

INDIAN POLITICAL DOCTRINES: UNDERSTANDING INTERNAL SECURITY DYNAMICS OF INDIA IMPACTING PAKISTAN

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Abstract

Strategic culture involves diplomatic ties, geopolitical orientation and political ideology involving the military. India's strategic culture orientates pro-nationalist policies, emphasizing the business progression of a specific class, discriminating in exercising minority rights, and imbalancing diplomatic ties with neighbouring states for regional hegemony. Indian leadership, from Jawaharlal Nehru to Narendra Modi, has kept regional dominance as a primary Indian strategic objective. More importantly, the Indian strategic community has carefully maintained narrative linking insurgencies with its neighbours, especially Pakistan. A cross-sectional analysis of Indian political doctrines explains how internal security challenges of India are shaping its strategic culture and stance towards Pakistan. It includes contextualizing the concept of strategic culture and modelling Indian strategic culture to the scope of research. The impact of Indian strategic culture on Pakistan is multi-dimensional, ranging from combat capabilities to international presence at international forums like the UN and FATF. The research proposes policy options and action points for Pakistan. The paper establishes three fundamental aspects. First, the Indian strategic thoughts are rooted in Kautilyan discourse. Second, linking Pakistan with insurgencies in India. Third, with the rise of Hindutva through the BJP with a conducive geostrategic environment, India has resorted to an offensive-defensive strategy towards Pakistan. With these interpretations, the research paves the way for identifying policy options for Pakistan while considering Pakistan's national interests.

Keywords: Arthshastra, Kautilya, Nehruvianism, Hindutva, Strategic Culture.

Security strategies of nation-states are based on an analysis of their strategic culture. In the era of hybrid warfare, the internal security dynamics of nation-states have a significant bearing on their strategic culture.¹ India has long stood internal security issues driven by diversity, ethnic divides, separatist movements, societal inconsistencies and flawed law and order structure.² In recent years, the rise of Hindutva ideology in India has further widened the existing chasms of mistrust among diverse communities and will have long-term ramifications on India's internal security.³ Gautam Das, in his discourse, argues that India has made significant grand strategic decisions after Cold

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War and enjoys more latitude than ever before to influence the global community.⁴ India has methodically linked internal security, especially insurgency, with Pakistan more impudently. By abrogating Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian constitution, India has also fissured the constitutional bridges holding the states of Kashmir and Ladakh.⁵


With internal and external security closely knitted, India's internal security instability directly affects its security strategies concerning neighbours, especially China and Pakistan.⁶ Therefore, the interplay of India's internal security situation and its strategic culture is an important subject for Pakistan to estimate the Indian course of action in the given environment.⁷ Therefore, understanding the impact of the internal security situation of India on its strategic culture is very important for policy formulation in Pakistan.

The relationship between strategic culture and internal security is an essential dimension for understanding policy formulation. Adding to it, academic and strategic community thought differences create ambiguity in foreseeing Indian strategic culture. The study focuses on India's political doctrines to estimate Indian strategic decisions and prospect choices for Pakistan. This paper also addresses how India's interplay of internal security and strategic culture affects Pakistan. It also invades various dimensions, i.e., how insurgencies have challenged India's internal security and to what extent India's internal security is shaping up its strategic culture. It further offers policy options for Pakistan concerning India's internal security and strategic culture.

Pakistan and Interplay of Indian Strategic Culture

While Indian strategic culture has been studied and modelled in different contexts, such as politics, military developments and economic agreements, there is not much significant work on the relationship between the internal security of India and its strategic culture. The insurgencies within mainland India and disputed territories under Indian control are vital in Indian security calculus. In parallel, since its independence in 1947, India has had an adversarial relationship with Pakistan, mainly over the issue of Kashmir, where India violates UN resolution 47 (~free and impartial plebiscite in Kashmir).⁸ Therefore, the Indian strategic culture and internal security challenges have direct bearings and ramifications for Pakistan.

