




# *Margalla Papers*

## **2007**



**National Defence University  
Islamabad, Pakistan**

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## Margalla Papers

Institute of Strategic Studies; Research & Analysis  
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**President's Address**

**Inaugural Session on International Conference on UN  
Peacekeeping at National Defence University, Islamabad  
6 March 2007**

*National Security is the ability of a nation to be fully sovereign to the degree that it can defend its vital national interests while maintaining relations with the rest of the world on honorable terms. It also means strengthening institutions and preventing governance from disruption. Security and sovereignty is also directly affected by economics and an economically weak nation can not be called a sovereign state in the real sense, as it is unable to take independent decisions to protect its national interests. Sovereignty is also governed by the obtaining environment and is strengthened by abiding to international rules, practices norms and conventions. Also at times, when dealing with extra-ordinary circumstances, policy changes may be necessary to protect vital interests. Remember that threats to national security could stem, as you know, from within and outside, the former being more dangerous as it hits at the very roots of the society. We all will therefore have to create societies, where hate for other people dies because there is nothing to nurture it.*

**President Pervez Musharraf  
Chancellor National Defense University  
Islamabad**

## GLOBAL TRENDS AND EVOLVING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT: OPTIONS FOR PAKISTAN

*Ambassador Najmuddin A. Shaikh*

As we look at the global strategic picture what stands out is the continued dominance of this scene by the United States. Its military power and military spending exceeds that of the next ten countries put together. Even while the Iraq and Afghan war have led to an overstretching of the human capacity of the armed forces they still remain a force capable of mounting yet another campaign albeit largely through the use of air and naval power rather than "boots on the ground". The plans that have been announced of a further expansion of the armed forces were triggered by the shortages experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan but it can safely be anticipated that these increases will be permanent or at least will remain in place until there is a perception that the battle against terrorism has been won. This is unlikely for the next decade or so given the probable continuation of the present Bush policies by succeeding administrations.

This administration and probably future administrations will continue to believe that this defence spending does not pose too much of a burden. In September 2001 that is before 9/11 when the largest increase in defence spending since the 1980's was proposed Secretary Rumsfeld said that the United States was spending less than 3% of its GNP on defence a sharp decline from the 10% that used to be spent earlier<sup>1</sup>. After 9/11 the budget has climbed much more steeply but as a recent book on American financing of America's war on terrorism says "World War II cost about 40 percent of GDP at its peak, Korean War 15 percent, Vietnam War about 10 percent, this war is less than 1 percent."<sup>2</sup>

US economic strength has not despite the costly wars it has been fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan been reduced. Nor has it been much affected by the fact that in the last twenty five years the USA has converted from being the largest creditor in the world to being the largest debtor nation in the world.

Analysts have offered the view that “a prolonged decline in the dollar’s value and increasing indebtedness will erode America’s dominance in political and security spheres. These trends threaten the dollar’s role as *the* global currency that facilitates international trade and finance, something the United States has gained immeasurably from over the years. A weaker dollar also reduces American leverage in international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Finally, a diminished U.S. currency means that each dollar’s worth of military and development assistance has less impact at precisely the time when the nation faces the greatest challenges”.<sup>3</sup> The truth of the matter however is that even with its large borrowings to meet its budget deficit and its trade deficit the Americans remain well below the figure of budget deficits in other countries. This year for instance the Bush Administration has announced that the budget deficit will now be half of what it was at its peak in 2004 and at \$205 billion will amount to 1.5% of the GNP.<sup>4</sup>

Because of the dominant position that the United States now occupies there is a need for every country and particularly countries in the region in which the United States has an immediate interest to assess the probable direction of American policy and what are the factors that will influence this policy in the near and medium term future. There is now no doubt that for the next decade or more American policy will be determined by the threat it sees from terrorism and more specifically from the Al-Qaeda and the affiliates and associates it has developed in various parts of the Muslim world.

A second and in many ways related concern for the Americans will be energy security. Many observers believe, perhaps rightly, that the American public’s concern about terrorism was used by President Bush as the pretext for the invasion of Iraq. For him it was perhaps related to his view that his father the senior President Bush had left the job undone and had as a result lost his chance for re-election. For his neo conservative advisers however there were more substantive reasons grounded in geopolitics and economics. First there was the concern that despite the crushing defeat Saddam had suffered Iraq remained the only Arab country that could in time

come to use its manpower and natural resources to threaten Israel's dominance of the Middle East. Second given the shaky situation in Saudi Arabia an occupation of Iraq was a sure way of guaranteeing that supplies of oil-Iraq had the second largest reserves of oil in the Middle East-would be available to satisfy American demands.

The invasion of Iraq has of course not advanced the global war against terrorism. It has instead given the extremists in the Muslim world the best possible recruiting tool that they could have asked for and created within Iraq-a country hitherto free of extremist trends- a haven for extremists from all the neighbouring Sunni Arab countries. It has also ominously from the perspective of the Arab world and the non Arab parts of the Islamic world catalysed a fresh impetus to the sectarian divides that first became significant during the Iraq Iran war of the 1980's.

It is now almost definite that the Americans will withdraw from Iraq within the next 18 months. How orderly this withdrawal can be and how far this will impact American relations with the other countries of the region and the rest of the world is not yet clear. What does seem likely is that the "civil war" now raging in Iraq will gain impetus and will lead to the partition of the country into an independent Kurdistan in the North, a Sunni Arab centre and a Shia South. Some American politicians-notably Senator Biden, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations committee- believe that this can be brought about in an orderly fashion. Most observers of the region disagree. Such a partition, in my view could be a recipe for disastrous turbulence in the region as regional players try to protect their own interests or those of their co-religionists in the changed circumstances. Let us look at some of the possible grim scenarios.

Turkey for instance will have to make moves to guard against the independent Kurdistan state becoming the nucleus for a "Greater Kurdistan" encompassing large parts of eastern Turkey and large swathes of Iranian and Syrian territory. Other players will also be active. What will be Iran's reaction? Will the Shia state in South Iraq seek a confederation with Iran or will the Arab population of Iran's Ahwaz province seek a special relationship with the Iraqi

Shias? Will there be an Iran Turkish alliance to prevent the setting up of the independent state of Iraqi Kurdistan? What will be the fate of Jordan, already struggling with the influx of 750,000 Iraqi refugees and the creation of Sunni insurgent cells primarily for activities in Iraq but also capable of directing their fire against King Abdullah's regime? What will Sunni majority Syria- the conduit for most of the foreign fighters that have found their way into Iraq do when its territorial integrity is perceived as being under threat from the Kurds, when the Sunni Arab conclave takes shape against their traditional Iranian allies and their alleged actions in Iraq and when the stalemate on the occupation of the Golan Heights continues with Israel refusing to yield any ground? Will Saudi Arabia become the main financial backer of the rump Sunni state in Iraq and will this rump state become the safest possible haven for extremist insurgents from all over the Sunni world? All these are questions for which no clear answers can be provided but which do make it certain that the Middle East will be thrown into the sort of turmoil that would make the Palestine issue pale in comparison.

The recently announced American initiative to provide arms to its Arab allies in the region is perceived by most observers as a step designed to reassure its regional allies that even after they withdraw from Iraq the American will remain active players in the region. Over the next ten years the Americans are talking of providing \$30 billion in military and economic assistance to Israel, \$ 13 billion to Egypt and to sell about \$ 20 billion of arms to the Gulf countries-notably Saudi Arabia and the UAE<sup>5</sup>. This is also meant to reassure these countries that the USA will stand with them as they view apprehensively the possible emergence of Iran as a nuclear weapon power and as a dominant influence in a divided Iraq.<sup>6</sup>

In Palestine again the Americans believe that the new initiative they have taken of promoting a regional conference will bring results. They hope that they can by backing President Abbas in the West Bank financially and otherwise, reduce the popular support Hamas enjoys in Gaza which it controls and remove the pocket of Hamas supporters in the larger and more populous West Bank. There is no doubt that the majority of the Palestinians including also a majority in Gaza favour the two state solution that Hamas is said

to be opposing but there are no indications that Israel will be prepared to make the concessions that would really make for a viable Palestinian state. This would require Israel to remove many of the settlements that they have set up in the West Bank and to dismantle large parts of the fence that they have built. Observers are agreed that Olmert lacks the political strength to make such concessions and more importantly Israeli hardliners are confident that as the Presidential elections approaches in the USA no American politician will risk the wrath of the Israeli lobby and pressure Olmert or his successors to make such concessions.

In Lebanon there appears to be no end in sight to the political impasse and the ongoing battle between the extremists occupying Palestinian refugee camps and the Lebanese army is not going to end soon particularly when it appears that other Palestinian refugee camps and Palestinian outpost in the country are becoming havens for extremist insurgents who are either veterans of the insurgency in Iraq or have been trained for that purpose. Hezbollah's universal popularity for its heroic resistance against the Israelis has now given way once again to questions about why it invited the destruction of Lebanon by provoking the Israelis. Its credentials as a welfare organisation have also been called into question by allegations of tardiness in providing the promised aid for reconstruction and of Hamas officials having developed sticky fingers in handling the aid that Iran is providing.

Overall there is also the intense dislike of the Americans that has been aroused in the Arab world and in the Islamic world. The Economist has said rightly, I believe, that "Any Arab leader who wins the label "moderate" and is showered as a result of this with American love and money is in danger of being called a traitor".<sup>7</sup> In the same article in the Economist the writer argues perhaps debatably that Egypt's president, "Anwar Sadat, was called a traitor for making his courageous peace with Israel in 1979 (and assassinated by jihadists two years later). Arafat was called a traitor after shaking hands with an Israeli prime minister on the White House lawn. In Lebanon right now the Hezbollah movement calls the beleaguered government of Fouad Siniora traitorous because it is propped up by France and America. Iraq's prime minister, Nuri al-

Maliki, needs to keep his distance from America to fend off accusations that he is a puppet of the occupation. And, of course, the assumption of many Muslims that a pro-American leader must in some way be a traitor to the cause extends beyond the Arab world: in Pakistan and Afghanistan Presidents Musharraf and Karzai have constantly to face down the cry that by allying with the superpower they have sold out their countries or, worse, their religion”.

In Iran, our closest neighbour, there appears to be no immediate internal threat to the present system or even to the populist President Ahmadinejad. There is some unrest as the economic situation continues to be of such concern as to prompt a band of Iranian economists to launch a scathing criticism of Ahmadinejad’s policies.<sup>8</sup> Petrol rationing has been introduced and a harsh morality campaign has been launched. All this has been justified as one Iranian economist put it, “The arrests, the intimidation, even the economic policy is about preparing Iran for the biggest outside threat it has faced since the Iran-Iraq war,”. He characterises the leaders as “people with military backgrounds that see dissent as a security issue and are very paranoid”.<sup>9</sup>

There appears to be no prospect of any agreement being reached between the Iranians and the Americans on the nuclear issue nor do there appear to be prospects of some early resolution of American charges that the Iranians are fomenting trouble in Iraq and sabotaging the prospects of progress on the Palestine issue or on reconciling current political differences in Lebanon.

The Iranians believe that the Americans are assisting if not creating insurgencies in Iranian Baluchistan using Pakistani Baluchistan as the conduit and are fomenting assistance to insurgents in the Arab population in Ahwaz province and in the Kurdish areas of Iran. They view with concern the monies the Administration has asked for and secured from congress for bringing about regime change.<sup>10</sup>

In other words the situation in the Middle East is fraught with danger. There is little chance in my view of the Americans attacking Iranian nuclear facilities and possibly there will eventually

be an agreement that allows Iran to retain and operate its uranium enrichment facilities under IAEA safeguards. This agreement will however be long in coming and in the meanwhile tensions will remain clouding the sort of political and economic relations that South Asia would like to develop with Iran. The most notable feature of this relationship would obviously be the planned Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline.

In our immediate neighbourhood, the peace process is regarded by both sides as irreversible but there is the perception that not enough progress is being made on the issues of concern to Pakistan in the composite dialogue and that such measures as have been agreed upon by way of enhancing people to people exchanges and increasing trade, while being beneficial to both sides are seen in the Pakistani mind as being part of the Indian agenda. There appears to be little evidence of flexibility on the Indian side on such easily resolvable issues as Siachen and Sir Creek. The Indians say that they are having difficulty persuading their armed forces to accept that there is no likelihood of Pakistan re-occupying the positions that would be vacated when an agreement is reached. Many are prepared to concede that this is an untenable position but feel that the current government does not have the political strength to be able to overrule the reservations of the Armed forces. On Sir Creek there has been a joint survey and there is a possibility that with these agreed maps a land boundary can be worked out paving the way for demarcating the maritime boundary. Ironically India which has always insisted that Indo-Pak disputes whatever their nature should be settled bilaterally faces the danger of having international arbitrators from the Law of the Sea Commission decide the Maritime boundary between India and Pakistan if the two sides do not agree upon a boundary themselves by 2009.

From Pakistan's perspective there is also concern about what appears to be the successful conclusion of the Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement. As a result of this agreement it is clear that enormous quantities of fissionable material will become available to India for the enhancement of its nuclear arsenal. It will make it necessary for Pakistan to spend valuable resources to upgrade its own nuclear weapons so that its deterrent capability is maintained. Since

all analysts are agreed that this Indo-US strategic partnership is aimed at providing a counter-weight to China's growing economic and military strength there is a strong chance that even while China will remain focused on its economic development it will also take steps to counter Indian capabilities. There is a prospect of an Indo-Pak arms race and perhaps a stepping up of a Chinese military build-up in the vicinity of South Asia.

In Afghanistan the situation continues to deteriorate. An inept Karzai administration beholden to warlords, rampant corruption, proliferating opium cultivation and trafficking, lack of development and therefore lack of economic opportunities, a wholly inadequate level of combat troops in the NATO and US forces have led to the resurgence of the Taliban and an increasing willingness on the part of the general populace to join them in the struggle against what are now regarded as occupation forces propping up a puppet regime.

As a result, Afghan refugees continue to be on Pakistan soil in camps that are probably being used by the Taliban as planning and training centres for their operations in Afghanistan. At the international community's insistence Pakistan has agreed to extend by another three years the period for voluntary repatriation of the refugees. While some of the camps are to be closed there is little likelihood that the new camps wherever they are located will not continue to serve as sanctuaries in addition to the other sanctuaries that the Taliban have managed to retain with the aid of their local sympathisers in other parts of Pakistan. Another significant consequence of the presence of the refugee camps and of unregistered Afghans spread throughout the country is the fact that they are a source of criminal activity and are often seen as the shock troops of extremist religious parties.

An even more serious element is the allegation contained in the National Intelligence Estimate drawn up jointly by the 16 American intelligence agencies that Al-Qaeda adherents have found safe haven in the tribal areas of Pakistan and that they have regrouped well enough to be now seen as having more capabilities than they have ever had since 9/11. There is panic in the United

States since the head of their Homeland Security has opined on the basis of a "gut feeling" that Al-Qaeda would launch another attack on the USA this year. The American Congress has now made aid to Pakistan which amount to more than \$ 1.6 billion annually conditional on a Presidential certification that "the Government of Pakistan is making all possible efforts to prevent the Taliban from operating in areas under its sovereign control, including in the cities of Quetta and Chaman and in the Northwest Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas".<sup>11</sup>

The American Congress bill which is designed to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission has also asked the President to present to Congress within 90 days the strategy it intends adopting in building a strategic relationship with Pakistan to achieve the following objectives: curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology; combating poverty and corruption; building effective government institutions, especially secular public schools; promoting democracy and the rule of law, particularly at the national level; addressing the continued presence of Taliban and other violent extremist forces throughout the country; maintaining the authority of the Government of Pakistan in all parts of its national territory; securing the borders of Pakistan to prevent the movement of militants and terrorists into other countries and territories; and effectively dealing with Islamic extremism<sup>12</sup>.

The bill also talks of working with the Government of Pakistan "to combat international terrorism, especially in the frontier provinces of Pakistan, and to end the use of Pakistan as a safe haven for forces associated with the Taliban" and of "dramatically" increasing its own assistance and assistance from the international community to achieve these objectives if "the Government of Pakistan demonstrates a commitment to building a moderate, democratic state, including significant steps towards free and fair parliamentary elections in 2007"<sup>13</sup>.

In this context it is important to note that Pakistan, since joining the coalition in the Global War on Terrorism in 2001 has been regarded as the frontline state in this campaign against the Al-Qaeda both in Afghanistan and in the hideouts that Al-Qaeda leaders

had established in various Pakistani cities. The success Pakistan has had in arresting Al-Qaeda leaders has been acknowledged. It has been said that no other country has done as much nor has any other country suffered quite as much particularly when action was taken in the tribal areas to try and rid the area of foreign militants. And yet there is concern as the above mentioned bill shows that the Al-Qaeda far from being eliminated from Pakistan has now found safe haven in its inaccessible tribal areas. This, in itself is bad enough but there has also been since 9/11 and even before that a concern in the international community that the polity of Pakistan was being Talibanised. In August 2001 the then Deputy Secretary of State had noted that America wanted to work towards preventing the Talibanisation of Pakistan. More recent expressions of concern have come about the growth of extremism in Pakistan. The recent reporters about the movement of the Taliban elements from the Tribal areas into the settled districts of the NWFP and of course even more significantly the activities of the Lal Masjid militants gave credence to these apprehensions. All this came atop reporters perhaps exaggerated that the British born perpetrators of bombing incidents in the UK had received training in Pakistani Jihadi camps or Madarsahs.

Whether we like it or not we must know that the world is concerned about this and this includes not only the western countries but also the East Asian Muslim countries and the conservative Muslim Arab states that we count among our friends. It is becoming increasingly difficult for Pakistanis to secure visas for a number of countries.

In past years there was great hope that a peaceful and stable Afghanistan would enable Pakistan to utilize its geo strategic location optimally to act as a bridge between Central, South and West Asia. Afghanistan after all had been the catalyst for the collapse of the Soviet Union and it was anticipated that the victors in that epic battle-the Afghan Mujahideen- would, with the assistance of their American, Pakistani, and other supporters, be able to rebuild the country quickly and would profit from their strategic location to provide the trade and transit routes that the newly independent states of Central Asia desperately craved to reduce the strangle hold the

Soviet Empire had established on the trade and resources of this region.

That hope, if it had ever been realistic, was soon belied by the events on the ground. The newly independent states of Central Asia were anxious to establish ties with their neighbouring Muslim countries and to resurrect the traditional ties and trading routes through these countries-Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan- that had been their means of communicating with the rest of the world before they became part of the Czarist and then the Soviet empire. They welcomed proposals from the newly resurgent ECO (Economic Cooperation Organisation that theoretically tied Iran, Pakistan and Turkey together in a regional, economic and trading bloc. Elaborate plans were drawn up to incorporate the Central Asian states and Afghanistan into ECO and much emphasis was laid at least in Pakistan and Afghanistan on how the Central Asian states would now be able to reduce if not eliminate their dependence on the distant Black Sea ports for their trade and even more importantly be able to secure world market prices for their fossil fuel exports.

Problems arose almost immediately. The Americans backed a Turkish effort to be in the vanguard of the Western drive to loosen Russia's grip on the Central Asian economies and to be the vehicle for almost all Western assistance to the Central Asian states. Americans were also anxious to ensure that the model the newly independent states should adopt be that of Turkey rather than Iran. By the end of 1997, a substantial part of the \$ 900 million credit that the Turkish Bank offered to the Central Asian States had been used and Turkish entrepreneurs had undertaken construction projects worth \$ 5.75 billion in these states<sup>14</sup>.

Iran, on its part had ambitions of its own in Central Asia including most obviously the use of Iranian territory and Iranian ports for the Central Asian states exports and for making Iraq the core of an Energy Grid that would pool the resources of the region and permit through Iranian operated pipelines and other means of transport their flow to markets in Europe, South Asia and East Asia. It very quickly built a rail link with Turkmenistan and there was an agreement reached on the construction of a pipeline that would bring

Turkmen gas to Iran which in turn would supply from its gas reserves an equal amount of gas to Turkey. It has not quite worked because the pipeline remains small and there are already problems between Iran and Turkey about the assured supply of the gas that Iran itself has contracted to supply to Turkey.

At that time it was appreciated that Pakistan, through Afghanistan was the logical transit route partly because (a) it was itself a large market (b) it could provide access to the Indian market which even at that time was beginning to experience serious energy shortages and was anxiously looking around the world for secure and economical supplies and (c) it provided the most economical access to the sea. Pakistan, at that time, was also seen as the friendly neighbouring country with which the Central Asian states had old connections but not connections that could be threatening to their effort to establish their independence. In the case of the other two neighbours, Turkey and Iran, there were linguistic or ethnic ties which the Central Asian states felt could offer an advantage but could also serve as a base for proposing to the Uzbeks, the Turkmens and the Tajiks what direction their political and economic development should take. There was also a very real fear in the Central Asian republics that Iran would seek to use.

The Central Asian had made their preference clear to outside investors. In 1991 it was difficult to find a hotel room in Islamabad since these were overflowing with representatives of oil and gas companies from around the world all wanting a slice of the action in Central Asia and believing that the route to those riches laid through Islamabad. Unfortunately the security situation in Afghanistan remained, to say the least problematic and then under the Taliban, Afghanistan became a pariah state that even the most hardy of investors was not prepared to look at it as a viable transit route. If, as appears likely, the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline project does go through it will be because the more economical and more politically beneficial (beneficial because of the revenues and economic activity it would have brought into some of the most impoverished areas of Afghanistan) pipeline from Turkmenistan could not be built. There continues to be talk of such a pipeline in the meetings between the Turkmen, Afghan and Pakistani leaders but the fact is that now

almost all of Turkmenistan's disposable gas reserves have been committed in long term deals with Russia and China. Because of the change in the global energy situation moreover Turkmenistan may not find it more attractive financially to sell to South Asia since it is now getting close to market rate prices from China and Russia.

Afghanistan today is a haven for smugglers. It is calculated, if the customs revenues collected at Herat are an indication that approximately \$5 billion worth of goods are brought into Afghanistan via Iran. Only a small proportion of this is destined for local consumption while, I believe, some \$4 billion worth of goods are smuggled into Pakistan doing serious damage to our economy and to the governments revenue raising effort. Afghanistan is also the source of 92% of the world's total supply of opium. Only a limited portion of this goes to European and Central Asian markets. The rest is consumed by the youth of Pakistan and Iran doing enormous damage to the generation on which Pakistan's further progress will depend. An open or porous Pak-Afghan border and unregulated traffic across this border is therefore deleterious for Pakistan's security and economy.

Some people in Pakistan had entertained the hope that a friendly Afghanistan would provide "strategic depth" for Pakistan in the case of a Pakistani conflict with its eastern neighbour. This was a flawed concept which no rational analyst could support. There could be a case made for seeking a friendly or even subservient Afghanistan to put an end to irredentist claim that Afghans have maintained on Pakistan territory while claiming that the Durand Line was an imposed border that Afghanistan did not recognize. This too is a flawed argument since even the Taliban regime much beholden to Pakistan refused to legitimize the Durand Line and propounded instead the dangerous thesis that between nations belonging to the Ummah there can be no borders. It was Taliban statements of this nature and the spread of their influence in our tribal and border belt areas that prompted concerns in the world about the "Talibanisation" of Pakistan. The fact of the matter is that Afghanistan's rulers-no matter what their complexion and no matter what the nature of the relations they maintain with Pakistan will not recognize the Durand Line since the call for its erasure is the

rallying cry used to promote unity domestically. At the same time however Afghanistan will continue to remain overwhelmingly dependent on Pakistan for its trade and its communications with the outside world. The Iranian route is less economical and every Afghan government again no matter what its complexion will be compelled to maintain a working relationship with Pakistan.

This then is the strategic environment regional and global in which Pakistan has to determine its options and frame, its domestic and foreign policies. It would seem to be obvious that no good news for the Muslim states of the Middle East can be expected in the near future. It is likely that there will be further deaths of Muslims in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. These will serve if precautions are not taken to inflame public opinion in Pakistan further and give fresh impetus to extremism. It is necessary therefore for any regime that is in power in Pakistan to educate public opinion and to make them understand that such emotions must be controlled and the nation's efforts must be focused on building Pakistan's economic strength so that it can then effectively defend both its own interests and the interests of the Muslim world.

