

# PAKISTAN'S POLICY TOWARD KASHMIR DISPUTE (2001-2014)

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## **Abstract**

*Since Pakistan's emergence as a nation-state, its dispute with India on Jammu and Kashmir region has substantially influenced the course of its foreign policy. Nonetheless, despite being the part of top foreign policy priorities, Pakistan's Kashmir policy has undergone several changes time to time. Yet the region remains important and thus the ensuing conflict with India is one of the major irritants in India-Pakistan relations. This study seeks to analyze Pakistan's policy toward the Kashmir dispute in the post 9/11 era. In particular, its first part analyzes President Musharraf's approach to save the freedom movement from being labelled as "terrorism" and his measures to resolve the dispute through peaceful means. The latter part explains the changes that the civilian governments have adopted and predicts possible trends for years to come.*

**Keywords:** Pakistan, Kashmir, Militancy, Dialogue, Diplomacy

## **Introduction**

The 9/11 terrorist attacks and subsequent U.S. response through the invasion of Afghanistan substantially changed the security environment of South Asia, if not the whole world. The new [security] environment constrained regional actors, particularly Pakistan, to adapt their security policies in accordance with the latest developments in the region. The US went to war to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy safe havens of terrorists in Afghanistan and forced Pakistan to join it in the war on terror. This US demand inevitably constrained Pakistan to change its security policy vis-à-vis its neighbours, India and Afghanistan. As a result, Pakistan had to abandon its support to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

The theocratic Taliban regime was probably not of the utmost importance for Pakistan. However, it was important for geo-strategic reasons and in terms of the country's enmity with India. Pakistan supported the Taliban regime to attain strategic depth and a safe corridor to Central Asia. That is why the leadership in Pakistan found it difficult to take a decision after the US call for support. However, they opted for what they thought was in the interest of the country and saved one of the two most important strategic goals. Afraid of putting the Kashmir movement at risk and a potential American blank check of support to India, Pakistan abandoned the Taliban regime and joined the US anti-terrorism campaign to keep the freedom struggle in Kashmir intact and different from terrorism of the Taliban.<sup>1</sup>

Not only the US-led war on terror affected Pakistan's policy toward the neighbours but also led to the emergence of new challenges to the country as far as its policy toward the Kashmir dispute was concerned. There were countrywide protests against the government's decision to join the US-led coalition against Taliban.<sup>2</sup> However, the tensions did not remain limited to the western border. The attack on Indian Parliament in December 2001 also exacerbated tensions at the eastern border.<sup>3</sup> India responded with a heavy-handed approach and termed the attack as "the Indian 9/11." India mobilized its troops along its border with Pakistan. In the meantime, the US decision to put Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) on its list of terrorist organizations further increased problems for the Pakistani decision makers (with reference to Kashmir Jihad).<sup>4</sup> These developments, in combination, also constrained the decision makers to review their policy toward the dispute to save the country from being labelled as "a terrorist state." Pakistan's Kashmir policy, therefore, underwent a substantial change after the 9/11 and the policy makers attempted to devise new methods to achieve [fixed] political goals attached with this conundrum.<sup>5</sup>

This article is based on historical and descriptive approaches. In historical research, the researcher interprets

past events to predict future whilst the historical research design involves synthesizing data from different sources. We have looked into the available sources to analyze Pakistan's policy toward the Kashmir dispute in the post 9/11 era. This article is divided into three major parts; each of them analyzes the policy of a government toward the dispute. We argue that Kashmir dispute has remained important, in one way or another, for all governments in Pakistan after the 9/11, yet their methods might have been different from each other. The nature of government and the external factor have substantially affected Pakistan's policy over the years. The historical records and recent changes in Pakistan and the region suggest that the core objective of Pakistan's policy toward the Kashmir dispute is unlikely to change. Therefore, we argue that the status quo is likely to continue in the near future.

### **Pakistan's Policy toward Kashmir Dispute on the Eve of 9/11**

Kashmir has been a major irritant in India-Pakistan relations over the period of six and a half decades. Both Pakistan and India agree on the disputed nature of the area, but their interpretations, actions, and goals are different. According to Pakistan Mission to United Nations, "Pakistan upholds the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to self-determination in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council."<sup>6</sup> Yet Kashmir's accession to Pakistan appears to be the ultimate objective of the latter.