The analysis focuses on modelling Indian culture as a reference for analysing Indian strategic culture through the Johnston model⁹ to determine its roots. Johnston's model of understanding strategic culture considers strategic culture's nature, character and work.¹⁰ It further analyses contemporary Indian thought to determine the trends and the effect of interplay and strategic culture on Pakistan. The schematic of the analysis framework is as follows:


Figure 1: Schematic – Analysis Framework

(Source: Authors' Compilation based on Johnston's study)

Strategic Culture

Strategic culture has a relative interpretation in strategic community and academia. The term 'Strategic Culture' was first coined by Jack Snyder in 1977 in a RAND Corporation study titled "The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations."¹¹ Snyder defined Strategic culture as "sum total of ideals, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of the national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy."¹² Whereas Ken Booth defined strategic culture as the influence of traditions, habits, values, attitudes, etc., on the threat or use of force."¹³ Yitzhak Klein defined it as the influence of variables like attitudes and beliefs emphasizing the operational use of military force.¹⁴ In 1995, Alastair Johnston reviewed the erstwhile work on strategic culture and reconceptualised it as an integrated system of symbols to establish pervasive, realistic, and long-lasting strategic preferences."¹⁵ The broader concept of strategic culture, conceived from scholarly work, leads to the conclusion that there are three dimensions of strategic culture (illustrated in Figure 2): Formative or shaping dimension – How is strategic culture shaped? Yielding dimension– What is the output of the strategic culture framework? Keeping dimension – Who are the architects and keepers of strategic culture?

Figure 2: Schematic – Concept of Strategic Culture



(Source: Authors’ Compilation)

A review of scholarly work on the concept of strategic culture summarizes a three-dimensional understanding of action and response behaviour in strategic cultures.

Table 1: Review of Scholarly Work on the Concept of Strategic Culture

Scholar	Formative Dimension	Yielding Dimension	Keeping Dimension
Jack L. Snyder (1977)	Behaviour, ideals, emotional responses	Formulation of Nuclear Strategy	National Strategic Community
Ken Booth (1979)	Traditions, values, attitudes	Strategize proper use of force	Nation
Yitzhak Klein (1991)	Attitudes and belief	Military strategy	Military establishment
Alastair Iain Johnston (1995)	Integrated value system	Grand Strategic Paradigm and Grand Strategy.	Elite with highest institutions of the state at the locus

(Source: Authors’ Compilation)

Indian Strategic Culture

George K. Tanham did the first deep examination of Indian strategic culture in 1992 in a RAND cooperation study titled “India’s Strategic Thought: An interpretive essay.” Tanham identified four principal factors responsible for shaping and explaining Indian Strategic Culture: geography, history, culture and influence of the British Raj.¹⁶ Tanham concluded that due to mysterious conceptions about life, lack of sense of time

in the Hindu religion, and political disarray, the Indian elite has not consistently thought about a national strategy.¹⁷ In 2013, Peter Garretson validated Tanham's assertions while arguing that India's lack of strategic thinking is due to the absence of dynamism and evolution.¹⁸

On the contrary, former Indian Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor, Siv Shankar Menon, argues that India's strategic culture remained consistent in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.¹⁹ In his work on Indian strategic culture, Rodney Jones noted that India has a strategic culture with philosophical and mythological foundations and nourishments from past civilizational values.²⁰ Likewise, Mohanan Bhaskaran Pillai identified two branches of India's strategic culture, 'Plural and Secular Democratic' and 'Hindu Nationalist' and related them to Nehruvian cum Gandhian and M. S. Golwalker, respectively.²¹ Indian strategic culture has also been viewed through the lens of the 3rd-century treatise called *Arthashastra*, written by Kautilya for Emperor Chandragupta Maurya.²² Contextualization of Indian strategic culture in terms of norms of political party and shifts in strategic behaviours to explain its post-1998 overt Indian nuclear posture is a dimension to simplify Indian strategic culture for understanding its dynamics.²³

Reviewing the scholarly work of four authors illustrated in Table 1 on India raises an argument of uniformity in thought about Indian strategic culture. Therefore, Indian strategic culture needs to be contextualized to reach the desired outcome of this research.