It is also painfully obvious that in curbing Talibanisation in our tribal areas we need to deploy not only military assets but also politicians who can win the hearts and minds of the people of the region away from the appeal of the distorted version of Islam that the extremists preach. This is a task best done by politicians and not by military commanders. Similarly the administration of the region must be placed in the hands of incorruptible seasoned Political agents-called back from retirement if necessary to help in the restoration of a system that will deny the free hand that the extremists now enjoy in spreading their ideology through their control of the mosques of the region.

The long awaited reforms of the Madarsahs first promised by President Musharraf in 2002 have yet to be implemented. This task must be given priority attention. This is not to suggest that all Madarsahs are breeding grounds for extremism, though some of them are certainly engaged in such activities. More importantly it is necessary to ensure that the students who emerge from these

institutes have acquired the knowledge and skills needed in today's economy.

It is of course understood that none of these internal measures are likely to succeed unless all organs of the state – the empowered civilian government, the armed forces, the intelligence agencies and the bureaucracy-work in close harmony to educate the public on the difficulties extremism creates and to wean away present adherents to the extremist school of thought and deny them the funding they receive from external and internal sources.

We have to strengthen our laws on money laundering and to ensure that the remittances received from abroad are for legitimate purposes. Much of the money from anonymous donors in the Gulf countries however comes in briefcases and other informal transfers through the Havala system. We have to pay special attention in our contacts with our friends abroad to this aspect so that all charity funds arriving from generous donors of their Zakat funds are used beneficially and do not fall into the hands of those who use them to promote an extremist agenda.

On the broader foreign policy front it is clear that in our relations with India we must continue to act on the premise that the peace process is irreversible but we must at the same time continue to press for the settlement of disputes and at the same time warn India and the world that an agreement on arms control in the region is necessary to avoid the wastage of scarce resources on an arms race that may ensue if India's build up of its nuclear arsenal and its conventional forces continues down a reckless path. At the same time we must be prepared to acknowledge that India may perceive its defence needs in a different light than we do and that some flexibility on our part with respect to the ratio of forces may be necessary.

Unlike the past however today we must acknowledge that our principal preoccupation in the region must be with our western neighbour Afghanistan. It is relations with this country and the actions we take with regard to it that will determine in large measure the nature of our relations with the rest of the world and even more

importantly the measure of success we enjoy in our campaign against extremism and terrorism in our own country. We must, as part of our campaign against extremism, seek and secure international assistance to close the Afghan refugee camps and to relocate them in Afghanistan. If the difficulties are too formidable-and this sort of excuse should not be too readily accepted-they must at the very least be shifted away from the border areas. Currently the Afghan refugees by and large live off the local economy competing for jobs with the hard pressed locals. If they are to be found jobs the international community must be persuaded to fund food for work projects on which they can be employed without infringing on the rights of local employment seekers.

We must acknowledge that whatever the concerns of our own Pushtun population Afghanistan is a sovereign country and will determine for itself the composition of its government. We must maintain correct relations with the government but must take such precautions as sealing our border as far as possible to prevent the flow of undesirable elements, undesirable goods and undesirable influences into our country.

Since we cannot, despite our best efforts, remain unaffected by the strife in Afghanistan and since we are now recognising that a Talibanised Afghanistan or a consolidation of Taliban influence in areas of Afghanistan bordering on Pakistan represents a danger to us, we must press hard on the coalition forces in Afghanistan to do their part in the effort to defeat the Taliban or to make them reconcile with the government. Even at this time the deployment on our side of the border and the number of posts we have set up dwarf the effort being made on the other side. We must join with Afghanistan and others in pressing the other partners in the coalition to make a greater military and developmental effort in Afghanistan.

We are the larger and comparatively the more stable country. While it is reprehensible that anti Pakistan sentiments are expressed by some Afghan politicians and leaders we should take them in our stride, secure in the knowledge that they do not amount to more than bluster and, if we have taken the right steps, will carry no credibility with the rest of the world.

Bringing the strong minority of extremists in our country back to the moderate polity that was the vision of our founding father and taking the right steps in our relations with Afghanistan and as a corollary with the coalition partners are two sides of the same coin. An abrasion on one side will affect the value of the obverse side.

#### End Notes

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## STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

*Brigadier Tughral Yamin*

### **The Concept of Stability**

One of the central preoccupations of the discipline of strategic studies is *stability* and some of the influential work in the field has focused on the question of what constitutes 'strategic stability.'<sup>1</sup>

The word *stability* describes a state or quality of being stable and is considered to be synonymous with 'balance', 'equilibrium' and 'symmetry.' The Oxford English dictionary defines stability as 'permanence of arrangement, power of resisting change of structure' and 'immunity from destruction or essential change.'

Microsoft Encarta Reference Library offers at least ten definitions of *stability*, each time in a different milieu, such as aerodynamics, ecology, economy, physics, climate and weather, and mental health. Quite understandably, diplomats and soldiers tend to examine this notion through the prism of their own knowledge and experiences.

During the Cold War, strategic stability came to be understood as the means of deterring the enemy by making known the destruction calculus i.e. the number of deaths, which could be caused and the destruction that could be wreaked on the enemy with the available nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup> This concept changed to a balance in strategic nuclear weapons during the period of détente.<sup>3</sup>

In the realm of international relations, 'peace' is often assumed to be the essential prerequisite for 'stability' and 'wars' and 'conflict' are considered to be anti thesis of such a condition. This judgment is based on the fact that conflict produces human misery and peace creates conditions for human happiness. In reality, however, 'stability' is a perception and not necessarily motivated by noble sentiments. If history is any guide, it can be argued that 'established' or 'status quo' powers favour things 'as they are,'

irrespective of whether it is a state of peace or war.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand 'anti status quo' forces seek change in the existing order most often through 'revolution' and 'wars'. Change is rarely through a process of 'evolution.' It is axiomatic therefore, that change disturbs the existing balance.<sup>5</sup>

There are different theories of conflict. Famous fourteenth century historian Ibn Khaldun in his landmark historical work *Muqaddimah* or Prologue conceived the theory of social conflict, based on the clash between the "townspeople" and the "desert folks."<sup>6</sup> Western scholars like Arnold J Toynbee and Samuel P Huntington have interpreted conflict in their theories of clash of religions and civilisations.<sup>7</sup> Yet others have blamed political disagreements, differences of opinion, conflicting ideals, racial and ethnic prejudices, irredentist claims and counter claims, as causes of conflict or imbalance within societies, communities, countries and civilisations.

Right through the ages, nations and their leaders: kings, emperors, generals, statesmen and politicians have sought to enforce internal and external stability within their own domains, countries, neighbourhoods and spheres of influence to perpetuate their national or personal rules and domination over others, through alternating strategies of diplomacy and war, in the true spirit of Carl von Clausewitz's famous dictum that "war is the extension of policy by other means" and vice versa.<sup>8</sup>

Internal and external stability represent the flip side of the same coin but the processes that shape the two notions are ideationally different. While, policy makers and administrators construct regimes of internal stability on the strong but benign foundations of domestic peace and harmony, good governance and other long term beneficial measures for the good of the society; diplomats, statesmen and soldiers seek regional and international stability by building security architectures premised on a shrewd mixture of statecraft and diplomacy backed by powerful system of forces and alliances. In security structures, where nuclear weapons play the role of a 'balancer', 'nuclear deterrence' or the ability to

deter an adversary from taking an offensive for fear of unacceptable punishment is the underpinning concept of stability.

Competing nations with differing world-views seek stability or balance by creating security architectures or global/regional 'orders' on the strength of their national 'power potentials.' Power potential is a relative measure of power, derived from a sum total of tangible and intangible resources that a nation-state possesses; economic and military might being among the foremost.

In his seminal work, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, Paul Kennedy argued that the strength of a 'Great Power' is directly proportional to available resources and economic durability; military "over-stretch" and an attendant relative decline is the consistent threat facing powers, whose ambitions and security requirements are greater than their resource base can provide for. Kennedy used a number of measures to indicate real, relative and potential strength of nations. For instance, prior to the twentieth century some of his measures to rank the power of a nation included the ratio of urban to total population, steel production, energy consumption from modern fuels and manufacturing output. For the twentieth century he used arms production and tonnage of steel or coal to produce a given GNP output.<sup>9</sup>

The elusive search for peace and stability to justify national aspirations and personal ambitions has ensured that conflict has remained the integral part of human history. Twice during the first half of the twentieth century, major world powers fought each other to acquire a position of global pre-eminence. Whereas, the First World War was more of a stalemate, leaving the losers crippled but not dead, the Second World War was brought to a conclusive and violent end in August of 1945, after two American atomic bombs destroyed the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and snuffed out the Japanese will to fight.

The emerging nuclear equilibrium between the two post-World War II power blocs was described by Albert Wohlstetter as the 'delicate balance of terror.'<sup>10</sup> This balance created by nuclear weapons is also referred to as *strategic* or *nuclear stability*. The

strategic community has intensely debated this new dimension of warfare and have failed to reach a consensus, whether nuclear weapons promote stability or are potentially destabilising?

### **Nuclear Weapons: A Source of Deterrent Stability?**

Ever since the end of Second World War, strategists have contributed tomes of strategic thought on the theory of nuclear deterrence. The concept evolved and matured during the period of the Cold War. Although no one has accurately measured deterrent balance, it is clear that a small deterrent may be effective against a larger one, provided the smaller deterrent can threaten the infliction of an unacceptable level of damage. This depends not only on an assessment by each opponent of the other's subjective evaluation of unacceptable damage but also on the offensive capabilities of the small deterrent relative to possible defensive capabilities of the opponent.

Deterrence in the nuclear age seeks the prevention of the opponent's use of nuclear weapons through the threat of retaliation.<sup>11</sup> It can be more fully defined as the maintenance of such a posture that the opponent is not tempted to take any action which significantly threatens his adversary's vital interests. The concept of deterrence is aimed, not only against the use of nuclear weapons but also against the use of the threat of nuclear weapons in vital circumstances.<sup>12</sup>

Throughout history, deterrence has been achieved by building a system of military forces credible enough to threaten punishment if vital interests were impinged upon. If deterrence is adequate, vital interests will not be challenged, and stability will be established and maintained. The problem arises in determining the kind and amount of forces that will achieve the desired deterrence. Two opposite views on the level of forces required to achieve deterrence and thus promote stability are the 'disarmament view' and the 'massive retaliation doctrine.'<sup>13</sup>

The assumption that arms make war, that weapons induce rather than reduce tension results in the conviction that stability is

possible only in a disarmed world. This extreme view is reflected in the advocacy of complete disarmament. Less extreme is the advocacy of arms limitation by agreement, either as a progressive lowering of force levels or force growth rates. The proposition that stability may be inversely proportional to the destructive potentials of weapons results in the opposition to technological advances. If weapons are destabilising in themselves, it is argued, then not only more but also better weapons are more destabilising.<sup>14</sup> Complete disarmament or genuine arms limitation as a means of producing a stable condition is an untested theory. It has never happened in the true sense because nations are neither willing to part with their weapons nor honest in limiting their arms. Disarmament can only be thrust upon vanquished nations.

The other view about deterrence is reflected in doctrine of *massive retaliation*, which was United States official policy during the fifties.<sup>15</sup> Massive retaliation was based on the central strategic concept of a short, extremely destructive war and depended on the potential use of strategic nuclear weapons against population as the sole threatened retaliatory punishment to deter all aggressions, large or small, against the United States or its allies. Hence, it was thought that the United States needed only to maintain its clear superiority in offensive nuclear forces and threaten to use them in times of crises. Stability was sought from the one-sided imposition of terror.

As the Soviet Union acquired a significant deterrent threat, the use of terror became balanced in a "mutually assured destruction," (MAD) regime in the sense that any transgression would result in catastrophic destruction.<sup>16</sup> The major defect of this "suicide pact" or death wish was that it was simply not credible, certainly not with respect to minor transgressions.<sup>17</sup> The massive retaliation strategy fixed the form of military reaction, leaving no options open to the deterring power. It was a policy geared to meet the one improbable type of warfare, but it did not adequately address more probable types of threats. It forced a choice of either yielding to local small aggression or applying the threatened massive nuclear destruction. The ultimate threat was neither credible nor usable as punishment for less than ultimate cause. It also left the terrifying prospect of accidental or unintended war, including not only war as

a result of a "short circuit" or the act of a berserk general<sup>18</sup> but also war as the outcome of miscalculation of intent or the misreading of enemy actions.

The fact that massive retaliation might be disproportionate to the most likely threats led the United States to broaden its options and adopt the concept of *flexible response*.<sup>19</sup> One of its major contributions to stability was that it required, precise definition of what was desirable to deter, in terms of both the full spectrum of conflict and the definition of the vital interests.

It is clear, of course, that it is desirable to deter a nuclear war. This aim was achieved; not only were nuclear weapons not used during the Cold War but there was no strategic use of forces, although an increased alert such as that during the Cuban crisis could possibly be considered a type of strategic use. On the other hand, the effectiveness of deterrence of general nuclear war is not static; the fact that it has worked so far does not ensure against its failure in the future. The deterrent balance needs constant reappraisal.

During the Cold War, the mode of deterring general nuclear war was by maintaining a strategic nuclear force sufficient to make credible a threat of "assured destruction"; that is, certain destruction of something of such value to the enemy that its loss would be unacceptable. In this assured-destruction mode, the force must be of sufficient magnitude to retain credibility even in a second-strike position; that is, even if deterrence fails and the enemy strikes first, using some or all of his first-strike weapons in a counterforce role. This posture was based on the view that strategic stability exists when each side deems the second-strike retaliatory capability of the other to be survivable, reliable, and effective.

Stability, as understood during the Cold War was a dynamic situation of mutual deterrence. Deterrence was constantly upgraded by both sides as the situation changed and technology improved.

### **Nuclear Weapons: Sources of Stability or Instability in South Asia?**

The voluminous corpus of literature available on the evolution of nuclear strategy during the Cold War, points out that the most of the western strategists, who shaped policy decisions argued vehemently in favour of these weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), declaring them to be the underpinning of 'strategic stability.'<sup>20</sup> Ironically the same nuclear weapons are now being touted as a source of potential instability between India and Pakistan.

Two kinds of scenarios are visualised in the South Asian context. One, in which India and Pakistan fight a conventional war, which escalates into a nuclear war and two, a situation, wherein Pakistani nuclear weapons fall into 'irresponsible' hands.<sup>21</sup> Curiously no such threat is visualised in case of the Indian nuclear weapons. The first argument has been played on a number of occasions to defuse explosive standoffs between India and Pakistan, which threatened to spiral out of control. The second scenario has lately assumed sinister proportions, particularly after Pakistan was rocked by internal stability during 2007.<sup>22</sup>

This is in stark contrast to the initial euphoria expressed by the 'nuclear optimists.'<sup>23</sup> It was hoped that nuclear evolution between India and Pakistan would create stable nuclear deterrence, which would make the outbreak of nuclear war unlikely. Parallels were drawn with a similar evolution of nuclear deterrence between Soviet Union and the United States of America during the course of the Cold War and empirical evidence was used to prove that India and Pakistan were able to avoid nuclear exchange despite experiencing multiple crises between 1986 and 2001.<sup>24</sup>

The 'nuclear pessimists' rejected the evolution of such a stable nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan and direly warned of the dangers of a possible nuclear war between these two arch rivals.<sup>25</sup> According to these 'pessimists', India and Pakistan are different from the Cold War superpowers and that nuclear deterrence as practiced by them superpowers is not appropriate for

the South Asian subcontinent for a variety of reasons, like short reaction times and low nuclear thresholds.

A second difference, in their opinion was that India and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals were much smaller than those of the United States and Russia. The US and Russian arsenals truly had the capability to destroy each other's society beyond recovery. The levels of destruction in the South Asian context did not reach the level of "mutual assured destruction" (MAD) that stood as the ultimate deterrent during the Cold War.<sup>26</sup>

Four distinct phases can be discerned in the evolution of nuclear politics in the India – Pakistan milieu. In the first or the preliminary stage both countries covertly developed nuclear weapons, in the teeth of opposition by the nuclear weapon states (NWS), who wanted to stop them from doing just that in the larger context of the non-proliferation regime. In the next two stages (covering the time period during which the two nations had acquired the nuclear capability but had not declared it and next when they declared their nuclear weapons programme), nuclear deterrence was successfully used to prevent conventional wars and in the fourth stage the US is propping up India as a reliable nuclear ally and as a countervail against China,<sup>27</sup> while Pakistan is being maligned as an unpredictable ally, whose nuclear weapons are in the eminent danger of falling into the 'unsafe' hands.<sup>28</sup>

The Indian and Pakistani nuclear programmes had dissimilar beginnings. India had a head start in nuclear R & D. The *Tata Institute of Fundamental Research* (TIFR) was established in Trombay, near Bombay in March 1944 by the father of the Indian atomic programme Dr Homi Bhabha, after whom the institute was, renamed *Bhabha Atomic Research Centre* (BARC) on 12 January 1967.<sup>29</sup> Nehru, the first prime minister of India was intensely involved in his country's nuclear plans and is credited with laying the foundations of the Indian ambitions to become a nuclear power, ever since it became an independent nation.<sup>30</sup> Pakistan only embarked on the nuclear path after the country was dismembered in 1971. New Pakistani President ZA Bhutto summoned his scientists in Multan in January 1972 and tasked them with developing an

indigenous nuclear programme. The Pakistani plans acquired real momentum after the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974. Working ferociously and against all odds the Pakistani scientific community was able to produce enriched uranium and conduct a 'cold test' in 1984.<sup>31</sup>

Chary of allowing nuclear competition in South Asia, India planned nipping the Pakistani atomic ambitions in the bud. Drawing inspiration from the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility in Osirak in 1981,<sup>32</sup> India planned eliminating Pakistani nuclear programme in Kahuta, in collusion with Israel. In 1982, *Washington Post* reported Indian contingency plans to carry out pre-emptive strikes against Pakistani nuclear installations, especially the Kahuta Uranium Enrichment plant.<sup>33</sup> Again during a briefing in 1984 to US Senators, CIA alluded to the possibility of Indian pre-emptive strikes against Kahuta.<sup>34</sup> Giving details of the stillborn Indo-Israeli raid in their book, 'Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Global Weapons Conspiracy,' journalists Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark stated: "In February 1983, with the strike plan at an advanced stage, Indian military officials had travelled secretly to Israel, which had a common interest in eliminating A.Q. Khan, to buy electronic warfare equipment to neutralise Kahuta's air defences." India put its plans on hold after Raja Ramanna, then director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), was warned by the then Chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) Munir Ahmed Khan in Vienna in the autumn of 1983 that Islamabad would attack Trombay, if its facilities in Kahuta were attacked. At this juncture, Israel suggested that they should carry out the raid on Kahuta from the Indian Jamnagar base in Gujarat to launch its jets and another IAF base in northern India to refuel. "In March 1984, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi signed off (on) the Israeli-led operation, bringing India, Pakistan and Israel to within a hair's breadth of a nuclear conflagration." However, according to Levy and Scott-Clark India and Israel backed off from the plan after the CIA tipped off President Zia ul Haq and the US state department warned India that "the US will be responsive if India persists." The book further said Prime Minister Indira Gandhi then aborted the operation despite protests from military planners in New Delhi and Jerusalem. General KM Arif, the then Vice Chief of

Staff of Pakistan Army is quoted as saying: "Our friends had let us known what the Israelis and Indians intended to do, and so we let them know how we would respond. Both sides were harrying the other and were absolutely aware of the consequences of every move. In the end, it was India that blinked."<sup>35</sup> This was the first instance of nuclear brinkmanship in the chequered history of Indo Pakistan conflict. In order to avoid another nuclear escalation, Zia and Gandhi met in New Delhi, in December 1985 and agreed to not attack each others' nuclear facilities.<sup>36</sup>

Another crisis was precipitated by a large-scale Indian military exercise codenamed Brasstacks. The manoeuvres began in July 1986 and reached crisis stage in December. By that time India had amassed a total of nine divisions in Rajasthan opposite the Pakistani province of Sindh, under the garb of the exercise. In absence of any formal notification of deployment of troops, Pakistan became suspicious about this massive concentration of battle ready troops, so close to its border. As a safeguard Pakistan moved its Army Reserve North and Army Reserve South to locations from where they could strike at Punjab or Kashmir. In January 1987, the situation threatened to escalate out of control. Better sense prevailed and both governments decided to lessen tensions by activating a hotline and agreeing to a systematic plan for standing down.<sup>37</sup> Conventional posturing was supplemented by unambiguous nuclear signalling to deter an all out war. On January 28, near the height of the crisis, Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr AQ Khan in a rare interview to Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar, plainly informed him that Pakistan had succeeded in enriching uranium to weapons-grade, and could build nuclear weapons. He added, "...nobody can undo Pakistan or take us for granted. We are here to stay and let it be clear that we shall use the bomb if our existence is threatened."<sup>38</sup> In 1987 President Zia told Time magazine, "Pakistan can build a bomb whenever it wishes".<sup>39</sup>

In early 1990, there were reports of missiles being readied in the subcontinent. The crisis was precipitated due to an unprecedented and largely indigenous independence Kashmiri struggle in late 1989. India blamed Pakistan for aiding and abetting the 'freedom movement' and deployed its troops along Pakistan's

border.<sup>40</sup> Pakistan countered by rapidly deploying its conventional armed forces and pre-positioning its nuclear capable F16s.<sup>41</sup> As risk of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan heightened, US sent the then Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates in the middle of May 1990 to South Asia. In his meetings with senior Pakistani and Indian officials, Gates made it amply clear that US did not want any escalation to nuclear levels.<sup>42</sup>

In the spring of 1999 a border incursion on the icy heights of Kargil, in the lofty Himalayas, once again snowballed into a major crisis, which threatened to escalate into a full blown war. To find a way out of the emerging maelstrom, Pakistani Premier Nawaz Sharif sought an urgent meeting with the American President, so that he could be asked to act as an honest broker to settle this conflict. Much to his chagrin, in the July the 4<sup>th</sup> meeting at Blair House, the Pakistani premier was hectored and cajoled by his American interlocutor, who insinuated that his generals had readied nuclear tipped missiles. A nuclear war he argued would be recipe for disaster. Having 'softened' up the Pakistani premier, Clinton emphasised the importance of an immediate troops withdrawal from Kargil heights and a promise to abide by the sanctity of the Line of Control (LoC) in the disputed territory of Kashmir.<sup>43</sup>

The disastrous consequences of a nuclear war in case of an India – Pakistan conflict were again the underlying theme of US dissuasive diplomacy during the 2002 crisis.<sup>44</sup> The Indians apparently in a bid to copy the American response to 9/11 attacks mobilised troops and concentrated them along the international border (IB) in offensive configurations, in retaliation to an attack on the Indian parliament by Kashmiri militants in December 2001.<sup>45</sup> To dissuade India from launching an attack across the IB, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in his June visit to the subcontinent shared a classified Pentagon study that concluded that a nuclear war between these countries could result in 12 million deaths.<sup>46</sup> This was also leaked to the international media. Travel advisories were issued to prospective travellers and non-essential embassy staffs were withdrawn. The panic caused had inherent economic consequences and threatened to dry up the massive financial investments being

made in India. The effects caused by the American disclosures on the market put a brake on Indian plans to invade Pakistan.

The argument that the potential use of nuclear weapons could lead to instability had been persuasively used by the US.

