-moscow/>

<sup>26</sup> US department of State: Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy (PD)and Public Affairs., <http://www.state.gov/r/>

<sup>27</sup>*R.S. Zaharna, Obama, U.S. Public Diplomacy (PD) and the Islamic World, 16 Mar 2009., p.2.*

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<sup>28</sup> . Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Mohan Jyoti Dutta and Mahuya Pal, Public Relations and Marginalization in a Global Context: A post Colonial Critique, in Nilanjana Bardhan and C.Kay weaver (ed), *Public Relations in Global Cultural Contexts: Multi-Paradigmatic Perspectives*, p 209

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<sup>33</sup>Nancy Snow, Public Diplomacy (PD)and Propaganda: Rethinking Diplomacy in the Age of Persuasion

<http://www.e-ir.info/2012/12/04/public-diplomacy-and-propaganda-rethinking-diplomacy-in-the-age-of-persuasion/>

<sup>34</sup>Nicholas J. Gull, op.cit., p. 23..

<sup>35</sup>[http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/Public Diplomacy \(PD\) in\\_monitor/issue/february\\_2012/](http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/Public_Diplomacy_(PD)_in_monitor/issue/february_2012/)

<sup>36</sup>Philip Seib, PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (PD)(PD) Snapshot: Looking Towards the Future [http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/Public Diplomacy \(PD\)\(PD\)in\\_monitor/article/PUBLIC DIPLOMACY \(PD\) \(PD\)\\_ Snapshot \\_Looking\\_Towards\\_the\\_Future/](http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/Public_Diplomacy_(PD)(PD)in_monitor/article/PUBLIC_DIPLOMACY_(PD)_Snapshot_Looking_Towards_the_Future/)

<sup>37</sup>Ibid.

# **ABOUNDING INTERNAL CONFLICTS IN AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS OF PREPOTENCY OF GREED OR GRIEVANCES**

*Dr. Muhammad Ihsan Qadir and Rafique A Khan*

## **Abstract**

*Scores of inter and intra-state conflicts have been haunting African continent for the last many decades. These conflicts have their roots embedded in diversity of religion, ethnicity, identity, resources' scarcity and political boundary delimitation concerns since decolonization of this vast land. Most of the conflicts in Africa emerged as an expression of economic and social deprivations as concluded by proponents of grievance. However, the recent addition of greed theory in conflict literature has reshaped the course of debate and discerns causes of conflict initiation in greed of conflicting parties having self enrichment motives. Greed theory has been put to test against three major African conflicts being most cataclysmic in terms of human casualties; Angolan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwandan conflict. These conflicts had monumentally shocking impact on humanity. This article argues that Greed theory has selective relevance instead of universal application. Our qualitative research based findings with respect to initiation of these conflicts show weaker causal relation as professed by greed theorists. This research article is significant as it challenges the findings of greed theory's generalization.*

**Key words:** Internal conflicts, Greed-Grievance theory, Resource wars, genocide

## **Introduction**

Continent of Africa is teeming with many internal conflicts and has remained unstable for the last many decades. Raging violent conflicts have inflicted unfathomable loss of millions of lives. As per rational estimate, 20% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa lives in conflict afflicted countries.<sup>1</sup> The states

*Abounding Internal Conflicts in Africa:  
An Analysis of Prepotency of Greed or Grievances*

embroiled in conflicts are facing abject poverty, economic retardation, political instability, uneven development and many other social challenges which have deterred human well beingness. During four decades (1960-2000), there have been 80 changes in governments in 48 sub-Saharan countries through violence.<sup>2</sup> Turn of new millennium brought no respite for the subjugated African population in terms of peace and prosperity as 18 countries faced armed rebellion and 11 states suffered political crises.<sup>3</sup> Subsequent decade of 2000 saw an overall decline in armed conflicts around the world. Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) conflict data signifies that 33 intra-state conflicts including 9 internationalized intra-state conflicts plagued the world in 2013 whereas number of conflicts was almost double in 1997.<sup>4</sup> Regional distribution of conflicts in 2013 showed that Africa still topped the tally with 20 active intra-state conflicts. Forty seven (81%) out of fifty eight UN recognized African states have witnessed conflicts of varying severity during past four decades. Loss of human lives attributed to different conflicts is estimated to be over 180 million.<sup>5</sup> At present, 26 countries possessing different militia, guerrilla, separatist and anarchist groups are entangled in both inter and intra-state conflicts.<sup>6</sup>

Taxonomy of African conflicts put forth by Salim<sup>7</sup> signifies that conflicts prevalent in Africa include; territorial and boundary conflicts, political and ideological conflicts, secession conflicts and transhumance and irredentist conflicts. This article will examine intra-state conflicts through greed – grievance prism for establishing preponderance of any one in three major African conflicts. Findings of the famous greed theory have been challenged against its generalization in African conflicts. Few variables like ethnicity, tribalism and social structure, being heart and soul of African life, have not been accorded due attention by greed theorists. In temporal terms, scope of this article is limited to last three decades and in spatial proviso, it focuses on Sub-Saharan Africa only. Grievance thesis in support of initiation of intra-state conflict is as old as humanity itself<sup>8</sup>. Many scholars have been professing preponderance of grievances in emergence of the intra-state conflicts and argued



that inequality, political oppression and scarcity of resources were major causes for emergence of internal conflicts in the world. Communities facing these harsh realities are gravitated towards use of violence for alleviation of root causes of these inadequacies. Succeeding group of scholars (Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, De Soysa and Neumayer) argued that greed is the primary cause for conflicts, initiation and asserted that presence of abundant natural resources, high share of commodity exports in overall national economy, external financial support and lower opportunity cost (ease of recruitment of rebels) are major sources for emergence of internal conflicts.<sup>9</sup>

### **Theoretical Framework**

Many African countries are unstable with the exception of few states. Reasons for proneness to conflicts can be traced by various theories propounded by eminent scholars through their seminal works in the field of conflictology and international relations. In conflict literature, there are various correlations (theories) drawn by Cilliers & Schuenemann (2015) explaining causes of internal conflicts Firstly, poverty - instability correlation, violence is generally more frequent and severe in economically poor states than wealthier ones. Furthermore, poverty is the function of inequality and social stratification therefore conflicts fuel poverty and *vice versa*. Secondly, the autocratic state<sup>10</sup> having 'democracy deficit' passing through transitional phase from autocracy to democracy are always prone to violence. Thirdly, there exists a strong correlation between large number of uneducated and unemployed youth (youth bulge) and conflict. In sub-Saharan Africa, majority of population falls within average age of 15-30 years; younger age has made population more prone to violent behaviour. Fourthly, possibility of recurrence of violence, when a country has experienced violence in the past, strong possibility of repetition of the phenomenon exists. Fifthly, politically and economically weak states suffer serious fall-outs of happenings in contiguous states commonly known as 'neighbourhood effect'.

Lastly, the cumulative effect of all five well proven theories in Africa has resulted in poor governance, access of inapt and self-serving leadership to power and excessive dependence on commodity exports for running state affairs. All these inadequacies have generated conflicts and scholars have undertaken investigative studies for establishing causes of conflicts. Till early 90s, it was theorized that social and economic grievances were the root cause of conflicts. However in mid-90s, this assertion was challenged by Collier and associates espousing conflict are entrenched in 'loot seeking' (greed theory<sup>11</sup>) rather than 'Justice seeking' (grievance theory<sup>12</sup>) by rebel forces.

### **Paradigm Shift - Greed versus Grievance Debate**

During Cold War, major academic focus remained on studying causes and consequences of systemic conflicts or major wars however, during same time frame, conflict landscape of the world changed all together as discovered by Ted Gurr and his associates; there was a sharp increase in intra-state conflicts within many societies during the decades of 1950s to 1980s.<sup>13</sup> These conflicts known as 'societal conflicts', were three times more than inter-state conflicts, further increased to six folds between 1980 and 1990. The end of Cold War weakened superpower patronage of ongoing independence movements which created a vacuum. This resulted in inevitable violence, emergence of disparate ideologies, religion and ethnicity based groups seeking to finance their operations through local taxation, plunder and pillage<sup>14</sup>. The latter half of decade of 1990s witnessed escalatory trend in conflicts' occurrences. By mid 1995 there were 22 high intensity conflicts being fought worldwide however, the number rose to 25 by the end of 1999. The number of low intensity conflicts also rose from 31 (in 1996) to 77 in mid 1999. On lower violence threshold, political conflicts increased from 40 in 1995 to 151 in mid 1999.<sup>15</sup>

For establishing the root cause of these conflicts, a paradigm shift occurred. Scholars reduced conflict investigation canvass from systemic level to local actors who

were aiming for independence, autonomy and secession. Causes of conflicts especially in Africa involved territory, ideology, dynastic legitimacy, religion, language, ethnicity, self-determination, resources, markets, ethnic dominance, equality and revenge.<sup>16</sup> Out of all postulated causes, ethnicity received maximum attention for investigation and it was most fashionable term to explain conflicts in 1990s. Emergence of Tamil insurgency, Bosnian conflict, Rwandan and Burundi genocide all had involvement of ethnicity in one way or the other.

By mid-1990s, on the other end of aetiological spectrum, studies investigating causes of intra-state conflicts started proposing economic agenda as essential driver of the conflicts particularly in developing world. This approach has been collated into 'Resource Wars'. Fights for control over resources have been the fundamental cause of many conflicts but scarcity also triggered violence; more the scarcity of resource greater the violence. On the opposite end, abundance of resources is also equally troubling for societies specially the natural resources. In case of abundance of resources, resource appropriation is considered fundamental cause of conflicts.

According to 'resource war' proponents, groups engaged in violence are not primarily motivated by grievances but essentially by economic agendas. The resource-war hypothesis has been transformed into 'greed theory' by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler espousing preponderance of greed as primary cause of conflict as opposite to earlier understanding of grievances instead. Greed theorists contended that discourse on the conflict tends to be dominated by group grievances beneath which inter-group hatred lurks have investigated statistically the global pattern of large scale civil conflicts since 1965, expecting to find a close relationship between measures of these hatred and grievances and the incidence of conflict. I found that economic agendas appear to be central in understanding 'why civil wars get going'.<sup>17</sup> Collier and Hoeffler used model of expected-utility theory with premise that rebels would conduct civil war if the perceived benefits outweigh the costs of rebellion. In the model, many independent variables

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were used including; per capita income, natural resource endowment, population size and ethno-linguistic fractionalization analysed using statistical regression. The study examining 161 countries having 78 internal conflicts covering period 1960-1999, revealed following major findings:

- Higher per capita income reduces duration of civil war and probability of its occurrence.
- Possession of natural resources initially increases the duration and risk of civil war but then reduces it, however high level of natural resources diminish probability of civil war due to enhanced financial capability of government.
- Countries with larger populations have higher risks of civil war and these wars last longer.
- Highly fractionalized societies are no more prone to civil war than homogeneous ones. (This finding was contrary to common belief of grievance theorists)
- Risk of civil war arises when society is polarized in to two groups; polarized societies have 50% higher probability of civil war than homogeneous or fractionalized societies.

Despite dominating results of the study in favour of greed, Collier believed that greed always remains embedded in belligerent's narrative however, grievance narrative being more sellable and plays better than greed narrative thus when rational at the top hierarchy is essentially greed, the actual discourse may be dominated by grievance.

Africa has big landmass; so is the number of conflicts. Testing all conflicts against greed-grievance theories is near impossible therefore scope of this paper has been intentionally limited to three major conflicts of sub Saharan region which include Angolan conflict, Congo conflict, and Rwandan conflict. The rationale behind selection of these conflicts is their dreadful nature in terms of human losses in comparison to other internal conflicts in Africa or Asia.

## **Angolan Conflict**

Angola<sup>18</sup> is the 7<sup>th</sup> largest South-Western African country (Area 1246700 Sq Km) bordered by Namibia in South, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) on the North, Zambia on East and faces Atlantic Ocean (1600 Km) on the West. It has multicultural and multi racial society having Ovimbundu 37%, Kimbundu 25%, Bakonogo 13%, Mestico 2%, European 1% and others 22%, as its inhabitants. Oil and diamonds exports contribute 85% and 5% in country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) respectively<sup>19</sup>. Angola being rich in natural resource, endowment and major oil exporter of Africa, is one of the poorest countries<sup>20</sup> in the world.

Conflict in Angola started in 1975 after securing independence from Portugal in 1961. During independence struggle, three main groups namely National Front for Liberation of Angola (FNLA), Peoples Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rose to eminence. However, after securing independence, conflict based on sharp politico-ideological differences for political power, between MPLA and UNITA ravaged the country. The conflict lasted for 27 years inflicting grave loss to human lives of about 1.5 million and dislocation of over 4 million people<sup>21</sup>. The conflict soon transformed into proxy wars between superpowers where USSR and Cuba started supporting MPLA and US and white-ruled South Africa sided with UNITA for controlling ascendancy to power for geo-economic interests. During late 80s, belligerents shifted focus from gaining political power to seizing control of natural resources crop fields for sustainability of activities. Conflict finally ended in 2002 when MPLA staged decisive victory by decimating UNITA.

Collier's model attaches great importance to four aspects with respect to conflict initiation; share of commodity exports in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), generation of finances for running insurgency through natural resources, external financial support and lower opportunity cost for rebel recruitment. World Bank data report (1960-1999) for GDP, oil

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revenues (primary commodity) and per capita income of Angola shows that just before the start of conflict in 1975, Angolan Gross National Product (GNP) was over \$ 8 billion and country was exporting oil worth over \$ 1.2 billion per annum gradually rising till the end of 1984.<sup>22</sup> The country has large natural resource endowment especially diamonds (being lootable), oil and fertile land for earning valuable foreign exchange through agricultural exports. Diamonds and oil were only available natural resources which ultimately became major source of funding for insurgency.<sup>23</sup> The share of commodity exports (oil and minerals) was 12.5% in national economy far below the limit (25%) set by Collier for drawing positive causal relation for conflict initiation however, theorists' assertion that 'effect of commodity exports on conflict risk is both highly significant and considerable' does not hold valid in case of Angolan conflict. The proxy actors (USSR & USA) played active role in providing financial support to warring factions. USA provided \$ 0.3 million to FNLA in 1975 on the start of conflict<sup>24</sup> which helped in uplifting of the group against its rivals. Covert economic support by both patronisers continued till end of cold war in 1989 however, it is extremely difficult to trace and proof as money remained mostly out of all banking channels. The regional small countries were politically coerced by both superpowers to support their respective progenies.

Insurgencies require continuous replenishment of fresh recruits (rebels) for successful operations. As per Collier's greed thesis, opportunity cost (ease of recruitment) for fresh recruits depends on three factors - prevailing unemployment, levels of education and ethnic fractures in society. Pre-war turbulences forced skilled white settlers (Portuguese) to exit which plummeted state economy<sup>25</sup>. The steep fall gave exponential rise to unemployment which touched 80%. When conflict started in 1975, the per capita income fell by almost 30.6% (from \$ 594 pre-war to \$ 412 at start of war)<sup>26</sup>. The cumulative effect of this economic downfall resulted in massive unemployment thus reducing opportunity cost for recruitment. Easy availability of recruits for rebelling forces in Angola is hard reality which is consistent with Collier's

findings (lower wages, education levels and ethnic fractures reduce opportunity cost). However, racial and ethnic tensions prevalent in Angolan society being actual cause of conflict cannot be ignored at all. Ethnic rivalry between Ovimbundu, Kimbundu and Bakonogo tribes is no hidden secret even today. Collier's findings of 'no direct relation of conflict with ethnic fracture of society' are also inconsistent as ethnicity played active role in this conflict. Another conclusion which can be drawn from Angolan conflict is that Collier's model is more applicable for explanation of duration and re-emergence of conflicts rather than initiation of civil wars. The utter disregard of ethnic and racial divisions weakens generalization of theory especially on African conflicts where race and ethnicity form the basis of survival.

### **Congo Conflict**

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)<sup>27</sup> is 2<sup>nd</sup> largest (area wise) central African country surrounded by Congo, Central African Republic and south Sudan in North, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania in East, Zambia and Angola in South and Atlantic Ocean in the West. Country houses over 200 ethnic groups having majority of Bantus<sup>28</sup>. DRC has been victim of cyclic violence since colonization by Belgium in 1885<sup>29</sup>. Belgium adopted iron-hand approach for exploitation of natural resources especially rubber being hot demand as era of industrialization had set in. Congolese population was forced to work endlessly for collection of rubber and violators were dealt inhumanely using whipping, cutting of arms and rape as exploiting tools. Congo lost almost half of its population through this ongoing tyranny; 10 million.<sup>30</sup> This destructive approach lost approval and backing of other imperialist powers involved in Africa in 1908 and Belgium was forced to adopt less oppressive tools for exploitation to avoid complete obliteration of Congolese form workers.

After getting independence on June 30, 1960, an anti imperialist democratic government came to power and demanded complete economic independence from previous masters. However, Belgium and USA were jointly vying to

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maintain hold on the internal affairs; political and economic (natural resources) of the newly formed state. Non compliance of western demands resulted in killing of newly elected president (Patrice Lumumba) by anti state factions duly supported by USA and Belgium in 1961 (Hochschild, 2001). Taking advantage of prevailing political anarchy in the country, an army officer (Col J Mabutú) took control of the country through a coup d'état in 1965 with collusion of USA<sup>31</sup> and continued ruling country for next 30 years. The installed stooge allowed plundering of country's natural resources to foreign mining companies and amassed huge wealth for himself in Swiss banks. US political support to Mabutú was based in anti communism thesis perceived as an ideological threat to USA as erstwhile USSR was extending her zone of influence in Africa.<sup>32</sup>

Conflict in DRC is very complex having its roots both in political and economic moorings. Conflict in political realm is because of so many political aspirants and ethnic venturing to gain political power however, its perpetuation is embedded in economic exploitation by many players. DRC is extremely rich in natural resources having almost all minerals discovered so far. Its mineral wealth is estimated to be of \$ 24 Trillion consisting of diamonds, gold, Coton<sup>33</sup> and uranium.<sup>34</sup> An estimated daily export of minerals worth \$ 6 Million was taking place in 2007.<sup>35</sup> Access to mineral resources is extremely easy as mostly very close to earth crust thus can be extracted with rudimentary tools and techniques. This easy-picking has transformed these minerals to 'militarized minerals' by various rebel groups creating a never ending conflict with the connivance of external powers having economic interest as priority.

The current conflict started in 1994 with the heavy inflow of ethnic Hutus (about 1.2 million) from Rwanda where ethnic Tutsis came to power, to avoid reprisal. In 1996, a trilateral alliance; Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda (commonly known as AFDL) invaded DRC for flushing out Hutu rebel groups who had taken shelter in DRC. This tripartite invasion had hidden motive of having control over DRC's natural resources as



believed by many experts. In subsequent years, differences over distribution of natural resources surfaced and Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda re-attacked DRC which resulted in 2<sup>nd</sup> Congo war 1998.<sup>36</sup> Angola, Chad, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Sudan sided with DRC during expanding war which had eight belligerents each trying to be victor in its own right. A UN sponsored truce was brokered and war officially ended in 2002 and elections were held in 2006. However, complete withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwandan forces from DRC did not take place and many splinter groups and militia bands previously part of regular Ugandan and Rwandan army stayed on to predate on resources (diamonds). The numerous 'stay-on' rebel groups were funded by Uganda and Rwanda for acting as proxy forces for natural resource exploitation. In 2008, cease-fire with 25 rebel groups took place but fighting still continued as many other active groups were left out of peace and negotiation process thus there was no change in death rate (casualties) in DRC.<sup>37</sup>

As per Collier's greed thesis African conflicts are entrenched in 'loot seeking' rather than 'Justice seeking'.<sup>38</sup> This conclusion was based on in-depth study of many influencing variables including share of commodity exports in Gross Domestic Product, insurgency financing through natural resources, external financial support and lower opportunity cost for rebel recruitment. Congo conflict had major involvement of natural resources, external financial support and low opportunity cost. Country has suffered 'resource curse' as abundance invites external intervention which actually happened through troika of neighbours (Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda) having relatively lesser endowment of natural resources. Congolese economy has historically been export oriented with mining being lead industry. Natural resources especially diamonds have been major export with other precious metals and minerals. Share of commodity exports (minerals & diamonds) has been 25.7% in country's GDP in 2002.<sup>39</sup> Before the conflict, its share was around 37%. Emergence of conflict with higher commodity export share in economy was in line with Collier's greed model. External political and financial support by multiple

neighbouring states in the conflict is no secret therefore, emergence of conflict is in line with Collier's model.

In multi ethnic states, ethnic divisions provide easy grounds for recruitment of rebels. This is complemented by lower education opportunities which in turn results in high unemployment rates. Unemployment rate of Congo has been very high average 52.1% during last decade<sup>40</sup>. Literacy rate is on continuous decline since start of the conflict in 1995 and has slipped from 77.3% to 66.8% which means that unemployment would further increase with passage of time. This, in turn, will reduce opportunity cost for recruitment of fresh soldiers by rebel leaders giving rise to the possibility of re-emergence of the conflict.

The above analysis amply demonstrates that Collier's greed thesis stands validated in case of initiation of Congo conflict.

### **Rwandan Conflict**

Continent of Africa witnessed a genocidal upheaval in 1994 when conflict broke out in Rwanda<sup>41</sup> and resulted in colossal loss of life and property. As per UN estimates, over 0.8 million (11% of population) men, women and children lost their lives<sup>42</sup> and 1.75 million people became Internally Displaced (Ids) and migrated to neighbouring countries. Rwanda having an area of 26338 Sq Km is land locked state commonly known as 'land of thousand hills' populated by three main ethnic groups (Hutus 84%, Tutsis 15% and Twas 1%). Tutsis have historically been landowners and Hutus have been land tillers. The conflict which formerly emerged in 1994 had its roots in colonial days of Belgium (1916-1962) when division of land was unjustly done between these two principal ethnic groups as majority (Hutus) were considered an inferior race. Cards system for establishing ethnic identity was introduced which generated tension amongst both ethnic groups. A civil war in 1959 resulted in dethroning of king of Tutsi origin and independence was granted to Rwanda in 1962 which paved way for formation of Hutu led government. For next few years, Tutsis community remained under extreme pressure as few

thousand were killed, maimed and over 0.15 million fled to neighbouring countries. These forced migrants (Tutsis) later formed a rebel group (Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)) during their refuge in Uganda and invaded Rwanda in 1990 with three objectives for establishing democracy, improvement in governance and securing refugees' rights to return to Rwanda. The war continued till 1993 when Arusha accord<sup>43</sup> was finally signed by Hutu led Rwandan government with RPF which brought feeble semblance of peace.

Despite signing peace accord, anti Tutsi fundamentalist groups remained active in cities and a Low Intensity latent conflict existed in post agreement scenario. On 6 April 1994, Rwandan presidential plane was downed by unknown assailants that triggered Tutsis' massacre in capital which engulfed whole country with staggering speed and brutality in coming days. On 7 April 1994, Shooting down of aircraft was attributed to RPF action and Prime Minister along with 10 Belgian peacekeepers was killed by Rwandan state soldiers. Few moderate government officials of Hutu origin were also eliminated by nationalist Hutu militias during initial days of carnage which later turned out to be genocide for ethnic cleansing of one community. Killings finally stopped on 16 July 1994 (after 100 days) when RPF managed to take control of state. The RPF victory created 2 million more refugees (mainly Hutus) from Rwanda, exacerbating what had already become a full-blown humanitarian crisis<sup>44</sup>.

These 100 days of bloodletting had many deep seeded causes which can be viewed through various sociological prisms. From historical perspective, it was result of ethnic hatred which was intentionally developed amongst Hutu-Tutsi communities by colonial masters for exercising effective control. One of the most plausible causes identified by scholars is access to scarce natural resources particularly land. Historians also believe that population pressure due to rapid population growth was another underlying cause of carnage. While analysing the causes of genocide, Gérard Prunier contends that decision to kill was made for political reasons.... there were too many people on too little land, and that with

reduction in numbers, there would be more for the survivors<sup>45</sup> pointing towards human greed. From political science perspective, Homer-Dixon also concludes that increased competition for scarce resources was the fundamental cause of this conflict.<sup>46</sup> Dehumanization was another aspect of the conflict as Hutus regarded Tutsis as 'cockroaches and vermin' being less than human beings.<sup>47</sup>

Pre-conflict share of commodity export in national economy was around 23% which is line with greed theory findings as concluded by the theorist that countries having 25% share of commodity exports are exposed to emergence of conflict more than the ones having lesser distribution. Rwanda's natural resources are limited. A small mineral industry provides about 5-8% of foreign exchange earnings therefore, possibility of financing of insurgency through natural resource exploitation is extremely limited. External political interference is evident as Ugandan government patronized RPF rebels by supporting through cash and kind, a necessary prerequisite for running any insurgency.