Modelling of Indian Strategic Culture

The research outcome is essentially the Indian approach towards Pakistan while understanding the formative role of internal security on strategic culture. Therefore, Indian strategic culture needs to be modelled exclusively. Following are important assertions with regards to modelling Indian strategic culture as per the concept illustrated in Figure 2:

- The yielding dimension in the research context is India's grand strategic preference (policies) towards Pakistan in light of the Indian internal security environment.
- Architects and keepers are essentially politico-military elite in a democratically governed state. Therefore, keeping the dimension of Indian strategic culture is essentially politico-military, including politicians, intelligentsia, and large business giants who play a role in the country's strategic orientation.²⁴
- The internal security factor in the context of this research falls in the formative dimension. Conceptually, the formative dimension of strategic culture is a value system, but internal security, a practical challenge, cannot be characterized as a value system. Nonetheless, the effects of the internal security environment and its strategic handling by the state

transform the behaviours and emotional responses. India, one of the most secessionist states in the world, has a constant emotional imprint driven out by insurgency challenges.²⁵ Therefore, by selecting emotional responses and behaviours as a value system, India's internal security is incorporated into the formative dimension. Another major driver of emotional responses is the history of a particular nation. The golden era of a nation plays out as aspiration, whereas occupations and defeats lead to a negative imprint on emotional behaviours. In summary, there is a consistent driver of emotional behaviour, aspirations of the golden era, and a flexible driver, practical security challenges, and their handling.


The three dimensions of Indian strategic culture based on the assertions above are finalized, summarized, and illustrated in Table 2 and Figure 3, respectively:

Table 2: Dimensions of Indian Strategic Culture

Formative Dimension	Emotional responses with a constant driver as history and flexible driver, i.e., pragmatic internal security challenges due to insurgencies and strategic outlook
Keeping Dimension	Politico-military elite, including business giants, influencing Indian foreign policy
Yielding Dimension	Grand strategic preferences (policies)

(Source: Authors' Compilation)

Figure 3: Conceptual Model of Indian Strategic Culture




(Source: Authors' Compilation)

Model-Based Analysis – Indian Strategic Culture

Taking the model of Indian strategic culture illustrated in Figure 3 as a benchmark, the roots of Indian strategic culture are determined by applying Alastair Iain Johnston's strategic culture framework. The trends are determined through analysis of contemporary internal security challenges and strategic thoughts (political doctrine),

and finally, the effect of the interplay of these factors on Pakistan is determined through deductive reasoning. The framework formulated thereof is as follows:

Figure 4: Model-Based Analysis Framework



(Source: Authors' Compilation)

Roots of Indian Strategic Culture

It is established through a theoretical application explaining that two components of Johnston's strategic culture framework, i.e., the Central Strategic Paradigm and the Grand Strategic Preferences, are fully congruent with the ancient Indian script. *Arthashastra* is the statecraft of the Mauryan Empire authored by the philosopher and the then-appointed Prime Minister of the state – Kautilya (350–275 BCE) – to establish the rule of Chandragupta Maurya and manage the affairs of the state. *Arthashastra*, a comprehensive treatise, included all state affairs, including economy, state administration, legal system and national security. 69.88% of *Arthashastra*, however, is purely dedicated to national security.²⁶ It has been noted that not only the Indian pro-nationalist leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru, Pranab Mukherjee and Shivshankar Menon influenced by Kautilya's thoughts, Indian political and defence-related documents also represent Kautilya's thought.²⁷ India's aspirations to become a significant world power and Asian hegemon are also attributed to the rise of Kautilya's thoughts. However, one worrying factor is that Kautliyan thought is specific regarding the political economy, governance and military handling rather than generalized.²⁸ Therefore, it can be concluded that the roots of Indian strategic culture found in *Arthashastra* and Kautilya's thoughts have remained consistent in Indian strategic culture.