### **Nuclear Options**

Clearly the nuclear option has deterred war in the past but would it continue to deter war in the future? Ever since India and Pakistan agreed to resume the peace process after the extremely optimistic SAARC summit held in Islamabad in 2004, tensions have by and large eased and the guns have fallen silent across the LoC. The composite dialogue, which resumed four years ago, addresses a basket of seven issues including the complex case of Kashmir.<sup>47</sup>

Understandably the dialogue process has followed a sputtering and frustrating trajectory but nonetheless, it has given hope that war as an instrument of settling issues has been put on ice, hopefully forever. If for argument's sake one accepts such an optimistic prognosis of the India-Pakistan relationship, which has traditionally been wracked by mutual suspicions and misgivings in the past, the question is whether this the opportune moment to opt for complete or partial nuclear disarmament? Before rejecting this approach outright, let's hypothetically examine the consequences. The immediate questions that come to one's mind is: Does Pakistan really stand to gain from such a decision? Would adopting such an option enhance Pakistan's security or would it make it more vulnerable? How can Pakistan redress the insecurity created by giving up its nuclear weapons? Would Pakistan be provided external security guarantees like a nuclear umbrella from allies or friendly countries? (India had similar assurances from western powers, when they perceived that India might be threatened by China).<sup>48</sup> Nuclear-sceptics might say that overtime the safekeeping of Pakistan's nuclear assets has become more important than the security of the country itself and that the existence of these weapons can become a likely *causus belli* for a foreign invasion.<sup>49</sup> Those in favour of nuclear weapons as a dependable means of deterrence may advance three arguments: One, nuclear weapons have deterred wars with

India in the past. Two, these have the potential of deterring wars in the future also because conventional weapons alone do not stand a chance of preventing a nuclear armed adversary from either blatant coercion or outright attack. Three, in case Pakistan gives up its nuclear weapons, the significant amount of time, money and energy spent on developing these would simply go waste. There are other additional questions, which would agitate the minds of disarmament experts. How to dispose off these redundant weapons and the weapon grade fissile material? Destroy them, sell them or place these under international stewardship? If these are to be given into safekeeping, who will be vested with custodial controls – IAEA or OIC or some other international organisation? Difficult questions, with no simple answers.

Nuclear disarmament would inevitably be welcomed by those segments of international community, who perceive nuclear proliferation as a threat to their unique nuclear status. Most western nations including NWS like US, Britain and France, and non – NWS like Germany and other western European states and Japan would applaud it. China might not consider this a welcome development because it will allow India to concentrate exclusively against it. It would be a heaven sent gift to the Indians, as this would remove a major hurdle in their quest in becoming the hegemonic power in the region. Muslim countries and others striving to acquire a nuclear status would be extremely disappointed because this would almost foreclose their nuclear options. Domestically, this will create an acute sense of insecurity and vulnerability.

Before closing the discussion on this option altogether, it would not be out of place to mention that India Pakistan landscape is littered with proposals for ‘no war pacts’ and ‘nuclear free zone’ (NFZ). At this point in time, India is not willing to discuss the NFZ option.<sup>50</sup> This puts paid to pious intentions of complete or partial disarmament.<sup>51</sup>

The sheer weight of economics militates embarking on an expensive and non-productive arms build up to keep up with India, both in the field of conventional as well as nuclear weapons. Logically speaking the more sensible option for Pakistan is to

maintain minimum credible nuclear deterrence without getting involved in a debilitating arms race with India. Right now Pakistan is doing just that. The current Pakistan nuclear policy according to the Director General of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division (SPD) Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai is based on restraint and responsibility with four salient features: (1) deterrence of all forms of external aggression; (2) ability to deter a counter strike against strategic assets; (3) stabilization of strategic deterrence in South Asia; and (4) conventional and strategic deterrence methods.<sup>52</sup> It is clear from this approach that Pakistani nuclear policy is based on the concept of deterrence.

### **Place of Nuclear Weapons in the Stability Matrix**

There is no doubt that nuclear weapons play a fundamentally important role in maintaining balance in an adversarial relationship. The question, however, is whether these WMDs are the ultimate guarantors of stability and security? There are two dimensions of stability – external and internal. Both are extremely complex, multifaceted and intricately interlinked phenomena. One can continue arguing without actually determining the importance of one as compared to another. Strong nations have collapsed because they had become internally weak and unstable.

The collapse and disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the last decade of the previous century is only recent history. During the Cold War nuclear weapons had a vital balancing position in the overall superpower equation. In the final analysis, these could not prevent the collapse of the USSR. The Soviet Union imploded not because of a nuclear strike on Moscow but because its economy could not longer bear the consequences of a long and expensive foreign campaign. The archaic and creaking financial system collapsed and the former global power disintegrated into a number of states. The former USSR makes an extremely interesting case study of internal and external stability. Analysts often credit or blame (depending on which ideology they subscribe to) Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, the last General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the last head of state of the USSR (from 1985 until its collapse in

1991), for presiding over the dissolution of the original bastion of communism by introducing reforms like *perestroika* (economic restructuring) and *glasnost* (policy of maximal publicity, openness, and transparency in the activities of all government institutions in the Soviet Union, together with freedom of information). Fact of the matter is that the decade long military operations in Afghanistan had drained the physical and economic resources of the Soviet Union. The national morale had fallen rock bottom. The common man had lost faith in communism, the Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe were faced with an acute leadership crisis. The socialist system built to safeguard the welfare of the proletariat had been waylaid by the vested interests of the politburo members and the party *apparatchiks*, who had become more equal than the party cadres.<sup>53</sup> Gorbachev was only the catalyst, which hastened the end of the mighty empire, not the main cause for losing the dialectic of opposing wills in the Cold War.<sup>54</sup>

Stability has different connotations when linked with the internal situation. In the case of Pakistan within the framework of South Asia, nuclear weapons are viewed as a major balancing factor in its instable relationship with India. There have been occasions, particularly in times of internal crises, when this strength has been portrayed as a source of weakness. It is interesting to examine the background of such speculations. The first time such a theme was played up was after the 1999 military coup, almost a year after Pakistan had conducted its nuclear tests. Western commentators, particularly arms controls and disarmament experts feared that without civilian controls, Pakistani nuclear weapons in the hands of the military would become a cause for instability. It was surmised that an unbridled military setup would be at liberty to initiate sub-conventional conflicts like the Kargil skirmish, which many hint may have been the root cause for the overthrow of the civil government.

In his analysis about the security of nuclear weapons after the military coup of 1999, Gaurav Kampani, a non-proliferation expert expressed concerns on the removal of 'civilian filters' in the nuclear decision-making process in Pakistan. He thought that the replacement of a civilian government with military hardliners would

result in the intensification of the sub-conventional war between India and Pakistan in Kashmir with risks of escalation to the conventional and nuclear levels and nuclear crisis stability. He also conjectured that the imposition of additional economic sanctions on Pakistan by the United States and international financial institutions would weaken the Pakistani government's commitment to export controls on nuclear, missile, and other dual-use technologies.<sup>55</sup>

In hindsight such doubts both genuine and motivated, proved false as nuclear weapons did not in any way become 'insecure' in the hands of the military sans civilian oversights. Pakistan military did not go into an overdrive to repeat a low intensity conflict like the one that had taken place in Kargil and nuclear weapons were instrumental in deterring India from escalating the mobilisation of forces in 2002 into an all out war. The military government also undertook immediate measures to institute a National Command Authority (NCA) to institutionalise nuclear decision making by way of policy formulation, and development of nuclear weapons and employment control over all strategic nuclear forces and strategic organizations.<sup>56</sup> It was also during this time that sources of nuclear proliferation were effectively blocked.

Concerns were also raised about the possibility of nuclear weapons and radioactive materials passing into the hands of the terrorists after the 9/11 attacks on mainland America.<sup>57</sup> The alarm lasted a while and subsided partially after Pakistani authorities made all out efforts to convince the world at large that their nation's nuclear arsenals were secure and were not likely to fall into the hands of unscrupulous elements.

Similar concerns are now being raised as Pakistan experiences internal turmoil and upheaval. A raft of articles appearing in the western press puts the safety and security of the Pakistani nuclear weapons into question, should religious extremists take over the reins of the government. The American presidential candidates on the campaign trails have offered solutions like taking the war from Afghanistan to Pakistan and setting up joint oversights to control Pakistani nuclear weapons.<sup>58</sup> Much to the chagrin of the Pakistani government, the head of the IAEA Muhammad Al Baradei

also added his voice to the din of condescending concerns about Pakistani nuclear weapons.<sup>59</sup> There were also alarming reports that Pentagon was considering contingencies to secure these weapons to prevent them from falling into the hands of radical extremists.<sup>60</sup> Foreign media reports suggested that hundred million dollars in US aid to secure make Pakistani nuclear weapons safe may have gone waste (*sic*).<sup>61</sup> This prompted Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, Pakistan's DG SPD to set the record straight by informing an audience of foreign journalists that aid offered by the US was accepted in order to share "best practices" in nuclear security and training, and that it amounted to no more than \$8-10 million dollars and not a hundred million dollars as claimed.<sup>62</sup>

There were also rumblings within the US policy making circles, expressing the need to properly audit the monies paid to Pakistan from 2002 to 2008 in various kinds of developmental and military aid and grants.<sup>63</sup> The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Joseph R Biden Jr went on record to suggest a new US approach to Pakistan based on four steps: 1) Tripling the aid to Pakistan for a decade but that it should be given to its people rather than the rulers. 2) Tying security aid with government's performance. 3) Ensuring "democracy dividends" in Pakistan and 4) Engaging the Pakistani people and not just the rulers.<sup>64</sup> Biden's suggestion was interpreted as being positive but patronising.

Suspicion and scepticism notwithstanding, there is a need for stocktaking and retrospection at the official level, of how Pakistan's nuclear weapons can be a source of stability and not become a cause for instability for the country?

Firstly, one needs to determine whether the present instability is because of the nuclear weapons or are there other causes for it? A logical examination of the prevailing instability leads one to the conclusion that nuclear weapons are not the reason for the turmoil rocking the country. The issues tearing the fabric of the society are basic like poverty, hunger and illiteracy. Nonetheless, a bogey has been created by the western media that Pakistani nuclear weapons were in imminent danger of falling into the hands of radical elements, who would use nuclear weapons irrationally.<sup>65</sup>

Ergo, it is the dreaded religious extremists, who arouse all these fears and apprehensions and not the nuclear weapons *per se*.

Secondly, one needs to contemplate, how to remove such international concerns and worries? The results of the recently held elections have already done a lot to disabuse the doomsday sayers, who have been depicting Pakistan as the hotbed of extremism. That the forces of extremism have been rejected goes to show the high level of maturity that the common Pakistani possesses.<sup>66</sup> This, however, does not absolve the new government from undertaking a holistic campaign to purge the feeling of perceived 'relative deprivation' afflicting the increasing numbers of the less privileged members of the society.<sup>67</sup> This can only be done if a real term investment is made in the human resource capital. The common man, who now makes up the swelling ranks of the marginalised and disenfranchised, has been neglected far too long. He must now be made stakeholders in the destiny of the nation. This is far easier said than done. Long term measures need to be undertaken to provide modern education to all, as compared to the archaic madrassah based education, which promotes obscurantism and perpetuates a primitive worldview. Equal opportunities in life, justice, healthcare, potable drinking water and freedom from fear and want are essential ingredients for a healthy developing society.

Thirdly, there is a requirement to prepare an imaginative security policy, which provides solutions to internal as well as external threat. For security from external aggression, first and foremost Pakistan needs internal stability. Stability within can only be insured, if the national leadership is mature and far sighted. An honest and committed top hierarchy can introduce good governance, maintain law and order, create harmony among the ethnically diverse population of Pakistan, alleviate poverty, and restore the confidence of the common man in his future. The country is currently experiencing violent upheaval and turmoil. Religious extremism threatens to tear apart the fabric of the society. The present state of affairs is the result of years of apathy and neglect. Certain segments of society have become so marginalised that the only solace and salvation they can find for themselves is in an old fashioned brand of religious extremism. There is no short term

solution for the polarisation of the society. The disenfranchised must be brought back to the main stream.

### **Conclusion**

Nearly thirty six years ago, after Pakistan was brutally torn asunder by force of arms, a strategic decision was taken to opt for nuclear weapons. Such a nostrum was expected to balance the strategic equation in South Asia. The decision has stood the test of time. As the nature of threat evolves, there is growing awareness that in the times to come nuclear weapons alone would not be enough to ensure internal or external security.

The nature of threat needs to be reassessed and defence policy revised in the light of new ground realities, including the menace of terrorism. Questions like the need for maintaining large armed forces trained and configured to fight a battle of manoeuvre should be reconsidered. The ratio of conventional forces as compared to nuclear forces needs to be rationalised.

In order to gauge the public opinion about the Pakistani nuclear weapons, I carried out a random survey among my peers in the PhD class. The results gathered were very instructive, i.e. all the respondents were in favour of retaining nuclear weapons, though many were unsure whether these should ever be used.<sup>68</sup>

One may conclude therefore that, whereas, nuclear weapons are acceptable as a safeguard against foreign aggression, many consider their actual use as counter productive. Axiomatically, one may also extend the argument that nuclear weapons are no guarantee against internal instability and turmoil.

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## CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

*Lieutenant General (R) Asad Durrani*

Military is a part of civil society in fact its reflection but it still stands apart in all social orders. The reason is simple: the force of arms has played a significant if not the decisive role in all ages. History, though wrongly, reads like a narrative of wars. "To serve" in some societies is understood as service in the armed forces, and an "officer" is the one who has commanded troops. Many of the great captains of war—Alexander, Chengiz Khan, Saladin, Napoleon—were warriors and at the same time leaders of their people. Even in modern times, some of them like Ata-Turk, De Gaul and Eisenhower, after they doffed their uniforms, were called national leaders by their grateful countrymen. In Pakistan, too, the military has a special status, but for different reasons.

Most of the region that today constitutes Pakistan has so often been trampled and traversed by marauding and transiting armies, that the people here have learnt to live and bear with the superior force. The area is fertile with a prosperous agrarian culture. The cost of conflict has therefore been always heavy. Compromise and submission were thus a more pragmatic *modus vivendi* than defiance and resistance. In fact, some of them from the less affluent areas found joining ranks of the foreign forces a beneficial pursuit. After the creation of Pakistan, there was yet another reason to concede a special status to the military.

Carved out from British India at the time of its liberation from colonial rule, Pakistan shared a number of succession problems with its larger twin, today's India. Thus born in a state of insecurity, in the eyes of its people the armed forces of Pakistan were not only the guarantor of national security, but also a symbol of its sovereignty. Military leaders, like Zia, even assumed the role of guarding the nation's "ideology". They may have been inspired by the Turkish armed forces who consider themselves to be the custodians of the country's secular character. Unlike in Turkey, though, our armed forces did not acquit themselves well in defence

of their country. Their larger than life role, however, did encourage them, as in Turkey, to influence national policies, even take over political power. In both places, the coup makers were assured of the peoples' support, or at least of absence of any mass resistance.

The civil-military relations in Pakistan are quite naturally an upshot of all these factors, but are most crucially affected by the Army's periodic, and consequently ever-deepening, involvement in the country's politics.

### **Factors Affecting Civil-Military Relations**

One reason that the people of Pakistan, in large numbers if not in majority, welcome a military takeover is because they believe they had not been served well by the civil society institutions. That helps the Army restore calm and order in the short term. If in the long run, the military too comes up short, there are good grounds for that as well. Civil affairs are complex requiring sustained work and patience. Army on the other hand is trained to achieve specific goals within a laid down time frame. But indeed there are other more profound reasons.

Military is part of the state apparatus, the so called "establishment". It is therefore inclined, also due to its own lack of capacity, to work through other institutions of the state. The masses thus continue to get the same deal, except that they now direct their ire towards the military. The civil bureaucracy too, although it is frequently shunted around when the politicians are in power, has grounds to grudge under the military rule. Its more lucrative jobs are often taken by servicemen.

The military is also not suited to wield political power. Unity and the chain of command are its essential ingredients. Politics on the other hand has to be more accommodative, and therefore needs a pluralistic approach. When the military takes over, it faces two problems right at the outset: it lacks legitimacy and it needs some form of public participation. It therefore undertakes abnormal measures to resolve these anomalies; finding creative judicial and constitutional solutions, holding referenda with little credibility,

cultivating pliable political forces as well as manipulating elections. This process obviously has to be constantly monitored and adjusted, and often requires damage control, even course correction. In due course military rule seems like an extended exercise in crisis management.

Minorities and smaller units are affected in a strangely perverse way under the military regime. In a conventional political system, such groups and regions have a modicum of representation. Military rulers make extra efforts to woo them but end up acting patronisingly and are thus resented by any self-respecting people. Here again, those who collaborate with the military are either unpopular or with little standing. In smaller regions and communities, this can alienate the people to a greater degree than elsewhere.

Some of the salient effects on civil-military relations of the military's frequent forays into politics can be summarised as follows:-

- This creates an oligarchic structure, with the military and its collaborators at the top of the pyramid. They get increasingly isolated from the rest of the people, and are held responsible for all that is wrong in the country.
- The fault lines in the polity proliferate. To the existing divisions are added: those between the civil and the military bureaucracies; between those who collaborate with the military rulers and those who oppose them; and the regions and minorities who do not feel genuinely represented.
- The Army gets the blame, not only for the wrongs it commits but also for those that it did not (more on it later in the paper). A few of its acts, like its welfare and commercial projects that otherwise might have escaped public notice, come into the limelight and are cited (its "corporate interests" for example), wrongly in my view, as some of the military's motivations to hang on to power.

- Since ultimately the military rule cannot provide the relief that the common man expects, over time the masses have come to regard the Army, along with the politicians, the bureaucracy, the feudal elite and the entrepreneurs, as yet another ruling class.

### **Implications for National Security**

National security was never a 'military only' concept. In primitive times and societies, brute force could provide a minimum of security for a community to survive. But to prosper, physical protection merely ensured one of the conditions for the development of civilisation. Even during the Middle Ages, when mobilising large bodies of arms was a relatively simple affair, Greek, Roman, Egyptian or Mongolian armies depended upon sound administrative and political systems relevant for those times.

Now that warfare is a much more complex and expensive affair, without a developed economic and technical domestic base, no meaningful defence capability is sustainable. And indeed, since modern war has become so destructive and its effects felt beyond areas of conflict, good diplomacy has taken on the role of a country's first line of defence. A robust security structure is therefore anchored to the three pillars of domestic, foreign and defence policies. As argued above, military rule erodes at least one of them, the domestic pillar.

When in power, the military initially resists the temptation to increase defence spending, but later succumbs to it, probably under institutional pressure. That, however, is not the real damage that the military's exclusive status, in or out of power, has caused. (In absolute terms, the defence budget in any case is not a huge amount.) A more fundamental problem is that with the military immune to civilian or outside control and oversight, a good part of this amount is spent on institutional whims, no new or unconventional ideas are developed or encouraged to improve the existing defence system (ours is an expensive model), and one fails to get the right "bang for the buck".

The most serious damage that the Army's special status in our power matrix has done is that the civilian decision makers have either abdicated their responsibility towards formulating security policies, or distanced themselves from policies that did not work. At times, they picked up the courage to change or modify an existing policy. But when it did not create the desired effect, either due to a half-hearted attempt or because the change was not well considered, they made the Army a convenient scapegoat for any botched efforts. There is a fairly widespread, in fact universal, impression that security policies were the military's exclusive domain; a forbidden territory for all others. That, however, is not the whole truth.

The first elected government after Zia's death took office in December 1988 with Benazir Bhutto at its head. That was the time that the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was nearly complete. The new government, legitimately and correctly, asked for a policy review since the situation had qualitatively changed. Some elements in the military were certainly opposed to it, but not due to any reservation against a civilian government's prerogative to direct a core security policy. It was because they regarded themselves as the custodians of a legacy, especially the one that had succeeded (the miracle of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century had taken place, and the Soviets had withdrawn). Ultimately, the review was done and it did some good to our post-Soviet Afghan policy.

The resistance in Indian-held Kashmir erupted in early 1990. The same government very wisely decided to take all political parties into their confidence. There was no opposition by the military establishment, which willingly contributed to all such briefings and discussions.

Later that year, another government, this one led by Nawaz Sharif, was elected to power. The new prime minister was keen to promote friendly relations with India and believed, contrary to the existing perception, that it could be done without the resolution of the Kashmir issue. He took the initiative and reached out to Narasimha Rao when the latter was elected to lead the new Indian government in 1991. The attempt was aborted, not because the Army came in the way, but because a sound frame-work had not

been worked out before launching the peace process. When it was done, in 1997 during Nawaz Sharif's second tenure, the forward movement did become possible.

It is generally believed that during her second term in office, Ms. Bhutto took a hard line regarding India under Army pressure. It was in fact the opposition led by Nawaz Sharif that in her first stint relentlessly blamed her for being "soft" on India and out to "roll-back" our core policies, on Afghanistan, on Kashmir and on the Nuclear issue. When returned to power, she wanted to prove her detractors wrong and became recklessly aggressive. In the process she courted a number of disasters. An attempt to revive the Kashmir issue in the UN came close to creating an embarrassing showdown, and was barely averted by the timely intervention of a few friendly countries.

Earlier in the paper, a mention has been made of how Nawaz Sharif was frustrated in his efforts to reduce tensions with India. Having learnt the right lesson, when re-elected in 1997, he tasked his foreign secretary, Shamshad Ahmed, to forge a workable framework with his counterpart, Salman Haider, the Indian foreign secretary. The two professionals, backed by the desired political will (I. K. Gujral, the Indian prime minister was also equally enthusiastic), produced a formula that has since become famous as the "composite dialogue".

This is not the right place to discuss either its design logic or the way it has been pursued thereafter. Suffice it to say that since the concept has survived many a crisis-- Kargil, the military coup in Pakistan of 1999, and the 2002 Standoff between the two countries, to name a few-- some sound thinking must have gone into it. The more important point to be made here is that it was purely a civilian enterprise. The Pakistani military very correctly stood aside and watched its nascent civilian leadership learn the art of peace making.

There was yet another crucial decision that was taken by a political leader who was in fact encouraged to do so by none other than the then Army Chief. The Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 had created a dilemma for Pakistan, who had the technical wherewithal

to respond in kind. The political and the psychological factors demanded that we too should carry out a few tests of our own. Indeed, these would have been inevitably followed by wide-ranging sanctions that, considering our critical economic situation at that time, would have added to our discomfort. Jehangir Karamat, the COAS at that time, told Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif that since the post test situation, internally and externally, would have to be managed by his government, the decision must essentially be his, in consultation with the cabinet.

The abnormal equation between the civil society and the military has resulted in an unusual configuration at the top of our power pyramid. In our political vocabulary it is called "the troika". During civilian periods, the prime minister as the chief executive is indeed one of the components. The Army chief is obviously the other. And the president, who usually enjoys extra influence because the military does not believe that the threat of a coup or judicial oversight were sufficient checks to rein in the elected bodies, completes the trio. The arrangement may have some merit and could also work. It is a misnomer, however, to call it a "troika".

The Russian three horse sleigh, the original troika, was pulled in the same direction. Our troika at the best of times has had a tenuous equilibrium. More often than not it resulted in turf battles. The Army chief has the monopoly over physical force, but it is not usable except in unusual circumstances. In normal times, he must make do with the aura of force if he wishes to influence policies. The president, too, though blessed with extraordinary constitutional powers, cannot flaunt them except in extreme conditions, and then too possibly with the military's tacit cooperation and at some risk of a judicial reproof and reversal. A smart prime minister can function within these restraints; even ride roughshod without transgressing certain limits. Such of them, however, do not join politics or get elected to head a government.

During our last civilian interlude, 1988-99, this uneasy relationship within the so-called troika led to some rather unsavoury conflicts.

All our rulers, military and civilian, prefer a pliable judiciary. They like to take the cover of the law, but hate to be hampered by its finer points. Military rule to start with, needs legitimacy from the Supreme Court and remains dependent upon its goodwill for as long as it lasts. It therefore at times takes extraordinary measures to get rid of difficult judges by asking for a fresh oath, which is a reaffirmation of loyalty in other words. Civilian governments have to follow a more tedious procedure: they depend upon the president for approval of their nominees.

During her first term as prime minister (1988-90), Benazir Bhutto on one occasion insisted that the president was bound by her advice when appointing judges to the Supreme Court. The President, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, had his own interpretation. The disagreement almost caused the country's two top leaders to take the matter to court for adjudication. It was resolved through the mediatory efforts of the third member of the Troika, General Aslam Beg, the then COAS.

This was not the only time that the president and the prime minister sought the Army's intervention to resolve a deadlock that was threatening to paralyse the functioning of the government. During the second tenure of Nawaz Sharif, the Army Chief, Jehangir Karamat, was recalled from a foreign trip to help resolve a standoff between the Prime Minister and President Farooq Leghari over the conduct of the Chief Justice, Sajjad Ali Shah. This time, however, the efforts proved futile and both the President and the Chief Justice resigned from their respective offices. That episode will remain as one of the most benighted spots in our history, as it followed a raid on the Supreme Court by the prime minister's supporters.