Recruitment of fighters on ethnic lines is generally an easy undertaking therefore, Rwandan Tutsis had all-out support of ethnic Ugandan Tutsis living in contiguous borderland regions of Uganda. Easy availability of unemployed and low educated children facilitated induction of 'child soldiers' during the conflict. Collier's greed and grievances comparative analysis had an unusual finding; 'ethnic and religious diversity reduces risk of conflict'. This finding in particular remained under focus of scholars who prioritize human grievances over greed which is an anti-thesis of greed theory. If this particular finding of the study is tested against Rwandan conflict then it can be safely concluded that finding cannot be validated as there were only two ethnic groups instead of many as in case of other African countries, but conflict still erupted with colossal loss of human lives. Ethnic and identity divides are permanent and always play lead role in conflicts therefore, cannot be ignored. Greed theory cannot be generalized as conflicts have many contributing factors.

## **Conclusion**

Africa is multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-cultural and multi-religious continent having uneven spatial and social development. African conflicts are perpetual with assortment of varying causes and episodes of violence thus provide good case studies for scholastic investigations. The causes of these conflicts are wide ranging having roots entrenched in economic, political, identity and ethnic crisis having violence as common denominator with no durable solutions. The intensity of violence has occasionally transformed into ideological, despotic or developmental genocide<sup>48</sup> in few cases in Africa. Economic and ethnic fault lines result in emergence of inter community grievances. The upshot of economic deprivations augments paucity and poverty which gives rise to intra-state conflicts. This cause is predominant in Africa as grievances are abundant with no foreseeable cure. Greed is also an important aspect in conflict analysis however, it cannot be treated as an independent cause for conflict initiation as professed by few scholars. Greed-grievance interdependence and inter-augmentation seems more logical conclusion for emergence of conflicts especially in Africa. Therefore, a balanced approach for establishing causes of internal conflicts may be win-win solution for analysis as greed and grievance thesis are always mutually inclusive than exclusive. Conflict ridden African governments may firstly, accelerate economic growth through pragmatic policy interventions, secondly must diversify their economies to obviate dependence on commodity exports, thirdly invest in social services including education and health, fourthly transparency and documentation of economic affairs and lastly the most important population control. These steps would help reducing the possibilities of new conflicts on the continent in future.

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**The Continent of Africa**



**Map of Angola (Appendix 1)**



### Map of Rwanda (Appendix 2)



### Map of Democratic Republic of Congo (Appendix 3)



## **Notes**

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<sup>1</sup> Elbadawi, Ibrahim, and Nicholas Sambanis. "Why are there so many wars in Africa? Understanding and preventing violent conflicts." *Journal of African Economics* 9(3), 2000: 244-269.

<sup>2</sup> Adebayo, Adedeji. *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance*. London: Zed Books, 1999. 63-79

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> L Themnér and P Wallensteen, Armed Conflicts (1946–2012), *Journal of Peace Research* 51(4), 2013: 145-169

<sup>5</sup> A Nhema, and P.T Zeleza, *The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes & Costs*. Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2008. 234-269

<sup>6</sup>Smith, Edward.  
*Warsintheworld.com*.<http://www.warsintheworld.com/pagestatic1258542232/index.html> (accessed on June 1, 2015).

<sup>7</sup> Salim, S. A. Localising outbreaks: The Role of Regional Organisation in Preventive Action. In K. M. Cahill, *Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start*. New York, Rutledge. 2000: 189-202

<sup>8</sup> Edward E. Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflicts: Theory and Cases*. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1990. 105-112

<sup>9</sup> Collier, Paul and Anke Hoefler, "Greed and Grievances in Civil War". Working Paper Series 2001-02. Centre for Study of African Economics (Oxford University),2002: 46-58

<sup>10</sup> States characterized with inherent political instability and ineffective regimes marred with nepotism, corruption and inefficiency.

<sup>11</sup> Greed Theory was conjectured by British economist Paul Collier in mid-90s, espousing that conflicts are initiated by combatants (rebels) after careful cost-benefit analysis for private gains, drawing motivation through control of goods and economic resources or by increasing power within state power structure.

<sup>12</sup> Grievance Theory posits that conflicts emerge over issues of identity, religion and social class differences (haves and have not), political repression and inequality etc.

<sup>13</sup> Gur, T, Marshall, M G and Kholsa, D, *Peace and Conflict 2001: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements and Democracy*. University of Maryland:2000, 287-299

<sup>14</sup> K Rupesinghe and S. N. Anderlini. *Civil Wars, Civil Peace: An Introduction to Conflict Resolution*. London Pluto Press, 1998:176

<sup>15</sup> P Wallensteen and M Sollenberg, Armed Conflicts 1989-98, *Journal of Peace Research* 36(5) 1999:593–606.

<sup>16</sup> Singer J D, *Armed Conflicts in Former Colonial Regions: From Classification to Explanation*. London MacMillan, 1996:139

<sup>17</sup> Collier, Paul and Anke Hoefler, "*Greed and Grievances in Civil Wars*". Working Paper Series 2001-02. Centre for Study of African Economics (Oxford University),2002: 46-58

<sup>18</sup> Map of Angola has been placed at Appendix 1



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- <sup>19</sup>CIA World Fact Book (Angola). cia.gov, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html> (accessed on June 8, 2015)
- <sup>20</sup> BBC.Com. (Angola Profile) [www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13036732](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13036732) (accessed on June 16, 2015)
- <sup>21</sup> Frynas, J. G. and Wood, G. (2001). "Oil and War in Angola". *Review of African Political Economy* 28(9), 2001: 587-606.
- <sup>22</sup> World Bank Reports and African Data Base of 2000, <http://www.worldbank.org/africa-data-base>.(accessed on July 12, 2015)
- <sup>23</sup> Assis, M "Ethnicity and Conflict in Angola: Prospects of Reconciliation," In *Angola's War Economy: the Role of Oil and Diamonds*, eds. J Cilliers and C. Dietrich (Pretoria: African Institute of Security Studies., 2000), 95–113.
- <sup>24</sup> Brittain, V. *Death of Dignity: Angola's Civil War*. London, Pluto.1998: 178
- <sup>25</sup> On the start of war, Portuguese owners abandoned 80% of agricultural crops and 41% of factories remained productive only. Over 30000 skilled workers left the country for better pastures.
- <sup>26</sup> International Monetary Fund. Report 2012. *Econstats: Angola*. New York: IMF.
- <sup>27</sup> Map of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been placed at Appendix 3
- <sup>28</sup> CIA World Fact Book (DRC). cia.gov <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html> (accessed on June 28, 2015)
- <sup>29</sup> In 1885, a conference in Berlin was held giving right to European countries to rule and colonize different African states. Belgium became formal imperial master of Congo through this conference.
- <sup>30</sup> Hochschild, A. *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa*, New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1999: 254
- <sup>31</sup> Olsson, Ola, and Heater Congdon. "Congo: The Prize Predation" *Journal of Peace Research* 3(41), 2004: 321.
- <sup>32</sup> Hochschild, A "Congo's Many Plunderers," *African Economic and Political Weekly* 4(36), 2001: 287–88.
- <sup>33</sup> Columbite-Tantalite (Colton) is the most profitable natural resource of Congo even more valuable than gold and diamonds. It is used in high tech circuitry in Printed Circuit Boards as it releases heat quickly and does not let the electronic gadgets overheat. It has enabled size reduction of various electronic devices and appliances. The market price of Colton ranges \$50-\$200 per pound depending on quality of ore.
- <sup>34</sup> "Kors, Joshu. "Blood Minerals.," *Current Science* 9(95), 2010:10–12.
- <sup>35</sup> Arthur, K. "Congo: Elections and the Battle for Mineral Resources," *Social Education* 71(1), February 2008: 86-94.
- <sup>36</sup> Olsson, Ola, and Heater Congdon. "Congo: The Prize Predation" *Journal of Peace Research* 3(41), 2004: 323.

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<sup>37</sup> “Polgree, Lydia.” Congo’s Death Rate Unchanged since War Ended., *newyorktimes.com* New York Times of 23 January 2008. (accessed on May 4, 2015).

<sup>38</sup> Collier, P and H Binswanger, “Ethnic Loyalties, State Formation and Conflict” Background Paper Prepared for the Africa in the 21st Century Project, Washington DC: World Bank, 1999.

<sup>39</sup> *nationsencyclopedia.com*: [www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Congo-Democratic-Republic-of-the-DROC-MINING.htm](http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Congo-Democratic-Republic-of-the-DROC-MINING.htm) (accessed on March 23, 2015)

<sup>40</sup> *Tradingeconomics.com*. Retrieved from *Tradingeconomics.com*: [www.tradingeconomics.com/congo/unemployment-rate](http://www.tradingeconomics.com/congo/unemployment-rate) (accessed on September 12, 2015)

<sup>41</sup> Map of Rwanda has been placed at Appendix 2.

<sup>42</sup> UN estimate of death toll in the crisis is 800,000 however Rwandan Government considers that 1,071,000 people lost their lives. More than 6 lives were lost every minute during 100 days of manslaughter. (*Amnesty.org*, 2004)

<sup>43</sup> Arusha Accords were set of five protocols, signed on August 4, 1993 in city of Arusha (Tanzania) by Rwandan government and Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) for ending three years long Rwandan civil war. The accord was mediated by USA, France and Organization of African Unity (OAU).

<sup>44</sup> *History.com*. (A+E Networks). <http://www.history.com/topics/rwandan-Genocide> (accessed January 6, 2015).

<sup>45</sup> Prunier, G. *Rwandan Crisis: History of Genocide*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1995: 217

<sup>46</sup> V Percival and T Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The Case of Rwanda,” *The Journal of Environment & Development* 5(3), 1996: 270–91.

<sup>47</sup> Stanton, G. H. *Genocidewatch.org*, <http://www.genocidewatch.org/aboutus/bydrgregorystanton.html>, (accessed on August 14, 2015)

<sup>48</sup> Three motive based classifications of genocides are typified in literature; developmental Genocide - perpetrator destroys those who stand in the way of economic exploitation of resources, despotic genocide, where the aim is to eliminate real or potential opposition; retributive genocide where the aim is to destroy a long-term enemy; and ideological genocide where the group to be destroyed is presented as evil.

# ILLEGAL APPROPRIATIONS IN THE SEA - FACTORS BEHIND EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS BY COASTAL STATES

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## **Abstract**

*Controversies among coastal states crop up on maritime boundary claims similar to that of demarcation disputes. Choice of the type of baseline for measuring various maritime zones (internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf) plays a pivotal role in shaping maritime claims. On regular coasts the default baseline is the normal baseline. The straight baselines though provide an easy solution for irregular coastal configurations but are mostly adopted by the states for obvious advantage of maritime expansion. Extended maritime claim by a state restrict many freedoms of other states in the sea like navigation, over flight, marine scientific research, laying of submarine cables and pipeline, resulting into controversies. The objections to unfounded maritime claims of coastal states by other states and conflicts are not scarce. This paper examines the leading factors behind excessive coastal claims like geographical, economic, political, strategic and psychological. The factors are relative depending on time and space which may accumulate all factors or dominance of one over the other. The central theme is appropriation of more sea for more economic benefits.*

**Keywords:** normal baselines, straight baselines, maritime zones, maritime claims, exclusive economic zone, contiguous zone

## **Introduction**

Edifice of maritime claims rests on the selection of baseline that determines the extent of coastal state territorial sea<sup>1</sup> and other maritime zones (Internal waters<sup>2</sup>,

Contiguous zone<sup>3</sup>, EEZ<sup>4</sup> and Continental Shelf<sup>5</sup>. It is significant to establish reference points on the coast for determining the outer limits of maritime zones at sea. The United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS) identifies different baseline systems for delimitation of maritime zones. The baselines are the starting point for construction of maritime regimes and for controversies as well. However, this paper would be restricted to Straight baselines being the most controversial due to their inherent capacity of maritime expansion seaward. Being advantageous, the coastal states mostly hanker after ways to expand their territorial limits seaward. The object of UNCLOS was to smooth the irregular coasts through application of straight baseline method for the convenience of both; the employing state and other states. The concept of straight baselines sprang from the famous Anglo-Norwegian fisheries case judgment by International Court of Justice (ICJ). The verdict legitimized straight baselines by Norway due to her irregular coastal conditions. During codification of the law of sea terms and phrases ICJ judgment got way into 1958 Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Convention (TSCZC), Territorial Sea Convention (TSC) and UNLCOS almost verbatim. The vagueness and ambiguities in the terms and phrases of straight baselines still exist in the UNCLOS without any precision leading to variety of interpretations. Contrarily some states take extraordinarily rigid position on employment of straight baselines resulting in interstate confrontations. In broad sense there may be a plenty of factors behind appropriation of sea through excessive maritime claims.

### **Baseline**

In ordinary parlance baseline is; *“clearly defined starting point (point of departure) from where implementation begins, improvement is judged, or comparison is made”*.<sup>6</sup> In legal terms baseline is; *“the line that divides the land from the sea, by which the extent of a coastal jurisdiction is measured.”*<sup>7</sup> Baseline, being the linchpin, determines the extent of coastal states’ maritime


zones. UNCLOS outlines various types of baselines like normal baselines,<sup>8</sup> closing lines,<sup>9</sup> straight baselines<sup>10</sup> and archipelagic lines<sup>11</sup> depending on coastal configurations.

### **Normal Baselines**

Historically, 1839 Anglo-French Fisheries Convention was the first treaty to refer to the low-water line<sup>12</sup> being the normal baseline from which the territorial sea is measured.<sup>13</sup> In 1804, jurisdiction case, the US Supreme Court declared that the word 'coast' meant the low water- line to measure the territorial sea.<sup>14</sup> In 1882 North Sea Fisheries Convention declared low water mark as the standard which was mostly followed by the European countries. The writers from civil law system<sup>15</sup> adopted this as convention for the sake of reference. Roman law described the word 'shore' and not the 'coast' from the high water mark instead of low water<sup>16</sup> for measuring territorial boundary of the state.

ICJ in Anglo-Norwegian fisheries case decided that low-water mark was the accepted criterion for measuring breadth of the territorial sea by the coastal states.<sup>17</sup> TSC<sup>18</sup> and UNCLOS<sup>19</sup> express that; "*the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low water line [....]*". Fig.-1 shows a normal baseline drawn from the contours of the coast and amplifying different maritime zones.

Fig.-1  
Normal Baseline



Source: [www.linz.govt.nz/sea/nautical-information/maritime-boundaries/maritime-boundary-definitions](http://www.linz.govt.nz/sea/nautical-information/maritime-boundaries/maritime-boundary-definitions)

### **Straight Baselines**

The coast which is not geographically straight and is irregular, the straight lines may be drawn instead of normal baselines.<sup>20</sup> Norway employed this system of baselines consistently since 1869.<sup>21</sup> The straight baselines conflicted up at international arena due to challenging of Royal decree of Norway by United Kingdom before the ICJ.<sup>22</sup> Norwegian coastline mostly comprises *fjords*<sup>23</sup> and *skjaergaard*.<sup>24</sup> The court decided that the straight lines applied by Norway were in consonance with the international law.<sup>25</sup>

A straight baseline has its genesis in juridical phenomenon based on a treaty codification. Article 5 of TSC, with a slight addition, has hailed almost verbatim as Article 7 of UNCLOS without providing any definition for straight baselines. The provision presents conditions for application of straight baseline system devoid of any mathematical precision for such conditions and for a uniform implication. Employment of UNCLOS Article 5, pertaining to normal baselines on uneven coasts can in

most, circumstances emerge into enclaves and deep-pockets of 'non-territorial seas'. This situation might create "considerable difficulties for both the observance of the appropriate régime and surveillance".<sup>26</sup>


State practice on application of straight baselines is mostly inconsistent to evolve any effect of creating new customary international law.<sup>27</sup> The straight baselines are permitted for exceptional circumstances. Reverse to the object, states have adopted straight baselines as their right in general, whereas employment of normal baselines has become an exception. The most effective way to tackle the excessive claims is negotiation of state parties under some international law of sea related forum for uniformity of rules on straight baselines. Fig-2 below portrays a coast showing different kinds of straight and closing lines for the convenience of understanding.

Fig.-2  
Straight Baseline Situations



The employing of straight baselines has not increased rather multiplied as is evident from Graph-1 below.

Graph-1



Source: Table compiled from US, *Limits in the Seas* Nos. 3, 4, 5, 8, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 43, 44, 47, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 76, 80, 82, 99, 103, 107, 111, 112, 113, 118 & 120.

Also DOALOS, *Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 71*, (United Nations: New York, 2009), 26. ILA, *Committee on Baselines*, (2014), Para 36.

### **Factors behind Excessive Claims in the Sea**

The maritime boundary delimitations involve many intricacies as they always take into account international aspects. It is important to identify different factors relevant to excessive claims. Vagueness of basic terms on straight baselines embodied in Article 7 of UNCLOS, lack of standard definitions and absence of arithmetical precision contribute to the problem. The non-uniform state practice due to their vested interests adds to the severity of issue. It encourages the states to go for liberal interpretations to possess more area of the sea and resources too. Possessiveness is a human nature irrespective of practical utility of the things.

There may be numerous factors behind excessive sea claims and covering all of them may not be possible. Maritime territory claims may be tinged in history, patriotism and traditions apart from sheer security or



solidarity of a state. Some salient factors are discussed as under:

### **Geographical**

Land is prerequisite for coastal claims as it dominates the sea<sup>28</sup>. Napoleon was more categorical about the vitality of geography when he observed, “*The policy of a state lies in its geography*”.<sup>29</sup> Geography of the coast is a striking element in claiming the sea frontiers. It is the type of coast which determines the nature of claims to be made in the sea. Geographical importance may depend, *inter alia*, on location, economic incentive, security considerations, and strategic objectives.

Mahan, being naval strategist, has discussed the issue of geographical locations. He referred the ocean as “*a great highway; or better, perhaps, of a wide common [.....]*”.<sup>30</sup> Gray and Sloan assert that geography is “*the mother of strategy*”.<sup>31</sup> A number of scholars have emphasized upon geographical considerations in the maritime boundary delimitations. Antunes is of the view that coastal geography is a key factor in maritime delimitation.<sup>32</sup> Similarly, Charney while discussing the considerations for maritime boundary delimitations notes that primary attention is to be placed on geographical features of the coastline<sup>33</sup>. It may be valid to say that there may be a state without coast but there may not be a state without land. Geography of a state is undoubtedly pivotal but it is the coastal geography which may have great impinging on shaping up the maritime claims.

Prescott and Schofield posit that geographical factors particularly the coastal geography of states is fundamental to maritime boundary delimitations.<sup>34</sup> To covet advantageous position, the desire of states for excessive maritime jurisdictions is natural. This factor persuaded the coastal states for *ultra vires*<sup>35</sup> claims on account of straight baselines. Generally in the complex coastal geographies, the excessive maritime claims are more vigorously enforced for

optimum advantage. The case in point is looming maritime claims in South China Sea by a number of states, mostly exaggerated, and based on excessive straight baselines.

## **Economic**

The economic vitality is considered amongst the foremost uses of the sea. The oceans have been a great medium of transportation since ages apart from food source. In Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, economic factor was treated as relevant for the drawing of straight baselines<sup>36</sup> that, in turn, enhanced Norwegian coastal area. In the modern era, the technological advancements have made it possible for the humans to exploit riches of the sea. The paramount resources include; a variety of fish species, marine mammals, minerals, gas, oil, gravel, sand, tin, gold and pearls. The UN report divulges that value of sea resources exploited account for about \$7 trillion per annum.<sup>37</sup> Estimated value of marine minerals generated per year comes to \$1 trillion.<sup>38</sup>

According to estimation, over 90% of fish resources of the sea lie in EEZ of coastal states<sup>39</sup>. Similarly, enormous non-living resources of the sea particularly gas and hydrocarbons are present in Continental Shelf<sup>40</sup> an area equal to EEZ in legal counts and in some cases extendable up to 350 Nautical Mile (NM). The two types of resources; living and non-living are discussed as follows:

## **Living Resources**

Traditionally, fishing has remained the foremost living resource in the sea. Dependence of people on fisheries and other sea species has increased manifold in the recent times.<sup>41</sup> Globally, 3.0 billion people take 20% of their proteins from fish, whereas, 4.9 billion people take 10% of this protein.<sup>42</sup> Comparing the high seas, EEZ of states are rich in living resources<sup>43</sup> that convince the coastal states to appropriate more sea for exploitation of living resources. Kenya's proposal<sup>44</sup> on EEZ was in fact the reflection of

evolving Asian and African countries' aspirations and their concerns over exploitation of off-shore fisheries by the foreign vessels.<sup>45</sup> EEZ concept re-allocated the fisheries rights significantly from international to national.<sup>46</sup> It is interesting that ICJ judgment which brought revolution in the baselines system was primarily the consequence of fisheries dispute between Norway and UK.

The living resources extend to all categories of fish including *anadromous*<sup>47</sup>, *catadromous*<sup>48</sup>, straddling stocks, highly migratory species, marine mammals, shared and sedentary species on the seabed and in the subsoil.<sup>49</sup> The law also provides for the control of sedentary species by coastal states on the extended continental shelf.<sup>50</sup> In this manner, the seaward extension of the outer Continental Shelf by excessive straight baselines occupies more area of sea encroaching High Seas.

The coastal states feel more concerned about the control of resources putting aside UNCLOS obligation for determining total permissible fish catch for maximum sustainable yield<sup>51</sup> and offering other states to harvest the surplus beyond their harvesting capacity.<sup>52</sup> In practice, one can hardly find any such arrangement or agreement for sharing of living resources with the landlocked<sup>53</sup> and geographically disadvantaged countries<sup>54</sup> of the regions in the spirit of UNCLOS. The attraction for living resources and exclusive authority vested in coastal states regarding their exploitation encourages the coastal states to appropriate area through straight baselines. The marine living resources, in addition to protein source, contribute to significant food security, employment<sup>55</sup> and profitable trade.<sup>56</sup> The advantages consequently urge the coastal states for bringing more expanses into national fold.

### **Non-Living Resources**

The non-living resources like minerals, specifically the significance of hydrocarbons in the economic development

of the countries still remain the priority of states. The technological progress has made it possible to tap hydrocarbons from the deep seabed and other pharmaceutical compounds of the sea. In the present era of globalization, the energy security is not just an economic issue rather a political as well as military issue for a state.<sup>57</sup> Petroleum is called 'blood' of the industry due to paramount importance of energy for states.

The energy experts unanimously consider that, "*Petroleum remains the principal energy provider among all the available resources in the 21<sup>st</sup> century*".<sup>58</sup> In order to secure economic sustainability and social development, states go for extended claims in the sea through drawing straight baselines. Most of the disputed sea areas are full of gas and oil reserves. According to Asif Inam, amongst other considerations, the hydrocarbons are one of the major factors behind appropriation of the sea by lodging claims through unfounded straight baselines.<sup>59</sup>

Offshore oil rigs may have multi-pronged advantages for a coastal state. Expansive claims on the basis of straight baselines offer more outreach along with economic benefits. At the same time it may have regional and international strategic ramifications particularly when there are controversies on maritime boundary claims. China and US have emerged as two major maritime players for their row on maritime matters at sea. US have alleged Chinese authorities for declaring their deep water oil rigs as their "*mobile national territory and a strategic weapon*".<sup>60</sup> US have bitterly criticized this point of view calling it a mercantilist thinking on the part of Chinese ruling elite.<sup>61</sup>

Hydrocarbons being a hard cash bring political stability in a state and meet the indigenous requirements as well. The vital value of this resource leads to competition of excessive maritime claims amongst the states. The easiest way for the states to acquire sovereignty or sovereign rights on large sea area or at-least to confuse the situation by generating conflict can be through excessive straight baselines. With the

increased scientific knowledge and probability of the presence of precious resources is likely to enhance eagerness of the states for appropriation of sovereign areas in the sea.

