FROM INTERVENTION TO EXIT: AN ANALYSIS OF POST-9/11 US STRATEGIES IN AFGHANISTAN
Keywords:Afghanistan, US Intervention, Use of Force, State-building, Taliban
Following the US exit from Afghanistan, the debate revolves around why US intervention in Afghanistan, the longest and one of the most expensive in its history, has failed in defeating the Taliban and realising a durable state-building. The debate considers endogenous factors that explore US and Taliban strategies and exogenous factors that underline the role of regional and extra-regional actors in determining the outcome of the Afghan conflict. This paper, therefore, focuses on faults and inconsistencies within and across US strategies in Afghanistan, i.e., the use of military force, political settlement, and state-building. It also examines US strategies vis-à-vis conflict in Afghanistan under four US administrations – from Bush to Biden – to ascertain why these strategies proved ineffective. These strategies have been analysed by following the conceptual framework of Game Theory. The paper argues that US strategies for entering Afghanistan were detached from the ground realities, which was the critical factor for its failure to achieve the desired outcome of the conflict.
Shad, Muhammad Riaz, Sajid Iqbal. 2021. "From Intervention to Exit: An Analysis of Post-9/11 US Strategies in Afghanistan." Margalla Papers 25 (2): 23-34.
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