On yet another occasion an army chief's intervention resulted in both the president and the prime minister abdicating their posts. Nawaz Sharif in his first stint locked horns with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan to get more political space. General Waheed Kakar, the then COAS, initially tried to arbitrate a less drastic outcome, but the Prime Minister insisted that the crisis could only be resolved if the two antagonists resigned to make way for fresh elections.

Nawaz Sharif in fact remained uncomfortable with all the presidents (except for Rafiq Tarar who was practically a family member) and the army chiefs with whom he had to share the burden. Rather than by a troika, he believed that the country was best run like a Karachi donkey cart: one animal to take the load and the other(s) to play the act. Benazir Bhutto, though probably nearly as obsessed with unbridled power, acted more pragmatically. In her first tenure, she did make a few ham-handed attempts at clipping the military's wings. She insisted on having as head of the ISI a person not recommended by the Army Chief, and asserted, strangely, that though the president could appoint a service chief, his retirement was the prime minister's prerogative. But in her second term, she decided to keep the Army in good humour. Her recipe to pre-empt presidential wrath by getting a loyalist installed in that office, however, did not work out. The second time around, she was dismissed by her own former deputy, Farooq Leghari.

### **Pak-US Relationship**

The *raison d'être* of the Pak-US relationship was the security concerns of the two countries, even though these did not ride in tandem. Pakistan was looking for an ally powerful enough to countervail its imbalance vis-à-vis India. The US, having failed to woo India—the bigger and therefore the more preferred choice—to become a cog in the anti-communist ring in the region, found merit in forging a security link with Pakistan. That resulted in a close working relationship between the two militaries, and though not intended to do so, affected civil-military relations in Pakistan.

I do not believe that the US or its military ever encouraged, even tacitly, the Pakistan Army to take over political power. But whenever the latter did, its special rapport with the US defence establishment proved helpful. After necessary noises about the democracy in Pakistan having suffered yet another setback, the more mundane considerations—the Soviet threat, its occupation of Afghanistan, the nuclear factor, etc—persuaded American leadership to maintain a “policy of engagement” with Pakistan's military rulers. It was also not too painful. The hegemonic powers like the US find it more convenient to work with leaders of client states who

are not constrained by institutions like a parliament, or for that matter by public opinion.

That however created a problem on the Pakistani side. People here at the best of times have been suspicious of American intentions and critical of their policies. As they got disenchanted with the military regime, they cursed the US for acting as its prop and started seeing their own Army as a tool of American imperialism. After the US led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 and the role played by the military led government in Islamabad in the events that followed, most Pakistanis believe that their Army was fighting an American war.

The US aid to Pakistan has always had a heavy, if not a dominant, defence component. Presently, two third of the American overt and covert aid is meant for the military. Since most of it is for the hardware and almost none of it serves to build up indigenous infrastructure, it has led to, like it did in the past, a dependency relationship. The Pakistani military would get addicted to high-tech equipment, will remain reliant on the US' supply line and will therefore obstruct any effort to change the nature of relationship, even when a course correction becomes necessary. It now has implications beyond civil-military relations, more grievously for the national security.

### **A Possible Prescription**

In our civil-military equation, the balance has been in favour of the coercive force. The mere fact that it has ruled the country directly for over half of its existence, and wielded disproportional influence for the rest, places the onus of damage control on the Army. And to be fair, it did try; not so much to improve the civil-military relations, but to save the national security interests from the vicissitudes of our erratic politics.

After the restoration of civilian rule in December 1988, the first paper sent by the GHQ to the Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, highlighted the need to find broad consensus on major national security issues. It expressed apprehensions that the political parties,

because of the peculiar nature of politics in the country, would exploit any subject, even to the detriment of national security. The latter events were to confirm that it was not too alarmist an assessment.

As mentioned earlier in this paper, Ms. Bhutto in her first stint asked for a review of the Afghan Policy. Even though it is the legitimate right of any government, her opposition, led by Nawaz Sharif, raised plenty of hue and cry claiming that she was out to harm the country's core interests. In her turn, she did not act any differently. Soon after the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998, she dared Nawaz Sharif to respond in kind and mocked him to wear bangles when he was seen to be hedging. However, when he finally did order the counter-tests, the lady moaned that the country was now isolated.

The GHQ paper suggested that the government could consider forming a 'national security advisory group' consisting of specialists from public and private sectors, as well as from the political spectrum. The idea was to create a core group to analyse our major security concerns and present to the government various policy options. More importantly, it would be a good forum for the opinion and policy makers of all hues to get familiar with the mechanics of evolving and implementing security policies. Another major benefit that one expected from such a process was that since it would involve the opposition, the latter might resist the temptation to politicise security issues and, when in power, would be well informed about them.

The authors carefully avoided recommending that the government should form a national security council (NSC). With our history of military involvement, the instinctive reaction to this suggestion has always been: "this must be another ploy of the Army to perpetuate its rule by other means". To further obviate such apprehensions, the military has repeatedly said (the concept was presented to other governments as well) that such a body- group or a council- should exclude service chiefs and merely have the chairman of joint chiefs of staff committee (CJCSC) as an ex-officio member. It was thus to be a "civilian" national security body, advisory in

nature, under the aegis of the prime-minister, and with the opposition and the independent expertise generously represented.

All the political parties when in opposition supported the idea enthusiastically. Once in power, none of them wanted to have anything to do with it. The reasons could be many: wish to woo the army when out of power; exclude the opposition from any decision making, when in power; or simply, political paranoia. Mian Nawaz Sharif, who had no compunction riding to political power with the military's support (and more than once), was so rattled as the prime-minister by an announcement of this concept by his genuinely apolitical army chief, Jehangir Karamat, that the latter was asked to resign.

In the meantime, the original idea has been metamorphosed because on the two occasions that it has been actualised, both the composition and the purpose were different. During the interregnum under President Farooq Leghari (November 1996 to February 1997) a council of defence and national security (CDNS) was created which included the three service chiefs and the CJCS. The aim was to show that the military fully supported the ouster of a civilian government by the President. And the present NSC, under General Musharraf, is obviously meant to serve as the supreme national council.

### **Conclusion**

Civil-military relations anywhere are essentially an expression of the status that the civil society concedes to its armed forces. The multiple fissures, vertical and horizontal, that exist in Pakistani polity, have conferred a larger than life role to its military. It is varyingly seen as a fire brigade, an arbiter, even as a messiah. But when it fails to come up to expectations, that is often the case since it is not cut out for such tasks, then the same military is dubbed as a predatory class raring to grab power and obsessed with keeping its stranglehold, if necessary, by manipulating its levers from behind the scenes.

The military on its part, as an institution has always been reluctant to play these extra-ordinary roles. Ironically, it is not primarily due to awareness that it cannot, but because of the adverse effects on its culture and ability to perform its primary role. Once in power, however, the effects are far graver. It suffers from all ills of being in total power.

The end product is not only an unhealthy civil-military relationship, but an all pervasive feeling that at the root of all ills was the military (an exaggerated view), and that it had a monopoly over formulation and execution of the national security policy. The Army on the other hand may have tried to stand aside to encourage the civilian leadership to take decisions but has not succeeded in changing this perception. The core security issues have therefore quite often not found the mass support that is the *sine qua non* for their success.

Obviously the need is to create a broad consensus on these issues between the civil and the military. The stumbling block indeed is the great political divide that brings the military to power, and then becomes so useful.

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## **SOME THOUGHTS ON THE DILEMMAS CONFRONTING THE COUNTER-INSURGENT IN A DEMOCRACY**

*Professor Hayatullah Khan Khattak*

### **Introduction**

Democracy and Counter-Insurgency Operations do not sit easily together.<sup>1</sup> The entire situation of the counter insurgent in a democracy, some believe, is a massive dilemma in itself. It seems as horrific that the forces of such a state should ever consider turning their eyes inwards towards the ranks of their own society and in this repulsion is born the softly thought suspicion that all is not well in the state of Denmark and the consideration that perhaps the wound is symptomatic of a gravely weak society.

Democracies confronted by a revolutionary group can attack, concede, bargain or delay or employ a combination of two or more of these strategies. Much depends on the idealism and resolution of the leadership and people of the country concerned but all of these "options" can be costly in political terms for a democratic state. Not all nations are threatened equally and a lot depends upon the nature aims and setting of the insurgency.

This paper will attempt no solutions but merely seeks to outline the major areas wherein the dilemmas lurk and in so doing point up the fact that the simplistic solutions so readily adopted by so many owe their existence more the determination of their owners to avoid reality and political exigencies than they do to any desire to respond to it.

### **Lessons From Northern Ireland: The dilemma of Political Resolve**

Past colonial experience, including Vietnam under the French and the Americans, has seen insurgency operations in rural and urban environments and indeed as we continue to see most prominently in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, the campaign in Malaya was required to counter an essentially rural insurgency, whereas in

Aden most of the action was concentrated in urban areas. Insurgencies can be inspired by communism, anti-colonialism, tribalism, religion, nationalism or minority fears. Local circumstances can be very different and although the dilemmas for the authorities are not always fundamentally different, any counter-insurgency actions have to be tailored to the type and scale of threat. The British involvement in Counter-Insurgency was inevitable, given their colonial and post colonial responsibilities<sup>2</sup>. Although the British gained a lot of experience, the lessons, principles and techniques derived from earlier operations have limited relevance to other conflicts. Military leader facing the internal security problem in Northern Ireland from 1969 no doubt considered the lessons which had been learned in the twelve years of the Malayan Emergency, and perhaps more significantly from Aden and Cyprus; but these lessons could not supply the definitive answer to a conflict taking place in a very different set of social, political and geographical circumstances. The British have had to relearn some old lessons, but Northern Ireland was hardly a colonial situation with the majority of one million Protestant and many of the Catholics wishing to remain a part of the United Kingdom. But the Northern Ireland situation was clearly similar to a colonial situation in the sense that the final outcome depended not so much on the IRA's capacity to inflict unacceptable losses on the security forces, as on its power (and the power of the Protestant extremists supporting the British), to persuade the British Government and British people that it had become impossible to hold on in the Province.

What was so significant about the Northern Ireland internal security problem was how resolute *politically* the British government had been to outfight the insurgent forces in all aspects of the struggle which lasted, in a sense, into the new millennium before the Irish Republican Army formally and publicly called it a day and settled for a political solution<sup>3</sup>. The political will of a democracy is invariably the prime target of the insurgent whether in the colonial or metropolitan environment. Of course the various sets of ground rules, such as Thompson's "Five Principles" cannot be ignored by any government faced with an Insurgency<sup>4</sup>. Some of these 'rules' apply some of the time in certain situations. What is required all of

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the time is close coordination between politician, police, military and paramilitary; a consideration of political matters before all else and perhaps most important of all the ability to be as ready as possible before any insurgency breaks out -timing being the essence in this kind of struggle. The sooner the central power reacts, in the most appropriate way, the less time will be available for the insurgent to organize and start to apply revolutionary war principles and stages. McCuen states that 'the most serious and the most common error of counter - revolutionary warfare is to do too little too late'<sup>5</sup>. This simple, but important principle has been disregarded over and over in the current insurgencies afflicting coalition partners in the so called 'war on terror'.

**Dilemmas of the "Who" and the Terrain**

The insurgent will be either local or to various degrees, alien or both. If he is local it might indicate that the counter insurgent is up against local grievances backed by local personnel with local knowledge. If he is alien, the problem may not be so deep rooted. He may be the standard traveling agitator at work whose very strangeness can be used against him. Conversely, the stranger's presence might indicate the reverse, that the local problem is but part of a grater struggle with all that implies. He may have the sympathy, even the gratitude, of local inhabitants for his part in the struggle or he may be seen as an interfering outsider importing trouble. None of this much matter in itself and certainly it is not peculiar to democracies. What does bring forth a dilemma lies in the establishment of this 'who'. The plucking out of an individual need be nothing more than that in some societies, but in democracy, and especially in a part of it experiencing unrest, relationships matter and it is these relationships which are the particular problem area for the counter insurgent personnel. There is a need to be sure of the 'who' factor before and during action taken against the insurgent for if his relationships within the society form which he has been plucked are not understood or are ignored then the real process of democracy in action can ensure reaction against the states personnel in their legitimate attempt to erase illegitimate insurrection. Worse still, ill judged reaction could give some legitimacy to the insurrection.

Staying with the 'who' factor, any insurgent has two jobs to do to gain the support of a proportion of the population and impose their will upon the government either by military defeat or by endurable harassment. Now the insurgent may adopt, or perhaps have to adopt, a variety of means to achieve his objectives. He might use non violent demonstrations or he might employ small and effective armed groups. These in turn might direct their fire at security forces or their bombs at the local populace. Whatever their approach, the response must constantly bear in mind the fact that no campaign of subversion will make headway unless it is based on a cause with wide popular appeal. But the counter insurgent will also be always faced by the dilemma that an insurgency's existence implies a base of popular support that actively aids or at least tolerates the insurgents. Mao Tse-tung spoke of guerrillas as fish in the sea, a metaphor that suggests a great sea of support exists and that fish cannot survive outside it.

What all this memory work adds up to is the truism that over reaction coupled with an interested audience spreads revolutionary tendency and increases general discontent. Gunning down swathes of demonstrators might well be immediately militarily effective or even aesthetically pleasing to some but the essential dilemma is that this action in such a state might well be counter reductive and may in fact bring about much more of the same. In a totalitarian state, wherein the individual's actions tend to be dictated more by permission and expediency than by opinion and defense of rights, such considerations may be slight. The democrat is ultimately the servant of all members of his society and he is compelled to bear this in mind. Thus the insurgent in such a society cannot but be aware that the gloves must always be on his opponent's hands for it is only thus that his opponent can maintain the public credibility without which he would not be permitted to function. Thus, it is that the counter insurgent that is faced with a dilemma relatively new to history, the need to protect his society without employing all of the means at his disposal.

The dilemmas posed by the insurgent then can be summarized as follows. He must be found in a common

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inflammatory manner. This can be slow and ineffective. He must be identified in such a way that further spreading of his tendency is not encouraged out of sympathy or thanks. The military threat which he presents must be responded to effectively but without undue force, without involving the innocent and without creating martyrs. This process again can be slow, ineffective and thus self defeating as well as creating resentment in a public which would also resent heavier tactics.

It is an area rife with dilemmas but the main dilemma is that posed by the fact that the partial answer to the question of 'who' must include the fact that the insurgent is within a democracy and is thus entitled to the unwitting and often unwilling protection of the general public. Thus the counter insurgent is in a war that any blow not fully absorbed by the insurgent will strike his fellow citizens and may even rebound on himself. Consistent, effective and wholehearted defensive action in such circumstances must be difficult.

However, no man is an island. Insurgents do not simply appear from the depths of tourist coaches with nothing better to do than attempt to overthrow the local government. They are thrown up by circumstances, by situations and in this area also lay traps for the counter insurgent of a type which are only to be found in democracies.

Once again, this area can be roughly shaken down into two sub division, the physical and the spiritual (for want of a better word). By physical, I simply mean problems of terrain and environment. By spiritual I mean the legacy of historical events.

The dilemma of terrain is simple but impressive. Simply put it runs thus; if the counter insurgent treats terrain in this type of military situation as such then he will lose. He may destroy the immediate enemy but the havoc wrought to achieve this end will destroy the fiber of his society.

The geography and demography of a democratic state can often assist the insurgent movement. The concentrations of

population in large cities can offer a vulnerable target for the terrorist wing of an insurgent movement. Even in liberal-democracies there is often a significant element in cities that feels deprived; a city proves a concentration of vital but soft targets; attacks in densely populated areas will normally bring an immediate and possibly disproportionate reaction from the media, and the city can provide a secure base for terrorist organization.

Whenever such trouble breaks out, the counter insurgent has his hands bound. Normal responses to such trouble would be to flood it with troops, to clear it of inhabitants, especially in urban centers, or in rural areas to plaster it with high explosive, aerial, or artillery bombardment or something equally distressing. Such courses, except in unusual circumstances, are simply not available to the democratic commander dealing with an insurgency.

His terrain imposed dilemmas are these. First of all if he goes after his prey ruthlessly and single mindedly, he will possibly swell its ranks by his alienation of the local populace. If he does not so pursue he will probably alienate a good deal of the general population as well as his erstwhile leaders. Second, if he treats insurgent terrain as such, with all that implies, he will effectively make insurgents sympathizers out of whole sections of fellow nationals thus fairly drastically escalating the conflict. Once again, if he does not so treat it, he runs the risk of damaging the morale of his own troops and personnel and of permitting the conflict to prolong itself indefinitely by allowing the enemy that sine qua non, secure base areas.

These physical problems which, if improperly handed, may disenchant various sections of the public through annoyance, inconvenience or fitful bursts of fright are as nothing compared to the dilemmas posed by attempts at solving the historical puzzle he may well find himself part of. As stated previously, minorities are the culprits in almost all cases of insurgent activity in democracies. Minorities are to be found in every democracy currently in business – it can be no other way. Ethnic and religious minorities present special handling problems. Too much force or too little tact and understanding can turn a minor, though nasty, incident into a

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running civil war. Conversely, too much tact and understanding can have exactly the same effect. Political minorities are often remarkably volatile.

The counter insurgent in this situation is likely to discover that that he is trying to maintain, through the judicious but paradoxical use of force, similar values to those with whom he is in conflict. His task is to fight and suppress the insurgency – or rather the insurgents – the cause is meat for the politicians. His enemies in this struggle are likely to be hot in pursuit of their personal freedoms and the context in which these are sought predisposes them to hostility with the counter insurgent because of who he is and this exacerbated by what he does. He is also likely to find himself the enemy of all faction involved simply because he has permitted another faction to survive.

The situational dilemmas are thus once again clear but full of menace. To treat terrain as terrain is asking for social and political trouble. Not to treat it as such is demanding military trouble. To treat historical context and background as of no current import or relevance is to invite historic disasters. To treat it with respect and caution may be militarily unwise and may court the accusation of taking sides with a minority party or worse and may further aggravate a delicate problem and thus effectively or worse and may further aggravate a delicate problem and thus effectively delay the discovery of acceptable solutions.

### **Dilemmas of a Free and Open Society Itself**

Democracies can be the most open and free states in the international system of states. Although such freedom can result in strength from flexibility (as compared to the brittle strength and rigidity of totalitarian and dictatorial regimes), democratic societies are vulnerable. In any Parliamentary democracy there are many ways available for publicizing a cause, or campaigning for political change. The basic freedoms of speech, association and opposition are fundamental to such societies and most democrats would argue that dissent is a sign of health and should be tolerated. The problem with this civilized state of affairs is that some internal groups and

certain external agencies are more than skeptical of such ideal perceptions of democracy; they are impatient with what is often a very inefficient and bureaucratic system that accepts the principle of change but only according to slow democratic principles and procedures. Democracy can be exceedingly frustrating for people in a hurry, or imbued with other ideals, hate, or who are perhaps members of a traditionally peaceful minority convinced that their political aims will never be achieved. At least in totalitarian regimes the target for dissent is easily identifiable, whereas in a democracy, responsibility is far more diffuse. The very acceptance that group can organize and campaign is somewhat condescending, but often it is this freedom that undercuts the reason for insurgency, as the intensity of dissent is diluted. However, because there are few restrictions on individual freedom in democracies, individuals and groups with extreme views can act with dramatic consequences. It is so easy to threaten violence, to use fear to coerce, persuade, or gain public attention.

It is important to differentiate between insurgency groups, and their aim, in order to come to some conclusion about 'successes' or 'failure'. An insurgent groups' aim can be very limited, for some revolutionaries the very fact that they manage to force or encourage the media to relay their views is a sufficient success. In this respect the terroristic aspect of revolutionary war can be viewed as pure theatre. Other groups or organizations can be far more determined and have more adventurous aims. They could employ terrorism for publicity and then threaten further acts of terrorism if various concessions are not granted. Other insurgency aims could be anarchistic; be aimed at provoking repression and counter terrorism in order to bring down an already unpopular government (which is therefore likely to be non-democratic); to enforce obedience or cooperation; to punish; to make the people choose sides and to enforce their version of ideology whether political or religious.

Terrorism's, as part of insurgency, significance often lies less in what actions have been taken than in what ordinary people fear may happen in the future. Although the actual amount of disruption and violence caused by terrorism employed during an insurgency in a democracy has often been exaggerated, due to the

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nature of the 'media-man', there is little doubt about the ease with which extreme groups can kick their views into the headlines. There is an odd psychological aspect about disasters and terrorism occurring in one place at one moment that always helps the insurgent and frustrates the Counter-Insurgent.

One of the crucial dilemmas that confront democracy faced with an insurgency is where the line between personal freedom and counter-insurgency restraints should be drawn. If too many liberties are undercut, popular support for government policy would be eroded very quickly – certainly amongst the more politically conscious elements in society. Popular support was crucial in the colonial insurgent situation but it is, arguably even more important in a politically sophisticated and aware democracy. Although many of the people have voted for the government and virtually all agree with the political system, allegiances can be strained. If an insurgent organization using terrorist tactics is allowed too much scope an elected government can be faced with some painful dilemmas ranging between submissions or resorting to methods that few democracies would welcome. The curtailing of individual liberties under emergency legislation some form of press censorship, the use of covert (and therefore probably 'unacceptable') methods to discover and eliminate terrorist cells, are all distasteful actions to a peaceful democratic state that has probably forgotten the realities and discomforts of war.

Democratic states are usually confronted with the dilemma of whether to classify a revolutionary movement's violence as criminal or political. Any special laws can cause a lot of confusion for the counter-insurgent forces and the legal profession. 'Special Status' problems had given the prisoners of the Maze in Northern Ireland an immediate and a local issue to fight about. Abu Ghariab and Guantanamo Bay has created their own peculiar headaches for the American. If any special powers are to be instituted they should be for a fixed term, simply drafted, published widely and applied impartially. The counter insurgent must act within the law- and the less special power that are enacted the less opportunity is given to the terrorist to make capital over threatened basic rights. The more that the government reacts by changing laws the more the insurgent

forces is encouraged to believe that their actions are having some effect. If the government departs from the usual legal framework it is in effect confessing to failure.

Any resort to torture to extract information or confessions is also likely to be detrimental to the morale of the counter insurgent forces especially the professional military amongst such forces. Yet the British gained a reputation for ruthlessness in proportion to the distance from London! By the identity card system; searching without warrant; hanging for the possession of illegal weapons; and severe punishments for aiding the rebels; shooting on sight in prohibited areas and the resettling of villages were all tough measures but within the law that was publicized widely<sup>6</sup>.

Insurgency violence can fact give the government the 'authority' or justification to implement special laws, but in this respect a lot depends on the scale and seriousness of the situation. Democracies should not need to be in any kind of dilemma if their leaderships have the courage of their convictions and the will to last out the struggles. Democratic politics and values placed against the usual extremism of the insurgent is an unequal struggle – in political terms. As Paul Wilkinson states, "the reforming and ameliorative character of liberal-democracies is the one reason why its citizens constitute such "hostile sea for the terrorist to swim in".<sup>7</sup>

### **Other Dilemmas**

Time is another constraining factor for all concerned in an insurgency situation. Insurgencies can last for much longer than originally anticipated.

A Democratic government will always be under pressure to show results. For example, western democracies cannot fight inconclusive wars because people want to relatively quick return for the sacrifices. Again, much depends upon the culture of the democratic state and the scale of the conflict. There are various stages that have to be reached before any successes can possibly be achieved. An appropriate strategy to ensure the security of the Counter Insurgent force base areas; preventative operations against

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the insurgents; the need of a long term plan to force the insurgents onto the defensive and for the seizure of the initiative – all these stages take time. Time is what the Counter insurgent and the central government needs, but democratic electorates and media are usually inquisitive and often impatient. Also, the success of a terrorist campaign will depend not so much on the terrorists themselves as on how the government reacts to them. Any over-reaction can help the insurgency cause. So long as the insurgency lasts, the government is under pressure – the government monopoly of force and authority is in question, and arguably, as long as the insurgent force exists, it is 'succeeding'. If one were to draw a basic lesson of the British counter insurgency action in Northern Ireland, fighting on its own territory, it was this: the patient and restraint in the use of force consistently for decades with a similar resilience in attempting to achieve a political solution.