### **Strategic**

The strategic importance of oceans and seas need no emphasis. This reality has been accepted since olden times. Navies are a potent tool of states being guardian of oceanic interests of states both in peace and war. Gradually the role of naval power has changed significantly from combatant facet to benign operations and as law enforcement agency. Soviet Admiral Gorchakov opined, “*The navy has always been an important instrument of the policy of states, an important aid to diplomacy in peacetime*”.<sup>62</sup> Luke observes that an action short of war by naval forces can cause strategic effects never thought before due to complexity of operating environment. He enumerates three factors; change in environment, globalization of maritime commerce and evolutionary impact of international maritime law.<sup>63</sup>

Naval forces primarily operate for safeguarding national interests of the states. The competitive environment at sea always has the potential of conflicts. It necessitates more than ever having restraints by the states particularly by the major maritime nations to avoid any untoward incident which may catapult the nations to devastating strategic impacts. One of the reasons for states to acquire expansive maritime claims through excessive straight baselines criteria is to have more sea for their authority to assert. Holmes views that even small coastal states through artful strategy can exploit the geographical assets themselves or can deny the stronger rivals. The strategic guile for the weak states, indeed, is more important.<sup>64</sup>

The importance of Sea-Lines of Communication (SLOCs) from national, regional and international perspectives is undeniable. SLOCs are crucial for the states both during peace and war. In as early as 1616, Sir Walter Raleigh said

that, "*Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world.*"<sup>65</sup> SLOCs not only ensure the flow of national trade but also strategic military interests. The protection of SLOCs necessitates sea control<sup>66</sup> by the naval forces. Sea denial<sup>67</sup> technique is usually adopted by a comparatively weaker naval power to avert any sea control by the hostile state. The recent example of sea denial is 2006 Lebanon War where Hezbollah fired C-802 missile on Israeli navy ship *Hanit* causing her significant damage. It compelled Israel to withdraw the ship from theatre of operation<sup>68</sup>. The weapons and gadgetry would continue to modernize and so the ships housing them but fundamental theme of naval warfare would remain the same; the military controlling the SLOCs would control the sea and would ultimately control the results of the war.<sup>69</sup> The uninterrupted SLOCs are considered the backbone of national, regional and international shipping activity as over 90% global cargo is transported by sea.<sup>70</sup>

The issue was not serious when territorial limits of states were generally restricted to 3NM as it did not cover much area in the sea. Straight baselines may give a variety of restrictions to the passages like; internal waters jurisdictions, territorial sea condition of innocent traversing by foreign shipping or EEZ subject to coastal state's right of traffic separation schemes. Strategic interests of states in the sea need no exaggeration. The case in point is Russian Federation rejection to return *Shikotan* and *Habomai* islands to Japan mainly on account of strategic interests.<sup>71</sup> Claiming of 12NM territorial sea by coastal states in terms of UNCLOS has taken over 100 straits including strategically important straits like; Hormuz, Malacca, Gibraltar, Bab El-Mandeb into national jurisdictions.<sup>72</sup>

Claiming expanses through straight baselines of states are inversely proportional to the international interests. The weak maritime nations find it difficult to compete with the major maritime nations either through trade or military might at sea. On the other hand maritime powers feel

handicapped due to the reduction or abridgement of the free navigation area in the sea from commerce as well as military strategy point of view.

### **Political**

Political element is another factor to shape up the maritime claims. Kaikobad contends; “*the political significance of territory to a State lies at the very heart of the whole idea*”<sup>73</sup>. The political imperatives also constrain the coastal states to appropriate large expanses in the sea. Uncertainty, over the limit of jurisdictions leads to mis-coordinated policies which exacerbate the problem. The political, economic and environmental impacts of such conflicts may be very serious.<sup>74</sup>

In certain cases the states go for exaggerated claims due to political and social compulsions. The national sentiments are so strong that governments find themselves compelled to lodge expansive sea claims due to public pressures.<sup>75</sup> Philippine’s government intended to submit its amended archipelagic baselines law with the UN to make it compatible with the UNCLOS regime. The public filed a petition in the Supreme Court of Philippine stopping the government from depositing amended law with the UN. The argument was based on historical, scientific and legal basis. Although the Supreme Court rejected the stance of petitioners,<sup>76</sup> yet it exhibits the awareness of public and constraints of governments on baselines and delimitation matters.

Land boundaries between the states are closer and usually visible with more emotive issues of the citizens and the governments alike. Maritime boundaries being at distant locations are not of grave concern of the general public. The land boundary issues are always concerned with the neighbouring states. Conversely, the maritime boundaries may encompass three scenarios; delimitation with the neighbouring state(s), with the opposite state(s) and with all

the states of the world, including landlocked, due to common high seas or International Seabed Area interests.

Occasionally the national ego transforms into political stunts for such excessive claims to counter the adversary, which later prove stumbling block for retreating. States, sometime, lodge excessive claims for placing themselves in better position for bargain during negotiation with their neighbouring states for delimitations. Schofield premises that declarations of straight baselines, ahead of discussions, based on tit for-tat are evident for achieving balance with their maritime neighbours.<sup>77</sup> Charney based on evidence of bilateral delimitation agreements views that economic, political and historical factors may have more salience.<sup>78</sup>

In a number of coastal situations the core factors for claiming excessive maritime claims are the legacy of colonial powers. Some states have inherited conflicts from the tug of war of colonial might. The classic example of such legacy is a complex political problem between Guyana (Netherland) and Suriname (UK) which could not be resolved by the two powers during colonial time.<sup>79</sup> In early days of 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, the states were eager to acquire more continental shelves.<sup>80</sup> With the advent of other maritime zones particularly EEZ, the temptation of states for appropriation of more area is not scarce. At occasions the historical political rivalries between states are also instrumental in lodging competitive excessive claims.

### **Psychological**

The psychological factor for excessive claims on the basis of straight baselines has been rarely discussed by the scholars. Exploration and exploitation of sea resources in the past had not been a reality like today's world. No exploitation of resources is possible without scientific data. Tanaka calls Main/Military Supply Route (MSR) a foundation for the ocean governance.<sup>81</sup> Until the mid of 20<sup>th</sup> century, the literature on law of sea did not contain anything about scientific research.<sup>82</sup> The developing and under



developed states had a lacking on two aspects; awareness about the resources and the capacity to exploit the resources. Converse to this, during 1950-1960, US alone drilled 15,300 wells in the sea exploiting 4.5 billion barrels of oil.<sup>83</sup> It was negotiated during third UN Conference on Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS-III) which provided insight of the sea resources and importance of the oceans to the developing and weak maritime states. The potentials of sea resources were not more than a dream to most of the nations. Blake is of the opinion that International boundary lines have a great significance for the states. Apart from representing the jurisdictional limits and defining ownership of the resources, they have immense significance; psychologically and politically.<sup>84</sup>

The acquiring of sovereignty and sovereign rights in the form of maritime zones was certainly a solace and psychological gain. To most of the states, it is still a moral and psychological consolation despite lack of their capability to exploit the resources. Most of the developing countries do not possess even the data of resources in their zones whether living or non-living. Nonetheless, the states avoid engaging foreign states or firms to exploit them. Similarly states are quite reluctant to allow other countries for MSR apparently due to fear of unknown. They are sceptical about the work of developed countries and their companies as well. This fear or reluctance is more peculiar with the states which secured liberation from colonial reigns due to inherent mistrust.

Ensuring offshore resources and economic security is both; psychological and political.<sup>85</sup> The militarily weak and developing states feel more secure to push the limits of their maritime boundaries seaward as much as they can. The easiest course of action for stretching the boundaries seaward is employment of excessive straight baselines. According to UN, only 46 states have submitted their claims for extension of continental shelves, whereas, 27 states have submitted preliminary information.<sup>86</sup> Most of the states have not exploited the resources of continental shelf at all except

a mere psychological consolation. The developing coastal states having explored or exploited their EEZ for tapping the offshore resources is insignificant apart from sheer psychological satisfaction of appropriating the sea area.

## **Conclusion**

The tug of war between the doctrinal concepts of *mare Librium* (freedom of the seas) for all and *mare Clausum* (appropriation of sea) is centuries old. The strong maritime powers always advocate free access to the oceans; contrarily weak states demand possessiveness of the sea areas. UNCLOS has although struck a balance between the rights and obligations of states in the sea, yet seaward expansion by the states is continuing unabated. However, factors for such claims have not been addressed to date. Controversies over excessive maritime claims is a serious concern which may jeopardize the international peace as any incipient incident at sea may have strategic impacts at international plane. UNCLOS provides a tool box for application of baselines suited to the coastal configurations of states. The straight baselines are certainly permitted for irregular coasts but not for expansive claims purpose. The factors behind excessive claims may vary but the easiest way for the coastal states to lodge excessive claims is through excessive straight baselines. The modern scientific knowledge about the sea and depletion of land resources has persuaded the coastal states to appropriate large expanses. The strategic relevance to the excessive claims is likely to continue for the coastal states particularly major maritime powers. The factors enumerated in the aforementioned discussion are self-explanatory for excessive claims by the coastal states. The states need to keep the windows of negotiation open for amicable resolution of controversies. An international UN forum on the pattern of UN Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf may be used as launch pad for negotiations of states. This in, turn would convince the coastal states to revisit their excessive claims especially by redrawing straight baselines.

## Notes

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- <sup>1</sup>The territorial sea may extend upto 12NM measured from baselines. Source: Article 2 of UNCLOS.
- <sup>2</sup> *Waters on landward of the baselines are internal waters.* Source: Article 8 of UNCLOS.
- <sup>3</sup>Contiguous zone may extend to 24NM from baselines. Source: Article 33 (2) of UNCLOS.
- <sup>4</sup>Exclusive economic zone may extend upto 200NM from baselines. Source: Article 57 of UNCLOS
- <sup>5</sup> Continental shelf consists of seabed and subsoil. It extends to 200NM but may not extend beyond 350NM to the maximum based on geological and geomorphological criteria. Article 76 of UNCLOS.
- <sup>6</sup> Source: <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/baseline.html> (accessed on 26 May 2015).
- <sup>7</sup> Bryan A.Garner, *Black's Law Dictionary*, 7<sup>th</sup> ed., (USA: West Group, 1999), 145.
- <sup>8</sup>*Measured from the low-water line along the coast.*
- <sup>9</sup>Article 10(4) & Article 50 of UNCLOS.
- <sup>10</sup>Straight baselines can be delineated on specific irregular coastal situations in spirit of Article 7 of UNCLOS.
- <sup>11</sup>Article 47(1) of UNCLOS.
- <sup>12</sup>A line where land intersects with the shore at low tide.
- <sup>13</sup>D.P. O'Connell, *The International Law of the Sea*, Vol-I, (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1982), 172. Hereinafter O'Connell, ILOS.
- <sup>14</sup>*Soult v. Africaine* (1804) 22 Fed.Cas. page 805 at 807.
- <sup>15</sup>O'Connell, ILOS, 172.
- <sup>16</sup>*Ibid*, 171.
- <sup>17</sup>*Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case*, ICJ Reports 1951, p. 116 at 128. Hereinafter Anglo-Norwegian case.
- <sup>18</sup>Article 3 of TSC.
- <sup>19</sup>Article 5 of UNCLOS.
- <sup>20</sup> John O'Brien, *International Law*, (London: Cavendish Publishing Ltd.: 2001), 398. Also in O'Connell, ILOS, 476.
- <sup>21</sup>.Anglo-Norwegian case, p. 116 at 138.
- <sup>22</sup>*Ibid*, p. 116.
- <sup>23</sup> The Norwegian origin word means; 'A long, narrow, winding inlet from these a between steep slopes of a mountainous coast.' Source: <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/fjord>(accessed on 26 May 2015).
- <sup>24</sup>Anglo-Norwegian case, p. 116 at 127.
- <sup>25</sup>*Ibid*, 143.
- <sup>26</sup> Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, *Baselines: An Examination of the Relevant Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*, (United Nations: New York, 1989), 18.
- <sup>27</sup> Robin R. Churchill, "The Impact of State Practice on the Jurisdictional Framework Contained in the LOS Convention" in Alex G. Oude Elferink Ed., *Stability and Change in the Law of the Sea: The Role of the LOS*

*Convention*, (Laiden / Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), 108. Also in Yoshifumi Tanaka, *The International Law of the Sea*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 50. Hereinafter “Tanaka, *International LOS*”.

<sup>28</sup>Anglo-Norwegian case, p. 116, at 133. Also North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3, para 96 at 51.

<sup>29</sup>Vijay Sakhuja, *Asian Maritime Power in the 21st Century: Strategic Transactions: China, India and Southeast Asia*, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), 35.

<sup>30</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1660-1783)*, (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1890), 25.

<sup>31</sup> Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan Ed., *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy*, (New York: Routledge, 2013), 3.

<sup>32</sup>Nuno Sergio Marques Antunes, *Towards the Conceptualisation of Maritime Delimitation: Legal and Technical Aspects of a Political Process*, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003), 290.

<sup>33</sup>Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander ed., *International Maritime Boundaries*, Vol-I, (Dordrecht / Boston / London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), xlv. Hereinafter “Charney and Alexander, *International Maritime Boundaries*”).

<sup>34</sup> J.R.V. Prescott and Clive Schofield, *The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., (Leiden / Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), 1. Hereinafter Prescott and Schofield, *The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World*).

<sup>35</sup>A Latin word meaning ‘beyond the scope or in excess of legal power or authority’. Source: <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ultra%20vires> (accessed on 26 May 2015).

<sup>36</sup>Anglo-Norwegian case, p. 116, at 133.

<sup>37</sup> United Nations (2002), *Ocean: The Source of Life: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 20th Anniversary (1982-2002)*, 5.

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>39</sup>FAO, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, (UN: 2011), Preface.

<sup>40</sup>United Nations (2002), *Ocean: The Source of Life*, 6.

<sup>41</sup>Fishery and Aquaculture Statistics, FAO Yearbook 2012, xvii.

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, xvii.

<sup>43</sup>FAO, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, (UN: 2011), Preface.

<sup>44</sup>Submitted proposal of 200NM Economic Zone to Seabed Committee on 7 August 1972. Source: *Draft Article on the Exclusive Economic Zone Concept*, UN Seabed Committee, Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.10.

<sup>45</sup>Dennis Rumley, Sanjay Chaturvedi and Vijay Sakhuja Ed., *Fisheries Exploitation in the Indian Ocean: Threats and Opportunities*, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 127.

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*, 126-127.

<sup>47</sup>Anadromous (Greek: ‘ana’ means ‘up’ and ‘dromos’ means ‘course’) Fish which spends life span in sea water but migrate upstream (rivers) for spawning. Source: *Northeast Fisheries Service Science Centre*. 2014.

<sup>48</sup>Catadromous (Greek: 'kata' means 'down' and 'dromos' means 'course') These Fish spend life cycle in fresh waters but migrate down streams (into the sea) for spawning. Source: *National Research Institute of Science for Environment and Agriculture*. 2014.

<sup>49</sup> Article 61-68, 77 (4) of UNCLOS.

<sup>50</sup> Article 76 (4)-(8) and Article 77(4) of UNCLOS.

<sup>51</sup>Article 61 (1) & (3) of UNCLOS.

<sup>52</sup>Article 62 (2) of UNCLOS.

<sup>53</sup>Article 69 (1) of UNCLOS.

<sup>54</sup>Article 70 (1) of UNCLOS.

<sup>55</sup>*Approximately 54.8 million people are engaged in fisheries and aquaculture worldwide. Asia alone accounts for over 87% of the world.* Source: *The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2012* (FAO, 2012), 10.

<sup>56</sup>*International trade in fish products has increased to an all-time high of US\$ 217.5 billion.* Source: *The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2012* (FAO, 2012), 3.

<sup>57</sup>Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore and Kuen-chen Fu Ed., *Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea and China*, (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 146.

<sup>58</sup>*Ibid.*, 145.

<sup>59</sup>Dr. Asif Inam is Director General and Head of Geology & Geophysics Section, National Institute of Oceanography, Pakistan.

<sup>60</sup>Brian Spegele and Wayne Ma, *For China Boss, Deep-Water Rigs Are a Strategic Weapon*, *The Wall Street Journal*, (29 August 2012), available at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444233104577592890738740290> (accessed on 26 May 2015).

<sup>61</sup> Martin Murphy, *Commentary – Deepwater Oil Rigs as Strategic Weapons*, *Naval War College Review*, Vol-66, No. 2, (Spring 2013), 110.

<sup>62</sup>Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov, *The Sea Power of the State*, (Michigan: Elsevier Science & Technology Book, 1979), 248.

<sup>63</sup>Ivan T. Luke, *Naval Operations in Peacetime*, *Naval War College Review*, Vol-66, No 2, (Spring 2013), 49.

<sup>64</sup> James R. Holmes, *Strategic Features of the South China Sea*, *Naval War College Review*, Vol-67, No 2, (Spring 2014), 32.

<sup>65</sup>Robert Debs Heintz, *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations*, (Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1966), 288.

<sup>66</sup>*Sea control is the condition that exists when there is freedom of action to use an area of the sea for one's own purpose for a period of time and, if necessary, deny its use to an opponent.* Source: DCDC, *British Maritime Doctrine, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10*, (Swindon: Ministry of Defence, (August 2011), para 220 at 2-10.

<sup>67</sup>*Sea denial is exercised when one party prevents an adversary from controlling a maritime area without being able to control that area oneself.* Source: *Ibid.*, para 224 at 2-11.

<sup>68</sup>Benjamin S. Lambeth, *Learning From Lebanon: Airpower and Strategy in Israel's 2006 War against Hezbollah*, Naval War College Review, Vol-65, No 3, (Summer 2012), 88.

<sup>69</sup>

Source:

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1988/LFR.htm> (accessed on 26 May 2015).

<sup>70</sup>IMO, *International Shipping Facts and Figures – Information Resources on Trade, Safety, Security, Environment*, (Maritime Knowledge Centre, 2012), para 2.1.

<sup>71</sup>Alex G. Oude Elferink, *The Law of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: A Case Study of the Russian Federation*, (Netherland: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), 311.

<sup>72</sup>The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – A historical perspective, available at [www.un.org/Depts/los/convention\\_agreements/convention\\_historical\\_perspective.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm) (accessed on 26 May 2015).

<sup>73</sup>Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad, *Interpretation and Revision of International Boundary Decisions*, (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 17.

<sup>74</sup>Prescott Schofield, *The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World*, 216.

<sup>75</sup>Seokwoo Lee, *The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan and the Territorial Disputes in East Asia*, 11 PAC. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 63 (2002), 91.

<sup>76</sup>Philippine Supreme Court Decision; G.R. Case No. 187167, August 16, 2011.

<sup>77</sup>Clive Schofield, *Departures from the Coast: Trends in the Application of Territorial Sea Baselines under the Law of the Sea Convention*, 27 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 723-732 (2012) at 728.

<sup>78</sup>Charney and Alexander, *International Maritime Boundaries*, xliii.

<sup>79</sup>Jonathan I. Charney, David A. Colson, Lewis M. Alexander and Robert W. Smith Ed., *International Maritime Boundaries*, Vol-5, (Netherland: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), 3426.

<sup>80</sup>*Ibid.*, 3500.

<sup>81</sup>Tanaka, *International LOS*, 335.

<sup>82</sup>Churchill and Lowe, *LOS*, (1999), 400.

<sup>83</sup>United Nations, ECOSOC, Doc. E/4973 (New York: 26 April 1971), 12 quoted in Richard B. Lillich and John Norton Moore ed., *Role of International Law and an Evolving Ocean Law (Vol-I)*, Vol-61, (New Port, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 1980), 391.

<sup>84</sup>Gerald Blake, *The Depiction of International Boundaries on Topographic Maps*, (IBRU: Boundary and Security Bulletin, 1995), 44.

<sup>85</sup>Juan Luis Suarez de Vivero and Juan Carlos Rodriguez Mateos, *New Factors in Ocean Governance. From Economic to Security-Based Boundaries*, 28 Marine Policy 185-188 (2004), at 187.

<sup>86</sup>

Source:

Website

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# **A PERSPECTIVE ON THE EVOLVING GEOPOLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

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## **Abstract**

*Though Middle Eastern region is not new to wars and conflicts, yet it has gone through a political and social quake over the past decade. Since 2003, with the American invasion of Iraq and the subsequent birth of anarchy, Middle East has converted into a fireball. The Arab spring saga, the rise of militant- non-state actors specifically the Islamic State (IS), deepening regional rivalry, the erosion of state authority, the breakup of social fabric and the widening sectarian fissure has put politics, stability and security in a dismal state. Dethroning of the Government in Yemen, followed by Saudi attack has further intensified the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia; a cause of sectarian conflicts in the region. Moreover, with the Iranian nuclear deal and the herculean terror of IS and other groups on the rise; it is argued that all regional actors and external powers will have to act responsibly in order to reverse these chaotic trends and to restore stability. The article views contemporary situation of the region through lens of regional security complex and comprehensive security doctrine. This analysis aims to include all sectors of statehood and security in Middle East in a comprehensive framework.*

## **Introduction**

The Middle East is a region that is strategically located at the junction of Africa, Asia and Europe. Having a total area of nearly 9,000,000 KM<sup>2</sup>, this vast region spreads from Egypt to Iran and from the southern border of Turkey down to the Arabian Sea. Some of the world's most important waterways such as the Persian Gulf, the Red sea, the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden count as its strategic and economic assets. The Middle East is a region of huge deserts, fertile river valleys, and a hub of energy. It is considered the cradle of some of the

world's oldest civilizations - the Babylonians, Sumerians, Mesopotamia and the Nile civilization, birthplace of the world's major religions - Judaism, Christianity and Islam and the meeting point of Turkish, Arab and Iranian history and cultures.

Nevertheless, the story of Middle East does not end here. The advent of Islam in the 6<sup>th</sup> century B.C fundamentally transformed the people and society of this great region. Till date, Islam bears huge influence on politics, society, culture and daily life in the Middle East. Right after its advent, Muslim rulers, scientists, craftsmen and traders turned this region into a center of knowledge, peace and prosperity. By the first quarter of the 20<sup>th</sup> century after the demise of the Ottoman Empire, many scholars thought that Middle East had lost its civilizational and historical value. The discovery of oil in early 20<sup>th</sup> Century transformed the Middle East into a reservoir of energy. Subsequently, the geo-politics of the Cold War made this region to serve as a geo-strategic asset and the engine of global economy.<sup>1</sup>

Over the years, the Middle East has, unfortunately, turned into a battleground of foreign conspiracies, regional rivalries, sectarian fault lines and an array of intra and inter-state armed conflicts. Moreover, the cultural, social, civilizational and ideological variety of the people of Middle East has been exploited by despotic rulers in collaboration with foreign powers for the simple reason of ensuring their rule over the people.

Traditionally, the major elements influencing politics and foreign policies in the Middle East have been; the Palestine issue, Iran's nuclear program, Saudi-Iran rivalry, the Shia-Sunni identity, Israel and the interests of foreign powers. The Arab spring added even more profound but dangerous dynamics to this list. These include the rise of militant and terrorist non-state actors having regional links and networking. The best example of these groups is Islamic State (IS). Self-styled leaders and other influential figures having



external forces behind them besides their own motives to control these armed militias and terror groups.

One of the dominant external players in the Middle East is the United States. Traditionally, it has enjoyed a high degree of influence over politics and security in the Middle East and at times acted as a patron of security in the region.<sup>2</sup> Many believe that after losing its credibility among Arabs, US might be in search of a new ally in the region in the form of Iran. With political bonds between the US and its long-time Arab allies weakening and finalization of Iranian nuclear deal, some experts of the region suggest that the US and Iran might come closer to each other, because Iran is relatively stable than Arab world and may become its ally against IS and Al-Qaeda.

The self-immolation of a Tunisian man was soon followed by million-man demonstrations that jolted the region and led to the collapse of a number of tyrants. This huge mass mobilization was dubbed “the Arab spring”. To many, the Arab Spring, a symbol of, oppression, denial of rights, neglect and a resistance to foreign presence, came as a ray of hope. However, this ray of hope quickly turned chaotic. The Arab Spring, after having quickly turned bloody, has transformed the dynamics of regional and global politics and security.

Owing to the ongoing sectarian divide and political chaos in Yemen, Syria and many other Arab countries, the authority of the rulers have shrunk and the ethnic, tribal and sectarian elements started filling up the gaps. Social fabric has broken down. Organized, violent, extremist and sophisticated non-state actors are wreaking havoc with lives and property.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately, it is the common people who have lost their lives, faced migration and abuse and are being persecuted under one or another label.

Middle East; owing to its geo-strategic location and being pivot of the world energy security calculus, is the most significant region where conflict, weakened governmental structures and instability cannot be left unattended by world community. The ongoing situation in Middle East has

potential to have spill over effect on the neighbouring region. With the onset of new era in political history since 2001, stakes of major powers in the region and consequent transition of institutional structures, Middle East has developed challenging situation, both in political and security realms. As the emerging situation is posing multidimensional challenges at all three levels; state, individual and institution; it is relevant to apply regional security complex analysis. Furthermore, the recent events imply that any long-term solution to the problems of the Middle East will need to be regional and indigenous where people are part of the statecraft.

In the contemporary era, the major issues in the Middle East are Iran-Saudi rivalry, the sectarian divide that has engulfed the region, the rise of ISIS, Iran's nuclear programme and the war in Yemen and Syria. So, as the despotic tyrants ruled with iron fist and Israel busy in expansion and oppression, Iran and Saudi racing for regional supremacy and the US looking after its own interests. Palestine kept on bleeding and the West, US and other Arab governments watched the situation inconsiderately. <sup>4</sup> Although, things seemed acceptable on the surface, but, beneath, lava was being cooked and the volcano erupted in 2011.