Hamid Hussain rightly argues, "Pakistan sees the annexation of Kashmir as the logical culmination of the triumph of the "two nation theory"; the basis of the birth of Pakistan that stipulated that Hindus and Muslims of the subcontinent were two nations."<sup>7</sup> As for India, Pakistan regards the accession of J&K to India (in 1947) illegal and considers the region a disputed territory. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) sources have stated repeatedly that Pakistan only provides moral and diplomatic support to the freedom struggle and believes that the UN-sponsored

plebiscite is an appropriate solution to this conflict.<sup>8</sup> However, despite having a clear objective, the Pakistani policy makers have devised multiple military and diplomatic strategies over the period of six and a half decades.

For instance, diplomacy remained a prominent theme in Pakistan's policy toward the dispute from early 1950s to late 1980s, although it fought two wars with India in 1965 and 1971 respectively. And after the emergence of armed insurrection in Indian administrated Kashmir (IAK),<sup>9</sup> it provided assistance to the insurgents (Mujahedeen) until 2001.<sup>10</sup> During 1960s, Pakistan's President Ayub Khan sought help from the US President John F. Kennedy to solve the dispute.<sup>11</sup> Pakistani and Indian foreign ministers –Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Swaran Singh – held talks regarding the dispute, but no agreement was reached. Nonetheless, “Pakistan signified willingness to consider approaches other than a plebiscite and India recognized that the status of Kashmir was in dispute and territorial adjustments might be necessary.”<sup>12</sup>

After the armed insurrection in late 1980s, Pakistan tried to change the status quo through supporting the insurgents.<sup>13</sup> Later on, it infiltrated its armed troops in the Indian administrative area, Ladakh, in 1999. However, one thing remains essential amid the study of Pakistan's policy toward the dispute that the external factor has always been substantial in the policy making process.<sup>14</sup> For instance, even during the diplomacy-led era (1950-1980), Pakistan's alliance with the US was a determining factor that convinced the leadership that they would be able to solve this dispute through seeking help of the superpower. Later, the armed insurrection in J&K proved a substantial factor that influenced Pakistan's policy and prompted the decision makers to focus on the military means. The US war on terror, another external factor, also influenced the course of Pakistan's policy toward the dispute.

## **9/11 and Pakistan's Kashmir Policy**

Pakistan supported the Taliban regime for approximately five years but joined the US-led coalition to save the freedom struggle, even though some of the Taliban groups were also supporting the Kashmiri fighters. After the parliament attack, the Indian officials waged an unsuccessful campaign to portray the Kashmir struggle as terrorism. The US, however, was reluctant to open another front in the region. One of the diplomats in the US embassy in New Delhi stated, "We did not treat it as part of the war on terror."<sup>15</sup>

President Musharraf defended the decision to join the US-led coalition in the wake of the war on terror and ensuing protests in the country.<sup>16</sup> Pakistan formally declared its support for the war and tried to keep the focus of the international forces away from the Kashmir issue. In addition, the Pakistani leadership also sought to clear their stance on the issue. For instance, Musharraf stated in a UN session that [the] "just struggles of the people for self-determination and liberation from colonial or foreign occupation cannot be outlawed in the name of terrorism."<sup>17</sup> However, they repeatedly termed India's policy in IAK as state terrorism and denied any kind of support to militancy in the area.

The parliament attack also increased problems for Pakistan. Although none of the (pro-Pakistan) Jihadi organizations took responsibility, India did not miss the opportunity to blame Pakistan for this attack.<sup>18</sup> In addition, the US decision to ban two Jihadi organizations made the Pakistani leadership clear that they would not be able to move forward with a pro-militancy policy; after all, the US had also acknowledged the element of terrorism in Kashmir. Therefore, Musharraf banned the aforementioned Jihadi organizations. He stated that none of the groups would be permitted to start any kind of armed movement in the name of Kashmir struggle from the Pakistani territory, although he did not back off from Pakistan's historical stance on J&K and stated, "Kashmir runs in our blood. No Pakistani can afford to sever links with

Kashmir. We will continue to extend our moral, political and diplomatic support to the Kashmiris.”<sup>19</sup>

The chain of events (in 2001) reduced Pakistan's [military] options vis-à-vis the Kashmir issue and constrained the leadership to bring in changes in the policy. The Pakistani leadership took several diplomatic initiatives including proposing new options to resolve the conflict. These initiatives helped the country to soften its image as a responsible power in the region.