At least as important as the need to be ready for political and military combat after an insurgency has begun, is the need for governments to prevent insurgencies by dealing with underlying causes. Misery, frustration, grievances, deprivation and despair compounded in some case by lack of education can cause some people to sacrifice their own lives (as well as other people's lives) in an attempt to achieve change. The Catholic minority suffered much in a Northern Ireland that was organized to suit a Protestant majority. Such corruption as the manipulation of electoral boundaries is not usual, but minorities can be frustrated even by the fairest electoral systems. The two party situations that have prevailed in the United Kingdom has been maintained largely by an apathetic majority mostly ignorant of the main political issues. Many politically aware minorities have never been able to visualize any possibility of being able to fundamentally alter policies. Too often the central government is some distance (geographical and political) from a deteriorating situation, and therefore out of touch with events. If action had been taken earlier in Malaya and Northern Ireland, local frustrations would have reduced. Prevention would require the central authority showing a greater respect for dissident groups and minorities which do not resort to terrorism. This is not always easy for political reason. There are usually so many other

priorities and demands upon the central government that small minority grievances cannot often be identified or dealt with in time.

A deterrent policy might assert that all acts of terrorism especially those involving random killing, should not go unpunished. But there are dilemmas for Democracy with such a policy. The deployment of the SAS in the Balcombe Street siege and even more dramatically during the Iranian Embassy siege are examples of a very positive policy<sup>8</sup>. In effect the then British government had declared that any revolutionary or terrorist group that decided to misuse the freedom of British society by killing people will in turn be killed. This is a deterrent policy. There is little doubt that the majority of the British people were delighted with the methods employed by the SAS in the Iranian siege. There are perhaps fewer dilemmas for the democratic government when the situation is obviously terroristic. Yet the Counter Insurgent force, in the glare of publicity, needs to be successful most of the time. Counter terrorism or counter-insurgency failures can demoralize the people, embarrass the government, encourage the insurgent and creates uncertainty for the future. However, it is likely that the people of a democracy are far more outraged by terrorist's action in their political environment, and therefore the Counter Insurgent forces can depend on a good deal of support, certainly in the early stages of an insurgency.

It is significant that there has been a rapid development of such groups as the alternating anti-terrorist squadron of 22<sup>nd</sup> Special Air Services Regiment of the UK, the West German GSG9 and Israeli Unite 269, and that such organizations are very secretive. Democracies cannot afford to display such units given the susceptibilities of small but vocal humanitarian and opposition groups. The "two wars" strategy of using covert and overt forces to disrupt and eliminate insurgency forces is also linked with this need to maintain a low profile in relation to a free society. The need for secrecy in Counter-Insurgency operations is necessary but potentially embarrassing for the central authorities. Open societies are invariably concerned about secrecy, but counter insurgency need intelligence and inside information about insurgency organization. The use of massive conventional military forces in populated areas,

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even when the insurgents decide to fight on fixed lines in such areas, ultimately may create hollow victory for the democratic forces because the force used is crude leading to collateral damage but above all the operations with all its horror are brought to the living room of the public. Even if censorship is practiced the rumor mills may do the damage that the censorship was put in place to prevent.

There is a certain international constraint upon states that wish to take overt military action against insurgency groups. A Democratic state does not necessarily have to break international law – but is likely to be condemned because it is a state acting against what is expected ‘state behaviour’. Although both sides in an insurgency aim to gain the ‘hearts and minds’ of a local population, the insurgent (especially the terrorist group) has little responsibility to any one and often campaigns outside the accepted rules of national and international diplomacy inter-state relations is bound to find it difficult to handle organization that do not play according to the rules of domestic and international politics. There are obvious problems for the Counter-Insurgent in trying to coordinate actions against an insurgent force that is international or has external aid.

Most movements consist from a few hundred to some thousands active members, the smaller the group the more difficulty it is for Counter-Insurgent forces to detect the opposition. But although there are operational advantages in small tightly organized cells, there are political disadvantages for the insurgent in terms of limited popular appeal. Also, people who might otherwise support the political programme of the insurgents, oppose them because of the terrorist methods they use.

In the early seventies, liberal-democracies were led to believe that the Baeder Meinhoff group, the Japanese red Army, the Symbionese Liberation Army and the British ‘Angry Brigade’ were large movements which ought to be taken seriously. But in fact these groups varied from fewer than ten (the Angry Brigade) to about sixty (the Japanese Red Army) active members and their ‘victories’ were largely in the area of publicity. Few of these groups had any significant popular support and for the most important groups like the Angry Brigade and even the Baeder Meinhoff disappeared. Yet,

some insurgent groups have been more successful, either because their nationalist/separatist appeal has guaranteed them a lot of popular support (e.g. the ETA in Spain) or because they have received massive assistance from foreign powers (e.g. the PLO and the Mujahideen fighting the USSR in Afghanistan). What is significant is that the organizations that do remain in operation today are far more professional in political and military terms than before, and therefore can pose greater problems for Counter-Insurgency forces.

### **Conclusions**

Some basic questions remain: to what extent can democracies resort to force in order to contain the violent aspects of an insurgency and yet still retain popular support? How far can a democracy control the media for preventing an over-emphasis on relatively minor incidents which give the insurgents the publicity they seek? Should a government pass special laws against Insurgents and risk the creation of 'special status' problems when normal criminal laws concerning murder, kidnapping, robbing provide sufficient punishment? To what extent can a well established and respected democracy afford to negotiate a political solution with an illegal organization that resorts to horrific violence? There are no easy options for a democracy in facing such questions. Given that insurgencies can usually gain external help and can run to sanctuaries, democratic counter insurgency process can only hope for some form of containment of the problem. Revolutionary movements are likely to enjoy some limited success whenever they occur in a democracy because of the doubts and uncertainties in such societies that have been outlined above. But any insurgent success has, so far, never been widespread and has been condensed by most rational men. After initial drawbacks, democracies have usually been able to adjust to new threats as extreme groups isolate themselves because of the tactics that they employ.

Democracies are not always well equipped psychologically to deal with insurgency situations, although Marx has normally been read and there are legitimate avenues for groups to protest. Democratic priorities and concerns are directed in far more

productive and hopeful directions. Yet it is subtlety and patience that is required especially in the initial stages of a struggle and the will to carry on Democratic policies as well as containing the insurgency for an indefinite period.

#### End Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Democracy is one of those common terms which like beauty the meaning is deeply coloured by the beholders explanation of it. In the context of our discussion we offer a broader definition of democracy not just restricted to that of liberal democracies of the West. Democratic control of the armed forces in the UK and Pakistan may differ in degree but this does not imply that the military in Pakistan can operate against insurgents without restrictions and total disregard to public sensitivities. The dilemmas confronting counterinsurgents under consideration are those faced within own borders and not such as faced by the US in Iraq or the US/Europeans in Afghanistan although the latter situations may be referred to.
- <sup>2</sup> See Thomas R. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990) and Colin McInnes, *Hot War, Cold War: the British Army's Way in Warfare 1945- 1995* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1996)
- <sup>3</sup> Terrorist activities by the IRA ceased to exist by the late 1980's but it was not until 28 July 2005 that it put an end to armed campaign and declared a peaceful struggle (i.e. political). See BBC, "IRA declares end to armed struggle", 28 July 2005. Located at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/28/newsid\\_4948000/4948188.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/28/newsid_4948000/4948188.stm) accessed on 16 November 2007
- <sup>4</sup> Sir Robert Thompson articulated Counterinsurgency theory with the following 5 principles:
  - a. The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable.
  - b. The government must function in accordance with the law
  - c. The government must have an overall plan
  - d. The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas
  - e. In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas firstSee Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Lessons Learned from Malaya and Vietnam* New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966, pp 50-55.
- <sup>5</sup> John J. McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-Insurgency* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1966), p 159.
- <sup>6</sup> See Thomas R. Mockaitis, op. cit for the British counterinsurgency policy in Malaya
- <sup>7</sup> Paul Wilkinson, Briefing Note, *The Nexus of Terrorism & WMDs: Developing a Consensus How could a Leaders' Level G20 make a difference*, 12 – 14 December 2004, Princeton University, USA.

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- <sup>8</sup> Balcombe Street siege (1975) was a six-day siege in London after four IRA gunmen took two hostages but gave themselves up to police. The siege of the Iranian embassy in London (1985) was ended after a dramatic raid by SAS commandos. Five Iranian gunmen were killed and one was arrested. Nineteen hostages were set free.

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**STRENGTHENING GLOBAL ENERGY SECURITY  
THROUGH ALTERNATIVE INTERNATIONAL  
PETROLEUM STORAGE AND LOADING TERMINALS  
OUTSIDE THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ**

*Dr Gulfaraz Ahmed*

Life in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century is highly dependent on commercially accessible sources of energy. The full spectrum of living from socio-economic development, research and scientific breakthroughs to modern lifestyles owes to the human ability to harness greater and better forms of energy. Quest for energy has in itself become a driver of economic and industrial development. Energy is at the heart of modern-day prosperity and concerns for stability and security of energy supply have become important aspects of international diplomacy. Hydrocarbons (oil and natural gas) have been the principal sources of commercial energy during the last century. But these natural resources are non-renewable and are fast depleting. It is generally anticipated that there is likely to be a major change in the global commercial energy mix toward the middle of this century. This realization of the impending decline in oil is spawning an energy crisis that, if not collectively addressed, could affect global prosperity and even jeopardize the global peace.

This paper briefly relates to one aspect of the energy crisis i.e. global oil movement. It spotlights the concentration of huge global reserves of oil and natural gas in a small region of the Persian Gulf countries. It looks at the contribution of the region to the global oil trade and highlights that the Strait of Hormuz has already become the most critical choke-point to the international shipping. Figure-1 shows a map of the Persian Gulf region extending to and including the countries in South Asia, South East Asia, Far East the Asia Pacific that are supplied oil by the east-bound routes.



Figure - 1

The paper projects the expected growth in oil exports from the region in view of the dwindling wide-spread availability of oil in other parts of the world and consequently increasing dependence on the outlasting reserves of the Persian Gulf countries. It identifies the limitation of the Strait of Hormuz to cope with the anticipated escalation in oil movement and suggests ways to augment the capacity through an option of alternative petroleum storage and loading terminals outside the Strait.

The newly completed Gawadar deep-sea port offers one such option. It is well-located outside the Gulf of Oman in the Arabian Sea on the maritime route of the east-bound oil. The port can handle super tankers that form the mainstay of the global oil movement. This enables Pakistan to play a substantive role in strengthening the global energy security as well as peace. The paper only introduces the subject in concept and concludes with a recommendation of some follow-up work in the form of focussed studies. The statistical information used in the paper is for the year 2005. The figures are adopted from a variety of literature openly accessible to public and are used with open acknowledgement. In the common international references the Gulf is interchangeably referred to as Arabian or

Persian and it is intended to stay clear of any underlying sensitivity of the name.

### **Concentration of Global Reserves of Oil and Gas in Persian Gulf Region**

Oil is the predominant source of commercial energy in the world. It makes up for about 38% of the global primary energy (commercial) mix. Around 85 million barrels of oil is presently consumed in the world everyday. The consumption of oil is expected to grow by about 2.0% every year well into the middle of this Century. Figure-2 shows the demand for commercial sources of primary energy from 1970 to-date and projects the yearly demand up to 2030.

World Primary Energy Demand




Figure - 2

Nearly 70% of the worldwide oil supply, around 60 million barrels per day, is imported, which represents the scale of the global oil trade. Presently oil is widely available and the maritime routes are able to handle the required shipping flows. The widespread availability of oil is however shrinking due to declining reserves and

a number of oil surplus/exporting countries (like China, Malaysia and Indonesia) have/would become net importers of oil in the coming years.

Over half of the global reserves of oil (56.5 %) are concentrated primarily in a few countries of the Persian Gulf (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar), which are likely to outlast many other sources of the world oil supply. It is, therefore, generally anticipated that the global reliance on the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf countries will continue to increase in the foreseeable future. Figure-3 shows a map of the Persian Gulf, the oil producing countries, the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz that connects the adjoining bodies of water.




Figure - 3

Figure-4 shows the share of proved reserves of oil for various regions of the world. Out of 1200 billion barrels global reserves 684 billion exist in the Persian Gulf region alone.





Figure-4

Figure-5 shows the relative period in years of the reserves to production ratio: the Persian Gulf region has the highest ratio in excess of 80 years.

### Reserves-to Production Ratios



The world's oil R/P ratio declined slightly in 2005 to 40.6 years from 40.7 in 2004, although reserves continued to increase. Iran and Russia accounted for most of the increase. Reserves were 17% higher than the 1995 level; production was 19% higher.

Figure-5

Figure-6 shows the same ratio over the world map: the Persian Gulf countries in general and Iraq in particular stand out for over 100 years of reserves to production ratio.




Figure-6

Figure-7 shows the relative production of oil from various regions during the 25 years: around 90% production shown against the Middle East is actually from the Persian Gulf region.

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**PRODUCTION BY AREA**




Figure-7

Figure-8 is a snapshot of the year 2004. It shows oil supply from various regions of the world since 1930 and gives long-wave projections up to 2050. Even if the futuristic potential of oil from deepwater, polar and heavy oil sources is taken into account, the proven reserves of the Persian Gulf region will continue to provide substantive share of the global oil supply up to and even beyond 2050.

### OIL & GAS LIQUIDS 2004 SCENARIOS (SUPPLY)




Figure-8

Figure-9 gives a summary of the Persian Gulf oil and gas resources as a percentage of the world covering: crude oil reserves, oil production capacity, excess oil production capacity, oil production and natural gas reserves. It is important to note that as of 2003, all the excess production capacity of oil in the world existed only in the Persian Gulf region. Most or the whole of that excess capacity has been since been brought into production to cope with the unexpected increase in the world oil demand during the last three years.

#### PERSIAN GULF AS OF PERCENT OF WORLD 2003




Figure-9

### **Projected Flow of Oil from Gulf Region**

The Persian Gulf countries are expected to export around 22 million barrels of oil daily in 2006. Figure-10 shows export of Persian Gulf oil by various routes including the Strait of Hormuz, East-West Pipeline through Yanbu, through Turkey etc. for 2003 and 2006. Nearly 90% of the exports, 20 million barrels daily, would be transported through the narrow Strait of Hormuz, which constitutes a big choke point for the global oil trade.





Figure-10

Figure-11 shows the volume of oil flows through major choke-points of the world including: Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, Bab al-Mandab, Suez Canal & Sumed Pipeline, Bosphorus and the Panama Canal. The Strait of Hormuz handles nearly the same volume of oil as the rest of them put together.

**OIL FLOWS, MAJOR CHOKEPOINTS & TRANSITED AT MAJOR STRATEGIC LOCATIONS 2003**



Source: Energy Information Administration 2003)

Figure-11

Figure-12 contains a map showing the volumes of oil flows through major choke points and the transit routes round the globe. This readily shows the predominant status of the Persian Gulf oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz.

**OIL FLOWS, MAJOR CHOKEPOINTS & TRANSITED AT MAJOR STRATEGIC LOCATIONS 2003**




Figure 12

In little over a decade from now, in 2020, oil exports from the Persian Gulf countries are estimated to increase to about 34 million barrels per day: Figure-13 shows oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz from 2000 and gives the projection up to 2030. The projected increase of 14 million barrels of daily oil flows, in just about thirteen years, through the already congested choke-point could seriously affect the smooth flow of oil affecting the reliability of oil supplies and increasing the freight and shipping costs. As nearly a third of the globally traded oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz, the anticipated increase in oil flow through the Strait could affect the global energy security as well as the regional peace.

### **FLOW OF OIL THROUGH STRAIT OF HORMUZ**




Figure-13

### **Flow of Liquefied Natural Gas from Gulf Region**

Although the focus of this paper is mainly on oil movement through the Strait of Hormuz, the increasing trade of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) by specially designed refrigerated ships is becoming a new factor in global maritime trade. Natural gas and especially the LNG are among the fastest growing fuels and are expected to continue to grow well into the middle of the century. Advances in the liquefaction and refrigerated shipping technologies are reducing the comparative cost of LNG and making it quite economical in relation to oil. Figure-14 gives two graphs: one shows

the trend with time of the reduction in the unit cost of LNG plants since 1960 and the second shows the trend of reducing cost as the size of LNG chain increases owing to the advances in technologies and economies of scale. In both cases the cost has reduced by nearly half during the last two decades and the trend displays a steeper decrease in the near future.

### LNG CHAIN CAPACITY & COST TRADE-OFF




Figure-14

The Persian Gulf countries are very rich in natural gas and nearly 58% of the global gas reserves are located in the region: Iran has the second largest and Qatar the third largest after Russia, which has the largest gas reserves in the world. The gas rich Persian Gulf countries are developing LNG export capacities faster than any other region in the world.

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Figure-15 shows the gas liquefaction capacity of Qatar, Oman and UAE for 2003 and its projected increase for 2007: Qatar's capacity is increasing by nearly 40% in only four years. This shows the trend of LNG market: the volume of LNG export from the region is expected to grow even faster.

**GAS LIQUEFACTION CAPACITY - 2003**




Figure-15

Figure-16 shows the volume and transit routes of LNG through the same international choke-points as involved in the oil movement. LNG export from the region will add substantially to the congestion of the Strait of Hormuz.

**INTERNATIONAL SEA-BORNE TRADE – 2003 (BCM)**




Figure-16

Figure-16

### Existing Arrangements of Persian Gulf Oil Export

The presently available arrangements for movement of Persian Gulf oil include the approximately 5-million-bbl/d-capacity East-West Pipeline across Saudi Arabia to the port of Yanbu and the Abqaiq-Yanbu natural gas liquids line across Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea. These options besides being longer and more expensive in transportation costs are very limited in their capacity and are essentially provided as emergency back-up in case of interruption of oil flow through the Strait. There may be a potential of enhancing the capacity of export via the Red Sea, but it would still not meet the requirement besides being longer and expensive as most of the oil fields of the countries are located close to the Persian Gulf which provides the shortest export route. Figure-17 shows a map giving locations of the major oil and gas fields of the region: most of the fields are located either offshore in the Gulf or onshore around the Gulf. The Gulf provides a natural export route but the Strait of Hormuz could limit its export capacity.




Figure-17

### Options for Augmenting Export Capacity of Persian Gulf Oil

The petroleum exporting countries of the Persian Gulf could create outlets for additional oil exports outside the Gulf. They could do that by setting up adjunct oil storages and loading terminals

beyond the Strait in the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. Figure-18 shows a close-up map of the Strait of Hormuz with shaded contours of water depth. Ships can use only the deeper channel providing the required draft which is limited to a width of about six miles.

Figure-18



Figure-18

Figure-19 shows the incoming and outgoing shipping lanes of about two miles width each separated by a middle lane of two miles. The limited number of lanes in the narrow Strait creates the choking effect on the shipping traffic.




Figure-19

The exporting countries could pump the additional oil through sub-sea pipelines to the alternative outlets and augment their export capacities without adding to the congestion of the Strait of Hormuz. Fortunately, there are a number of options for locating adjunct/alternative terminals outside the Strait of Hormuz along the Coast of Iran, Pakistan and Oman. Considering the enormous increase in the volume of oil that would be flowing from Persian Gulf sources from 2020 onwards, all available options would perhaps be required. The new Iranian deep sea port at Chabahar about 150 miles east of the Strait in the Gulf of Oman and new Pakistani deep sea port at Gawadar about 250 miles east of the Strait in the Arabian Sea together with some ports on the Coast of Oman are likely choices. Figure-20 shows a satellite image of the region showing the locations of the ports of Chabahar and Gawadar.




Figure-20

Figure-21 is a map view of the Iranian ports serving the Gulf.

*Strengthening Global Energy Security through Alternative International Petroleum Storage and Loading Terminals Outside the Strait of Hormuz*



Figure-21

Figure-22 shows the map of the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea and Omani ports that could provide a possible option.




Figure-22

Oman option would be suitable for south bound oil meant for the European and USA markets. The Iranian Chabahar port is suitably located for both South and East bound oil. Figures 23a&b show a map and a satellite close-up view of the new Iranian deep-sea port at Chabahar. The Pakistani port of Gawadar is suitable for east-bound oil for South Asian, South East Asian and Asia Pacific markets predominantly of China, Japan and India.



**Chabahar Port**



Figure-23a & b

### **Gawadar Option for Long Term**

The proposed outlet at the Gawadar deep sea port could take a part of 10 million barrels daily increase in the east-bound oil from the Persian Gulf countries by 2020. The Gawadar port can handle very large crude containers (VLCC) of up to 0.5 million tons dead

*Strengthening Global Energy Security through Alternative International Petroleum Storage and Loading Terminals Outside the Strait of Hormuz*

weight which form a crucial part of the international oil movement. Figure-24 shows the schematic layout of the port which has recently been completed and commissioned to operation. Some possible location sites for storage and loading terminals are identified but this has to be in line with the Master Plan of the port development. The increase in the eastbound oil in 2020 is expected to go up to 10 million barrels daily, of which the export to China alone is expected to go up by over 5 million barrels daily. It would appear impracticable to ship the required quantity of oil through the Strait of Hormuz from 2020 onward. Open outlets outside the Strait are likely to become cost-effective and feasible options. It is an appropriate time to give this concept a focussed attention, as it would take over a decade or so for the facilities to be created and oil export arrangements to be operative.

**SCHEMATIC LAYOUT OF GAWADAR DEEP SEA PORT**




Figure-23a & b

The required infrastructure that comprises exporting country storage facilities, sub-sea pipelines and pumping facilities, outside Hormuz storage facilities and deep-sea loading terminals. Figure-25 gives a rough estimate of time required for completing the infrastructure that spreads over a decade.

**TIME SPAN**

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Time/Year</u>
Concept Study/International Charter Model	1
Review by PG Oil Exporting Countries	1
Technical & Economic Feasibility Studies	1
Permits/Licenses/Agreements	1
Project Designs	1
Financing Arrangements	2
Construction & Commissioning	3
<b>Earliest Availability</b>	<b>10</b>

Table-25

**Gawadar Option for Medium Term**

It may also be feasible to consider the option of trans-shipment from Gawadar deep-sea port instead of or in addition to the concept of alternative storage/loading terminals. In trans-shipment arrangement oil could be taken out of the Strait of Hormuz by super-tankers and then transferred through single-point mooring floating arrangement directly to smaller vessels for onward shipment. A large number of smaller vessels that carry oil through the Strait presently could thus be reduced. Instead a larger number of super-tankers would ply through the Strait, which would enhance the capacity manifold. The trans-shipment option does not require sub-sea oil pipelines, storages and loading terminals. This option could be very economical as it would cost much less and take much less time to put in place. This could, therefore, be an interim arrangement till such time that the requirement for storages and alternative loading terminals becomes real and commercially feasible.

### **Suggested Work**

The whole concept is based on a visualized scenario of regional oil movement from medium to long term time horizon. It needs more work to bring it into a focus. There is a need to initiate a conceptual study to foresee the increasing quantum of oil trade through the Strait of Hormuz, assess the effects of the expected increase in oil trade on maritime congestion and identify the potential benefits of the proposed outlets at Gawadar to oil exporting and importing countries as well as to Pakistan. A subsequent study could concentrate on the economic aspects for promoting investment on multilateral basis. Besides the promising economic value of the concept, its principal thrust would be on creating a framework for multilateral cooperation to sustain and facilitate global access to the vital sources of energy concentrated in the Persian Gulf region. It may be expedient to launch the concept from the auspices of the United Nations for the required multilateral undertaking.

### **Conclusion**

The prospect of alternative outlets augmenting the export capacity of the Persian Gulf oil would ease potential concerns for the stability and security of oil supplies among the oil importing countries. This will contribute to peace and prosperity of the world in line with the vision and charter of the United Nations. As a vibrant member of the world comity, Pakistan could play a vital role and contribute effectively to global peace and prosperity by opening its infrastructure to world oil movement and strengthening global energy security. Newly commissioned Gawadar deep-sea port is ideally located for alternative petroleum outlets outside the Strait of Hormuz especially for east-bound oil for South Asian, South East Asian, Far Eastern and Asia Pacific markets. As an interim arrangement Gawadar port could provide trans-shipment facilities through a single point mooring floating arrangement by transferring oil from super-tankers directly to the smaller vessels and thereby reducing the large number of the smaller vessels currently congesting the Strait. At a later stage when there is a need the option of alternative storage and loading terminals might become

commercially feasible. The paper suggests additional work in the form of pre-feasibility studies to explore the concept.