Trends – Review of Indian Strategic Preferences

Since Independence, Indian strategic thought can be divided into four eras: first, from 1947 – 1965, dominated by Nehruvians liberal thoughts; second, from 1965 – 1989, dominated by Indira Gandhi's thought of realpolitik (Indira Doctrine); third, from the 1990s – 2014 witnessed the rise of nationalism in post-Cold War era (Gujral and Manmohan Doctrine); and fourth, from 2014 – 2021 dominated by Hindutva ideology (Modi – Doval Doctrine).²⁹ A short explanation of each one is as follows:

- **1947 – 1965 (Nehru Doctrine)**

In the initial 17 years of independence, Indian foreign policy and security strategy were based on the thoughts of Jawaharal Lal Nehru. He stuck to his vision that India must hold to its unique and liberal identity. Globally, India did not join any eastern or western political blocs and laid the foundation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).³⁰ The core of foreign policy was to retain strategic autonomy without accepting any role of the global community, which could have undermined the country's foreign policy. Regionally, Nehru saw India as a power, dominating the countries around it. Although he advocated liberal foreign policy, he neither accepted two nation theory³¹ nor the existence of Pakistan as a separate state.³² The defeat in the 1962-war with China changed his liberal approach, and he started modernizing defence forces and equipment.³³ As for internal security, Nehru's handling of insurgency did not follow morality. He was the first to authorize the brutal use of force in Nagaland by enacting of Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA) in 1958.³⁴ All those states later used this Act, where insurgency and separatist movements were witnessed. Similarly, the occupation of Muslim majority states, including Kashmir, through force and Operation Vijay in 1961 to take control of Goa, Diu, Daman and Anjediva Islands from the Portuguese reflect the realist facet of Nehru's strategic bent or leanings. His actions were explained by a famous comment from US President John F. Kennedy:

*You spend the last fifteen years preaching morality to us, and then you go ahead and act the way any normal country would behave. People are saying, the preacher has been caught coming out of the brothel.*³⁵

- **1965 – 1990 (Indira Doctrine)**

Indira Gandhi was Nehru's daughter and became Prime Minister of India. She transformed Indian foreign policy from the philosophy of moral politics to the realist paradigm.³⁶ Globally, Indira Gandhi opposed the presence of extra-regional powers in the region, a reason why Indira's doctrine is also referred to as the Monroe Doctrine.³⁷ She somewhat defied the non-alignment policy to get military support and achieve superiority against Pakistan.³⁸ Indira Gandhi crafted a careful politico-diplomatic strategy to solidify India's hegemonic position in South Asia on the regional front.³⁹ It included the first nuclear test in May 1974,⁴⁰ intervention in Pakistan by supporting the *Muktibahini* movement disintegrating Pakistan,⁴¹ Operation Meghdoot to send Indian

troops and occupy disputed Siachen Glacier,⁴² and supporting Tamil separatists in the civil war of Sri Lanka in the 1980s, which went on for 30 years.

Similarly, following Indira, Rajiv Gandhi blockaded the trade of Nepal when Nepal sought close military and economic ties with China.⁴³ On the internal security front, Indira Gandhi exercised assertive nationalism. Starting in the late 1960s, she employed military force through Operation Steeplechase to control the Naxalite uprising in West Bengal.⁴⁴ In 1966, India bombed Aizawl through IAF fighters in response to the Mizo National Front's movement in the north-eastern State of Mizoram.⁴⁵ In the Khalistan uprising, she launched the military operation Blue Star.⁴⁶ The incompatibility of Sikhs with Indira Gandhi culminated when her Sikh bodyguards took her life in 1984.⁴⁷