### **Musharraf's Kashmir Policy**

The US-led war on terror, terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, and the subsequent pressure of the international community brought in multiple implications for Pakistan. These factors not only resulted in the emergence of new challenges but also provided the leadership with an opportunity to review the Kashmir policy.<sup>20</sup> Pakistan took bold yet cautious steps in the wake of the changing political landscape of the region. Husain Haqqani argues, “Pakistan Army has been the sole architect of the country's policy making vis-à-vis the dispute. Whatever decision Pakistan has taken amid the six decades long course of the Kashmir dispute, its military has had a leading role.”<sup>21</sup> Thus, it was rather easy for a military general, Parvez Musharraf, to take bold steps that would probably have been impossible for a civilian leader. Musharraf's initiatives also indicated Pakistan's return to a diplomacy-led solution of the dispute. After the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's visit to South Asia in 2001 and his call for resumption of dialogue,<sup>22</sup> President Musharraf attempted to resume dialogue and negotiations between India and Pakistan on all issues including the long-standing unresolved dispute of Kashmir. He visited India in July 2001 and met with the Indian leadership in Agra. However, the Agra Summit could not be materialized, as both sides even failed to issue a joint statement. Pakistan and India resumed dialogue in 2004, although Musharraf found the “lack of trust” a real spoiler in the process. In addition, he did not receive any noteworthy

response from his Indian counterpart because the Indian leadership probably took it as his popularity stunt and an effort to resist the international pressure.<sup>23</sup> Nonetheless, Musharraf was adamant to bring his Indian counterpart in confidence. He assured him during their meeting on the sidelines of the SAARC Summit (2004) that Pakistan would not permit any militant organization to operate from its territory.<sup>24</sup>

In addition to issuing a joint statement with Vajpayee, Musharraf managed to convince the Indian leadership to permit the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) leadership to visit Pakistan.<sup>25</sup> Both countries also initiated Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), especially with reference to Kashmir, which proved helpful in the successful opening of Muzaffarabad-Srinagar bus service and trade route on LoC.<sup>26</sup> Thus, not only did Musharraf initiate new debates on the dispute worldwide but also he managed to soften Pakistan's image as a responsible state that wanted to resolve its bilateral disputes through peaceful means. He proposed a "four stages" based formula in 2003 that included:

- Recognition of Kashmir as a disputed territory
- Initiating dialogue
- Dropping impractical solutions
- Moving towards a win-win situation<sup>27</sup>

First two stages of the proposed formula were easy to implement. This formula was not a breakthrough, but it could have provided both countries with an opportunity to move forward. Yet Musharraf kept changing his position and came up with several overtures. For instance, he proposed a "seven regions" formula in 2004.<sup>28</sup> This formula suggested Kashmir's division in seven regions: for instance, Ladakh, Kargil/Dras, Poonch, Jammu, the Valley, Northern Areas, and AJK.<sup>29</sup>

Largely, this proposal also emphasized an easy step such as the identification of regions on ethnic, religious, and geographical lines. Following the identification phase, demilitarization and change in the status quo of the regions

were also sought in the proposal. In addition to four stages and seven regions formulas, Musharraf proposed another (four points) formula in 2006 that included:

- Gradual withdrawal of troops
- Local self-governance
- No redrawing of boundaries and
- Mutual administration by India and Pakistan

President Musharraf's proposals generated new debates in the country as well as in J&K. The moderates (led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq) were in favor of a political solution, but the hardliners (led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani) advocated armed struggle.<sup>30</sup> On the other hand, the head of Muslim Conference (MC) Abdul Qayoom Khan and Prime Minister of [Pakistan-administrated] Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) Sardar Attique Khan supported Musharraf's four point formula. Nevertheless, the opposition factions in AJK continued their opposition to these proposals.