**Author**


*Dr. Gulfaraz Ahmed is Honors graduate and Gold Medalist in civil engineering and holds MS and PhD degrees in Petroleum Engineering from Stanford University, USA. He has rich and diverse experience in energy sector policy, planning, operations, management and regulation as Chairman/CEO Oil & Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL); Chairman National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA); Member Nuclear Regulatory Board/Authority; Federal Secretary to the Government of Pakistan in the Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Resources; and Consultant to UNDP on Energy. Dr Gulfaraz Ahmed has authored numerous publications and articles.*

## MEETING PAKISTAN'S ENERGY NEEDS

*Mukhtar Ahmed*

### Introduction

With a population of 152 million, the economy in Pakistan is currently growing at a rate of over 8% supported mainly by an expanding industrial sector that currently contributes to 38% of the economic output and is growing at a rate of 12.5%. Per capita energy consumption of the country is estimated at 14 million Btu, which is only a fraction of other industrializing economies in the region such as Thailand and Malaysia. With 40% of the households that have yet to receive electricity, and only 18% of the households that have access to pipeline gas, the energy sector is expected to play a critical role in economic and social development.



**Source:** Pakistan Economic Survey 2004-05 Latest GoP estimates for per capita income and population below poverty line

## Policy Framework

Key elements of the policy response of the country to meet the energy requirements of an expanding economy are summarized below:

- **Adequate Energy Supplies:** The energy sector plans focus on development of indigenous energy resources, import of energy at competitive prices to meet the deficits, infrastructure for delivery of energy to the consuming sectors, and systems to assure reliability, efficiency, and economy of supply.
- **Security of Energy Supply:** Recognizing the uncertainty in the international energy markets and emerging requirements of other developing economies such as India and China, the energy plans focus on maximum utilization of indigenous energy resources to lower the dependence on imported energy, and diversification of the energy mix to manage risks and external shocks.
- **Long-term Viability of the Energy Sector:** The cornerstone of the government policy to assure long term sustainability of the energy sector is shifting from a predominantly state controlled industry to a structure where the government maintains a strategic presence, while the private sector plays a leading role in development of the energy sector. Supporting policies to achieve this objective include appropriate distribution of responsibilities within the government institutions for policy formulation, regulation, administration to avoid overlaps and conflicts, policies and regulations that provide appropriate incentives and encourage competition in the private sector, and sustainable pricing regimes that account for cost-of-service and subsidies that are transparent and address the social and environmental concerns.

## Implementation Approach and Strategy

To achieve these objectives, the government has adopted an approach based on implementation of integrated energy development plans that take into account crosssectoral economic impacts of energy options and projects through the supply and demand chain. Policies and plans in place target further development of indigenous conventional energy resources including oil and gas, hydel, and coal by providing appropriate incentives and a level playing field to the private sector. Plans for meeting the energy needs of rural areas give special emphasis to exploitation of renewable energy potential, taking into account the economic cost of

delivering energy from alternative sources and benefits associated with decentralized resource development. Finally, longer term strategies focus on meeting the energy deficits by establishment of energy trade corridors to capitalize on the proximity of Pakistan to resource rich countries in the Middle East and Central Asia.

### Primary Energy Supply and Demand

Pakistan has a well developed infrastructure for energy. The gas transmission infrastructure connects to 4.26 million households and commercial establishments addition to bulk of the industries and thermal power generating units in the country, and includes 9,060 high pressure transmission pipelines and over 225,000 HP of compression capacity. The power transmission and distribution network serves over 16.3 million residential and commercial and 0.23 million industrial customers, and includes 40,500 km of high voltage transmission lines. In addition, a network of oil pipelines transport crude oil and products to inland refineries and market centers, and the ports at Karachi are well equipped to handle import of crude oil and petroleum products that accounts for a major fraction countries demand, and limited quantities of coal imported into the country.

Figure 1 summarizes the primary energy supply picture for the country. Total energy supplies were 56 MTOE (Million Tons Oil Equivalent ) in FY 2005. With an annual production of 3,685 MMscfd (28 MTOE), gas accounts for 51% of energy supply, followed by oil at 29%, hydel at 11%, and coal at 8%. Pakistan currently meets only 19.9% of its oil demand from indigenous resources.




Figure-1

The power sector accounts for 23 MTOE or 41% of energy supply, of which 55% is gas, 27% hydel, and 15% is oil. Nuclear energy accounts for only 3% of power generation. Current installed capacity in the country is 19,160 MW of which 34% is hydel, and bulk of the remaining is thermal. Sector wise energy consumption in FY 2005 is illustrated in Figure 2. Industrial sector dominates the market with 41% of the demand, followed by transport sector at 31% and residential at 21%.




Figure-2

Source: Pakistan Energy Yearbook 2005

### Projected Energy Demand and Deficits

Projected energy demand, assuming a GDP growth rate of 6.5% consistent with recent trends, is summarized in Figure 3. Over the next 20 year period, overall demand for energy is expected to increase by a factor of 3.5, from a current level of 56 MTOE to 198 MTOE.

	FY05	FY15	FY25	FY05	FY15	FY25
	Million TOE			% Share		
Oil	16	29	47	30	27	24
Gas	28	56	93	48	50	47
Coal	4	9	17	8	8	8
Hydel	7	13	29	12	12	15
Renewable	-	1	5	0	1	2
Nuclear	1	2	7	1	2	4
Total	56	110	198	100	100	100

Figure-3

**Source:** Medium-Term Development Framework: 2005-10, Planning Commission

**Note:** Government of Pakistan adjusted to GDP growth rate of 6.5% and updated for power generation plans

The projections assume current long term plans for power generation with emphasis on development of coal, hydel and nuclear resources, consistent with the policy of the government to develop the indigenous resource base and diversify the energy mix. The share of oil in the energy mix is expected to drop in view of higher oil prices in the international market, and the policy of the government to switch lower cost alternatives for power generation, including an aggressive program for development of nuclear power and renewable energy sources. The sensitivity of demand for energy to the economic growth rate is illustrated in Figure 4. Alternative scenarios for economic growth assuming growth rates of 5.5% and 7.4% were considered to test the impact of GDP growth rate on the demand for energy. The 7.4% scenario corresponds to an 'optimistic' economic growth rate assumed in the MTDf, while the 5.5% scenario represents a 'reasonably conservative outlook' for economic growth, based on a historic average. Over the next 20 year period, the demand for energy under these scenarios varies by about 25%, dropping to 155 MTOE corresponding to an economic growth rate of 5.5%, and increasing to 246 MTOE corresponding to an economic growth rate of 7.4%.




Figure-4

The Medium Term Development Framework, 2005-10. Planning Division assumed a GDP growth rate of 7.4%

Projected indigenous energy supply and deficits corresponding to the 6.5% GDP growth rate are summarized in Figure 5. Production of oil and gas in the country is expected to improve slightly in the near term but decline in the long run, given the current onshore exploration activities and resource outlook, and a low likelihood of a major offshore discovery.

Million TOE

	FY05	FY15	FY25
Oil	3	4	2
Gas	26	34	19
Coal	2	5	13
Hydel	7	13	29
Renewable and Nuclear	1	3	12
<b>Total Indigenous Supply</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>Total Energy Requirement</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>198</b>
<b>Deficit</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>122</b>
<b>Deficit as % of Energy Requirement</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>62</b>

Figure-5

Source: Medium-Term Development Framework: 2005-10, Planning Commission

Note: Government of Pakistan adjusted to GDP growth rate of 6.5% and updated for power generation plans

Availability of coal, hydel, nuclear and renewable energy is projected to improve significantly, in line with current resource development plans. The availability of energy from these sources, however, will not be enough to meet the growing demand of the economy. The energy deficit which stands at 15 MTOE or 28% of the energy demand presently will increase to 122 MTOE by 2025, corresponding to 62% of the demand. This outlook clearly indicates a need to place development of the indigenous resource base on a high priority, followed by long-term arrangements to acquire energy from external sources that are affordable and reliable.

### Energy Resource Potential and Risks

Energy resource potential for the country is summarized in Figure 6. The reserves to production ratio is currently 13 and 22 for oil and gas respectively, while for coal it is 720, and only 16% of the hydel potential has been realized. Major unexploited reserves of coal are located in the Thar Desert in the Sindh province.




Figure-6

Development of these reserves, however, presents a major challenge as the coal is of inferior quality, with heating value of 5,700 Btu/lb, sulfur content of over 1%, ash over 6%, and moisture of about 50%. The overburden that will have to be removed to access the coal seams is also soft and has a depth in the range of

175- 230 m, indicating the need for open pit mining that will involve significant upfront investments. Other constraints that increase the costs and commercial risks in development of Thar coal resources include limited road and power infrastructure to support the initial phases of project development, and scarcity of fresh water in the area.

In case of hydel projects, government plans include an aggressive program to develop sites that have been identified, recognizing the economic benefits associated with power generation as well as storage of water for agricultural use. Constraints and risks that can limit the extent to which this potential can be realized in the near term include location of most of the sites in mountainous regions in the north where construction of access roads can involve significant investments, cost of resettlement of affected populations, and longer lead times associated with detailed technical studies required for project design.

In view of the above outlook for exploitation of the domestic resource base and associated risks, Pakistan given high priority to tapping the energy resources in region, and several projects for import of natural gas from the gas rich countries in the Middle East and Central Asia have received serious attention. These include pipelines for import of gas from Turkmenistan, Iran, and Qatar. In addition, import of power from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan that are rich in hydel resources is also under active consideration. The development of these options for importing energy has been constrained by the sensitive regional security environment, special technical issues, and complexities associated with commercial and operating arrangements typical of large projects requiring inter-country agreements.

### **Economic Considerations in Energy Planning**

Figure 7 illustrates the comparative economic costs of fuels for the country, assuming a crude oil price of \$ 60/bbl and prevailing prices of other fuels in the international market. While delivered cost for local and imported coals is under \$ 3/MMBtu, delivered cost of natural gas and LNG is estimated at \$ 4 and \$ 6/MMBtu respectively, allowing for price differentials associated with liquefaction, transportation, and regasification

for LNG and netback values available to the suppliers. The delivered prices of petroleum products are substantially higher than those for coal and natural gas, and are currently estimated at over \$8/MMBtu for high sulfur fuel oil (HSFO) and over \$13/MMBtu for transport fuels including diesel and motor gasoline.




Figure-7

Note: HSFO price corresponding to US\$ 60/bbl crude. Delivered price of imported coal assumed at US\$ 75/tonne

The economic cost of energy supplied in 2005 (Figure 8) on the basis of these prices is estimated at \$15.3 billion, of which 48% is attributable to the oil used in sectors other than power (mainly transport and agriculture), 8% to HSFO used mainly for power generation, 17% to gas used in the industry (inclusive of fertilizer), residential, and commercial sectors, 12% to gas used for power generation, and the remaining 15% shared by hydel, coal, and nuclear energy. In view of this distribution of energy costs, sectors and end-uses that require special attention in energy planning include oil use in transport sector, provision of natural gas for sectors other than power where economics of switching to alternative liquid petroleum and solid fuels such as fuel oil and coal are not favorable, and selection of fuels and technologies for power generation.




Figure-8

Source: Assumed prices of energy: Oil (power) 8.13 US\$/MMBtu, Oil (non power) 13.30 US\$/MMBtu, Gas 4.00 US\$/MMBtu

Note: Coal 2.70 US\$/MMBtu, Hydro and Nuclear 5.73 cents/kWh (equivalent to electricity generated from imported coal)

Cost of power generation for alternative technologies and fuels assuming prevailing capital and operating costs and economic cost of energy as indicated in Figure 7 are illustrated in Figure 9. While the economic cost of electricity produced from coal, natural gas, hydel, and nuclear power plants falls in the range of US cents 5-6/kWh, the cost of producing electricity from LNG approaches 7 cents/kWh and that from HSFO exceeds 9 cents/kWh. The country therefore cannot afford to install and operate power generation capacity on imported LNG or HSFO. Priorities for meeting the energy needs of the country in the long-term include import of natural gas, generation of electricity from indigenous and imported coal, and development of hydel and nuclear resources.




Figure-9

### Energy Options and Scenarios

While the cost of meeting the energy requirements of a rapidly expanding economy will be substantial, the country has a range of options available to manage the supply and demand for energy. The choices made will also determine the extent to which the risks associated with variations in energy prices and availability of fuels in the international market can be managed, and the cost of delays or inability to develop indigenous resources can be absorbed. The following cases were analyzed in terms of total energy requirements, energy deficits and imports, and cost of imported energy:

- Base Case: Unconstrained gas import
- Low Gas: Imported gas not available, LNG and imported coal to replace imported gas in Base Case
- High Thar: Thar coal to replace imported coal for power generation in Low Gas Case
- Low Hydel: Hydel capacity additions reduced by 30%, imported coal to replace hydel power generation in Low Gas Case
- High Nuclear: Additions in nuclear capacity increased by 100% in 2015 and 200% in 2025 over the Base Case
- Energy Conservation: Energy conservation applied on Base Case

The Base Case assumes that the country will be able to import natural gas to meet the emerging energy deficits. This is the

least cost option, given the proximity of the country to gas surplus regions, the opportunity of transporting gas through inland pipelines, and the economic advantage offered by gas in end-uses such as fertilizer production, combined cycle gas turbines, cogeneration, and CNG vehicles. This case assumes that the gap in power generation capacity, after accounting for the capacity planned on hydel, nuclear, and renewable sources, will be filled by CCGT units operating on imported natural gas. The Low Gas Case represents the scenario where imported gas is not available, and the deficit has to be made up with the least cost fuel in absence of natural gas. In this case, the country will have to import LNG to meet the established demand for natural gas in the residential, commercial, fertilizer, and industry sectors, and generation capacity in the power sector that can operate only on natural gas.

The gap in power generation capacity, filled by imported gas in the Base Case, was assumed to be filled by capacity based on imported coal which is the least cost option in absence of the CCGT option. The High Thar Case represents the option of enhanced utilization of Thar coal to replace imported coal in the Low Gas Case.

The Low Hydel Case represents the case under which the risks associated with development of hydel capacity such as the negative outcome of feasibility studies and higher than expected resettlement costs come into play. The hydel capacity additions were reduced by 30% for this case, to be replaced by the next economic option which is imported coal. In the High Nuclear Case, installed nuclear capacity was increased from 4,400 MW in the Base Case to 7,200MW, assuming a 100% increase in capacity additions by 2015, and 200% by 2025. Finally, the Energy Conservation scenario assumes a conservative penetration rate for energy efficient technologies and demand side management, resulting in a reduction in demand of about 9% across the economy. Figure 10 summarizes the energy demand and the power generation capacity required in each of the above scenarios.

Scenario	Oil MTOE	Gas MMscfd		LNG MMscfd	Coal MTOE		Hydel MW	Nuclear MW
		Indigenous	Imported		Indigenous	Imported		
Base Case	47	2,290	8,170	750	13	3	20,325	4,400
Low Gas	47	2,290	–	6,060	13	35	20,325	4,400
High Thar	47	2,290	–	6,060	44	3	20,325	4,400
Low Hydel	47	2,290	–	6,060	13	43	14,230	4,400
High Nuclear	47	2,290	–	6,060	13	21	20,325	7,200
Energy Conservation <sup>1</sup>	42	2,060	7,450	675	12	3	18,800	3,740

Figure-10

Energy Conservation Scenario: Technical potential estimated at 15% power, 10% for oil and gas in industry and transport sectors. Achievable by 2025 assumed at 50% of technical potential.

The economic cost of imported fuels under the Base Case is illustrated in. Fuel imports under the base are projected to increase from the Figure 11 current level of \$ 7.5 billion to \$ 38.2 billion in 2025, with oil accounting for 65% of the energy imports, followed by gas at 30%.




Figure-11

Additional cost of fuel imports under each of the scenarios studied is illustrated in Figure 12. Annual additional cost of imported fuels for the Low Gas Case are estimated at \$ 0.8 billion in 2015, increasing to \$ 3.2 billion in 2025, and represent the additional cost of energy imports in case the country is unable to import gas through pipelines. Comparable figures for the Low Hydrel Case are \$ 1.2 billion in 2015 and \$ 4.1 billion in 2025, and for the High Nuclear Case are \$ 0.6 billion 2015 and \$ 1.7 billion in 2025. The High Thar Case yields a saving of \$ 0.3 billion in 2025 over the Base Case, on account of lower energy cost of Thar coal.




Figure-12

### Conclusions and Priority Areas for Action

An assessment of the current and projected energy requirements of the country and additional costs for energy imports under alternative scenarios and options leads to the following conclusions:

- While Pakistan has substantial coal and hydel resources, it is not possible to develop and utilize these resources in the short term in view of inherent constraints
- The dependence of the country on imported energy is therefore expected to increase considerably in the near to medium term

- Gas import pipelines can deliver energy at competitive prices in the near term to meet the demand of priority consumer segments such as the residential, industrial and power sectors
  - Development of Thar coal and nuclear power in the medium term can secure the country against high energy prices in the global markets and risks associated with large scale development of hydel resources
  - Development of indigenous coal can be coupled with inclusion of imported coal for greater diversity in the mix of imported fuels
- Key elements of an action plan to meet the energy requirements of the country in the long term, to balance the risks associated with rising world energy prices and to protect the economy against uncertainties in development of domestic resource base include:

**Import of Energy:**

- Implementation of gas pipeline projects, LNG projects and projects for import of electricity from CAS on a fast track basis

**Development of Indigenous Energy Resources:**

- Enhanced oil and gas production
- Detailed technical and economic assessment of coal mining and coal based-power generation
- Assessment of advanced technology options for gasification and coal bed methane
- Enhanced hydroelectric power generation
- Enhanced nuclear power generation
- Mainstreaming renewable energy

**Energy Efficiency and Management:**

- Optimization of energy mix
- Demand side management in industrial sector
- Mass transit for major urban centers

## Emerging Investment Opportunities in the Energy Sector

The government expects the private sector and foreign direct investment to play a central role in development of the energy sector in the country. Specific investment opportunities in the energy sector where the private sector can participate are summarized below:

### ➤ Oil and Gas Industry

- **LNG Project:** Consultants have been engaged to provide advice on technical, financial, and commercial issues, and an RFP will be issued to short-listed firms in the near future.
- **Gas Import Pipelines:** Technical parameters have been defined through pre-feasibility studies and technical working groups, and joint working groups have been established to address technical, commercial, project financing, and other issues
- **Oil Refining:** Expressions of interest are being invited for a 200,000 to 300,000 BPD coastal refinery located near Karachi.

### ➤ Electricity and Power Generation

- **Import of Electricity from CAS:** Further work is being initiated to evaluate the technical and economic aspects of power import.
- **Hydroelectric Generation:** Proposals have been invited from the private sector for 7 projects with a total capacity of 1,620 MW.
- **Power Generation from Thar Coal:** Private sector is currently involved in preparation of feasibility studies for mining and power generation.
- **Power Generation from Imported Coal:** Work has been initiated for involving private sector in setting up power generation units in the coastal areas.
- **Power Generation from Renewable Sources:** Renewable energy policy framework has been drafted and an incentive package has been defined for fast-track capacity additions. In addition to above, the

government plans to divest 51% of its shareholding in the following concerns to give majority ownership and management control to the private sector.

- **Power Generation and Distribution:** Jamshoro Power Company, Faisalabad Electric Supply Company, and Peshawar Electric Supply Company
- **Oil Marketing:** Pakistan State Oil Co. Ltd., the largest oil marketing company in the country with approximately 70% share of the market
- **Gas Transmission and Distribution:** SNGPL and SSGCL, state owned utilities that currently account for over 86% of the gas transmission and distribution business in the country.
- **Petroleum E&P:** Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. and Oil & Gas Development Co. Ltd., state owned companies that account for 45% of gas and 53% of oil production respectively in the country. In case of Oil & Gas Development Co. Ltd, divestment of 10% to 15% equity through simultaneous GDR offering and domestic secondary offering will precede the divestment of 51% shares.

#### **Author**

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## THE MEDIA AS AN ORGAN OF CIVIL SOCIETY

*Victoria Schofield*

As a prelude I should like to define what exactly we are talking about: the Media as an Organ of Civil Society? What do we mean by media and what do we mean by Civil Society? Do we inherently think that the media once defined is an organ which has a positive effect on civil society or do we think it has a negative effect? What effect should it have? Should it be an extension of civil society or should it play a more combative role? Why do we only report bad news? Where does information stop and propaganda or sensationalism begin? Why bother with words when pictures tell their own story?

There are other issues as well: What is the role of the media in developing society? What are the essential elements of responsible media? What is the media's role in promoting national security? What role does media have to play in promoting inter-faith harmony?

### **The media**

What do we really mean by media? The word, as you know, comes directly from the plural of the Latin word – medium - which literally means: that which lies in the middle. In other words, we the journalists lie in the middle of what has happened or may be is going to happen and the people; in its purest sense the function of its representatives is to transmit information to people with less knowledge than those who are doing the transmitting. When we look at the media today, we have come a long way from the days of the Court Herald announcing the King or Queen's, Nawab or Nizam or Maharaja or Maharani's – bidding – from the days when the only way to obtain information was through scribes laboriously writing in their quilled pens on bits of parchment paper, but strictly speaking they too were the earliest members of the media.

The media today – a mere five hundred years since the printing press was first developed – has become so multi-faceted, so

multi-dimensional that even one generation has difficulty in understanding the tools used by the next. My children are far more adept at 'surfing' and 'downloading' information – words which did not exist in our vocabulary 20 years ago – than I am – but then I am more adept at using a tape recorder than my parents were. So whereas five hundred years ago, the media was confined to pen and paper, today we have print, audio – visual – electronic - digital, we have satellites in the sky giving us footprints all over the world making the transference of information instantaneous. But going back to the origin of the word 'media' – what are we journalists and writers, reporters, television presenters, trying to achieve by being in the middle?

The ideal is that we are communicating factual information which is of benefit to our fellow human beings, so that they can further their knowledge about a particular aspect of their lives or a particular issue which interests or affects them. Addressing one of the other questions I have posed – *the role of media in society's development* – it must surely be a helpful occupation; the media gives people information they need to know; it can be educative; children can learn from it; so too can adults. Information as basic as the weather forecast tells people how much water there will be for their crops; it makes society more cohesive because we share common knowledge. We can also enjoy common events: think of the pleasure which television has brought to sport coverage across the world; it creates a bond, it is a means of communication which makes us feel part of a larger whole. So far with the media, so good one might say.

But problems arise when, added to what might become a digest of facts and dates, an attempt is made to analyse the information which is being given; when the author puts his or her own slant on the information he or she is imparting, it can mean that we have departed from reporting the truth and are entering the murky world of bias, which, if we are not careful can degenerate still further into propaganda or lies. Thus people are told certain things because the people who are doing the telling want them to believe what they are being told. This can either be malicious or it

can be unintentional due to poor research and therefore poor presentation.

This brings me to the next question: *the media's role in promoting the national interest*. In a country like Pakistan, where the majority of the people are not educated, this is critically important because the media also has the ability to play upon people's ignorance. Here we come up against another definition. What is in the national interest? Who defines the national interest? Is it for example in the national interest to hide from the people that there is going to be a severe drought or famine lest they get panic stricken and stockpile? Or is it in the national interest to forewarn them so that they can make the necessary preparations? Is it in the national interest to allow people to be told when they are losing a war or should that news be withheld from them lest they lose heart?

Propagating a viewpoint in order to achieve a particular objective is as old as time, and can be deadly depending on the nature of the person or people doing the propagation; in the western world, as we have become more educated and have greater and greater access to the fount of knowledge through our ability to travel and see different places, we feel that a certain purity should permeate the information we pass on. Gone are the days, or gone should be the days, when it was possible to dupe the people because of their own ignorance and ours. And one of the key objectives of any form of media must surely be to inform, so that as human beings we are better able to make our own assessments about how we lead our lives and about events which affect our lives.

But supposing this clashes with the national interest? In Britain we have the classic case of the war in Iraq. The government told us that it was in our national interest that we attack Iraq and get rid of Saddam Hussein. But was it? History has still to relate the truth of the matter, but by using this example I am trying to show how fine is the line between using the media in the national interest and turning the media into a propagandist tool for a covert objective. In World War II in Britain, there is no doubt that the British media had propagandist overtones in order to encourage Britons in the war effort and many people would say rightly so. But there is always the

danger that propagating a viewpoint in the national interest can overstep the mark.