- **1990 – 2014 (Gujral Doctrine)**

The fall of the Soviet Union was a major external factor that brought about a global shift. In India, leaders with strong imprints like Nehru and Indira Gandhi were no longer available after the Cold War. However, the Indian aspiration for regional dominance remained consistent.⁴⁸ India experienced four important developments after the Cold War: the conversion of the peaceful Kashmir separation movement into an insurgency, liberalization of the economy, the political rise of the Bhartiya Junta Party (BJP), having inspiration from the nationalist ideology of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar and nuclear tests by BJP-led government in 1998. Liberalizing the economy was a core strategic objective that brought a liberal shift in strategic preferences in the form of the Gujral Doctrine.

Inder Kumar Gujral, the Prime Minister of India from April 1997 to March 1998, gave a new shape to the Indian grand strategy based on liberal foundations.⁴⁹ The five basic principles of his doctrine were relationship without reciprocity (except Pakistan), no use of their territory against others, non-intervention in internal matters, respect for territorial integrity, and peaceful settlement of disputes.⁵⁰ These principles were also manifested in India's grand strategy concerning neighbours in the Gujral era and beyond during the next government of Vajpayee (1999-2004) and two tenures of Manmohan Singh (2004-2013).

Gujral Doctrine sought to establish India's power by augmenting regional relations. It sought to increase India's status at the global level by establishing India as a positive power in the South Asian region.⁵¹ Regionally, India signed the Treaty on Sharing of the Ganga Waters at Farakka with Bangladesh in 1996⁵² and Indo-Nepal Treaty to allow Nepalese manufacturing firms to trade in the Indian market.⁵³ In the Vajpayee-led government, the Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement was signed in 1998,⁵⁴ the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway was conceived, and the reopening of Nathula Pass (in Sikkim) for trade with China in 2006.⁵⁵ Gujral's idea of meeting the expectations of neighbours without reciprocity did not include Pakistan.

After the Cold War, India–Pakistan relations remained characterized by uneasy peace with very few highlights.⁵⁶ The highlights include confidence-building measures (CBMs) and the Composite Dialogue Process (CDP)⁵⁷ during the Gujral-led government, the signing of the Lahore Declaration in 1999 during the Vajpayee-led government,⁵⁸ converging on a four-point formula for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute in 2005 during Manmohan Singh government.⁵⁹ The lowlights of Indo–Pakistan relations during this era were the Kargil conflict in 1999,⁶⁰ the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001,⁶¹ and Mumbai Attacks in 2008.⁶² India attributed all these attacks to Pakistan. India responded with conventional force in Kargil, a military stand-off in 2001, and restraint in 2008.⁶³ In parallel, India capitalized on global discontent regarding the war on terror and tried to label Pakistan as a terrorist state. Apart from Kashmir, Indian governments adopted a people-centric approach towards Nagaland and Maoist insurgencies.⁶⁴ However, this approach failed in the case of the Maoist movement, where the enemy-centric approach was adopted in 2009 through Operation Green Hunt.⁶⁵ It resulted in the killing of a senior Maoist leader, Koteswara Rao, in November 2011 and the surrender of 440 cadres.⁶⁶

- **2014 to Present (Modi-Doval Doctrine)**

After the Cold War, a significant development in India was the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to form a central government. The roots of the BJP can be traced back to the Hindutva teachings of V. D. Savarkar in 1923. Narendra Modi is considered a torch bearer of Hindutva ideology and ambitions of making India a Hindu state.⁶⁷ Modi's rise to power in 2014 significantly transformed the Indian grand strategy. He appointed Ajit Doval, a former Intelligence Bureau director, as national security advisor in 2014. While Modi vowed to transform India into a leading power, Ajit Doval strategized to increase India's weight and punch proportionality.⁶⁸ This shift in Indian strategic preferences is referred to as the Modi–Doval doctrine.