Musharraf came up with several new ideas and thus provided an impetus to the peace efforts between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute. Yet the Indian response to his suggestions remained limited to some tentative improvements on LoC. An important reason of this stalemate was probably the bureaucracy in both countries. For instance, MFA Pakistan avoided mentioning any policy level changes in its briefings throughout the Musharraf era and continued to mention the right of self-determination as the legitimate right of the Kashmiris.<sup>31</sup> Even so, the Musharraf era reflected a change in Pakistan's policy toward the Kashmir dispute and encompassed new initiatives, which, later on, the new [democratic] government turned off.

### **PPP's Kashmir Policy**

The anti-Musharraf factions in both Pakistan and J&K welcomed the new government and anticipated that the [democratic] Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) regime would reverse the changes initiated by the previous government. The

moderates hoped that Pakistan would keep supporting the Kashmir movement regardless of change in the regime whilst the pro-Jihad groups were hoping for the continuation of PPP's historical stance on the matter.<sup>32</sup> However, President Asif Ali Zardari's statement that "Kashmir cause should not become an impediment to normalization between India and Pakistan" indicated a potential change in Pakistan's policy toward the dispute.<sup>33</sup> Later, President Zardari tried to repudiate the rumours and explained his statement in a defensive manner that his party would not betray the martyrs of freedom struggle. Yet in reality, the Kashmir cause remained on the back burner because the PPP government did nothing more than "internationalizing the issue" during its term.

After entering the office in 2008, the new government faced two major problems in its relations with India, such as the bombing of Indian Embassy in Kabul and LoC violations. Even there were reports that India had cancelled the fifth round of composite dialogue. The MFA Pakistan, however, repudiated the reports and confirmed rescheduling of the dialogue where the foreign ministers discussed progress on visa liberalization and promotion of trade between the two countries.<sup>34</sup> In 2008, the Prime Minister's National Security Adviser Mahmud Ali Durrani visited New Delhi to meet the Indian leadership. Both sides discussed a wide range of issues. Durrani denied Pakistan's involvement in the bombing of Indian Embassy and his [successful] trip led to the opening of Poonch-Rawalkot route for trade across the LoC.<sup>35</sup>

The Kashmir issue might have continued to remain a secondary problem between India and Pakistan if there were no Mumbai attacks in November 2008. These attacks once again brought the dispute in the limelight. The Indian authorities blamed Pakistan, as some of the perpetrators of attack were Pakistani nationals and had already fought against India in IAK.<sup>36</sup> In response to the attack, the PPP administration analyzed the situation carefully and banned Jamaat ud Dawa (JD) in addition to arresting seven of its senior leaders. Pakistan took a moderate position amid the

growing rhetoric of war and surgical strikes in the country. It also kept a moderate approach in the wake of protests and strikes in IAK in 2010.<sup>37</sup> Pakistan did not repeat its practice of 1990s, despite the fact that the situation during the protests was ripe for supporting militancy in the region.

As stated above, the PPP government in Pakistan focused on internationalization of the Kashmir issue. The Pakistani leadership attempted to involve the international community by highlighting the issue on various forums. President Zardari, for instance, told the US ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson on January 2, 2009, “He would have no choice but to respond militarily to an Indian attack and there was no more politically sensitive issue in Pakistan than Kashmir.”<sup>38</sup> The Pakistani side was expecting the US to play a leading role in the issue. Particularly, President Obama’s statement that “ending Indo-Pakistani differences over Kashmir was one of the keys to calming tensions in South Asia and winning the war on terror” had raised their hopes.<sup>39</sup> After the Obama administration’s decision to nominate a special envoy for South Asia, President Zardari wrote in his op-ed in Washington Post:

Much as the Palestinian issue remains the core obstacle to peace in the Middle East, the question of Kashmir must be addressed in some meaningful way to bring stability to this region. We hope that the special envoy will work with India and Pakistan not only to bring a just and reasonable resolution to the issues of Kashmir and Jammu but also to address critical economic and environmental concerns.<sup>40</sup>

The US State Department Spokesman Robert A. Wood’s statement that the Kashmir issue was not the part of Richard Holbrooke’s mandate, therefore, brought in disappointment among the Pakistani policy makers. In fact, his statement that “India has some very clear views as to what it wants to do vis-à-vis dealing with the Kashmir issue, as well as the Pakistanis” indirectly supported the position of New Delhi.<sup>41</sup> This

development assured the PPP leadership that internationalizing the Kashmir dispute, supporting the Kashmir movement politically and morally, and normalizing bilateral relations with India was an effective way to move forward.