### **Responsible media**

This brings me to the most important question of all: what are the essential elements of responsible media? Who sets the standards for responsible media? How do we define responsible media? We have for example in Britain specific broadcasting standards which every so often are reviewed and which generally relate to the use of obscene language and pornography as well as libel. We also have security issues about which it would not be permissible to broadcast. But beyond that who sets the standards? Is it the journalist who writes the article or the editor who oversees it? Or is it always necessary to have some regulatory body over them?

One of the problems here is that the journalist in the field is only as good as the knowledge of the subject which he or she has and this is one of the difficult things about writing; many people want to write and become journalists – it is an attractive career – but certainly what I have learnt throughout my thirty years of journalism is that one is only as good as the interviews one has done and so it is important to make sure that one really has achieved a balanced appraisal. Inevitably unless we are simply relating facts, we are going to be putting our interpretation on what we say because of what we feel and what we have seen, but the important thing is to cast our investigative net wide, not, for example, to find a specific incident and then portray it as a general occurrence because this would be misleading and biased. Therefore the elements of responsible media are the cardinal rules of journalism: accurate, balanced, factual reporting.

Obviously the better informed we are, the more accurate our reporting will be. Why else would journalists risk their lives by being in the front line if it were not so that they could get the best coverage? Gone are the days when one could write from a distance without at least making some attempt to visit the places about which one is writing, if only to see the landscape and better understand the

setting. These too are the essential elements of responsible media: a thirst for knowledge and a genuine desire to transmit that knowledge honestly. When I first started to write on Kashmir during the insurgency, I realised that I could not write a book on Kashmir without visiting the valley – yes, there were dangers but it was my responsibility to find out as much as I could about Kashmir and the Kashmiris before I even considered that I could write a book on the subject.

### **Civil Society**

I asked earlier is media an extension of civil society or should it be more combative? Should our information channels merely be accepting what happens day to day, or should they be pushing the limits, challenging individuals not to accept situations which can be changed for the better? Should for example, the media be used as part of a liberation movement? A typical example occurred right here in the subcontinent in the early and mid- 20<sup>th</sup> century, with the advent of print journalism which enabled the peoples of South Asia to read and come together in order to fight for self government and eventually independence sixty years ago. To a certain extent the same was true in Soviet Russia when Marxist Leninist tracts were smuggled about the country encouraging the people to see more clearly the injustices of the Tsarist regime. The slogan ‘workers of the world unite’ has been handed down as a clarion call in the fight against injustice and what a powerful manifestation of peoples’ grievances it became!

World wide there are numerous examples where the dissemination of information through the media has been used positively to make people realise that they are not alone in their viewpoints and this has given them the courage to alter their situation. Look at the impact which the transmission of the tape recordings of the Ayatollah Khomeini’s voice had in Iran at the start of the Iranian revolution in 1979. So great was the impact that, as you may know, the BBC World Service was criticised for having assisted Khomeini in coming to power by broadcasting his voice!

There are also times when the media has been used negatively in civil society. Just as the power of the written, spoken, electronic word can have a beneficial effect, so can it also have a negative impact. Virtually every revolutionary movement which has taken over in a coup has used the media. Depending on the circumstances, this can be good or bad. Be it South America, Africa or Asia, the new authority has always made sure to gain control of the sources of information i.e. the radio station so that it can broadcast in the new national interest. We have, therefore, these twin pulls in different directions – the media can be a heart pumping energy into civil society or it can be a cancer destroying it. An obvious negative example is Nazi Germany where Josef Goebbels' legendary propaganda machine encouraged thousands, millions of perfectly ordinary Germans to pledge their allegiance to Hitler.

In modern phraseology we call the propaganda element: 'spinning'. There seems to be an obvious reason why we have adopted this terminology, because the art of spinning information does result in catching people in a web. I mentioned the war in Iraq; today in Britain there are very few people – and I count myself among the early dissenters – who do not recognise that our government played on our fears by spinning – by directing us to believe, through the media, that the war in Iraq was essential for our national security. Now of course we are caught in the web it is more difficult to extricate ourselves. The American people blindly supported the war in Vietnam until, through their television screens, they began to doubt its legitimacy.

I posed the question earlier: Why do we always report bad news and never good news? This leads me to one of the biggest problems facing the media today – do we report what we think people want to read /hear/ see or do we report what we think they ought to know about? In Britain, we have our sensational press – known also as the 'gutter' press – papers like the News of the World, the Mirror, the Sun which sell in their millions. Open the pages and you will read about every disaster imaginable, every flood, fire, murder, burglary. Other papers like the Daily Telegraph and The Times sell only in their thousands, partly because they are more serious newspapers with a less sensational flare. The articles

are longer; it takes more time to read them and more time to digest their contents. Recently they too have become a little less studious in order to attract a wider readership. I remember well the furore from the more conservative readership when *The Times* first put a colour photograph on its front page; those who rejected the change, regarded it as an attempt by *The Times* to attract attention by its photographs rather than by the content of its pages.

In general, in Britain the media balances between the two pressures; it both enables people to read about disasters but it also tries to take on issues which its editors consider are important to know about. For example, people might be less interested to know that there has been an improvement in community relations or indeed in inter-faith harmony, compared with finding out more about the lives and loves of the Royal family but a responsible Editor will make sure that there is some space in his pages for informative features even though they might not have the sensational qualities about which people in general like to read.

There is also the problem of the sheer magnitude of what can be covered. After numerous visits to the valley of Kashmir during the insurgency I would often return to phone up the editors of the various newspapers for which I have worked to suggest a Kashmir story – invariably their response was ‘no’ sorry we’re doing Iraq today. In newspapers there are only a few pages devoted to foreign news and with 192 members of the United Nations there is a lot of foreign news to fit in. One of the things which has changed is the growth of the electronic media, where space is virtually unlimited and where all kinds of stories can be printed. This new outlet provides huge advantages in terms of increasing one’s knowledge; not only can I read my local newspapers printed in England but at the press of a button I have *Dawn*, I have the *Kashmir Times* on my screen to read. However, once again there is a downside. The use of internet has enabled people to circumvent the standards and post poorly researched and biased material which can be equally inflammatory and over which there is no control.

### **Editorial Control**

This does of course bring me to Editorial Control. If we are viewing the media as an organ of civil society this is the most powerful weapon determining what is publicised; its close associate - you are familiar with - is called Censorship and I suppose one might say their constant opponent is Freedom of Speech. So Editorial Control - is it good or bad? The answer again is both. Good editorial control can prevent articles being written which are inaccurate, biased and indeed libellous; bad editorial control can mean that articles which express a particular -perhaps unpopular but necessary to know- viewpoint are changed or altered to suit a particular belief or policy. Censorship can prevent articles from ever seeing the light of day. I well remember when I first came to report in Pakistan during the late 1970s that newspapers would frequently appear with large white spaces where text had been eliminated. At the same time censorship can perform a necessary role if what has been censored is likely to harm, insult, libel, or indeed inflame. Yet again there is a fine line, because having completed license to say what we want may cause distress to others. Instead of the media promoting harmony through exposing common views and interests, it can be divisive by exposing hatred and prejudice. Yet still we cling to the freedom of the press as a basic human right of which we should not be deprived. We have grown up in the post World War II era, believing that it is indeed our inherent right to be able to write what we think and not be penalised because of our views. To us this is part and parcel of living in a free society. But, as we know in most countries throughout the world this is not the case - either through editorial control or plain censorship, complete freedom of speech is curtailed.

Sometimes control or censorship can be more indirect - as you know many newspapers rely on advertising - leaning on the advertisers and hence putting pressure on the financial resources of the newspapers and indeed their owners is a subtle but obvious way of exerting editorial control. I know it has happened in Pakistan, and also in many other countries throughout the world. Even in Britain, ever since the newspaper magnate Rupert Murdoch bought The Times newspaper, there is a general feeling that the paper now has

some controlling hand at the top subtly promoting a particular viewpoint and agenda.

### **The media as an institution**

I want now to talk about the sheer power of the media which brings me to my final definition. We are here describing the media as an organ of civil society. I would go one step further and describe it as an institution of civil society. As I mentioned above, the media has developed into so many hybrid manifestations that it is everywhere in our lives. If I refer back again to the court herald, he may have announced the news once a day from the steps of the palace. Today we are subject to news and views 24/7: we wake, we turn on the radio, we have breakfast, we read the newspaper, we go to work, we check the internet, we come home, we watch television, we go to bed, we listen to the radio, we read a magazine. We have a sleepless night – what do we do – we turn on the radio to listen to the BBC World Service!

As an institution, the media has the power to make you laugh and to make you cry, or to make you angry and upset. Only recently there was a programme on the late Princess Diana. It was called 'Witnesses in the Tunnel'; the objective was to vindicate the journalists of any responsibility for the death of Princess Diana. There had been allegations that by attempting to take photographs of the dying princess they had prevented the ambulance getting to her and the doctors from tending to her. Hence with the very valuable medium of photographs and CCTV footage the programme producers managed to recreate exactly what had happened and when. I won't go into all the conspiracy theories about Diana's death but the point here is that the value of the media was in being able - through factual pictures and interviews - to show what happened in the tunnel in the minutes after the car crash; however in doing so there were some pictures shown of Diana which her sons – Princes William and Harry - would have preferred not to have broadcast and they did not want the programme aired; in deference to their concern, the producers agreed to block out Diana's face but they felt it was important to air the programme in order to impart the information which it contained. As an organ of civil society-

promoting greater understanding of the situation – one might therefore say that here the media played a useful role – but it was treading a fine line because of the grief it caused to the members of the late Princess's family.

### **Pictures**

I want now to talk about pictures because photographs, almost more than anything else, perform a valuable role. What is good about images is that proverbially the camera does not lie. They also have an immediacy of impact which the printed word lacks. You have to take the time to read an article or listen to a radio broadcast, whereas you simply have to view a photograph to form an opinion. One of the most famously influential pictures was that of the young Vietnamese girl nearly naked burning from napalm which said more about the war in Vietnam than almost anything anybody had written. Although I am not a photographer I would say that when considering the media as an organ – or as I have also said – an institution of civil society, photographs can and do play a leading role. Why do we want a photograph to illustrate an article? The answer is because it makes it more immediate; the reader can identify better with what he is reading if he can glimpse the person or place about whom the article has been written. Why are there more people who watch television than those who read a newspaper or listen to the radio?

The other great advantage is that pictures are less easily corrupted. I say 'less easily' because with modern technology they can be tampered with; they can also be selective. And they can be subject to censorship – a distressing picture may not be shown either for fear of upsetting the viewer or because in so doing it might cause the viewer to adopt an opinion about a particular situation which the owner/proprietor/editor of the information outlet may think they had better not adopt. I cite the publication of the cartoons of the Holy Prophet PBUH in Denmark, which resulted in an outcry against Denmark. This is perhaps an example where a 'responsible' editor would have seen the offence these cartoons were going to cause and have decided not to print them. This is censorship, you will say, but often it is the case of which is the lesser of two evils. A popular

adage is to say 'publish and be damned' but perhaps we can grant that there are times when we must be more circumspect.

I am mentioning this example because I believe it adequately demonstrates the power the media has through images – just like headlines - because they attract our attention and make us form an instant opinion and possibly react to it. This also brings me to the role of the media and interfaith harmony. There is an obvious advantage if the media acts responsibly and in an educative manner – there is a disadvantage if it acts irresponsibly and merely serves to inflame.

### **Lessons for the future?**

I have spoken broadly because the media is a global institution. There are lessons to be learnt from all aspects of how we handle the media and how it handles us. In the thirty years I have been writing, which includes numerous trips to both Pakistan and India, I have graduated from the manual typewriter, the photocopier in the bazaar and going to send my articles from the telex machine to a situation where I can email what I have written from my hotel bedroom or even the comfort of my home in England. Undoubtedly the technological revolution has not only reached but it has also benefited Pakistan as it has many other developing countries throughout the world. More importantly, at a time when other institutions are fragile, it can perform a useful role of informant, provided it is allowed to do so and provided it takes its responsibilities seriously. I have many friends amongst Pakistan's journalists and I know how hard they have fought sometimes in more difficult times to report honestly and fairly what is going on. I know there are pressures and difficulties. As I have mentioned, these pressures are both editorial and managerial. I was fortunate to have worked for the BBC World Service when I began my career in journalism and know, at a time when the press was really controlled, how much of a lifeline it was so that people could get closer to the truth about their daily lives.

In conclusion, the media as an organ or institution has a very important role to play in civil society; it is not always an easy role; it

must never be subservient to any other institution. At the same time it must take its responsibilities seriously because, more almost than the government of the day, it has the power to shape opinions.

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## ANTI AMERICANISM, RISE OF A GLOBAL PHENOMENON

*Brigadier Waqar Hasan Khan*

### **Introduction**

The term anti Americanism has existed for a while and has become an interesting subject of a global debate. Traditionally small states remain vary of large states, specially the super powers or regional hegemons, however anti Americanism as it exists today has diverse reasons and something peculiar about it as the US enjoys the status of the 'hyper power' and affects the lives of people at the global scale. A clear dichotomy of views on the subject when one compares the stereotype anti Americanism with feelings of people who have visited the US and interacted with the wonderful and even benign people of the American nation. A visit to the US and interaction with its people would simply lead you to the conclusion that the Americans are courteous, kind, humane, caring and above all embodiments of democratic values enshrined in a constitution so carefully formulated and promulgated by their founding forefathers.

Why has anti Americanism become a global phenomenon in recent past and continues to haunt American policy makers and think tanks? This question is the main focus of the paper. Just to highlight the question, one may find a couple of books and a plethora of research articles on the subject as well as feel this general phenomenon as a barber shop gossip in all countries and societies that form the global village. Before discussing the term anti Americanism it is important to define it first, Peter J Katzenstein defines it as,

*"We begin with a definition of anti-Americanism since the term is used so broadly (and often loosely) in ordinary language. As our analysis continues in this chapter, we will develop a typology of anti-Americanism. In the broadest sense, we view anti-Americanism as a psychological tendency to hold negative views of the United States and of American society in general. Such views draw on cognitive, emotional, and normative elements. Using the language of psychology, anti-Americanism could be viewed as an attitude"<sup>1</sup>.*

With this definition of anti Americanism in perspective we move forward to the very aim of this paper. To analyse the rise of anti Americanism as a global phenomenon, (especially in the aftermath of 9/11) with a view to draw pertinent conclusions.

### **Historical perspective, the rise of America as a 'hyper power'**

20<sup>th</sup> Century witnessed the rise of the United States of America to preeminence as a result of two great wars. It was the first time in history that a non Eurasian state started seriously affecting the global scene including geopolitical landscape of Eurasia. The fall of erstwhile Soviet Union and the inability of any major player from Eurasia to challenge the rising tide of Pax Americana led to the establishment of American hegemony and acknowledgement of America as a hyper power. The American military might followed the force of globalization and started filling power vacuum wherever it existed. Post 9/11, it has rolled back the Russian power from east of Baltic States in the north to the Caspian in the south, established a physical foothold in Iraq and Afghanistan and threatens to strategically suffocate the rising China by American presence in the emerging rim land around China.

Going back to the dawn of 20<sup>th</sup> Century one finds deliberate efforts put in by leading statesmen of America in shaping her future, Woodrow Wilson and Roosevelt had distinctly different approaches to defining America's role in global politics. This important factor is described by Peter J Katzenstein as,

*"Wilson crafted that doctrine out of his own understanding of America's past. Roosevelt had urged Americans to divest themselves of the isolationist delusions that their unique history had unfortunately instilled in them. Wilson, in contrast, excavated from the peculiarities of America's historical record a vein of sentiment and belief and an inventory of images and myths from which he hoped to fashion a tool that would transform the world. He cast himself as the long-awaited agent who would fulfill the Revolutionary generation's promise to create a 'novus ordo secolorum' (new order of the ages), abroad as well as at home. 'It was of this that we dreamed at our birth,' he told the Senate in*

*July 1919, on presentation of the treaty he had just signed at Versailles. Wilson believed that he was not simply selecting foreign policy from a palette of options or inventing a new American international agenda. He believed, rather, that he was articulating the only such agenda that his countrymen would find consistent with their past, their principles and their own self-image, if they were to have a foreign policy at all”<sup>2</sup>.*

While George Bush the Senior promulgated his famous ‘New World Order’ after the fall of Berlin Wall, it was not the result of a creative policy but resonating trend of the Wilsonian school of thought in America whose contours were laid out by Woodrow Wilson in first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. The end of WWII had made America as the super power whereas end of Cold War transformed her into the ‘Hyper Power’. By natural laws of physics America was bound to fill the power vacuum at global level was inevitable, the only important factor left was how this would be manifested, as a global hegemon or a benign leader, and the American leadership chose the first option and let the American steam roller to role freely, disregarding the kind of resistance it would face. The current feeling of anti Americanism at a global scale is a result of a number of factors which have been beautifully summarized by Keohane in the book referred earlier. It may not be prudent to hold a stereotype view on the subject as it would mislead one to pitfalls of generalization and thus squander the chances of finding an intellectual answer to the problem based on rational thought process. That is where subsequent portions of this paper will focus and crystallize the tangled question of anti Americanism.

### **Post 9/11 dispensation and its catalytic role in rise of anti Americanism**

9/11 is a global household term and needs no explanation; however post 9/11 dispensation of American political and foreign policy is the key factor which has created a steady and almost alarming trend of anti Americanism. While avoiding pitfalls of conspiracy theories, it may be prudent to analyse happenings in pre 9/11 decade. American think tanks, policy makers and political philosophers had started preparing grounds for post Cold War strategy before the fall of Berlin Wall. The New World Order or Pax

Americana needed a formidable foe that would be created by the intellectuals and turned into a monster by an orchestrated media blitz. Whether it was Huntington's Clash of Civilization theory urging the West to become pro active or Francis Fukuyama's End of History which addressed the sensitivities of West and particularly American public opinion, the contours of the New World Order heavily relied on creation of that formidable foe, the Political Islam. The New World Order unfolded as under:-

- **The Cause (on the face of it).** The world was divided into forces of integration and disintegration. Principles of democracy (as per Western definition), globalization, multinational corporations, NGOs, and West's allies were grouped into forces of integration with an assertion that these will be supported at all cost. Whereas any group or forces which opposed or negatively affected forces of integration were labeled as forces of disintegration. Unfortunately political Islam was projected and made to fall into the second category and thus became the ultimate foe in the New World Order.
- **The Tool to solve the problem.** No explanation needed, the tool to be applied was America's hyper power in all its ferocity and fan fare, followed and supported by the West and her allies at a global scale. 9/11 became watershed in full scale implementation of the grand agenda, and war on terror became the ultimate cause. Since war on terror was against an ideology, it transcended conventional boundaries and has been termed as the 'Long War' by none other but the former CENTCOM Chief, General Abizaid. When will this Long War end? General Abizaid described it in an interview with the Washington Post as, "*the Long War is only in its early stages. Victory will be hard to measure, he says, because the enemy won't wave a white flag and surrender one day. Success will instead be an incremental process of modernization of the Islamic world, which will gradually find its own accommodation with the global economy and open political systems*"<sup>3</sup>. Unfortunately term Long War is quite misleading and

apparently with foggy objectives. Try translating the notion of victory as described by John Abizaid and you will find that it points to an open ended war with really no objectives per se; however one thing is certain, the term Long War puts the domestic American audience at ease (they should forget about homecoming of the GIs) and allows America to field and use her military instrument wherever desired (without much remorse) and gives the policy makers an opportunity to keep a permanent foothold in the hydrocarbon hub of the Middle East.

➤ **Interpretation of actual Agenda.** My own interpretation of New World Order Agenda is somewhat different and is described as under:-

- The Global War on Terror is basically an economic war with an ideological façade.
- The West led by America is seeking an economic lebensraum (energy security by physically controlling the hydrocarbon hub).
- The Superpower's entry into Middle East and West Asia was not possible without a Pearl Harbor, 9/11 was either created or supported to be labeled as the second Pearl Harbor.
- American occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan is Operation Barbarossa at a very large scale where first and second prongs have been played and 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and nth prongs are yet to be played.
- In the larger context of this Long War, Islamic World happens to be the main battle ground and has to be tackled by an indirect strategy of creating divisions in the Islamic society and weakening its moorings to obtain the ultimate breathing space for success of this economic war.
- Since the next challenge for the West is bound to come from China at the global level, the War on Terror is a two in one strategy where control of hydrocarbon hub will allow the West to squeeze the breathing space for China and humble her before she

can pose any meaningful challenge to the Western hegemony.

Why I divulged from the main subject of effects of post 9/11 dispensation of American policy on the main question of anti Americanism is because it crystallizes the subject to a great extent, especially in the Islamic World where the anti Americanism is at its peak.

### **From Caracas to Tehran to Beijing the regional view of America**

In order to look at various causes of rise of anti Americanism, the paper would deal with the issue from the perspective of different regions:-

- **'Red Storm Rising' in South America.** South America seems to be breaking the shackles of *Monroe Doctrine* after a lapse of two centuries. The left led by social democrats is taking over one state after the other. Whether it be the vocal Hugo Chavez of Venezuela or the Bolivian leadership or even the rising Brazil, anti Americanism in the garb of anti imperialism has steadily established a foothold in Latin America. As a case study I have chosen the rise of left in Venezuela. Hugo Chavez has transformed Venezuela into a thriving economy and has openly sided with the so called Axis of Evil states like Iran, Syria and Cuba. A BBC report of 20<sup>th</sup> April 2007 described Hugo Chavez's Venezuela as,

*"Why Caracas? Because at the moment it is the heart - the very epicenter - of Latin anti-Americanism. Venezuela is unusual, indeed unique. It is a Latin American nation which in recent years has become rich enough to have the power to tell the US to take a hike. And Hugo Chavez, the democratically elected leader, loses no opportunity to do just that. In the early part of this century, he became one of the ringleaders of the worldwide anti-American movement. Hugo said this recently about George: 'The imperialist, mass murdering, fascist attitude of the*

*President of the United States doesn't have limits. I think Hitler could be a nursery baby next to George W Bush"<sup>4</sup>.*

Barring the rhetoric there are some major reasons for rise of anti Americanism in South America. Firstly the people, wary of corrupt governance and exploitation of multinationals, have gradually shifted their mandate to the leftist political parties who promise better governance and poverty alleviation and a decent piece of bread for every body. Secondly South American states have overcome the hegemonic dispensations of Monroe Doctrine (which allowed America to check any interference from colonial powers of that particular time in Americas especially South America). Thirdly, leading South American states like Brazil, Venezuela and Bolivia have started consolidating a block under MERCOSUR with lot of independence and confidence to guard the geopolitical interests of Latin American countries. Some of these have displayed independence from Monroe Doctrine by forging geopolitical relations with outcast states like Fidel Castro's Cuba (much to the annoyance of America). Another view substantiating the argument of anti Americanism is visible in deliberations by Gamal Nkrumah as,

*"Although the current level of anti-Americanism in South America presents no immanent threat to the Pax-Americana, the trend poses two challenges to the region's stability. It has emboldened South American countries into taking an independent stand vis-à-vis the US, and nowhere is this more obviously the case than in the relatively well-developed and economically buoyant countries of the MERCOSUR; an economic grouping that brings together the largest South American economies -- Argentina and Brazil, and Uruguay and Paraguay. Indeed, centre-left governments dominate the region politically... There are some in Washington who warn that the current wave of anti-Americanism in South America will eventually undermine the political stability critical to future prosperity of the region. Naturally, many South Americans refute such notions, predicting instead that the*

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*new anti-American outlook in South America heralds a new phase in the region's traditional volatile relations with the US. South Americans see the problem as being Washington's rising discontent with American foreign policy is eroding Washington's legitimacy"*<sup>5</sup>.

The rise of the left in South America has negatively affected American interests in this part of the world and she has been forced to forge ties with Mexico to address this psychological vulnerability from the south.

- **Voices from Europe, Anti Americanism in the West.** Anti Americanism in the West; Strange, but it is there with a different form and attitude. Washington Post in its analysis describes it as a mixed feeling of love and hate relationship, It writes,

*"Why has U.S. stature in the world eroded? Opinion polls cite widespread dismay with the Iraq war, our dog-eat-dog social model and the arrogance of an imperial superpower that places itself above international law. But behind the surveys about 'why they hate us' lies a reservoir of goodwill waiting to be tapped among foreigners who would prefer to see the United States succeed rather than fail. This love-hate mélange has perpetuated four modern myths about transatlantic relations that deserve to be debunked"*<sup>6</sup>.