The Doval doctrine is primarily Pakistan-specific and hinges upon exploiting the vulnerabilities of Pakistan.⁶⁹ Ajit Doval states in his thoughts that “India will fight not only on its own territory but also on foreign soil which becomes the source of a security threat” – a clear threat to Pakistan.⁷⁰ He considers terrorism as a tactic to achieve ideological or political advantages.⁷¹ While capitalizing on Indian strategic thinking against Pakistan, he adopted a defensive-offensive strategy against Pakistan. It entails working on Pakistan's economic, internal, and political vulnerabilities to push it into isolation, defeat its policies in Afghanistan and disturb its internal political and security equilibrium.⁷² The manifestation of the Doval doctrine against Pakistan was in the form of propaganda for fake surgical strikes in 2016, the cross-border strikes in 2019 after a false flag operation in Pulwama, orchestrating terrorism in the hinterland (Baluchistan and Karachi),⁷³ diplomatic efforts to put Pakistan in FATF blacklist and most importantly using information warfare to discredit Pakistan.⁷⁴

Furthermore, Prime Minister Modi developed a strategic alliance with the US to counterbalance China.⁷⁵ India's participation in Quadrilateral Security Dialogue

(QUAD) updated to QUAD 2.0, and the signing of agreements like Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016, Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2018, and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) in 2020 verifies alignment of India with the US against China. It is a significant shift from the erstwhile Indian policy of non-alignment of the Cold War through which India aspires to be a net security provider in the Indian Ocean region (IOR).⁷⁶ Modi initially approached China in the region for trade, investment and connectivity, but the relationship deteriorated after 2016-17,⁷⁷ with China stopping India from entering in Nuclear Supply Group, followed by Doklam and Ladakh crises in 2017 and 2020, respectively.⁷⁸ Similarly, India's relationship with Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh has sustained major blows during Modi's era, primarily because of the BJP government's anti-Muslim drive and hegemonic behaviour towards Muslims.⁷⁹

On the internal front, BJP's anti-Muslim measures and communal violence have revitalized the Hindu-Muslim divide. On the one hand, the controversial Citizen Amendment Bill (CAB) was enacted to marginalize Muslim immigrants, whereas, on the other, BJP-backed RSS fanatics started violence in India, resulting in the polarization of Indian society.⁸⁰ Modi's approach towards insurgencies and freedom movements is not uniform. In Nagaland, the Modi government signed Naga Peace Accord in 2015; the deal has not materialized due to differences between the government and NSCN (IM) over a separate flag and constitution.⁸¹ In the Indian illegally occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK), the BJP government unilaterally abrogated Articles 370 and 35A on August 5, 2019.⁸² The abrogation of the special status of IIOJK was followed by lockdown, communication blackout and detention of Muslim Kashmiri leadership.

Interpretation of Indian Political Doctrines

Regional dominance has remained India's grand strategic objective, for which different leaders have adopted different strategies.⁸³ India considers Pakistan and China as states opposing Indian strategic objectives.⁸⁴ Indian strategy towards Pakistan has remained hostile since independence in 1947, but under Modi's government, India has adopted an offensive-defensive strategy.⁸⁵ On the one hand, India has abrogated the special status of IIOJK, while on the other hand, India has created room for using military force against Pakistan on the pretext of terrorism and internal security.

- **Indian Strategic Culture**

Considering non-uniformity in thoughts about Indian strategic culture is modelled in the research context. It is determined through the Alastair Iain Johnston model explaining that Indian strategic culture is rooted in Kautilya's thoughts and statecraft for Mauryan Empire, *Arthashastra*. Since independence in 1947, Indian leaders and the strategic community have kept Indian superiority in the region as a strategic objective. Furthermore, Indian strategic thoughts transformed from liberalism (in the Nehru era) to realism (in the Indira Gandhi era) to hyper-nationalism (in Modi's Era) with an intervening period of neo-liberalism (from the 1990s to 2014). During the Cold

War, India maintained Nehru's policy of non-alignment. The fundamental aim of non-alignment was to keep strategic autonomy and pursue the strategic objective of regional superiority. Strategic autonomy has remained a core national interest of India, irrespective of changing regimes. However, after having strategic alignment with the US to counterbalance China during Modi's era, the strategic autonomy of India has become seriously questionable.