The PPP government, therefore, increased its focus on the issue in 2009. For instance, Pakistan lodged complaints against India in the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) over alleged breaches of the LoC ceasefire. The higher authorities, however, let the local commanders solve the issues.<sup>42</sup> In November 2009, President Zardari met with the Chairman Hurriyat Conference Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and assured him that his government would keep supporting the Kashmir movement politically and morally.<sup>43</sup> Meanwhile, the Zardari government also influenced the local politics of AJK. For instance, the AJK legislative assembly elected Raja Farooq Haider as AJK Prime Minister in October 2009 – making him the region’s third prime minister since 2006 elections.<sup>44</sup> The Zardari government is believed to have kept Sardar Attique out of the race due to his support to the former President Musharraf on his four-point formula. The government and military establishment also kept the Kashmiri leadership away from establishing Nawaz Sharif-led PML (N) in AJK with a view that “this would have sent an unwelcoming signal to the Indians that Pakistan was ready to absorb AJK on the basis of the status quo.”<sup>45</sup>

One of the most important steps of the PPP government was the introduction of administrative changes in the governance of Northern Areas (hereafter Gilgit-Baltistan, GB).<sup>46</sup> The government decided to give provincial status to the area probably for two reasons: first, to stem whatever appeal the Taliban might enjoy among separatists in the region; and second, to send a signal to India that Pakistan was serious about restarting the back-channel talks on the status of Kashmir.<sup>47</sup> At the external front, the government continued its strategy of highlighting the Kashmir issue at different international forums, particularly the UN. President Zardari

criticized the UN role in the Kashmir dispute at 67<sup>th</sup> session of UN General Assembly. He stated:

Kashmir remains a symbol of failure of the UN system and Pakistan's principled position on territorial disputes remains bedrock of its foreign policy...we will continue to support the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to peacefully choose their destiny in accordance with the UN Security Council's long-standing resolutions on this matter.<sup>48</sup>

As stated above, the PPP government moved forward with a strategy of "supporting the [Kashmir] movement politically and morally." During his visit to AJK, Zardari stated, "The struggle for Kashmir began before the struggle for Pakistan. We achieved Pakistan, we will also achieve Kashmir....India could never hope to get its way on Kashmir by force.... Democratic governments in Pakistan had negotiated with India on equal terms."<sup>49</sup> In April 2013, a leading Pakistani newspaper published a story that stated, "Pakistan believes in dialogue to resolve Kashmir Dispute.... President has regretted that unfortunately the world community had failed to resolve the Kashmir dispute that has been lingering for 65 years."<sup>50</sup>

The PPP government's term ended in May 2013. This year proved crucial for India-Pakistan relations because of the LoC ceasefire violations. Nonetheless, there was no substantial move on the part of the government to initiate any noteworthy phase of bilateral negotiations with India to resolve the long-standing unresolved dispute. In effect, various issues including ceasefire violations on LoC remained untouched until the arrival of a new government in office in May 2013.

### **New Government and the Kashmir Policy**

The new government has assumed office in a time when the issues of high politics demand the utmost concentration of decision makers. Dealing with the Talibanization has ultimately become the most important matter for the

government. This statement does not imply that Kashmir is a bygone issue. Similarly, it remains noteworthy that Pakistan, under the leadership of Nawaz Sharif, worked closely with India before the Kargil episode. At that time, the leadership of both countries agreed on increasing cooperation and working for the resolution of unresolved disputes. Therefore, after becoming Premier of the country for the third time, Nawaz Sharif has kept his hopes high as far as India-Pakistan relations are concerned.

A half of the first year of this government has been marked with the escalation of hostility on LoC.<sup>51</sup> India has blamed Pakistan for giving a free hand to the extremist elements such as Hafiz Saeed to inflame sentiments against India under the guise of “Difa-e-Pakistan Alliance”. Whether supported by Pakistan or not, it appears to be true that the aforementioned elements have not yet faced any significant problem in continuing their activities. In fact, several right wing politicians and activists have also shown support to the forum. Similarly, the pro-Jihad elements have also been active in giving pro-militancy statements.