There have been many theoretical frameworks to analyze different situations of Middle East in history. What is the most appropriate to understand indigenous realities of the region is framework of Regional Security Complex (RSC). This paper analyses the evolution of Middle East security complex, role of actors, factors and phenomenon with an emphasis on the ever-growing salience of the region. The region has rich variables of all analytical sectors prescribed comprehensively only in the theory of regional security complex, for instance social, political, economic etc. The analysis also considers Turkey as an 'insulator state' in the regional security complex. The 'interface logic' of theory also applies well to the current and emerging situation of the region. The paper also takes into

consideration the role being played by major powers to further their own objectives.

### **Iran - Saudi Relations – from Warm Rivalry to a Cold War**

Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are two of the main players in the Middle Eastern region. Along with the American attack on Iraq and the Arab awakening, the Saudi – Iran rivalry is the main cause of the huge transformation, the region is going through in the present time.<sup>5</sup> It can be argued that Iran-Saudi rivalry that has now turned into a regional cold war is, in fact, the main motor behind the conflicts. Owing to their size, population, resources and influence in the region, security and politics in the Middle East is conditioned by the way the Royal Kingdom and the Islamic Republic play their cards.

Historically, the relationship of Iran and Saudi Arabia has remained quite frosty. It is a relationship, which has gone through tough times during the Shah's period, reached a crisis point after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and what we see today is a breakpoint in it. During the time of the secular Shah, relations were relatively friendly and a visible degree of cooperation between the two states existed. Their relationship reached a crisis point immediately after the Khomeini-led Islamic revolution.<sup>6</sup> The reason was that Ayatollah Ali Khomeini, besides trying to export the revolution abroad, called upon the Saudis to rise against the monarchy. For Saudis, this was enough of Iranian interference in its internal affairs. In 1987, when the Saudis quashed Iranian protesters in Mecca, Khomeini openly declared the Kingdom as the Islamic Republic's chief enemy.<sup>7</sup>

The decade of 1990s was a period of Détente. This was relatively a better period, as Khomeini was no more present on the scene. Iran had paid a huge cost for trying to export its revolution abroad and Saddam Hussain had emerged as a common enemy of Riyadh and Tehran. The relationship of

Iran and Saudi Arabia has significantly deteriorated after the American attack on Iraq in 2003.

### **Post Arab Spring Relations**

Presently, both the countries are locked in a Cold war due to differing interests in the region. It's evident from the way both have responded to developments that have swept the region recently. While Iran supported Morsi regime in Egypt, opposed foreign intervention in Libya, called for the rights of the minority Shiites in Baharian and stood firmly beside Assad and its proxies. Over the past decade, Iranian clout has increased in Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria and Lebanon. Saudi Arabia on the other hand, supported Morsi's removal from power, provides financial, military and diplomatic support to the Syrian opposition. Riyadh has supported its proxies and sympathizers in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon. Moreover, when Riyadh saw the Al-Khalifa's rule weakening in Baharian, sent troops to quash the uprising there.<sup>8</sup> Recently, the Saudi attack on Yemen has added more antagonism to the already frosty relations and now, the Yemen civil war is considered to be a proxy of Saudi Kingdom and Iran.

### **Iranian Nuclear Programme; Pre and Post Deal**

Until reaching on an agreement with P5+1, the Iranian nuclear programme has been considered to be one of the most critical issues. Indeed, it has been provoking tension and suspicion in the entire Middle East as well as international community. While the United States, European powers, Israel and the GCC countries viewed that Iran was allegedly on its path of becoming a nuclear weapon state. The Iranian Government stressed that, its nuclear program was for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, inside the framework and in accordance with the principles of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Furthermore, for Iran, its nuclear program symbolizes its peaceful technological advancement and triumph against Israel and United States.<sup>9</sup>

On the other hand, the West, Israel and GCC countries have categorically called Iran's nuclear program as threatening, dangerous and unacceptable. These states have declared to go to any extent and do whatever it takes in order to prevent the Islamic Republic from acquiring a nuclear bomb. Iran managed to develop its nuclear program in a very clandestine manner for over twenty years, until in 2003/4, IAEA formally hinted at Iran being racing for nuclear weapons.<sup>10</sup> Being a signatory to NPT, Iran was under international obligations not to develop, produce or possess nuclear weapons and other kinds of WMDs.<sup>11</sup> Being signatory of NPT, Iran could have gone for nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, while staying away from developing Nuclear weapons.<sup>12</sup> After UN sponsored sanctions against Iran, starting from 2005, the first major breakthrough in these negotiations occurred in 2013 when Iran and P5+1 agreed on a six months Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) and a Framework for Cooperation (FFC) between the IAEA and Iran. Under this deal, the world powers agreed to ease the back breaking sanctions and release Iranian funds worth 7 billion dollars. Reciprocally, Iran agreed to an expanded IAEA access to its nuclear facilities and promised to cut down Uranium enrichment from 20% down to 5 %.<sup>13</sup>

After hectic efforts, debate and discussion on Iran's nuclear Programme, on April 2, 2015, it was announced in Lausanne, Switzerland that, eight nations states agreed on the framework of Iran's nuclear deal. The announcement said that, "Today, we have taken a decisive step: we have reached solutions on key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)."<sup>14</sup> Based on this agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between Iran and P5 plus 1 was formally announced on July 14, 2015. According to JCPOA, Iran will limit its installed enrichment centrifuges from 19000 to 6000; only 5000 of these will be spinning.<sup>15</sup> These will be first generation centrifuges without any advance model for another 10 years. Natanz enrichment plan of Iran will cease enrichment and instead will be used as physics research centre for 15 years. Low-enriched uranium will also be reduced from 10,000kg to 300kg for the next 15 years.<sup>16</sup> For

15 years, there will be no heavy water reactor established by Iran and the current facility (Arak heavy-water reactor) will be removed and destroyed.

Israel and Saudi Arabia opposed the nuclear deal between Iran and P5+1, instead they were favoring a military action to destroy Iran's nuclear infrastructure. For Israel and Saudi Arabia, Iran's nuclear programme will mean a severe blow to security and stability in the region. Despite international sanctions, Iran gained a unique ability of having developed long-range missiles (ICBMs) that can hit Israel and every other country in the region.<sup>17</sup> Interestingly, as Israel has already gained nuclear capability, top officials in the Saudi establishment have categorically stated that the Kingdom will not lag behind if the Islamic Republic goes nuclear.<sup>18</sup> For Saudi Arabia and Israel, a nuclear Iran would have gained an unprecedented leverage over the politics and strategy in the Middle East. The Duo visualized that, nuclear capability will result in an increased Iranian influence in Iraq, Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah, Lebanon, Yemen and other countries like Bahrain which have significant number of Shiite population. Indeed, Iran already gained influences over all these even without having nuclear weapons, indeed a strategic gain.

### **The Tribal Nature of Middle Eastern States**

The sectarian wars that have erupted today in the Middle East can also be traced back to the tribal nature of many of the states in the region. A tribal state, in which the loyalties of the citizens are not with the institutions of the state but with the tribes or sects to which they belong, makes these states inherently weak. This is one of the reasons why the current conflicts have taken a sectarian dimension. The leaders in order to prolong their role rely on the sect to which they belong. Saddam relied on its Sunni population, Al-Maliki relied on Shias, Assad depends on the Alawites and the Al-Khalifa dynasty rely on the minority Sunnis of Bahrain. These conflicts in one way or another are linked to Tehran and Riyadh who exploit these conflicts to feed their geo-political rivalry.<sup>19</sup>

## **Who is with whom in the Middle East?**

As the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia aggravated after the Islamic revolution. Tehran and Riyadh have crossed the sectarian line in finding and choosing allies in the region. For example, Iran has been a staunch advocate and supporter of the Sunni group HAMAS. Again, Iran is a staunch supporter of the rights of Palestinians who are mainly Sunni. Iran was against foreign intervention in Libya which is again a predominantly Sunni state. President Morsi – a conservative member of the Sunni Brotherhood had close ties with Shiite Iran rather than Saudi Arabia. Similarly, Iran doesn't really like the Houthis, but Iran has a political and strategic compulsion to stand with the Houthis. On the other hand, every Sunni is also not a friend of Saudi Arabia. The Muslim Brotherhood – a conservative Sunni entity, is staunchly against the Saudi monarchy, Al-Qaeda, ISIS and other hard-line Sunni groups are as much against Kingdom as they are against Iran. <sup>20</sup>

## **Current State of Affairs**

Iran - Saudi divergence is visible everywhere across the Middle East. Be it Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain or anywhere else. The Saudis are playing more on Sectarian card, by projecting the cause of Wahabi Islam against Tehran. As Shias are in minority, Iran therefore, does not refer directly to sectarianism. Instead, Tehran uses Anti –Jewish, Anti-Israel and Anti- American rhetoric to mold public opinion in its favour, feed its supporters ideologically and protect its Iran-Syria- Hezbollah axis.

At present, as the Saudis are on the defensive, they are facing a growing Iranian influence in Iraq, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen. After nuclear deal, Iranian international isolation and economic sanction has reduced reasonably. Imagine how the region has changed, compared to early 2000s, when, Iran was politically isolated, Saddam was sitting next to its borders, a hard-line and extremist Sunni group – the Taliban were ruling Afghanistan and lastly Iran at that time was the member of

United States' axis of evil. Much has changed now for Iran. Taliban are no more in Afghanistan, Iraq, with which it had its 10-year long war is heavily influenced by Iran and despite all odds, Iran has prevented the fall of Assad so far. Nevertheless, against IS, neither Iran, nor Saudi Arabia seem to have found any panacea.

### **Islamic State-The Birth of a Terrorist Network**

If any hopes of reconciliation and peace were to live after protests turned bloody routs in Syria in May 2012. The rise of IS and the capture of huge swaths of Iraqi and Syrian land by the group has quashed all those hopes. As the term "al-Sham" suggests, ISIL wants to establish its rein in a region that ranges from the south of Turkey to Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel.<sup>21</sup> For some "al-Sham" and "Levant" which means greater Syria, or Syria and Lebanon, carry the same meaning.<sup>22</sup> Although, the group is known by the names of ISIS, ISIL, IS, *al-Dawla*<sup>23</sup> and Da'ish,<sup>24</sup> John Daniszewski, of the Associated Press says, "We believe this is the most accurate translation of the group's name and reflects its aspirations to rule over a broad swath of the Middle East."<sup>25</sup> In June 2014, the group named itself as Islamic State (IS).

The roots of current instability and violence in the Middle East, to some extent, go back to 2003 when US and Britain invaded Iraq. For the high-tech American and British war machine, the invasion was expected to be a piece of cake. What followed the invasion, was a total chaos, disorder, violence and instability. The violent insurgency, which quickly followed the invasion, opened the door of hell. Innocent Iraqis as well as British and U.S soldiers got killed on daily basis. For the Americans, the insurgency quickly became a reminiscent of the Vietnam War.

The group behind this mounting insurgency was later known to be Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). A Jordanian veteran of the Afghan Jihad –Abu Muasab Al-Zarqawi, led this group.<sup>26</sup> The AQI comprised former Jihadis, Iraqi Sunnis who felt marginalized in post-Saddam Iraq, Officers of the Baathist



party and other Al-Qaeda sympathizers from across the region. After three years of giving a tough time to the Americans, Al-Zarqawi was killed in a U.S. air strike on June 7, 2006 and replaced by an Egyptian, Abu Ayyub al-Masri. As the head of AQI, Masri dropped the label of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), gave a new name to the group - Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), later ISIL, ISIS, and now IS. In 2010, Al-Masri was killed by US forces and replaced by Abu-Omar Al-Baghdadi and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi respectively.<sup>27</sup> By exploiting political, social and ethnic grievances in 2012, Al-Baghdadi's men took control of the eastern rebel-held city of Raqqa and began stretching along the border with Turkey<sup>28</sup>. Re-organised, revamped and lured by the vacuum all around, IS was once again carrying out major attacks in Iraq and Syria on almost daily basis during the year 2013.<sup>29</sup>

### **The Rise of ISIS**

Three main factors played a crucial role behind the rise of ISIS. The first was the American decision of disbanding Iraqi army after it occupied the country. This not only made all those people upset and jobless, but it also infused a sense of desperation among the wider Sunni population of Iraq. The second factor was the politically suicidal policies of Al-Maliki - then, Iraq's Prime Minister. Al-Maliki pursued a sectarian line in governing Iraq. Sunnis were ousted from key governmental posts, marginalized and their grievances were not addressed. Maliki used security forces against Sunnis which further deepened divisions and polarization between the two sects. Calling everything terrorism was just a wrong panacea for the insurgency. And at a time, when Maliki should have gone for political reforms, he acted otherwise and to a large extent alienated the Sunnis. The third factor had a regional dimension. Both Saudi and Iran wanted to maintain its influence in Iraq. At a time when Iran was backing Shiite figures and militias, Saudi provided generous funding and support to Sunni groups in order to weaken Iranian influence in Iraq.<sup>30</sup>

All these developments directly and indirectly benefitted ISIS and other militia outfits. So when the monster rose, it was too late for everyone to control it. Even though, there is a large US-led coalition fighting ISIS today. IS' defeat will take years and even many more years will be required to reverse the trend in the wider region. The only thing left for the people today is to learn how to deal with chaos that is going to last for many more years.

### **ISIS' ATM**

ISIS has so far launched daring assaults in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Yemen. Currently, IS is the richest terrorist group with its daily earnings exceeding the figure of more than U.S. \$3 million a day. IS obtains this money from selling oil, smuggling antiquities, extortion and taxation.<sup>31</sup> It is also believed that regional countries particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia might also have played with the dragon. As a weak Iraq was in favor of Iran, studies have established that Iran had been financing Al-Qaeda in Iraq in its early days. All this was done in order to keep the US on the defensive and engaged within Iraqi cities.<sup>32</sup>

Moreover, Iran is also believed to have provided sanctuary to Al Zaraqawi and Al-Qaeda leaders when they fled Afghanistan after the American invasion.<sup>33</sup> The same argument holds true about Saudi Arabia. The Saudis are also blamed to have provided cash to the IS, as it was a Sunni group and Saudis thought they would use this and other similar groups to keep the spread of Iranian influence under check. It is difficult to determine whether both Iran and Saudi Arabia knew the consequences of their actions, however, the strategic calculus has now changed. IS must have surprised all of its ex-supporters. Today, IS is hitting Sunnis and Shiites alike. It is also hitting Saudi Arabia and its allies and is becoming a growing danger for Iran as well.

## **The Military Muscle of ISIS**

Today, IS is not only the world's richest terror group, but also world's most sophisticated and well-equipped group. Armed with light and heavy weapons like machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, surface to air missiles, captured tanks, Humvees, and bomb-proof vehicles left by the Iraqi army and withdrawing US forces, IS commanders are also considered expert in bomb making, propaganda war, administration, recruitment and battlefield tactics and strategy. As a number of Baathist officers have filled its ranks, IS has shown formidable resistance against the combined strength of US, Iraqi army, Kurdish forces and Shiite militia. Many analysts consider that, US has an indirect role in the birth and subsequent rise of IS. IS, has in its ranks and cadre, trained and war-hardened fighters hailing from different nations including non-Middle Eastern and Western countries.<sup>34</sup>

## **Yemen War**

Yemen is one of the most impoverished, divided and complicated countries of the Middle East. A country divided on political, ethnic and sectarian lines, its society had long been facing a crisis of the government and unity. The presence of a myriad number of players like the US, AQAP (Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) and other proxy groups extremely complicates the political atmosphere in Yemen. The presence of so many diverse groups has already complicated things, Saudi Arabia's attack and the awakening of regional proxies, have made the situation even worse. Iran has formally shown its concern over Saudi attacks in Yemen. There is a complicated situation in Yemen and Saudi should remember that, Yemen might not be another Bahrain. This time the Kingdom is dealing with a very complicated country.

Saudis are experiencing growing Iranian influence in Yemen. It is very simple to understand that the sole reason behind Saudi's attack on Yemen is to prevent Iranian influence from spreading.<sup>35</sup> Although, the Saudis have their own problems with Al-Qaeda and Muslim Brotherhood who

have considerable presence in Yemen. Riyadh will never allow the Houthis who are backed by Iran and former president Ali Abdullah Saleh to run a country next to its immediate south. This would simply make the crisis bi-polar for the Saudis who are facing similar challenges to its north. This is the reason that Saudi Arabia and its allies in the Gulf i.e. Egypt, Sudan and the US intervened militarily in Yemen after the Houthis ousted Saudi-backed president Abu –Rabuh Mansour Hadi.

The intentions of Tehran are, however, quite clear. Iran would like to keep the Saudis involved in as many places and on as many fronts as possible. Because this will increase domestic, pressure on the Saudis and might weaken the country internally.

### **Déjà vu in Yemen**

More than a year has now passed since the Houthis started advancing in Yemen and the Saudis have been bombing Yemen, what is visible ground is chaos and lawlessness. Neither of the party seems to be winning this war. The analysis of the present situation leads us to say that both are making a mistake. The Houthis and the Saudis both should have seen this day. They are repeating the grand American blunder in Iraq. The reason is that military action by the Saudis or the physical capture of territory by the Houthis will not bring stability to Yemen. Military action, in other words, cannot be a substitute for long-term political rapprochement between the parties. The only outcome will be further instability. Surprisingly enough, as the Americans have withdrawn from Yemen, and the Saudis and the Houthis are locked in battle, they are indirectly creating an opportunity for their common enemies - IS and AQAP to exploit the situation. And to remind ourselves, the strengthening of AQAP and IS in Yemen will have global repercussions.<sup>36</sup>

### **The Syrian Crisis**

Ever since its start in March 2011, the Syrian crisis continued expanding. Starting from pro-democracy in

Southern city of Derra by youth, the crisis has formally taken the shape of international conflict, where major powers have stepped in with their militaries and logistics supporting either the Syrians or the opposition groups. By September 2015, over 250,000 Syrians had lost their lives.<sup>37</sup> This is besides those, who still are missing and there are many who are non-Syrians in origin and just joined the conflict on the ideological basis or as proxies of major or regional powers. As per UN estimates, millions of Syrians have left their homes and trying to take refuge in either neighbouring countries or in various European countries.

Apart from major powers, the main rivalry in Syria is between Iran and Saudi Arabia, each promoting its own school of thought and ideologies too. Iran has given weapons, ammunition and billion of USD for the survival of Assad regime. Iranian military and civil fighters have been fighting against the rebels on behalf of Assad Regime. On the other hand, Saudi Arab and many other Sunni monarchs are supporting the rebels in all respect. Now with Russian support to the Assad regime, Syria has become a centre of the global power play. U.S and some EU countries had their direct and indirect presence and support for the rebels. After IS attack in France, killing 129 people, France has moved its aircraft carrier<sup>38</sup> in the region and bombed on the locations of IS. The aerial bombing has killed hundreds of innocent civilians, besides few rebels or IS militants. Turkish shooting down of Russian aircraft has further escalated the situation and it is likely that, U.S and Russia may engage against each other in the region, for the promotion of their strategic objectives. Such a situation will be disastrous for the Middle East. For the sake of local masses of Middle East, the major powers, UNO and regional actors must make efforts to cease the hostilities.

### **Role of the Regional Actors – Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)**

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), headed by Saudi Arabia, although having difference of opinion on Muslim brotherhood and Morsi, have by and large stood united on

core regional issues of security. The GCC countries share Saudi concerns that are emanating from the rise of IS. All GCC countries including Qatar, Kuwait and UAE are part of the anti-IS coalition. There is an agreement that IS has emerged as the collective enemy of all GCC countries, rather foreign powers and Israel. Resultantly, the security and political challenges of the contemporary Middle East of all GCC countries are similar to that of Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia like other states of the region, is going through its toughest times. Its foreign policy options are gradually shrinking and it is facing severe setbacks on the regional level. Its influence is vanishing over the regional governments, its appeal as being the center of Islam is losing ground, its status as the protector of the right of Arabs has ended, and similarly, it is also not winning its rivalry with Iran. To add to the Saudi predicament, its relations with the US are at the lowest point ever. All this has put Saudi Arabia against an avalanche of challenges.<sup>39</sup> All of these challenges have forced Saudi Arabia to take unexpected foreign policy steps. As evident from the strike against Houthis, Saudi Arabia seems to be growingly concerned with increasing Iranian influence in the region. It has supported militant networks across the region in order to balance Iranian influence. It has also criticized Hamas and has stopped short of explicitly condemning Israeli aggression against Gazans. Surprisingly enough, Saudi Arabia was a vocal supporter of General Sisi when he overthrew Mohammad Mursi in mid-2013.<sup>40</sup>

### **The Egypt of Al-SISI**

Egypt, no doubt is the most important country in the Middle East. If Saudi Arabia is considered the birthplace of Islam, Egypt has, to a large extent, remained the intellectual base of Islamic thought and political Islam. Since early 1970s, Egypt has remained a close US ally. It has played a mediating role in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. It's one of the largest recipient, of American military aid as well. Things were going smooth in Egypt until the fall of Mubarak and the election of

Mursi- a Muslim brotherhood candidate which raised eyebrows in US, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Morsi's close ties with Iran and Hamas were unwelcomed by Saudi Arabia, US and Israel.<sup>41</sup> Many believe that it was for this reason that Morsi was finally overthrown in a coup led by General Sissi, thus, reversing the policies of Morsi. Since the fall of Morsi, insurgent attacks have increased in Egypt's Sinai province. More concerning is the fact that IS has raised its head in the volatile north east of Egypt- the Sinai. Gradually, Sinai is becoming a breeding ground for IS and its supporters. This is evident from the fact that on June 4, 2015, the Egyptian branch of IS claimed responsibility of firing rockets into southern Israel. Moreover, since 2013, more than a hundred Egyptian soldiers have lost their lives in attacks that are widely believed to have been linked to IS.

One of the brazen attacks carried out by ISIS came on July 1, 2015 in which nearly two dozen Egyptian soldiers were killed and many injured. For Egypt, the threat of IS does not come only from Syria or Iraq. It also faces the danger of IS-spill over from Libya to its west. Being a very important country of the Arab world, Egypt can be considered a potential IS target in the near future.

## **Turkey**

Turkey, a very important state which lies at the fringes of the Middle East is likely to be affected by the ongoing unrest close to its borders in Syria. Having its own Kurdish problem, regional interests and a right-wing government, Turkey will be closely watching events as they unfold. So far, the instability in Syria has put a negative impact on Turkey both economically, politically and strategically.<sup>42</sup>

Since the beginning of the Syrian uprising, Turkey support has been the opposition against Assad. However, Turkey is concerned with the rise of ISIS and other extremist groups close to its borders. These groups certainly pose a threat to Turkey's security and sovereignty. In fact, Turkey has been a major transit point for fighters that arrive from Europe to

Syria and if IS is able to spread its tentacles into Turkey, it will bring the group at the doors of Europe and Caucasus. For Russia and Europe, such a development will be too much to ignore. The current puzzle for Turkey is that as it has growingly become entangled in the war in Syria, it is hard for Turkey to find a way between Assad and IS. In mid November 2015, Turkey shot-down a Russian fighter plane, after it crossed over the Syrian border. The incident has created tension between Turkey and Russia. Russia and Syria accuse Turkey for supporting rebel groups including IS against Assad regime.

## **Jordan**

Jordan- the Hashemite Kingdom is considered a close American and Saudi ally in the region and therefore, a good enough reason for IS to target it. The basic problem of Jordan comes from its demography and geography. While there is no doubt that ISIS has an appeal inside Jordanian society, it is geographically situated such that it borders with; Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Therefore, for Jordan, to remain isolated from IS, is nearly impossible. The demographic challenge of Jordan comes from the fact that Jordan houses millions of Palestinian and Syrian refugees while at the same time it is a country that has seen less social and economic development so far.

Hardline Jihadist-Salafism and anti-Western Muslim brotherhood has gained a visible presence in the country in the recent times. So, if we were to look into ISIS' strategy, the group might be trying to reach Jordan so as to expand its influence southwards towards Palestine, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Although failed by Jordanian army and intelligence, IS has a number of times tried to enter Jordan.<sup>43</sup> Thanks to the alertness of Jordanian army and the vivid anti-ISIS stance of King Abdullah, Jordan's borders have not been breached by IS so far.



## **Israel**

Israel is US' closest, formidable and natural ally in the Middle East. Since its creation in 1948, the US has strongly stood beside Israel diplomatically, politically and militarily. In fact, the US considers Israel as the only democracy in the middle of Arab monarchs. Israel's security and the interests of Israel remains a cornerstone of US regional policy in the Middle East.<sup>44</sup> Although Israel has normal relationship with Egypt, Jordan and recently it has received favorable signals from Saudi Arabia as well, Iran happens to be seen as Israel's enemy and strategic mire.

It is to be remembered that while the US has been teaching democracy to the Arabs, the illegal occupation of Palestinian lands by Israel remained the main source of extremism in the region. On one hand the militant groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS have used Israel's occupation and its atrocities against Palestinians as tool of recruiting people, on the other, Iran, by highlighting Israeli atrocities against Palestinians, is also using anti-Israeli rhetoric in order to gain support for its influence in the wider region and improve its bets against Saudi Arabia.