This appears to be a simplified view, a more elaborate description of anti Americanism in Europe and its different manifestation has been described by Peter j Katzenstein as,

*"Americanization and anti-Americanism interact and occur through a variety of venues. Through its distinctive combination of territorial and non-territorial power, the United States and affected most corners of the World since 1945. The Middle East, Latin America, and East and Southeast Asia have experienced U.S. military might firsthand. By contrast, Western Europe has been exposed only to the peaceful, emporium face of American*

*hegemony, from shopping malls to artistic and intellectual trends. Indeed, European avant-garde and American popular culture often coexists in a complicated symbiosis. On questions of popular culture, for example, cross-fertilization of different innovations bypasses most politics as conventionally understood. American popular culture is sometimes viewed as undermining local cultures, a charge that nationalist political entrepreneurs often seek to exploit to create a political backlash against processes of Americanization”<sup>7</sup>.*

This appears to be a benign view but has lot of merits; however the recent wave of anti Americanism (courtesy 9/11) goes beyond the traditional understanding of the phenomenon in Europe. The practical experience of American tourists visiting Europe in recent years tells a different story as described here,

*“Anti-Americanism has been a hazard to US travelers for decades. Ever since the US attack against the Taliban in Afghanistan, anti-American sentiment has increased. Protests, sometimes violent, have taken place all over the world. This hatred of the US has surprised many Americans who had no idea of the depth of some of the world's anti-Americanism”<sup>8</sup>.*

Anti Americanism could have other reasons in Europe as well, for example,

*“The angry reaction in Europe and Japan against the Bush administration's rejection of the 1997 Kyoto agreement on reducing greenhouse gas emissions holds that the United States is ignoring the general international interest in preventing global warming. This stance is seen as a cynical payback to industry campaign contributors, indifferent to larger human concerns. The Bush administration promises a future, new approach to global warming, but the violently anti-American reaction of the present moment is inescapable”<sup>9</sup>.*

Whatever the reasons the graph of anti Americanism has gained ascendancy in recent past, American handling of Global War on Terror being the main factor in this regard.

- **The Middle Kingdom and her Worries on American Behavior.** The Chinese experience with colonialism and her rise to power in the later half of 20<sup>th</sup> Century have placed her at crossroads of history and secured her place in the sun in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Chinese uneasiness with America results because of a typical mindset in Chinese polity, as described by Johnston and Stockmann,

*"The Chinese case study, by Johnston and Stockmann, provides the best illustration of the impact of power imbalances. Johnston and Stockmann show that contemporary Chinese discussions of the United States revolve around what they call a 'hegemony discourse,' which implies that the United States is not only powerful but also overbearing, just, hypocritical, and illegitimate. It is supplemented by a 'century of humiliation' discourse, which reflects China's terrible experiences with Western and Japanese imperialism. The combination of these discourses with American power – and support for Taiwan – help to explain both the deep Chinese distrust of the United States that Johnston and Stockman found in the Beijing public and the periodic outbursts of at times violent anti-American demonstrations in response to perceived threats, such as the bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade or the flight of a spy plane over or near Chinese territory"*<sup>10</sup>.

Does anti Americanism's universality auger well for the world and America in a global village and how does a benign China unfold her cards as a super power of the future? This is a pertinent question.

- **Islam under Siege–West Africa to Indonesia.** Most violent and probably justified reaction to American occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan has come from the heartland of Islam. While the US drives its agenda in the

Middle East and West Asia in the garb of 'War against Terror' without even defining terrorism, it had stirred the feeling of every Muslim on this planet in one way or the other. Peter Ustinov has described terrorism in a simple and comprehensive manner, "*Terrorism is the war of the poor, and war is the terrorism of the rich*"<sup>11</sup>. This phrase says a lot about American interference in the Islamic World now entering its 18<sup>th</sup> year. As described earlier in this paper this so called 'long War' has changed the geo strategic realities in Asia especially in the Islamic World. The specter of insecurity and fear created by the West in Muslim lands has ushered in an era of contest between America and Islam at a grand scale with no end in sight. Despite reconciliation effort on part of both sides the phenomenon of anti Americanism has not only gained universal currency in the Islamic world but has also seen a steady rise. From the lands of Islam this phenomenon has gradually found acceptance in Muslim Diaspora residing in the west. The reconciliation effort by scholars from both sides is there, as described by Richard Neu,

*"Certainly, not all Muslims wish America ill. Just as certainly, not all of those willing to unleash or to tolerate violence against Americans are Muslims. Nonetheless, distrust, suspicion, misunderstanding, and animosity between America and at least some parts of the Muslim world cannot be ignored. Today's uncomfortable reality is that the most dangerous terrorist threats to Americans seem to arise from societies and groups where Islam is the dominant religion. A good initial focus for thinking about the roots of anti-American violence will be a consideration of the divide that seems to have opened between America and some parts of the Islamic-and especially the Arab-world. The challenge of understanding and resolving differences between Americans and Muslims is a daunting one. But good works and good luck have won over populations that were once distinctly anti-American to an appreciation, if not a full acceptance, of American values: Japanese and Germans after World War II, Vietnamese after the*

*Vietnam War, Russians and East Europeans after the cold war. And most recently, perhaps, the Chinese”<sup>12</sup>.*

The West has to realize (as suggested by the President of Pakistan in his theory and strategy of Enlightened Moderation) that the Iron curtain now falling between the West and Islam will become a reality in foreseeable future if both sides fail to address the root causes of terrorism at a global scale. Some of the more radical regimes like Iran and Syria have sought support from non Asian states like Venezuela and Cuba to form a grand alliance against America; this could lead to erosion of American power at a global scale and limit American freedom of action to a great extent. The experiment of Greater Middle East has already hit serious snags and time is running out before things get totally out of control of the West led by the US.

#### **Anti Americanism within American Lands**

The term American lands here implies the continent of North America. There are two distinct pressure groups operating against the American Establishment within North America, internally it is the American Left and externally (but quietly) it is the American cousin, Canada. With the ban on Communists in America in the blame game of McCarthyism the forces of left found themselves besieged and marginalized. However the freedom of speech and expression in America has allowed the American left to air their feelings with guarded freedom. The American left's is led by charade of respected scholars and media think tanks like Noam Chomsky, Robert Fisk and Peter Ustinov (although a British but mostly writes on the American Establishment) and even New York Times. This group is not only critical of American Establishment's foreign policy but also feels that the Establishment undermines the rights of people within America by one way or the other.

For Canada, the feeling of living with a giant has started affecting the psyche of its people, an interesting description of anti

Americanism in Canada can be gleaned from deliberations by Nora Jacobson,

*"Many Canadians have American relatives or travel frequently to the United States, but a large number are pretty naive about their neighbors to the south. A university student confidently told me that there had been "no dissent" in the United States during the run-up to the Iraq war. Toronto boosters argue that American cities lack the ethnic diversity found in Canada's largest metropolis. The author of a popular book on the differences between the Canadian and American characters (a topic of undying interest here) promotes the view that Americans are all authority-loving conformists...Canadians often use three metaphors to portray their relationship with the United States. They describe Canada as 'sleeping with an elephant.' Even when the elephant is at rest, they worry that it may suddenly roll over and crush them. They refer to the U.S.-Canadian border as 'the longest one-way mirror in the world' -- Canadians peer closely at Americans, trying to make sense of their every move, while the United States sees only its own reflection. Finally, they liken Canada to a gawky teenage girl with a hopeless crush on the handsome and popular boy next door. You know, the one who doesn't even know she exists" <sup>13</sup>.*

### **The Good in America, it's People**

As per Jean Francois Revel ,<sup>14</sup> *"As the sixties unfolded, I had begun to be invaded by doubts as to the validity of this reflective anti Americanism, which indiscriminately condemned America's 'imperialistic' foreign policy and American Society. When I traveled to America in the early winter of 1969 to research, I was astonished by evidence that everything Europeans were saying about the US was false. Over the course of a few weeks I went from the East Coast to the West Coast with a stay in Chicago along the way. Rather than a conformist society, what I found was one in the throes of political, social and cultural upheaval."* I personally endorse his views as a travel to America makes you feel the same way and the good in American people really strikes you the moment you land on this set fort of opportunity.

Robert O Keohane tries to differentiate the point by acknowledging the good in America, its values and people, he writes,

*"One way of beginning to think about expressions of negative attitudes is to ask whether they are based on views of 'what the United States is' the fundamental values and attitudes of U.S. society or 'what the United States does' its policies, particularly its foreign policies. Negative views of what the United States is are less likely to change, as U.S. policy changes, than are negative views of what the United States is doing"*<sup>15</sup>.

While hinting at the diversity and richness of American culture he write,

*"The United States has a vigorous and expressive popular culture, which is enormously appealing both Americans and to many people elsewhere in the world. This popular culture is quite hedonistic, oriented toward material possessions and sensual pleasure. At the same time, however, the United States is today much more religious than most other societies and, in the words of two well-informed observers, 'has a much more traditional value system than any other advanced industrial society''. One important root of America's polyvalence is the tension between these two characteristics. Furthermore, both American popular culture and religious practices are subject to rapid change, expanding further the varieties of expression in the society, and continually opening new options. The dynamism and heterogeneity of American society create a vast set of choices: of values, institutions, and practices"*<sup>16</sup>.

The aim of these lengthy references quoted above is to highlight that despite the universality of anti Americanism now prevalent in four corners of the world, the main factor which mitigates this odd feeling also comes from within America in form of American people, their culture and their democratic values. Has the American establishment gone too far in being unjust to her wonderful people by a cowboyish attitude where the good of America has been made to hide behind a thick fog of anti Americanism? Yes, that is what I strongly feel and also present it as the concluding argument of this paper. In the long run this

dichotomy will tilt the balance in favor of anti American forces and the good in America will not only become invisible but also start adversely affecting the morale of American people which in turn would be a bad day for the entire world.

### **Conclusions**

The universal rise of anti Americanism can be summarized as following:-

- The diversity of anti Americanism and its presence in almost all societies and States, points to a 'clear and present danger" for America.
- Whereas anti Americanism is at its peak in certain regions, like the Islamic world, it has psychological underpinnings at global level and has started affecting the morale of American nation as a whole, you cannot feel safe and easy with a blue passport any more, it has become a symbol of uneasiness and may be fear.
- Post Cold War victory celebrations are over and the leftist block is not only emerging in the backyard of America but also gaining currency in Asia, the new alliances between the so called rouge states and the leftist states of South America could pose a serious challenge to American might in the form of 'all the anti imperialist forces' block. This would not only have geopolitical repercussions but seriously affect capitalism in the West.
- Is America getting entangled in a cobweb of forces of disintegration (so much publicized and prophesized by the West)? Certainly it is happening and the windows of opportunity to get out of this entangled web are closing as the time ticks. American capacity to face these challenges directly has eroded and she is losing logistic stamina as well as strategic space for maneuver.

### **A word of Advice for the American State**

As a saying goes in Urdu language, "Zaban-e-Khalq ko Naqara-e Khuda Samjho" meaning the voice of people should be

interpreted as the call of God, this is what is my recommendation to American policy makers representing the American State. Since too many people cannot be wrong all the time (and especially when too many people mean more than half of the globe), it is high time for United States to realize that she is the main catalyst driving the forces of anti Americanism and she must address the issue at priority. *Thus America is not only part of the problem but also part of the solution.*

The contours of the recommended course of action are listed below:-

- America should review and redefine her policy of Global War on Terror by addressing the sensitivities in the Islamic World. President of Pakistan General Parvaiz Musharraf's strategy of Enlightened Moderation has a lot of merit in helping America, especially the part that deals with the role of the West in mitigating the root causes of terrorism.
- American policy makers must realize that globalization is not one sided and its multidimensional contours have to be acknowledged, where small and medium level states and actors should be given their due share and stake in shaping the geopolitics of the globe. The role of United Nations has to be strengthened to bring an element of justice in geopolitics and geo economics.
- The cost of wars in Middle East and West Asia should be weighed against the suffering of American goodwill and prestige at global level, is it worth the expenditure incurred? if not then it should lead to fundamental changes in American foreign policy. A policy of live and let live (as being applied by China at present) could be followed in the status of real sense.
- The 'hyper power' also demands magnanimity on the part of America, a benign America with soft image could effectively do the damage control and restore American respect in the comity of nations. A continuation on path of destruction and fear will ultimately erode American

respect to a point of no return and bring an ultimate downfall of American power.

- A simple formula could be the reflection of good in America (as displayed by goodness of her people) in the form of a revised foreign policy where the universality of this good is practically displayed to the entire world. America could regain her global leadership by mitigating the fear factor. Fear can generate uneasy compliance but has never produced an accepted leadership; this is the writing on the wall.

#### End Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Katzenstein Peter J. and Keohane Robert O. Cornell. *Verities of Anti Americanism, a Framework for Analysis* (Ithaca, and London: University Press, 2007).
- <sup>2</sup> Ibid
- <sup>3</sup> See "Interview: Gen John Abizaid," *Washington Post*, December, 2004.
- <sup>4</sup> Webb Justin. "Anti-Americanism in Venezuela," *BBC's Washington*, <http://www.news.bbc.co.uk.com> (accessed January 21, 2008).
- <sup>5</sup> *Al Ahrum Weekly, Cairo*, (November 16, 2005).
- <sup>6</sup> William Drozdiak. "Myths about America Bashing in Europe" *Washington Post*, (May 13, 2007).
- <sup>7</sup> *Anti-Americanism in world politics*, Edited by Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane Cornell University Press Ithaca and London, 2007.
- <sup>8</sup> Terri Morrison and Wayne A. Conaway. "Anti-Americanism — Why Don't They Like Us?" (2004). <http://www.globalattitudes.com> (accessed January 20, 2008)
- <sup>9</sup> William Pfaff. "The U.S. Misreads the Causes of Anti-Americanism," *International Herald Tribune* (2001).
- <sup>10</sup> Peter J Katzenstein. and Robert O. Keohane. *Anti-Americanism in world politics* (Ithaca & London: University Press, 2007).
- <sup>11</sup> The Wisdom Fund, [www.twf.org](http://www.twf.org)
- <sup>12</sup> Richard Neu. "Anti-American Violence: An Agenda for Honest Thinking" *Global Priorities, RAND Corp* (2006).
- <sup>13</sup> *Washington Post*, November 28, 2004
- <sup>14</sup> Jean Francois Revel, *Anti Americanism*, Encounter Books, California, US 2004
- <sup>15</sup> Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane. *Anti-Americanism in world politics*. (Ithaca & London: University Press, 2007).
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid.

**Author**

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**Deception: Pakistan, The United States And The Global Nuclear  
Weapons Conspiracy**  
(London: Atlantic Books, 2007), Pages 549

*Ms. Sadia Tasleem*

Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clarke are well-reputed investigative journalists working as Senior Correspondents for *The Guardian*. Both have an experience of reporting from South Asia for more than a decade, which has enhanced their comprehension of Pakistan's politics and its foreign policy – essentially, along with other South Asian States. They have written two books before their recently published, much debated and highly controversial work on Nuclear Weapons Proliferation.

“Deception” is mainly an investigative account of a proliferation network. First half of it presents an exhaustive description of the history of Pakistan's Nuclear Program, rationale that set off the zealous endeavors, and its tremendous achievements in the field, with a sharp focus on the establishment of a network for the procurement of sensitive and some rarely available items required for weapon purposes – much of which is already known to many familiar with the subject of Nonproliferation. However, the manner by which minutest details have been traced, reflect exceptional investigative reporting that helps generate a lot of interest in reading this book. Nevertheless primary focus of the book lies in two propositions that it vehemently projects through out the book in general and in the second part in specific.

First, it asserts that the development of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and later its involvement in a larger proliferation network has been deliberately ignored by the United States. The authors propose two major reasons behind the US negligence of Pakistan's involvement in proliferating sensitive information and items to other States including Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea and Saudi Arabia. They claim that it was partially a result of self-interest and partly of inter-departmental rivalries rampant in the United States. The authors ardently question the rationale behind US punitive actions against Iraq and penalizing policies against Iran, while staying silent

on Pakistan. They strongly push forward a case suggesting Pakistan should be punished first.

Second stream of argument implies that Pakistan's proliferation activities did not come up accidentally, it was a rather a well-thought out route that Pakistan opted for various reasons that include: -

- Recovery of huge sums of money invested in Pakistan's own nuclear weapons program,
- Strengthening Muslim Ummah by helping them equip themselves with the weapons of deterrence
- To use uranium-enrichment as a mean to conduct barter trade to meet technological needs in areas where Pakistan faced deficiencies (e.g. long range missile program).

It argues that the role of military and establishment cannot be secluded from Pakistan's proliferation episode. It emphasizes that proliferation via Pakistan was not a work of a handful of scientists or a small group within KRL establishment. A.Q.Khan and other KRL members have rather been manipulated as a cover up by President Pervez Musharraf, to secure himself in specific and the military's high-ups as well as ISI in general.

The authors have also tried to fabricate a whole lot of accusations against Pakistan. They have blamed Pakistan for extending its proliferation activities to non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and Taliban before 9/11. They profess that Pakistan is still maintaining ties with Taliban and Al-Qaeda. They have also claimed that despite Khan and his associates being off the show, Pakistan has not halted its proliferation activities. However much of these allegations reflect a lot of speculation, lack of substantive evidence and a deliberate attempt to tarnish Pakistan's image.

Based on these accusations, the authors press hard on the need for some action against Pakistan which also seems as the primary agenda point behind this book. In order to promote this objective and build the case really hard, the authors, at some instances appear over occupied with bias and fabricating links substantiated with weak references.

Laborious efforts undertaken by the authors to conduct dozens of interviews with the concerned people and extensively quoting the primary data should win due credit. However, some instances reflect a more selective approach in terms of data citation. Also there are few claims that are either not referenced or the evidences are too weak to be bought. It makes the reader feel as if there is a purported effort to demonize Pakistan.

One may safely assert that it is a chunk of "selective truth". It may not be wrong to express it with the one liner description of Nick Naylor's character in the movie "*Thank you for smoking*" which says "he does not hide the truth, he filters it". Authors of this book have partially done the same.

Keeping these controversial aspects and derogatory remarks apart, the strengths of this book may not be discredited. For instance, it touches a far broader range of issues and subjects than what the title suggests. It provides a good deal of information on Pakistan's political culture and history. It also presents a deep insight into the institutional mechanism and inter-departmental rivalries in the United States and their impact on policy-making. It provides a good deal of explanation of how the rift amongst White House, Pentagon and CIA undermines effective decision making in the United States. The story of Richard Barlow covered at a good length helps understand institutional frailties as well as challenges faced by young professionals in the World's leading Power. It uncovers many facets of double-standards manifested in US policies and entails a reasonable explanation of the US outlook, its involvement in Iraq and other foreign policy priorities.

To sum it up, "Deception" undoubtedly projects some highly disputed notions. Nevertheless it is worth reading.

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*Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Global Nuclear Weapons  
Conspiracy*

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**"Rethinking Western Strategies Toward Pakistan: *An Action Agenda For The United States And Europe*" Frederic Grare's Study At Carnegie Endowment For International Peace (Washington: July 2007)**

*Ambassador Arif Kamal*

The study on Pakistan released at Carnegie Endowment July 2007, gives a three-fold treatment of Pakistan's role vis-à-vis the West's war on terror. First, the report calls into question the Pakistani elite's intent and willingness to comply with the Western agenda regarding the fight on terror. Second, it finds organic linkages between Pakistani military's role, vision and interests on one hand, and the process that germinates and unfolds militancy on the other. Third, it argues that the Western interests would be best served with Pakistan's "demilitarization" and move towards a democratic culture. The study has been released amidst a spate of other documents and statements (e.g. US Intelligence Estimation Report) on the subject which speak of Pakistan's deficient compliance in the war, although with varying emphasis.

To recap essential details, it is noteworthy that the report while questioning Pakistan's perceived failings in the way of "fullest possible cooperation", raises questions as to "whether Pakistani state is merely unable to do better or is actively undermining international efforts in Afghanistan and against terrorism". In turn, it blames Pakistan for the worsening security situation in Afghanistan, the resurgence of Taliban (besides "terrorism in Kashmir") and for the "growth of Jihadi ideology internationally". The blame is squarely placed on Pakistani military and on what is seen as its overriding control over the levers of power in the country. It claims that the army has developed over the years "nationalism based more on its own delusions of grandeur than on any rational analysis of the country's national interest". In discussing the perceived root cause, the study contends that the army elite gained strength over the years in the wake of most Western nations' pursuit of short term interests. Pakistani priorities therefore reflect the army's institutional interests. In a nutshell, the authors' hopes for a change would come true when the army gradually ceded its political role to representative civilian

leaders. The study therefore, calls for a new strategy to encourage re-establishment of civilian pre-eminence.

The Carnegie Endowment study, together with other documents in circulation, bring a renewed focus on what was regarded as a "forgotten (Afghan) war", especially after the US engagement in Iraq. They all speak of the safe havens on Pakistan's frontiers that are "regenerating" militancy and "radiating" it to a larger world, threatening the Western interests. The Carnegie product though loaded with negative overtones, holds common ground with other contemporary American documents at least on two counts. Firstly, it carries an implicit acknowledgment that six years after 9/11, the US Administration is unable to show a credible report card and now, it is faced with a complex situation in the wake of the rise of Democrats in the Congress. Secondly, Pakistan is seen as central to the success or failure of the Western engagement. It does acknowledge that the US Administration is not eager to put disproportionate pressure on Pakistan because of its possible ramifications. At one point, it acknowledges that today Pakistan is, in a "unique position of helping both belligerents"(Taliban as well as the Allies).

The report is myopic in major parts in its understanding of Pakistan's strategic interests and leaves the reader with an unmistakable impression of a venomous treatment that it gives to the institution of Pakistani armed forces. It ignores the fact that the jihadi culture at the very outset was born of the West's war against the Soviets. It resents that Pakistan's survival strategy continues to take India factor into full account. For example, the country's military acquisition program, resting upon \$10 billion worth US assistance, has remained India-specific (Pakistan made no effort to gain anti-insurgency assistance). It also resents that while making compliance with the western demands, Pakistan continues to make distinction between Al Qaeda and Taliban. It raises questions if Pakistan's post 9/11 move was a strategic decision or a tactical shift.

The study prescribes that Pakistan's "demilitarization" and move towards democratic culture are pre-requisites for long term stability in the region. The corrective measures should be unfolded

preparatory to electoral process 2007-08 and carried forward thereafter. The process should aim at reestablishing civilian power, with military playing a subordinate role. It is the democratic culture and the civilian primacy that would offer popular mobilization and contain militancy. The West should therefore, adopt a package of incentives and sanctions to promote the process. The assistance should aim at focusing on areas of US interest, and to condition assistance with results.

No doubt, the renewed focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan's role speaks of the US administration's need to find ways of bridging the credibility gap that it faces in the overall failure in the so called war on terror, particularly the Iraqi debacle. The rise of Democrats in the US Congress and a short time span from now till the next Presidential election, reinforce the need to produce a better report card. Some hopes lay on greater engagement from Pakistan. As far the call for greater democratic culture, it may be a welcome opportunity from the standpoint of Pakistani interest that is focussed on institution building and assuring transparent elections on schedule. It may also be the time to find greater reliance on democratic institutions to define and interpret the national interest and set the of direction of the policies that are carried. However, the US accent on democracy, judged from their own track record, is misplaced from the standpoint of the time-tested American interests.

How far can Government of Pakistan comply with the current US demand to "do more" without serious destabilization of its own society and without prejudice to its own long term interests? We can perhaps keep the Bush Administration constructively engaged within the broader rules of game employed since 9/11. However, we need to review our preparedness for a response from the mid-term point of view, especially keeping in view a future Democratic Administration in Washington.

The Endowment does not speak for the US Government, but carries the profile and standing across the American political spectrum that is crucial to influence the policy formulation process. Moreover, the report is significant in its timing in as much as it relates to intra US politics as well as the upcoming electoral process

*Rethinking Western Strategies toward Pakistan: An Action Agenda for the United States and Europe*

in Pakistan. The report should therefore be taken seriously in spite of its subjective overtones.

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