As for the government, Prime Minister Sharif has stated that peace with India remains one of his highest priorities. He appears committed to his agenda. For instance, the terrorist incident that resulted in eight Indian casualties in IAK did not disrupt the India-Pakistan peace efforts.<sup>52</sup> Both Premier Sharif and Premier Singh agreed in their meeting in New York that the Indian and Pakistani DGMOs would meet to identify improved mechanisms to maintain ceasefire and prevent infiltration.<sup>53</sup> Sharif’s statement that “Kashmir might become a nuclear flash point and cause of a fourth war between India and Pakistan, so it should be resolved” also reflects his emphasis on peaceful means to resolve the dispute.<sup>54</sup>

Overall, the Kashmir policy of the Nawaz government remains ambiguous. So far, the government has not emphasized a specific approach to resolve the dispute with India, nor has it indicated the resumption of the Lahore Declaration.<sup>55</sup> Yet it has become clear after the Adviser to

Prime Minister on National Security and Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz's visit to India that Pakistan is likely to keep all [diplomatic] channels open with India.<sup>56</sup>

## **Conclusion**

Pakistan's policy toward the Kashmir dispute is important for its relations with India. As for Pakistan's policy, it has changed time to time. Every government in the country has devised its own method, so the importance of dispute has varied from time to time. In addition to domestic political factors, the international scenario has also substantially influenced Pakistan's policy, especially after the 9/11. The ensuing war on terror has significantly shaped the course of Pakistan's foreign policy toward its neighbors, India and Afghanistan. The external factor, therefore, has also affected the Kashmir policy. Simply put, the transformation from dictatorship to democracy, change in governments, terrorism and extremism, and a weakening economy along with an imported war on the western border have substantially influenced the course of Pakistan's policy toward the dispute.

Second, in Pakistan, politicians and Army have rarely been on the same page. If such an alliance existed, Army was on the driving seat. As stated above that the Kashmir policy has historically remained a business of Army, the politicians find it difficult to manage India-Pakistan bilateral relations whilst keeping the issue intact. In this regard, they appear unable to do any breakthrough except internationalizing the issue, which the PPP government did. Overall, Musharraf's attempt to make the dispute bilateral and solve it through dialogue has been a bold step of Pakistan, but India's response to his proposals has weakened the position of the moderates who advocate peaceful bilateral resolution of the conflict.

Third, Premier Sharif's visit to India on the inauguration of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in an attempt to normalize relations with India and the start of military operation against the Taliban in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) region suggest that Pakistan is unlikely to go for

militancy option in the IAK, at least in the near future. At the movement, the top priority of the government and military establishment is countering terrorism and militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), FATA, and Baluchistan. Nonetheless, both states need to solve their bilateral problems related to J&K such as the water dispute for long-term stability and peace in the region. The conflict on natural resources may become inevitable if the leadership in both countries does not take appropriate steps and develop an understanding on management of conflicts.

Last, the regional political landscape of South Asia appears to be changing rapidly. New actors are endeavoring to increase their reach and influence in the region. For instance, China has increased its presence in AJK in particular and the region in general. A majority of the China-funded mega projects in Pakistan are in AJK and GB. Therefore, given Pakistan's dependence on energy sources in PAK, an overwhelming focus on the counterterrorism campaign, and the increasing Chinese presence in the region, it appears reasonable to argue that any change in Pakistan's policy toward the Kashmir dispute that may change the status quo is unlikely in years to come.

### **Notes**

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<sup>1</sup>Akhtar, Shaheen. (Last Accessed 2014, March 17). War on terrorism and Kashmir issue. 1. <http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/Currentissue-pdf/SHAHEEN%20AKHTAR.pdf>

<sup>2</sup>Ahmad, Munir.(2001, October 15) Militants surge toward Pakistani air base reportedly used by U.S. forces. *The St. Augustine Record*.[http://staugustine.com/stories/101501/ter\\_216233.shtml#.Vgu1yPmqkko](http://staugustine.com/stories/101501/ter_216233.shtml#.Vgu1yPmqkko)

<sup>3</sup>Bennett-Jones, Owen. (2008). Musharraf's Kashmir Policy.*Asian Affairs* (38.3), 308.