## **Perspective on the Role of Global Powers Russia**

Russia has long history of engagement with the Middle East. During the cold war, it had formidable strategic allies in the Middle East such as Egypt and Syria. Although Egypt changed its direction in the 1970s and went into the US camp, Syria and Iran remain critical Russian allies in the region. The end of cold war saw an end of Russian influence in the world and Middle East. Russia's influence in the region came to a bare minimum during the time of American unipolarity. But, as the world is witnessing a re-arrangement and re-distribution of economic power and political influence. Russia has again started looking for a greater role in the region. Russia's role has been crucial in preventing the US and the west from taking a Libyan-style military action in Syria or against Iran.

Although difference of opinion and interests exist among Saudi Arabia, Iran, United States and Russia, the Iran- Russia duo seems to be blocking the US from increasing its influence in the region. Indeed, Russian involvement in the region is quite different from that of US, while the US is mainly concerned with protecting its energy supply and the security of Israel; Russian interest is of a strategic nature. Russia is primarily concerned with preventing fundamentalism and terrorism from reaching its borders and blocking US influence in the region.<sup>45</sup>

The recent policy of Russia in the region is very different from that of US. Russia has opposed the US and Saudi backed rebels in Syria and recently started bombing the IS sites and other groups fighting against President Assad. After shooting down its aircraft by Turkey, there appears to be cold war between Russia and NATO.

## **China**

The most renowned reference of China in today's politics is its economic rise. While China is rising economically, resource-rich Middle East naturally becomes an important place for energy-hungry China. The foreign policy of China is very different from that of US and Russia. While US yearns for democracy, human rights and reducing anti-Americanism, Russia, struggling for maintaining a strategic balance, China however, has adopted a non-missionary foreign policy with no political strings attached to its policy. What China wants is to have economic market and energy contracts so as to ensure its exports grow and its energy supply is maintained.<sup>46</sup> China is interested in the energy supply coming from the Middle East; therefore, it would like stability to prevail in the region. As China is trying to diminish US' economic influence in the region through its expansion to the Middle Eastern markets, its future strategy calls for forging close ties with countries (Middle East) that are located across new Silk Road and maritime economic belt.<sup>47</sup> Eventually, it can be inferred that as China is mainly interested in the market and energy of the Middle East, it makes China interested in the politics of

Middle East as well. Although China doesn't have any traditional allies in the region, it is rapidly increasing its influence in Middle East and has a greater acceptability among the regional countries.

### **Future Prospects**

It is hard to determine whether Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iran and the US- the major players in the region, knew the consequences of regional instability or not. The rise of IS and the current anarchy are the logical outcome of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the US interests. Furthermore, a decade of ill-conceived policies of the region's most influential rectangle - US, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel have also fertilized disorder in the region. Today, Yemen, Syria and Iraq are facing existential threats to their security and integrity. One wonders whether these states will or not be able to protect their integrity. Alternatively, an analysis of the situation leads us to ask whether a major transformation in the geography of Middle East is on the cards. Only time will give us a clear answer of these questions.

It can be, stated that, the Kurds, who have long struggled for autonomy are, achieving their dream. If it happens, the integrity of Syria and Iraq is certainly at stake. This will ultimately raise eyebrows in Turkey and Iran. Because Iran and Turkey have a significant Kurd population with sub-national aspirations present there since long.

The contemporary Middle East is going through a very crucial phase of its history. Its society, politics and security are going through a phase of transition and flux. Major developments like the Arab spring, US invasion of Iraq, social unrest across the region, Israel-Palestine dispute, the war in Yemen, Syrian strife, Saudi-Iran rivalry, the rise of extremism and terrorism, tribalism, the rise of sophisticated terrorist networks and deepening Shia-Sunni fissure are tearing everything apart.

In conflict zone of Middle East, it appears that, authority has collapsed and chaos and disorder rule the region. The Kurds are stronger and autonomous than ever, Iraq lies divided politically, ethnically and socially. Syria- the country of Palmira and Aleppo has turned into ruins. IS and Hezbollah are acting more like a state rather than a non-state actor, the Huthis, once deprived and ignored, today rule vast swathes of Yemen. Sectarian militias both Shia and Sunni have largely replaced state armies.

Saudi Arabia and Iran although still mongering for regional dominance, nevertheless have started feeling the heat. Gaza is still bleeding and the west bank still in shambles. The only thing Al-Sisi has achieved after the removal of Mursi is instability, hopelessness and is now faced with a threat of organized insurgency in Sinai. Most despairing is the role of the US. Its illegal invasion of Iraq neither brought democracy nor diminished terrorism. What we see is wolves dancing on the plains of Iraq. Not to be forgotten is the fact that US and its ill-conceived strategies and policies are largely responsible for the current mess. Now, Russia has jumped into the region to counter the US and sustain the Assad regime. France and other EU actors are also making their entry into the region after IS attacks in France killing over 132 people. One can only hope that US, EU and Russia stop playing with strategies in the volatile region of Middle East. Rather enlarging gulf between Muslims of Middle East, the major powers should let the regional actors resolve their intra-state and inter-state disputes.

For Iran and Saudi Arabia, there is writing on the wall. Again, history is witness to the fact that after the Islamic revolution in Iran and the beginning of Iran-Saudi rivalry, both have paid a heavy cost in lives and money. Iran-Iraq war is a terrible and tragic reminder of it. It's high time that both of the countries understand that their actions are not serving the Muslims and the people of the region in anyway. In contrast, their foreign policy choices have caused trouble, fissure, enmity and misunderstanding among Muslims inside and outside the region. Ultimately, they will have to find a

better solution because in this rivalry, both are going to lose. Therefore, it is time to build regional consensus to prevent the rise of extremism and terrorism. In addition, the infamous terror groups like IS, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist non- state militias alongside other sectarian elements must be dealt with severely.

To sum up, it can be said that the recent developments in the Middle East have put sovereignty, security, well-being, and human dignity at stake. It is time to understand that instability in the Middle East, if not controlled, will have global repercussions as witnessed during IS attacks in France. The world is simply different today and the idea that this anarchy will only confine itself to the Middle East, is severely wrong. The pages of history bear witness to the fact that any developments in the Middle East have had a farther resonance in the wider Muslim world in particular and in other parts of the world in general.

And finally, to the Ayatollahs, Sheikhs, Al-Sisis, Assads and Al-Malikis, let it be reminded that gone is the time of despotism, tyranny and neglect. There is no more room of a paid-for security or a hired stability. There is no room left for hired security guarantors from the outside world. Be it the US or any other state, real security, stability and prosperity are ensured of the whole population is treated respectfully and is included in statecraft; without giving stake to the population, stability in the Middle East will remain a dream.

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# PAKISTAN'S POLICY TOWARD KASHMIR DISPUTE (2001-2014)

*Dr. Sumaira Shafiq*

## **Abstract**

*Since Pakistan's emergence as a nation-state, its dispute with India on Jammu and Kashmir region has substantially influenced the course of its foreign policy. Nonetheless, despite being the part of top foreign policy priorities, Pakistan's Kashmir policy has undergone several changes time to time. Yet the region remains important and thus the ensuing conflict with India is one of the major irritants in India-Pakistan relations. This study seeks to analyze Pakistan's policy toward the Kashmir dispute in the post 9/11 era. In particular, its first part analyzes President Musharraf's approach to save the freedom movement from being labelled as "terrorism" and his measures to resolve the dispute through peaceful means. The latter part explains the changes that the civilian governments have adopted and predicts possible trends for years to come.*

**Keywords:** Pakistan, Kashmir, Militancy, Dialogue, Diplomacy

## **Introduction**

The 9/11 terrorist attacks and subsequent U.S. response through the invasion of Afghanistan substantially changed the security environment of South Asia, if not the whole world. The new [security] environment constrained regional actors, particularly Pakistan, to adapt their security policies in accordance with the latest developments in the region. The US went to war to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy safe havens of terrorists in Afghanistan and forced Pakistan to join it in the war on terror. This US demand inevitably constrained Pakistan to change its security policy vis-à-vis its neighbours, India and Afghanistan. As a result, Pakistan had to abandon its support to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

The theocratic Taliban regime was probably not of the utmost importance for Pakistan. However, it was important for geo-strategic reasons and in terms of the country's enmity with India. Pakistan supported the Taliban regime to attain strategic depth and a safe corridor to Central Asia. That is why the leadership in Pakistan found it difficult to take a decision after the US call for support. However, they opted for what they thought was in the interest of the country and saved one of the two most important strategic goals. Afraid of putting the Kashmir movement at risk and a potential American blank check of support to India, Pakistan abandoned the Taliban regime and joined the US anti-terrorism campaign to keep the freedom struggle in Kashmir intact and different from terrorism of the Taliban.<sup>1</sup>

Not only the US-led war on terror affected Pakistan's policy toward the neighbours but also led to the emergence of new challenges to the country as far as its policy toward the Kashmir dispute was concerned. There were countrywide protests against the government's decision to join the US-led coalition against Taliban.<sup>2</sup> However, the tensions did not remain limited to the western border. The attack on Indian Parliament in December 2001 also exacerbated tensions at the eastern border.<sup>3</sup> India responded with a heavy-handed approach and termed the attack as "the Indian 9/11." India mobilized its troops along its border with Pakistan. In the meantime, the US decision to put Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) on its list of terrorist organizations further increased problems for the Pakistani decision makers (with reference to Kashmir Jihad).<sup>4</sup> These developments, in combination, also constrained the decision makers to review their policy toward the dispute to save the country from being labelled as "a terrorist state." Pakistan's Kashmir policy, therefore, underwent a substantial change after the 9/11 and the policy makers attempted to devise new methods to achieve [fixed] political goals attached with this conundrum.<sup>5</sup>

This article is based on historical and descriptive approaches. In historical research, the researcher interprets

past events to predict future whilst the historical research design involves synthesizing data from different sources. We have looked into the available sources to analyze Pakistan's policy toward the Kashmir dispute in the post 9/11 era. This article is divided into three major parts; each of them analyzes the policy of a government toward the dispute. We argue that Kashmir dispute has remained important, in one way or another, for all governments in Pakistan after the 9/11, yet their methods might have been different from each other. The nature of government and the external factor have substantially affected Pakistan's policy over the years. The historical records and recent changes in Pakistan and the region suggest that the core objective of Pakistan's policy toward the Kashmir dispute is unlikely to change. Therefore, we argue that the status quo is likely to continue in the near future.

### **Pakistan's Policy toward Kashmir Dispute on the Eve of 9/11**

Kashmir has been a major irritant in India-Pakistan relations over the period of six and a half decades. Both Pakistan and India agree on the disputed nature of the area, but their interpretations, actions, and goals are different. According to Pakistan Mission to United Nations, "Pakistan upholds the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to self-determination in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council."<sup>6</sup> Yet Kashmir's accession to Pakistan appears to be the ultimate objective of the latter.

Hamid Hussain rightly argues, "Pakistan sees the annexation of Kashmir as the logical culmination of the triumph of the "two nation theory"; the basis of the birth of Pakistan that stipulated that Hindus and Muslims of the subcontinent were two nations."<sup>7</sup> As for India, Pakistan regards the accession of J&K to India (in 1947) illegal and considers the region a disputed territory. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) sources have stated repeatedly that Pakistan only provides moral and diplomatic support to the freedom struggle and believes that the UN-sponsored

plebiscite is an appropriate solution to this conflict.<sup>8</sup> However, despite having a clear objective, the Pakistani policy makers have devised multiple military and diplomatic strategies over the period of six and a half decades.

For instance, diplomacy remained a prominent theme in Pakistan's policy toward the dispute from early 1950s to late 1980s, although it fought two wars with India in 1965 and 1971 respectively. And after the emergence of armed insurrection in Indian administrated Kashmir (IAK),<sup>9</sup> it provided assistance to the insurgents (Mujahedeen) until 2001.<sup>10</sup> During 1960s, Pakistan's President Ayub Khan sought help from the US President John F. Kennedy to solve the dispute.<sup>11</sup> Pakistani and Indian foreign ministers –Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Swaran Singh – held talks regarding the dispute, but no agreement was reached. Nonetheless, “Pakistan signified willingness to consider approaches other than a plebiscite and India recognized that the status of Kashmir was in dispute and territorial adjustments might be necessary.”<sup>12</sup>

After the armed insurrection in late 1980s, Pakistan tried to change the status quo through supporting the insurgents.<sup>13</sup> Later on, it infiltrated its armed troops in the Indian administrative area, Ladakh, in 1999. However, one thing remains essential amid the study of Pakistan's policy toward the dispute that the external factor has always been substantial in the policy making process.<sup>14</sup> For instance, even during the diplomacy-led era (1950-1980), Pakistan's alliance with the US was a determining factor that convinced the leadership that they would be able to solve this dispute through seeking help of the superpower. Later, the armed insurrection in J&K proved a substantial factor that influenced Pakistan's policy and prompted the decision makers to focus on the military means. The US war on terror, another external factor, also influenced the course of Pakistan's policy toward the dispute.

## **9/11 and Pakistan's Kashmir Policy**

Pakistan supported the Taliban regime for approximately five years but joined the US-led coalition to save the freedom struggle, even though some of the Taliban groups were also supporting the Kashmiri fighters. After the parliament attack, the Indian officials waged an unsuccessful campaign to portray the Kashmir struggle as terrorism. The US, however, was reluctant to open another front in the region. One of the diplomats in the US embassy in New Delhi stated, "We did not treat it as part of the war on terror."<sup>15</sup>

President Musharraf defended the decision to join the US-led coalition in the wake of the war on terror and ensuing protests in the country.<sup>16</sup> Pakistan formally declared its support for the war and tried to keep the focus of the international forces away from the Kashmir issue. In addition, the Pakistani leadership also sought to clear their stance on the issue. For instance, Musharraf stated in a UN session that [the] "just struggles of the people for self-determination and liberation from colonial or foreign occupation cannot be outlawed in the name of terrorism."<sup>17</sup> However, they repeatedly termed India's policy in IAK as state terrorism and denied any kind of support to militancy in the area.

The parliament attack also increased problems for Pakistan. Although none of the (pro-Pakistan) Jihadi organizations took responsibility, India did not miss the opportunity to blame Pakistan for this attack.<sup>18</sup> In addition, the US decision to ban two Jihadi organizations made the Pakistani leadership clear that they would not be able to move forward with a pro-militancy policy; after all, the US had also acknowledged the element of terrorism in Kashmir. Therefore, Musharraf banned the aforementioned Jihadi organizations. He stated that none of the groups would be permitted to start any kind of armed movement in the name of Kashmir struggle from the Pakistani territory, although he did not back off from Pakistan's historical stance on J&K and stated, "Kashmir runs in our blood. No Pakistani can afford to sever links with

Kashmir. We will continue to extend our moral, political and diplomatic support to the Kashmiris.”<sup>19</sup>

The chain of events (in 2001) reduced Pakistan's [military] options vis-à-vis the Kashmir issue and constrained the leadership to bring in changes in the policy. The Pakistani leadership took several diplomatic initiatives including proposing new options to resolve the conflict. These initiatives helped the country to soften its image as a responsible power in the region.

### **Musharraf's Kashmir Policy**

The US-led war on terror, terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, and the subsequent pressure of the international community brought in multiple implications for Pakistan. These factors not only resulted in the emergence of new challenges but also provided the leadership with an opportunity to review the Kashmir policy.<sup>20</sup> Pakistan took bold yet cautious steps in the wake of the changing political landscape of the region. Husain Haqqani argues, “Pakistan Army has been the sole architect of the country's policy making vis-à-vis the dispute. Whatever decision Pakistan has taken amid the six decades long course of the Kashmir dispute, its military has had a leading role.”<sup>21</sup> Thus, it was rather easy for a military general, Parvez Musharraf, to take bold steps that would probably have been impossible for a civilian leader. Musharraf's initiatives also indicated Pakistan's return to a diplomacy-led solution of the dispute. After the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's visit to South Asia in 2001 and his call for resumption of dialogue,<sup>22</sup> President Musharraf attempted to resume dialogue and negotiations between India and Pakistan on all issues including the long-standing unresolved dispute of Kashmir. He visited India in July 2001 and met with the Indian leadership in Agra. However, the Agra Summit could not be materialized, as both sides even failed to issue a joint statement. Pakistan and India resumed dialogue in 2004, although Musharraf found the “lack of trust” a real spoiler in the process. In addition, he did not receive any noteworthy

response from his Indian counterpart because the Indian leadership probably took it as his popularity stunt and an effort to resist the international pressure.<sup>23</sup> Nonetheless, Musharraf was adamant to bring his Indian counterpart in confidence. He assured him during their meeting on the sidelines of the SAARC Summit (2004) that Pakistan would not permit any militant organization to operate from its territory.<sup>24</sup>

In addition to issuing a joint statement with Vajpayee, Musharraf managed to convince the Indian leadership to permit the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) leadership to visit Pakistan.<sup>25</sup> Both countries also initiated Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), especially with reference to Kashmir, which proved helpful in the successful opening of Muzaffarabad-Srinagar bus service and trade route on LoC.<sup>26</sup> Thus, not only did Musharraf initiate new debates on the dispute worldwide but also he managed to soften Pakistan's image as a responsible state that wanted to resolve its bilateral disputes through peaceful means. He proposed a "four stages" based formula in 2003 that included:

- Recognition of Kashmir as a disputed territory
- Initiating dialogue
- Dropping impractical solutions
- Moving towards a win-win situation<sup>27</sup>

First two stages of the proposed formula were easy to implement. This formula was not a breakthrough, but it could have provided both countries with an opportunity to move forward. Yet Musharraf kept changing his position and came up with several overtures. For instance, he proposed a "seven regions" formula in 2004.<sup>28</sup> This formula suggested Kashmir's division in seven regions: for instance, Ladakh, Kargil/Dras, Poonch, Jammu, the Valley, Northern Areas, and AJK.<sup>29</sup>

Largely, this proposal also emphasized an easy step such as the identification of regions on ethnic, religious, and geographical lines. Following the identification phase, demilitarization and change in the status quo of the regions

were also sought in the proposal. In addition to four stages and seven regions formulas, Musharraf proposed another (four points) formula in 2006 that included:

- Gradual withdrawal of troops
- Local self-governance
- No redrawing of boundaries and
- Mutual administration by India and Pakistan

President Musharraf's proposals generated new debates in the country as well as in J&K. The moderates (led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq) were in favor of a political solution, but the hardliners (led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani) advocated armed struggle.<sup>30</sup> On the other hand, the head of Muslim Conference (MC) Abdul Qayoom Khan and Prime Minister of [Pakistan-administrated] Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) Sardar Attique Khan supported Musharraf's four point formula. Nevertheless, the opposition factions in AJK continued their opposition to these proposals.

Musharraf came up with several new ideas and thus provided an impetus to the peace efforts between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute. Yet the Indian response to his suggestions remained limited to some tentative improvements on LoC. An important reason of this stalemate was probably the bureaucracy in both countries. For instance, MFA Pakistan avoided mentioning any policy level changes in its briefings throughout the Musharraf era and continued to mention the right of self-determination as the legitimate right of the Kashmiris.<sup>31</sup> Even so, the Musharraf era reflected a change in Pakistan's policy toward the Kashmir dispute and encompassed new initiatives, which, later on, the new [democratic] government turned off.

### **PPP's Kashmir Policy**

The anti-Musharraf factions in both Pakistan and J&K welcomed the new government and anticipated that the [democratic] Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) regime would reverse the changes initiated by the previous government. The



moderates hoped that Pakistan would keep supporting the Kashmir movement regardless of change in the regime whilst the pro-Jihad groups were hoping for the continuation of PPP's historical stance on the matter.<sup>32</sup> However, President Asif Ali Zardari's statement that "Kashmir cause should not become an impediment to normalization between India and Pakistan" indicated a potential change in Pakistan's policy toward the dispute.<sup>33</sup> Later, President Zardari tried to repudiate the rumours and explained his statement in a defensive manner that his party would not betray the martyrs of freedom struggle. Yet in reality, the Kashmir cause remained on the back burner because the PPP government did nothing more than "internationalizing the issue" during its term.

After entering the office in 2008, the new government faced two major problems in its relations with India, such as the bombing of Indian Embassy in Kabul and LoC violations. Even there were reports that India had cancelled the fifth round of composite dialogue. The MFA Pakistan, however, repudiated the reports and confirmed rescheduling of the dialogue where the foreign ministers discussed progress on visa liberalization and promotion of trade between the two countries.<sup>34</sup> In 2008, the Prime Minister's National Security Adviser Mahmud Ali Durrani visited New Delhi to meet the Indian leadership. Both sides discussed a wide range of issues. Durrani denied Pakistan's involvement in the bombing of Indian Embassy and his [successful] trip led to the opening of Poonch-Rawalkot route for trade across the LoC.<sup>35</sup>

The Kashmir issue might have continued to remain a secondary problem between India and Pakistan if there were no Mumbai attacks in November 2008. These attacks once again brought the dispute in the limelight. The Indian authorities blamed Pakistan, as some of the perpetrators of attack were Pakistani nationals and had already fought against India in IAK.<sup>36</sup> In response to the attack, the PPP administration analyzed the situation carefully and banned Jamaat ud Dawa (JD) in addition to arresting seven of its senior leaders. Pakistan took a moderate position amid the

growing rhetoric of war and surgical strikes in the country. It also kept a moderate approach in the wake of protests and strikes in IAK in 2010.<sup>37</sup> Pakistan did not repeat its practice of 1990s, despite the fact that the situation during the protests was ripe for supporting militancy in the region.

As stated above, the PPP government in Pakistan focused on internationalization of the Kashmir issue. The Pakistani leadership attempted to involve the international community by highlighting the issue on various forums. President Zardari, for instance, told the US ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson on January 2, 2009, “He would have no choice but to respond militarily to an Indian attack and there was no more politically sensitive issue in Pakistan than Kashmir.”<sup>38</sup> The Pakistani side was expecting the US to play a leading role in the issue. Particularly, President Obama’s statement that “ending Indo-Pakistani differences over Kashmir was one of the keys to calming tensions in South Asia and winning the war on terror” had raised their hopes.<sup>39</sup> After the Obama administration’s decision to nominate a special envoy for South Asia, President Zardari wrote in his op-ed in Washington Post:

Much as the Palestinian issue remains the core obstacle to peace in the Middle East, the question of Kashmir must be addressed in some meaningful way to bring stability to this region. We hope that the special envoy will work with India and Pakistan not only to bring a just and reasonable resolution to the issues of Kashmir and Jammu but also to address critical economic and environmental concerns.<sup>40</sup>

The US State Department Spokesman Robert A. Wood’s statement that the Kashmir issue was not the part of Richard Holbrooke’s mandate, therefore, brought in disappointment among the Pakistani policy makers. In fact, his statement that “India has some very clear views as to what it wants to do vis-à-vis dealing with the Kashmir issue, as well as the Pakistanis” indirectly supported the position of New Delhi.<sup>41</sup> This

development assured the PPP leadership that internationalizing the Kashmir dispute, supporting the Kashmir movement politically and morally, and normalizing bilateral relations with India was an effective way to move forward.

The PPP government, therefore, increased its focus on the issue in 2009. For instance, Pakistan lodged complaints against India in the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) over alleged breaches of the LoC ceasefire. The higher authorities, however, let the local commanders solve the issues.<sup>42</sup> In November 2009, President Zardari met with the Chairman Hurriyat Conference Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and assured him that his government would keep supporting the Kashmir movement politically and morally.<sup>43</sup> Meanwhile, the Zardari government also influenced the local politics of AJK. For instance, the AJK legislative assembly elected Raja Farooq Haider as AJK Prime Minister in October 2009 – making him the region’s third prime minister since 2006 elections.<sup>44</sup> The Zardari government is believed to have kept Sardar Attique out of the race due to his support to the former President Musharraf on his four-point formula. The government and military establishment also kept the Kashmiri leadership away from establishing Nawaz Sharif-led PML (N) in AJK with a view that “this would have sent an unwelcoming signal to the Indians that Pakistan was ready to absorb AJK on the basis of the status quo.”<sup>45</sup>

One of the most important steps of the PPP government was the introduction of administrative changes in the governance of Northern Areas (hereafter Gilgit-Baltistan, GB).<sup>46</sup> The government decided to give provincial status to the area probably for two reasons: first, to stem whatever appeal the Taliban might enjoy among separatists in the region; and second, to send a signal to India that Pakistan was serious about restarting the back-channel talks on the status of Kashmir.<sup>47</sup> At the external front, the government continued its strategy of highlighting the Kashmir issue at different international forums, particularly the UN. President Zardari

criticized the UN role in the Kashmir dispute at 67<sup>th</sup> session of UN General Assembly. He stated:

Kashmir remains a symbol of failure of the UN system and Pakistan's principled position on territorial disputes remains bedrock of its foreign policy...we will continue to support the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to peacefully choose their destiny in accordance with the UN Security Council's long-standing resolutions on this matter.<sup>48</sup>

As stated above, the PPP government moved forward with a strategy of "supporting the [Kashmir] movement politically and morally." During his visit to AJK, Zardari stated, "The struggle for Kashmir began before the struggle for Pakistan. We achieved Pakistan, we will also achieve Kashmir....India could never hope to get its way on Kashmir by force.... Democratic governments in Pakistan had negotiated with India on equal terms."<sup>49</sup> In April 2013, a leading Pakistani newspaper published a story that stated, "Pakistan believes in dialogue to resolve Kashmir Dispute.... President has regretted that unfortunately the world community had failed to resolve the Kashmir dispute that has been lingering for 65 years."<sup>50</sup>

The PPP government's term ended in May 2013. This year proved crucial for India-Pakistan relations because of the LoC ceasefire violations. Nonetheless, there was no substantial move on the part of the government to initiate any noteworthy phase of bilateral negotiations with India to resolve the long-standing unresolved dispute. In effect, various issues including ceasefire violations on LoC remained untouched until the arrival of a new government in office in May 2013.