- **The Interplay of Strategic Culture and Internal Security**

In line with Kautilya's thoughts, the Indian conception of national security inheritably includes internal security. For insurgencies in India, repressive constitutional measures were taken, such as enacting Nehru's Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) until Modi abrogated Articles 370 and 35A. Indira Gandhi used blatant force in Khalistan, Nagaland, and against the Maoist uprising. Indian strategic community has consistently kept the external element linked with internal security challenges. The linking of the Khalistan movement with Pakistan, the Maoist movement with China and Pakistan, and most importantly Kashmir insurgency with Pakistan are a few pertinent examples.

- **Effect of Interplay of Indian Strategic Culture on Pakistan**

Irrespective of leadership, India has always maintained an adversarial posture towards Pakistan. It started with Nehru's use of force to annex Muslim majority states, including Kashmir, disintegrating Pakistan, other coercive means to weaken Pakistan after the Cold War, and most recently, limited use of force by India in response to false flag operations in Kashmir. All these as a whole are congruent with Kautilya's strategies of *Sham* (patience to understand adversary), *Dam* (persuasion through gifts), *Dhanda* (imposing appropriate punishments), and *Bhed* (brute Force).⁸⁶ Indian Strategic objective of regional hegemony is grounded in Kautilya's Mandala theory, and Pakistan is considered a state opposing the Indian strategic objective. Therefore, capitulating to Pakistan is part of the Indian strategic objectives.

After Pakistan and India attained the status of nuclear powers, India resorted to non-traditional means. It involves using information operations, coercive diplomacy, and intervention to weaken the state as per the Doval doctrine. India used the parliament attack in 2001, the Mumbai attack in 2009, the Uri attack in 2016, and the Pulwama attack in 2019 to shape domestic and global opinion against Pakistan. Resultantly, the strategic culture of India has developed a natural linkage of Pakistan with the insurgency. While Pakistan restored credible deterrence through an effective response to the post-Pulwama strike, military provocations and terrorism cannot be overruled in Modi's India. After the Indian strategic partnership with the US, the military muscularity of the US augmented the ideological masculinity of the BJP. In this milieu, India has more impunity than ever before to use coercion and force against Pakistan on the pretext of internal security.

Conclusion

The existence and contours of Indian strategic culture are debatable amongst strategic communities and academia. Therefore, Indian strategic culture is modelled in the research based on conceptual understanding through content and context analysis. The content and context of each doctrine devised Indian strategic culture according to the leadership's mindset. Applying Johnston's strategic culture framework helps understand that Indian strategic thoughts are congruent with Kautilya's thoughts. Analysis of Indian strategic thoughts through various doctrines has identified that India has not only maintained an adversarial relationship with Pakistan but carefully linked insurgency with Pakistan. In the recent past, under the Doval doctrine, India again accused Pakistan of being involved in insurgencies in Indian territory and possible counteractions. Resultantly, Indian strategic thinking is shaped to justify any degree of conflict with Pakistan. The Indo-US strategic alliance provides further impetus to Indian designs against Pakistan.

Notably, Pakistan must move ahead by considering these dynamics of Indian strategic culture for its strategic policy formulation to counter blame propaganda from a traditional adversary. While if Pakistan's strategic approaches are considered, then game at the backfoot and safe play are observed. It can further be taken up by adopting a deterrence shift to assurance for balancing regional hegemonic race and Indian madness against Pakistan to play with the sentiments of their people for winning elections.

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