<sup>4</sup>Pandey, Prashant. (2001, December 17). Jaish, Lashkar carried out attack with ISI guidance: Police. *The Hindu*.

<sup>5</sup>Change in policy does not imply change of policy. Pakistan's policy toward the dispute has remained consistent whereas the policy objective is, more or less, clear.

<sup>6</sup> Pakistan Mission to United Nations(last accessed 2014, March 15)Kashmir- the history. <http://www.pakun.org/kashmir/history.php>

<sup>7</sup>Hussain, Hamid. (2011, August 21) Pakistan's military operations in Kashmir. *Aljazeera*. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/08/2011887622615886.html>

<sup>8</sup>Pakistan's position on Kashmir remains unchanged: FO. (2012, September 15). *Daily Times*.

<sup>9</sup>The terms Indian administrated Kashmir (IAK) and Pakistan administrated Kashmir (PAK) refer to the areas under the control of India and Pakistan respectively. We have chosen IAK and PAK (also known as Azad Jammu and Kashmir, AJK) to avoid confusion while referring to the divided region. The term Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) refers to the Kashmir region as a whole, which includes both IAK and PAK.

<sup>10</sup>Khaliq, Sohaib. (2012). Pakistan's Kashmir Policy in New Strategic Environment. *IPRI*(12.1), 48.

<sup>11</sup>Irfani, Suroosh. ed. (1997) *Fifty years of the Kashmir dispute*. Muzaffarabad: University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, 11-12.

<sup>12</sup>Hashim, Asad. (2014, May 27) Timeline: India-Pakistan relations. *Aljazeera*. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/kashmirtheforgott-enconflict/2011/06/2011615113058224115.html>

<sup>13</sup>Haqqani, Husain. (2003) Pakistan's Endgame in Kashmir. *India Review* (2.3), 46.

<sup>14</sup>Khaliq, Sohaib. (2012). 48.

<sup>15</sup>Coll, Steve. (2006, February 13). The stand off. areporter at large. *New Yorker*.

<sup>16</sup> Musharraf was of the view that he joined the coalition to save Pakistan from being declared a terrorist state. The US position of "with us or against us" left him with no option except joining the coalition.

<sup>17</sup>AkhtarShaheen. (2011, August 21). Kashmir: Pakistan's 'unfinished agenda'. *Al Jazeera*. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/08/2011887641662208.html>.

<sup>18</sup>Akhtar, Shaheen (2014). 1.

<sup>19</sup>Saddiqi, A.R.(2003, December 31). Musharraf's Kashmir Demarche: Kargil Reversed. *Dawn*.

<sup>20</sup>Akhtar, Shaheen. (2014).1.

<sup>21</sup>Haqqani, Husain. (2003). 37-38.

<sup>22</sup> Kofi Annan told the reporters, "The only way out is through dialogue, the only way out is through negotiations." See Annan upbeat on Kashmir, *BBC*, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/1224717.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1224717.stm)

<sup>23</sup>Reddy, B. Muralidhar. (2004, November) The Musharraf's Formula. *Frontline*

<sup>24</sup>Akhlaque, Qudssia. (2004, July 1). Dialogue to Start Next Month: Joint Statement on Musharraf-Vajpayee Meeting. *Dawn*.

<sup>25</sup>The All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) is an alliance of different political, religious and, social organizations whose aim is to secure the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir through peaceful struggle.