### **New Government and the Kashmir Policy**

The new government has assumed office in a time when the issues of high politics demand the utmost concentration of decision makers. Dealing with the Talibanization has ultimately become the most important matter for the

government. This statement does not imply that Kashmir is a bygone issue. Similarly, it remains noteworthy that Pakistan, under the leadership of Nawaz Sharif, worked closely with India before the Kargil episode. At that time, the leadership of both countries agreed on increasing cooperation and working for the resolution of unresolved disputes. Therefore, after becoming Premier of the country for the third time, Nawaz Sharif has kept his hopes high as far as India-Pakistan relations are concerned.

A half of the first year of this government has been marked with the escalation of hostility on LoC.<sup>51</sup> India has blamed Pakistan for giving a free hand to the extremist elements such as Hafiz Saeed to inflame sentiments against India under the guise of “Difa-e-Pakistan Alliance”. Whether supported by Pakistan or not, it appears to be true that the aforementioned elements have not yet faced any significant problem in continuing their activities. In fact, several right wing politicians and activists have also shown support to the forum. Similarly, the pro-Jihad elements have also been active in giving pro-militancy statements.

As for the government, Prime Minister Sharif has stated that peace with India remains one of his highest priorities. He appears committed to his agenda. For instance, the terrorist incident that resulted in eight Indian casualties in IAK did not disrupt the India-Pakistan peace efforts.<sup>52</sup> Both Premier Sharif and Premier Singh agreed in their meeting in New York that the Indian and Pakistani DGMOs would meet to identify improved mechanisms to maintain ceasefire and prevent infiltration.<sup>53</sup> Sharif’s statement that “Kashmir might become a nuclear flash point and cause of a fourth war between India and Pakistan, so it should be resolved” also reflects his emphasis on peaceful means to resolve the dispute.<sup>54</sup>

Overall, the Kashmir policy of the Nawaz government remains ambiguous. So far, the government has not emphasized a specific approach to resolve the dispute with India, nor has it indicated the resumption of the Lahore Declaration.<sup>55</sup> Yet it has become clear after the Adviser to

Prime Minister on National Security and Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz's visit to India that Pakistan is likely to keep all [diplomatic] channels open with India.<sup>56</sup>

## **Conclusion**

Pakistan's policy toward the Kashmir dispute is important for its relations with India. As for Pakistan's policy, it has changed time to time. Every government in the country has devised its own method, so the importance of dispute has varied from time to time. In addition to domestic political factors, the international scenario has also substantially influenced Pakistan's policy, especially after the 9/11. The ensuing war on terror has significantly shaped the course of Pakistan's foreign policy toward its neighbors, India and Afghanistan. The external factor, therefore, has also affected the Kashmir policy. Simply put, the transformation from dictatorship to democracy, change in governments, terrorism and extremism, and a weakening economy along with an imported war on the western border have substantially influenced the course of Pakistan's policy toward the dispute.

Second, in Pakistan, politicians and Army have rarely been on the same page. If such an alliance existed, Army was on the driving seat. As stated above that the Kashmir policy has historically remained a business of Army, the politicians find it difficult to manage India-Pakistan bilateral relations whilst keeping the issue intact. In this regard, they appear unable to do any breakthrough except internationalizing the issue, which the PPP government did. Overall, Musharraf's attempt to make the dispute bilateral and solve it through dialogue has been a bold step of Pakistan, but India's response to his proposals has weakened the position of the moderates who advocate peaceful bilateral resolution of the conflict.

Third, Premier Sharif's visit to India on the inauguration of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in an attempt to normalize relations with India and the start of military operation against the Taliban in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) region suggest that Pakistan is unlikely to go for

militancy option in the IAK, at least in the near future. At the movement, the top priority of the government and military establishment is countering terrorism and militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), FATA, and Baluchistan. Nonetheless, both states need to solve their bilateral problems related to J&K such as the water dispute for long-term stability and peace in the region. The conflict on natural resources may become inevitable if the leadership in both countries does not take appropriate steps and develop an understanding on management of conflicts.

Last, the regional political landscape of South Asia appears to be changing rapidly. New actors are endeavoring to increase their reach and influence in the region. For instance, China has increased its presence in AJK in particular and the region in general. A majority of the China-funded mega projects in Pakistan are in AJK and GB. Therefore, given Pakistan's dependence on energy sources in PAK, an overwhelming focus on the counterterrorism campaign, and the increasing Chinese presence in the region, it appears reasonable to argue that any change in Pakistan's policy toward the Kashmir dispute that may change the status quo is unlikely in years to come.

### **Notes**

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<sup>1</sup>Akhtar, Shaheen. (Last Accessed 2014, March 17). War on terrorism and Kashmir issue. 1. <http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/Currentissue-pdf/SHAHEEN%20AKHTAR.pdf>

<sup>2</sup>Ahmad, Munir.(2001, October 15) Militants surge toward Pakistani air base reportedly used by U.S. forces. *The St. Augustine Record*.[http://staugustine.com/stories/101501/ter\\_216233.shtml#.Vgu1yPmqkko](http://staugustine.com/stories/101501/ter_216233.shtml#.Vgu1yPmqkko)

<sup>3</sup>Bennett-Jones, Owen. (2008). Musharraf's Kashmir Policy.*Asian Affairs* (38.3), 308.

<sup>4</sup>Pandey, Prashant. (2001, December 17). Jaish, Lashkar carried out attack with ISI guidance: Police. *The Hindu*.

<sup>5</sup>Change in policy does not imply change of policy. Pakistan's policy toward the dispute has remained consistent whereas the policy objective is, more or less, clear.

<sup>6</sup> Pakistan Mission to United Nations(last accessed 2014, March 15)Kashmir- the history. <http://www.pakun.org/kashmir/history.php>

<sup>7</sup>Hussain, Hamid. (2011, August 21) Pakistan's military operations in Kashmir. *Aljazeera*. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/08/2011887622615886.html>

<sup>8</sup>Pakistan's position on Kashmir remains unchanged: FO. (2012, September 15). *Daily Times*.

<sup>9</sup>The terms Indian administrated Kashmir (IAK) and Pakistan administrated Kashmir (PAK) refer to the areas under the control of India and Pakistan respectively. We have chosen IAK and PAK (also known as Azad Jammu and Kashmir, AJK) to avoid confusion while referring to the divided region. The term Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) refers to the Kashmir region as a whole, which includes both IAK and PAK.

<sup>10</sup>Khaliq, Sohaib. (2012). Pakistan's Kashmir Policy in New Strategic Environment. *IPRI*(12.1), 48.

<sup>11</sup>Irfani, Suroosh. ed. (1997) *Fifty years of the Kashmir dispute*. Muzaffarabad: University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, 11-12.

<sup>12</sup>Hashim, Asad. (2014, May 27) Timeline: India-Pakistan relations. *Aljazeera*. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/kashmirtheforgott-enconflict/2011/06/2011615113058224115.html>

<sup>13</sup>Haqqani, Husain. (2003) Pakistan's Endgame in Kashmir. *India Review* (2.3), 46.

<sup>14</sup>Khaliq, Sohaib. (2012). 48.

<sup>15</sup>Coll, Steve. (2006, February 13). The stand off. areporter at large. *New Yorker*.

<sup>16</sup> Musharraf was of the view that he joined the coalition to save Pakistan from being declared a terrorist state. The US position of "with us or against us" left him with no option except joining the coalition.

<sup>17</sup>AkhtarShaheen. (2011, August 21). Kashmir: Pakistan's 'unfinished agenda'. *Al Jazeera*. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/08/2011887641662208.html>.

<sup>18</sup>Akhtar, Shaheen (2014). 1.

<sup>19</sup>Saddiqi, A.R.(2003, December 31). Musharraf's Kashmir Demarche: Kargil Reversed. *Dawn*.

<sup>20</sup>Akhtar, Shaheen. (2014).1.

<sup>21</sup>Haqqani, Husain. (2003). 37-38.

<sup>22</sup> Kofi Annan told the reporters, "The only way out is through dialogue, the only way out is through negotiations." See Annan upbeat on Kashmir, *BBC*, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/1224717.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1224717.stm)

<sup>23</sup>Reddy, B. Muralidhar. (2004, November) The Musharraf's Formula. *Frontline*

<sup>24</sup>Akhlaque, Qudssia. (2004, July 1). Dialogue to Start Next Month: Joint Statement on Musharraf-Vajpayee Meeting. *Dawn*.

<sup>25</sup>The All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) is an alliance of different political, religious and, social organizations whose aim is to secure the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir through peaceful struggle.



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- <sup>26</sup> Bennett-Jones, Owen. (2008). 310-311.
- <sup>27</sup>Khaliq, Sohaib. (2012). 60;Cheema, PervaizIqbal. (2003, July 6) Musharraf's recipe for Kashmir.*News International*.
- <sup>28</sup>Lavoy, "Pakistan's Kashmir Policy," 2.
- <sup>29</sup>Ladakh (the Muslim part between Himalayas and Indus), Kargil/Dras (Muslim), Poonch (Muslim, contiguous with Azad Kashmir), Jammu (Muslim-majority districts) and the Valley (Muslim).
- <sup>30</sup>Malik, Mehreen Zahra. (2007, February). Kashmiris are not tired but they need a change in strategy. *Friday Times*.
- <sup>31</sup>For instance, the foreign office sources have never denied the Kashmiris' right to self-determination in accordance with the UN resolutions. The UN resolutions protecting their right to self-determination were even mentioned during the Musharraf era of bilateral diplomacy.
- <sup>32</sup>Several leaders including Syed Ali Geelani opposed President Musharraf's four-point formula for resolution of the Kashmir issue. He portrayed it as surrender.
- <sup>33</sup>Subramanian, Nirupama.( 2010, January 6). Rights of Kashmiris suppressed: Zardari. *The Hindu*.
- <sup>34</sup>Kashmir Line of Control Violations. (2008, July 14). *WikiLeaks*.
- <sup>35</sup>Kashmir Trade opens between Pakistan and India for First Time in 60 Years. (2008, October 24). *WikiLeaks*.
- <sup>36</sup>Rizvi, Hassan Askari. (2010).Pakistan-India Relations: Post Mumbai Deadlock &The Way Forward. *PILDAT*. 11-12.
- <sup>37</sup> The protests in Kashmir started in June 2010 after the fake encounter of three young men in Baramulla district. The Kashmiri leaders including Geelani and Mirwaiz demanded demilitarization of the region. The protests claimed around 112 civilian lives and ended in September 2010 after the Indian government's announcement of a package aimed at defusing the tensions.
- <sup>38</sup>Zardari Comments on India/Nawaz Sharif. (2009, January 5). *WikiLeaks*.
- <sup>39</sup>Ghosh, Bobby. (2009, January 28). Will Kashmir be an Obama foreign policy focus?.*TIME*, <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1874627,00.html>
- <sup>40</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>41</sup>Kashmir taken out of Holbrooke's brief, says report. (2009, January 31). *Dawn*.
- <sup>42</sup>Pakistan protests Indian violation of Kashmir Line of Control. (2009, March 27). *WikiLeaks*.
- <sup>43</sup>Pakistan to Keep Supporting Kashmir: Zardari. (2009, September 28). *Geo Pakistan*.
- <sup>44</sup>Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly votes out Prime Minister. (2009, January 12). *WikiLeaks*.
- <sup>45</sup>Azad Jammu and Kashmir gets a new prime minister, yet again. (2009, November 14). *WikiLeaks*.

<sup>46</sup> Formerly known as Northern Areas of Pakistan, Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) is an administrative territory of Pakistan. The PPP government passed an order in 2009 that granted a de facto province-like status to the GB. Kashmiri nationalist groups including the JKLF claim GB as part of a future independent state whilst India considers it a part of IAK.

<sup>47</sup> GOP announces reforms toward autonomy for the Northern Areas in signal to India to jump start the back channel. (2009, September 1). *WikiLeaks*.

<sup>48</sup> Zardari rakes up Kashmir in UN, calls it a symbol of UN system's failure. (2012, September 26). *The Times of India*.

<sup>49</sup> Fighting for Kashmir liberation is Pakistan's duty: Zardari. (2010, January 6). *The Nation*.

<sup>50</sup> Pakistan believes on dialogue to resolve Kashmir dispute: Zardari. (2013, April 17). *The News*.

<sup>51</sup> Cross LoC Trade, travel suspended in Kashmir following India, Pakistan Skirmish. (2013, November 11). *Xinhua*.

<sup>52</sup> Kashmir attacks: Indian troops and civilians killed, (2013, September 26) *BBC*, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-24279602>

<sup>53</sup> Chandran, Suba, (2013, December 19). Next steps across the LoC: The DGMO meeting. *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, <http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/next-steps-across-the-loc-the-dgmo-meeting-4219.html>

<sup>54</sup> Bukhari, Shujaat. (2014, February 12). Pakistan's Kashmir dilemma. *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, <http://www.ipcs.org/article/terrorism-in-pakistan/pakistans-kashmir-dilemma-4305.html>

<sup>55</sup> Nawaz invites India to solve Kashmir dispute. (2014, February 5). *The Express Tribune*.

<sup>56</sup> Quraishi, Omar. (2013, November 13). Delhi Trip: Sartaj Aziz discusses LoC truce with Indian FM. *The Express Tribune*.

## MILITARY SPENDING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN PAKISTAN

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### **Abstract**

*This paper deals with the causal relation between military spending and economic growth of a state. There are three schools of thought on this issue: military spending promotes economic growth; it retards economic growth; and there exists no causal relations between the two. Pakistan's military spending – being indispensable because of the existing threat perception – has been considered as a burden on the national economy. This paper argues that military spending as part of the budgetary expenditure does not all go in the drain. Its role in the economic development of Pakistan – if less in economic growth – cannot be neglected. However, their indirect impact on the economic growth of Pakistan has been substantial. Technological advancement, provision of security, military's social uplift projects which positively affect the 'health' of the economy, military's ancillary institutions like Fauji Foundation, Bahria Foundation, Shaheen Foundation, Army Welfare Trust (AWT) are performing their role directly in the economic growth of the state. Importantly, Arms trade internationally has been contributing trillions of dollars in various states economies. This paper suggests that defence industrial capacity and efficiency can be improved in order to increase the output, which in turn, would help the state's economy by earning millions of dollars through arms sale at the international arena and by ensuring the continued supply of necessary equipment to its armed forces, especially in the times of crises – which in turn, may not only ensure the security of the Pakistan, but also reducing the political leverage being held by great powers on Pakistan. To achieve the target, as a first step, efficient planning be done so as to make the defence industry self-sufficient, and in the long-run to strengthen it to support the overall military spending. This way, it would not*

*only contribute to the economic development, but also in the economic growth of Pakistan.*

**Key Words:** security, military spending, economic growth

## **Introduction**

Military spending is imperative for Pakistan because of the country's complex, ambiguous and volatile strategic environment. Security concerns in Pakistan are increasingly amalgamated when juxtaposed on inter-state border issues, intra-state ethnic tension and the war on radicalized militant groups in the entire country, such as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan terrorist syndicate, and spillover impact of protracted asymmetrical warfare in Afghanistan. The notion of security among the South Asian states is directly and indirectly affected by the defence spending and military build up of China, India and Pakistan as well as the military postures and policies of other countries well beyond the region.<sup>1</sup> China and India, in terms of military, geography, and demography, are the larger states in the region. India's predominant geopolitical position in the region – sharing border with most of the South Asian states (except Afghanistan) – enflames its aspiration to be an eminent state or the “big brother”<sup>2</sup> in the region. China and Pakistan, having the sufficient military potential and the ‘strategic will’, have deterred such Indian hegemonistic designs.

The South Asian history is marred with frequent inter- and intra-state conflicts, particularly India and Pakistan belligerent relationship. The rivalry between India and Pakistan was precisely spelled out by Saeed Shafqat: “Despite shared colonial past, visible cultural and institutional similarities, the dynamics of power relations continue to be driven by hostility, lack of trust, conflict and war. Insecurity, fear and suspicion of the ‘other’ continue to keep South Asia as the ‘nuclear flash point’. Peace, cooperation, economic partnership remains elusive.”<sup>3</sup> Another South Asian expert Stephen Philip Cohen argued that: “One of the most important puzzles of India-Pakistan relations is not why the smaller

Pakistan feels encircled and threatened, but why the larger India does. It would seem that India, seven times more populous than Pakistan and five times its size, and which defeated Pakistan in 1971, would feel more secure. This has not been the case and Pakistan remains deeply embedded in Indian thinking.”<sup>4</sup> The relations between the two shape the political and strategic outlook of the South Asian region.

Since the independence, Pakistan’s defence policy – and hence military spending – has remained India-centric. India however, has blamed China for initiating the conventional and nuclear arms race in South Asia. The mistrust coupled with the threat perception and security dilemma has ignited a continual arms race in the sub-continent, with both India and Pakistan ensnared in hardware myopia requiring traditional military definitions and approaches for attaining national security.<sup>5</sup> So military spending and budgets for developing military industrial complexes have increased manifold in the recent decades. Since the beginning of twenty-first century, India’s military spending has immensely surpassed Pakistan due to the latter’s economic degradation.<sup>6</sup> The growing Indian economy has facilitated a growth in military expenditure in real terms. India is currently implementing and planning major investments in new weapons and other military equipment, reportedly for a total of between \$100-150 billion in the period 2012-2021.<sup>7</sup>

Importantly, the collective world military expenditure during the year 2012 was estimated as \$1756 billion, representing 2.5 per cent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or \$249 for each person in the world ... the total is higher than in any year between the end of World War-II and 2010.<sup>8</sup> Out of that sum total, billions of dollars have been spent on arms trade. Pakistan and India are important arms importers because the pace of development of their domestic arms industry remains slow.<sup>9</sup> It will be useful to assess the possibilities of Pakistan effectively employing its defence industry optimally, thus exploring and utilising the revolution in military affairs (RMA), for the attainment of a heightened degree of economic growth.

The impacts of the military spending on economic growth remain controversial especially in developing states with lingering strategic and military irritant issues because of the continuing tension between domestic socio-economic needs on one hand, and defence and foreign policy compulsions on the other. Nevertheless, the Classical economists including Adam Smith acknowledged: “The first duty of the sovereign ... that of defending the society from the violence and injustice of other societies grows gradually more and more expansive, as the society advances in civilization.”<sup>10</sup> It has been established throughout Pakistan’s history that the principal responsibility of every government is to develop its defence forces in order to ensure its national survival, sovereignty and enhance its national interest. The enduring question remains, “how much (defence spending) is enough?”<sup>11</sup> The strategic/defence analysts have been struggling to answer this question in different ways. Despite it, the issue remains contentious considering the conflict ridden under-developed states that are compelled to channelize crucial developmental resources for military industry.

This study aims to critically examine the impacts of military spending upon national economic growth. In addition, an effort would be made to identify the negative effects of military spending and how these may be mitigated. It would also explore whether military spending can be utilised to contribute towards the economic progress of Pakistan. The study is divided into three sections. The first section deals with the conceptual constructs of the study. Second section spells out the relationship between military spending and economic growth of the country. The third section contains deliberation on Pakistan’s military spending and its relations with the national economic growth.

### **Military Spending and Economic Growth: Conceptual Constructs**

The budgetary expenditures are broadly of two types.<sup>12</sup> Developmental expenditures consist of social community services and economic services. Non-developmental

expenditures consist of defence and interest payment. In the post-cold war era, the concept that 'military spending'<sup>13</sup> is a non-developmental expenditure has gone through a major shift. There have been views that although military spending might not fall under the developmental expenditure category of the budget, yet if employed effectively, it can help not only in the economic growth but also in the economic development of the state.

The concept of Military Spending has been explained by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) as:

*...expenditure on the following actors and activities: (a) the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; (b) defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects; (c) paramilitary forces, when judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and (d) military space activities. It includes all current and capital expenditure on: (a) military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; (b) operations and maintenance; (c) procurement; (d) military research and development; and (e) military aid (in the military expenditure of the donor country). **It does not include** civil defence and current expenditure for past military activities, such as for veterans' benefits, demobilization, conversion and weapon destruction.<sup>14</sup>*

The military spending is indicative of a state's threat perception and its intentions of possible aggressive and expansionist policies in the future. Economic growth is the increase in the total amount of production and wealth in an economy. It is the ability to produce a larger total output.<sup>15</sup> Economic growth is a dynamic entity and for the world as a whole, the growth rates were close to zero over most of the

history, but have increased sharply in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>16</sup> Two credible indicators of economic growth are GDP Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross National Product (GNP). GDP is the market value of all final goods and services produced within a country in a given period of time.<sup>17</sup> GNP is the market value of final goods and services (including both consumer and capital), plus incomes earned by the national residents in foreign countries, minus incomes earned locally but accruing to foreigners.<sup>18</sup> A state's GDP and GNP can be increased through different means especially by industrial productivity, agricultural efficiency, enhancement in the services sector, revenue collection or through the collection of the custom duties on imports.

The term economic development is often likely to be confused with the economic growth. While economic growth is related to the *health of the economy*, economic development is related to the *health of the society* and its people. Infant mortality rates, access to educational services, quality of life of its people, law and order situation, and other such indicators are used to measure the economic development of the state. It will be assessed whether military spending may increase the economic growth of a state, but its impact on the economic development of the state can rarely be questioned.

The discussion on beneficial and detrimental effects of the military spending and its relation to economic growth necessitates an inquiry into the primary incentives and motivations for huge military spending. For the conflict ridden developing states, the primary objective remains 'security'<sup>19</sup> against internal and/or external; actual and/or perceived threats.<sup>20</sup> The quest for national security appears to represent both means and ends of the state's policies. In social sciences' academic circles, security studies may be defined as the "study of threat, use and control of military forces ... in order to prepare for, prevent and engage in the war."<sup>21</sup> Stephan Walt has highlighted three phenomena along with three objectives. First is the threat of the use of military force; second is the actual use of military force, and third is the control of the military force being used. Considering the ways



and means to counter the threat or use of force, the objectives have been delineated as: first, 'to prepare for the war' in the peacetime. Second, 'to prevent' the incidents of war through measures short of war – including deterrence which is defined by *US Department of Defense* as "the prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits."<sup>22</sup> Third, 'to engage in war:' if war could not be prevented, then it must be fought with the objective to achieve victory over the belligerents.

Sophisticated strategic technologies have been declared as "forbidden fruit"<sup>23</sup> for the developing states, because the advanced states only wish to sell their "end-products" and preserve the right to develop their technological base. This so-called *ban* has proved to be a big hurdle in the progress of these developing states like India and Pakistan which have been trying – since long – to develop their own strategic industrial base so as to ensure the supply of minimum defence equipment in case of any foreign misadventure.