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- <sup>26</sup> Bennett-Jones, Owen. (2008). 310-311.
- <sup>27</sup>Khaliq, Sohaib. (2012). 60;Cheema, PervaizIqbal. (2003, July 6) Musharraf's recipe for Kashmir.*News International*.
- <sup>28</sup>Lavoy, "Pakistan's Kashmir Policy," 2.
- <sup>29</sup>Ladakh (the Muslim part between Himalayas and Indus), Kargil/Dras (Muslim), Poonch (Muslim, contiguous with Azad Kashmir), Jammu (Muslim-majority districts) and the Valley (Muslim).
- <sup>30</sup>Malik, Mehreen Zahra. (2007, February). Kashmiris are not tired but they need a change in strategy. *Friday Times*.
- <sup>31</sup>For instance, the foreign office sources have never denied the Kashmiris' right to self-determination in accordance with the UN resolutions. The UN resolutions protecting their right to self-determination were even mentioned during the Musharraf era of bilateral diplomacy.
- <sup>32</sup>Several leaders including Syed Ali Geelani opposed President Musharraf's four-point formula for resolution of the Kashmir issue. He portrayed it as surrender.
- <sup>33</sup>Subramanian, Nirupama.( 2010, January 6). Rights of Kashmiris suppressed: Zardari. *The Hindu*.
- <sup>34</sup>Kashmir Line of Control Violations. (2008, July 14). *WikiLeaks*.
- <sup>35</sup>Kashmir Trade opens between Pakistan and India for First Time in 60 Years. (2008, October 24). *WikiLeaks*.
- <sup>36</sup>Rizvi, Hassan Askari. (2010).Pakistan-India Relations: Post Mumbai Deadlock &The Way Forward. *PILDAT*. 11-12.
- <sup>37</sup> The protests in Kashmir started in June 2010 after the fake encounter of three young men in Baramulla district. The Kashmiri leaders including Geelani and Mirwaiz demanded demilitarization of the region. The protests claimed around 112 civilian lives and ended in September 2010 after the Indian government's announcement of a package aimed at defusing the tensions.
- <sup>38</sup>Zardari Comments on India/Nawaz Sharif. (2009, January 5). *WikiLeaks*.
- <sup>39</sup>Ghosh, Bobby. (2009, January 28). Will Kashmir be an Obama foreign policy focus?.*TIME*, <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1874627,00.html>
- <sup>40</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>41</sup>Kashmir taken out of Holbrooke's brief, says report. (2009, January 31). *Dawn*.
- <sup>42</sup>Pakistan protests Indian violation of Kashmir Line of Control. (2009, March 27). *WikiLeaks*.
- <sup>43</sup>Pakistan to Keep Supporting Kashmir: Zardari. (2009, September 28). *Geo Pakistan*.
- <sup>44</sup>Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly votes out Prime Minister. (2009, January 12). *WikiLeaks*.
- <sup>45</sup>Azad Jammu and Kashmir gets a new prime minister, yet again. (2009, November 14). *WikiLeaks*.

<sup>46</sup> Formerly known as Northern Areas of Pakistan, Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) is an administrative territory of Pakistan. The PPP government passed an order in 2009 that granted a de facto province-like status to the GB. Kashmiri nationalist groups including the JKLF claim GB as part of a future independent state whilst India considers it a part of IAK.

<sup>47</sup> GOP announces reforms toward autonomy for the Northern Areas in signal to India to jump start the back channel. (2009, September 1). *WikiLeaks*.

<sup>48</sup> Zardari rakes up Kashmir in UN, calls it a symbol of UN system's failure. (2012, September 26). *The Times of India*.

<sup>49</sup> Fighting for Kashmir liberation is Pakistan's duty: Zardari. (2010, January 6). *The Nation*.

<sup>50</sup> Pakistan believes on dialogue to resolve Kashmir dispute: Zardari. (2013, April 17). *The News*.

<sup>51</sup> Cross LoC Trade, travel suspended in Kashmir following India, Pakistan Skirmish. (2013, November 11). *Xinhua*.

<sup>52</sup> Kashmir attacks: Indian troops and civilians killed, (2013, September 26) *BBC*, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-24279602>

<sup>53</sup> Chandran, Suba, (2013, December 19). Next steps across the LoC: The DGMO meeting. *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, <http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/next-steps-across-the-loc-the-dgmo-meeting-4219.html>

<sup>54</sup> Bukhari, Shujaat. (2014, February 12). Pakistan's Kashmir dilemma. *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, <http://www.ipcs.org/article/terrorism-in-pakistan/pakistans-kashmir-dilemma-4305.html>

<sup>55</sup> Nawaz invites India to solve Kashmir dispute. (2014, February 5). *The Express Tribune*.

<sup>56</sup> Quraishi, Omar. (2013, November 13). Delhi Trip: Sartaj Aziz discusses LoC truce with Indian FM. *The Express Tribune*.