Another related question to the debate: whether it is military spending that promotes economic growth, or it is economic growth that leads to the increase in the military budgets in order to strengthen any state's position in the military sphere (after being established it, in the economic sphere).<sup>24</sup> Emile Benoit studying forty-four Less Developed Countries (LDCs) in different overlapping periods (addressed this question as) "higher defence expenditure was more likely the cause rather than the effect of the economic growth."<sup>25</sup> He concluded that the "direct interaction ... seems to run primarily from defence burdens to growth, rather than the vice versa."<sup>26</sup> Defence spending may affect the economic growth of a state, but opposite is also possible. For example, "a country with a high economic growth rate may be willing to strengthen its armed forces through increased defence expenditures."<sup>27</sup>

## **Military Spending and Economic Growth: A Debate**

The causal relation (positive or negative) between the military spending and economic growth was seriously debated during the last quarter of twentieth century. It resulted in the emergence of the third school of thought which believes that ‘there exists no causal relationship between the two’. Military spending affects economic growth of a state in two ways: demand-side effects and supply-side effects.<sup>28</sup> The demand-side effect implies that defence expenditure increases the aggregate demand. While supply-side effects are of two types: Direct effects, which are mostly negative in nature (i.e. crowding out of the investment and the capital from the civilian economic activities), and indirect effects about which a controversy exists (whether these are positive or negative). Indirect effects are mainly of four types: training effects, infrastructural effects, consumable effects, and security effects.<sup>29</sup> Ron Mathews pointed out four areas of economic growth affected by defence expenditure either positively or negatively: “modernisation, capital accumulation, export performance, and technological innovation.”<sup>30</sup>

## **Military Spending and Economic Growth: Supporting Arguments**

Conservative commentators on military strategy, including Winter argue that a viable approach to national security is to maintain an adequately sized, trained, and equipped force that is capable of dissuading, deterring, and – if necessary – defeating a diverse set of future adversaries.<sup>31</sup> According to this view, if military security is compromised then all other economic, developmental and monetary gains appear vulnerable. Moreover, in addition to conservatives, certain cosmopolitan thinkers also posit that for the resource unconstrained states, because of their other positive aspects (education, linkage with industry, etc.), defence spending may play an important role in increasing growth.<sup>32</sup> Benoit employed simple regression analysis to trace the impact of defence burden (the ratio of defence expenditure to GDP) on the growth rate of the civilian GDP and said that the military

spending affects GDP positively.<sup>33</sup> It has been argued that: first, there are incentives to develop military and related ancillary industries because considering the skill, development or the training effects, the military imbues LDC workers with modern workforce discipline, skills, and attitudes. The training which is being given by the defence sector, not only to the uniformed but also to the civilians, enhances the level of skilled labour of a state. Even after the retirement from the defence sector, they are likely to contribute to the civilian economic uplift. This impact is especially significant in the developing countries, where the civilian technical training institutions are either weak, or insufficient to impart vocational training to the aspirants. Heightened levels of literacy, social and economic development and vocational training through the military's educational institutions have been the areas that experience the multiplier effect through capitalizing on the already developed defence industry.

Second, amelioration of the infrastructure and the related consumption effects through which the military spending may indirectly contribute to economic uplift of the states by the development of the public infrastructure such as roads, bridges, railway lines, airports, canals, dams, and other engineering projects which have alternative civilian usage. These projects are especially helpful in the less populated and remote areas where civilian governments have less resources and incentive to invest in (especially in the LDCs).

Third, considering the inflationary stimuli, defence spending may have the potential to lead to a controlled gentle level of inflation, promoting higher utilisation of existing productive capacity.<sup>34</sup> Fourth are the security effects. Ironically, one of the biggest problems for the developing states is the maintenance of the law and order domestically and protection from abroad. In the initial stages, well-trained armies may provide a helping hand to the civil security organizations, as is often the case in states including Pakistan. Besides these four areas, technologically advanced militaries may have the potential to act as actors in assigning a higher

position to the states in the hierarchical international system, thus providing them with more political leverage in the political arena. In the LDCs, the advancement in the military technology is also often used by the political leadership to enhance their standings in the domestic politics. Providing quality health services to both uniformed and non-uniformed personnel in the LDCs, is one area where military excels and helps in the social development of the states, thus enhancing the services sector of the economy.

Military spending is considered to stimulate demand and thus results in more employment opportunities especially in the less developed countries. Hence, Military Keynesian's argue that in view of unemployment in an economy, higher military spending add to aggregate demand resulting in greater national output. However, in a full employment economy, higher military spending may be inflammatory or could be associated with balance of payment problems.<sup>35</sup> Scholars associated with Military Keynesian Hypothesis (MKH) argue that defence expenditure is a part of overall budgetary outlay and the government has considerable discretionary control over it, therefore defence expenditure has not only positive effects on economic growth but could also be used to stabilize the economy as a fiscal instrument.<sup>36</sup> On the basis of MKH, Looney opined that Pakistan's defence expenditure works as a stabilization tool, especially during the periods of relative peace with India.<sup>37</sup>

Defence industry is earning trillions of dollars annually in the world. Development of the industrial sector of the LDCs is one area where military spending may have positive impact. The defence industry earns the states billions of dollars through selling arms and other related equipment. Besides, Research and Development (R&D) section of these industries benefits the civilian industrial sector both technologically and in the development of the skilled manpower for the states.

In the resource scarce states like Pakistan, nuclear reactors – if managed properly – can help give a boost to the economic uplift of the state through the uninterrupted supply of the

energy. After establishing a nuclear threshold in the military sector, these nuclear reactors might be used for the economic uplift of the states.

### **Military Spending and Economic Growth: Opposing Arguments**

Many analysts, such as, Saadet Deger and Ron Smith argue that military expenditure in less developed countries has a minimal positive effect on growth through modernization effects<sup>38</sup>, but the net effects on the growth rate remains negative. Deger and Sen pointing to the causal relationship between military spending and economic growth further claim that economic ‘spin-off’ from defence to development is weak.<sup>39</sup> On the other hand, Emile Benoit while pointing to the positive effects of the military spending upon economic growth in LDCs, also noted certain negative effects, however, he concluded that the positive effects outweigh the negative effects. He categorized these negative impacts in three areas, first, income shift, implying rising military-outlays reduces the civilian domestic product. Second, productivity effect: the public defence sector is characterized by slower increases in efficiency when compared with the private civilian sector. Third, investment effect, which is based on the argument that military expenditure ‘crowds out’ civilian sector.<sup>40</sup>


Fredericksen and Looney while distinguishing the resource-rich and resource-constrained countries state that defence expenditure may be helpful for states that are industrially advanced, however for states with developing industries, it is more likely to siphon funds away from more productive domestic investments with a subsequent detrimental effect on growth.<sup>41</sup> Leontief and Duchin extending the arguments further claim that virtually all the economies are able to increase total output and per capita consumption as they progressively reduce their military spending.<sup>42</sup> Similar views are held by David Lim, who after conducting an empirical study noted that defence spending was detrimental to the economic growth.<sup>43</sup>

Following are the main negative effects of the military spending upon economic growth of the states being pointed out by different authors: crowding out of the investment from the civilian sector; military's "absorption of the scientists, engineers, designers and other skilled labour, thus depriving the dynamic civilian export oriented industries; capital in the form of land is also diverted away from the civilian sector."<sup>44</sup> Simultaneously, a significant section of scholars argue that there exist, no correlation between military spending and economic growth. Biswas and Ram noted "Military expenditures neither help nor hurt economic growth in the LDCs to any significant extent."<sup>45</sup> Scholars belonging to this category believe that one can observe a positive or negative relationship by focusing on certain time periods, limiting the sample to countries with certain characteristics, or adopting certain types of specification alternatives, while overall causal relation between the two variables does not exist.

### **Pakistan: Trends in Military Spending**

Since independence, Pakistan has faced problems of its economic as well as strategic survival, because of the external threats and the internal disturbances aggravated by the poor and *ad-hoc* policies of the state and *much-hyped* foreign interventions. India and Pakistan are considered as two of the 'nine pivotal states' in the developing world.<sup>46</sup> India, which is aspiring for the international activism, is developing its arms industry vigorously, which in turn, creates serious security predicaments in Pakistan.<sup>47</sup> Pakistan has been spending more than substantial funds on its domestic and foreign arms procurements. Figure 1 represents the trends in Pakistan's military spending in last two decades. Figure 1 shows that the military spending increased in the first half of the 1990s, from \$2722 million in 1988 to \$3666 million in 1995, a 34.68 % increase, despite the fact that its economy was in doldrums because of the poor performance of the government and many layers of military and economic sanctions being imposed on Pakistan, due to its pursuance of a nuclear program.<sup>48</sup> By mid-1990s, through Brown's amendment, sanctions were relaxed resulting in respite to the economic situation of Pakistan. It

coincided with the decrease in the defence spending of Pakistan which was brought down to the level of 1990 i.e. \$2842 million in 2001, a decrease of 22.48 %. During this period, Pakistan continuously managed to strengthen its military, ensuring its traditional security from all sorts of threats.




**Figure 1: Military Spending in Current US Million Dollars: 1988-2013**  
(Source: Data taken from SIPRI Yearbook 2013)

After September 11, 2001 (9/11), majority of the sanctions on Pakistan were waived,<sup>49</sup> which resulted in the opening up of the economic opportunities. Macroeconomic reforms in 2000s coupled with the inflow of money under Coalition Support Fund resulted in the economic recovery of Pakistan.<sup>50</sup> Pakistan privatised state-subsidised utilities e.g. it successfully privatised nationalised banks, broke up the monopoly of Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation, introduced successful reforms in trade and tariff, promotion of higher education, instituted a world-class anti-money laundering law, cracked down on piracy of intellectual property, agricultural and industrial reforms, and quickly resolved investor's disputes.<sup>51</sup> This policy did not display any significant short-term results but in the long-run, Pakistan's economy started showing some signs of improvement. Figure shows that its military spending has also seen a gradual increase culminating

in \$7641 million in 2013 – an increase of 168.86%. There was a stagnation of the military spending from 2007-2009. It was the time when Pakistan's domestic politics was in turmoil because of the government's confrontation with the judiciary and the United States had initiated the tune of Pakistan's playing a 'double game' in Afghanistan.<sup>52</sup>

The 1990's were a specifically arduous period for Pakistan, because foreign aid was discontinued, and unstable domestic political situation resulted in the near bankruptcy of the state. The situation further aggravated, when Pakistan, in response to Indian nuclear explosions, conducted its nuclear tests.<sup>53</sup>




**Figure 2: Military Spending as Percentage of GDP: 1988-2013**  
(Data Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2013)

It appeared that after attaining the threshold in the nuclear program and establishing credible nuclear deterrence, Pakistan decided to lower its military spending, so as to minimize the economic losses. Figure 2 represents Pakistan's military spending as percentage of the GDP for last two decades. It represents that the military spending as percentage of the GDP dropped down from 6.4% in 1988 to 3.8% in 2000.



From 2000–2006 Pakistan successfully met all the performance criteria negotiated with the IMF<sup>54</sup> and its GDP increased from 2% in 2001 to 7.7% in 2005. The years 2005 to 2008 were again hard for Pakistan as it was facing challenging politico-economic situation at home and extensive international pressure especially from international monetary organizations. Figure 2 shows that the military spending as percentage of GDP continued to drop down from 4% in 2001 to 2.8% in 2010, and again bouncing back to 3% in 2013.

Figure 3 represents one of the most important trends in this context. It shows that the military spending as percentage of overall government spending decreased from 29 % in 1994 to 22.1 % in 2000.



**Figure 3: Military Spending as Percentage of Government Spending: 1993-2001 (Data Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2013)**

Military spending as percentage of government spending increased for a short period of time to 27.4% in 2004, and again dipping down to 17.2% in 2008. From the period of 2008 to 2013, it remained almost stagnant and its current level is 16.2% in 2013.

## **Indirect Contributions of Military in Pakistan's Economy**

Analysts opine that the security studies in Pakistan have been based upon historical-realistic approach.<sup>55</sup> This realistic approach – coupled with the ‘insecurity syndrome’<sup>56</sup> in Pakistan which was accentuated by the 1971 Pak-India war and the dismemberment of Pakistan – resulted in the strengthening the armed forces thus ensuring its security in the anarchic international system. The indirect impacts of military spending remain significant: evidence suggests that military spending is draining the civilian economy, but at the same time, it is the only institution in Pakistan which has employed the largest manpower in the country.<sup>57</sup> It also helps the civilian sector in the form of improved infrastructure (roads, communication links, bridges, airports) and social sector including hospitals, schools, colleges, universities. Owing to the substantial allocation of resources, the institutions run by military have appeared more efficient in the country. The most remote areas of the country e.g. tribal areas, northern areas, and parts of Balochistan are the ones which usually enjoy greater benefits because of the military's developmental activities.<sup>58</sup> Armed forces personnel undergo different necessary trainings (e.g. medical, technical etc) along-side military training. Military also provides them incentives to pursue higher education (not only to them but also to their children). When they retire from the service, they go back to the far-off areas of the country and help build their societies on the modernised lines. In Pakistan, 63% of the population resides in the villages<sup>59</sup> and when these retired army personnel go back to their villages, they usually open schools, local technical training workshops, medical dispensaries or other such activities, thus helping in the social uplift of the rural society.

Militaries in the developing states have the greatest stakes in the survival of the states and have gradually emerged as actors in state governance and politics and are more likely to act as a uniting or integrating agent, especially in the heterogeneous societies, such as Pakistani society, which is

struggling with ethnic differences. Military-related institutions in Pakistan, including Fauji Foundation, Shaheen Foundation, Bahria Foundation, Army Welfare Trust have employed civilians in addition to the retired military personnel and are also engaged in social uplift programmes including establishment of educational institution, health facilities etc., thus helping Pakistan in its economic development. They have invested in cement and fertilizer industries, construction works, electronics and electrical industries, etc. These industries are meeting the needs of the civilian economy, thus reducing the import burden by making Pakistan self-reliant and saving foreign exchange. Dr Ayesha Siddiqua in her *Military Inc.* has criticised the role of military, especially the organisations established for the retired military personnel, in the business and economy of Pakistan.<sup>60</sup> The MILBUS hypothesis has received criticism – both positive and negative. This paper entitled the view that there is nothing wrong in military's intervention in the civilian business avenues – as far as rules of games are clearly defined and military institutions or their subsidiaries do not establish their monopoly in the said business – rather it should be appreciated and encouraged. But at the same time, military's role in the civilian economy should be institutionalised, so as to avoid monopolistic tendency, and to encourage healthy competition in the civilian economy.

### **Pakistan's Defence Industry: Direct Contribution in Economic Growth**

The strategic environment of the Southern Asia indicates that Pakistan is unlikely to reduce its military expenditure in the near future. Therefore, it seems appropriate to utilise Pakistan's existing military expenditure in the more productive and useful manner for the economic growth of the state. Steps can be taken to make the military as a whole, or as a first step military industry self-sufficient i.e. military industry to generate the revenue to be self-sustaining. Military industries are globally generating trillions of dollars per-annum. There have been propositions since Pakistan's independence to indigenise the defence industry. Indigenous

defence production and R&D will require the nation to develop the capacity to conduct research and produce the armament reasonably sufficient for catering the nation's military needs. The rationale behind such a strategy is the saving of the foreign exchange, technical independence, earning through sales, and thus the provision of substantial benefits to the civilian sector.<sup>61</sup>

Pakistan has faced challenges of maintaining its strategic as well as economic and natural resources. At the time of independence, there were sixteen operational ordnance factories on Indian soil, and none on the Pakistani side. Therefore, at the time of independence, Pakistan lacked the necessary machinery to start the building of its own ordnance factory. Its share of the ordnance factories was denied and instead was given a meagre sum of six crore rupees, which was insufficient to sustain the cost of even one factory, in January 1948.<sup>62</sup> In order to deal with the challenge, Pakistan had to either develop the military industry at home or import the necessary defence material from abroad. It adopted the two policies, simultaneously. Pakistan's first Prime Minister issued a special directive in early 1948 for the establishment of Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) in 1951<sup>63</sup> for self-reliance in defence production (at least for the small arms level). Pakistan also signed defence agreements during 1950s with the US to ensure the supply of advanced weaponry to its forces.<sup>64</sup> The supply of weapons continued till 1965 Indo-Pak War, when sanctions were imposed on both India and Pakistan. Pakistan faced a dilemma that it was dependant on the West for the supply of its arms, but India had adopted a multilateral approach and was also getting arms from Soviet Union. The 1971 war between India and Pakistan confirmed Pakistan's fears and it initiated a program of relatively greater self-reliance. In 1972, it established Defence Production Division to lay-down policy, formulate plans, coordinate between procurement and developmental activities, and to accelerate the pace of technological development to achieve greater self-reliance through indigenization.<sup>65</sup>

The Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT) was established in September 1971 to manufacture rebuild, upgrade, and develop tanks, tank guns and armoured personal carries.<sup>66</sup> In the following years, Pakistan established Pakistan Aeronautical Complex at Kamra, north of Islamabad. These facilities are being used to assemble and overhaul Chinese F-6s and French Mirages; produced the Mushshak and K-8 Karakoram trainer aircrafts, maintained and produced radar and avionics equipment, and recently produced JF-17 in collaboration with China.<sup>67</sup> It established a Heavy Forge Foundry in 1978 and a Heavy Rebuild Factory in 1979, besides modernising POF Wah.

Pakistan established Defence Export Promotion Organization (DEPO) in 2001, to promote exports associated with defence industry and to facilitate foreign inquiries related to defence products associated with Land, Naval and Air Forces, along with other Security Agencies.<sup>68</sup> Since 2001, it has been working efficiently to promote the defence products of Pakistan, abroad. To strengthen its defence production facilities, it re-designed Defence Production Division into Ministry of Defence Production in 2004, which was responsible for promoting and coordinating the procurement and the production of defence related equipment, and the export of the surplus goods to friendly and regional countries.<sup>69</sup> The modernization of the indigenous military build-up infrastructure entailed the launching of the International Defence Exhibition and Seminar (IDEAS) in 2000 – an event organised biennially. The IDEAS gradually became very popular. For instance, the IDEAS 2014 attracted 256 exhibitors and 88 foreign delegations from 50 countries, up from 65 exhibitors from 15 countries, and 285 delegations from 42 countries in 2000.<sup>70</sup> It has been a success story and resulted in the promotion of Pakistan's defence exports especially to the developing and under developed states of Asia and Africa.


Pakistan's defence industry has delivered the equipment worth \$6.3 billion in 2009, and it was expected to reach \$10.4 billion by 2015.<sup>71</sup> Most of the goods have been produced to

cater for the domestic needs of the armed forces. Learning from the past, Pakistan has been pursuing a policy for attaining self-reliance in its defence production. Since 2002, it has launched a program to enhance the existing capacity of the defence production facilities so as to give a boost to the defence exports.<sup>72</sup> As a result, the country's defence exports have tripled to around \$300 million in 2012,<sup>73</sup> from \$100 million in 2006 and \$40 Million in 2000, an increase of 650%. Pakistan's defence products are in service in over 30 countries with an ever-expanding galaxy of satisfied customers.<sup>74</sup> The destinations include countries in Asia and the Far East, Africa and the Middle East, North America, the Central Asian States and Europe.<sup>75</sup> Pakistan has been exporting small arms and ammunition to these states, besides having some smaller deals for heavy products. It is looking forward to get major deals for Al-Khalid (tank), Al-Zarrar (tank), K-8 trainer (aircraft), JF-17 Thunder,<sup>76</sup> armoured vehicles, and indigenously built UAVs. Pakistan's defence industry has remained mostly the domain of public sector. But with the technological revolution of 1990s, and prudent policies of 2000s, several private enterprises have ventured in the field.<sup>77</sup> In 2006, the government has "given go-ahead signal to Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) to undertake greater collaboration with the private sector for manufacturing additional arms and ammunition for export."<sup>78</sup> POF and other public defence industries have launched several joint ventures with different private enterprises both domestic and abroad.

Information age wars require better access to the advanced technology and world's electronic infrastructure.<sup>79</sup> Despite these developments, Pakistan is lagging behind in the Research and Development (R & D) sector. It has been dependent upon the foreign sources for access to modern defence related technologies. Since 2000, Pakistan has introduced extensive infrastructural changes in the higher education resulting in increased output in the research sector<sup>80</sup> and the number of PhDs reached to 8142 in 2012.<sup>81</sup> Intellectual output aside, Pakistan is still lagging behind in the university-industry linkage. If dealt efficiently, this area may

have tremendous positive impacts on the qualitative industrial output in Pakistan – both in the civilian and military setups. Pakistan has been developing *smart arms and ammunition*. The difference between “smart arms” and “traditional arms” is immense: former means the arms fitted with the latest technological tools. The most advanced laser-guided technology, GPS system, and other such systems are the buzzwords for the smart arms industry. There has been a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and Pakistan is also trying to get maximum benefits of it, but its pace can be accelerated by enhancing the capability and effectively utilising the existing capacity of its R&D sector.<sup>82</sup>

The domestic military industry’s contribution to the economic growth of the states may also take some other forms, such as, the intellectual capital, a major cause of worry when it flees to foreign shores, will become ‘captive’ within the country.<sup>83</sup> The issue of unemployment in Pakistan can be dealt with by increased industrialisation. Figure 4 shows a Gallup Survey in 2011, which found out that 19% of Pakistani nationals, wish to permanently settle abroad. In June 2008, this percentage was 6%.<sup>84</sup> In 2013, it was reported that 2.7 Million Pakistanis exited the country in last five years.<sup>85</sup> Military industry is credited with having lucrative pay-scales, job security, with the chance of having advanced tools at hand to conduct the research and development work. So, there is no surprise that it not only restricts the brain-drain, but also reverses the process and attracts Pakistanis living abroad to serve the state.



**Figure 4: Pakistanis Willing to Move Abroad Permanently (Source: Gallup 2011)**

Second, imported arms have served as leverage in the hands of the foreign governments to squeeze Pakistan to accept their demands, especially at times when those arms are needed the most. Pakistan has remained under Western sanctions for a large part of its history. These sanctions, especially those of 1990s, proved to be a blessing in disguise and Pakistan vigorously pursued a policy of self-reliance, thus reducing its partial dependence on the imported arms.

Third, the related benefit of strong defence industrial base is the national prestige. The anarchical nature of the international system demands a country to be militarily as well economically strong, and pursuance of a strong defence industry serves both purposes. David Isenberg pointed out that through defence exports, “Pakistan is trying to strengthen its industrial base and bolster its standing as a regional power.”<sup>86</sup>

Fourth, through launching joint ventures with other states in the defence industrial sector, Pakistan is promoting its standing in the international community as a *new and responsible player in the old game*.<sup>87</sup>



## **Conclusion**

The overall increase in the defence budget of South Asian States, since 1990, may be attributed to the changed security perceptions in the post-Cold War era, with the defence budgets of Pakistan and India increasing manifolds.<sup>88</sup> However, India's defence modernisation programme appears to be more advanced compared to Pakistan,<sup>89</sup> coupled with the visits by the heads of five major powers to India in a short span of two months in 2010.<sup>90</sup> Despite these developments, Pakistan's military spending remains low compared to other states in the region.<sup>91</sup> Given the poor socio-economic state of Pakistan, many analysts have demanded further decrease in its defence expenditure to spare the funds for the developmental sphere. If agreed, it is likely to be a unilateral moratorium on the military spending.<sup>92</sup> Considering existing strategic and economic compulsions, a workable option is to capitalise on the existing military spending and steps be taken to make it beneficial for the economic growth of the state. Developing states can maintain the higher military spending along-with an appreciable economic growth rate, by pursuing a policy of military to cater for its own needs.

Pakistan defence industry's self reliance certainly gradually increases its efficiency and capacity to provide the revenue for the military as a whole. To pursue this objective, it seems imperative that the parliament should legislate that while formulating the acquisition plans, Pakistan focuses not only on the import of the equipment but also of the related technology. It would qualitatively and quantitatively improve the technological base of the industries in Pakistan. An example of such an approach can be the development of totally indigenous submarine in Pakistan.<sup>93</sup> The most important benefit of the indigenous defence industry is the availability of the required equipment to the armed forces to face the exigencies, even if the foreign supplies are impeded. Pakistan can benefit by focussing the development of the Potential Defence Capacity (PDC),<sup>94</sup> which will not only be used for strengthening the country's defence but also help in its economic growth.

Existing military spending needs to be efficiently utilized. Excesses like wasteful imports of luxury cars or other luxury items for the senior officers should be minimised, besides increasing the efficiency by curbing corruption especially in the military procurements. Resources may be raised by minimizing the monetary benefits for high-ranking officers, and avoiding wastage in the communication in inter- and intra-services setup because of the less-developed C4Is. Certain steps by General Musharraf's government in order to address this issue were commendable. Shireen Mazari noted in 2002 that: "Theoretically there should be total cooperation between the three services in terms of doctrine and induction of new weapons systems, with the existence of the Joint Chief of Staff Committee (JCSC) ... but the reality is different ... even at the level of R&D, each service seems to be 'going-it-alone'."<sup>95</sup> It resulted in not only the wastage of time and space, but also the resources. Operations may be characterized by the 'true jointness' and inter-service rivalries that lead to final excesses and turf wars should be eliminated.<sup>96</sup> Private enterprises should be brought in, especially in the non-strategic avenues to enhance the capacity and efficiency, to have a target oriented approach, and to spare the resources to be used in strategic avenues.

These aforementioned resources can be used for the promotion of the economic growth of the state, through conversions in industries and development of ancillary industries. The focus of the policies should be in this direction e.g. POF Wah consists of some fourteen industries and three subsidiaries, out of which certain industries like Tungsten Alloy Factory, Tungston Carbide Factory, Steel Foundry, Brass Mills, Garments Factory, Wah Nobel, Wah Hi-Tech Plastics<sup>97</sup> have dual use, and can be wholly or partially privatised without any security predicaments – for instance, if Garments Factory is totally privatised, it will not endanger the security or the supply of the important commodity, rather it will enhance its efficiency. Moreover, Pakistan has been promoting its defence equipment through IDEAS and at other international defence exhibitions. Though it appears to be a step in the right direction, however, its pace may be increased

and vigorous marketing strategies can be pursued by taking help from the specialised private sector in this regard.

Pakistan is spending nearly 3% of its GDP on defence; it follows that 97% may be more efficiently utilized by reducing the wastage of the resources, enhancing skills and accountability at all levels.<sup>98</sup> The 3% may also be used for the promotion of the economy, primarily through conversions. Maintaining advanced military is expansive while war may be more expensive than ensuring the defence capability of the state,<sup>99</sup> hence for a state similar to Pakistan that has already invested greatly in defence infrastructure, defence spending may provide the bases for rational industrial planning through innovation, providing security and protection to the state, and creating options for the economic uplift.

### Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Jasjit Singh, 'Reducing Defence Expenditure: Issues and Challenges for South Asian Countries', in *Defence Expenditure in South Asia: An Overview*, ed. Jasjit Singh and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, RCSS Policy Studies 10 (Colombo: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 2000). While this also must be kept in mind that the security policies of South Asian states affect the security of many countries around the world.

<sup>2</sup> "India has either played the nosey big brother or it has completely ignored its neighbours. During the heady days of Indira Gandhi's intimidating foreign policy, the country has split the old Pakistan into two, trained Tamil insurgents to (try to) split Sri Lanka too, if need be, played along with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, meddled in Nepal, "influenced" Bhutan and, by and large, wreaked havoc in the neighbourhood". Rajesh Ramachandran, 'Narendra Modi Wants a Larger Role for India in South Asian Neighbourhood', *The Economic Times*, 30 June 2014. Also see J. Jegannathan, *Alternative Regional Strategy for India: Exploring Soft Power Options*, IPCS Issue Brief (Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, January 2012).

<sup>3</sup> Saeed Shafqat, "Islamic world and South Asia: Rise of Islamism and Terror, Causes and Consequences?" in Dr. Kaniz F.Yusuf, ed. *Unipolar World & The Muslim States* (Islamabad: Pakistan Forum, 2004) pp 217-246.

<sup>4</sup> Stephen Philip Cohen, "India, Pakistan and Kashmir," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2, December 2002, p. 34.

<sup>5</sup> Considering another perspective of security i.e., human security, South Asia houses twenty three percent of the world's poorest people, and has the largest number of people living below poverty line in absolute terms. Even

then not a single state of the region is in a position – nor willing – to decrease its defence expenditure because of the threat perceptions and the domestic political pressure. It is of primary importance to assess the impacts of high military spending and the possibilities of transforming the military industrial complex in order to raise the level of economic growth of the developing states. Ejaz Ghani, *The South Asian Paradox*, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (World Bank, 25 October 2012).

<sup>6</sup> The global war on terrorism has inflicted more than 100 billion US dollars losses on Pakistani economy and also completely hindered the foreign direct investment Pakistan.

<sup>7</sup> S.T. Jackson, M. Grinbaum, “The Indian arms-production and military services industry,” *SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 239. It was reported that in fiscal year 2012-13 India spent 97.9 billion rupees (\$1.8 billion), 5.2 per cent of its military budget, on military Research and Development. This is to be increased to 106 billion rupees for fiscal year 2013-2014. “Budgets and accounts” *Department of Defense* (Ministry of Defence, Government of India: November 21, 2013), <http://www.mod.nic.in/forms/Mainlinks.aspx?lid=1584&Id=56>, accessed on January 25, 2015.

<sup>8</sup> Sam Perlo-Freeman, ‘Military Expenditure’, in *SIPRI Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Oxford University Press, 2013).

<sup>9</sup> Editorial, ‘A Check on Arms Trade’, *Dawn*, 28 October 2006.

<sup>10</sup> David K. H. Begg, Stanley Fischer, and Rudiger Dornbusch, *Economics*, 4th ed. (London: McGraw-Hill, 1994), 32.

<sup>11</sup> Dipankar Banerjee, ‘Preface’, in *Defence Expenditure in South Asia: An Overview*, ed. Jasjit Singh and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, RCSS Policy Studies 10 (Colombo: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 2000).

<sup>12</sup> Damodar Das Khanna and P. N. Mehrotra, *Defence Versus Development: A Case Study of India* (Indus Publishing Company, 1993), 95.

<sup>13</sup> Distinguishing the terms military spending, defence spending, military expenditure, defence expenditure, and defence budget do not fall under the scope of this paper, thus the terms are often used interchangeably. At times it happens in certain states that military budgets don’t really represent the military spending. It is because of the fact that (in such states) certain military acquisition programs are funded through extra-budgetary resources. So the use of the term ‘defence budget’ will be minimized so as to avoid the confusion.

<sup>14</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, ‘Monitoring Military Expenditures’, Page, accessed 6 August 2014, <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/measuring-military-expenditures>.

<sup>15</sup> Campbell R. McConnell and Stanley L. Brue, *Microeconomics: Principles, Problems, and Policies*, 13th ed. (McGraw-Hill, 1996), 29. A

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somewhat similar definition of Economic Growth can be ‘an increase in the total output of a nation over time’, Larry Weiser and Lynn Kirby, ‘Glossary of Economic Terms and Concepts’, Wisconsin Council on Economic Education, *Economics Wisconsin*, accessed 6 August 2014, <http://www.economicswisconsin.org/guide/glossary.htm>.

<sup>16</sup> Charles Irving Jones, *Introduction To Economic Growth*, 2nd ed. (W.W. Norton & Company, 2002), 11.

<sup>17</sup> N. Gregory Mankiw, *Principles of Economics* (Cengage Learning, 2014), 486.

<sup>18</sup> D. N. Dwivedi, *Macroeconomics: Theory and Policy*, 3rd ed. (Tata McGraw-Hill, 2010), 57.

<sup>19</sup> Scholars like Barry Buzan have demarcated five sectors which fall under the heading of ‘security’ namely; “military, environmental, economic, societal and political”. Buzan, and *et.al.* noted: “Security is defined to involve perceived threats to the survival of some highly valued referent object. The objects of such threats can be varied, including not only territorial states but also non-state actors (e.g., nations, tribes, classes), sets of abstract principles (e.g., the rules of the liberal international economic order) or even nature itself (e.g., the global environment). Similarly, threats can arise from any source, including aggressive states, unfavourable social trends (e.g., rapid population growth) or cultural imperialism (e.g., Westernisation). Existential threats can manifest themselves across a number of different policy contexts or ‘sectors,’ including economic, environmental, cultural and the more traditional political and military spheres ... preservation of the political system, economic and political well-being of all societies of the people, as well as external security that encompasses military, economic, food, energy, environment and political dimensions”. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 2–25. Also see C. Maxwell Stanley, ‘New Definition for National Security’, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 37, no. 3 (March 1981): 1. Caroline Thomas notes that “Security in the Third World countries now encompasses the “internal security of the state through the nation-building, the search for secure systems of food, health, money and trade.” Caroline Thomas, *In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987).

<sup>20</sup> “Threat is an inherent geo-political environmental condition for which the price and penalty will have to be paid by the target state if it fails to build its own effective warding-off mechanism. Environmental conditions (threats), domestic or international, are inherently dynamic and not static.” The theoretical debate on the threat perception in the case of Indo-Pak is discussed by Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, *Pakistan’s Defense Policy, 1947-58* (St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 67–99.

<sup>21</sup> Stephen M. Walt, ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 12–13.

- <sup>22</sup> US Department of Defense, DOD, 'Deterrence', *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (US Department of Defense, 16 July 2014).
- <sup>23</sup> Khalid Mehmud, 'Governance and National Security: Pakistan-A Case Study', in *Security Studies in South Asia: Change and Challenges*, ed. Dipankar Banerjee (Manohar Publishers, 2000), 131.
- <sup>24</sup> Steve Chan raised this question as, "whether economic prosperity produces increased defence outlays or whether increased defence outlays leads to economic prosperity". Steve Chan, 'The Impact of Defense Spending on Economic Performance: A Survey of Evidence and Problems', *Orbis* 29, no. 2 (Summer 1985): 411.
- <sup>25</sup> Émile Benoit, *Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries* (Lexington Books, 1973).
- <sup>26</sup> Émile Benoit, 'Growth and Defense in Developing Countries', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 26, no. 2 (January 1978): 275.
- <sup>27</sup> Abdur R. Chowdhury, 'A Causal Analysis of Defense Spending and Economic Growth', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, no. 1 (March 1991): 83. China has been developing its economy since long, while keeping a low profile in the military activities. After achieving a stable economic growth rate, it is now strengthening its military muscle.
- <sup>28</sup> Khanna and Mehrotra, *Defence Versus Development*, 35–36.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>30</sup> Ron Matthews, *Defence Production in India* (ABC Pub. House, 1989), 27–29.
- <sup>31</sup> Donald C. Winter, *Adapting to the Threat Dynamics of the 21st Century*, Background Paper, National Security and Defense (The Heritage Foundation, 15 September 2011). <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/09/adapting-to-the-threat-dynamics-of-the-21st-century>
- <sup>32</sup> Peter C. Frederiksen and Robert E. Looney, 'Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth in Developing Countries', *Armed Forces & Society* 9, no. 4 (1983): 643. Other authors supporting the beneficial aspects of military spending include Gavin Kennedy, who stated that military's "disaster rehabilitation, mapping, surveying, geological and meteorological Research & Development have civilian spin-offs". Kennedy, *The Military in the Third World* (Scribner, 1974)., Kennedy, *Defense Economics* (Duckworth, 1983). Mary Kaldor found a positive correlation between military spending and industrialisation., Kaldor, 'The Military in Development', *World Development* 4, no. 6 (1976): 459–482. See also David K. Whynes, *The Economics of Third World Military Expenditure* (Macmillan, 1979).
- <sup>33</sup> Benoit, 'Growth and Defense in Developing Countries', 277. See also Benoit, *Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries*.
- <sup>34</sup> Khanna and Mehrotra, *Defence Versus Development*, 28.
- <sup>35</sup> Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, *The Economics of Defense* (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 256.

<sup>36</sup> R. E. Looney, 'Defense Expenditures and Macroeconomic Stabilization in Pakistan: A Test of the Military Keynesianism Hypothesis', *RISEC* 45, no. 1 (1998): 599–613. Also see Robert E. Looney, 'Excessive Defense Expenditures and Economic Stabilization: The Case of Pakistan', *Journal of Policy Modeling* 19, no. 4 (1997): 381–406. Mahmoodul Hasan Khan, *Defence Expenditure and Macroeconomic Stabilization: Causality Evidence from Pakistan*, SBP Working Paper Series (State Bank of Pakistan, December 2004).

<sup>37</sup> Looney, 'Defense Expenditures and Macroeconomic Stabilization in Pakistan', 610.

<sup>38</sup> Saadet Deger and Ron Smith, 'Military Expenditure and Growth in Less Developed Countries', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27, no. 2 (1983): 351–52.

<sup>39</sup> Saadet Deger and Somnath Sen, 'Military Expenditure, Spin-off and Economic Development', *Journal of Development Economics* 13, no. 1 (1983): 67.

<sup>40</sup> Benoit, 'Growth and Defense in Developing Countries'. Also see Benoit, *Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries*.

<sup>41</sup> Frederiksen and Looney, 'Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth in Developing Countries', 643.

<sup>42</sup> Wassily Leontief and Faye Duchin, *Military Spending: Facts and Figures, Worldwide Implications and Future Outlook* (Oxford University Press New York, 1983), 66.

<sup>43</sup> David Lim, 'Another Look at Growth and Defense in Less Developed Countries', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 31, no. 2 (January 1983): 384.

<sup>44</sup> Matthews, *Defence Production in India*, 29.

<sup>45</sup> Basudeb Biswas and Rati Ram, 'Military Expenditures and Economic Growth in Less Developed Countries: An Augmented Model and Further Evidence', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 34, no. 2 (January 1986): 362, 370.

<sup>46</sup> Pivotal State as "A state (which) is so important regionally that its collapse would spell trans-boundary mayhem: migration, communal violence, pollution, disease and so on. A pivotal state's steady economic progress and stability, on the other hand, would bolster its region's economic vitality and political soundness". Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy, 'Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy', *Foreign Affairs*, February 1996. Robert S. Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy, review of *The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World*, by Philip Zelikow, *Foreign Affairs*, 1 May 2000.

<sup>47</sup> "Pakistan thinks that India has not accepted the partition of British India in good faith". Rasul Bakhsh Rais, 'Post-Cold War Security Studies in Pakistan: Continuity and Change', in *Security Studies in South Asia: Change and Challenges*, ed. Dipankar Banerjee (Manohar Publishers, 2000), 125–26.

<sup>48</sup> Ahmed Faruqui noted, “In 1990’s the economy slowed down to a crawl, as successive civilian regimes outdid each other in the corruption and mismanagement”. Ahmad Faruqui, ‘A Blueprint for Pakistan’s Economic Revival’, *IPRI Journal* 2, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 22.

<sup>49</sup> Alex Wagner, ‘Bush Authorized to Lift Sanctions on Pakistan’, *Arms Control Association*, November 2001, [https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001\\_11/paksancnov01](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_11/paksancnov01).

<sup>50</sup> In 2014, it was reported that “since 9/11, the US has disbursed over \$12 billion on account of CSF to Pakistan.” Tribune Correspondence, ‘Coalition Support Fund: Pakistan to Receive \$380m This Month’, *The Express Tribune*, 10 May 2014.

<sup>51</sup> Ishrat Husain, ‘Economic Reforms in Pakistan: One Step Forward, Two Steps Backwards’, in *Quaid-E-Azam Lecture* (Annual Conference of Pakistan Society for Development Economics, Islamabad, 2012), 12–13. Also see Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, *Background Note: Pakistan*, Country Profile (Washington D.C.: US Department of State, May 2007), <http://www.infoplease.com/country/profiles/pakistan.html>. IBRD-IDA, *Growth in Pakistan*, Macroeconomics & Economic Growth (World Bank, 2005), <http://go.worldbank.org/QTEHWN5Q70>.

<sup>52</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, ‘The Great (Double) Game’, *The New York Times*, 31 July 2010, sec. Opinion, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/01/opinion/01friedman.html>.

Editorial, ‘Wikileaks: Pakistan’s Double Game’, *The New York Times*, 26 July 2010, sec. Opinion,

<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/27/opinion/27tue1.html>. David Millar, ‘Why Pakistan Plays a Double Game’, *Huffington Post*, 11 May 2011, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-millar/why-pakistan-plays-a-doub\\_b\\_860184.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-millar/why-pakistan-plays-a-doub_b_860184.html).

<sup>53</sup> One of the purposes of the nuclear weapons of Pakistan was “to compensate for its conventional military inferiority”. Rais, ‘Post-Cold War Security Studies in Pakistan: Continuity and Change’, 128.

<sup>54</sup> Husain, ‘Economic Reforms in Pakistan: One Step Forward, Two Steps Backwards’.

<sup>55</sup> Shireen M. Mazari, ‘The Development of Defence and Strategic Studies as a Social Science Discipline in Pakistan’, in *The State of Social Sciences in Pakistan*, ed. S.H. Hashmi (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam University Press, 1998), 224.

<sup>56</sup> Mehmud, ‘Governance and National Security: Pakistan-A Case Study’, 132.

<sup>57</sup> Pakistan Army has 617,000 active duty personnel. Editorial, ‘2014 Pakistan Military Strength’, *Global Fire Power*, 2014, [http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country\\_id=pakistan](http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=pakistan).

<sup>58</sup> One such example is the establishment of cadet colleges. The people in LDCs usually prefer the military run educational institutions as compared to the civil administered schools. It is because of the quality education



being imparted by military-run education institutions, and their lower or subsidised tuition fees.

<sup>59</sup> IBRD-IDA, *Pakistan: Rural Population (% of Total Population) Data* (World Bank, 2013), <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS..>

<sup>60</sup> Ayesha Siddiq Agha, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy* (Pluto Press, 2007).

<sup>61</sup> Khanna and Mehrotra, *Defence Versus Development*, 139.

<sup>62</sup> Fazal Muqem Khan, *The Story of the Pakistan Army* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1963), 40.

<sup>63</sup> Muhammad Taufeeq, 'POF: The Force Behind the Forces', *Pakistan Observer*, 6 September 2012. POF MIS, 'History of Pakistan Ordnance Factories', *Pakistan Ordnance Factories*, 2014, <http://www.pof.gov.pk/History.aspx>.

<sup>64</sup> Mahmud Ali, 'The Rise of Pakistan's Army', *BBC News*, 24 December 2003, sec. South Asia.

<sup>65</sup> MODP, 'Ministry of Defence Production: History/Background', *Government of Pakistan*, 2014, <http://www.modp.gov.pk/>.

<sup>66</sup> HIT, 'Heavy Industries Taxila: Background', *Government of Pakistan*, 2014, <http://www.hit.gov.pk/aboutus.html>.

<sup>67</sup> PAC, 'Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Kamra - History', *Government of Pakistan*, 2014, <http://www.pac.org.pk/history>. Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan* (Progressive Publishers, 1987), 205.

<sup>68</sup> Tahir Ashraf Khan, 'D.G's Message: DEPO', *Defence Export Promotion Organisation*, 2012, [http://www.depo.org.pk/contents.php?section\\_id=115](http://www.depo.org.pk/contents.php?section_id=115).

<sup>69</sup> MODP, 'Ministry of Defence Production: History/Background'.

<sup>70</sup> DEPO, 'Overview of IDEAS (International Defence Exhibition and Seminar) 2014', *IDEAS Pakistan*, 2014, [http://ideaspakistan.gov.pk/2014\\_ideas\\_overview.php](http://ideaspakistan.gov.pk/2014_ideas_overview.php).

<sup>71</sup> IDEAS 2012, 'Defence Industry Likely to Reach \$10.4 Billion by 2015', *The News International*, 16 November 2012.

<sup>72</sup> Muhammad Munir, Tamour Khan, and Amna Pervez, *Year Book 2012-2013* (Rawalpindi: Ministry of Defence Production, 2013).

<sup>73</sup> IDEAS 2012, 'Defence Industry Likely to Reach \$10.4 Billion by 2015'.

<sup>74</sup> POF, 'Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) / Havelian Cantt', *Global Security*, 2014, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/pof.htm>. POF MIS, 'Frequently Asked Questions: POF', *Pakistan Ordnance Factories*, 2010, <http://www.pof.gov.pk/faqs.aspx>.

<sup>75</sup> POF MIS, 'Frequently Asked Questions: POF'.

<sup>76</sup> It is reported that Pakistan secured its first contract of JF-17 aircrafts from one of the Asian countries. Air Commodore Khalid Mahmood stated that "A contract has been signed with an Asian country." Greg Waldron, 'PARIS: JF-17 Wins First Export Order', *Flight Global*, 14 June 2015,

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<http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/paris-jf-17-wins-first-export-order-413480/>.

<sup>77</sup> “State and private enterprise should go side-by-side in the defence industry ... but before allowing private enterprise, certain rules should be made, in order to keep a check on the private enterprises that they should follow government policy in the sale of the arms (because of the sensitivity of the industry)”. Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Jamshed Ayaz Khan and Former Additional Secretary Defence Production and Former President Institute of Regional Studies (IRS), Defence Production, interview by Muhammad Nadeem Mirza, Islamabad, 21 November 2006. “Pakistan Ordnance Factories have been opened for joint ventures, joint training and joint Research and Development with private sector. We want to make POF a hub of national industrial activities”. Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Syed Sabahat Hussain, “POF to Be Made Hub of Industrial Activity”, *Dawn*, 10 November 2006.

<sup>78</sup> “Germany and South Korea have agreed to enter into joint ventures with Pakistan for manufacturing ‘smart arms and ammunitions’ by transferring the latest technology to Islamabad...Turkey has also shown keen interest in launching a joint venture”. Ministry of Defence, ‘Co-Production of Arms with Germany, S. Korea Soon’, *Dawn*, 17 November 2006. China has always been a partner of Pakistan in the defence industrial sector.

<sup>79</sup> Bruce D. Berkowitz, *The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century* (New York: The Free Press, 2003), 5–6.

<sup>80</sup> APP, ‘Intellectual Boom: “Pakistan Is Publishing More Research Papers per Capita than India”’, *The Express Tribune*, 17 July 2013.

<sup>81</sup> APP, ‘Total Number of PhDs Reaches 8,142 in Pakistan’, *The News International*, 8 October 2012.

<sup>82</sup> For a detailed history of the concept and the evolution of RMA, see: Theodor W. Galdi, *Revolution in Military Affairs? Competing Concepts, Organizational Responses, Outstanding Issues*, CRS Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service, 1995). Steven Metz and James Kievit, *Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy* (DIANE Publishing, 1995). Dipankar Banerjee, ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’, *Asian Defence Journal*, no. 9 (1997): 17–19. David Jablonsky, ‘US Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs’, *Parameters* 24, no. 3 (1994): 18–36. Steven Metz and James Kievit, *The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War* (DTIC Document, July 1994).

<sup>83</sup> Dhiraj Kukreja, ‘Defense Production: Enter The Private Sector’, *Indian Defence Review* 20, no. 1 (March 2005): 31–32.

<sup>84</sup> Gallup Survey, *Pakistan’s Troubled State* (Abu Dhabi: Gallup Inc., July 2011).

<sup>85</sup> APP, ‘Brain Drain: 2.7m Pakistanis Have Exited Country in Last 5 Years’, *The Express Tribune*, 23 December 2013.

<sup>86</sup> David Isenberg quoted by Roxana Tiron, ‘Pakistan Pushing Military Exports’, *National Defense Magazine*, May 2005.

<sup>87</sup> This is especially important in the current circumstances when Pakistan is being defamed because of the tireless efforts of Modi government, AQ Khan issue, much-hyped double game in Afghanistan, and its presumed providing of the safe havens to the Haqqani's and the sort. In such a state of affairs, it does have some states in the international arena who are ready to support or at least listen to Pakistan's side of the story. So Pakistan is trying to develop some sort of complex interdependence through the effective use of its energies.

<sup>88</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press, 2013). Carl Conetta and Charles W. Bray, *Post-Cold War US Military Expenditure in the Context of World Spending Trends*, Briefing Memo # 10 (Project on Defense Alternatives, January 1997).

<sup>89</sup> Perlo-Freeman, 'Military Expenditure'.

<sup>90</sup> American President Barack Obama and British Prime Minister David Cameron visited India in November 2010, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visited India in December 2010. Christophe Jaffrelot, 'India: More than a Market', *The Caravan Magazine*, 1 January 2011. Rajeev Deshpande, 'Obama Backs India for UN Seat', *The Times of India*, 9 November 2010. Nicholas Watt, 'David Cameron Seeks to Impress India with His Massive Delegation', *The Guardian*, n.d., sec. Politics, accessed 20 August 2014. Ambassador, 'Wen Jiabao Leaves for Visits to India, Pakistan', *Chinese Embassy in India*, 15 December 2010. News, 'Nicolas Sarkozy and Manmohan Singh in Nuclear Deal', *BBC News*, 6 December 2010. Jonathan Marcus, 'Medvedev Seals India Visit Deals', *BBC News*, 21 December 2010.

<sup>91</sup> Mateen Haider, 'Pakistan's Defence Spending Lowest in Region', *Dawn*, 20 May 2014.

<sup>92</sup> Khalid Mehmud has said that the 'asking for a unilateral reduction of the defence expenditure is no less than asking for the moon.' Mehmud, 'Governance and National Security: Pakistan-A Case Study', 134-35.

<sup>93</sup> Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema noted that, "first submarine for Pakistan was made in France, the second in Pakistan with the joint effort of French and Pakistanis, and now the third one is solely indigenous". Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, A Talk about Pakistan's Military Spending, interview by Muhammad Nadeem Mirza, 19 October 2006.

<sup>94</sup> Gavin Kennedy termed the industries such as those of "engineering and metal production especially the following industries; metal production, non-electrical machinery, electrical machinery, ship-building and repairing and finally transportation equipment production industries as Potential Defense Capacity (PDC) of a country". Gavin, *The Military in the Third World*, 296-97.

<sup>95</sup> Shireen M. Mazari, 'Nature of Future Pakistan-India Wars', *Strategic Studies (Islamabad)* 22, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 7-8.

<sup>96</sup> Faruqui, 'A Blueprint for Pakistan's Economic Revival', 33-35.

<sup>97</sup> POF MIS, 'History of Pakistan Ordnance Factories'.

<sup>98</sup> Berkowitz, *The New Face of War*, 5.

<sup>99</sup> Sandler and Hartley, *The Economics of Defense*, 262.